

8-9-1948

The Attitude of Queen Victoria Toward the Indian Mutiny and the Second Afghan War

William P. Armstrong

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/hist_etds



Part of the [History Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Armstrong, William P. "The Attitude of Queen Victoria Toward the Indian Mutiny and the Second Afghan War." (1948).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/hist_etds/103

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in History ETDs by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact disc@unm.edu.

378.789

Un 3 Oa

1949

cop. 2

Amstercum — A Guide of Queen Victoria Toward the Indian Ministry

THE LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO



Call No.

378.789

Un30a

1949

cop.2

Accessio.
Number

130526

IMPORTANT!

Special care should be taken to prevent loss or damage of this volume. If lost or damaged, it must be paid for at the current rate of typing.

A14405 924927

DATE DUE	
APR 15 '71	DEC 10 1993
RECD UNM MAY 14 '71	MAR 11 1998
JUN 3 '80	
RECD UNM DEC 20 '79	
DEC 2 '84	
RECD UNM JAN 22 '85	
RECD UNM OCT 23 '85	
APR 22 1994	
APR 29 1994	
DEC 15 1993	
JUN 17 1998	
GAYLORD	PRINTED IN U.S.A.

UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO LIBRARY

MANUSCRIPT THESES

Unpublished theses submitted for the Master's and Doctor's degrees and deposited in the University of New Mexico Library are open for inspection, but are to be used only with due regard to the rights of the authors. Bibliographical references may be noted, but passages may be copied only with the permission of the authors, and proper credit must be given in subsequent written or published work. Extensive copying or publication of the thesis in whole or in part requires also the consent of the Dean of the Graduate School of the University of New Mexico.

This thesis by ...William P. Armstrong..... has been used by the following persons, whose signatures attest their acceptance of the above restrictions.

A Library which borrows this thesis for use by its patrons is expected to secure the signature of each user.

NAME AND ADDRESS

DATE

By _____

of the _____

UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO LIBRARY

MANUSCRIPT THESES

Unpublished theses submitted for the Master's and Doctor's degrees and deposited in the University of New Mexico Library are open for inspection, but are to be used only with due regard to the rights of the authors. Bibliographical references may be noted, but passages may be copied only with the permission of the authors, and proper credit must be given in subsequent written or published work. Extensive copying or publication of the thesis in whole or in part requires also the consent of the Dean of the Graduate School of the University of New Mexico.

This thesis by ...William P. Armstrong.....
has been used by the following persons, whose signatures attest their acceptance of the above restrictions.

A Library which borrows this thesis for use by its patrons is expected to secure the signature of each user.

NAME AND ADDRESS

DATE

MANUSCRIPTS

Unpublished theses submitted for the degree of Master of Arts and deposited in the University of New Mexico Library are open for inspection but are to be used only with the consent of the rights of the author. Bibliographical references may be made and passages may be copied only with the permission of the author and proper credit must be given to the author in writing or printed work. Reproductive copying or publication of the thesis in whole or in part requires the consent of the Board of the Graduate School of the University of New Mexico.

This thesis by William F. Thompson has been used by the following persons, whose signatures given their acceptance of the above statement:

A library which borrows this thesis for use by its patrons is expected to secure the signature of each user.

DATE

NAME AND ADDRESS

THE ATTITUDE OF QUEEN VICTORIA TOWARD THE INDIAN
MUTINY AND THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR

A Thesis

Presented to

the Faculty of the Department of History
University of New Mexico

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

William P. Armstrong

August 1948



EFFICIENCY
LEASE BOND
RAC CONTENT

This thesis, directed and approved by the candidate's committee, has been accepted by the Graduate Committee of the University of New Mexico in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Francis V. Stohr

DEAN

August 7-1948

DATE

THE ATTITUDE OF QUEEN VICTORIA TOWARD THE INDIAN
MUTINY AND THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR

Thesis committee

James C. Russell

CHAIRMAN

Gordon H. McNeil

Alfred H. Hughes

This thesis, directed and approved by the candidate's supervisor, has been accepted by the Graduate Committee of the University of New Mexico in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

[Signature]

Date

August 7, 1947

THE ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TOWARD THE JAPANESE
WUJIN AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Thesis committee

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

1947

378.789

Un30a

1949

cop.2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I INTRODUCTION	1
II THE INDIAN MUTINY 1857-1858	14
III THE DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN 1876-1881	31
IV CONCLUSION	58
BIBLIOGRAPHY	62

130526

ST. 100
1000
1000

1000 1000 1000

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION

II. THE THEORY OF THE SUBJECT

III. THE PRACTICE OF THE SUBJECT

IV. CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

EFFICIENT
ERASE 50
1000 1000 1000

1000 1000 1000

LIST OF MAPS

INDIA 1805

Facing page 1

INDIA 1857

Facing page 14

THE INDIAN EMPIRE AND AFGHANISTAN

Facing page 31

LIST OF

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

THE INDIAN EMPIRE AND

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801


INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

INDIA 1801

DEDICATION

To my wife, Mary, without whose aid and encouragement
this thesis would never have been possible.



From Sir Alfred Lyall, The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India, London, 1929.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

William IV died June 20, 1837, and was succeeded as ruler of Great Britain and Ireland by the next in line, his eighteen year old niece Victoria, daughter of the Duke and Duchess of Kent. She did not, however, receive the full inheritance from her uncle. The Kingdom of Hanover, unlike the British Isles, followed the Salic Law. Therefore, her sex served as a barrier to coronation and the German state passed over to her uncle, the Duke of Cumberland.

The constitutional position of the ruler upon Victoria's accession to the throne merits review at this time because the character of the crown had undergone continuous changes since the Civil War. The control over national expenditures was now completely in the hands of parliament, and the royal family was placed on a fixed salary, known technically as the Civil List. This process started with George III, who surrendered his hereditary revenues, and continued with the reigns of George IV and William IV. With the accession of Victoria the determination of expenditures had gone completely over to parliament.

