Perhaps the biggest obstacle to understanding the later philosophy (1930-1951) of Ludwig Wittgenstein is that, unlike his earlier work, the later work has no explicit organization. I have attempted to show a way around this obstacle by showing the legitimacy of imposing upon the later work the following order:
First, I have taken his later work to stand opposed to the position of "traditional epistemology." I have attempted to show how from traditional epistemology the "empiricist theory of meaning" stems, and how from that theory of meaning stem certain familiar problems of academic philosophy.
Second, I have attempted to show that the bulk of Wittgenstein's later work may be considered as presenting a "theory of meaning," and have attempted to show the role of five concepts in that theory: 'meaning-as-use,' 'family resemblance,' 'language-games,' • forms of life,• and 'criteria.'
Level of Degree
First Committee Member (Chair)
Paul F. Schmidt
Second Committee Member
Joseph W. Hassett
Third Committee Member
Hubert Griggs Alexander
Amdur, Stephen. "Toward an Understanding of the Later Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein." (1967). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/phil_etds/37