



Winter 1989

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Derrick W. R. Sewell

Philip Dearden

John Dumbrell

Recommended Citation

Derrick W. Sewell, Philip Dearden & John Dumbrell, *Wilderness Decisionmaking and the Role of Environmental Interest Groups: A Comparison of the Franklin Dam, Tasmania and South Moresby, British Columbia Cases*, 29 NAT. RES. J. 147 (1989).

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W. R. DERRICK SEWELL (posthumously),*
PHILIP DEARDEN, and JOHN DUMBRELL

Wilderness Decisionmaking and the Role of Environmental Interest Groups: A Comparison of the Franklin Dam, Tasmania and South Moresby, British Columbia Cases**

ABSTRACT

Environmental interest groups have become a major factor in the decisionmaking process for the establishment of many wilderness areas. This paper examines two internationally significant case studies, South Moresby Island in Canada and the Franklin in Australia, in terms of the role played by environmental interest groups. There are noted similarities between the two cases both in terms of context and group strategies. There are also some differences. The preservation of the Franklin area acted as a major catalyst and focus for the environmental lobby to become politically active in Australia. The Moresby lobby was never overtly political, yet it has been extremely effective in sensitizing political attention to the public interest in wilderness issues. It is suggested that this may represent an evolution of world views within these societies that recognizes the benefits of preserving wilderness even at the cost of foregoing considerable returns from traditional resource extraction industries. It is perhaps a manifestation of a New Environmental Paradigm to replace the Dominant Social Paradigm of old.

INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 1983, the High Court of Australia ruled by a four to three

*Department of Geography, University of Victoria.

**This paper was initiated by Derrick Sewell following his visit to Australia and his experience on the Wilderness Advisory Committee in B.C. He was actively working on the paper in conjunction with the other authors at the time of his death. Unfortunately, we were not able to complete the paper before his death. The paper is essentially descriptive and would have gained considerably in analytical strength with Derrick's input. Nonetheless, we feel it is worthwhile publishing the paper, not only as a testament to Derrick, but also due to the attention it focuses on the role of interest groups in wilderness issues, a topic otherwise lacking in this special issue, and one close to Derrick's heart. We would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Tim O'Riordan, Jon O'Riordan, Bruce Mitchell and Tony Dorcay on an earlier draft of the manuscript.

margin to uphold the right of the Commonwealth government to stop the Tasmanian Hydro-Electric Commission from inundating part of the southwest Tasmanian wilderness area through the construction of a dam on the Franklin River.¹ The Commonwealth government was thus able to intrude into that state's jurisdiction by invoking the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act (1983),² legislation designed specifically to protect one of the last remaining vestiges of the world's temperate rain forest areas. A critical factor in this decision was the role of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society, an interest group so committed to protecting the values embodied by this expanse of wilderness that 1,272 of its members went to jail in support of their convictions.³ The preservation of the area is significant not only "for the conservation movement in Australia [but] for the cause of wilderness preservation world-wide."⁴

More than two years later and ten thousand kilometers distant, a similar confrontation was occurring over the fate of South Moresby in the Queen Charlotte Islands, off the coast of British Columbia. This confrontation between "developers" and "preservationists," resulted in the arrest of some 89 protestors for defiance of trespass orders and other related offences.⁵ Again, several interest groups representing native and environmental concerns were involved not only in the confrontations but in grasping the attention of decisionmakers both nationally and provincially. As in the Tasmanian case, the issue generated considerable conflict between federal and provincial governments before the two agreed to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on July 6, 1987 to negotiate towards establishing a national park reserve in South Moresby. The environmental and native groups involved with the issue were subsequently honored by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, and the Federal Minister of Environment—Mr. Tom MacMillan—became the first foreign recipient of the Sierra Club's highest conservation award, the Edgar Wayburn medal, for his dedication to the cause. Both cases are clearly of international significance.

The incidents illustrate several factors. They show the political nature of environmental and, more specifically, wilderness issues. Furthermore, the incidents exemplify the difficulties involved in defining and administering responsibilities related to such matters. Finally, and in the context of this paper, most significantly, the conflicts over the Franklin River in southwest Tasmania and South Moresby in British Columbia illustrate

1. B. Davis, *Wilderness at Risk*, 9 UNESCO REV. 19 (1984).

2. World Heritage Properties Conservation Act, 1983.

3. TASMANIAN WILDERNESS SOC'Y, FRANKLIN BLOCKADE, (1983).

4. Kellow, *The Dispute over the Franklin River and South West Wilderness Area in Tasmania*, 29 NAT. RES. J. (1989) (this issue).

5. VANCOUVER SUN, Jan. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 3.

the importance of interest groups in environmental controversies. Although much has been written on the growth of the environmental movement in the U.S., relatively little has been contributed from elsewhere, especially analyses comparing high-profile wilderness conflicts in different jurisdictions. Greater understanding of the role that non-government organizations (NGO's) play in the environmental movement is being recognized as becoming increasingly critical. For example, the influential World Commission on Environment and Development chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, the Prime Minister of Norway, places considerable stress on the important role that NGO's must play in the future. They recommend that "governments should establish or strengthen procedures for official consultation and more meaningful participation by NGO's in all relevant inter-governmental organizations."⁶ This increased role should be facilitated by "increased financial support [for NGO's] which are rapidly emerging as important and cost-effective partners in work to protect and improve the environment locally and nationally."⁷ Some teeth are given to this assertion by, for example, the announcement in June 1988 that Environment Canada laboratories would offer their services to analyze water samples taken by the Greenpeace vessel *Beluga* in the Great Lakes.

The two disputes, although widely separated geographically are strikingly complementary. Although well-publicized battles over wilderness designation are not new they have, hitherto, largely been confined to the U.S. Seldom has international mobilization taken place on wilderness issues even in the U.S. Both cases also took a long time to resolve, involved non-violent illegal activities by environmentalists and hinged upon getting political support at senior, federal levels to overcome pro-resource extraction proclivities at the provincial scale. In both cases control of the land base was vested in the provincial or state authorities.

