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THE MONROE DOCTRINE

AND

THE EMPIRE OF MAXIMILIAN, 1861-67

by

DAVID LOPEZ CAMPA

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of History

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INTRODUCTION

Much has been written regarding the Monroe Doctrine by advocates, opponents, and by impartial observers, and much more will yet be written about this important phase of American foreign policy. The increasingly important role being played by Latin-America in international relations is conducive to further discussions regarding application, expansion and development of the Monroe Doctrine.

In this short discussion of an instance often referred to as a "splendid vindication" of the Monroe Doctrine, the author intends to give as impartial a treatment of the probmen chosen as human limitations permit. The Monroe Doctrine during the French Intervention in Mexico and during the Civil War was, contrary to the assertions of some American historians, a dead letter. At the end of the American Civil War the Doctrine received more attention from the American Department of State, but it is not borne out by the facts that the French evacuation of Mexico was altogether due to the reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine by Secretary of State Seward.

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The writer does not agree with nationalistic historians of the United States who would give the Monroe Doctrine all the credit for the withdrawal of the French, alleging altruistic motives for American reassertion of the Doctrine at the time of that withdrawal. Neither can the writer agree with those Latin-American historians who argue that the Monroe Doctrine played no part whatsoever in the retirement of the French troops from Mexico in 1867. Closer study of conditions, both in the New World and in Europe, will reveal that these points of view are extreme and that a middle ground can be more safely relied upon to give the historically correct view of the situation.

The materials utilized in the writing of this dissertation have been selected from primary and secondary sources written both in English and in Spanish in order to compare the viewpoints of writers of the two interested parties, the United States and Mexico. Much help has been derived from the official correspondence between the American and Mexican State Departments during the French Intervention in Mexico: "Correspondencia de la Legacion Mexicana en Washington durante la Intervencion Extranjera, 1860-1868" edited by the Hon. Matias Romero, who was the Minister of Mexico in Washington during this period. Much material has also been gathered from the United States Government papers, such as the Senate Executive Documents, the House

Executive Documents, the Congressional Globe, and the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, edited by Richardson. While these have been the chief sources, the bibliography at the end of this work gives a detailed enumeration of the works consulted by the author in preparing this thesis.

Appreciation and thanks are due to those persons who have assisted the writer in selecting the topic discussed, acquiring materials, suggestions as to composition and final preparation of this thesis. Dr. Marion Dargan is responsible for the choice of the topic by the writer, as it was in his class on the History of American Foreign Policy that this problem suggested itself, due to the impartial and sympathetic treatment of the subject given by Dr. Dargan in his lectures covering that period. Prof. Lansing B. Bloom gave many valuable suggestions regarding the sources utilized, the scope of the problem and final preparation; Miss Wilma Loy Shelton and Miss Ruth Russell very kindly assisted in securing materials; Miss Irene Quintana rendered invaluable assistance in typing and correcting the manuscript.

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Chapter I

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

The invasion of Mexico by the troops of France, England and Spain, was agreed upon at London on October 31, 1861. By the terms of the Treaty of London, these three nations were to send sufficient naval and military force to Mexico to seize and occupy several fortresses and military positions on the Gulf coast for the purpose of obtaining the customs revenues of the principal ports of entry to satisfy demands of a financial nature made against Mexico by citizens of these countries. The treaty also provided for appointment of a commission to determine the just distribution of these revenues among the foreign creditors of the Republic of Mexico.[1] The purpose of the use of force by the three European powers was, as stated in the preamble of the Treaty, to demand more effective protection for the persons and property of their citizens in Mexico and to secure fulfillment of certain obligations contracted by the Government of Mexico.[2]

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[1]Moore. International Law Digest, VI, pp. 485-88; also House Executive Documents, 100, 37-2, pp. 229 et seq.

[2]Archivo Historico Diplomático Mexicano, Vol. XXX, pp.60-69.

The actual invasion of the country did not take place until December 14, 1861, when a Spanish fleet under the command of Gutierrez de Rubalcaba sailed into the port of Veracruz and took possession of the city without resistance from the Mexican troops. The plan of the three powers called for a rendezvous of their forces at Havana. Spain was the first to launch its expedition, but instead of awaiting the arrival of the French and English contingents, proceeded to Veracruz.[3] The French and English followed later and were somewhat displeased at the premature coming of the Spaniards. The allies differed from the start, as revealed by the disregard in which the Spaniards held the joint agreement. Further differences finally resulted in the dissolution of this triple alliance.

Among the provisions of the London Convention, which were later violated, the second article of the Treaty proved to be misleading as to the aims of the French:

"The high contracting parties bind themselves not to seek for themselves, in the employment of the coercive measures foreseen by the present convention, any acquisition of territory, or any peculiar advantage, and not to exercise in the subsequent affairs of Mexico any influence of a character to impair the right of the Mexican nation to choose and freely constitute the form of its own government."[4]

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[3]Bancroft. History of Mexico, VI, p. 29; also, Archivo Hist. Dip. Mex. Vol. XXX, pp. 51-55.

[4]House Exec. Doc. 100, 37-2, p. 187.

In spite of the fact that the United States was already engaged in a life and death struggle for the preservation of the Union, and was conceded by the Europeans to have hardly a chance of succeeding in dominating the South, the signatories of the London Treaty deemed it expedient to invite the government at Washington to acquiesce in the terms of the treaty:

"The high contracting parties, expressing the desire that the measures which it is their intention to adopt may not have an exclusive character, and recognizing the fact that the Government of the United States, like themselves, has claims of its own to enforce against the Mexican Republic, agree that, immediately after the signing of the present Convention, a copy of it shall be communicated to the Government of the United States, and that this Government shall be invited to acceed to it, and that in anticipation of such accession, their respective ministers at Washington shall be furnished with full powers to conclude and sign, collectively or severally, with a plenipotentiary of the United States, to be designated by the President, such an instrument."[5]

The United States replied to the invitation to co-operate with the three powers by declining to join, saying that although the United States Government did have some grievances against Mexico, the President could not see that a redress of them could be obtained by that Convention.

The ostensible object of the intervention of the foreign powers was the collection of debts owed by Mexico to some of their nationals. The claims made by the Europeans

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[5] House Exec. Doc. 100, 37-2, pp. 185-87; also Latane. History of American Foreign Policy, p. 402.

were as follows:

1. British: Robbery of about $660,000 from the British Embassy by Marquez on November 16, 1860, belonging to English bondholders. Damages claimed for the murder of a British subject in 1859. Claim for bonded debts secured by a previous diplomatic arrangement with Mexico.

2. French: During Miramon's revolutionary administration, bonds were issued through the agency of Jecker, a Swiss banker, to the amount of $15,000,000 of which only $750,000 were raised. Another claim was made for $12,000,000 for torts on French subjects.

3. Spanish: Miramon recognized certain previous claims of Spain which were later repudiated by the Juarez government. Dismissal of the Spanish minister by Juarez.[6]

That the claims were exorbitant and some of them without any foundation whatever, cannot be denied. It also seems to have been generally overlooked that, with scarcely an exception, the wrongs which the intervention was to redress were committed by a pseudo-government and not by the true government then existing. Some of the outrages for which reparation was sought were perpetrated by Marquez and his followers while Juarez was trying to capture them.[7] While this circumstance did not absolve the Mexican Government from all responsibility and liability, it should have furnished a plea for indulgence.

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[6]Wharton. International Law Digest, I, pp. 311-12.
[7]Noll. From Empire to Republic. p. 234.

The most unjust claims made were those of the Swiss banker, Jecker, who suddenly, without ever having resided in France, became a French citizen. His claim for $15,000,000 was pressed by Saligny, the French minister in Mexico, though only $750,000 was paid to the Miramon Government. The absurdity of the claim was acknowledged by the Spanish and English plenipotentiaries.[8]

The total of all debts, according to the calculations of the Mexican Treasury Department on July 12, 1862, was $82,316,290.86, divided among the three nations thus:

To Great Britain.....	$69,994,542.
To France..even including the principal advanced by Jecker for the purpose of waging war against the legitimate government.....	2,860,000.
To Spain.....	9,460,986.[9]

The French debt was by far the smallest. Even including the unjust demands of Jecker, France's claims did not rival England's, which fact justly made England and Spain suspicious of the ulterior motives of the French.

A series of events that had direct bearing on European intervention in Mexico were the attendant disorders accompanying the War of the Reform. The struggle between the Conservatives and Liberalists for the control of the country dated from the days of the consummation of independence. Immediately prior to the French Intervention,

[8] Bancroft. Op. Cit. VI, p.39.

[9] Payno. Mexico y sus cuestiones financieras. Quoted in Bancroft, VI, p. 38.

many abuses had been committed by the Reactionaries. This war, which lasted from 1858 to 1861, was a struggle between the Liberals, headed by Benito Juarez, and the Conservatives, under Miramon and Zuloaga. The Conservatives, supported by the Church party, had opposed all legislation which had tended to separate the Church and State in Mexico. Particular opposition had been shown against three laws which bore the names of their promulgators. Juarez, as Minister of Justice, had passed the "Ley Juarez" which suppressed special courts for both the clergy and the military, on November 23, 1855. Lerdo de Tejada, on June 25, 1856, had secured the passage of the "Ley Lerdo" which struck at the basis of clerical domination by forbidding civil and religious bodies from holding real estate not used for worship. This alienated the agricultural property of the Church without confiscating it, but enabling the tenants of such land to purchase it on liberal terms.

The third blow dealt at the privileges of the Church was the promulgation of the "Ley Iglesias" which was initiated by Jose M. Iglesias, and excluded the clergy from influence in the exercise of civil rights by citizens and secularized cemeteries.[10] While these laws were passed for beneficent purposes, they curtailed the power of the clergy.

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[10]Priestley. The Mexican Nation. pp. 323-26.

These laws were later embodied in the Constitution which became effective on September 16, 1857 by the Liberal group under the leadership of Juarez. The clergy immediately voiced its opposition to the Constitution on the grounds that it attacked and encroached upon the spiritual functions of the Church.

