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The election of Maoist leader Baburam Bhattrai as Nepal’s Prime Minister on August 29 ,2011 marked a clear deviation from India’s recent policy of rallying anti Maoist forces to keep Nepal’s Maoists from returning to power. Bhattrai was elected with the support of the Terai or plain region parties which represent Nepal’s Madhesi population. Most Madhesi parties, since their rise into national prominence in 2007, were known to have calibrated their moves with India. The formation of Mr. Bhattarai’s government raises many questions. Does the return of Maoist led government in Kathmandu signal a real shift in New Delhi’s policy towards Nepal’s major political actors? Is the formation of Maoist- Madhesi coalition a sign of India’s waning influence on the principals of Nepali politics? Have Nepal’s traditional political parties, the Nepali Congress (NC), and the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-UML), lost India’s confidence in their ability to achieve a breakthrough with the Maoists in completing the peace process or to effectively encounter the Maoist challenge? This paper examines these questions in order to understand if recent developments in Nepal signal a fundamental recalibration of India-Nepal relations and how India’s policies in Nepal have helped or hindered Nepal’s peace process.

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Oct 20th, 12:00 AM

India’s role in Nepal’s political transition and the peace process: help or hindrance?

The election of Maoist leader Baburam Bhattrai as Nepal’s Prime Minister on August 29 ,2011 marked a clear deviation from India’s recent policy of rallying anti Maoist forces to keep Nepal’s Maoists from returning to power. Bhattrai was elected with the support of the Terai or plain region parties which represent Nepal’s Madhesi population. Most Madhesi parties, since their rise into national prominence in 2007, were known to have calibrated their moves with India. The formation of Mr. Bhattarai’s government raises many questions. Does the return of Maoist led government in Kathmandu signal a real shift in New Delhi’s policy towards Nepal’s major political actors? Is the formation of Maoist- Madhesi coalition a sign of India’s waning influence on the principals of Nepali politics? Have Nepal’s traditional political parties, the Nepali Congress (NC), and the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-UML), lost India’s confidence in their ability to achieve a breakthrough with the Maoists in completing the peace process or to effectively encounter the Maoist challenge? This paper examines these questions in order to understand if recent developments in Nepal signal a fundamental recalibration of India-Nepal relations and how India’s policies in Nepal have helped or hindered Nepal’s peace process.