The control over the conduct of the executive departments had passed into the hands of a cabinet responsible to parliament. William IV was the last personal monarch. After

his death a series of strong ministers had reduced the share of the crown in the government. A government evolved, conducted by ministers responsible to the parliament for their actions rather than to the crown. When the crown did not heed the advice tendered by the ministry or when parliament disapproved ministerial policy, the ministry was forced to resign. This growth in the power of the cabinet made the ministry solely responsible for governmental policy. This development of ministerial responsibility took from the sovereign most of the power to act politically. Now it could be truly said that the king could do no wrong. Therefore, instead of rebellions against the throne, changes in ministry accomplished political revolution with less turmoil and no bloodshed. As one expert on the subject stated:

Instead of a dangerous conflict between the Crown and Parliament, there succeeded struggles between rival parties for Parliamentary Majorities; and the successful party wielded all the power of the State. Upon ministers, there devolved the entire burthen of public affairs; they relieved the Crown of all its cares and perils, but, at the same time, they appropriated all its authority. The King reigned, but his Ministers governed.¹

In spite of the greater influence of the cabinet, the legal powers of Queen Victoria differed very little from those of Queen Elizabeth. The crown had immense reserve powers vested in it by the constitution which were little affected by the growth and decay of institutions. The Queen

¹ Sir Thomas Erskine May, The Constitutional History of England, Since the Accession of George III, 3 vols, (London, 1912) I.

had certain prerogatives of which she made great use. She had the right of dissolution which in the words of Marriott consisted of "the right to appeal from Parliament to the masters of Parliament, from his (her) own advisors to the political Sovereign before the expression of whose deliberate will the legal sovereign must bow."² A prerogative similar but quite distinct from the former that the Queen had at her command was the right to refuse dissolution to an existing ministry. The royal right to exercise her discretion as to which leader of the party she would invite to form a ministry was hers constitutionally. It can be stated, however, that Queen Victoria, in the exercise of this right, many times overstepped the bounds of propriety.

Besides these main prerogatives the Queen had at her disposal other rights which were hers by the constitution. In the words of Bagehot these were, "the right to advise, the right to encourage, and the right to warn." The sovereign put these powers to good use. She was constantly giving advice to her ministers on all problems from the minutest point on military etiquette to the gravest issues of domestic and foreign policy.³ During the great battle waged in parliament on the repeal of the Corn Laws both Queen Victoria

² Sir J. A. R. Marriott, The Mechanism of the Modern State, 2 vols., (Oxford, 1927), I, 32.

³ Harold J. Laski, Parliamentary Government in England (New York, 1938), p. 353.

and Prince Albert wrote constantly to Peel giving him encouragement for his efforts. In the case of the right to warn, Victoria used it more as a right to reproach. The classic example of this can be seen in a letter to the Earl of Derby caused by the surrender of some of the royal rights in the debate over the India Bill.⁴

It was in the field of foreign and imperial policy that the rights to advise, encourage, and to warn were found in wide use. The rise of the cabinet system drew the actual making of policy into its hands with the advice of parliament. Nevertheless Mr. Gladstone pointed out that the power of the crown was of great importance in the conduct of government because the sovereign had

. . . the advantage of long experience, wide survey, elevated position, and entire disconnection from the bias of party. Furthermore, personal and domestic relations with the ruling families abroad give openings, in delicate cases, for saying more, and saying it at once more efficaciously, than could be ventured in the more formal correspondence and ruder contacts, of Governments. . . .⁵

In the hands of a strong monarch like Queen Victoria the royal prerogatives and the position of the crown assumed great influence. An example of the Queen's interest in the affairs of state can be seen as early as 1847. In a letter

⁴ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, ed. A. C. Benson and Viscount Esher, 3 vols., (London, 1908) III, 294, citing ltr., Q.V. to Derby, 8 July, 1858.

⁵ Gladstone, Gleanings, I, 41-43, quoted in The Mechanism of the Modern State, I, 48.

had certain prerogatives of which she made great use. She had the right of dissolution which in the words of Marriott consisted of "the right to appeal from Parliament to the masters of Parliament, from his (her) own advisors to the political Sovereign before the expression of whose deliberate will the legal sovereign must bow."² A prerogative similar but quite distinct from the former that the Queen had at her command was the right to refuse dissolution to an existing ministry. The royal right to exercise her discretion as to which leader of the party she would invite to form a ministry was hers constitutionally. It can be stated, however, that Queen Victoria, in the exercise of this right, many times overstepped the bounds of propriety.

Besides these main prerogatives the Queen had at her disposal other rights which were hers by the constitution. In the words of Bagehot these were, "the right to advise, the right to encourage, and the right to warn." The sovereign put these powers to good use. She was constantly giving advice to her ministers on all problems from the minutest point on military etiquette to the gravest issues of domestic and foreign policy.³ During the great battle waged in parliament on the repeal of the Corn Laws both Queen Victoria

² Sir J. A. R. Marriott, The Mechanism of the Modern State, 2 vols., (Oxford, 1927), I, 32.

³ Harold J. Laski, Parliamentary Government in England (New York, 1938), p. 353.

and Prince Albert wrote constantly to Peel giving him encouragement for his efforts. In the case of the right to warn, Victoria used it more as a right to reproach. The classic example of this can be seen in a letter to the Earl of Derby caused by the surrender of some of the royal rights in the debate over the India Bill.⁴

It was in the field of foreign and imperial policy that the rights to advise, encourage, and to warn were found in wide use. The rise of the cabinet system drew the actual making of policy into its hands with the advice of parliament. Nevertheless Mr. Gladstone pointed out that the power of the crown was of great importance in the conduct of government because the sovereign had

. . . the advantage of long experience, wide survey, elevated position, and entire disconnection from the bias of party. Furthermore, personal and domestic relations with the ruling families abroad give openings, in delicate cases, for saying more, and saying it at once more efficaciously, than could be ventured in the more formal correspondence and ruder contacts, of Governments. . . .⁵

In the hands of a strong monarch like Queen Victoria the royal prerogatives and the position of the crown assumed great influence. An example of the Queen's interest in the affairs of state can be seen as early as 1847. In a letter

⁴ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, ed. A. C. Benson and Viscount Esher, 3 vols., (London, 1908) III, 294, citing ltr., Q.V. to Derby, 8 July, 1858.

⁵ Gladstone, Gleanings, I, 41-43, quoted in The Mechanism of the Modern State, I, 48.

and Prince Albert were... sent for his efforts... Victoria need it more... angle of this can be seen... caused by the... debate over the... It was in the... that the rights... in wide use... asking of policy... ment. Nevertheless... of the... ment because the...

...the... elevated position... line of... relations with... ing, in... it at once more... in the... of government...

In the hands of... the total... great influence... affairs of state...