The purpose of this paper is first, to provide a synopsis of the development of each conflict; second, to describe the salient characteristics of the environmental interest groups involved; third, to compare and contrast the role and strategies of the groups and finally to provide a context for the discussions with reference to broader concepts of environmental and social change. First however, it is necessary to give a brief overview of some of the literature on public participation and interest group involvement.

Literature Review

The rise of the environmental movement since the early 1960s has

6. WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., *OUR COMMON FUTURE*, 392 (1987).

7. *Id.* at 319.

resulted in widespread attention being given to matters such as conservation, resource allocation and environmental preservation.⁸ A movement may be seen as a particular portion of society which is committed, to varying degrees, to special societal goals and interests.⁹ Lowe and Goyder¹⁰ identify three components of the environmental movement—the organized environmental groups, the attentive public who are interested in environmental concerns yet do not belong to any groups, and the inattentive or disinterested public. Analysis of the literature on public participation and interest groups suggests that the public may articulate environmental concerns in two ways.¹¹ First, they may utilize individually motivated channels of political involvement, varying from voting to holding office. Second, they may band together or otherwise support collective activities in the form of organized interest groups. Although this distinction is not clear in reality, it is the latter form of involvement which will constitute the focus in the remainder of this discussion.

As interest groups bring together people who have like concerns, it follows that their broad function is to influence public policy in order to promote their common interests.¹² In this study, preservation of certain areas from consumptive resource extraction may be broadly described as the common interest. Three specific roles of interest groups may be outlined.¹³ First, and perhaps most importantly, such groups communicate information, demands, messages and so forth between the interested public and political decisionmakers. Second, interest groups are important in the legitimation of intentions and initiatives proposed by such decisionmakers. Legitimation involves not only providing support and acknowledgement for such proposals but extending the latter throughout the political community. Third, interest groups regulate their memberships and administer programs and projects, such as research and data collection.

There are several ways of classifying interest groups. Pross¹⁴ suggests a distinction between “institutional groups” and “issue-oriented” groups. The former are represented by groups which have elaborate organizational structures, possess a stable membership and have an extensive knowledge

8. L. MILBRATH, *POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: HOW AND WHY DO PEOPLE GET INVOLVED IN POLITICS?* (1965).

9. G. HOLLOWAY, *THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY: TRANSFORMATION OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION* 24 (Occasional Paper No. 4, 1986) (Dep't of Sociology, Univ. of Tasmania).

10. P. LOWE, & J. GOYDER, *ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS IN POLITICS* 12 (1983).

11. MORRISON, *How and Why Environmental Consciousness Has Trickled Down*, in *DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE POLICY* (A. Schnaiberg, N. Watts & F. Zimmerman eds. 1986).

12. A. PROSS, *GROUP POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY* (1986).

13. *Id.* at 17.

14. *Id.* at 24.

of the branches of government which affect their interests. The Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society and Sierra Club are examples. Issue-oriented groups, on the other hand, tend to be concerned only with the resolution of one or two issues or problems and are generally not as well organized or permanent. The Friends of the Stikine, who are asking for preservation of the Stikine River from hydro and logging interests in northern British Columbia, would be an example. Many environmental groups fall into this category.

Certain characteristics may be attributed to environmental interest groups.¹⁵ Members pursue a common goal. Membership is important, especially as it relates to numerical strength, financial resources and degree of available knowledge and expertise. Some form of decision-making structure and distribution of authority is necessary and will vary in accordance with factors such as the size of the group, means of electing leaders and personalities involved. The final common element of interest groups is that they utilize particular strategies to accomplish their goals. These include public education, letter-writing campaigns, submission of briefs to committees, manipulation of the media, demonstrations and blockades and running for political office.¹⁶

Several points may be drawn from the above discussion. According to the pluralistic mode of analysis, environmental decisions which are political in nature are the results of bargaining among interest groups who know what they want and, increasingly, know how to get it. The success of the environmental groups varies and may reflect, besides the nature of the issue at hand, how the group is structured and directs its resources. Four factors may be of importance in this regard: 1) degree of consolidation of interest groups to address a particular issue; 2) knowledge of political machinery; 3) access to information and expertise and; 4) organizational strategies and tactics. Unfortunately most of the factors are difficult to assess quantitatively. Nonetheless they will be alluded to in the following descriptive accounts of the role of the environmental groups in the Australian and Canadian case studies.

Conflict over the Franklin River in Southwest Tasmania

The state of Tasmania possesses not only one of the last significant forested areas in Australia, but one of the last temperate rain forest wilderness areas of the world (Figure 1). The most highly valued of the rain forest species in southwest Tasmania is the Huon pine, some of which

15. Draper, *Environmental Interest Groups and Institutional Arrangements in British Columbia Water Management Issues*, in *INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR WATER MANAGEMENT: CANADIAN EXPERIENCES* 119, 134 (B. Mitchell ed. 1975).

16. P. LOWE & J. GOYDER, *supra* note 10, at 8.




Figure 1

are more than 2,000 years old.¹⁷ Plunging rivers, sparkling lakes, spectacular valleys and craggy peaks characterize this area. It is these resources which attracted not only developers, including Tasmania's Hydro-Electric Commission [H.E.C.] and several forest companies, but interest groups intent on preserving this area as wilderness. The details of this conflict have been described elsewhere¹⁸ and will be repeated here only as necessary to elucidate the role of the environmental interest groups.

The origins of the environmental movement in Tasmania may be traced to the proposal by the state's H.E.C. to flood Lake Pedder in the southwest

17. Gladwin, *Patterns of Environmental Conflict over Industrial Facilities in the United States, 1970-1978*, 20 NAT. RES. J. 243 (1980); T. O'RIORDAN, *ENVIRONMENTALISM* (1981).

