Philosophy ETDs

Publication Date

Fall 11-14-2018


In this dissertation I hope to shed further light on Heidegger’s thought-provoking claim that “We do not “have” a body; rather, we “are” bodily.” After discussing the problem of the body in the context of Being and Time in chapters one and two, I move to Heidegger’s later lectures and seminars in chapter three to articulate a specifically Heideggerian account of the bodying of the body. I hope to show that Heidegger’s understanding of the ontological difference can effectively help us to understand bodily difference in its corporeal, lived, and existential dimensions. From a Heideggerian standpoint, the existential dimensions of embodiment are inevitably overlooked when the discussion becomes limited to subject-object formulations. Nietzsche thus serves as the culmination of metaphysics within Heidegger’s history of being in the sense that he effectively carries the Leib-Körper distinction to its most thorough logical conclusions while simultaneously pointing the way forward to a new conception of the body in its temporal dimensions. I try to show that human identities are better understood in terms of the tripartite unity of thrownness, fallenness, and projection because it is too simplistic to reduce questions of bodily identity to binaries such as mind and body.

Degree Name


Level of Degree


Department Name


First Committee Member (Chair)

Iain Thomson

Second Committee Member

Ann Murphy

Third Committee Member

Adrian Johnston

Fourth Committee Member

Karen Gover




mind mind problem Heidegger sex gender

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Philosophy Commons