...Hansen and... sitting... Mechanisms of the...

of complaint to Lord Palmerston, of that year, the Queen claimed that the foreign office drafts were being dispatched without her sanction and that this practice must be ended.⁶ This not only violated her right to advise but reduced her knowledge of foreign affairs. Her desire to see all drafts and to be kept informed of all discussions of policy can be readily illustrated by the concluding paragraphs of the ultimatum sent to Lord John Russell a few years later. In this letter, it is evident that she believed it the duty of her ministers to keep her informed and to give her time to become acquainted with all decisions.⁷

Many authorities believe that the Trent Affair showed most clearly the influence of the crown on the pursuance of policy. A draft from the Foreign Office, couched in harsh words, was prepared for transmission to the United States. It was sent to Victoria for sanction, but in the process Prince Albert made certain modifications that left the dispatch still firm but opened a way out for the United States. Although the actual modifications of the draft were made by the Prince Consort it can be assumed that the changes were those desired by Queen Victoria as well. This exercise of tact by the Crown probably averted a long and costly war

⁶ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, II, 222, citing ltr., Q.V. to Palmerston, 17 April, 1847.

⁷ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, II, 265, citing ltr., Q.V. to Lord John Russell, 12 August, 1850.

with the United States.

Numerous instances in the Letters of Queen Victoria show that her connections with the ruling houses of Europe affected the conduct of foreign and imperial affairs. Queen Victoria personally took her views and the views of her government to Napoleon III in an effort to stave off the Franco-Prussian War. In this case her efforts were to no avail. During the crises with Russia in the 1870's and 1880's she made use of her connections with the Russian ruling family and was able to smooth somewhat the situation between the two countries.

At Victoria's accession the crown was in disrepute as a result of the character of her predecessors. It was her duty to reestablish the monarchy in the affections of the English people. The Hanoverian line had not been either intelligent or virtuous. George III, her grandfather, had led a good private life, but his stubbornness and narrowness combined with a weak intellect left much to be desired. Her uncle, George IV, had disgusted England; her other uncle, William IV, was in many ways a great improvement over his brother but he was erratic and, by many, considered unbalanced.

The task of restoring the prestige of the crown was complicated by terrific social and economic changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution. Domestic issues dominated

ICIENCY
ASE BOND
COMENT

the early years of Victoria's reign. There was constant agitation for free trade which resulted in the repeal of the Corn Laws. This in itself eased the relationship between capital and labor. In 1845 a terrible famine in Ireland created unforeseen strains upon the British people and led to a mass emigration of nearly four million Irishmen to North American. Throughout her reign legislation was passed dealing with the social problems caused by the increased industrialization of the country. Various acts affecting the conditions of work and the gradual extension of the electoral franchise enabled the new laboring classes to take over their share of national responsibilities.

In the early decades of Victoria's reign, England was rocked by liberal agitation. The Chartist movement was the most radical, causing uneasiness for the governing classes. Although the great petition brought derision upon this movement, thinking people were forced to recognize that certain demands had to be fulfilled. By the end of the century most of the Chartist program had been carried out by the Liberal and Conservative parties.

The interest in domestic affairs gradually yielded to a deepening interest in foreign policy. The years of Victoria's reign witnessed a series of vast movements throughout Europe and in the world at large; revolutionary uprisings in Europe in 1848; the Crimean War of 1854-1856; the Sepoy

The first part of the report is devoted to a general survey of the situation in the country. It is followed by a detailed account of the work done during the year. The report then goes on to discuss the results of the work and the progress made. It concludes with a summary of the work done and a statement of the conclusions reached.

EFFICIENCY

EZERASE BOND

RAG CONTENT

Although the work done during the year has been considerable, it is not yet complete. It is hoped that the results of the work will be published in the near future. The report is a valuable contribution to the knowledge of the subject and is well worth reading. It is a must for all those who are interested in the subject.

rebellion against the East India Company; the unification of Italy; the Civil War in the United States; the intervention of France in Mexico; the formation of the German Empire and the subsequent colonial race of the European powers in Africa and the Pacific area. In some of these movements Britain played a leading part and in every case she was at least an interested and attentive observer.

Of all the problems that faced Queen Victoria none was more serious than the problem of imperial affairs. Queen Victoria in the course of her reign was always an imperialist like many of her subjects. There was, however, a strongly entrenched school of thought which did not believe in imperialism. This philosophy existed long before her accession to the throne and did not run its course until the 1870's.

With the growth of the theory of laissez-faire there had been an accompanying development of the idea that the colonies should be viewed from a profit and loss basis. This materialistic inspection of the value of colonies did not take into consideration the political or even the spiritual ties that bound the colonies to the mother country nor was it conducive to the preservation of such ties.

The group that carried the anti-imperialistic and separatist beliefs even into parliament was the Manchester School of free traders. They believed that free trade

EFFICIENCY
EZERASE BOND
ACCIDENT

would sweep the world and that the colonies would be useless appendages to the British economy. Furthermore they held that the clamor for responsible government being raised in the 1860's by Canada was a forerunner of revolution by the larger colonies following the example of the United States. The name, Little Englanders, soon was applied to them. Led by such staunch free traders as Richard Cobden and John Bright, this group gained a strong foothold. Even such members of the Colonial office as Sir James Stephen, Herman Merivale, and Frederic Rogers believed that the colonies would break away from Britain.

A letter from Lord Grey to Lord Elgin showed how far the Little Englanders had influenced those in high places. Grey said there was a feeling in the House of Commons and in other high quarters that Britain had no interest in preserving the colonies and should take no steps to keep them. Grey said further that Gladstone, Graham and Peel were in

⁸ Mechanism of the Modern State, I, 306-307.

Sir James Stephen, permanent counsel to the Colonial Office and Board of Trade, 1825-1834; Assistant Under-secretary for the Colonies, 1834-1836; Under-secretary for the Colonies, 1837-1846.

Herman Merivale, Assistant Under-secretary for the Colonies, 1847; permanent Under-secretary for the Colonies, 1848-1859; Under-secretary for India, 1859-1874.

Frederic Rogers, Under-secretary for Colonies, 1860-1871.

sympathy with theories openly avowed by Cobden and his friends.⁹

In the same generation many took exception to the beliefs of the Little Englanders. Men like Lord Durham, Sir William Molesworth, Lord Grey, Wakefield and Buller were not in sympathy with the colonial theories held by Cobden and his associates. These men believed that Britain had a future in her colonies.¹⁰

Regardless of the fact that the Little Englanders were powerful in the government, colonial expansion took place. It was an unconscious growth that neither economic theories nor an unsympathic government could block. Britain continued to expand in India until its natural frontiers were reached. Canada reached confederation stage while the Australasian colonies clamoured for responsible government.

The discussions over Canadian confederation awakened a new interest in Britain. Although the exponents of laissez-faire were certain that Canadian confederation meant the beginning of separation from Britain, a wave of imperialistic sentiments appeared. Benjamin Disraeli, the head of the new Conservative party, fostered this growing idea. He built up the attitude of pride in an Empire in place of an attitude of cold appraisal of colonial worth. This idea, awakening

⁹ Mechanism of the Modern State, I, 300.

