Electrical and Computer Engineering ETDs

Publication Date

Fall 12-14-2024

Abstract

In the emerging landscape of Integrated Sensing and Communication (ISAC) networks, achieving energy efficiency while concurrently performing sensing and communication tasks remains challenging. This paper introduces a new framework, a novel solution that empowers User Equipment (UEs) to make informed decisions regarding their transmission power allocation, optimizing the energy efficiency of sensing, communication, and data reporting to the gNB (gNodeB) functions. Initially, a novel ISAC network paradigm is proposed, where the gNB employs rewards, such as monetary incentives, to motivate UEs to engage in sensing, data collection, and reporting within its coverage area based on the principles of Contract Theory. The proposed framework integrates the incentive mechanism with an optimal resource management technique which facilitates UEs to make energy-efficient decisions that balance their dual roles of sensing and communication, distributedly, while maximizing overall energy efficiency. The resulting multi-variable resource management problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game, establishing the existence and uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium. Through modeling and simulation, we demonstrate the proposed framework's benefits, showcasing its energy-efficient operation and rapid convergence to optimal operational points.

Keywords

Integrated Sensing and Communication, Contract Theory, Game Theory

Document Type

Thesis

Language

English

Degree Name

Computer Engineering

Level of Degree

Masters

Department Name

Electrical and Computer Engineering

First Committee Member (Chair)

Eirini Eleni Tsiropoulou

Second Committee Member

Jim Plusquellic

Third Committee Member

Aris Leivadeas

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