Philosophy ETDs

Publication Date

1967

Abstract

Either Wittgenstein did not care to study the “problems of truth and falsehood” or he did not return to these problems in his later philosophy. Whatever may have been the reason, an examination of his later writings beginning with the discussions contained in The Blue and Brown books reveals that Wittgenstein did not investigate the problems of truth and falsehood systematically. There is no where stated a theory of truth, but only scattered remarks as to “truth” might be considered. The lack of anything beyond the few remarks in the Philosophical Investigations and the Remarks on the Foundations of mathematics, as well as the text cited above, presented the single greatest difficulty in attempting to discern a Wittgensteinian conception of truth. This difficulty was further compounded by the lack of commentary available relating specifically to the concept of truth as Wittgenstein might have expressed it. Thus far one brief essay entitled “Wittgenstein’s Concept of truth” by Jerry H. Gill 2 had appeared in the literature of philosophy and this has been presented as merely “an initial exploration” of the “explicit and implicit ramifications for the concept of truth of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.

Degree Name

Philosophy

Level of Degree

Masters

Department Name

Philosophy

First Committee Member (Chair)

Paul F. Schmidt

Second Committee Member

Hubert G. Alexander

Third Committee Member

Brian O'Neil

Language

English

Document Type

Thesis

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