¹⁰ Ibid., 304.

in the sixties, was the direct antithesis of the Little Englander's creed.

Disraeli embarked upon the new Imperialism partly because the rise of Germany under Bismarck disrupted the balance of power in Europe, and partly because it was politically expedient to combat the views of Gladstone and Granville.

The defeat of France by Bismarck was a turning point in British thought. In a race for world power the advantages of colonial expansion were obvious. Disraeli in his speech from the Crystal Palace in 1872 put these thoughts before England and in doing so committed the Conservative Party to the extension of the empire. He laid the blame for indifference to the empire upon the Liberal Party and said that the grant of self government to the colonies was done with a view to hastening their separation.¹¹ By this speech Disraeli became the leader of the new Imperialists and hastened the downfall of the laissez-faire school.

The accession to power of the Conservative Party in 1874 placed Britain irrevocably on the road to the acquisition and maintenance of a colonial empire. This change in colonial policy can perhaps be best illustrated in the further expansion by Britain in the Asiatic continent, especially in India, where Queen Victoria followed the ups and downs of her government with avid interest as one would

¹¹ A. P. Newton, A Hundred Years of British Empire (Oxford, 1940) 233-246.

expect of an imperialist.

In the era of Pitt, only a small part of India had been annexed to the dominions of the East India Company. There were, however, some aggressively inclined governors-general who were constantly bringing new territory under the authority of Britain.. Lord Dalhousie, for instance, as governor-general (1848-1856) firmly made, in the eight years he held office, the most notable territorial advances in India that had ever been made under the East India Company.

Lord Dalhousie epitomized the "forward" policy in regard to territorial expansion. In 1843 General Napier, commander of Western India, found a pretext for interference in the Sindh, a Mohammedan state on the lower Indus, and annexed it. Two years later after the invasion of British India by a Sikh army, the Punjab, an area north-east of the Sindh, was reduced to a protectorate. A revolt of the Sikhs in 1848 led to the complete annexation of this state by Dalhousie. Burma in 1851 had clashed with Britain over the economic penetration of British merchants. This war ended in the defeat of the Burmese by Lord Dalhousie and the incorporation of Lower Burma into the Indian Empire.

Lord Dalhousie used another method for the acquisition of territories for which showed his dreams of empire. An ancient Hindu custom allowed a ruler who had no natural heirs to adopt an heir for his dominions. This was considered

a legal practice even though the act might be delayed until the last hours of the ruler's life. Lord Dalhousie refused to honour this custom and announced that if any ruler died leaving no natural heir, his territory could be regarded as having "lapsed" and was escheated to the East India Company. During the years 1849-1853 there were eight of these escheats, five of which were permanently annexed to the Indian Administration.¹²

A month before Dalhousie returned to England the Oudh, a rich area on the upper Ganges was annexed to the British flag after the deposition of the incapable ruler. Thus in the space of a decade Britain's Indian empire had been greatly enlarged but she was faced with a vast population in northern India that was smouldering with unrest.

¹² Sir W. Lee Warner, "India and Afghanistan, 1815-1869," Cambridge Modern History; the Growth of Nationalities (New York, 1935) XI, 743.

is at present even though the ...

The last ...

to handle this ...

leaving no ...

as having ...

gent. ...

concerns ...

Administration

A ...

Only, a ...

British ...

There is ...

to ...

also ...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

THE BRITISH BOMBARDIER IN 1914: PAGES 10-11
TO REMEMBER THE 4TH LANCY BATTAL IN 1914
AND IN 1915: PAGES 12-13

CHAPTER II

THE INDIAN MUTINY 1857-1858

I

Queen Victoria's dominions in India were peaceful in January, 1857. The year before Lord Dalhousie, the retiring Viceroy of India, had written to her that he would transfer India to Lord Canning, his successor, "in a state of perfect tranquillity" and he could state within limits that "he knows of no quarter in which it is probable that trouble will arise."¹ This sense of security and the end of the Crimean War led the government of Lord Palmerston to reduce the army estimates in an economy move, little realizing what was in store for Britain in her Indian empire.

There was in India a growing undercurrent of unrest among the people. British defeats in the First Afghan War in the late 1830's brought loss of prestige among the natives. The introduction of social reforms which went against established customs and religions created an intensely hostile feeling among the Indian people. The first threatening symptoms appeared early in 1857 when the Indian Government was informed that an unwholesome situation was growing among the Sepoys. This arose from their belief that the British through the use of the new Enfield rifle wanted them to

¹ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, ed. A. C. Benson and Viscount Esher, 3 vols., (London, 1908) III, 179, citing ltr., Dalhousie to Q.V., 29 February, 1856.

from the British Wall, the size and location of
the British Position in India, London, 1929.

commit sacrilege by biting its greased cartridges. The rumor was spread among the native troops that these cartridges were covered with the fat of cows and pigs, the use of which was forbidden by both the Hindu and Moslem religions. In February the mutiny actually broke out at Berhampore but was inadequately suppressed by the government. After this outbreak the Indian authorities discovered that further mutinies were being incited by propagandists who were spreading the rumor among other regiments that the British were deliberately seeking to destroy the Sepoy caste and to force them into Christianity. In vain did Lord Canning, the Viceroy, assure the native troops that no offense to their religion or injury to their caste was intended. Open revolt broke out in the native garrison at Meerut on the 10th of May, 1857.²

When the government had decided to reduce the military establishment, both Queen Victoria and her husband, the Prince Consort, were filled with misgivings. They were uneasy over the reduction of the costly military machine which had been built up with so much difficulty and expense. They felt that there was no margin left to meet any sudden emergencies and to keep such a vast colonial empire it was important that economy should not imperil it. Notwithstanding

² Sir Lee W. Warner, "Indian and Afghanistan, 1815-1869," Cambridge Modern History, The Growth of Nationalities (New York, 1934) XI, 745-746.

commitment to the cause of the oppressed
which was a constant reminder of the
fact that the struggle was not only
of which was the result of the
In February 1905 the first of the
was undoubtedly the result of the
outbreak and the result of the
mutinies were the result of the
ing the struggle was the result of the
deliberately and the result of the
force then came the result of the
Victory, however, the result of the
petition in the result of the
broke out in the result of the

1905

then came the result of the
any notable result of the
Prison Council, the result of the
every other day of the result of the
had been the result of the
told that the result of the
genocide and the result of the
portent that the result of the

2. The result of the
1865, the result of the
(New York, 1905)

the Queen's objections the military budget was cut, leaving the British in an unfortunate position when the Mutiny broke out in India.³⁾

Lord Palmerston in a letter to the Queen on June 26, 1857, wrote that he was sorry to have received news of further uprisings of Sepoys "but he has no fear of its results." He minimized the seriousness of the whole situation and stated that the troops already under orders for embarkation to India would be sent. Future army orders would await news from India when "it will be seen whether any further reinforcements will be required."⁴

Two days later on the 28th Lord Palmerston, the Secretary for War, writing to the Queen admitted "the crisis is one of great anxiety" and gave her the information that the cabinet had ordered four more regiments to be prepared for India. At the same time he pressed for a greater number of crown troops to be employed permanently in that country.⁵

The Queen replied to this letter on the 2th. She agreed with Palmerston that reinforcements to India should not be delayed because "the moment is certainly a very critical one," and that The East India Company should have a larger force

³ Theodore Martin, The Life of the Prince Consort, 5 vols, (London, 1879) IV, 18-20.

