Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-1986
Abstract
This Article examines traditional regulatory discipline, the development of a legal basis for confidential supervision, the role of the SEC and federal securities laws in the development of a public disclosure system for banks and bank holding companies, and the utilization of public disclosure to achieve market discipline as a major tool in preventing bank failure and maintaining the stability of the banking system. The scope of this Article is limited to the regulation of commercial banks, whether state or federally chartered, by the following federal bank regulatory agencies: the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve).
Publication Title
Journal of Corporate Law
Volume
11
First Page
139
Recommended Citation
Alfred D. Mathewson,
From Confidential Supervision to Market Discipline: The Role of Disclosure in the Regulation of Commercial Banks,
11
Journal of Corporate Law
139
(1986).
Available at:
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_facultyscholarship/388
