History ETDs

Kai-Hwa Ger

Publication Date

5-12-1975

Abstract

The years from 1931 to 1937 were a crucial period in modern Chinese history. The National Government in Nanking faced the challenges of dissident Kuomintang elements and Communist subversion from within and Japanese aggression from without. Facing this unprecedented national crisis, the whole policy debate among the Chinese leaders centered around two alternatives: conciliation versus resistance. This is, therefore, a study of the composition and form of the internal pressures that gradually built up and converged on Chiang Kai-shek and which eventually forced him to change his policy toward Japan from conciliation to resistance. It is, in that sense, a study of two reactions in Chinese society, one official and the other national.

The analysis falls into three areas: Japanese aggression and China's internal politics, Nanking's policy toward Japan, and internal opposition to Nanking. As a background study, Chapter II describes briefly the nature of Japan's expansion in the thirties and, in some detail, China’s internal political situation immediately preceding the Manchurian Incident. The purpose is to explain the relationship between Japanese aggression and China's internal situation, and more importantly, to show that origins and characters of those groups that constituted internal opposition to Nanking. Chapter III discusses Nanking's military and political reactions to Japanese aggression. Through the investigations, it is hoped that the reasons Nanking's policy met strong internal opposition will be clarified. The southern politicians and militarists, the Chinese Communists, the students and the intellectuals, the Nineteenth Route Army, and the Tungpei Array formed the core of internal opposition to Nanking. This work delineates the way in which they exert their pressures on Nanking, what motivated them in their opposition, and why the convergence of internal pressures on Chiang did not occur until the Sian Incident in December 1936. The discussions in Chapters IV, V and VI emphasize the importance of two elements in the convergence: patriotic motive and a unified program.

The convergence of the internal pressures on Chiang in the years 1931-37 was a slow process. In the early years, emphasis on self-interest had made the possibility of convergence rather remote. The incompatibility of the major objectives of the various factions considerably weakened internal opposition to Chiang. In this circumstance, Chiang was able to follow continually the policy of conciliation toward Japan. It was not until the end of 1935 that patriotism and the United Front policy gradually emerged as the basis of cooperation between the anti-Chiang forces and worked toward the final convergence of internal pressures on Chiang.

Viewed in a broad perspective, the dispute over the policy priorities which resulted in Chiang's conversion to resistance was actually a continuation of the power struggle that had begun in 1927, only in a new context. In the final analysis, the Chinese Communists were the real beneficiaries of Japanese aggression

Level of Degree

Doctoral

Degree Name

History

Department Name

History

First Committee Member (Chair)

Jonathan Porter

Second Committee Member

Frank William Iklé

Third Committee Member

Noel Harvey Pugach

Language

English

Document Type

Dissertation

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