Philosophy ETDs

Publication Date

Spring 4-7-2022

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to investigate if Digṇāga’s commitment that non-observation (adarśanam) of the reason (adarśanam)and property to be proven (sādya) in the dissimilar example (vyatireka dṛṣṭānta) is alone sufficient to ground the exclusion of other referents (anyāpoha), as a valid inference for oneself (svārthānumāna) and proof for others (parārthānumāna). To answer this question, four formal accounts of Digṇāga’s view of the three characteristics (Trairūpya) of inference by Hayes, Katsura, Tillemans, and Oetke were consulted. I argue a formal logical account of anyāpoha shows that vyatireka as the lone sufficient example (dṛṣṭānta) in inference (anumāna) is false and does not lead to ascertainment (niścaya). Making a valid inference for oneself or a proof for others (svārthānumāna or parārthānumāna), requires that one must consider both examples (anvaya and vyatireka dṛṣṭānta) to gain ascertainment (niścaya) from the inference (anumāna).

Degree Name

Philosophy

Level of Degree

Masters

Department Name

Philosophy

First Committee Member (Chair)

Dr. Pierre-Julien Harter

Second Committee Member

Dr. Paul Livingston

Third Committee Member

Dr. Emily McRae

Language

English

Keywords

Digṇāga, logic, anumāna, Trairūpya, anyāpoha, dṛṣṭānta

Document Type

Thesis

Download

Included in

Philosophy Commons

Share

COinS