18. J. McQUEEN, *THE FRANKLIN: NOT JUST A RIVER* (1983).

wilderness area.¹⁹ Until the late 1960s, the H.E.C. was able to proceed with development of hydro-electric schemes with full support of the state.²⁰ However, this proposal to flood Lake Pedder brought the H.E.C.'s demand projections, project evaluation techniques and "development at all costs" ethic under question. The Lake Pedder Action Committee was formed in 1971 and undertook a nationwide campaign to save the Lake.²¹ The central strategy was to lobby the federal government to accept responsibility for saving the southwest wilderness.²² This tactic resulted in the formation of the United Tasmanian Group, the world's first "green" party which ran, unsuccessfully, in several state and federal elections. Key individuals in these interest groups went on to form the South-West Tasmanian Action Committee (SWTAC) in 1974, two years after the H.E.C. had successfully flooded Lake Pedder through a series of extraordinary political maneuvers.²³

The Tasmanian Wilderness Society (T.W.S.) was formed in 1974 following the consolidation of various interest groups under the SWTAC.²⁴ The T.W.S. was initially committed to preserving the whole of southwest Tasmania as a wilderness area. The branch structure of interested parties which had been developed by the SWTAC was taken over by the T.W.S. It gained the support of the attentive public in financial and political terms. The over-all strategy of the T.W.S. was like that of its predecessors—lobby the federal government to protect southwest Tasmania. As this social movement progressed, two important events took place. First, the goal of the T.W.S. was narrowed to one specific focus—preventing the H.E.C. from damming the Franklin River.²⁵ Second, Bob Brown, a highly committed, charismatic physician, was elected leader of the T.W.S. in 1979.

Several "lessons from the Lake" were realized following the unsuccessful campaign to save Lake Pedder. Among these was the realization that the T.W.S. must become more familiar with the machinery of government, and utilize the growing support on the mainland, especially in Melbourne and Sydney, to lobby federal politicians and the Commonwealth government.²⁶ The latter would be especially crucial during elec-

19. See Kellow, *supra* note 4; Dragun, *Hydroelectric Development and Wilderness Conflict in South West Tasmania*, 10 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION 197 (1983).

20. G. HOLLOWAY, *supra* note 9, at 3.

21. J. McQUEEN, *supra* note 18, at 62.

22. Davis, *supra* note 1, at 22.

23. G. Easthope & G. Holloway, *The Development of a Successful Conservation Movement: A Case Study of the Wilderness Society in Australia* (1986) (Oral presentation at Departmental Seminar, Dep't of Geography, Univ. of Victoria).

24. Davis, *The Struggle for South-west Tasmania*, in INTEREST GROUPS AND PUBLIC POLICY, 152 (R. Scott ed. 1980).

25. G. Easthope & G. Holloway, *supra* note 23.

26. G. HOLLOWAY, *supra* note 9, at 16.

tion campaigns. The T.W.S. strove to make the Franklin River a plank in political platforms. Dr. Norm Sanders, the Director of the T.W.S. prior to Bob Brown, was critically important in this political game. Dr. Sanders was elected to the Tasmanian State Parliament in 1980 and again in 1982. He was the lone Democrat in a house dominated first by Labour Party members, then by Liberals. From his position, Dr. Sanders had access to a wide range of "non-public" knowledge and information and was able to do much to discredit the H.E.C. and further the cause of the T.W.S.²⁷

A second lesson from Lake Pedder for the T.W.S. was the necessity to have pertinent and up-to-date information.²⁸ Such information was partly facilitated by "leaks" from the Tasmanian government and its bureaucracy, as well as by contributions from Dr. Sanders. In addition, the T.W.S. was able to call upon a very wide range of professional expertise within its own ranks. By utilizing this information and expertise, the T.W.S. was able to formulate well-informed, articulate arguments to counter those of the pro-dam politicians and the H.E.C.

The final group of lessons from the Lake relate to strategy. First, the T.W.S. felt it was important to organize efficiently and therefore retained a small core of approximately ten members who planned activities and made decisions.²⁹ Second, the T.W.S. maintained an elaborate communications network to ensure that decisions could be made with the most up-to-date information.³⁰ In addition, the philosophy underpinning the T.W.S.'s tactics and strategies was one of non-violent action. The activities of the T.W.S., which are more fully described below, included campaigns, demonstrations, a blockade and political lobbying. Central to all of these activities was the use of the media and the issuance of well-prepared statements, typically given by Bob Brown, who came to personify the whole campaign.

Prior to examining the activities of the T.W.S. over the course of the Franklin River controversy, it is necessary to understand the position taken by the H.E.C. In October of 1979, the H.E.C. tabled a proposal to construct an integrated power scheme involving the King, Franklin and Gordon River systems (Figure 1). Phase one involved the flooding of the Franklin River. In response to opposition from interest groups, the federal government threatened intervention. This led to a statement in September of 1982 by the pro-dam Tasmanian Premier, Mr. Gray, that the state would secede from the Commonwealth if the Federal government

27. *Id.* at 17.

28. R. GREEN, *BATTLE FOR THE FRANKLIN* (1981).

29. G. HOLLOWAY, *supra* note 9, at 17.

30. G. Easthope & G. Holloway, *supra* note 23.

attempted to stop construction of the dam.³¹ The matter was referred to a Senate Select Committee, which concluded that the entire scheme was unnecessary. Despite such criticism, the H.E.C. and Tasmanian Liberal government moved ahead with preparations to build the dam.

On December 14, 1982, the blockade began, the same day that all of southwest Tasmania was officially listed as a World Heritage Area by UNESCO. Base camps which housed and fed protestors were established in strategic locations and acted as communication centers and provided training bases for instruction of nonviolent methods. Protestors from Tasmania, mainland Australia and abroad arrived at these camps, and were briefed, trained and then dispatched to selected sites. T.W.S. members patrolled the protest sites by foot, boat and in the air to gather information and pictures for carefully prepared press releases. Tactics included disrupting equipment barges in flotillas of rubber rafts, chaining themselves to bulldozers and other machinery and creating human blockades across access roads. As the majority of these activities took place on land granted to the H.E.C., police pressed charges for trespassing and related offenses. Some 1,272 protestors were arrested, many of whom were fined or detained in Risdon Gaol in Hobart. Concurrent with these activities, "no-dam" rallies were held throughout Australia. These rallies were among the largest ever held in major Australian cities, with 15,000 attending the Melbourne rally and 4,500, 2,000 and 20,000 attending various Sydney, Canberra and Hobart demonstrations, respectively.³² The blockade lasted until March 5, 1983.

