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THE MILES-CROOK CONTROVERSY

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A thesis Submitted for the Degree
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THE MILES-CROOK CONTROVERSY

PREFACE

The Geronimo campaign engendered a number of controversies which were argued at length by the press at the time. I have not attempted to arrive at a definite settlement of these disputed questions because, after all the available information is obtained, it is really a matter of personal opinion. I have rather given a sketch of the Apache troubles in southern Arizona, setting forth briefly, first, the policy of General George Crook in dealing with these Indians, and then that of General Nelson A. Miles who replaced Crook in command of the Department of Arizona, and finally the varying opinions as to who really deserved the credit for the surrender, whether Miles resorted to Crook's disdained policy, and whether or not it was really a surrender at all. In conclusion I have suggested some possible explanations of the matters in dispute.

The accusations and resulting explanations in the Miles-Crook newspaper encounters revolved around four questions. First, had Miles disobeyed his orders

in accepting a conditional surrender. The chief difficulty here was that no one seemed able to discover just what terms or promises Miles had made to Geronimo. There were a number of conflicting stories told by different persons who were present at the conference, and Miles himself seemed unable to make a report that was satisfactory to the Secretary of War. Second, had not General Miles and Captain Lawton received the credit for the surrender which should have been bestowed upon Lieutenant Gatewood, who with two Chiricahua scouts, sought out the hostile camp and arranged that the Indians should go to the border and give themselves up to Miles. Third, had not Miles, after boasting that Crook's policy was to be reversed, resorted to all of Crook's methods in the end. And fourth, if Geronimo and his band had surrendered as prisoners of war, should not Miles' promise to them that they should not be separated from their families, have been kept inviolate.

My sources of information are somewhat biased, but at least there are champions for each side even though Miles has to be his own most important defender. Captain John G. Bourke, General Crook's trusted friend and officer, serving under him for

more than fifteen years, is Crook's most ardent supporter. In his book, On the Border with Crook, and in his diaries, he staunchly defends both Crook's policies and the execution of those policies. Even the newspaper clippings preserved in the diaries, for the most part laud Crook and disparage Miles, because few of the Crook opponents are included. If a criticism does appear in a newspaper account, Bourke answers it with a biting comment placed below the clipping. Britton Davis is a great admirer of Crook. He served under Crook both in Wyoming and in Arizona, and his account of the Apache Campaign of 1882 to 1883 is found in his book, The Truth about Geronimo.

Most of the defense of General Miles comes from his own book, Personal Recollections and Observations, although no less an authority than the Dictionary of American Biography can be counted in his support because it makes the following definite statement: "Miles accomplished the surrender of these Indians and their incarceration at Mount Vernon, Alabama."

A great deal of the newspaper criticism of General Crook in his Arizona campaign came from the politicians and profiteers of the "Indian Ring." On the other hand, much of the criticism of General Miles

came from the army, and it is possible that some of this feeling arose from jealousy, because Miles had been advanced very rapidly although he was not a West Point man.

PART I

Indian Situation in Southern Arizona before the Outbreak of 1885

The Apaches are the southernmost group of the great Tinneh family. They roamed as conquerors or raiders over a territory which took in the whole of the present states of Arizona and New Mexico, one-half of the state of Texas, and the Mexican states of Sonora and Chihuahua.[1] The name Apache was applied by both the Spanish and the Americans to several distinct tribes. Those living on the headwaters of the Gila are known as the Chiricahua, the most warlike of the Arizona Indians, and it is they who have made the name of Apache so widely known and feared. In earlier days they robbed the Mexican settlements.[2] Later when the Americans came, and their native lands were taken away from them and they were placed on a reservation, they fled to Mexico where they plundered on both sides

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[1] John G. Bourke, On the Border with Crook, p. 114.

[2] Frederick W. Hodge, Handbook of American Indians, Part I, p. 282.

of the international boundary line, until they finally surrendered to General Miles' command in 1886. The Apaches gathered on the San Carlos Reservation were called the San Carlos. Others quite similar to them living on the White River are generally spoken of as the White Mountain Apaches. They and a tribe living in the Tonto Basin were taken from their homes and placed on the San Carlos Reservation. It is with the Indians on this reservation, and with the Chiricahuas from around Camp Apache who went to Mexico, that this account is concerned.[1]

When the Americans first entered the territory occupied by the Apaches, they found the Indians inclined to be friendly. One chief was even anxious to help the American boundary commissioner advance farther south and occupy more of the Mexican territory than was provided by the Gadsden Purchase.[2] This friendly attitude on the part of the Indians, however, soon gave place to suspicion and hate because of the treacherous dealing they so often received at the hands of the white men. Constant warfare developed between the two races.

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[1]Pliny Earle Goddard, Indians of the Southwest, pp. 128, 129.

[2]Bourke, On the Border with Crook, p. 118.

During the years 1869, '70, and '71, Apache atrocities reached an appalling height. No one was safe outside the half dozen large towns. In the villages and on the ranches sentinels were kept posted by day and packs of dogs were turned loose at night.[1] "The Prescott Miner, in the autumn of 1871, published a list of Apache murders and atrocities occurring between March, 1864, and the fall of 1871. Three hundred and one pioneers had been murdered, two of whom were known to have been burned alive; fifty-three were wounded and crippled for life and five carried into captivity."[2] Scouting expeditions were carried on all this time by army officers who tried to forestall these attacks, or, after they occurred, to pursue and punish the Apaches. But the task was very difficult because of the great extent of the territory involved, its desert or mountainous character, and the fact that the enemy were able to move so swiftly and to strike simultaneously at points far apart.

The worst offender at this period was the chief of the Chiricahua Apaches, Cochise, who from 1861 had with his band ravaged the country from the Gila River

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[1]Bourke, General Crook in the Indian Country, The Century Magazine, XLI (March, 1891), p. 650.

[2]Frank C. Lockwood, Pioneer Days in Arizona, p. 165.

far into Mexico and eastward into New Mexico. Up to 1860 he had been on good terms with the Americans, and had the wood contract for supplying the station of the Southern Overland Mail Company at Fort Bowie.[1] But in the fall of that year a party of Pinal Apaches had stolen a little boy from a ranch near Fort Bowie. An inexperienced lieutenant at Fort Buchanan accused Cochise of the act, and though Cochise denied it, half a dozen of his band were executed. Cochise went on the warpath and for the next ten years terrorized the southern half of Arizona and New Mexico.[2]

In 1871 President Grant sent General O. O. Howard as a special commissioner to settle a number of problems among the Indians of the Southwest, but his chief object was to find Cochise and make terms with him. The General had a conference with the Indians at the "Stronghold" in the Dragoon Mountains; it was agreed that Cochise was to leave the warpath for good, and that he and his people should live upon a reservation in the Dragoon Mountains.[3] This arrangement exempted this particular band from General Crook's jurisdiction and proved to be a source of trouble because it sepa-

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[1]Lockwood, Pioneer Days in Arizona, p. 160.
[2]Bourke's "Diary," January 8 - March 1, 1886 (Clipping from New York Herald, December 30, 1885.)
[3]Lockwood, Pioneer Days in Arizona, p. 166.

rated the Chiricahuas into two sections, giving one kind of treatment to one and another to another. The rest of the Chiricahuas were placed on the San Carlos Reservation under military surveillance, but there were no troops stationed in the Dragoon Mountains.[1]

In the same year, 1871, President Grant sent General George Crook to assume command of the Department of Arizona and to end the trouble with all hostile Indians of that section. Crook had already had a great deal of experience in dealing with Indians, and the immediate cause of his transfer to Arizona was a petition addressed to President Grant by the settlers, many of whom, having known Crook in California and Nevada, respected and admired him and felt that he was the man for the place.[2] After his graduation from West Point, he served in the Northwest in exploration and in protecting settlers from Indian raids. After the Civil War, from which he emerged a brigadier-general, the regular army was reorganized, and Crook became Lieutenant Colonel of the Twenty-third Infantry and was assigned for three years to the command of the district of Boise, Idaho. Here he was engaged in

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[1]Bourke, On the Border with Crook, p. 236.

[2]Bourke, General Crook in the Indian Country, pp. 650, 651.

bringing to an end the Indian War which had been raging for several years in southern Oregon, Idaho, and Northern California.[1]

As to his appearance, Bourke says that Crook was over six feet in height, straight and strong and manly, with an elasticity of movement gained from years of exercise in the mountains of the West.

In character General Crook was kind and fair but extremely reserved, and he possessed a dignity which discouraged any undue familiarity. He never consulted with anyone, but made his own decisions after careful deliberation without disclosing any of his plans and purposes, although he possessed the ability to learn all that his informant had to yield. He "never indulged in stimulant of any kind--not so much as tea or coffee--never tobacco, was never heard to employ a profane or obscene word, and was ever and always an officer to do, and do without pomp or ceremony, all that was required of him, and much more."[2] He was much interested in the career and progress and aspirations of the young officers under him and was always ready to listen to their plans.

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[1]G. J. Fiebeger, "George Crook" Dictionary of American Biography, IV, pp. 563-564.

[2]Bourke, On the Border with Crook, p. 109.

Hunting and fishing were a passion with Crook and had helped to develop his senses to such a point that he could detect at a wonderful distance the slightest movement across the horizon, and became so skilled in the knowledge of "signs" and trails that he was almost as much of an Indian as the Indian himself.

> "There never was an officer in our military service so completely in accord with all the ideas, views, and opinions of the savages whom he had to fight or control as was General Crook. In time of campaign this knowledge placed him, as it were, in the secret councils of the enemy; in time of peace it enabled him all the more completely to appreciate the doubts and misgivings of the Indians at the outset of a new life, and to devise plans by which they could all the more readily be brought to see that civilization was something which all could embrace without danger of extinction."[1]

General Crook arrived in Tucson in June, 1871, and by July he began a march by Fort Bowie to Fort Apache, then over the Mogollon Mountains to Camp Verde, and finally on to Fort Whipple and Prescott about seven hundred miles through the Indian country. The chief object of the march was a practice campaign, enabling the General to study the country, harden his men, and build up a wonderfully efficient pack train service that could follow the troops anywhere.

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[1]Bourke, On the Border with Crook, pp. 109-112.

When the party reached Camp Apache in the White Mountains where many Apaches were living under well-behaved chiefs, Crook had a conference and told the leading men that he was doing his best to find out which Indians wanted peace and which were determined to remain hostile. Those who refused to come in to the reservations and to live quietly there, he would hunt down and kill. Since the Indians did not know the ways of the white man, Crook told them it would be better for the soldiers to remain with them on their reservations to explain what they did not understand and to protect them.