Ignacio Commonfort was inaugurated President of Mexico on December 1, 1857 and two weeks later General Zuloaga proclaimed his "Plan of Tacubaya" setting aside the Constitution and dissolving Congress. Commonfort in acquiescing to the plan of Zuloaga, lost the support of the Liberals and in January, 1858 was obliged to flee for refuge into the United States. The Reactionaries then placed Zuloaga at the head of the government, Juarez escaping to Guanajuato. This was the beginning of a pilgrimage for Juarez that was to take him and his government to Guadalajara, Veracruz, and back to Mexico City on December 27, 1860. On establishing his government on January 11, 1861, Juarez's first measure was to expel the Spanish Minister, Pacheco, who had been influential in the negotiations of the Mon-Almonte treaty, whereby it was arranged that Mexico should assume the demands of Spanish subjects for reclamations and compulsory loans agreed to in 1855 under Santa Anna's administration, in consideration for assistance to be rendered the Reactionary Government in the form

of a European protectorate over Mexico.[11]

The entrance of Juarez into Mexico City did not by any means signify that the War of the Reform was at an end. Zuloaga, Marquez, and Mejia fled into the mountains back of Queretaro and kept up an intermittent series of guerrilla warfare, committing all sorts of cruelties upon any Liberals they happened to capture.

Among the Liberal leaders that were executed by the Reactionaries during the War of the Reform were such men as Santos Degollado, Melchor Ocampo, and Gral. Leandro Valle. After so many vicissitudes had attended the government of Juarez, it is not surprising that it found itself without resources enough to pay the interest on its foreign debt. Circumstances forced Juarez to issue a decree on the 17th of July, 1861 suspending all payments on accounts of foreign debts. This was intended to gain time for the Juarez government to straighten out the finances of the country, which were in a deplorable condition. France and Spain protested against the suspension decree. Diplomatic relations were broken off by these two nations on November 26th, three days after Juarez had revoked the decree suspending foreign debt payments.[12]

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[11] Archivo Hist. Dip. Mex. Vol. XIII - El Tratado Mon-Almonte; also, Correspondencia de la Legacion Mexicana, Vol. I, p. 739.

[12] Bancroft. Op. Cit. p. 25; also Archivo Hist. Dip. Mex. Vol. XXX, p. 37.

On October 31, 1861, the London Convention was signed and by the end of the year the Spanish were at Veracruz. By January, 1862, the French and English arrived. But everything was not destined to go well among the three allies. The claims of the French were not acceptable to the English and the Spanish. Preliminaries of negotiations to be entered into by Juarez and the allied plenipotentiaries were signed at La Soledad on the 19th of February. The allied forces were to occupy Cordoba, Orizaba and Tehuacan to avoid the inclement torrid weather of the coastal regions, with the express condition that should a rupture occur in the negotiations, the allied troops were to retreat to the coast. Juarez was recognized, as were also the independence and sovereignty of Mexico. On the 9th of April the allied commissioners met at Orizaba and after a stormy session, where the French ignored the provisions of the London Convention and the preliminaries of La Soledad, were unable to agree as to the interpretation of the Treaty of London.[13] An independent course of action was agreed upon by the three powers. The Spanish, under the great soldier and diplomat of Spain, General Juan Prim, receded without coming to an agreement with Mexico. The English Representative, Sir Charles Lennox Wyke, came to an understanding with Doblado, but the settlement was considered too oppressive by the Mexican Congress and was rejected.

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[13] Archivo Hist. Dip. Mex. XXX, p. 84, et seq.

From the point of the withdrawal of the Spanish and English from Mexico, the French set out to conquer the Liberals, aided by the Reactionaries that favored intervention, among which were Almonte, Miramon, Mejia, Marquez, Velez, Lozada and Taboada.

The first move of the French at Orizaba after the defection of the English and Spanish, was to proceed to take the capital of Mexico, going by way of Puebla. At this junction the French received a surprise reception, and on the 5th of May, 1862, the Liberals, under Zaragoza, repulsed the attack of the French. This feat is venerated yearly by the Mexicans as the national holiday of "El Cinco de Mayo". After waiting for reinforcements at Orizaba the French proceeded to take Puebla on the following May, 1863. By June of the same year, the French Army of Intervention entered the capital of Mexico. Forey and Saligny headed the French and were accompanied by the Reactionaries, Almonte, Marquez and Salas. The French set up a Regency composed of Almonte, Salas, and Archbishop Labastida.[14]

As a legislative body, an Assembly of Notables was chosen, composed of 231 members and its first act was to establish a monarchical form of government, offering the crown to the Archduke Maximilian of Austria, with the following declaration:

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[14] Noll. From Empire to Republic. p. 249.

"1. The Mexican Nation adopts as its form of government a limited hereditary monarchy, with a Catholic prince.

"2. The sovereign shall take the title of Emperor of Mexico.

"3. The Imperial Crown of Mexico is offered to his royal highness the Prince Ferdinand Maximilian, Archduke of Austria, for himself and his descendants.

"4. If under circumstances which cannot be foreseen, the Archduke of Austria, Ferdinand Maximilian, should not take possession of the throne which is offered to him, the Mexican nation relies on the good will of his majesty, Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, to indicate for it another Catholic prince."[15]

Before the end of the year 1863, Forey and Saligny were recalled to France, owing to the great haste with which these events took place. Forey was succeeded in the chief command of the French Expeditionary Force by Marshall Bazaine, who throughout the Intervention proved himself a faithful servant of Napoleon III. Under Bazaine's command, the French troops proceeded to occupy as much of the interior of Mexico as their numbers could safely allow. The Republican Army was scattered, but was by no means completely annihilated.

The entrance of the French into Mexico City started Juarez and his Government on a second pilgrimage that first took him to San Luis Potosi, where he established his government, having retained throughout the French

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[15] Senate Exec. Doc. No. 11, 38-1, pp. 254-68.

Intervention the recognition of the United States Government. On the approach of French troops to San Luis Potosi, Juarez moved to Saltillo, in the State of Coahuila, on November, 1863. Through the defection of the Governor of Coahuila, Santiago Vidaurri, Juarez was compelled to withdraw from Saltillo in April, 1864 and establish his government at Monterrey, where he remained until August of that same year. The success of the French and Mexican Imperialist forces again made it necessary that Juarez change his capital, and in the middle of August, 1864 moved to Chihuahua, remaining there one full year. The approach of Imperialist troops forced Juarez to leave Chihuahua in August, 1865 and take up his residence at El Paso del Norte (now Ciudad Juarez), refusing ever to leave the national territory and declining invitations to seek refuge on the American side of the border.[16]

Meanwhile, the committee appointed by the Assembly of Notables to offer the throne of Mexico to Maximilian lost no time in discharging its duties, and on October 3, 1863, the crown was formally offered to the Austrian Archduke by the Imperialist Mexican delegation headed by Gutierrez de Estrada. Maximilian did not immediately accept the proffered crown but demanded an expression of the Mexican people in the form of a popular vote that in that manner the wishes of the capital be confirmed by

[16] Noll. From Empire to Republic. pp. 252-60.

the will of the people.[17] Bazaine then proceeded to secure such an election and shortly afterwards certificates of election in favor of the Empire and of Maximilian were produced from all places occupied by the French. Six months later, Maximilian accepted the crown, apparently not knowing that he was anything but the unanimous choice of "the Mexican people". On April 10, 1864, Maximilian accepted the crown and four days later embarked from Miramar, stopping at Rome for two days, where the new Emperor and Empress received the blessing of the Pope. On the 28th of May, Maximilian arrived at Veracruz and after stops at Orizaba and Puebla, where the Imperial troupe was enthusiastically received by the Imperialist supporters, entered the City of Mexico on June 12, 1864, amid great enthusiasm and popular acclaim.[18] The conditions under which Maximilian accepted the throne of Mexico were hardly favorable to the new Empire. By the "treaty of Miramar" Maximilian was to pay the Jecker claims and the sum of $54,000,000 for the support of the army and all expenses of the expedition of the Intervention, making a total of $173,000,000 of public debt. The treaty also provided that the French troops of 38,000 then in Mexico, should be reduced to 25,000 in 1866, to 20,000 in 1867, and that as soon as

[17] Latane. United States and Latin America. p. 215.
[18] Bancroft. Op. Cit. pp. 141-147.

possible these should be replaced by Maximilian's own Mexican troops, except for 8,000 Foreign Legionnaires, who were to remain in Mexico six years longer.[19] Thus, Maximilian was to be Emperor of Mexico by grace of French bayonets and as such he remained only until the French bayonets were withdrawn from Mexico.

The establishment of the Empire was now a fact.

What was the policy of the United States in this clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine? The attitude of the American people was certainly against the French, and there was agitation for the use of force against the foreign invaders. The policy of the Department of State, however, was not as belligerent. In the following chapter will be seen how Seward played the part of prudence and refused to dig Monroe from his grave, lest in that grave he should bury the American Union.

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[19] Priestley. The Mexican Nation. p. 355; also Latane. United States and Latin America. p. 220.

Chapter II

AMERICAN POLICY AND AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE FRENCH INTERVENTION DURING THE CIVIL WAR

Once the French Intervention was effected and the Empire of Maximilian was established, the question that loomed important in American foreign policy was the reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine. It must not be overlooked that during the American Civil War there was a distinct difference of opinion between the United States Department of State and a majority of the northern people regarding the course of action that should be taken in relation to the invasion of Mexico by the French.

The Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, was urged by Thomas Corwin, United States Minister in Mexico, to secure the coöperation of the representatives of the South American republics in Mexico to meet the French and Spanish while they were making their first demonstration. Corwin believed that both France and Spain had covetous eyes on the South American republics and that Spain desired the reconquest of her lost colonies.[1]

The Mexican Government had sought financial aid from

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[1] Callahan. Evolution of Seward's Mexican Policy. p. 28

the United States in order to be able to meet the payments on the foreign debt and in that manner avoid the intervention of the foreign powers. On September 8, 1861, Foreign Minister, Zamacona recommended to the Mexican charge d'affairs in Washington the advisability of securing from the United States a loan of from one to ten million dollars to be secured by public lands or by transit rights through Tehuantepec.[2] Seward was also apprehensive of European occupation of Mexican territory as being inconsistent with the national dignity and security (refusing to mention the Monroe Doctrine) and authorized Corwin to negotiate with Mexico a treaty by which the United States would agree to pay the interest at three per cent, on Mexico's funded debt ($62,000,000) for five years from the date of the decree of suspension of payments, and Mexico, on her part, would pledge reimbursement by a lien on the public lands and mineral rights in Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora and Sinaloa, which would become the property of the United States at the end of six years in default of reimbursement.[3]

"Before negotiating the proposed treaty, it was necessary to obtain from the English and French governments an agreement to refrain from operations against Mexico until the President could submit the treaty to the

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[2] Correspondencia de la Legacion Mexicana. I, p. 951.

