History ETDs

Publication Date

3-18-1969

Abstract

The different strategic bombing policies of the Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) and the United States Army Air Force (U.S.A.A.F.) toward Germany, 1943-1944, were both basic and important. As a part of the Anglo-American coalition of World War II, these differences persisted in spite of vigorous efforts for their solution. Only when the Anglo-American air forces realized the precariousness of their position in favor of strategic bombardment did they seriously attempt to modify their disagreement over policy. Even this action, however, was taken superficially. The bombing differences were largely confined to target selection. R.A. F. Bomber Command, led by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, subscribed to a policy of night area attack. The principle behind this method was two-fold: 1) to reduce losses through night operations, and 2) to attack an urban complex supporting war industries. The American concept provided for: 1) daylight attack upon 2) industrial factories themselves. Each procedure was closely adhered to in practice, although various directives gave a false impression of cooperation. One reason for such “cooperation" was the formulation of top level directives for the bomber offensive; another was the fear of diversion of strategic air forces into the Pacific area through the persistence and efforts of the American Navy. The underlying reasons behind Anglo-American policies were deep and often reflected service doctrines and centuries-old policies. British traditional strategy emphasized attacking peripheries of the enemy by what Americans later called "hunt and peck warfare." To avoid the massive casualties suffered in World War I, a strategic bombing attack upon Germany lay within overall British war policy. British casualty-conscious planners believed an air offensive was the cheapest way to bring the war home to the enemy. In addition to these factors, the success of the area bombing of Coventry (carefully assessed by the Ministry of Economic Warfare) pointed to the results the R.A.F. could wreak upon “other Coventrys” located in Germany. American air thought stressed the importance of precision and, hence, selective bombing principles. These ideas were based upon an ingrained American emphasis placed on the capability to hit the target. Also, previous plans for a bombing force designed to attack invading enemy fleets influenced Air Corps doctrine in the 1930s. A superficial argument of humanitarianism was presented in opposition to “terror" raids of the R.A.F. but subsequently the fire bombing of Japan revealed the inconsistency of this position. In order to selectively bomb, daylight was a necessity. The opposition of the Luftwaffe was strong for American "flying fortresses" were designed for self-defense. Much of the story of Anglo-American strategic air policies is interwoven with the efforts of the Air Corps to continue the daylight bombing of Germany, and the pressures put upon Bomber Command to render the Americans air support. Finally, the pursuit of textbook doctrine taught decades before combat practice reveals how oblivious military men can be to the facts.

Level of Degree

Masters

Degree Name

History

Department Name

History

First Committee Member (Chair)

Gunther E. Rothenberg

Second Committee Member

Robert William Kern

Third Committee Member

Illegible

Language

English

Document Type

Thesis

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