In the fall of 1872, it was decided that nothing but war would put a stop to the Apache outrages in Arizona. In only the last year the Indians had made fifty new raids and had killed more than forty American citizens. Crook was ordered, therefore, to bring in all the outlaws to the reservation and to guard them closely. Accordingly, he divided the troops into a number of separate commands under experienced officers, each to set out from widely separated posts and to converge toward the Tonto Basin. The plan was to pursue the Indians so closely that if they escaped death in battle they would perish from privation, cold, or fatigue among the mountains. Crook himself went to

Fort Apache were he enlisted a force of Apache scouts.[1] These scouts were a particular hobby with the General, and the matter came to cause a difference of opinion between him and Lieutenant-General Sheridan which led (in 1886) to Crook's request to be relieved of his command. Crook says of the scouts:

> "To operate against the Apaches we must use Apache methods and Apache soldiers, of course with white soldiers along. The first great difficulty is to discover the whereabouts of the hostiles, and this can be done well only by Indian scouts . . . . . As soon as they locate the hostile camp, they noiselessly surround it if possible, meantime sending back runners to us. We make forced marches by night, come up and attack the hostiles, if they have not already flown. We kill a few and the rest escape among the rocks and canons . . . . . Then there is nothing for us to do but to return to our base of supplies, wait until the hostiles begin to feel secure again, and then repeat the same tedious operations . . . . . The Apache scouts are indispensable. We could have made no progress without them. I first began using them in 1872, and have used them ever since. Nothing has ever been accomplished without their help. We have every assurance that they have acted in good faith. They followed the hostile trails almost as well as blood-hounds . . . . . and when they succeeded in catching up with the hostiles, they have invariably fought well. But there is a great uproar because the Chiricahuas have been employed as scouts. There is a reason for their employment . . . . . Almost any Indian scout is better in his peculiar line than a white

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[1] Lockwood, Pioneer Days in Arizona, p. 178.

> man, but the ordinary Indian, and even the ordinary Apaches are totally unable to cope with the Chiricahuas. The White Mountain Apaches come nearest to it, being mountain Indians. But the Chiricahuas are matchless . . . . . and all the other tribes acknowledge it."[1]

During the winter of 1872-1873 the Indians were hunted out of their strongest refuges in the mountains, and finally by spring they were ready to give up. In April, they sent messengers to Crook at Camp Verde to ask for terms, and a conference of all the leading chiefs was arranged. Chalipun, who said he was spokesman for all the hostile Apaches, brought in three hundred representatives of the leading tribes and surrendered unconditionally.[2]

For the next two years 1873-1875 Crook had sole charge of the reservations in Arizona, and during that time not a settler was injured nor a head of stock run off either in Arizona or Mexico.[3] In his recommendations on the subject of the Indians he was far in advance of his time. He advocated the division of the reservations into individual plots so that the Indians might become self-supporting--he was a firm believer

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887. (Clipping from Mirror, Los Angeles, May 8, 1886.)

[2]Lockwood, pp. 182-183.

[3]Bourke's "Diary," January 8 - March 1 (Con't.) 1886. (Clipping from Chicago Tribune, January 6, 1886.)

in the pride of ownership.[1] The Apaches at Camp Verde were immediately set to work on a great irrigation ditch. In a short time they had about fifty-seven acres of land planted with the sort of garden truck which the Indians liked. Crook promised to provide a ready cash market for everything they could raise, and he kept his word. He bought all the hay they could cut and had the quartermaster pay cash for it. All the wood and a good portion of the corn used by the troops at Camp Apache and San Carlos were bought from the Apaches as individuals, and not from contractors or from tribes. Horses and sheep were bought in southern California and brought to the reservation.

Crook believed that the Indians should be granted equal rights with white men in the courts of law and in all the privileges of citizenship. He was very much opposed to the disarming of the Indians on the reservations. "Disarming them," he said, "shows them that we are afraid of them. I never saw an Indian who was deterred from going on the warpath for want of arms and ammunition, for money will buy anything in this country; and besides, if the arms were taken from the

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," January 8 - March 1 (Con't.) 1886. (Clipping from Chicago Tribune, January 6, 1886.)

Indians on the San Carlos reservation, they would not have a head of stock left in a year. They would be left at the mercy of the rustlers and cowboys, and nothing but fear deters them."[1]

Order was maintained on the reservations by the Indian Police, an institution which originated at San Carlos in 1874 under the Indian Agent there, John P. Clum. The force the first year was composed of four Apache policemen who were paid $15.00 a month, the same salary as the white soldiers, and whose duties were to patrol the Indian camps, quell disturbances, arrest offenders, report signs of disorder or mutiny, scour the entire reservation, and arrest Indians absent from the agency without a pass, and whites trespassing contrary to the rules of the reservation. Within a year after its organization the Indian Police, now increased to twenty-five, had jurisdiction over 4200 Indians, and had so fully demonstrated their efficiency and dependability that, at Clum's request, all troops were removed from the reservation in October, 1875.[2]

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," March 1 - May 1 (Con't) 1886 (Clipping from Omaha Herald, March 26, 1886.)

[2]John P. Clum, "The San Carlos Apache Police," New Mexico Historical Review, IV (July, 1929), p. 208.

In March, 1875, Crook was transferred to the command of the Department of the Platte--a misfortune for Arizona and for the Apaches. If he had been let alone in the management of the Indians there would have been no outbreak. It was not until Crook's plans had been set aside and his authority nullified, that the troubles he had predicted came upon the people of the Southwest. About the time of the departure the government, under the influence of a "ring" of federal officials, contractors, and others, formed at Tucson, began to carry out the unwise policy of bringing all the Apache tribes together on the San Carlos Reservation. These tribes were not a united people; they spoke different languages and were jealous and, in some cases, were afraid of each other. Each tribe loved its own native region, or a reservation which had been assigned to it with the promise that it was to be their's for all time.[1] They were a nomadic people who had always lived by agriculture, and the lands on which they were settled were not suited to agriculture anyway. Tiffany, the Indian agent at San Carlos said in his report of September 1881, "The southern part, or that south of the Gila River, is rough, mountainous and much cut up with

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[1]Bourke, On the Border with Crook, p. 217.

deep arroyas or water washes. But few springs are found, and only in the rainy season is there water in these arroyas; the hills are covered with large stones or malipi rock, and no part of it is suitable for agricultural purposes."[1] Eighty per cent of the five thousand Indians on the reservation were living in this hot, barren, brush-covered bottom land of the Gila within ten miles of the agency with nothing to do but to gather once a week to have their rations doled out to them.

The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Price, in his report of October, 1881, listed various causes of discontent among the Indians. He began by urging the absolute necessity of making them self-reliant and self-supporting by locating each family on a certain number of acres which they might call their own and hold by a title as strong as a United States patent could make it. As it was, those Indians who did hold plots of land had nothing to show for it but a small piece of paper called script which was not much good as a title.

There was much discontent over the matter of rations. The government, in treaties with the Indians,

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[1]Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 24, 1881, p. 65.

agreed to give them so many pounds of beef, flour, coffee, sugar, etc., and then a certain sum of money was appropriated for the purpose, which sum, because of increased prices, would not buy that many pounds. Also, owing to the failure of Congress to appropriate during the years 1879, 1889, and 1881, sufficient funds to pay for the transportation of goods and supplies to the various agencies, the stores had not been promptly delivered. Flour delivered to the contractors for different agencies in October, 1880, was not delivered until July or August, 1881.

Another cause of complaint was the want of an exact location of the boundary line of some of the reservations which led to serious conflicts between the Indians and the white settlers outside. Valuable coal deposits were discovered along the southern line of the San Carlos division of the White Mountain Reservation and while the agent had determined the approximate location of the boundary, and declared the discoveries to be within the reservation, the miners and prospectors disputed his jurisdiction.[1]

The Indian commissioner and the Indian agent do

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[1]Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 24, 1881, pp. 1, 2, 17, 20.

not mention another source of trouble--that rations provided by the government were being sold openly to nearby towns and mining camps, that the beef cattle, forming the principal part of the rations, was scarcely more than skin and bone, so that, as the Indians said, "they were compelled to eat every part of the animal, intestines, hoofs, and horns." In some places the rations had become so scanty that "one of the shoulders of the small cattle of that region was made to do twenty people for a week; one cup of flour was issued every seven days to each adult. The corn and melon fields of the Apaches, who had been making their own living, had been destroyed, forcing them to depend upon the agent for meager supplies. Arbitrary punishments were inflicted without trial or without testimony of any kind. "In regard to the civilian agents, the Apaches said they ran from bad to worse, being dishonest, indifferent, tyrannical, and generally incompetent . . . . . The rottenness of the San Carlos Agency extended all the way to Washington, and enfolded in its meshes officials of high rank."[1]

This state of affairs on the San Carlos division of the White Mountain Reservation had existed almost

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[1]Bourke, On the Border with Crook, p. 442.

since 1875 when Crook left. By the summer of 1882, Indian affairs in Arizona were in such a condition that the president re-assigned General Crook to that command. All the Apaches were in a sullen, distrustful state and many of them were again on the warpath. The year before, the Chiricahua Apaches at Camp Goodwin under their leaders Juh and Geronimo killed the agency chief of police, attempted to kill the sub-agent, and fled into Mexico. A few months later a war party of these Indians came back to Camp Goodwin and forced the Indians there under Loco to go back with them to Mexico, increasing the number of this group to more than four hundred. The Indians remaining on the reservation were in such a bitter state of mind at their treatment that unless a change were made, other outbreaks were bound to follow.

General Crook took up his work in September, 1882, conducting his management of the department as he had during his former administration. On his mule "Apache," he journeyed all over the territory, meeting and talking with the Indians. At Fort Apache he met the principal chiefs, and after hearing their complaints, promised he would do what he could to remedy unjust conditions, but in return they must live peaceably and work in

order to become self-supporting. One of his first moves was to expel from the reservation the squatters, miners, and friends of the Indian agents who had been plundering the Indians and stirring up trouble among them. He revived the practice begun during his former administration, of enrolling all the Indians, requiring the males, capable of bearing arms, to wear tags and to appear every few days to be counted. Then he prepared for the spring raids in pursuit of the Chiricahua renegades still in the Sierra Madres. Troops were stationed at Fort Bowie and other strategic points in the south, ready for instant action, and scouts patrolled the border. The several pack trains in the department were sent to San Carlos for reorganization and equipment.[1] Telegrams and letters were sent to the officers commanding the Mexican troops but no replies were received because the addresses were not accurately known. As it was desirable to have their cooperation, General Crook took a train to Guaymas, Hermosillo and Chihuahua in order to confer personally with the Mexican civil and military authorities. He was very cordially received by all classes, evidence of the high regard in which he was held by the in-

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[1]Lockwood, Pioneer Days in Arizona, p. 186.

habitants of the two affected States of Sonora and Chihuahua.[1]

During the winter several scouting expeditions were sent across the border to learn the whereabouts of the hostiles but they could find out nothing. In March, 1883, a small band of the Chiricahua, under a young chief named Chato, broke through into Arizona, murdering and pillaging as they went. By their familiarity with the country they were able to dodge the troops sent in pursuit, and fled back into Mexico. General Crook organized an expedition to go into the mountains and rout them out. Permission to cross the border had been granted by the Mexican government, and in April he entered Mexico with about two hundred Apache scouts, a troop of cavalry, and two pack trains.