[3] Callahan. Op. Cit. p. 24; Correspondencia de la Legacion Mexicana. pp. 952-53.

Senate and obtain its ratification. Seward promptly and informally communicated his plans to both these governments, but received no favorable reply. Neither France nor England approved. They probably feared that the plan was a 'preliminary to an entry for foreclosure', rather than an effort to maintain the abstract principle of the Monroe Doctrine. Thouvenel thought France ought not in any way to recognize the transaction. The British government stated that the unpaid interest was not the only cause of complaint with Mexico, and Lord Lyons suggested that the difficulty and the dangers of intervention might be more satisfactorily met by the coöperation of the United States, Great Britain and France with Spain in some distinctly defined policy."[4]

The French and the English were not the only ones to disapprove of Secretary Seward's plan of maintaining the Monroe Doctrine (unexpressed) by shouldering the responsibility of paying the interest on Mexico's debt. Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister near the Court of St. James, expressed his disapproval of the plan in the following terms in addressing himself to Mr. Seward:

"You will permit me here, however, to make a single remark in this connection upon the importance of appearing to divest the United States of any personal and selfish interest in the action it may deem proper to adopt. The view customarily taken in Europe is that their government is disposed to resist all foreign intervention in Mexico, not upon any principle, but simply because it is itself expecting, in due course of time, to absorb the whole country for its own benefit. Hence any proposal like that which I had the honor to receive, based upon the mortgage of portions of Mexican territory as security for engagements entered into by the United States, naturally becomes the ground of an outcry that this is but the preliminary to an entry for inevitable foreclosure. And then follows the argument that if this process be legitimate in one case, why not in all. As against Great Britain and France, it would be difficult to oppose to this the abstract principle contained in

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[4]Callahan. Op. Cit. pp. 27-28; also, Latané. U. S. and Latin America, p. 201.

what has been denominated the Monroe Doctrine, however just in substance."[5]

It is remarkable that Secretary Seward in dealing with the Mexican situation in official correspondence never mentioned the Monroe Doctrine by name nor stated it in the terms enunciated by President Monroe. It is also interesting to notice that Seward's policy during the early days of the Foreign Intervention in Mexico was one of strict neutrality and non-intervention. That the Monroe Doctrine was not popular in Europe was known by Seward, and the additional handicap of a tremendous struggle at home no doubt influenced him in his attitude toward foreign aggression in Mexico.

On October 12, 1861, Mr. Seward had a conference with Matias Romero, Mexican Minister at Washington, in which he expressed to Mr. Romero that the policy of the United States regarding the impending intervention would be:

1. That the United States consider it to their interest to avoid at all costs the hostilities between Mexico and the European nations.

2. That in order to gain this end they propose to employ mediation and all manner of conciliatory measures and not take a decisive and imposing attitude that would perhaps be more effective.

3. That in case hostilities should break between Mexico and said powers, the United States would remain neutral, unless these powers should try to meddle in the internal affairs and subvert Mexico's form of government.

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[5] House Exec. Doc. 100, 37-2, p. 201.

4. That such neutrality would be carried to the point of withholding from Mexico all pecuniary assistance that it should need to carry on its operations in the war.[6]

One of his earliest statements of policy after the allied occupation of Mexico was made in a letter sent to the American legations abroad on the 3rd of March, 1862. The letter in its entirety is interesting, revealing the statesmanship of Seward in asserting American opposition to the plans of the Europeans without saying anything that would offend or excite any undue antagonism from the parties concerned:

"We observe indications of a growing impression in Europe that the demonstration made by the Spanish, French, and British forces against Mexico is likely to provoke a revolution in that country which shall bring about the introduction of a monarchical government and the assumption of the crown by a foreign prince. Our Country is deeply interested in the peace of the world and desires to preserve loyal relations as well with the Allies as with Mexico. The President has, therefore, directed me to submit to the parties interested his views on the new aspect of affairs.

"The President has relied upon the assurance given his government by the Allies that they were in pursuit of no political object, but simply the redress of their grievances. He entertains no doubt of the sincerity of the Allies; and if his confidence in their good faith has been distrubed, it would be restored by the frank explanations given by them, that the governments of Spain, France and Great Britain had no intention of interfering to procure a change of the constitutional form of government now existing in Mexico, or any political change which should be in opposition to the will of the Mexican people. In short, he has cause to believe that that Allies are unanimous in declaring that the revolution proposed to Mexico is solely prompted by certain

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[6] Correspondencia de la Legacion Mexicana. I, pp.552-57.

Mexican citizens who are now in France.

"Nevertheless the President regards it as his duty to express to the Allies, in all kindness and candour, that a monarchical government established in Mexico, in the presence of foreign fleets and armies, occupying the waters and soil of Mexico, has no promise of security or permanence; in the second place, that the instability of such a monarchy would be enhanced if the throne were assigned to a person alien to Mexico; that in these circumstances the new government would instantly fall unless sustained by European alliances, which, under the influence of the first invasion would be practically the beginning of a permanent policy of armed intervention by monarchical Europe, at once injurious and inimical to the system of government generally adopted by the American Continent.

"These views are based upon some knowledge of the opinions and political habits of American society. There can be no doubt that in this matter the permanent interests and the sympathies of our country would be on the side of the American republics.

"We must not be understood as predicting on this occasion the course of events which may ensue, both in America and Europe, from the steps which are contemplated. It is enough to say that in the opinion of the President, the emancipation of the American Continent from the control of Europe has been the principal characteristic of the past half century. It is not probable that a revolution in the opposite direction can succeed in the age which immediately follows this period, and while the population of America increases so rapidly, while the resources develop in the same proportion, and while society forms itself uniformly to the principles of American democratic government.

"It is necessary to indicate to the allies how improbable it is that the nations of Europe would accept a policy favorable to a similar counter-revolution, thus incompatible with their own proper interests. Nor is it necessary to point out that, notwithstanding the care of the Allies to avoid aiding, by means of their land and maritime forces the internal revolutions of Mexico, the result would be none the less due to the presence of their forces in the country, however different the object they may have proposed; for without their presence, it may be considered as certain that such revolution would probably not have been attempted or even conceived.

"The Senate of the United States has certainly not accorded its official sanction to the precise measures proposed by the President, to lend our aid to the actual Mexican government, in order that the latter might, with the approbation of the Allies, extricate itself from the present embarrassments; but this is strictly a question of internal administration. There could be no greater error than to see in this disagreement a divergence of opinion in our government, or in the American people in regard to their cordial wishes for the safety, welfare, and stability of the republican government in that Country."[7]

It is interesting to analyse the preceding statement of policy and discover just how near it comes to being a re-expression of the policy of Monroe. In the first paragraph, Mr. Seward expresses the interest of the administration in the rumors that a monarchy would be established in Mexico, which reminds one of Monroe's expression "with the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected....". The third paragraph of Seward's circular bears a closer similarity to Monroe's language of December 2, 1823, but in comparing the wording of both utterances, it can readily be seen that Seward left unsaid what Monroe without hesitation declared. Mr. Seward said "nevertheless the President regards it as his duty to express to the Allies, in all kindness and candour, that a monarchical government established in Mexico....has no promise of security or permanence.....". Monroe, when the Holy Alliance threatened to interfere in Spanish America, made a similar declaration: "We owe it, therefore, to

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[7] Callahan. Evolution of Seward's Mexican Policy. pp. 31-33.

to candour and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."[8] What Mr. Seward expressed to the Allies "in all kindness and candour" was merely the opinion that a monarchy in Mexico would not be secure or permanent. Mr. Monroe, on the other hand, with more candor and less kindness, bluntly declared that the extension of the European "system" to any portion of this continent and would be considered dangerous to the peace and safety of this nation and as "the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States." Mr. Seward's statement in comparison with Monroe's virile declaration seems pusillanimous, to say the least. Regarding Europe's extending of her political system to America, Mr. Seward continues: "...notwithstanding the care of the Allies to avoid aiding, by means of their land and maritime forces, the internal revolutions of Mexico, the result would be none the less due to the presence of their forces in the country,....for without their presence it may be considered certain that such revolution (from republic to monarchy) would probably not have been attempted or even conceived."

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[8]Richardson. Messages. Vol. II, p. 218; also Pres. Monroe's Annual Message, Dec. 2, 1823 in Hart's "The Monroe Doctrine--An Interpretation". pp. 66-68.

Again we look back to Mr. Monroe's message to see what his declaration was regarding the extension of the European "system" to the American continents: "It is impossible that the Allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference." That Monroe expressed himself with a great deal more force than did Mr. Seward is plainly evident. One must not lose sight of the fact, however, that what Monroe expressed was assented to by the English Foreign Office and would be supported by the English Navy if necessary, while Seward was forced to be more circumspect not only because of division at home, but because of not any too satisfactory relations existing between the United States and the Allied powers of England, France and Spain.

Not until after the battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, did Seward make a protest to France regarding its interference in Mexico. On September 21, 1863, Secretary Seward wrote to Mr. Dayton, American Minister in Paris:

"The President thinks it desirable that you should seek an opportunity to mention these facts to Mr. Drouyn de l'Huys and suggest to him that the interests of the United States, and, it seems to us, the interests of France

herself, require that a solution of the present complications in Mexico be made, as early as may be convenient, upon the basis of unity and independence of Mexico."[9]

Throughout the period of the Civil War, Secretary Seward maintained an attitude of strict neutrality, and the result was that he avoided trouble with France at a time when trouble would have proved fatal to the cause of the American Union.

There was a difference, however, between the policy followed by the State Department and the attitude of a great majority of the American people. Such a difference was also noticeable in the last war when the American people were inclined to be pro-German at the beginning of the war and proceeded to become anti-German as the war progressed. The State Department, however, followed a policy of neutrality until the declaration of war against Germany.