Prior to the national election of March 5, 1983, the T.W.S. and a coalition of other interest groups throughout Australia, stated that they would lobby against the Federal Liberal government in marginal ridings if the latter did not intervene to save the Franklin River.³³ Following the threat of secession posed by Mr. Gray and an unsuccessful offer of \$500 million in compensation by the Prime Minister, the Federal Cabinet refused to act. The "Save the Franklin" coalition lobbied against the Federal Liberals, who were defeated by the Federal Labour Party who had pledged to save the Franklin River. The Labour government then passed regulations forbidding the H.E.C. from working in World Heritage areas, which included southwest Tasmania. Subsequently, the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act, legislation designed to prevent damage to World Heritage sites in Australia, was given the Governor-General's assent. The legislation was challenged by Tasmania, which felt it represented intrusion into state jurisdiction. The matter was referred to the High Court of

31. TASMANIAN WILDERNESS SOC'Y, *supra* note 3, at 16.

32. *Id.* at 31.

33. *Id.* at 32.

Australia, which ruled 4–3 in favor of upholding the legislation.³⁴

The South Moresby Controversy

The South Moresby archipelago is a triangular cluster of islands 170 kilometers offshore from the city of Prince Rupert, B.C., in the Queen Charlotte Islands (Figure 2). The temperate climate, abundant rain, nutrient rich ocean currents, glacial history and isolation have combined to produce some exceptionally productive and distinctive ecosystems. Several endemic animal subspecies, including the Queen Charlotte black bear, saw-whet owl and golden pine marten are found in South Moresby. The area is also noted for its populations of raptors and seabirds, particularly the number of Peale's peregrine falcon and bald eagles and members of the alcid family.

In 1974, Rayonier Canada (B.C.) Ltd. submitted a five-year logging plan to the Provincial government as required under a tree farm license granted in 1958.³⁵ The plan included harvesting timber on Burnaby Island in the South Moresby chain (Figure 2). The initiative resulted in the formation of the Islands Protection Society (I.P.S.), a group of environmentalists, Haida and concerned citizens based on the Queen Charlotte Islands. The group's founding members, Thom Henley, John Broadhead and Gary Edenshaw, prepared a South Moresby Wilderness Proposal and presented it to the Provincial government, marking the beginning of the interest group involvement in this controversy.

Interest in the issue spread over the 13-year period of debate from this broad base to encompass a large range of regional, national and international groups. By the early 1980s, several environmental groups in British Columbia and western Canada had become involved in this issue. These included the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society,³⁶ the Sierra Club of Western Canada, the Friends of the Ecological Reserves, the Western Canada Wilderness Committee and the Valhalla Society. As the issue pressed into the mid-1980s, national groups including the Canadian Nature Federation, World Wildlife Fund (Canada), joined in the fight. The cause gained international support through groups such as the American based National Parks and Conservation Society, Audubon and the Sierra Club and U.K. groups such as Earthlife.³⁷ The financial support


34. Davis, *supra* note 1, at 23.

35. SOUTH MORESBY RESOURCE PLANNING TEAM, SOUTH MORESBY: LAND USE ALTERNATIVES (1983).

36. Then known as the National and Provincial Parks Association of Canada.

37. See P. Dearden, Mobilizing Public Support for Environment: The Case of South Moresby Island, British Columbia (1987) (Presentation to the Seventeenth Annual Joint Meeting of the Public Advisory Committee on the Environment, Environmental Education Advisory Committee and the Science Advisory Committee with the Environment Council of Alberta, Edmonton) (Proceedings in press).

Figure 2



and hundreds of thousands of supporters contained in this amalgam represented a considerable force united to press for the preservation of South Moresby.

In addition to sheer numbers, the coalition gained access to the corridors of power particularly at the federal level. Throughout the debate, the local federal member of Parliament remained an avid supporter as did Charles Caccia, the federal Minister of Environment in the ruling Liberal government in the early 1980s and Environment Critic when the Progressive Conservatives took power in 1984. The leader of the Opposition, John Turner put his support behind preservation of the area following his visit there. Perhaps most significant, however, were statements by the Minister of the Environment, who is in charge of National Parks, Tom MacMillan, and the Speaker of the House of Commons, John Fraser, that the values contained within South Moresby would not be sacrificed. Finally, the influence of many individuals with strong political and business contacts cannot be discounted. Influential people having taken excursions in and around South Moresby,³⁸ emerged convinced that this remarkable area should be preserved and used their contacts to ensure that this was the case. It will never be known, for example, how significant the visit of Brian Williams, the prominent lawyer who later chaired the Wilderness Advisory Committee, (WAC)³⁹ was in influencing the final decision of the British Columbian Cabinet to favor preservation. It is known however that the report of the WAC was taken very seriously by Cabinet,⁴⁰ that Williams was a very influential chairman,⁴¹ and that he had a personal commitment to South Moresby.⁴²

The coalition had access to a wide range of information and expertise which could be called upon to assist in strategy development and tactics. In addition to critical "inside" information provided by influential persons such as those mentioned above, the coalition maintained contacts with provincial and federal bureaucracies. A wide range of credible experts including Jacques Cousteau, David Suzuki and Bristol Foster, was available to provide advice, issue statements or make advocacy presentations.

38. Particularly on sailing expeditions with Pacific Synergies, the largest charter boat operator in the area. For a more detailed review of the clientele on such journeys see P. Dearden, *Oceanic Wilderness Uses: A Case Study of Sail-boat Charterers to South Moresby Island, British Columbia* (1987) (Poster Session Presentation, Oceanic Wilderness Seminar, World Wilderness Congress, Denver, Colo.).

39. For a fuller discussion of the role of the Wilderness Advisory Committee in B.C., see Dearden, *W.R.D. Sewell and Wilderness* 29 NAT. RES. J. (1989) (this issue); O'Riordan, *Derrick Sewell and the Wilderness Advisory Committee in British Columbia* 29 NAT. RES. J. (1989) (this issue).

40. See O'Riordan, *supra* note 39.

41. Sewell, "Getting to 'Yes' in the Wilderness," in *FESTSCHRIFT* (G. Robinson ed. in press) (publication to honor Professor Wreford J. Watson, Dep't of Geography, Univ. of Edinburgh).

42. He had sailed several times with Pacific Synergies.

However, throughout the 13-year controversy, decisions on initiatives to be taken by the coalition continued to be made by a small core of leaders, particularly Henley and Broadhead.