The expedition was very successful. Under the guidance of the Indian scouts, it penetrated more than two hundred miles south of the boundary into the Sierra Madre Mountains and surprised and captured the stronghold of the Chiricahuas. More than three hundred of them returned with Crook to San Carlos. About two hundred, including most of the fighting men,

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[1]Bourke, With General Crook in the Sierra Madre. (See Outlook, August, September, and October, 1885. Clipping in Bourke's "Diary," August 19 - October 22, 1882.)

remained in Mexico, promising to come in as soon as they could get word to the various ranches scattered in the mountains and gather up their live stock.[1] After several months, as nothing was heard from these Indians, Crook sent Lieutenant Britton Davis to the border to hurry up their move to the reservation. After several weeks Chato and about half the band came in to Davis's camp and he took them back to San Carlos and then returned to wait for Geronimo and the rest. Another wait of six weeks, and then Geronimo and his followers arrived at the line bringing with them three hundred fifty head of cattle stolen from the Mexican ranches just below the boundary, and which Geronimo insisted upon bringing to the reservation. The Indians and their cattle were delivered safely at San Carlos, but there the cattle were taken from them and turned in to the agency for beef, the Mexican owners being later paid by our government. The loss of these cattle was one of the causes which led to the outbreak in 1885, when Geronimo, with 143 of the 550 Chiricahua near Fort Apache, left the reservation.[2]

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[1]Davis, The Truth about Geronimo, p. 69.
[2]Ibid. p. 101

The result of this outbreak was the famous Geronimo campaign, which is the theme for the rest of this discussion.

PART II

The Outbreak in 1885, and General Crook's Expedition against Geronimo

By the terms of the agreement entered into by the secretary of the interior, the commissioner of Indian affairs, the secretary of war, and Brigadier-General Crook, the recently captured Apaches were to be kept under the control of the War Department at whatever points on the San Carlos Reservation the department should decide. The War Department was to have complete police control of all the Indians on the reservation and was to feed and care for them until further notice. As the Chiricahuas disliked the San Carlos region, Crook settled them, five hundred and twelve in all, on little farms, near Camp Apache. For the next two years there were no raids in Arizona, and the Indian problem there seemed solved at last. General Crook in his official reports for 1883 stated that the increase of cultivation that year over the year before was about ten fold. The Indians had raised a large amount of barley, which they sold to the government, and corn, most of which they stored for their own use and for

seed. They also had cut and sold to the quartermaster department four hundred tons of hay and three hundred cords of wood. Besides this they had raised for themselves garden truck: pumpkins, melons, potatoes, and so forth.[1]

By the spring of 1885, however, the novelty of farming had worn off. A few of the Indians made half-hearted efforts at clearing little patches of land in the river bottom near Fort Apache, but most of them loafed around the agency, gambling and trading. The Indians were not entirely to blame. This was a mode of life entirely foreign to them, and the region was little adapted to agriculture. Anywhere out of the river bottoms only dry farming was possible, and even in the river bottoms irrigation ditches were necessary. The sections best suited to farming had been assigned to the White Mountain, Cibicu, and Coyotero Apache several years before, and the newcomers had to take what was left.[2]

The fundamental cause of the outbreak in 1885 was the division of authority and the consequent friction between the War Department and the Interior Department.

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[1]Bourke, On the Border with Crook, pp. 457-458.
[2]Davis, The Truth about Geronimo, pp. 122, 123.

The change was due to the fact that the Indian Bureau, in 1884, having had no trouble with the Indians for nearly two years, assumed that the time was ripe for the politicians of the "Indian-ring" to resume their grafting. Accordingly, a new agent was sent to San Carlos who immediately came in conflict with Captain Crawford, the officer in charge there.[1] The Indians were quick to take advantage of conditions, and to defy all authority, both civil and military, and this attitude soon spread to Fort Apache. The Chiricahuas had become restless and suspicious, and a few were anxious to return to their old life. These few, not more than fifteen men, were headed by Chihuahua, who was discontented because of regulations forbidding the drinking of tiswin and the ill treatment of women, and by Geronimo, who had always been intractable and treacherous and whose chief grievance was the loss of the stolen cattle he had brought up from Mexico. Geronimo was not a chief, but he had risen to power because of his courage and skill as a leader. He was feared and disliked by a majority of the Indians.[2]

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[1]Davis, The Truth about Geronimo, p. 137.
[2]Ibid. p. 139

On the 17th of May, 1885, Geronimo and Natchez and one hundred and twenty men, women, and children escaped from the reservation and headed for Mexico, leaving a trail of death and destruction in their path. The immediate cause of the break was a tiswin drinking bout on the part of these two leaders and a number of their followers. They defiantly informed Lieutenant Davis, in charge at Camp Apache, of the fact and wanted to know what he was going to do about it, since he had no jail big enough to hold them all. Davis told them that the matter was too serious for him to decide, and that he was wiring General Crook for instructions. But the wire never reached Crook. It had to go first to San Carlos, and then be relayed on to Whipple Barracks near Prescott. Captain Price, a newcomer in command at San Carlos, decided that the matter was not very important, and so he did not forward the message. After two days of waiting to see what was going to happen to them, this small band slipped away. The other three-fourths of the Indians, under the leadership of Chato who was unfriendly to Geronimo, remained on the reservation, and many of them even enlisted as scouts and rendered valuable

service in the ensuing campaign.[1]

Davis immediately tried to telegraph the news of the escape to Crook, but the Indians had cut the wires and then tied them so that it took some time to discover the break. By the time the pursuit was organized, the Indians were so far along toward their refuge in the Sierra Madre Mountains that the hope of catching them was abandoned, and the troops realized it was to be a long campaign in Mexico.[2] The fugitives were better armed, if anything, then their pursuers. Furthermore, they had friends in Mexico and, it was thought, elsewhere, who profited by their robberies and murders, and who kept them posted concerning the movements of soldiers and scouts. They traveled with lightning speed and operated in a rugged mountain country covering almost as much space as the continent of Europe. For several months the most General Crook was able to do was to prevent them from persuading any more Indians leaving the reservation, and to protect the settlers from their depredations.[3]

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[1]Davis, The Truth about Geronimo, p. 139.
[2]Ibid. pp. 146, 147.
[3]Bourke's "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887. (Clipping from Army and Navy Register, Washington, D, C., May 1, 1886.)

The account of the expedition into Mexico, the finding of the hostile Apaches, and of Geronimo's second flight back across the border, is given by Maus, the young lieutenant who negotiated with Geronimo and brought him in to a conference with Crook, only to lose him again on the way to Fort Bowie.

The command started south by way of the Dragoon Mountains, in the effort to find the trail of a band of Indians who were returning to Mexico after a raid into the United States. After thoroughly scouting these mountains without finding the trail, they crossed the border into Mexico near the town of Fronteras, believing that if they could trace this band they could find the entire hostile camp under Geronimo and Natchez in their haunts in southern Sonora.

By the early part of January, 1886, the troops had penetrated over two hundred miles into the mountains of Mexico. By this time they were sure the hostiles were near and it was decided to move against them immediately. At last, on the 9th of January, Noche, the Indian guide, sent word that the hostile camp was located twelve miles away. It was decided to make a night march and attack them at daylight, in

spite of the fact that night marches were very difficult because the trail of the hostiles was always made purposely over the worst country possible.

Just before daylight they reached a spot from which they could see, in the distance, the dim outlines of the rocky position occupied by the hostiles. The command was quickly disposed for an attack, the first object being to surround the enemy's camp. As they were noiselessly creeping along, the braying of some burros was heard and all at once flames burst from the rifles of some of the hostiles who had gone to investigate the cause of the disturbance. In an instant the whole camp was in arms, and dim forms were seen descending the mountain sides and disappearing below. The troops pursued them for a time but finally gave up because they were too much exhausted by their long march to go farther. The entire herd of the hostiles was captured, all the camp effects, and what little food they had.

After a while an Indian woman brought word that Geronimo and Natchez wanted to talk, and was sent back with the message that Captain Crawford would see the chiefs next day. The conference was to be held about a mile away on the river, but it did not take place,

for a body of Mexican irregular troops attacked Captain Crawford's camp at daybreak, and though every effort was made by the American officers to explain to the Mexicans that they were attacking a friendly force, the firing continued and Crawford was wounded and died a few days later. Lieutenant Maus then assumed command, and the next day the troops proceeded on the homeward march.

That night Geronimo again sent word that he wanted to talk, and the next morning Maus left the command and went with the interpreter and five scouts to a point about a mile or so distant to meet the hostiles. The chiefs did not appear, but two messengers made arrangements for a conference next day at which Maus was to appear without arms. Accordingly, next day Maus went to meet them as directed and found Geronimo, Natchez, Nana, and Chihuahua, with fourteen men, all fully armed and with their belts full of ammunition. Maus describes the conference:

> "Apparently suspicious of treachery, every man of them sat with his rifle in an upright position, forming a circle nearly around me with Geronimo in the center. He sat there for fully a minute looking me straight in the eyes and finally said to me:
>
> "'Why did you come here?'

"'I came to capture or destroy you and your band,' I answered.

"He knew perfectly well that this was the only answer I could truthfully make. He then rose, walked to me and shook my hand saying that he could trust me, and then asked me to report to the department commander what he had to say. He enumerated his grievances at the agency, all of which were purely imaginary or assumed. I advised him to surrender and told him if he did not that neither the United States troops nor the Mexicans would let him rest. He agreed to surrender to me Nana, one other man, his (Geronimo's) wife, and one of Natchez's wives, and some of their children, nine in all, and promised to meet General Crook near San Bernardino in two moons to talk about surrendering. With this understanding I returned to camp. In a short time he sent the prisoners."[1]

The following details of the conference are quoted from Crook's "Report of Operations against the Apache Indians."

"This conference took place in the Canon de los Embudos about twenty-five miles south of San Bernardino, on the 25th day of March. I found the hostiles encamped on a rocky hill surrounded on all sides by ravines and canons through which the hostiles could escape to the higher peaks behind in the event of attack. They were in supurb physical condition, armed to the teeth, with all the ammunition they could carry. In manner they were suspicious and at the same time self-reliant. Lieutenant Maus with his battalion of scouts was encamped on lower ground, separated by a deep rugged

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[1]Nelson A. Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles, pp. 450-579.

canon from their position and distant five hundred or six hundred yards. The hostiles refused to allow any nearer approach.

"I was conscious that in agreeing to meet them I was placing myself in a position similar to that in which General Canby lost his life, and that any incident which might, with or without cause, excite their suspicion would result in my death, and probably that of some of the officers with me. I therefore endeavored to induce them to meet me within the United States, urging that the presence of white soldiers would prevent any attempt of the Mexicans to attack them. But no argument would move them. Into their hands I must trust myself or back they would go to their mountain fastnesses."

Geronimo began the conference with a long recital of his grievances, which General Crook answered, showing that most of it was a fabric of lies.

"After my talk it seemed as if they would accept no terms other than that they be allowed to return to the reservation upon the status ante bellum. This I positively declined and the conference broke up. That night I got emissaries into their camp, but the hostiles were so excited that they would listen to nothing. The Indians whom I had employed told me that they did not dare even talk to them about surrendering. Geronimo told his people to keep their guns in their hands and to be ready to shoot at a moment's notice. The Indians said that the slightest circumstance which would look suspicious would be a signal for firing to begin: that they would kill all they could and scatter in the mountains. Even after they surrendered to me they did not cease their vigilance.