From the beginning of the affair of the Foreign Intervention in Mexico, the American people had opposed such an aggression upon the basis that it violated the Monroe Doctrine. The opposition took shape in vehement protests on the part of prominent men, especially after Maximilian's coming to Mexico. Romero informed Mexican Foreign Minister Tejada that on September 10, 1864, in a conference with Senator Chandler of Michigan, the senator expressed the

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[9] Senate Exec. Doc. No. 11, 38-1, p. 464; also Hart. The Monroe Doctrine--An Interpretation. p. 149.

opinion and the strong hope that the United States should take definite and effective steps against the Foreign intervention in Mexico as soon as the Civil War should permit it.[10] On September 30, 1864, Romero entertained Montgomery Blair and Salmon P. Chase, former members of the Cabinet, and they also expressed themselves emphatically in favor of expelling the French from Mexico upon the termination of the Civil War.[11]

Not only did prominent individuals express in private conversation their desire for American reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine, but even in public could be heard forceful statements condemning the French Intervention in Mexico and favoring a more belligerent policy on the part of the State Department. On March 29, 1864, at a banquet given to Romero at Delmonico's by prominent citizens of New York, many celebrities expressed their views regarding Mexico's predicament:

> William Cullen Bryant: "We may say of this Maximilian of Austria, that in accepting the Crown of Mexico from the hands of Napoleon, he has accepted, not an Empire, but a quarrel-- a present quarrel with the people of Mexico and a prospective quarrel with the people of the United States."[12]
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> Charles King, President of Columbia College: "Mexico never can, with the assent of the people of the United States, become the appendage of a European nation, or

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[10] Correspondencia de la Legacion Mexicana, VI, p. 64.

[11] Ibid, p. 65.

[12] Quoted in Callahan. Evolution of Seward's Mex. Pol.p.47.

furnish a peaceful throne to any scion of a European imperial house. The opportunity....is eagerly embraced....to give emphatic expression to the declaration that 'biding our time' we will, at all hazards when the time comes, assert and uphold the doctrine that on this continent we will not permit the interference by arms of any European nation to overthrow republican institutions and to establish monarchy."[13]

Frederick De Peyster, President of the New York Historical Society: "In due season our rebels will have to succumb to the loyal will. Then the republics of North America will shake hands in brotherly sentiment and alliance, and unitedly maintain inviolate the Monroe Doctrine."[14]

Ex-Governor Washington Hunt: "The time approaches when our government will reassert and maintain its well-defined policy....that no European power shall be allowed to subjugate the people or destroy republican institutions on any part of the American Continent."[15]

From the above can be seen that although these prominent individuals realized that during the duration of the Civil War, American aid against the French aggressors could not be given, they unhesitatingly expressed their desires and even their threats of use of force against the French expedition.

Political bodies also registered their disapproval of the French scheme and became energetic in their protests against the occupation of Mexico by French troops and the monarchical form of government set up by the Emperor Napoleon. On April, 1865, the Legislature of the State of New York passed a resolution favoring the reaffirmation

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[13]Ibid. p. 48
[14]Ibid. p. 48
[15]Ibid p. 48

of the Monroe Doctrine in the existing conflict between Mexico and France.[16] Congress was also assuming a more restless attitude. In the Senate, on January 11, 1864, Senator MacDougall of California renewed his resolution declaring that "the occupation of Mexico by armed forces of the government of France is an act unfriendly to the republic of the United States of America," and stated that it was the duty of this government to demand withdrawal of those troops.[17] Mr. MacDougall had introduced his first resolution before Maximilian's acceptance of the Mexican throne. The House of Representatives passed a resolution on April 4, 1864, by the unanimous vote of 109-0 declaring its opposition to the recognition of a monarchy in Mexico. The same resolution was offered in the Senate, but it was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations where Senator Sumner allowed it to sleep.[18]

In June, 1864, the Radical Convention at Cleveland and the Republican Convention at Baltimore passed resolutions favoring the vindication of the Monroe Doctrine, and a resolution to the same effect was passed by the Democratic Convention at Chicago on July 5th of the same year.[19]

In May, 1864, members of the "D. M. D." Club, Defenders of the Monroe Doctrine, at New Orleans, started on an

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[16] Correspondencia de la Leg. Mex. VI, p. 252.
[17] Callahan. Op. Cit. p. 48.
[18] 64 Cong. Globe, Apr. 4, 1864, p. 1408.
[19] Correspondencia de la Leg. Mex. IV, pp. 224-26.

expedition to Brownsville with the intention of aiding Mexico in getting rid of the French. The steamer was taken care of by United States officials and the filibusters did not reach their destination.[20]

Innumerable other proofs of popular agitations against the French and in favor of a more energetic reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine can be cited. The press was almost unanimously in favor of driving the French from Mexico, but more details can not be given in a discussion of this length. From the above facts, however, can be drawn the conclusion that from Maximilian's coming to Mexico until the end of the Civil War, there was a difference in the popular attitude of the American people and the policy followed by the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward.

That there were reasons enough for not reasserting the Monroe Doctrine while the Civil War was in progress, cannot be denied, but after the end of the Civil War, Mr. Seward proceeded to mildly reassert the Monroe Doctrine and persuade Napoleon out of Mexico, instead of force him out as has been the popular notion.

In the following chapter Mr. Seward's policy after the end of the Civil War is discussed.

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[20] Latane. The United States and Latin America. p. 223.

Chapter III

MILD REASSERTION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE AT THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR

Criticism of the United States for failure to reassert the Monroe Doctrine was common during the Civil War, as was demonstrated in the preceding chapter. Seward's policy of reasserting Monroe's doctrine with mild remonstration in order to abstain from using force in engineering the French out of Mexico right after the Civil War, was also severely criticized. One of the accusations made against the United States was its inconsistency in maintaining the Monroe Doctrine. It has been pointed out that the invasion of Mexico by the French and their setting up a monarchic form of government was cause enough to demand an outright protest from the American State Department.[1] Polk had invoked the Monroe Doctrine on less provocation in order to prevent foreign interference in Yucatan in 1848.[2] That there was an inconsistency cannot be denied. But inconsistency in its application is no argument in favor of abandoning the Monroe Doctrine, nor should this

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[1] Woodburn, J.A. Chautauquan, 22:549-56. Feb. 1896.
[2] Wharton. Digest of International Law, I, pp.297-98.

inconsistency be considered a crime on the part of Secretary Seward. It must be remembered that the Monroe Doctrine is merely a policy, not a law. As a policy it is unilateral, as a nation's policy may always be. It may affect other nations but is formed without their consent; for instance, the United States does not formulate its high tariff policy to the liking of other nations nor does she consult them about it. Then again, a policy does not impose a continuous obligation upon a state, as would a law that is in force, but it is changeable to coincide with the demands of self-interest. This is especially true of the United States where it is not uncommon for an administration to disavow the actions of a preceding administration.[3]

That the United States should not have reasserted the Monroe Doctrine when it would have been more to Mexico's advantage to have done so, is no indictment against Seward's attitude toward the Doctrine. One must keep in mind the original three principles that characterized the policy of President Monroe:

> I. "The Monroe Doctrine was a statement of policy originated and maintained by reason of self-interest, not of altruism.
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> II. "It was justified by reason of the right of self-defense. (Which is a recognized principle of international law.)

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[3] Chinese financial administration policy of Taft and Wilson.

> III. "It called no new rights into being, therefore reasonably interpreted, the right disappears and the policy is questionable, for it then violates the rights of others."[4]

It can be seen that the intention of Monroe was not to protect Latin-America, though his doctrine may incidentally do so, but to protect the United States. The statesmanship of Seward did not suffer by his failure to energetically reassert the principles of Monroe when a greater task, that of preserving the Union, was requiring his more immediate attention, for the test of his statesmanship was not how well he could succeed in reasserting the Monroe Doctrine, but how successfully he could avoid the disruption of the Union through foreign aid to the South.

The inconsistency in Mr. Seward's attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine, however, is one proof less toward the affirmation of the contention that the Doctrine was "splendidly vindicated" after the end of the Civil War.

It has been noticed that Mr. Seward never mentioned the Monroe Doctrine by name during the course of the Civil War. Now, let us consider a few of his protests against the presence of French troops in Mexico and the setting up of the Empire of Maximilian and relate them

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[4] Woolsey, Theodore S. North Amer. Rev. 199:833-40, June, 1914.

to Mr. Monroe's famous message; the result will be that Mr. Seward's "protests" will still be seen to be of the "insinuating" variety, although his hands were now free.

Early in September, 1865, Mr. Seward reminded the French Government that the Civil War being over, the people and the Congress of the United States would be free to give a larger share of attention to foreign policy, a phase of which would be the interference of the French in Mexico.[5] The threat of giving the foreign policy of the United States a larger share of attention, of course, was merely an insinuation, not a direct and outright protest.

On December 6, 1865, in a dispatch to M. de Montholon, French Minister in Washington, Mr. Seward assumed a more energetic attitude declaring that: "We recognize the right of sovereign nations to carry on a war with each other if they do not invade our right or menace our safety or just influence. The real cause of our national discontent is that the French army which is now in Mexico is invading a domestic republican government there, which was established by her people and with whom the United States sympathize most profoundly, for the avowed purpose of suppressing it, and establishing upon its ruins a foreign monarchical government, whose presence there, so long as it should endure, could

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[5]Latane. The U. S. and Latin America. p. 226-7.

not but be regarded by the people of the United States as injurious and menacing to their own chosen and endeared republican institutions."[6] But this firmer tone does not approach Mr. Monroe's forceful declaration that any interposition of foreign powers in the American Continent would be regarded as a manifestation of an unfriendly attitude toward the United States and dangerous to its peace and safety.