A host of tactics and strategies was utilized by the coalition in an attempt to gain public and political support. The overriding concern was that actions should be nonviolent and legal, with the exception of civil disobediences such as trespass and defiance of court orders. Lobbying activities included letter-writing campaigns, submission of signed petitions and frequent direct contact with elected officials from provincial and federal governments. The promotion of public awareness was a main concern. This was accomplished through several mechanisms. Presentations were made to conferences and panels, including the National Park Centennial Conference in Banff in 1985⁴³ and the Wilderness Advisory Committee in 1986. Across Canada slide shows on South Moresby, sponsored by the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society were held in 1986. Various pamphlets, posters and brochures and newspaper advertisements were produced culminating in the critically acclaimed book *Islands at the Edge*.⁴⁴

Central to these initiatives was contact with the media. In the first 10 years, few statements were prepared for the press and the groups had to be persistent and aggressive to attract media attention. As the issue gained support and momentum, however, reporters began to hound the central figures involved. Extensive newspaper coverage appeared in most major newspapers in Canada as well as the *New York Times*, *London Observer* and other international papers. Canada's national television and radio network, the C.B.C. carried regular reports as well as documentary specials. Large circulation magazines such as *National Geographic*⁴⁵ printed articles on South Moresby. These activities resulted in broad public support from the international community and intensified pressure on provincial and federal decisionmakers to resolve the issue.

A particularly notable component of the campaign to save South Moresby was the whistle-stop Caravan, a group of Haida and environmentalists who traveled by rail and gave speeches and slide shows at rallies organized in cities across Canada. The Caravan began in St. John's, Newfoundland on March 1, 1986 and terminated in Vancouver, British Columbia on

43. HERITAGE FOR TOMORROW: CANADIAN ASSEMBLY ON NATIONAL PARKS AND PROTECTED AREAS (R. Scace & J. Nelson eds. 1987). This was a very significant conference for protected areas in Canada involving large-scale public input processes across the country. A strong and vocal pro-Moresby contingent raised the fate of the area at every opportunity. This was undoubtedly quite influential on the recently appointed Minister of Environment, Rt. Hon. Tom MacMillan, who thereafter took an intense personal interest in the area.

44. ISLANDS PROTECTION SOCIETY, *ISLANDS AT THE EDGE* (1984).

45. See, e.g., Johnston, & Jones, *Canada's Queen Charlotte Islands: Homeland of the Haida*, 172 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (1), 102 (1987).

March 10, 1986. Tens of thousands of people attended the various rallies, with 30,000 signing a petition stating that the South Moresby wilderness should be preserved. In Toronto, the gathering was held in St. Paul's Cathedral, which was filled to capacity and included the Archbishop of Toronto as well as the appearance of three Haida elders. The Caravan received similarly enthusiastic receptions in Edmonton and Vancouver, the latter representing the welcome home ceremony.

A critical element in the dispute was the involvement of the Haida. It is difficult to explain the attachment which the Haida have with their ancestral home, Haada Gwaii. This special relationship is best described in an extract from the *Journal of the Haida Nation*.

The Haida Nation is the rightful heir to Haada Gwaii. Our Culture, our Heritage, is the child of respect and intimacy with the land and sea. We owe our existence to Haada Gwaii. The living generation accepts the responsibility to ensure that our heritage is passed on to following generations. Like the forests, the roots of our people are intertwined such that the greatest troubles cannot overcome us. On these islands our ancestors lived and died and here too we will make our home until called away to join them in the great beyond.⁴⁶

Clearly, the culture and existence of these people is inextricably linked to the land and surrounding sea of the Queen Charlotte Islands.

Haida representatives were among the founding members of the I.P.S. but subsequently left to join the Council of Haida Nations. Since that time, there has been extensive cooperation between environmentalists and the Council to realize the common goal of preserving South Moresby. However it should be noted that the Haida, unlike the environmental lobby, were not seeking preservation through national park status, but had a much larger goal in mind, native land claims and "nationhood" for the Haida people. Through the course of debate over wilderness preservation in South Moresby, the Haida interests assumed an increasingly important position, gradually becoming the central focus. The I.P.S. and its affiliates felt that the Haida's arguments over claim to the land gave the issue greater legitimacy because, as argued by Council Chief Miles Richardson Jr., the governments of British Columbia and Canada were attempting to assume title to land which had been occupied by the Haida for over 10,000 years.⁴⁷ In October of 1985, the British Columbian government announced that logging would be allowed in an area covered under Western Forest Products'⁴⁸ Tree Farm Licence on Lyell Island in the heart of South Moresby. The Haida formed a human chain to block

46. *Frontispiece*, 2 J. HAIDA NATION 1 (Spec. ed. Summer 1984).

47. *Id.*

48. Formerly Rayonier Canada Ltd.

access.⁴⁹ Western Forest Products charged the Haida for lost time and money, applied for a court injunction to stop the blockade and was granted its wish by the British Columbian Supreme Court. When the loggers pressed for access to Lyell Island once again, they were met by another group of Haida. Seventeen were arrested. The blockades continued through the winter of 1985-86 and resulted in the arrest of 89 Haida for mischief, contempt of court, defiance of court orders and trespass. Throughout the blockades, the I.P.S., other groups and their supporters resisted the temptation to join the blockades, as they felt the intrusion of a non-native element would weaken the legitimacy and meaning of the Haida protecting their homeland.

In March of 1986 the Wilderness Advisory Committee appointed by the British Columbian Government released its report which, although in support of preserving most of South Moresby as wilderness, contained recommendations to log some areas—particularly on Lyell Island.⁵⁰ After announcing its support “in principle” of the Committee’s advice, the moratorium which had been placed on logging in most of South Moresby by the government was lifted in July of 1986. Logging continued on existing permits on Lyell Island. In the spring of 1987, Western Forest Products announced that hundreds of jobs would be lost if no new logging permits were issued. The environmental coalition and Council of Haida Nations felt that in response to this pressure, the British Columbian Government would issue the permits for extensive logging on Lyell Island. Plans were made for a major blockade involving all of the affiliated interest groups. A moratorium on new logging permits on South Moresby was announced shortly thereafter and negotiations over a National Park for the area intensified. The second blockade was not held. In July 1987, it was announced that an agreement for a national park reserve in South Moresby had been reached. Concessions to British Columbia included subsidies to the Queen Charlotte ferry system and a new national parks office in British Columbia, in addition to \$106 million to be used to compensate forest interests, fund a Queen Charlotte Islands Regional Development initiative, establish park operations and enhance silviculture in British Columbia.⁵¹ The Memorandum of Understanding to negotiate a National Park Reserve and National Marine Park in South Moresby was signed by the Prime Minister and Premier in Victoria on July 11, 1987. Negotiations are still underway. The major obstacle is the resolution of the Haida land claim with national park status and details of the forestry compensation liability.