⁴ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, III, 234-235, citing letter, Palmerston to Q.V., 26 June, 1857.

⁵ The Prince Consort, IV, 72-73.

of royal troops in India, since they were the troops that maintained the empire. The highest interests should not be sacrificed by the Company "to the love of patronage." Furthermore the Queen wanted an increase in the military establishment up to authorized strength to protect the home shores and to be capable "of meeting a sudden emergency, which, as the present example shows, may come upon us at any moment." She showed her regrets for the economy drive when she said, "if only we had not reduced in such a hurry this spring, we should have all the men wanted."⁶

The material available shows that there had been some discussion as to the matter of tactical organization in which the reinforcements were to be sent out to India. The Queen favoured the brigade organization "without which no army in the world can be efficient." She tried to overrule Lord Panmure's objection to it by pointing out the need for staff officers. The only way they could obtain tactical training was "on military duty, not on clerk's duty in some district or colony." Therefore she deemed it wise for the government to adopt a system that would insure the efficiency of the army.⁷

The month of July brought continuous reports of the

⁶ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, III, 235-236, citing ltr., Q.V. to Panmure, 29 June, 1857.

⁷ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, III, 236, citing ltr., Q.V., to Panmure, 3 July 1857.

of royal... maintained... be... further... establishment... as the... The... "it only... should...

discovered... the... favoured... in the... Panama's... officers... was... or... sent to... the... The...

... 250, ... sitting...

seriousness of the uprising in India. This convinced the Queen that the government had underestimated the danger or, at all events, was not taking sufficient military precautions to meet the emergency. She communicated her belief to this effect: 117 July, 1857, in a letter to Lord Palmerston. This letter did not produce the required results from Palmerston. He replied that the government was taking every measure to meet the mutiny "but measures are sometimes best calculated to succeed which follow each other step by step."⁸

Victoria was not satisfied with this "step by step" policy. In her answer to Palmerston's letter, 19 July, 1857, she expressed deep concern over the way the government was handling the whole affair. The Queen wanted to impress upon the government the necessity of a comprehensive view of the military situation and the need for a plan to meet the crisis rather than "living from hand to mouth, and taking small isolated measures without reference to each other." Again she brought up the reduction of the army which was "contrary to the Queen's hopes and expectations." She reproached the government for this action, especially since it had been taken "in spite of the fearful lesson just taught by the late war," and for its contentment in sending out reinforcements to India without reorganizing its forces. In a more militant tone she hammered at the government for "some

⁸ The Prince Consort, IV, 77-78.

...of the ...
...the ...
...at all ...
...along ...
...this ...
...This ...
...also ...
...to ...
...no ...
...V ...
...policy ...
...the ...
...handling ...
...the ...
...military ...
...rather ...
...last ...
...the ...
...to ...
...government ...
...taken ...
...late ...
...cents ...
...million ...

CIENCY
SE BOND
CONTENT

comprehensive and immediate measure - - - its principle settled by the Cabinet, and its details left to the unfettered execution of the military authorities." Victoria continued her letter with a concrete plan of action that had been approved by the Commander-in-Chief and would improve the present position of the army.⁹

These arguments in the letter to Alarston had their effect, for the Prince Consort wrote in his diary 22 September, "that the Cabinet has at last adopted our suggestions for an increase in the army."¹⁰

The importance of news from India caused Queen Victoria to include, even in a letter to the King of the Belgians about the marriage of her daughter Charlotte, a statement in regard to it. She said "here we are in anxious (and I fear many people in very cruel) suspense, for news from India. They ought to have arrived the day before yesterday."¹¹

After a series of debates in parliament, the government was given complete authority to mobilize the country's resources to quell the mutiny, including the power to call up the militia to augment the military force. Nevertheless, the Queen believed the Cabinet to be lacking in vigour. She

⁹ The Prince Consort, IV, 78-82.

¹⁰ The Prince Consort, IV, 88.

¹¹ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, III, 240, citing ltr., Q.V., to King of Belgians, 27 July, 1857.

gave expression to this belief in replying to a letter of Palmerston on the 2nd of August, in which he told her of the decision of the government. In her opinion the calling up of the militia was a necessity "for the defence of our country, and for keeping up on the Continent of Europe the knowledge that we are not a defenceless state." She pointed out that the militia had to be called out in sufficient strength because former measures viewed in the light of the formidable state of affairs in India were "by no means adequate to the emergency." She blamed her government for a "most short-sighted" policy which caused Britain "finally to suffer either in power and reputation, or to pay enormous sums for small advantages in the end--generally both." She urged her cabinet to "look the question boldly in the face" and to take advantage of the power granted for vigorous measures since "it is generally the Government, and not the House of Commons, who hang back."¹²

News about the true conditions in India reached England slowly. Since the outbreak, the mutiny had spread rapidly throughout Bengal and Oude. The rebels took Delhi with ease but were besieged early in June by a British army under General Wilson, strongly augmented in August by fresh troops of General John Nicholson. General Wheeler

¹² Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st series, III, 241, citing letter, Q.V. to Palmerston, 2 August, 1857.

EFFICIENCY

EZERASE BOND

TAC COVER

and the garrison of Cawnpore were destroyed June 27 by the rebel leader, Nana Sahib. The city of Lucknow, in Oude, with its British garrison was besieged by another group of Sepoys.¹³

England had not received the news of Cawnpore by the 22nd of August. The Queen in her letter to Lord Palmerston on that date mentioned that "affairs in India have not yet taken a favourable turn. Delhi seems to still hold out." However, the Queen manifested her greatest interest in the effort being put forth by the government to meet the crisis. Once again Victoria told Lord Palmerston "that the measures hitherto taken by the Government are not commensurate with the magnitude of the crisis." She urged him to commit his government fully to the prosecution of the war and to make no attempt to save money when "financial difficulties don't exist" because troops sent to India were taken over by the Indian Government.¹⁴

Palmerston replied on the same day to this letter of the Queen. He defended his course of action in regard to reserves, and assured Victoria "that there is no wish to make savings on the amount voted." The Queen was not satisfied with this answer. She still accused the government of

¹³ Cambridge Modern History, XI, 746-747.