> They kept mounted men constantly on the watch; there were never more than from five to eight of their men in our camp at one time, and even after the march northward began the hostiles did not keep together, but scattered over the country in parties of two and three. At night they camped in the same way, and had I desired it would have been an absolute impossibility to have seized more than a half a dozen of them. The remainder would have escaped, and one breach of faith would have prevented forever any possiblity of any settlement with them."[1]

The last conference with the hostiles took place the afternoon of March 27. General Crook demanded their unconditional surrender. The only propositions they would entertain were three:

1. That they should be sent East for not exceeding two years, taking with them such of their families as they desired.

2. That they should all return to the reservation on the old status.

3. Return to the warpath.

Crook was obliged to decide quickly, and accepted their surrender on the first proposal; the whole party started, escorted by the Apache scouts under Lieutenant Maus, for Fort Bowie.

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[1]Crook, "Report of Operations against Apache Indians," May 1885 to April 1886. (With Bourke's "Diary" for May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887.)

The terms of the surrender were received at Washington on March 30. The response of the President was that their imprisonment in the East for two years and their return to the reservation could not be approved. Certain instructions were given, but before General Crook received the dispatch, Geronimo and Natchez, with some of their followers, left Maus' camp and escaped to the mountains. Whiskey or mescal had been smuggled into their camp and many of them were drunk, but Chihuahua had reported the fact to General Crook and had told him that they would all begin the move to the border, so Crook left for Fort Bowie in order to be within telegraphic communication with the War Department. Lieutenant Maus, with his battalion of scouts, was to conduct the hostiles to Fort Bowie. At the end of the second day's march the command camped at the Smugglers' Springs near the border. Owing to the persistent sale of intoxicating liquors to the Indians by a man named Tribolet, orders were given that his ranch should be guarded so that no liquor could be sold, and all that could be found was destroyed.

That night the hostiles were apparently sober and Maus sent a dispatch to General Crook indicating that there would be no trouble in continuing the march.

But the Indians were in a highly excitable state, and Crook afterward believed that interested parties started rumors among them as to what would happen to them when they were finally turned over to the authorities. At any rate, Geronimo and Natchez with twenty men left sometime during the night, taking with them fourteen women, two young boys, and three horses. No one in the camp, except those who left, seemed to know anything about the matter until the next morning when Lieutenant Maus with eighty scouts of his battalion immediately started in pursuit. Crook, on learning the details of the affair, exonerated Maus, stating that under the circumstances it would have been impossible to have prevented their escape.

The remainder of the prisoners, twenty-seven in number, arrived at Fort Bowie April 2, and on the 7th left, under escort of a company of the 8th Infantry, for Fort Marion, St. Augustine, Florida. Crook believed that this surrender was the entering wedge, and that there would be little difficulty in obtaining the surrender of those still out.[1]

On learning of the escape of the Indians, Crook

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[1]Crook, "Report of Operations against Apache Indians," May 1885 to April 1886. (With Bourke's "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887.)

immediately notified Lieutenant-General Sheridan, who sent the following telegram:

> "Your dispatch of yesterday received. It has occasioned great disappointment. It seems strange that Geronimo and party could have escaped without the knowledge of the scouts."

Knowing that Sheridan had always had his doubts about the dependability of the Apache scouts, Crook hastened to defend them in his reply.

> " . . . . . There can be no question that the scouts were thoroughly loyal, and would have prevented the hostiles leaving had it been possible. When they left their camp with out scouts they scattered over the country so as to make surprise impossible, and they located their camp with this in view, nor would they all remain in camp at one time.[1] . . . . . To inform the Indians that the terms on which they surrendered are disapproved would, in my judgment, not only make it impossible for me to negotiate with them, but result in their scattering to the mountains, and I can't at present see any way to prevent it."[2]

The general tone of Sheridan's next telegram to Crook was somewhat critical. He said that President Cleveland could not understand how the Chiricahuas had been permitted to escape, and as the campaign had demonstrated that the Apache scouts were a failure, and as Crook had so many troops under his orders, it

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[1]Davis, The Truth about Geronimo, p. 214.
[2]Bourke, On the Border with Crook, p. 483.

might be best to take up the defensive and give protection to the settlers and business interests in the threatened localities. Crook promptly replied that protection of life and property had been his constant aim in all the present operations; that he believed his plan upon which he had conducted this campaign the one most likely to succeed in the end; and that since he, Crook, was still wedded to the idea of employing Indian scouts to hunt up the hostiles, he thought it might be better to send a new man to take his place, and therefore he requested that he might be relieved from command of the Department of Arizona. Crook's request was granted the next day. In the change of commands following the death of General Hancock and the retirement of General Pope, Crook was assigned to the Department of the Platte, and Miles took his place in the Department of Arizona on the 12th of April, 1886.[1]

A year later, Crook wrote to the Adjutant General of the army, giving a resume of the operations against the Apache Indians from 1882 to 1886, and asking if it might be published, or, if not, if there were any objections to his having it privately

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," March 1 - May 1 (Con't) 1886.

published and giving out copies of it.

The Assistant Adjutant General, J. C. Kelton, replied that since there was nothing in the letter in the way of military information not previously contained in the official reports of both Crook and Miles, and since the letter was mainly an argument in support of Crook's belief in the efficiency and reliability of the Indian scouts, neither of the means of publication suggested was deemed advisable as it would only reawaken a discussion in the press of a controversy which had died down.

Crook, however, did have his resume privately published[1] because he said not all of his or Miles' reports had been given to the public, and as some of those that were published contained an implied censure of his acts he felt it was only fair that he be allowed to present the facts which justified his action.

In this explanation of his policy Crook stated that Sheridan implied a criticism in the suggestion that the troops be used defensively for the protection of life and property. He explained that for this purpose the troops were stationed along the frontier

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[1]Crook, Resume of Operations against Apache Indians, 1882 to 1886. (Pasted in front of Bourke's "Diary," March 6 to December 31, 1887.)

with a detachment at every point at which it was thought possible for the hostiles to pass. Five Indian scouts were assigned to each detachment to watch the front. A second similar line was established in the rear of the first, both to act as a reserve and to catch any of the hostiles who might slip through the first line. Behind this second line troops were stationed on the railroad so that they might be sent to any desired point on the whole front. "Troops never worked harder or more deserved success, but during the entire sixteen months of this operation, not a single man, woman, or child of the hostiles was killed or captured by the troops of the regular Army."[1]

Crook then goes on to the defense of his use of Indian scouts. It has been claimed, he said in conclusion, that while the Chiricahua scouts could be depended upon to try their utmost to capture or secure the surrender of the hostiles, they had no wish to kill their own people. "It may well be questioned whether it be the policy of the government simply and absolutely to kill a number of the Indians; or to restore peace, and secure the safety of its citizens. The instructions given to me plainly and specifically authorize me to

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[1]Crook, Resume of Operations against Apache Indians, 1882 to 1886. (Pasted in front of Bourke's "Diary," March 6 to December 31, 1887.)

secure the surrender of the hostiles, without conditions if possible, with conditions if necessary. It was not until my successor assumed command that orders were given, 'looking to the destruction or capture of the hostiles,' simply."[1]

In view of the controversy which later took place concerning Miles' dealings with Geronimo, it is interesting, at this point, to consider some earlier agitation in favor of Crook's removal from Arizona. The first intimation of such a move is found in an entry in Bourke's diary which says that a number of newspapers, the Capital of Washington, D. C., the St. Louis Globe-Democrat, San Francisco Chronicle, and others, all of about the same date, had contained editorials assailing Crook, and suggesting that he be superseded by Miles or some other officer. Bourke adds that the whole thing "smacks of the Literary Bureau style of pre-arrangement."[2]

Bourke pasted in his diary several newspaper clippings dealing with the talked-of removal of Crook. The Chicago Tribune for January 6, 1886, says that the rumor about the President's intention of replacing

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[1]Crook, Resume of Operations against Apache Indians, 1882 to 1886. (Pasted in front of Bourke's Diary, March 6 to December 31, 1887.)

[2]Bourke's "Diary," January 8 - March 1, (Con't) 1886.

Crook in the Southwest by Miles is well founded, although it is not true that this intention is due to the complaints of the Congressmen from the Southwest. Cleveland had studied the Indian problem carefully, and in his investigations he became impressed with the record of General Miles as an Indian fighter, and as complaints of the Apache outrages in the Southwest became more numerous he practically decided that Miles was the man for the emergency. He had no prejudice against Crook, but he would not listen to explanations and excuses as long as the outrages were not stopped. He would have put Miles in command months before if it had not been for the opposition of General Sheridan, who said it would be unjust to a faithful officer, and that no man could deal successfully with the Apaches if Crook could not.

The article goes on to say that there were reasons why the transfer of Miles to Arizona would help the administration. Miles' wife was John Sherman's niece who was the sister of Senator Don Cameron's wife. This family connection might insure the friendly interest of two Republican senators in the President's Indian policy. If Miles were to succeed in pacifying the Southwest, doing what Crook had failed to do, it would

strengthen President Cleveland and his party in the Southwest. Miles also had the support of General Pope, with whom he had been associated in the army more or less since the Civil War.

Crook's friends said that when he went to Arizona after his successful management of the Sioux in Nebraska and Dakota he came into conflict with various Indian rings which did everything possible to embarrass him, particularly on the San Carlos Reservation. They also claimed that the complaints about Crook came chiefly from the speculators who were interested in shifting the troops as often as possible.

Inquiry at the War Department brought out a specific denial that any such change in the Department of Arizona was contemplated. It was stated that both Secretary Endicott and General Sheridan were satisfied that Crook had done everything possible toward suppressing the Indian outbreaks, and they could not see that a change in the command would help the situation. But it was the President who was to make the change and it was to him that all the arguments had been addressed.

The clipping, of which the above is a summary, is prefaced by the following remark by Bourke:

> "This extract would seem to show that General Miles and his friends have been guilty of some very questionable work in Washington, but happily without success."

