Henrique Capriles, the Venezuelan opposition leader running for president against Hugo Chávez, said on Aug. 1 that he would scrap preferential oil deals with foreign allies including Argentina, Cuba and others, Reuters reported. Capriles said the country would save $6.7 billion annually under his plan, money that he would use for domestic social spending. Meanwhile, state-run oil company PDVSA reportedly will need to set aside between $4 billion and $7 billion annually for the next five years to make payments on its heavy debt burden, analysts have forecast. Has Venezuela's petro-diplomacy run the end of its course? Which countries would suffer the most from an end to PetroCaribe and Venezuela's other preferential oil deals? If re-elected, will Chávez be able to maintain the agreements? How serious of a problem has PDVSA's debt burden become?
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Inter-American Dialogue's Latin American Energy Advisor. "Will Venezuela's petro-diplomacy survive?." (2012). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/la_energy_dialog/132