¹⁴ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, III, 242-243, citing ltr., Q.V. to Palmerston, 22 August, 1857.

of taking an "apologetic line" when "The Queen, the House of Lords, the House of Commons, and the Press, all call out for vigorous exertion." She disagreed violently with the policy of "letting out a little sail at a time" and was convinced "if vigour and determination to get what will be eventually wanted is shown by the Cabinet, it will pervade the whole government." If, in her opinion, they lacked the necessary determination and "people don't see what the government really require, and find them satisfied with a little at a time, even that little will not be got." Queen Victoria asked the cabinet again to "look the whole question in the face" in order to arrive safely and less expensively in the long run at the end of the crisis.¹⁵

The Queen was aware of her failure to get Palmerston to take more positive action on the part of the government. She wrote him on 25 August, 1857, that "she is deeply grieved at her want of success in impressing upon him the importance of meeting present dangers by agreeing on, and maturing a general plan. . . ." She attacked his plan for rebuilding the country's military machine and his failure to achieve something definite to build up the Indian armies. She complained bitterly "that the Government incur a fearful responsibility toward their country by their apparent indifference.

¹⁵ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, III, 244, citing ltr., Q.V. to Palmerston, 22 August, 1857.

of taking an "active" part in the work of the
of London, the House of Commons, and the House of Lords
for vigorous action. The Government's policy of "active"
policy of "active" action is a result of the fact that
placed "it" in a position of "active" action.
eventually reached the point of "active" action.
The whole movement is a result of the fact that
necessary, but it is in the hands of the Government
that really counts, and the Government is the only
at a time, even if it is not the only one.
ended one of the most important of the Government's
two" in order to reach the point of "active" action.

EFFICIENCY
E-ZERASE-BO
RAC CONTENT

of reaching the point of "active" action.
general point of view, the Government is the only
the country's interest, and the Government is the only
something that is not the only one.
placed in a position of "active" action.
eventually reached the point of "active" action.

God grant that no unforeseen European complications fall upon this country--but we are really tempting Providence." So assured was she that her views were correct, that she wanted Palmerston to take them to the cabinet.¹⁶

Queen Victoria was resting at Balmoral Castle in the Highlands of Scotland when she received the full news of the massacre at Cawnpore. This terrible information shocked her and left her "in sad anxiety about India, which engrosses all our attention." She commented further in her letter of 2 September, 1857, to her uncle, the King of the Belgians, that "troops cannot be raised fast or largely enough" to end the situation in India. She expressed disbelief at "the horrors committed on the poor ladies--women and children--are unknown in these ages and makes one's blood run cold." To her the Mutiny was "much more distressing than the Crimea--where there was glory and honourable warfare, and where the poor women and children were safe."¹⁷

Cawnpore and the continued disasters in India had startling results. Alarm penetrated all circles of the English people, even to the government and Lord Palmerston. His immediate reaction was to ask the Queen to set aside a day "for National Prayer and Humiliation with reference

¹⁶ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, III, 246, citing ltr., Q.V. to Palmerston 25 August, 1857.

¹⁷ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, III, 246-247, citing ltr., Q.V. to King of Belgians, 2 September, 1857.

and grant that a sufficient number of copies of this
upon this country—namely the British and the
So assured was the result that the British
named telephone to the same in the same way.

Queen Victoria and Prince Albert were the
the King and the Queen were the most important
of the British Empire. The British Empire
showed how the British Empire was the most
emerged all on a sudden. The British Empire
factor of 2 and the British Empire was the
Belgian, that the British Empire was the
enough to and the British Empire was the
believed at the British Empire was the

ERASE

and children were the most important
ran out of the British Empire was the
than the British Empire was the most
first and while the British Empire was the
European and the British Empire was the
existing power. The British Empire was the
British Empire was the most important
the British Empire was the most important
a day the British Empire was the most

16. British Empire
17. British Empire
18. British Empire
19. British Empire
20. British Empire
21. British Empire
22. British Empire
23. British Empire
24. British Empire
25. British Empire
26. British Empire
27. British Empire
28. British Empire
29. British Empire
30. British Empire
31. British Empire
32. British Empire
33. British Empire
34. British Empire
35. British Empire
36. British Empire
37. British Empire
38. British Empire
39. British Empire
40. British Empire
41. British Empire
42. British Empire
43. British Empire
44. British Empire
45. British Empire
46. British Empire
47. British Empire
48. British Empire
49. British Empire
50. British Empire
51. British Empire
52. British Empire
53. British Empire
54. British Empire
55. British Empire
56. British Empire
57. British Empire
58. British Empire
59. British Empire
60. British Empire
61. British Empire
62. British Empire
63. British Empire
64. British Empire
65. British Empire
66. British Empire
67. British Empire
68. British Empire
69. British Empire
70. British Empire
71. British Empire
72. British Empire
73. British Empire
74. British Empire
75. British Empire
76. British Empire
77. British Empire
78. British Empire
79. British Empire
80. British Empire
81. British Empire
82. British Empire
83. British Empire
84. British Empire
85. British Empire
86. British Empire
87. British Empire
88. British Empire
89. British Empire
90. British Empire
91. British Empire
92. British Empire
93. British Empire
94. British Empire
95. British Empire
96. British Empire
97. British Empire
98. British Empire
99. British Empire
100. British Empire

to the present calamitous state of affairs in India." This request did not please her. She replied that he "knows what the Queen's feelings are with regard to fast days, which she thinks do not produce the desired effect," however she would "not oppose the natural feeling - - - to pray for our fellow countrymen and women who are exposed to such imminent danger. . . .". Queen Victoria did make one stipulation and that was that the day be "on a Sunday, and not on a week-day," because "the Queen heard it generally remarked, that it produced more harm than good."¹⁸

Queen Victoria on 18 September, 1857, continued her attack on the government's preparedness program. In this letter to Lord Palmerston she told him that "the Indian news, upon every further development, justifies less and less the opinion that it is rather favourable than otherwise and leading to the hope that affairs will soon take a favourable turn in India." She disagreed violently with Palmerston's view that the reinforcements sent out from England would ease the situation quickly. She claimed too many delays in their embarkation, plus the lengthy voyage would retard their effectiveness until October. This led to her belief that the government should take concrete steps