49. See reports in Canada’s national news magazine *Maclean’s* to gain some ideas of how sympathetically this was reported in the media. E.g., *Maclean’s*, July 15, 1986, at 58.

50. WILDERNESS ADVISORY COMM. THE WILDERNESS MOSAIC 34 (1986).

51. Canada-B.C. Joint Press Release (July 11, 1987) (Victoria Premiers Office).

COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS

These two case studies are strikingly similar in many respects.

1. Both involved the preservation of temperate rainforests from industrial activities that would have been considered routine twenty or even ten years ago. As such both were reactive as opposed to pro-active in nature;
2. Both involved immediate crises. Extractive activities were already taking place in both areas as the campaigns evolved. The immediacy of these threats may have done much to stimulate the large public and international concern;
3. Both involved remote areas, perhaps spared from earlier development by this isolation, that were of recognized international significance for their ecological, cultural and recreational values;
4. Both occur in a province or state that historically and currently had relied heavily upon resource extraction as the main source of income;
5. Both involved not only conflict between environmentalists and developers but also between regional and national governments;
6. In each case federal governments favored preservation while regional governments favored development;
7. Both ultimately depended upon the highest political authorities in each country to resolve the issue;
8. Both took long time periods to resolve;
9. Environmental interest groups played a major role in both cases.

The groups involved in attempting to convince decisionmakers to set aside the values embodied in these wilderness areas exhibit characteristics which are remarkably alike (Table 1). In fact there was little difference between the styles of decisionmaking, availability of expertise and information, and types of strategies and tactics utilized by the groups. Some variations do, however, exist. One important one is that the T.W.S. was a single organization with a strong branch structure. No single group dominated in South Moresby. Although concerns originated with the I.P.S., the issue outgrew the capacities of the Society. Key individuals realized this, and rather than develop the I.P.S., major efforts were diverted toward enlisting the support of other, already established groups with larger resources.⁵² The resolution of the South Moresby conflict has not left a much stronger, better established I.P.S. in place, as resolution of the Franklin did for the T.W.S. Instead the groups forming the coalition have tended to drift apart and move to pursue their own agendas. Another difference is that the T.W.S. had among its membership elected members

52. P. Dearden, *supra* note 37, at 18.

TABLE 1

Characteristics of Interest Groups Involved in Southwest Tasmania and South Moresby Controversies.⁵³

	<i>Franklin River, Southwest Tasmania</i>	<i>South Moresby, B.C.</i>
Political Access	Membership includes elected officials	Some elected officials support cause
Decisionmaking	By consensus among a small group	By consensus among a small group
Expertise	Wide range available within group and from supporters	Wide range available within group and from supporters
Information	Available through political contacts and from sympathetic bureaucrats	Available through political contacts and from sympathetic bureaucrats
Strategies and Tactics	Stress direct lobbying activities —letter writing —rallies and demonstrations —political persuasion —direct lobbying in marginal ridings during election campaigns	Stress direct lobbying activities —publication of materials —slide shows and demonstrations —rallies and demonstrations —letter writing —political persuasion

of the Tasmanian Parliament, while the Moresby coalitions relied more upon lobbying politicians. The T.W.S. engaged in lobbying in marginal ridings during the March 1983 election campaign, while the Moresby coalition relied more upon generating public awareness and support and direct lobbying of politicians. The characteristics of the blockades which were staged in the two areas provide similarities and contrasts. While the conflicts endured for approximately the same length of time, the number of people involved in the blockade and related rallies in southwest Tasmania far outweighed those similarly involved in South Moresby. The same is true in terms of number of people arrested. This discrepancy may be attributed to the decision of the Moresby coalition to not participate directly in the Haida blockade on Lyell island. However, had new logging permits been issued on Lyell Island, then comparable numbers to the Tasmanian case might have been expected.

Another major difference is the prominent role taken by the Haida in the Moresby issue, and the absence of such a native perspective in Tas-

53. Mainly based upon TASMANIAN WILDERNESS SOC'Y, *supra* note 3; Davis, *supra* note 1, G. Easthope & G. Holloway, *supra* note 23 and discussions with Easthope and Bob Brown for the Franklin; personal experience (the second author was Chairman of the B.C. Chapter of the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society during the course of the dispute); and interviews with Tom Henley of the Islands Protection Society for the Moresby case.

mania. In this respect the Moresby case has more in common with similar issues in Canada, such as the Meares Island case north of Pacific Rim National Park⁵⁴ the Temogami case in eastern Quebec, or the establishment of the North Yukon National Park as described by Sadler.⁵⁵ The issue of native involvement in protected areas designation and management has been a major one in many parts of Canada and has led to the designation of national park reserves, as opposed to national parks, in areas where land claims are outstanding.

A final difference relates to personalities. In the Tasmanian case one dominant and charismatic individual, Bob Brown, came to symbolize the fight for preservation. He issued press statements, appeared at rallies and on television, and was practically the sole spokesman on the issue. He became a celebrity and his cause gained from this. No such single individual emerged as a celebrity from the Moresby campaign. David Suzuki produced television programs on the conflict, artist Robert Bateman spoke at rallies, and numerous individuals appeared on television and radio. John Broadhead and Thom Henley were the main strategists but neither came to symbolize the issue to the public in the manner that Bob Brown had in Australia.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The southwest Tasmanian and South Moresby case studies represent similar wilderness conflict situations with similar outcomes. Further, the activities of interest groups had much to do with each outcome. However, the actual process whereby the interest groups accomplished their aim differed. In Australia, the T.W.S. utilized direct political lobbying as a critical element of its strategy. This lobbying captured the important swing vote in marginal ridings and played a real part in the election of Bob Hawke, who advocated the preservation of southwest Tasmania. The T.W.S. was also extremely well organized and superbly led by a highly committed group of individuals, notably Bob Brown. This leadership and organization was evident not only in the activities surrounding the blockade, but in the ability of the Society to mobilize huge numbers of people throughout Australia to support the cause at rallies and demonstrations. In short, the T.W.S. orchestrated a highly successful overt operation which resulted in initiatives at the federal level to save Tasmania's southwest.