On December 16, 1865, Seward addressed a communication to Bigelow, American minister at Paris, in which he declared that:

> "It has been the President's purpose that France should be respectfully informed that upon two points, namely: First, that the United States earnestly desire to continue and to cultivate sincere friendship with France. Second, that this policy would be brought into imminent jeopardy, unless France could deem it consistent with her interest and honor to desist from the prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico, to overthrow the domestic republican government existing there, and to establish upon its ruins the foreign monarchy which has been attempted to be inaugurated in the capital of that country."[7]

This declaration has been classified by Prof. Latane as a "practical ultimatum" to France.[8] It can be seen that the declaration referred to sets no conditions, specifies no time limit, and makes no threat of breaking off diplomatic relations if France should not have

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[6] Wharton. Int. Law Digest, I, p.327; also, House Exec. Doc. 73, 39-1, Part II, p. 347.
[7] Moore, Int. Law Digest, VI, p.501.
[8] Latane. History of American Foreign Policy. p.413.

complied with the desire of the United States that armed intervention should cease, therefore, it can hardly be classified as an ultimatum.

On the 12th of February, 1866, Mr. Seward informed Mr. de Montholon that the United States had not seen any satisfactory evidence that the people of Mexico had of their own accord chosen and established the monarchical form of government called into being through the intervention of the French and concluded his dispatch with the words that "We shall be gratified when the Emperor shall give to us.....definite information of the time when French military operations may be expected to cease in Mexico".[9] This has also been denominated by Prof. Latane as a "virtual ultimatum".[10] This, it seems was the second ultimatum sent to the French by Mr. Seward in the space of two months. It has been pointed out, however, that the force of the "virtual ultimatum" was somewhat diminished by what Mr. Seward in the same dispatch conceded:

"Realizing, however, that Napoleon, by reason of the domestic situation in France, could face war more easily than a confessed defeat, Seward gave him a seeming victory by assuring him, February 12, 1866, that after the French evacuation the United States would continue the same neutrality between Juarez and Maximilian that she had previously preserved between Juarez

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[9]House Exec. Doc. No. 93, 39-1.
[10]History of American Foreign Policy, p.414.

and the French....Accepting this way out so wisely prepared for him, de L'huys replied, 'We receive this assurance with entire confidence and we find therein a sufficient guarantee not any longer to delay the adoption of measures intended to prepare for the return of the army'!"[11]

One cannot but deduce from the preceding account that Mr. Seward's dispatch of February 12, 1866 contained a concession and not an ultimatum. This concession Prof. Latane calls a "loophole",[12] which probably very amply describes the sort of "ultimatums" that Seward sent to France.

As to Fish's assertion that Seward's promise of neutrality toward Maximilian was a "seeming victory" for Napoleon III, one needs but to scan the dispatch of October 18, 1865 of the French Foreign Minister to M. de Montholon, Minister at Washington, in which de l'Huys intimated that if the United States would assume an "amicable attitude" toward the Maximilian government, France would be ready to agree upon a basis of understanding with the Cabinet at Washington,[13] to see that Napoleon would consider it a victory should he obtain a promise of neutrality toward Maximilian after the Archduke's repeated failures to obtain recognition. Furthermore, Napoleon's was no less a diplomatic victory because of Seward's confidence in the fact that Maximilian

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[11]Fish. American Diplomacy. p.332.
12.History of American Foreign Policy, p.415.
[13]Moore. Int. Law Digest, VI, p.501.

without French aid would be at the mercy of Juarez and American neutrality would scarcely avail him. It satisfied national pride to be assured that the Empire of his making, (in direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine) would be left alone by the United States.

By what has so far been said it can be seen that Mr. Seward's protests were still mild, but his policy did not stop there. There was too much pressure brought to bear by the victorious generals of the North for Mr. Seward to passively allow the Empire of Maximilian to die a natural death, which was sure to come, since Napoleon had not intended the indefinite occupation of Mexico should the Confederacy fail, and approaching events in Europe already foreboded the recall of the Legionnaires from their adventure in the land of the Aztecs to more important engagements at home. In order to appease the belligerent war eagles of the Union, Mr. Seward secured the services of Gen. J. M. Schofield, whom he sent on an informal mission to Paris.[14] Again Mr. Seward demonstrated his statesmanship, for not only would this move hold the warlike generals in check, at least for the duration of Schofield's mission, but he would utilize them in his efforts to persuade Napoleon to abandon his Mexican scheme instead of appealing to

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[14] Ibid. p.499.

the use of force to evict the French from the neighboring republic.

General Schofield found in France that Napoleon's intervention in Mexican affairs was unpopular but, at the same time, that the national pride was touched at the thought of withdrawing under threats of the United States.[15] Schofield came back satisfied that, although no promises were made of immediate withdrawal of the French troops from Mexico, it was inevitable that they would be withdrawn in the not too distant future.

The policy of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine by the use of arms was advocated by many other public and military leaders who, in public speeches, proposed the overthrow of the Maximilian Empire by the joint force of the United States and Confederate soldiers. Such sentiments were expressed in the speeches of General Wright at Sacramento on June 11, 1865; General Lew Wallace at Washington on June 15; General Banks at New Orleans on July 4; Montgomery Blair at Hagerstown on July 12, and Secretary of the Interior, James Harlan at Washington on July 13.[16] One of the most belligerent expressions made was that of General Frank P. Blair, who on delivering a farewell order to his soldiers at

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[15]The withdrawal of the French from Mexico. Century Magazine. 32, May, 1879.
[16]Callahan. Evolution of Seward's Mexican Policy. p.62.

Louisville on July 11, 1865, declared that the triumph of the North could not be called complete and its victory should not be considered as resting on a solid foundation until the French should be driven out of Mexico, and admonished his soldiers to hold themselves in readiness in order that they be prepared to "finish their task".[17]

That Mr. Seward was in favor of persuading Napoleon to abandon Mexico, and was opposed to the use of force to expel him, is attested to not only by the numerous efforts made to induce him to use force to vindicate the Monroe Doctrine, but by statements that Mr. Seward himself made. Regarding General Schofield's mission to France, Mr. Seward said: "I sent General Schofield to Paris to parry a letter brought to us from Grant insisting that the French be driven head over heels and at once out of Mexico. It answered the purpose. It gave Schofield something to do, and converted him to the policy of the Department by convincing him that the French were going as fast as they could. That pacified Grant and made everything easy."[18] This assertion of Mr. Seward reveals that his policy was based on the

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[17] Correspondencia de la Legacion Mexicana, V, p.505-6.
[18] Bancroft. Life of Seward, II, p.435, quoted in Latane History of American Foreign Policy, p.412.

assumption that there was no need for the use of force since the French were "going out as fast as they could". Prof. Callahan has also expressed Seward's attitude toward the French as being one of noninterference:

"feeling sure of the future vindication of the supremacy of republican institutions upon the American Continent, for the time he was willing to pursue a policy of 'masterly inactivity'. Although he knew that normal opinion in Mexico favored a republican government and although he admitted the war between France and Mexico had continued longer than he had expected, he said the United States adhering to the principles of neutrality had 'neither the right nor the disposition to interfere by force in the internal affairs of Mexico, whether to establish or maintain a republican (or even a domestic government there or to overthrow an imperial or foreign one if Mexico should choose to establish or accept it."[19]

It is not improbable that Mr. Seward did not seriously believe that the American people would really be willing to plunge into a war with France for the mere object of helping Mexico. In view of his continued "masterly inactivity" it is very logical to suppose that Mr. Seward's attitude regarding the Monroe Doctrine and its relation to the Empire of Maximilian was the same as Bigelow's, the American Minister in Paris, who in a dispatch to Mr. Seward written on August 21, 1865, expressed his views thus:

"I think you will find, when the question is raised in practical shape with all its attendant responsibilities before our people, that with them the opposition to the

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[19]Evolution of Seward's Mexican Policy. p.44-45.

extension of European influences in the Western Hemisphere is a sentiment which they cherish but not a policy for which they will fight. A war for such a purpose would become unpopular.

"The abstract folly of making ourselves the armed champions of all or any of the Spanish American States whose people belong to a different race from ours, who speak a different language, who profess a different religion and who have been trained under social and political institutions having very little in common with those of the United States, would be aggravated now by the state of our finances which are likely for many years to tax all our resources to the utmost... It is hardly worth our while, under pretext of defending republican institutions, to get ourselves into a war with one and perhaps several of the most powerful states of Europe.....In a war to redress the wrongs of Mexico or to propagate republicanism by the sword, we would in my opinion be likely to fail. Such a contest would accomplish for the Emperor of France what he has sought in vain to accomplish hitherto.... it would speedily arm and equip in the Southern States more rebels than General Lee had under his command on the day of his capitulation, and end in our humiliation by the recognition of Maximilian."[20]

It is not very likely that Mr. Bigelow, holding as he did the above opinion of the Monroe Doctrine, nor Mr. Seward who continued to adhere to his policy of "strict neutrality" and "masterful inactivity" would essay a "splendid vindication" of President Monroe's oft-mentioned policy. It is significant that even when the United States were free from their devastating Civil War the Monroe Doctrine was indirectly referred to in Mr. Seward's dispatches and not mentioned by name in his official correspondence.

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[20]Ibid. p.67.