... for while we are putting off decisions in the vain hope that matters will mend, and in discussing

¹⁸ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, III, 247-248, citing ltr. Q.V. to Palmerston, 11 September, 1857.

the objections to different measures, the mischief is rapidly progressing, and the time difficult to catch up again. . . .¹⁹

The seat of the Mutiny had been in Oude, Delhi, and the upper Ganges, but had spread southwest towards Bombay. In Bengal it had spread behind the fighting lines due to the failure to disband some Sepoy regiments and thus endangered British lines of communication. However, in September of 1857, the tide began to turn. The British besiegers of Delhi, with the receipt of siege artillery, breached the Kashmir gate. The city was stormed on the 14th and completely subdued two days later. A strong relief column under General Havelock relieved Lucknow but was in return beleaguered by the rebels and was not relieved until November by Sir Colin Campbell.²⁰

Victoria wrote to Lord Clarendon, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 12 November, 1857, that "the news from India was a great relief and a ray of sunshine in our great affliction,"²¹ referring of course to the recapture of Delhi and Lucknow. However, she hastened to express her sorrow "at the loss of two such distinguished officers as Generals

¹⁹ The Prince Consort, IV, 127-128.

²⁰ Cambridge Modern History, XI, 746-748.

²¹ The great affliction was the sudden death of the wife of the Duc de Nemours, a beloved cousin and friend of Queen Victoria.

Nicholson and Neill,²² and alas! of many inferior ones."²³

As the British steadily reestablished their authority over the mutinous areas of India, a feeling of hostility and intolerance developed between them and the native population. The army was for vengeance upon all classes of Indians and this spirit manifested itself in many positions of rank. Queen Victoria was informed of this growing racial rancor by Lord Canning, the Governor-General of India, early in November.²⁴ She replied to this letter on the 9th, expressing her sorrow and indignation "at the unchristian spirit shown --- toward Indians in general and to Sepoys without discrimination," not only in India but by the public in England as well. She blamed most of it on the atrocities of the mutineers against "innocent women and children, which makes one's blood run cold and one's heart bleed," and thought it would soon pass over. She was completely in favour of "stern justice" being administered to the perpetrators of these crimes, but to the loyal population "there should be shown the greatest kindness" to let them know there is no rancor "but the greatest wish on their Queen's part to see

²² General Nicholson had been killed storming the Lahore gate 14th September at Delhi. General Neill had been slain relieving Lucknow in September.

²³ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, III, 253-254, citing ltr., Q.V. to Clarendon, 12 November, 1857.

²⁴ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, III, 249-252, citing ltr., Canning to Q.V., 25 September, 1857.

them happy, contented and flourishing."²⁵

After the fall of Delhi, fighting continued. Sir Colin Campbell rapidly suppressed the disorders in Oude and Agra provinces. The luckless city of Lucknow, which after its second relief had been allowed to fall again into the hands of the rebels, was in April of 1858 recaptured by the British. To Sir Colin Campbell, subsequent upon his victories at Delhi and local battles, Queen Victoria wrote a personal letter 19 January, 1858, expressing her "pride and satisfaction with which she had learned of the glorious victories," the manner of which "is beyond all praise."²⁶

Timed with the fall of Lucknow in April of 1858, was the publication in the Province of Oude by Lord Canning, the Governor-General of India, of a proclamation which announced that the proprietary rights in the soil of the province would be confiscated. There was, however, an exemption inserted in favour of such land owners and loyal rajahs who would actively aid in restoring law and order. This was a severe course of action to take but as Oude was still the seat of the mutiny stern measures were necessary to crush it.²⁷

Although the government believed this measure to be unwise, Lord Ellenborough, the President of the Board of

²⁵ The Prince Consort, 147-148.

²⁶ The Prince Consort, IV, 148.

²⁷ The Prince Consort, IV, 221-222.

EFFICIENCY
CASE-BOND
CONTENT

Trade, without waiting for an explanation from Lord Canning, sent him a secret dispatch of censure criticizing his harsh treatment of the natives. Lord Ellenborough had not received the sanction of his colleagues in the cabinet for this action and therefore it constituted a serious breach in the rules of official conduct. If the transmittal of the dispatch was an error, he made a much greater one in allowing several copies of the censure to reach members of parliament before it had even been seen by the Queen. The result of Ellenborough's precipitancy was a governmental crisis.²⁸

This action on the part of Ellenborough brought the Queen's ire down upon the head of Lord Derby, the Prime Minister. Although she couched her words carefully and was anxious not to increase Derby's difficulties she made it plain that "she must not leave unnoticed the fact that the dispatch in question ought never to have been written without having been submitted to the Queen." She called upon Derby to "take care that Lord Ellenborough will not repeat this," because it placed her "in a most embarrassing position."²⁹

The following day, May 10, 1858, Lord Ellenborough tendered his resignation. Both Houses of Parliament gave

²⁸ The Prince Consort, IV, 223.

²⁹ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, III, 282, citing ltr., Q.V. to Derby, 9 May, 1858.

ENCLOSURE
BOND
IN

notice of motion to censure the government which led Derby to write the Queen that he hoped Ellenborough's retirement would stop the vote of censure because the cabinet could not be punished for an action in which it had no part.³⁰

The Queen was unable to share this hope with Lord Derby since she felt the cabinet was responsible for anything that came from the publication of the dispatch, and that it was difficult to disconnect Ellenborough's action from that of the cabinet. As the Queen wrote to Derby the very next day

The fact that the Governor-General having been publicly reprimanded, and his policy condemned, remains the same, although the Government have done what they could to mitigate the consequences of what could not be undone.³¹

The government was able to weather this crisis caused by Lord Ellenborough's actions but it left Victoria with a bad impression of a man "with his knowledge, experience and energy and ability" who "should be so entirely unable to submit to general rules of conduct." She felt no keen loss with his retirement because she mentioned that she "had been for some time alarmed at his writing letters of his own" explaining to important native rulers his policy.³²

In India all that was left of the flaming disorders

³⁰ Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st. series, III, 283-284, citing Memo., Prince Albert, 11 May, 1858.

³¹ The Prince Consort, IV, 226-227.

³² The Prince Consort, IV, 225.

Notice of meeting of members of the Board of Directors of the
to visit the President of the United States and to discuss
would also be the first time since the war that the
be conducted in an informal manner. It was expected
through the efforts of the Board of Directors.
The Board of Directors of the United States
Board of Directors of the United States
thing that the Board of Directors of the United States
that it was the first time since the war that the
from that of the Board of Directors of the United States
the very first time.