In contrast, the Moresby coalition organized a more covert operation. They did not directly lobby politicians during the British Columbian provincial election in October of 1986, nor were they highly visible during

54. Dearden, *Protected Areas and the Boundary Model: A Case Study of Meares Island and Pacific Rim National Park*, in 32 THE CANADIAN GEOGRAPHER 256-65 (1988).

55. B. Sadler, *National Parks, Wilderness Preservation and Native Peoples in Northern Canada*, 29 NAT. RES. J. (1989) (this issue).

the blockade in South Moresby. Rather, they concentrated upon campaigns to expose South Moresby with all of its inherent values to the public and the decisionmakers. It was hoped that this would result in increasing pressure from across Canada to preserve this area. In addition, the Moresby coalition relied upon the influence of those with high profiles and access to the corridors of power to convince decisionmakers to set aside South Moresby. One group which assumed an increasingly high profile throughout the course of the debate were the Haida. The image of Haida elders and their people, clothed in traditional dress and locked arm-in-arm across a road intended to allow clearcutting was a powerful message. It moved many Canadians and, along with the efforts of the members of the Moresby coalition, resulted in the commitment of the federal government to save South Moresby.

There are lessons for each of the major groups involved in these issues. They may not be new, but they are worth reemphasizing and may be briefly summarized as follows: *Government* (i) Be aware of how politically sensitive wilderness decisions are; (ii) Act pro-actively to solve them rather than reactively; (iii) Involve all interests at the earliest stages of decisionmaking; (iv) Ensure that thorough and justifiable data is available on *all* aspects of the issue; *Environmental Interest Groups* (i) Organize early and efficiently; (ii) Have the best expertise and information available; (iii) know the political system and its pressure points; *Industry Interest Groups* (i) Be aware that your group is no longer the only interest group trying to influence political decisionmaking; (ii) Be aware that other interest groups may have expertise and credibility as high or higher than your own; (iii) Be aware of political sensitivity of wilderness issues and the need to present clearly justifiable courses of action.

Are these two cases, and the role that interest groups played in their resolution, isolated events or do they signify something of larger global and temporal significance? It is not possible to answer such a question definitely, yet it is appropriate to present views on the topic. Three factors seem worthy of comment. First is the time component and the emergence of a New Environmental Paradigm (NEP). Several authors⁵⁶ have now contributed to the work originated by Dunlap and Van Liere⁵⁷ regarding the conflict in world views between the Dominant Social Paradigm (as

56. Albrecht, Bultena, Hoiberg & Nowak, *The New Environmental Paradigm Scale*, 13 J. ENVTL. EDUC. 39 (1982); Arcury, Johnson, & Scollay, *Ecological Worldview and Environmental Knowledge: The New Environmental Paradigm*, 17 J. ENVTL. EDUC. 35 (1986); Geller & Lesley, *The New Environmental Paradigm Scale: A Re-Examination*, 17 J. ENVTL. EDUC. 9 (1985); Jackson, *Environmental Attitudes and Preferences for Energy Resource Options*, 17 J. ENVTL. EDUC. 23 (1985); Jackson, *Outdoor Recreation Participation and Attitudes to the Environment*, 5 LEISURE SCIENCES 1 (1986).

57. Dunlap & Van Liere, *The New Environmental Paradigm*, 9 J. ENVTL. EDUC. 10 (1978); Dunlap & Van Liere, *Commitment to the Dominant Social Paradigm and Concern for Environmental Quality*, 65 SOC. SCIENCE Q. 1013 (1984).

here exemplified by resource development and the provincial/state governments) and the NEP (as exemplified by the preservationists and federal governments). Perhaps David Suzuki best summed up the relationship to South Moresby:

. . . [I]n the end what South Moresby revealed was a profound clash between world views. The dominant one sees all of nature as a potential resource, of value only for the economic worth. But there is growing support for a different outlook that recognizes that we are biological beings, who, in spite of science and technology remain embedded in, and dependent on, nature. So we have to fight to keep nature intact and to try to bring ourselves into a balance with the environment. South Moresby could be a watershed that marks a shift towards this emerging world view.⁵⁸

This editorial excerpt has empirical validations from the works of authors such as Dunlap and Van Liere who conclude:

. . . [W]hen we consider that just a few short years ago concepts such as "limits to growth" and "spaceship earth" were virtually unheard of the degree to which they have gained acceptance among the public is extremely surprising. This acceptance is all the more surprising when one realizes how dramatically the NEP departs from our society's traditional world view of dominant social paradigm. Indeed in a society which has always taken abundance, growth, progress, etc. for granted . . . the rise of the NEP represents a revolutionary occurrence.⁵⁹

The suggestions are certainly far from being isolated occurrences. The two case studies are powerful and visible symbols of this change in dominant world views that are occurring in many parts of the world.

Ironically following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding for the Moresby park several other factors have come to light that illustrate this change. The first is that the major forest company on the Charlottes, MacMillan-Bloedel Ltd., following complaints by their own loggers, the Haida and environmentalists, have been found guilty⁶⁰ of leaving excess waste on their logging operations. Following clearcutting many logs are simply left to rot on the forest floor. It has been estimated that the waste from one block of the Tree Farm Licence would have built 2,628 houses.⁶¹ The independent audit concluded that this was routine practice on the Charlottes. Again the role of interest groups, as opposed to the bureaucracies officially charged with monitoring the situation, should be noted.

58. *Globe and Mail*, July 11, 1987, at 4, col. 3.