The next clipping is from the New York Times, January 10, 1886, which states that one of the reasons for the talk about the displacement of Crook by Miles in charge of the operations in the Southwest, is the effect it might have upon the chances for promotion for certain officers. Major-General John Pope was soon to retire, and President Cleveland would select one of the six brigadier-generals to be promoted to the rank of General Pope. Miles and Crook were the two officers from whom it was believed the selection would be made, and the friends of each were doing what they could to secure the appointment. If Crook were let alone and if he should succeed in putting down the hostile Apaches in New Mexico and Arizona it would further his chances for promotion. On the other hand if Miles were sent out to relieve Crook and proved fortunate enough to subdue the Indians who had given Crook so much trouble it would bring him before the President in a most favorable light. The vacancy left in the grade of brigadier-general would be filled from the ranks of the colonels, and so on down the list, so that General Pope's retire-

ment would involve a number of interests.[1]

An editorial entitled, "A Word for Crook," in the San Franciscan, California, January 23rd, points out much the same conjecture and adds that Crook had not had to fight the Apaches only, but had had to contend with misrepresentation and slander from those who found they could not use him as a tool. In this list were the Arizona Indian ring, the "mining sharks and cattle swindlers" who wanted to seize upon the Apache Reservation, and the contractors who supplied the agencies. It was unfortunate that at this particular time "military jealousy, backed by family and petticoat influence at Washington, should lend itself to the scheme for 'downing' a brother officer." On the other hand, it was fortunate for Miles that his wife was a niece of William and John Sherman. The situation in Arizona was bad enough without complicating matters by removing the only man in the army who thoroughly understood the country, the Indians, and the people, and in whom General Sheridan placed such great confidence. That the best element in the Southwest itself appreciated Crook was evidenced by the fact that the Society of Arizona Pioneers, "the only association of bona fide pioneers

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," January 8 to March 1, (Con't) 1886.

in the Southwest," just at this time had held a meeting and indorsed Crook to the fullest extent as being "from their personal knowledge of the past fifteen years, the only man to cope with the situation."[1]

The following is an extract from an editorial headed "Crook and his Enemies" in the San Franciscan for February 6th:

> "If persistent lying can get Crook out and get some more pliable man in, we may expect it to be done. With the Indian ring it is purely a matter of profit. With the officers who have assisted the design of the Ring by intriguing against a worthy officer, it is a matter of personal feeling or prejudice. There is no liklihood that General Miles, should he supercede Crook, would prove less incorruptible or more favorable to plundering schemes than General Crook; but he would be in a new position, with a limited knowledge of the country and the men, and would be certain to be imposed upon."[2]

The last clipping is from San Bernardino Springs, Arizona, written by a correspondent from the Saint Louis Republican, February 17, 1886. He claims to have made a thorough investigation of the complaints against General Crook, and to have found that they came not from the old settlers who were for him to a man, but from his military rivals, politicians, the

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," January 8 to March 1, (Con't) 1886.

[2]Ibid.

Indian-ring, and all classes who hope to make a living off an army. Also the new arrivals in the country who were interested in cattle ranches and mines, and whose property was endangered by the Indians, criticized him.[1]

Some of the foregoing, as the newspapers themselves admit, is based on nothing more than rumor and conjecture. However, because there was so much criticism, whatever was back of it, General Crook telegraphed to Lieutenant General his request to be relieved from the command of the Department of Arizona. This was near the last of March, 1886, about two weeks before Geronimo's escape and Crook's second request, which was granted.[2] He gave no reason for the desired change, but the guess in army circles was that he was tired of the complaints from various quarters about his Indian policy, and thought he would let someone else try it for a while and see if he could do any better.[3]

A better piece of evidence that the friends of Miles were working for the removal of Crook is found in the following letter which Bourke has reproduced

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," January 8 to March 1 (Con't) 1886.
[2]Bourke's "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887, (Clipping from Army and Navy Journal, April 10, 1886.)
[3]Bourke's "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887.

in his diary. The letter is from W. H. H. Llewellyn of Las Cruces, New Mexico, written from Santa Fe, January 30, 1886.

"Dear General:

I have just returned from Washington, D. C. I very much regret that I did not see Mrs. Crook before she left for the West as I have some information which I should have preferred reaching you through Mrs. Crook, than by letter.

"While in Washington, I found that Governor Ross, instigated mostly by Albuquerque and Silver City friends of his, was doing everything he could to hurt you. Several friends of his stated that he, Ross, was largely interested in Albuquerque real estate and that he, Ross, had received assurances from an officer representing General Miles, that Department-Headquarters would go to Albuquerque should Ross succeed in effecting your removal. Ross wrote letters to Laird, M. C. from Nebraska, arraigning you and your actions terribly.

"I read them and tried to turn Laird, but could not. He is not your friend. The rest of the Nebraska delegation is very friendly to you.

"I found that General Bradley and prominent citizens of Santa Fe had done all they could to counteract Ross' and his Albuquerque and Silver City friends' attacks on you. I have seen strong letters written by Santa Fe people to influential and prominent rep. and dem. senators, asking that they see the President and have you retained in command, and denying Ross' statements.

"I explained to the President in person the character of the men who are

writing these venemous letters against you. Senator Van Wythe told the President in my presence that the Nebraska delegation, except Laird, would not tolerate any injustice to you and wanted to see you the next Major-General.

"The pressure for you on the President is very strong and, in my opinion, the President's mind has been fully disabused of the impressions made by Ross et al.

"The information contained herein can be relied on and when the interests of Santa Fe, in the matter of District or Department Head-Quarters, should ever be in jeopardy, I have to request as a personal favor and because they deserve it, that you do all you can consistently in aid and support of Santa Fe. Your attention is invited to enclosed newspaper clipping.

Yours very truly,

(sig.) W. H. H. Llewellyn."[1]

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," January 8 - March 1 (Con't.) 1886.

PART III

General Miles' Expedition and the Surrender of Geronimo

The situation which confronted General Miles on taking over command of the Department of Arizona was a difficult one. Nine-tenths of the vast territory over which the hostile Indians ranged was an absolute wilderness. The task of catching thirty-four of these Indians, tireless, fearless, and constantly on the alert, was infinitely harder than if there had been a thousand. Luck had to be an important factor, along with skill and generalship.

General Miles' military record would seem to justify the President's choice of a successor to General Crook. Miles did not have a formal military education, but he had received the rudiments of his training from a former officer of the French army. His opportunity came, however, when the Civil War broke out and he recruited a company of one hundred volunteers which formed part of the 22nd Massachusetts Regiment. With one exception, he fought in every important battle of the Army of the Potomac, and after

each engagement he was commended for gallantry, and promoted, until by the end of the war he had attained the rank of Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

After the war he was transferred to the regular service and put in command of the 5th Infantry, which he made famous through his long continued field service. For fifteen years he carried on difficult but successful campaigns against various hostile Indian tribes west of the Mississippi.

> "Without benefit of many singal advantages possessed by his military contemporaries, he attained outstanding leadership through his indefatigable industry, sound judgment, and personal bravery."[1]

Lieutenant-General Sheridan's instructions to Miles were in accordance with the directions of the President and were communicated by the Adjutant-General as follows:

> "He directs that the greatest care be taken to prevent the spread of hostilities among the friendly Indians in your command, and that the most vigorous operations looking to the destruction or capture of the hostiles be ceaselessly carried on. He does not wish to embarrass you by undertaking at this distance to give specific instructions in relation to operations against the hostiles, but is is deemed advisable to suggest the

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[1]Charles Dudley Rhodes, "Nelson A. Miles" in Dictionary of American Biography, XII, pp. 614, 615.

> necessity of making active and prominent use of the regular troops of your command."[1]

In his Diary, one year later, that of March 6 - December 31, 1887, Bourke makes the following comment on the above instructions:

> "This dispatch was all bumcombe and meant as such. Its key-note was 'anything to hurt and belittle Crook'-- and as Crook had advocated the use of Apache scouts, the words about the use of troops had an unusual significance. But Apache scouts were used more prominently than ever, even to the extent of being sent to beg Geronimo to come in on any terms. However, these services were not fittingly acknowledged."

Miles arrived at Fort Bowie on the afternoon of April 12th, 1886. After a close conference with Crook, who explained the situation fully, he issued a brief "General Orders" in which he assumed command of the Department of Arizona, including the troops in Arizona, New Mexico, at Fort Bliss, Texas, and Fort Lewis, Colorado. The next morning, while the two commanders were again going over the situation with which Miles was now to deal, the Apache scouts came in to say good-by to Crook. They hugged him and patted him and did a great deal of talking; Miles

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," March 1 - May 1 (Con't.) 1886.

made them a short speech, pointing out to them how much better off they were than the renegades in the mountains in Mexico and the prisoners now in Florida. He told them that every last one of the hostiles would be hunted down and taken alive or dead, no matter how long it took nor how much money it cost. General Crook left at noon followed by the cordial good wishes and regrets of the troops and civilians who were in a position to know him and his invaluable work in Arizona.[1]

Miles adopted a policy which was midway between what Crook had wanted to do and what Sheridan had demanded that Crook should do.[2] The territory was to be distributed for thorough patrol, and twenty-five or thirty signal posts established on prominent mountain peaks using the heliostat for signaling. The scouts were dismissed, except a few to be used as trailers with the various cavalry and infantry commands. The infantry was to be used in constant hunting through the mountains, occupying passes and so forth, the cavalry was to be used in light scouting, with a sufficient force always ready for instant

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," March 1 - May 1 (Con't) 1886 (Clipping from Los Angeles Times, April 16th, 1886.)

[2]Davis, The Truth about Geronimo, p. 219.

pursuit. To prevent the hostiles from getting ammunition, every cartridge was to be accounted for and all empty shells destroyed.[1]

In commenting on the clipping from the Army and Navy Journal May 1, 1886, from which the above summary was made, Bourke says:

> " . . . . . Miles' proclamation is sheer, idle bombast. The district system was tried years ago in Arizona and died of its own weight. The cavalry can follow up hostiles and run themselves down but what then? There'll be no indefatigable Apache scouts to hang to the trail by night and by day, to pick it out from rocks, and bush, in canon and on precipice. Miles is not going to have any Apache scouts, so he says. That part of his order about ammunition is claptrap. The order was issued to the newspapers of Arizona, not to the soldiers. It is a political bid for votes, a military charlatain's effort to curry favor with the vilest rabble on God's footstool--demagoguery, pure and simple."[2]

Near the last of April, Miles wrote to Washington describing the unprotected condition of the national boundary and asking an appropriation by Congress of $200,000 for improving and strengthening the existing posts and establishing new ones. He pointed out that from Fort Bliss, Texas, to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, a stretch of two hundred fifty

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887.
[2]Ibid.

miles, there was not one post, and it was between these two points that every raiding party from Sierra Madre had entered the United States. There were a dozen bodies of troops stationed along this space, but it was extremely expensive to keep them there because all supplies had to be packed in to them. He also added that it might be necessary for the United States government to call on the Mexican government to remove the renegades now in the Sierra Madres so far into the interior of Mexico that they would no longer be a menace to the United States. Bourke, commenting on the request for an appropriation, says:

> "The demand for $200,000 to build new posts may please the ring in Arizona, but it will deceive no one familiar with the country, as there is no permanent water, except at points already occupied by posts."[1]

General Miles began his campaign with great zeal and energy. He organized a principal pursuit column under Captain H. W. Lawton, Fourth Cavalry, with orders to operate only south of the American border. The command as at first organized was composed of

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887, (Clipping from Inter-Ocean, Chicago, Ill., April 22, 1886.

infantry, cavalry, and about a dozen Indian trailers, the only scouts who had been retained.[1] After five days in the mountains of northern Sonora the cavalry were dismounted, the horses, discarded, and the men joined the infantry.

Before Miles was fairly ready the Indians themselves precipitated the campaign by committing depredations south of the boundary in northern Mexico. This gave him a positive knowledge of their whereabouts. On the 27th of April they invaded United States territory, passing up the Santa Cruz Valley, stealing stock and killing a few citizens. In an engagement on the 15th of May, Captain Hatfield surprised the Indians near Santa Cruz, Sonora, and captured their entire camp equipage and about twenty-five horses. One of the Indians deserted and later surrendered and accompanied Gatewood when he induced Geronimo to surrender to Miles.

