Political Science ETDs

Publication Date

7-17-1974

Abstract

Problem and Procedure: This study attempts to explain the causes and policy consequences of the Velasco overthrow of President Belaúnde in Peru in 1968. In Part I theoretical propositions in the literature on the etiology of military coups are tested against the specifics of three Peruvian cases--1948, 1962 and 1968. In Part II an analysis is made of the major politics emerging from the 1968 coup, and an attempt is made to explain how the internal dynamics of the institution contributed to the policy outcomes of the Velasco regime.

Results: In Part I it was found that the threshold of intervention in Peru is lower than predicted in the literature. Specifically, the 1962 and 1968 cases demonstrate that the political crisis accompanying an overthrow does not necessarily derive from an economic crisis or instability resulting from the inability of the executive to cope with the demands from newly-mobilized groups. Even relatively minor crises can result in coups. In Part II it was found that the policies of the regime are the result of conflict and compromise within the armed forces hierarchy. The faction that overthrew Belaunde was highly reformist in its orientation and was able to secure passage of a reform program, but was forced to weaken the effect of this program by a more conservative faction within the armed forces.

Degree Name

Political Science

Level of Degree

Doctoral

Department Name

Political Science

First Committee Member (Chair)

Martin Cyril Needler

Second Committee Member

Edwin Lieuwen

Third Committee Member

Illegible

Language

English

Document Type

Dissertation

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