Mr. Seward did not renounce the principles of the Monroe Doctrine but merely forbore to insist on the use of force for its reassertion on the basis of national interest. Many other American writers, besides those already quoted, take this view of the situation. "When the Civil War closed, the hands of the Administration were unloosened, and Mr. Seward was then enabled to assume a more defiant attitude toward the French aggression in Mexico, but he hoped to accomplish by peaceful means what Generals Grand and Sheridan insisted should be done by direct threat of military force."[21] It is also to be noted that Prof. Bushnell Hart, in his work relating to the Monroe Doctrine entitles the chapter dealing with Mr. Seward's diplomacy during the French Intervention, "How to Get On Without Monroe".[22]

It has been pointed out in the early part of this chapter that there was a great deal of agitation on the part of the American people right after the Civil War for the energetic reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine. Opposition had been voiced in France against the venture of Napoleon in Mexico, and the situation in Europe in 1866 was such that Napoleon had been brought to realize the need of playing a more important role in the

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[21]Henderson. American Diplomatic Questions. p. 404.
[22]The Monroe Doctrine--An Interpretation. pp.142-59.

diplomacy of Europe. All these circumstances had no doubt influenced Mr. Seward in sending his most energetic protest, the so called ultimatum of February 12, 1866. The agreement for the withdrawal of troops was arranged for in that same year, and the final withdrawal of French soldiers spelled the downfall of the Maximilian Empire. Mr. Seward had taken advantage of the opportune moment for his "ultimatum" to the French. These circumstances and the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the fall of the Maximilian Empire shall be discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter IV

FALL OF THE MAXIMILIAN EMPIRE AND ITS RELATION TO THE MONROE DOCTRINE

As a response to the "ultimatum" of Seward dated February 12, 1866, Napoleon III, on the 21st of April of the same year notified the American State Department that the troops of France would be withdrawn from Mexico in three detachments. The first contingent was to leave Mexico in November, 1866; the second on March, 1867; and the last troops were to embark in November, 1867.[1] Napoleon had already announced at the opening of the Chambers in January, 1866, that he had taken steps to arrange for the recall of the troops.[2]

Bazaine embarked for Toulon on March 12, 1867 with the last of the French troops and from then on the days of the existence of the Maximilian Empire were numbered. By the middle of May, 1867 Maximilian surrendered at Queretaro and after a court martial at which he was defended by five of the most prominent Liberal lawyers, was sentenced to death on the 15th of June. Escobedo, commander-in-chief of the Republican Army, confirmed

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[1]House Exec. Doc. No. 93, 39-1, p.42.
[2]Bancroft. History of Mexico, VI, p.208.

the sentence on the 16th and ordered the carrying out of the execution. At the request of Benito Juarez, the execution was postponed until the 19th of June, and on that day, at the foot of the Cerro de las Campanas in Queretaro, Maximilian and his two Mexican generals, Miramon and Mejia, paid with their lives for the subversion of republican institutions in Mexico. It was an accident of fate that the trial of Maximilian should have been held in a theater named "Iturbide", after Mexico's first emperor, who on his return from exile to attempt to regain his throne met a similar end. It was perhaps this recollection that influenced the government of Juarez to relentlessly carry out the sentence of execution in spite of the fact that appeals for mercy toward the Austrian Archduke were received from the majority of the rulers of Europe as well as from the United States. By June 20, 1867, the Imperialists had been defeated in Mexico City and on July 15, Juarez entered the City again to resume the leadership of the republican government in the capital of the nation.

The end of the Empire of Maximilian followed swiftly upon the withdrawal of the French from Mexico, but, did the reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine by Mr. Seward cause the French to withdraw?

From the beginning of the intervention of the French in Mexico this policy was opposed by the people of France. "It is but just to say that the Mexican Expedition never obtained the slightest degree of popularity in France. It was looked upon with coldness, indifference, dislike and contempt, by the people; and it was ably combated in the Corps Legislatif in 1863, by leading Deputies, who were returned by overwhelming majorities in the subsequent election, thus showing that their constituents fully approved of their position."[3] On the eve of Maximilian's acceptance of the Mexican throne the popular feeling in France was much opposed to the French scheme, as Slidell, Confederate representative in Paris, wrote to Benjamin, Confederate Secretary of State on March 16, 1864: "It is impossible to exaggerate the unpopularity of the Mexican expedition among all classes and parties in France. It is the only subject upon which public opinion seems to be unanimous....The Emperor is fully aware of this feeling and is, I believe, very anxious to get rid of the embarrassment as soon as he conveniently can. The Archduke may be obliged to rely on his own resources at a much earlier period than he expects."[4] Napoleon had continued to adhere to his costly imperial Mexican policy and the opposition had continued to

[3]Noll. From Empire to Republic. p.237
[4]Callahan. Evolution of Seward's Mexican Policy. p.50.

increase at home. Thiers, one of France's ablest ministers, made a lengthy speech on January 27, 1864, in the Corps Legislatif, in which he gave an account of the circumstances leading to the French organization of the Mexican expedition. He warned his countrymen that although the United States had been respectful in her attitude toward France, she would not accept the outcome of the French scheme in Mexico, from which he advised that France should withdraw as soon as possible without making any plans to establish a monarchy in the New World. Berryer, referring to the American Civil War then in progress, warned his colleagues that whatever might result from the War, the United States would continue to be a powerful enough nation to be influential in the American territory and to feel the deep rooted vital national sentiment of impatience and hostility toward intervention of European powers in American affairs.[5] It would appear that the Monroe Doctrine was in the background of his argument. It is then evident that if there was strong opposition to the Mexican scheme of Napoleon among the French people themselves, there was no need for Mr. Seward to make any bold reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine to induce the

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[5]Senate Exec. Doc. No. 11, 38-1, Vol. I, pp.300-9.

French to withdraw. Mr. Seward had been informed by Bigelow in 1863 that the phrase "Monroe Doctrine" had better be avoided because of its unpopularity in Europe,[6] and he had also been informed by Schofield that the Napoleonic scheme in Mexico was very unpopular with the French.[7] In view of these facts it is not surprising that Mr. Seward gave up the practice of resuscitating Monroe in order to oppose European intervention in the affairs of America.

Not only was the opposition of the French people a factor that influenced the recall of the French troops from Mexico, but the political situation in Europe was becoming such that Napoleon, in order to assume an important role in Continental affairs, necessarily had to free himself from the Mexican entanglement. As a prominent American student of international affairs has said:

"American historians have usually attributed Napoleon's backdown to Seward's diplomacy supported by the military power of the United States, which was, of course, greater then than at any other time in our history. All this undoubtedly had its effect on Napoleon's mind, but it appears that conditions in Europe just at that particular moment had an even greater influence in causing him to abandon his Mexican scheme. Within a few days of the receipt of Seward's ultimatum Napoleon was informed of Bismark's determination to force a war with Austria over the Schleswig-Holstein

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[6]Hart, The Monroe Doctrine--An Interpretation. p.149.
[7]Supra. p. 37.

controversy. Napoleon realized that the territorial aggrandizement of Prussia, without any corresponding gains by France, would be a serious blow to his prestige and in fact endanger his throne."[8]

The situation in Europe that demanded Napoleon's attention has also been given credit by European historians for Napoleon's decision to abandon his Mexican enterprise: "France had been driven into abandonment of her protege in Mexico by the imminence of critical questions much nearer home, and the necessity for concentrating her attention on European affairs. The most alarming of these questions was that of the relations of Austria and Prussia over Schleswig-Holstein."[9] France was not immediately concerned with the fate of either Schleswig or Holstein, but the relations of Prussia and Austria were of great importance to her. On March 30, 1863, Frederick VII of Denmark proclaimed a Constitution which bound Schleswig politically and Holstein financially to Denmark. His action at once reopened the Danish question which, supposedly, had been closed by the treaty signed at London on the 8th of May, 1852, and provoked great anger in Germany. On November 14, 1867, Frederick VII died and his successor, Christian IV, refused to withdraw the Constitution of March 30, and thereby incurred the enmity of the German

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[8]Latane. The U. S. and Latin America. pp.231-32.(Not underlined in the original.)
[9]Macdonald. A History of France. Vol. III, p.342.

Confederation.[10] Bismark, who had previously given reassuring pledges to Denmark, seeing the trend of German public opinion, at once threatened Denmark with war if the Constitution were not withdrawn. Austria, anxious to obtain predominance in German affairs, associated herself with Prussia and in February, 1864, Austria and Prussia jointly invaded Schleswig-Holstein.[11] Denmark was despoiled while Europe looked on. For France, this policy of looking on was suicidal. Here was her opportunity for checking the growth of the future German Empire and by failing to take it she was preparing for herself the humiliations of 1870. On October 30, 1864, a treaty was signed between Prussia, Austria and Denmark by which Lauenburg, Holstein and Schleswig were ceded to Austria and Prussia for joint administration, Denmark thereby losing about two-fifths of her territory. To Bismark this joint administration was but a step toward an annexation from which Austria should be excluded, and for the next year his whole energy was devoted toward the planning of Austria's downfall. Austria, who was seeking the support of the South German States, suggested that the conquered duchies of Schleswig-Holstein should be handed over to the Duke of Augustenberg, whose

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[10] Hassall. France, Medieval and Modern. p. 260.
[11] Macdonald. Op. Cit. p. 343.

claims were supported by the German Princes.[12] Prussia refused to accede to the Austrian proposal and finally, on August 4, 1865, a convention was signed at Gastein by which Austria was given the administration of Holstein, Prussia that of Schleswig, while the small district of Lauenburg went to Prussia for a money payment.

Napoleon was a disciple of Metternich in matters of the balance of power, but in manipulating for a balance of power in Europe, committed an error of judgment that was later to cost him his Empire. In 1859, France and Italy had jointly waged a war on Austria. Napoleon in 1866 was still afraid of Austria's power and disgusted at her encroachments on the Italian states. It was natural that he should have singled Austria, his former enemy, and not Prussia as the German Power from which danger was likely to proceed; nevertheless, he was in error. In order to preserve the balance in Germany, his plan was to encourage Bismark to ally himself with Italy that in this way Prussia would gain a preponderance over his hated and feared enemy Austria. Bismark, through the good offices of Napoleon, secured on the 8th of April, 1866, an alliance with Victor Emmanuel, an alliance which enabled Bismark to defeat Austria and paved the

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[12]Ibid. p. 343; also, Mowat. European Diplomacy. p. 188.

way for his future triumph over France.[13] Austria, still bidding for the support of the South German States, revived the Augustenberg claim regarding Schleswig-Holstein and Prussia at once accused her of violating the treaty of Gastein. On the 16th of June, 1866 war was declared and Austria persuaded France to remain neutral by promising her the cession of Venice to be in turn presented to Italy. "Napoleon accepted a bribe for abstention from the very power he should have supported."[14]

The war ended with the crushing defeat of the Austrians at Koniggratz (Sadowa). From that moment France realized that her true antagonist was Prussia and not Austria. It was impossible for France to stand by and watch the growth of Prussia until the balance of power in Europe was completely destroyed. The terms as set down by Bismark in the treaty of Prague of August, 1866 were: (1) "Abolition of the German Confederation; (2) Annexation of Schleswig-Holstein by Prussia; (3) and hegemony of Prussia north of the Main".[15] Before the treaty was signed, France struck in with a demand for compensation asking for the Rhine frontier as far as and including Mainz and including the Bavarian Palatinate. This demand influenced Bavaria in going to the

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[13]Macdonald. Op.Cit. p.344.
[14]Ibid. p.344.
[15]Ibid. p.345. also, Mowat. Op.Cit. p.194.

side of Prussia. The reason for Napoleon's rash demand was that to his mind the honor of France and the stability of his dynasty impelled him to insist that if Prussia was to expand, France must expand with her. The misfortune was that he was not in a position to enforce his demands at the point of the sword. It is said that in 1866, owing to the Mexican War, France was not able to place a fully equipped army of 50,000 men on the Rhine.[16]

Hassall points out that "the year 1863 was a momentous one for France, both at home and abroad. In Europe a series of events of deep import took place, while in France the elections left the Emperor and the democracy face to face, at a time when, mainly owing to the American Civil War, France was passing through a commercial crisis..... In January of that year the outbreak of the Polish insurrection took place, while Napoleon was deeply involved in war with Mexico."[17] In the Polish insurrection affair, Napoleon antagonized Russia by remonstrating with Prussia for agreeing to a military convention with Russia, and this lost him the support of the Tsar when he needed it most.