A campaign into the Sierra Madre Mountains was at once begun, and for the next three months Captain Lawton pursued the savages from one range of mountains to another, the troops during this time marching 1,400 miles. The governor of Sonora, Torres, was

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[1]Davis, The Truth about Geronimo, p. 219.

of great assistance to the officers in moving troops and supplies through that part of the country.

On the 13th of August information was received that the Indians were moving toward a mountain range in northern Sonora, and Captain Lawton immediately set out to head them off, arriving in the neighborhood of Fronteras on the 20th. There he learned that they had communicated to the Mexicans a desire to surrender. In the meantime Miles had found the deserter, before referred to, who reported that when he left the camp of his companions they were much worn down and disheartened and that some of them were ready to surrender if two or three men whom they knew were sent to talk to them. This Indian, and one other, an influential Chiricahua, were sent under the charge of Lieutenant Gatewood to seek out the hostile camp and demand a surrender.[1]

When Gatewood reached Fronteras he learned that two of the hostile women had been in town a few days before to sound out the Mexican authorities on the question of peace. After following the trail of the women for several days, he heard that the hostiles

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[1]Nelson A. Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles, pp. 489, 493.

were in camp about four miles away. The two Indians who were to make connections with the hostiles went into Geronimo's camp and informed him of their mission. Geronimo kept one of the messengers all night, but sent the other back to say that he would talk to Gatewood only, the meeting to be in the open.[1] Gatewood had the talk with him, which he describes as follows:

> "By squads the hostiles came in, unsaddled and turned out their ponies to graze. Among the last to arrive was Geronimo. He laid his rifle down twenty feet away and came and shook hands, remarking my apparent bad health and asking what was the matter. The tobacco having been passed around, of which I had brought fifteen pounds on my saddle, he took a seat along side as near as he could get, the others in a semi-circle, and announced that the whole party was there to listen to General Miles' message.
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> "It took but a minute to say, 'Surrender, and you will be sent with your families to Florida, there to await the decision of the President as to your final disposition. Accept these terms or fight to the bitter end.'"[2]

At first Geronimo emphatically refused to consider Miles' demands. He said they would surrender only on condition that they be allowed to return to

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[1]Nelson A. Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles, p. 511

[2]Davis, The Truth about Geronimo, p. 225.

the reservation and be furnished with rations, clothing, and farm implements, and be guaranteed that they would not be punished. Gatewood returned to his camp agreeing to meet the Indians again the next morning and continue the argument. Gatewood conferred with the Indians all the next day, and at last the following morning they told him that they had decided to go to the border and surrender to Miles, but they insisted that they were not to give up their arms until after their talk with Miles, that Lawton's troops should march near them to protect them in case they should meet other commands, and that Gatewood should go with them and sleep in their camp.[1] Miles had authorized Gatewood to promise Geronimo and his band that they should be sent with their families to Florida, and it was because of this promise that Gatewood induced them to agree to surrender.[2]

Captain Leonard Wood, who was with Lawton's command, said that after Geronimo's negotiations with the Indians, Geronimo, Natchez, and a few others, came into Lawton's camp and after a short conference agreed to accompany Lawton to a place where they could meet

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[1]Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles, p. 512.

[2]Davis, The Truth about Geronimo, p. 232.

General Miles and formally surrender. He said there could be no doubt that the terms of surrender were fully understood by all the Indians, and in all the talks at which he was present they seemed to comprehend perfectly that the surrender was to be unconditional and that they were told from the very first that the intention was to send them away. The only definite assurance given them was that American soldiers did not kill their prisoners.[1]

General Miles, in his Personal Recollections, gives a detailed account of the surrender. In their interviews with Captain Lawton, the Indians asked the same terms and privileges which they had been granted before. They wanted to see General Miles, but Miles notified Lawton that he was "fully authorized to receive their surrender as prisoners of war to troops in the field." They were told that if they laid down their arms they would not be killed but held as prisoners of war subject to higher legal authority. They promised to surrender to Miles in person, and so both groups, Lawton's command and the camp of Geronimo and Natchez, moved north in parallel lines; often camping near each other.

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[1]Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles, p. 517.

Geronimo sent his brother ahead to Fort Bowie to remain there as a hostage in order to assure Miles that their consent to surrender was in good faith. As soon as Lawton notified Miles of the sending of the hostage, Miles started south and joined Lawton's camp at Skeleton Canon on September 3. Soon after Miles' arrival Geronimo arrived for a conference. At first he wanted to surrender as they had surrendered before, going back to Camp Apache and taking their arms and stolen stock with them. Miles replied that they must surrender absolutely as prisoners of war, that they must rely upon the President for the character of their punishment, and that they must submit to being moved out of the country. Geronimo consulted, brought in his band the next morning, and Natchez came in a little later.

The Indians were abundantly supplied with stolen property, and were well mounted on Mexican horses. Many of the men were outlaws from their own tribes, "and their boys of from twelve to eighteen were the very worst and most vicious of all." This last fact would have presented a difficulty had they been turned over to the civil courts for trial and punishment. The principal warriors would probably have been

indicted, but the young men and boys who had no doubt committed many of the crimes, would have escaped punishment, and if, allowed to remain in their own country, would have returned to the warpath.

After the surrender of the hostiles the command started for Fort Bowie, Miles going on ahead escourted by a troop of cavalry and accompanied by Geronimo, Natchez, and four other Indians. Captain Lawton followed with the rest of the band. On arriving at Fort Bowie the Indians were dismounted, disarmed, and placed under a strong guard, and in order to avoid any interference from the civil authorities a guard was put around the reservation. On September 8, the prisoners were put on the train at Bowie Station and started toward their destination in Florida.[1]

As soon as the details of the Geronimo surrender were made public a storm of criticism swept the country, and the newspapers were full of recriminations: because Miles had disobeyed his orders in accepting a conditional surrender; because due credit for the surrender was not given to Gatewood; because, after all of Miles' assertions to the contrary, he resorted to Crook's policy in the end; because Miles had played

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[1]Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles, pp. 518-527.

false with the Indians in not sending them with their families as he had promised; and because the good Indians had been punished along with the bad. Miles and his supporters responded to the accusations, explaining and denying until finally in late December, after four months of bitter argument, the matters were glossed over in Washington and dropped.

Considering these accusations one by one in the order mentioned above, the most official account of the first is Secretary of War Endicott's Report of the Apache Indian Campaign, of which the following is is an extract:

> "The fact of the surrender was communicated to the President and the authorities in Washington on September 7th, and from the information received on that date the surrender was supposed to be unconditional. To this dispatch the President replied that all the hostiles should be very safely kept as prisoners until they could be tried for their crimes, or otherwise disposed of. The first intimation that the surrender was not unconditional reached the department on September 9th by telegraphic advice from General Miles, through his division commander, that the Indians surrendered with the understanding that they would be sent out of the country, and in pursuance of this plan General Miles had ordered them to be taken to Fort Marion. As this order was in direct opposition to the President's orders, General Stanley was directed from the War Department to stop these Indians at San Antonio, Texas, and hold them securely until further orders.

"Nothing more specific in regard to the surrender was received at the department until the receipt of General Howard's dispatch of September 24th in which he said that he believed at first from official reports that the surrender was unconditional except that the troops would not kill the hostiles; but from General Miles' dispatches, and from his annual report, the conditions were plain that the lives of all the Indians should be spared, and that they should be sent to Fort Marion, where their tribe, including their families, had already been ordered.

On September 25, General Miles was directed by the President to report by telegraph the exact promises if any, made to Geronimo at the time of the surrender. In his reply General Miles states:

"'At the request of Captain Lawton, I joined his command. Geronimo came to me and recounted his grievances. I informed him that Captain Lawton and Lieutenant Gatewood were honorable, and that if they threw down their arms, and placed themselves entirely at our mercy, they would not be killed; but that they must surrender absolutely as prisoners of war, and rely upon the justice of the Government or trust their future to the President of the United States. I informed him that I was removing all the Chiricahuas and Warm Springs Indians from Arizona, and that they would all be removed from this country at once for all time, and this they understood. Geronimo replied that he would obey any order I might give, and go to any place, and that he would bring in his camp which he did. Natchez subsequently surrendered his camp in the same way. Their status is the same as that of Chief Joseph, Sitting Bull, and hundreds of others. They are strictly prisoners of war, the result of the skill and fortitude of our troops. As prisoners

of war they are now entirely under the control of the President.'

"The terms and conditions attending this surrender were such that Geronimo and those of his band who had committed murders and acts of violence in Arizona and New Mexico could not properly be handed over to the civil authorities for punishment, as was intended by the President, and therefore on the 19th day of October, orders were issued, by direction of the President, that Geronimo and the fourteen hostile Apache adult Indians captured with him should be sent from San Antonio, Texas, under proper guard, to Fort Pickens, Florida, there to be kept in close custody until further orders."[1]

Miles' response to the demand for "direct promises made to Geronimo" seems somewhat vague, and in every account which he gives, the same thing is true. It is rather like the Hatter's remark to Alice, appearing "to have no sort of meaning in it, and yet it was certainly English." The Washington Star says in this connection:

"It is known that the report is not a satisfactory one to the authorities at Washington. He does not, as he was directed to do, state exactly what the conditions of the surrender were, nor does he give any good reason for accepting a conditional surrender, which was not in accord with the policy of the Government, and which amounts practically to a violation of orders. He apparently regards the possession of the hostiles the only object to be attained, and in his report covers up his failure to

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887.

> comply with General Sheridan's request for full particulars as to the conditions of surrender by argument and illustration which, when carefully considered show unmistakably that he secured the prisoners only upon the condition that their lives should be spared and that they should at once be removed from Arizona."[1]

Almost every clipping bearing on this subject, which Bourke has pasted in his diary, is accompanied by some scathing comment of his own. A few days after the surrender, he writes:

> "General Miles telegraphed to the War Department that he had arrived at Fort Bowie with Geronimo, Natchez, and band of Chiricahuas, prisoners of war, 'surrendered unconditionally'. Miles knew that he was sending a false report, a miserable lie. Geronimo surrendered on his own terms, immunity from punishment and permission to join his family now in Florida."[2]

General Miles claimed that his course in connection with the Indian campaign had been unjustly criticised, and that he had been given full discretion in the matter of the conduct of the campaign and of its termination. The War Department, however, came out with the information that when Miles succeeded Crook in command of the Department of Arizona, his orders from Lieutenant General Sheridan were that "operations looking to the destruction or capture of the hostile Indians be cease-

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[1] Bourke's "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887.
[2] Ibid.

lessly carried out." In order to emphasize the special instructions in the order, the words destruction and capture were underscored. It was held that no officer would have considered that he had discretion in accepting a conditional surrender, for a capture is not a surrender. Neither the army circles nor the public could understand how Miles could have regarded a surrender, on the terms he acknowledged, to have been in accordance with the specific orders sent to him. It is hard to reconcile two somewhat conflicting statements of General Miles, first, that Geronimo and Natchez both surrendered on the strength of an assertion that no terms could be made with them, but that they must look to the President as the final arbiter in the case; and, second, that Miles had full discretion.[1] And it is hard to see why, with the means of communication, and all the facts in possession of somebody, the public all this time could not find out whether Geronimo could be punished as a murderer, or had to be treated as an honorable foe. And bourke adds, at the end of these newspaper comments, "Miles has been lying from the very first."[2]

The controversy was still in full swing as late

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887.
[2]Ibid.

as the last of December. The Washington Star for December 10, 1886, relates that when Geronimo was told at San Antonio that the President had ordered that he and his followers should be imprisoned at Fort Pickens, Florida, he asked to see General Stanley and told that officer that Miles had promised they should not be separated from their families. He added, with an expressive gesture of his hand, that the past was to be entirely wiped out.[1]

The Star, for December 21, states that there are papers on file at the War Department which show that Geronimo and his band claimed even better terms than those really granted to prisoners of war. General Stanley, who had charge of these Indians at San Antonio, reported that their version of the terms of surrender was confirmed by a lieutenant who was present, and also by the interpreter.[2]

Bourke, in the entry for November 10, 1890, in his diary, quotes Captain Foot's remarks about the surrender of Geronimo.

