In this dissertation I hope to shed further light on Heidegger’s thought-provoking claim that “We do not “have” a body; rather, we “are” bodily.” After discussing the problem of the body in the context of Being and Time in chapters one and two, I move to Heidegger’s later lectures and seminars in chapter three to articulate a specifically Heideggerian account of the bodying of the body. I hope to show that Heidegger’s understanding of the ontological difference can effectively help us to understand bodily difference in its corporeal, lived, and existential dimensions. From a Heideggerian standpoint, the existential dimensions of embodiment are inevitably overlooked when the discussion becomes limited to subject-object formulations. Nietzsche thus serves as the culmination of metaphysics within Heidegger’s history of being in the sense that he effectively carries the Leib-Körper distinction to its most thorough logical conclusions while simultaneously pointing the way forward to a new conception of the body in its temporal dimensions. I try to show that human identities are better understood in terms of the tripartite unity of thrownness, fallenness, and projection because it is too simplistic to reduce questions of bodily identity to binaries such as mind and body.
Level of Degree
First Committee Member (Chair)
Second Committee Member
Third Committee Member
Fourth Committee Member
mind mind problem Heidegger sex gender
Briggs, Daniel Harland Jr.. "Body and Time: The Temporality of Human Embodiment." (2018). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/phil_etds/35