Description
In this paper, the problem of evaluating a new ecologically damaging project undertaken by a locally dominant firm is studied. Often the total cost of undertaking such a project tends to be under evaluated for several reasons. One major reason is due to the failure to anticipate the rise of several small fringe firms in different regions and the impact of competition with them. This paper uses recent advances in game theory to present a game theoretic model to evaluate such a project in the context of what happened in Nepal when Arun project was mulled by the Nepal Electricity Authority in 1990s.
On the evaluation of an environmentally damaging project
In this paper, the problem of evaluating a new ecologically damaging project undertaken by a locally dominant firm is studied. Often the total cost of undertaking such a project tends to be under evaluated for several reasons. One major reason is due to the failure to anticipate the rise of several small fringe firms in different regions and the impact of competition with them. This paper uses recent advances in game theory to present a game theoretic model to evaluate such a project in the context of what happened in Nepal when Arun project was mulled by the Nepal Electricity Authority in 1990s.