> "He said he had been stationed at Cloverdale, New Mexico, when word was sent to him that Lawton had captured Geronimo. Foot took the mail over to Lawton near Skeleton Canon

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887.
[2]Ibid.

where he found the military encamped in one place and the Chiricahuas three hundred yards off, with every one of their warriors on guard, armed to the teeth.

"Foot asked Lawton why the Apaches acted thus after having 'surrendered.'

"'Surrender! Hell!' said Lawton. 'It's as much as I can do to keep them here. They must see Miles and I've sent him word that he must come down and be quick about it, or they'll all skip.' Then he went on to say that Geronimo had been in to see him the day previous, and that he felt strongly tempted to carry out his secret instructions which were to have officers approach carelessly, and upon a signal to be given by Lawton, attack Geronimo with revolvers and knives, but he added, and I gladly put in the remarks as showing that every noble impulse had not yet departed, 'I didn't like to do it--I was afraid it wouldn't do.'

"Miles came down in an ambulance, wearing a white linen shirt, which is all that need be said regarding the hardships of his campaign; after the 'surrender' had been perfected, he made the soldiers put up a heap of stones, inside of which was a bottle containing a piece of paper with the words:--'On this spot Geronimo surrendered to General Miles 1886'"[1]

Since there seemed so much uncertainty at the time as to just what constituted a "surrender," it may be well to insert here a summary of an article in the Washington Star which discusses the question.

If the Indians who surrendered to General Miles in the fall of 1886 should be considered prisoners of war

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," November 1, 1890 - January 14, 1891.

they could not be turned over to the civil authorities for trial, and the only means of punishing them would be the verdict of a trial by a military commission. But a military commission could try them only as a public enemy and therefore it would have to be proved that the Apaches as a tribe were at war with the United States. The Supreme Court had decided "that a detached band of marauding Indians was not an 'enemy', and these renegade Indians were simply a group of one of three bands of the Apache tribe.

When Miles assumed command General Sheridan directed "that operations looking to the destruction or capture of the hostile Indians be ceaselessly carried on." Army officers in general hold that such an order to "capture or destroy" could not permit of any terms whatever. It was a question whether the Indians could be regarded as prisoners of war, but if they did surrender as such, General Miles' promises to them should have been kept inviolate.[1]

The chief difficulty was that no one seemed able to discover just what terms or promises Miles had made to Geronimo. There were a number of conflicting stories told by different persons who were present at the

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887 (Clipping from Washington Star, October 10, 1886)

conference, and Miles himself seemed unable to make a report that was satisfactory to the Secretary of War.

It is possible that the whole affair might be explained as follows: That Miles was sent to bring the Indian troubles in the Southwest to a speedy close. Since Crook's policy had been criticised, Miles had to lay other plans, and because he was much more communicative than Crook, his plans received wide publicity. Miles, though he was an experienced Indian fighter, had had no dealings with this particular type of Indians,--the Chiricahua Apache. When he found that he had to resort to Crook's methods after all, the fact that he had so publicly repudiated these methods, laid him open to criticism. The campaign proved much longer and more expensive and more difficult than he had expected, and when at last he saw a chance to end it he disregarded his instructions and brought in Geronimo under terms, since that seemed to be the only means possible at the time. Later when explanations were demanded he did his best to reconcile his actions with his instructions, and thus the vagueness of his replies to Washington. Since Miles' orders from Lieutenant General Sheridan that "operations looking to the <u>destruction</u> or <u>capture</u> of the hostile Indians be ceaselessly carried out" were

emphatic, it would seem that there would have been some reprimand for his disregard of these orders, and for his lack of a satisfactory explanation. A Senate resolution in the spring of 1887 did demand the whole correspondence in regard to the surrender of Geronimo, but after all the dispatches were submitted, no further action seems to have been taken. At the time of Miles' assignment to the Department of Arizona it was pointed out by some of the newspapers that he was connected, through his wife, with two influencial Republican senators, and that if he were successful in pacifying the Southwest it would mean some Republican support for President Cleveland and his party. This may partly explain why, after the storm of criticism, the whole matter was quietly dropped by the Washington authorities.

In the accounts of the Geronimo surrender, Lieutenant Gatewood receives little if any credit, and yet it was Gatewood who, with a little band of six or eight men and two Indian scouts, followed the trail of the Apaches for three days, a piece of flour sack on a stick as a flag of truce; who finally met them and induced them to come in to arrange for a surrender. It seems to fall to the lot of young lieutenants to carry out these dangerous undertakings. Lieutenant

Maus did practically the same thing when he arranged that Geronimo should come in to meet Crook, but in his case he was not assigned the duty, it devolved upon him because he was next in command after the death of Captain Crawford.

James Caffey of the Omaha Bee in an article September 29 entitled, "A Theatrical Campaign," says:

> "Lawton did not do the service of the command of Davis and Crawford last year. Still the effort has been made to identify him wholly with all that has been attained out here when, and mark my words, he never had a fight, never drew blood, and never captured an Indian."

Later in the same article he says:

> "General Miles has acted like a theatrical manager in the whole business. Everything possible has been done to make Geronimo's surrender a personal triumph. When Captain Lawton arrived at Fort Bowie the Fourth Cavalry band, which had been sent for the purpose, discoursed thrilling, martial music."[1]

In another article, October 10 he says:

> "Lawton received a great deal of undeserved credit for Geronimo's surrender. He had nothing whatever to do with it. Lieutenant Gatewood, with two scouts, begged Geronimo to come in, promised him immunity from danger, and secured the return of the whole Chiricahua cavalcade."[2]

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[1] Bourke's "Diary," November 1, 1890 - January 14, 1891.

[2] Ibid.

Miles himself, in his order to his troops announcing the close of the Indian campaign in Arizona mentions three officers as most conspicuous for their acts of heroism, but Gatewood is not one of the three.

Britton Davis is somewhat bitter on the subject of the treatment of Gatewood. He quotes a note written by Lawton to Gatewood, the last part of which is as follows:

> " . . . . . It will be too late for me to go over tonight, and besides I do not wish to interfere with you, but will come over if you wish me. Send a man back to conduct pack mules over, and write me what you want. I hope and trust your efforts will meet with success."

Davis adds:

> "As Miles never saw Geronimo until he met him with Gatewood at the border, September 3, 1886, this note of Lawton's should settle the controversy over who 'captured Geronimo.' At the time the note was written Lawton was in camp where Gatewood had camped when he first got in touch with the hostiles and was overtaken by Brown. The Indians had turned Brown's scouts back and specified that no troops or scouts should approach nearer than that point while they were negotiating with Gatewood, four miles away. That was as near as Lawton got to them until after they had agreed with Gatewood on the terms of their surrender . . . . . Credit is due Lawton for four months of strenuous work under mighty discouraging conditions. Lawton himself never claimed

more."[1]

Davis goes on to tell of the banquet given in honor of General Miles by the citizens of Tucson, at which "he was presented with a Tiffany sword and Lawton a fine watch for 'capturing Geronimo.'" Gatewood had been invited but was unable to attend because he was left in command of the post while Miles and the other officers were away.[2]

With regard to the third criticism, that Miles, after belittling Crook's policy, ended by employing it after all, Caffey of the Omaha Bee comments that Miles, in coming to Arizona, had a different class of Indians to deal with. Though entirely inexperienced in Apache warfare, he boasted of what he proposed to accomplish by reversing Crook's methods. The Indian scouts were to be abandoned as untrustworthy, the regular cavalry were to do the pursuing, and the Apaches were to be worn out by a relentless pursuit into "unconditional surrender or annihilation in the field." The papers came out with many details of the organization of the campaign: additional troops, the equipment of a heliograph corps to signal

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[1]Davis, The Truth about Geronimo, pp. 228, 229.
[2]Ibid., p. 235.

the trail of the enemy, the efforts which were to be made to bring the war to a speedy close. And then after all this publicity there were several useless campaigns without results, and finally a surrender of the Indians on their own terms.

Caffey goes on to say that Miles failed until he adopted every one of Crook's methods which he had so loftily discarded. Indian scouts were again employed, and the officers were ordered to bring in the Apaches on any terms, but to bring them in without delay. It was easier for Miles than it had been for Crook because these Indians had every inducement to join their relatives and friends who had already been sent East.[1]

Bourke, in quoting Captain Foot, said,

> "that Miles in everything imitated as closely as he could, Crook's methods, and when his imitations failed of success his sycophantic subordinates made a campaign of abuse against the noble old soldier denying that Miles had been compelled to fall back upon Crook's employment of Indian scouts whereas the facts were that every company and every detachment great or small had Indian scouts, and where Apaches wouldn't go, Yaquis were used instead."[2]

In addition to the above newspaper clipping is

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887 ("A Theatrical Campaign," Omaha Bee, September 29, 1886.)

[2]Bourke's "Diary," November 1, 1890 - January 14, 1891.

this entry found in Bourke's diary:

> "To correct an erroneous impression artfully disseminated by General Miles and his people to the effect that Crook's policy had been subverted in Arizona, and that above all, Apache scouts were no longer employed in hunting down the hostiles, peaceful Papagoes being substituted for them, I here give a list from the official reports, of the number of Apache scouts in service during the last month that Crook was in command of the Department of Arizona, and during the succeeding months, under Miles.

"March '86	April '86	May '86	June '86
454	424	409	431

July '86	Aug. '86	Sept. '86	Oct. '86
362	391	395	69

> "In October 1886, after Geronimo had been cajoled into trusting himself in Miles' hands, and had been treacherously sent to Florida, the War Department ordered the allotment of scouts reduced to 69. The difference in numbers under Crook and Miles was due to one fact only, that the Apaches had no confidence in Miles or respect for him, and many whose terms of service expired in the spring declined to reenlist, altho urged to do so, and preferred to devote their attention to their farms."[1]

And General Crook ends his "Resume of Operations against the Apache Indians" with the following statement:

. . . . . "The surrender to my successor of

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," January 1 - March 21, 1888.

