A Marriage Story: Dowry, Hypergamy, and Human Capital
Description
This paper starts its journey following a popular term often used by the American media – “success gap,” which indicates penalty associated with hypergamous marriages. In simple words, hypergamy implies that women marry up in terms of their partners’ human capital potentials (Rose, 2004). Marriage in low-income countries is different from that in developed ones in two crucial ways – (a) the ‘arranged’ nature of spouse selection, and (b) custom of dowry, i.e., transfer of financial resources and other assets from a bride’s family to the groom. The literature focuses mainly on linking female education and dowry, i.e., the supply side of dowry. However, there is a dearth of theoretical as well as empirical explanations of the demand side of dowry, i.e., how dowry is demanded as a groom’s price. The economic logic of dowry as a groom’s price suggests that campaigns to change cultural norms are likely to be ineffective in reducing dowry prevalence. Other approaches, such as increasing female labor force participation in skilled sectors, are likely to be more effective. This paper uses an intertemporal utility maximization framework to model the interlinkages among dowry, hypergamy, and human capital. The validity of the proposed theory is underway – variation in human capital and first-born’s gender in a groom’s family jointly play a significant role in the demand for dowry. We calibrate the model to India using the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS) data for 2008. The Indian government has been failing outright even after repeated legislative attempts in banning dowry. With theoretical underpinnings and empirical validity, this paper may recommend some designs of alternative approaches to anti-dowry policy.
A Marriage Story: Dowry, Hypergamy, and Human Capital
This paper starts its journey following a popular term often used by the American media – “success gap,” which indicates penalty associated with hypergamous marriages. In simple words, hypergamy implies that women marry up in terms of their partners’ human capital potentials (Rose, 2004). Marriage in low-income countries is different from that in developed ones in two crucial ways – (a) the ‘arranged’ nature of spouse selection, and (b) custom of dowry, i.e., transfer of financial resources and other assets from a bride’s family to the groom. The literature focuses mainly on linking female education and dowry, i.e., the supply side of dowry. However, there is a dearth of theoretical as well as empirical explanations of the demand side of dowry, i.e., how dowry is demanded as a groom’s price. The economic logic of dowry as a groom’s price suggests that campaigns to change cultural norms are likely to be ineffective in reducing dowry prevalence. Other approaches, such as increasing female labor force participation in skilled sectors, are likely to be more effective. This paper uses an intertemporal utility maximization framework to model the interlinkages among dowry, hypergamy, and human capital. The validity of the proposed theory is underway – variation in human capital and first-born’s gender in a groom’s family jointly play a significant role in the demand for dowry. We calibrate the model to India using the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS) data for 2008. The Indian government has been failing outright even after repeated legislative attempts in banning dowry. With theoretical underpinnings and empirical validity, this paper may recommend some designs of alternative approaches to anti-dowry policy.