A more detailed study will show how deeply Napoleon

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[16]Hassall. Op.Cit. p.261.
[17]Ibid. p.258.

was immersed in the political situation of Europe, and how much he was in need of every soldier and all the military equipment he could muster for the anticipated struggle for the preservation of his Empire. Would Napoleon then need an "ultimatum" from the American Secretary of State in order to withdraw the French troops from Mexico for which he had such a pressing need? It is not at all improbable that Mr. Seward himself knew that Napoleon would inevitably have to recall his troops and on this account pursued his policy of persuasion and "masterly inactivity".

The opposition to the Maximilian Empire on the part of the Americans, especially the Northern generals, after April, 1865, was of course a threat that Napoleon could not very well ignore. But since "the chances of Maximilian's success in Mexico were deliberately calculated on the probable success of the Southern Confederacy"[18] there was no object in maintaining the French troops in Mexico after the failure of that Confederacy.

The knowledge that the United States stood for such a policy as the Monroe Doctrine, more than Mr. Seward's mild reassertion of that doctrine, may have influenced Napoleon to abandon his Mexican scheme after the Civil War. This coupled with the many and more pressing

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[18] Latane. History of American Foreign Policy. p.406.

troubles at home undoubtedly disillusioned him regarding his plans to put a stop to the "political supremacy of Washington in North America" and the "financial supremacy of New York in the Western Continent".

Chapter V

THE MONROE DOCTRINE NEITHER VINDICATED NOR TOTALLY NEGLECTED

From what has preceded, one would be led to believe that the Monroe Doctrine was relegated to total obscurity by the United States when Maximilian set his Empire in Mexico. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The Monroe Doctrine was not vindicated during the Civil War because it could not be clearly reasserted without incurring the danger of the dismemberment of the American Union. That Mr. Seward had not given up the reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine but was merely following a course of allowing France to effect her inevitable exit, is illustrated by the difference in his attitude toward Austria when troops were being recruited to supplant the outgoing French soldiers. On April 6, 1866, Mr. Seward instructed Mr. Motley (American Minister in Vienna) to state to the Austrian Government "that, in the event of hostilities being carried on hereafter in Mexico by Austrian subjects, under the command or with the sanction of the government of Vienna, the United States will feel themselves at liberty to regard those hostilities as constituting a state of war by Austria against the Republic of Mexico;

and, in regard to such war, waged at this time and under existing circumstances, the United States could not engage to remain as silent or neutral spectators."[1]

"Mr. Motley seems to have been somewhat surprised and puzzled at the sudden and emphatic change of tone in the instructions of his government, and failed to carry them out in the spirit intended by Mr. Seward."[2] It is not surprising that Mr. Motley should have been nonplussed at the energetic attitude of Mr. Seward toward Austria when he was aware of the policy of patient waiting that had been followed in respect to France. To defend Mr. Seward's course alleging the inapplicability of the Monroe Doctrine is futile, and those who follow such a course usually fall into contradictions. Prof. Henderson tries to vindicate Mr. Seward's "complacent attitude of neutrality" thus: "The Secretary of State, Mr. William H. Seward, had not failed from the beginning to obtain the most convincing and satisfactory assurances from France that the object of the intervention was solely for the purpose of collecting a debt, and was in no wise intended to be converted into a political movement. Although the Monroe Doctrine had, on previous occasions, been loosely regarded as a general inhibition against foreign intervention of any kind whatever in the Western Continent, a more reasonable construction of Mr. Monroe's words could not give them so broad a meaning. The Allies, it was thought, had an undoubted right to use force in the collection of just claims against Mexico, and the United States had no right to interpose so long as her own safety was in no manner involved."[3]

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[1]Moore. Int. Law Digest. VI, p.506; also, Wharton. Int. Law Digest, I, p.328.
[2]Latane. Hist. of Am. Foreign Pol.p.416. (not underlined in original.)
[3]American Diplomatic Questions. p.398.

The impression is here conveyed that the Monroe Doctrine was not involved because the French were merely on an errand of collection of "just claims". Then Prof. Henderson continues in a vein that results in contradiction:

"Later in March 1862, the administration became convinced of Napoleon's real intentions in Mexico, and upon Mr. Seward fell the burden of opposing French aims without offending the French Emperor. It at once became Mr. Seward's object to prevent Great Britain and France from combining in a common cause against the United States. The task of the diplomatist was not an easy one.....At such a moment the observance of a mere political tenet was of little relative importance."[4]

As a matter of fact, Mr. Seward knew before the French came to Mexico that collection of claims was only a pretext, for in his instructions to Mr. Corwin, American Minister in Mexico, on the 6th of April, 1861, he declared that the President had no sympathy with the schemes of foreign powers to intervene in Mexico to establish a protectorate.[5] The allegation that the Monroe Doctrine was not applicable in the case of the intervention of the European powers in Mexico does not stand when the same writer admits the inability of the Department of State to observe at that particular time "a mere political tenet". The same author nullifies his argument of the inapplicability of the Monroe Doctrine when he states that "it was only after Appomatox closed this critical period of American History that the Administration was enabled to assume its proper attitude

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[4]Ibid. p.400
[5]Callahan. Op. Cit. p.21.

toward the French in Mexico. With a veteran army to back the demand, Napoleon was requested to abandon at once his project in Mexico. The Monroe Doctrine was vindicated".[6] It will be well nigh impossible to find anyplace in the diplomatic correspondence of this period the request made of Napoleon to "abandon at once his project in Mexico" but the assertion that the administration was enabled, after Appomatox, to assume its proper attitude toward the French in Mexico goes to show that up to that time the proper attitude had not been taken. This assertion lends further proof to the contention that it was not the inapplicability of the Monroe Doctrine that kept Seward from insisting upon its observance, but his inability, because of the Civil War, to reassert it.

The preservation of the American Union was the thought uppermost in the mind of President Lincoln and his Secretary of State, Mr. Seward. In order to preserve the Union, every effort had to be made to keep the Confederacy from obtaining foreign help and, the energetic restatement of the Monroe Doctrine during the Civil War would undoubtedly have brought about the granting of foreign help to the South for the nullification of the Monroe Doctrine. "One needs but to review the situation in Latin America at that time to understand how easily such a result could have been

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[6]Henderson. American Diplomatic Questions. p.399. (not underlined in original).

brought about. In 1863 British ships established a blockade of the Brazilian port of Rio de Janeiro "for the protection of British interests".[7] Strong reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine at this time would more than likely have influenced England in giving her support to the Confederacy, for the cause of the South was already popular in England and the relations between the United States and Great Britain had been strained to almost a point of war over the Trent affair in 1861. Spain in 1861 reannexed Santo Domingo and in spite of the neutrality of the United States was forced by the revolutionists to abandon her former colony.[8] An energetic reaffirmation of the Monrovian dictum on the part of the United States in this instance would probably have meant an ally for the Confederacy. Another instance of Spanish interference in the New World during the American Civil War was the conflict with Peru in 1864, when the Spaniards seized the Chincha Islands as a pledge. A further aggression of Spain was its war against Chile which lasted until 1866. It is not difficult to suppose that Spain, with so many violations of the Monroe Doctrine to her credit, would have resented the reassertion of the Doctrine by the United States and would have sided with the Confederacy in its struggle to over-

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[7]Hart. Op.Cit. p.152.
[8]Ibid. p.151.

throw the Union. The task of Mr. Seward during the Civil War then was to let the Monroe Doctrine in peace lest the reassertion of it should bring Spain, England and France to espouse the cause of the Confederacy and wreck the American Union. The protection of the Mexican Republic was consequently a minor issue and the more vital problem of preserving the Union demanded the individual attention and astute diplomatic ability of Mr. Seward.

