Authors

Matthew Ingram

Document Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

6-1-2004

Abstract

Judicial efficiency can be engineered. Although there are several significant determinants of judicial efficiency that are, relatively speaking, out of the control of policy makers and politicians, this research argues that institutional design is a critical variable over which there is substantial control. In this quantitative study of the judiciary in 11 Mexican states, institutional design is a strong predictor of judicial efficiency . Design choices promise to yield substantive improvements in the efficiency of judicial institutions. Judicial efficiency , in turn, facilitates the vindication of rights in democratic countries and promises to promote the consolidation of democracy. Furthermore, these design choices provide a mechanism by which to hold politicians accountable for their policy decisions regarding the judicial branch.

Publisher

Latin American and Iberian Institute

Language (ISO)

English

Keywords

Political, Justice, Judicial

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