59. Dunlap & Van Liere (1978), *supra* note 57, at 19.

60. *Times-Colonist* (Victoria, B.C.), Apr. 19, 1988, at 5, col. 5.

61. *Id.*, Apr. 14, 1988, at 1, col 3.

The finding also points to the weaknesses of the forestry arguments that the timber on Moresby had to be cut to keep their mills going.⁶² It is abundantly clear that full utilization is not being made of trees already cut.

The second factor that should be noted with regard to changing values and the change from a resource base to service economy is the role of tourism. Throughout the debate on Moresby both the forestry companies and Minister of Tourism ridiculed the idea that tourists would wish to visit the area,⁶³ and further that they would spend sufficient money there to replace income lost through logging reductions. Since then an extensive survey undertaken for the Ministry of Tourism⁶⁴ has indicated that three out of four visitors to British Columbia place visiting the Charlottes as their top priority, making the Islands the biggest attraction in the province. Visiting a gambling resort, a favorite suggestion of several leading politicians, placed lowest on the list with only 19 percent indicating any interest. Clearly if British Columbia wishes to facilitate the transfer from a resource base to service economy, greater forethought must be given to the requirements of the latter.⁶⁵

The third point is that the geographical isolation of these cases from major centers of population and from each other is no longer relevant. The report of The World Commission on Environment and Development, commonly referred to as The Brundtland Commission is entitled *Our Common Future*.⁶⁶ The title is very apt and reflects the Commission's view that environmental issues can no longer be seen to be merely national responsibilities, but concern everyone. Wilderness preservation is a global issue and one that deserves global concern rather than narrow parochialism. To this end, letters supporting the preservation of South Moresby appeared in newspapers in British Columbia from all over the world, including from the directors of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society.⁶⁷ Furthermore the Franklin would not have been preserved except for the global significance of the area as formally recognized through the World Heritage designation. This also illustrates the importance and potential strength of global conventions in achieving conservation goals.

The fourth point relates to the role of the environmental interest groups in both cases. The Brundtland Commission suggests that, "... a first

62. See, e.g., Western Forest Products (1985) (Mimeograph).

63. *Id.* at 6.

64. MARK TREND MARKETING RESEARCH INC., VISITOR '87: A TRAVEL SURVEY OF VISITORS TO BRITISH COLUMBIA 3 (1988) (B.C. Ministry of Tourism, Recreation and Culture, Victoria).

65. See Dearden, *Tourism and the Resource Base*, in TOURISM IN CANADA (P. Murphy ed. Western Geographical Series, vol. 21, 1983) (Dep't of Geography, Univ. of Victoria), for a fuller discussion of this point.

66. WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., *supra* note 6.

67. See Dearden, *supra* note 37, at 12.

priority it to establish the problem of disappearing species and threatened ecosystems on political agendas."⁶⁸ This is exactly what both interest groups did. In so doing they raised a question of values into clear view not only of politicians, but also the voting public. Again David Suzuki neatly sums up the situation:

What have we learned from all of this? South Moresby, particularly Windy Bay, became a symbol for all special wilderness areas. It became a crucial issue, because the outcome would indicate what Canadians value and how we see ourselves in relation to nature. The very act of debating the importance of wilderness, logging, tourism, fishing, native rights and mining, was part of an educational process going on around the world.⁶⁹

Whether the importance of the interest groups involved in these two issues will continue to be of political significance is difficult to judge. The Moresby lobby was never, as described earlier, overtly political in supporting one political party over another by virtue of their stand on the issue. Moresby was not an election issue either provincially or locally. Nonetheless, both in Ontario and in British Columbia, environmental coalitions have quizzed political candidates on their environmental beliefs. It is only a matter of time before this evolves to full-scale lobbying in swing ridings.

The influence on Australian politics both during and since the Franklin case has been more profound. The Labour Party, having overtly courted the environmental vote, is now enjoying its third term of office—a record. The so-called Greenies targeted twelve swing seats in the last election and won eleven of them for the Labour cause. Jonathan West, a director of Australia's Wilderness Society wrote in the *Los Angeles Times*:

The effect of our victory has been enormous. We have gained new confidence at the same time that our effectiveness is being recognised. The prime minister congratulated us and acknowledged the important role that we played in his victory. We have become a permanent power in our country, a true manifestation of a grassroots movement that has demonstrated that an appreciation of our natural heritage can triumph over an appeal to grow.⁷⁰

The indications are that in Australia, environmentalists have not only fulfilled the first priority of the Brundtland Commission by establishing environment on the political agenda, but are also a major force to be reckoned with in influencing who makes decisions on that agenda. Whether a similar situation will arise in Canada remains to be seen.

68. WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., *supra* note 6, at 162.

69. *Globe and Mail*, July 11, 1987, at 4, col. 3.

70. Reprinted in *Times-Colonist* (Victoria, B.C.), July 17, 1987.

One final point that needs to be made is that the inadequacies of current bureaucratic and political processes need to come to terms in an efficient manner with the magnitude of problems raised by both the Franklin and Moresby cases. Undoubtedly cases of such magnitude place an inordinate amount of stress on the system and decisions about who or what represents the public interest are not easy. However, pro-development bias is heavily entrenched within existing decisionmaking systems. The traditional political way of solving conflicts is through compromise. Unfortunately, wilderness is an absolute condition that, by definition, is not compromised. It was not possible, for example, in South Moresby to follow Western Forest Product's suggestion that they be allowed to log the valleys and leave the mountains between as wilderness.⁷¹ This would have been the perfect political solution in that forestry would have obtained its goals, taking out the trees, and yet some areas could still be declared as "wilderness." It was with great difficulty that politicians (and some bureaucrats) were persuaded of the fact that the trees in the valleys were an integral part of that wilderness and that to stand on the summits and survey a sea of clearcuts did not impart a sense of wilderness. Pro-forestry forces on South Moresby never came to terms with this factor. To ease the transition to a society where the New Environmental Paradigm becomes the Dominant Social Paradigm will require not only a means to incorporate wilderness values into the earliest stages of decisionmaking, but also to invest greater effort in educating society to this need. Environmental interest groups, after raising the issue to the political agenda, must now pay more attention to this equally important role.

71. Western Forest Products, *supra* note 62, at 16.