If it can be said that the Monroe Doctrine was not vindicated during the Civil War, it can also be said that it was not neglected after the Civil War, although Mr. Seward was opposed to the use of force to sustain its principles. The attitude of Mr. Seward is best summed up by an impartial scholar, thus:

"At the end of the Civil War Seward, the sagacious statesman, soon discovered a new field for his diplomacy in the peaceful solution of the problems for which the war furnished the occasion. Still anxious that Napoleon should be given no reason to believe that the United States had changed its views expressed to France, in reply to which the latter had repeatedly disclaimed all purpose of interfering with the government or sovereignty of Mexico, and at the same time apprehending that a war to drive France from Mexico might strengthen Napoleon by enlisting the French national spirit and by the realization of a long threatened alliance of France with the Confederates, he decided that peace and time would secure the best settlement of all questions without reviving the danger of American disunion. Though still confident of the ultimate success of republican institutions in Mexico and still hoping to secure by peaceful diplomacy what others were anxious to obtain by active military intervention, Seward was stimulated by the course of events to reiterate, then to emphasize, and finally to boldly insist upon what he had so often hinted or suggested

before -- the necessity of the withdrawal of the French from Mexico."[9]

In Mexico there was considerable apprehension because of Mr. Seward's failure to give the Government of Juarez the material support it would have received had the Monroe Doctrine been vindicated at the point of the sword. In the middle of April, 1865, General Carvajal, former Governor of Tamaulipas, was sent by the Juarez government to negotiate a loan with New York bankers and in that manner secure the necessary means for the "vindication of the Monroe Doctrine".[10] Carvajal failed in his efforts to secure both men (in the form of "colonizers") and money to aid Juarez. On March 29, 1865, Mexican Foreign Minister Tejada, sent instructions to Romero, Mexican Minister at Washington, as to how an "auxiliary army" organized in the United States would be received in Mexico. Romero had previously declared that he believed such an army to fight the French could be organized with the consent of the United States.[11] Romero persisted in his efforts to induce the United States to assume a more belligerent attitude toward the French. He informed the Mexican Foreign Office of early expressions on the part of prominent Americans in regard to the Monroe Doctrine, and promoted many schemes that were intended to influence the Administration

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[9] Callahan. Op. Cit. p.61.
[10] Contratos hechos en los EE.UU. p.17.
[11] Correspondencia de la Leg. Mex. VI, p.121.

in reasserting the Monroe Doctrine. Romero did not, however, ask outright for protection for Mexico under the Monroe Doctrine but from the beginning tried to convince Mr. Seward that the French intervention was aimed at the overthrow of republican institutions in the United States as well as in Mexico. Romero expressed surprise at the fact that President Lincoln in his annual message of December 6, 1864, had made no mention of the Monroe Doctrine, and in sending a copy of the message to Minister Tejada commented on the fact that Mr. Lincoln had denominated the intervention then in progress in Mexico as a "civil war".[12] Romero wondered whether Mr. Lincoln in ignoring the foreign intervention in his message and referring to the Mexican situation as merely a "civil war" was shirking the responsibilities that otherwise the Monroe Doctrine would impose on his Administration.

The rest of the Latin American republics were in sympathy with Mexico in its struggle against the French and some of them endeavored to aid the Mexican republic in its sad plight. On the 8th of March, 1865, Sr. Bruzual, Minister of Venezuela at Washington and Sr. Astaburoaga, Charge d'Affairs of Chile, proposed to Mr. Seward to make a joint demand with Venezuela and Chile, and other Latin

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[12] Ibid. p. 145; also
Richardson's Messages, VI, p.243.

American republics upon France for the withdrawal of her troops from Mexico.[13] Mr. Seward replied that such a step would be inconvenient to the United States while the Civil War was in progress, and refused to commit himself on what his course of action would be after the end of the Civil War. The above mentioned Latin American representatives withdrew their proposal and declared their intention of renewing it at a more opportune time.

The attitude of Mexican historians has generally been that the Monroe Doctrine was not vindicated by the United States because of selfishness; that is, it failed to reassert the Doctrine because it did not feel a need for it since the French were being forced out of Mexico by the situation in Europe. Credit is also given to the fact that the enterprise was of Napoleon's making and not s scheme of the French people. Iglesias Calderon takes such a stand; the title of his book "American Egoism during the French Intervention" clearly shows this. Another Mexican historian who accepts the views of Calderon that the French withdrawal was caused by the situation in Europe declares: "We can say with Iglesias Calderon that it was not American diplomacy but the cannon of Sadowa that sounded the retreat of Bazaine."[14] Other Mexican writers take a more extreme view and declare that Monroe's Doctrine never aided

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[13]Correspondencia de la Leg. Mexicana. VI, p.190.
[14]Perez Verdia. Historia de Mexico. p.489.

any Latin American nation and that Mexico never sought aid. Antonio de la Pena y Reyes, in discussing the problems of Mexican diplomacy incidentally mentions the Monroe Doctrine and says: "I am not passing judgment on a thesis so much commented upon in the last century, but praise should be tributed the Mexican Chancellery for having never, even in the most critical international situation, as much as thought of adhering to its benefits."[15] The same writer continues his comments on the uselessness of the Monroe Doctrine and quotes another Mexican author of note, Lopez Portillo y Rojas: "Mexico can feel proud of never having appealed to foreign aid, not even in its most painful crises.... Never having turned its eyes toward the United States to seek protection according to the declarations of President Monroe".[16] Carlos Pereyra, prominent Mexican historian gives the Monroe Doctrine credit for nothing, the withdrawal of the French included, and says "In the short century of life as independent States, the nations of America are not indebted to the United States for any protection whatever or for any assistance in their development. The great southern nations have developed and, above all, have lived through their own efforts and through European influence".[17]

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[15]Revista Mexicana de Derecho Internacional. IV, #3, p.365.
[16]Ibid. p.366; also, Archivo Hist. Dip. Mex. vol. I, p.31.
[17]Quoted in Alvarez. The Monroe Doctrine. p.312.

Among these writers, as among American writers, there are some extremely nationalistic, and some who are impartial. The idea that the European situation had more influence upon the withdrawal of the French than did the reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine is held more generally by Mexican than by American writers.

Among the rest of the Latin American writers opinion is divided as to the influence of the Monroe Doctrine in keeping Europe from interfering in American affairs. Luis Anderson, prominent Costa Rican statesman after referring to the attitude of the United States in regard to the French Intervention declares: "It is necessary, therefore, to admit that, thanks to the Monroe Doctrine, maintained by the diplomacy of the United States with such ability, energy and constancy, the Latin American continent has remained until now immune to the colonizing tendency which characterizes the Great Powers of Europe."[18]

Oliveira Lima, Brazilian diplomat, does not accord the Monroe Doctrine as much credit: "Up to the present time, however, the Monroe Doctrine has seldom or never protected the Spanish-American republics in a practical way... The intervention in Mexico against France in time of Maximilian was merely a question of convenience for

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[18]Ibid. p.233.

the United States, which felt itself ill at ease with an extensive and well-ordered Latin Empire at its gates."[19] Marcial Martinez, Chilean writer and diplomat has said that "When England, France, and Spain invaded Mexico in order to place the unfortunate Maximilian on the throne of that country, the United States remained shamefully silent. True they were at that time engaged in civil war, but their duty was to issue an energetic protest. Instead of doing this the House of Representatives rejected Mr. MacDougall's proposition, which aimed at the fulfilment of Monroe's promise. The American government spoke when it was already publicly known that France, the last supporter of Maximilian, was ready to withdraw her troops, a resolution due to the inefficacy of the sacrifices of that army and to violent opposition with which Napoleon's foolishness met in France."[20]

Raymundo Wilmart, noted Argentine writer, takes an impartial view of the situation: "When Napoleon III, assisted by other monarchs, attempted to establish a European empire in Mexico, the United States could not, or dared not, oppose him by force, but its conduct contributed to make short-lived the dream of Napoleon the Little."[21]

It can be seen that the writers of Latin America generally take the most impartial view of the influence that the Monroe Doctrine had on the withdrawal of the French from Mexico and the collapse of the Maximilian Empire. American historians have only of late begun to accept this view, which, while not overlooking the fact that Mr. Seward's diplomacy influenced Napoleon to some extent,

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[19] Ibid. p.282
[20] Ibid. p.303.
[21] Ibid. p.367.

attributes to the situation in Europe the credit it is due for the retirement of the French.

In trying to understand the viewpoint of the Latin Americans, it is interesting to note what the eminent scholar, Dr. Latane, has to say regarding this much discussed incident:

"Americans have been so little concerned with international affairs that they have failed to see any connection between the Monroe Doctrine and the balance of power in Europe. The existence of a European balance of power is the only explanation of our having been able to uphold the Monroe Doctrine for so long a time without a resort to force. Some one or more of the European powers would long ago have stepped in and called our bluff, that is, forced us to repudiate the Monroe Doctrine or fight for it, had it not been for the well-grounded fear that as soon as they became engaged with us some other European power would attack them in the rear. What other satisfactory explanation is there for Louis Napoleon's withdrawal from Mexico...?"

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[22]The United States and Laton America. pp.321-22.

CONCLUSION

It will no doubt appear from the contents of the preceding chapters that the writer has tried to criticize the policy of Mr. William H. Seward in regard to his dealings with the French Intervention in Mexico. This, however, has not been the object. From the viewpoint of sound statesmanship and political sagacity, the policy of Mr. Seward was admirable. Any other course than that followed by him would in all probability have brought about the division of the American Union. But, it must be kept in mind, that the test of statesmanship is not how well he can serve another country, but how well he can serve his own. The policy followed by Mr. Seward was of greatest benefit to the United States, but it does not conform with history to say that his attitude was calculated to be of great benefit to Mexico, since he could not adhere to the latter without imperiling the former.

Then, too, the words of Prof. Woolsey must be kept in mind; that is, that the Monroe Doctrine is a policy, not a law, and as such may be adhered to and interpreted in terms of self-interest. The fact that inconsistency in the application of the Monroe Doctrine has been one

of the severe criticism made of Mr. Seward by some writers, should in no wise be considered as an indictment against him, since inconsistency may be one of the characteristics of any policy that is adhered to on the basis of self interest.

It will also appear, from the contents of this work, that the eminent scholars who have dealt with the topic here discussed and who have been cited in some instances, were criticized by the writer. The intention has been to bring out some apparent inconsistencies in the interpretation of certain events which, from the viewpoint of the writer, do not agree with the facts in the case involved. The criticism is made not of their findings, but of the interpretation of certain events, which interpretation depends largely on the viewpoint of the interpreter. Neither is the merit of these able scholars questioned.

The findings of the writer, in short, have been:

1. That the Monroe Doctrine was not vindicated by the United States during the Civil War because of the American situation.

   (a) Civil War in America weakened the Union and practically tied Seward's hands.

   (b) European interventions in Latin America made it practically certain that they would resent any reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine.

2. That the Monroe Doctrine was not reasserted after the Civil War because the European situation made it unnecessary.

(a) Rise of Prussia threatened Napoleon's dynasty and made it imperative for him to withdraw his troops from Mexico.

(b) Opposition of the French people to the Mexican expedition because of its futility and its enormous cost, made it certain that Napoleon could not carry the intervention on indefinitely.

(c) Napoleon's desire to play a more important role in European affairs, viz., the insurrection of Poland, consolidation of Germany, consolidation of Italy, made it necessary for him to be free from complications in America.

3. That the Monroe Doctrine was influential in the withdrawal of France from Mexico because, although it was not reasserted, it was a silent reminder of what the deep rooted American sentiment had continued to be as witnessed by the popular opposition in America to the French Intervention and the Maximilian Empire.

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