> this party was accomplished solely by the use, not only of scouts, but of Chiricahua scouts. . . . . After an experience of months, absolutely without gaining one step, during which time troops, horses, and pack trains had been worked beyond the limit of endurance, and citizens, Mexicans, and friendly Indians of other tribes had been employed in vain, Lieutenant Gatewood, with the aid of two Chiricahua Apaches, obtained the surrender. In other words, the campaign was closed only by a return to methods which constituted the distinctive feature of the policy adopted and followed by me."[1]

The feeling on the subject of the broken promises to Geronimo and his band was divided. Some of the people in Arizona who had suffered so much from the depredations of these Indians only regretted that the terms of the surrender had been such that these murderers could not be brought to trial in the civil courts. Then there were the people, chiefly in the East or in places well removed from any danger, who worked up a sentimental sympathy for the Indians as a race. And finally there were the majority of the soldiers and all those with a fair sense of justice, who felt that a promise should be kept even if it were a promise made to savages whose treachery had been proved. Britton Davis emphasizes the fact that it was only the promise which Miles authorized Gatewood

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[1]Crook, "Resume of Operations against Apache Indians," 1882 to 1886. (Pasted in front of Bourke's "Diary," March 6 - December 21, 1887.)

to make to Geronimo, that they were to be sent with their families to Florida, which induced Geronimo and his band to surrender. But instead the men were confined in the dungeons of Old Fort Pickens at Pensacola and their families sent to Fort Marion at St. Augustine several hundred miles away. This breach of a promise amounting to a treaty of peace embittered the rest of Gatewood's life. Davis goes on to say, however, that after indignant protests on the part of many prominent persons who investigated the treatment accorded these Indians and the terms of the surrender, the authorities united the families and sent them eventually to Indian Territory.[1]

The treatment of the Indians who had remained loyal to the pledges given to General Crook in 1883 was a dishonorable matter. Chatto, who since his surrender to Crook in 1883 had never violated his promise of good behavior and who had served in the army as a scout, was sent with nine other Indians to Washington, supposedly to talk with the government authorities concerning the possible removal of himself and his people to a better reservation. On the way home they were stopped at Fort Leavenworth. They were told by Captain

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[1]Davis, The Truth about Geronimo, p. 233.

Dorst, who was in charge of them, that they were not to be sent back to Fort Apache but were to be given a new reservations, sixty square miles of land. They were sent, however, as prisoners to Fort Marion, Florida.[1] At San Carlos the three-fourths of the band who had remained faithful for three years, and who had rendered invaluable service in the pursuit of their own people, were suddenly surrounded by troops, the men disarmed, and they with their families sent to Florida where they received the same punishment as that meted out to Geronimo.[2]

Miles, in his Personal Recollections, describes with somewhat childlike satisfaction the treachery practiced upon the latter innocent victims. He is pleased with his choice of Colonel Wade as just the right man to carry the thing through successfully. He says:

> "Before returning to Fort Bowie I had several conversations with Colonel Wade as to the duty he was to perform and the method of his performance. At Wilcox Station I opened communication with Colonel Wade and directed him to secure the entire Indian camp at Fort Apache and move them north to the railroad and thence east to Florida."[3]

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[1]Bourke's "Diary," March 6 - December 31, 1887.
[2]Bourke, On the Border with Crook, p. 485.
[3]Miles, p. 501.

The telegraph office at Fort Apache overlooked the buildings of the fort and grounds, and Miles directed the operator to watch what was going on and report to him in full. The operator observed that, as was the usual custom on Sunday, all the Indians were gathered in to be counted, the troops held their Sunday inspection, and then suddenly the troops completely surrounded the Indians. There was some commotion and then Colonel Wade quietly walked up and commanded the Indians to sit down. Realizing that escape was impossible, and resistance foolish in the presence of so many troops, they obeyed. Then Wade ordered the warriors into a large building, and directed some of the women to return to their camp and to gather up whatever they would need on a journey as they were about to be removed.

Colonel Wade moved the Indians from Fort Apache to Holbrook, a distance of nearly a hundred miles through a mountainous country. At Holbrook he loaded his charges on a long train and started them on their journey east.[1]

Bourke makes the following statement with regard to the whole affair:

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[1]Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles, pp. 501, 502, 527

> "There is no more disgraceful page in the history of our relations with the American Indians than that which conceals the treachery visited upon the Chiricahuas who remained faithful in their allegiance to our people."[1]

After dragging on for four months, the Crook, Miles, Gatewood, Lawton, Geronimo controversy quieted down. The Southwest was not deeply concerned with these matters. The essential thing was that peace, however attained, had at last come to that section, and Arizona, after years of fear, was free to develop her resources and to advance her civilization.

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[1]Bourke, On the Border with Crook, p. 485.

CONCLUSIONS

In reviewing the facts as presented by both sides in the Miles-Crook controversy, one is inclined to feel that most of the criticism of Miles was, on the whole, justified. The most serious accusation against him was the fact that he disobeyed his orders from General Sheridan in allowing Geronimo and his band a conditional surrender. There seems not much doubt that he was guilty of this charge. His instructions, directing that "operations looking to the destruction or capture of the hostile Indians be ceaselessly carried out" were certainly clear. Secretary of War Endicott very evidently considered that Miles had violated these instructions when he says in his report that Miles ordered the Indians to be taken to Fort Marion in "direct opposition to the President's orders,"[1] and also when he states that "from General Miles' dispatches, and from his annual report, the conditions were plain that the lives of all the Indians should be spared,

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[1]Bourke, "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887 (Report on the Hon. Wm. C. Endicott, Sec'y. of War, on the Apache Indian Campaign)

and that they should be sent to Fort Marion, where their tribe, including their families had already been ordered."[1] Bourke expressed himself very decidedly on the subject when he says that the cabinet session was occupied "with a further discussion of the Miles-Geronimo complication, or, in other words, the false report made by General Miles to palliate his positive disobedience of orders given him by the President of the United States."[2] And Endicott concludes his report with the statement that since the terms of the surrender were such that Geronimo and his band "could not properly be handed over to the civil authorities for punishment, as was intended by the President"[3] they were therefore sent to Fort Pickens, Florida.

Judging from the newspaper comments, a great deal of the criticism of Miles at the time was due, not so much to the fact that he had disobeyed orders, but that he would not come out and admit that he had. The majority of the people probably were not greatly concerned over just what constituted a conditional or an unconditional surrender. The important point was that the Indian menace

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[1]Bourke, "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887 (Report on the Hon. Wm. C. Endicott, Sec'y. of War, on the Apache Indian Campaign)

[2]Bourke, "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887.

[3]Bourke, "Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887. (Report of Sec'y. of War Endicott)

in the Southwest was practically ended, and had Miles admitted at once that he had disregarded his orders, the criticism would no doubt have been short lived. Instead however, Miles' evasions lent such mystery to the whole affair, that for months the newspapers were furnished with grounds for all sorts of rumor and conjecture.

The other charges against Miles were somewhat personal in character: that he was very pushing in his desire for advancement, that he was not honest in his dealings with the Indians, and that he was lacking in generosity in regard to both Crook and Gatewood in withholding from them their due share of the credit for Geronimo's surrender.

Miles' desire for personal advancement, and his descent to somewhat undignified methods for its attainment have been illustrated in the newspaper campaigning in his behalf prior to his assignment to the department of Arizona, in which matter it appeared that family connections and political pull probably played a part. Added point to the above characteristic is found in the following clipping from the Washington Herald for February 11, 1886:

> "Army officials here, when they first heard it reported that petitions were being sent to

> the President by some of General Miles' over-zealous friends urging his appointment to succeed General Terry, were loth to believe it. While General Miles has the reputation of being a very enterprising and active worker when a matter of personal advancement is involved, it was not supposed that he would so far overstep the bounds of propriety as to apply for a brother officer's place before it had become vacant, and especially since it is well known that there is not the slightest intention of retiring General Terry, even if he should remain on the sick-list for a year to come. In cases of retirement on account of age it is not out of place for candidates to begin their wire-pulling in advance, but to anticipate a vacancy when a brother officer's health is involved is, as a prominent officer expressed it yesterday, like jumping into a dead man's shoes before they have become cold. . . . . The general impression among officials at the War Department is that General Miles has placed himself at a disadvantage through his previousness."[1]

Bourke adds the following comment: "This brilliant episode in the humbugging career of that military blatherskite, Miles, is well worthy of presentation."[2]

The matter of Miles' dealings with the Indians is closely connected with the charges concerning the surrender. Since Miles promised the Indians that their lives should be spared and that they should be sent to Florida, the authorities at Washington complied with the terms and sent them to Florida. But Miles had

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[1]Bourke, "Diary," January 1 - March 21, 1888 (Clipping from Washington Herald, February 11, 1888)

[2]Bourke, "Diary," January 1 - March 21, 1888.

further promised Geronimo that he and his band should not be separated from their families. The government did separate them however, sending the men to Pensacola where they were confined in the dungeons of old Fort Pickens, and their families to Fort Marion in St. Augustine several hundred miles away.[1] Miles was not responsible for this breach of faith, unless it was that he should not have made the promise, but he was responsible for his treacherous treatment of the Indians at Fort Apache who had remained loyal to their promises made to General Crook.

Not the most serious criticism of Miles, but the criticism which most lowers him in one's estimation perhaps, is his inability to give credit to Crook and to Gatewood. When Miles first assumed the command in Arizona his implied criticism of everything that Crook had done, and his wide publicity of his own proposed course, displayed very poor taste on his part. The superseding of another in any occupation is always a very delicate situation, and one which calls for tact and courtesy. Miles' outlined reversal of Crook's methods and the boasted superiority of his own, were so loudly advertised that it would have been hard for anyone to have to back down and admit that he had re-

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[1]Davis, p. 235.

sorted to his predecessor's policy in the end. That Miles failed to give credit to Crook's judgment however, illustrates the same smallness which he displayed in the case of Lieutenant Gatewood. Though Gatewood performed the most dangerous task in connection with the surrender when he went to Geronimo's camp and it was only through his efforts that the surrender was arranged because he was trusted by the Indians, his name is not even mentioned by Miles in the latter's list of those officers who had rendered most distinguished service in the campaign.[1] And Gatewood was kept from attending the banquet given to celebrate the surrender to which he had so largely contributed because he was left in command of the post while Miles and the other officers were receiving the ovation which he should have shared.[2]

Miles, the general, emerges triumphant from the controversy, for a few months after the surrender, the President ordered a re-arrangement of the geographical divisions of the army so as to increase Miles' command in area and importance, extending his division from the Pacific Ocean to Fort Bliss on the Rio Grande, and with his headquarters at Los Angeles instead of Albuquerque.[3]

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[1]Davis, p. 235.
[2]Ibid..
[3]Bourke,"Diary," May 1, 1886 - March 5, 1887 (Clipping from Army and Navy Register, December 18, 1886.)

But recalling the cheap boasting, the petty jealousy, and the lack of moral courage and real honesty, one feels that Miles, the man, has strangely shrunk.

The erroneous tradition, that Miles subdued the Apaches of the Southwest, persists however, as is shown by the statement in the Dictionary of American Biography: "Miles accomplished the surrender of these Indians and their incarceration at Mount Vernon, Alabama."

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

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