The Board of Directors of the United States
purpose of the Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States

The Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States

United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States

United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States

United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States

United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States

United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States

United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States
United States Board of Directors of the United States

were scattered bands of mutineers. Sir Colin Campbell had completed by January, 1859, the suppression of the mutiny in Oude and Agar. Central India was restored to authority by April. The lasting effect of the Indian Mutiny was the transfer of the government of India from the old outmoded, outworn administration of the East India Company to one based on a constitution. The Act for the Better Government of India was passed in August, 1858, abolishing the administration of the East India Company. The crown assumed full responsibility for the new government and a new cabinet office, that of the Secretary of State for India, was established directly responsible to Parliament. The Governor-General was raised to the rank of Viceroy and was entrusted with the administration of India, the task being too great to be handled by Parliament. This transfer was communicated to the Indian people in the Queen's Proclamation of Allahabad, November 17, 1858.³³

³³ A. P. Newton, A Hundred Years of British Empire (Oxford, 1940) 220-221.

THE INDIAN EMPIRE AND AFGHANISTAN

From "The Marquess of Dalhousie," Rulers of India,
Sir William Wilson Hunter, ed., Oxford, 1890.

THE INDIAN EMPIRE

Prepared for Sir William Wilson Hunter's

IMPERIAL GAZETTEER OF INDIA

Scale 265 miles = 1 inch

T H I B E T

BAY OF BENGAL

N O C E

REFERENCES

Railways opened
Do not opened
Roads
The numbers denote the length shown in feet in feet
This Map is intended only to exhibit the principal
places. Any more see in India



THE DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN 1876-1881

I

The territorial conquest of India had been in the main accomplished by 1837.¹ What confronted Queen Victoria and her people was the problem of whether or not Great Britain would be left to develop India undisturbed, for the outset of her reign witnessed an aggressive Russian expansion in Central Asia. This drive placed in jeopardy the Northwest Frontier of India adjoining the Punjab. To keep Russia at arm's length, British strategy envisaged the integrity of Afghanistan, which bordered on the Northwest Frontier, as a buffer state. The fact that Afghanistan was in a political condition akin to feudalism and the authority of the emir uncertain prompted the British Government to take military steps to make Afghanistan a sphere of British influence. Accordingly, shortly after Victoria became Queen, British troops marched into Afghanistan late in 1838 and in August, 1839, reached Cabul. The Afghan tribesmen, however, refused to bow to foreign domination and the First Afghan War broke out, lasting from 1838 to 1842. After four years of fighting during which the British suffered

¹ This background material has been drawn from Sir Alfred Lyall, The Rise and Expansion of the British Domination in India (London, 1929), 313-320; Sir W. Lee Warner, "India and Afghanistan, 1815-1869," Cambridge Modern History: The Growth of Nationalities (New York, 1934), XI, 724-735.

several major defeats, notably at Cabul and Jagdalak, the home government gave up its plans to bring Afghanistan within the orbit of British domination. Whether Queen Victoria had expressed herself on these developments is not to be determined from the available material, although the impelling suggestion is present that perhaps her interest in such matters awaited her greater maturity.

That the British position in the northwest continued precarious needs no extended brief.² In the late eighteenth sixties a renewal of Russian activity in Central Asia spurred Great Britain once more to positive action. Although an agreement was reached with Russia in 1871 concerning the Afghan frontiers and Lord Mayo, Viceroy of India, sought to establish closer contact with Afghanistan through personal friendship with the Emir, Sher Ali, both approaches proved of only temporary value.

The assassination of Lord Mayo in 1872 terminated neighborly relations based on harmonious personalities. Lord Mayo's successor, Lord Northbrook, the most influential of the Baring family and former Under-secretary of War, was more successful in directing the internal administration of India than in conducting its external relations.

² The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, ed., Sir A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, 3 vols. (New York, 1923), III, 75-77; P. E. Roberts, "The British Empire in India," Cambridge Modern History, The Latest Age, XII, 462-466.

Lord Northbrook did not believe Russia was as great a threat to Indian security as many people in England regarded her and therefore he saw no reason for taking any aggressive steps to forestall a highly hypothetical Russian danger. Therefore he refused aid of arms and money to Afghanistan and thus alienated the Afghan emir.³

The election victory of the Conservative Party in 1874 instituted a new policy for Afghanistan which was not in keeping with Lord Northbrook's "non-interference" views, and he resigned. The reduction by Russia of Khiva and Bokhara to the position of dependent vassals raised anew British suspicions of Romanoff aims.⁴ As the situation presented itself, Britain was faced with the alternatives of (1) building Afghanistan through subsidies into a strong independent state able to withstand external pressures from all nations or (2) forcing Afghanistan to accept a British resident agent who would conduct its foreign affairs.

The Conservative Party under the leadership of Disraeli in 1874 chose the second alternative, the policy of transforming Afghanistan into a protectorate. The new Viceroy to India, Lord Lytton, was instructed to take the necessary steps to this end. He pressed the incumbent Emir, Sher Ali, to receive a British resident agent. This Afghan potentate,

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

Lowest efficiency of 10% was obtained at a concentration of 10% in the case of the 10% solution. The efficiency of the 10% solution was 10% at a concentration of 10% and 10% at a concentration of 10%. The efficiency of the 10% solution was 10% at a concentration of 10% and 10% at a concentration of 10%.

The efficiency of the 10% solution was 10% at a concentration of 10% and 10% at a concentration of 10%. The efficiency of the 10% solution was 10% at a concentration of 10% and 10% at a concentration of 10%.

EFFICIENCY
EZERASE BOND
RAC CONTENT

The efficiency of the 10% solution was 10% at a concentration of 10% and 10% at a concentration of 10%. The efficiency of the 10% solution was 10% at a concentration of 10% and 10% at a concentration of 10%.

10%
10%

however, refused to accept the British demand, preferring to maintain an independent Afghanistan by pursuing a middle course between the Slavic and Anglo-Saxon nations. To make matters worse, Sher Ali interpreted Britain's move in obtaining Baluchistan as a protectorate and the right to occupy Quetta in 1876 by arrangement with the Khan of Kalat, a feudatory of his, as an infringement upon his sovereignty. The result was that even the nominal negotiations then in progress with regard to the establishment of a residency were broken off.⁵

The full measure of British disappointment was reached when news of a Russian mission to Cabul and portentous Russian military movements in the direction of Herat in the north-west corner of Afghanistan were received by Lord Lytton. As a countermove Lord Lytton proposed the bold stroke of dispatching a British mission under General Sir Neville Chamberlain, a personal acquaintance of the emir, "to demand explanations of the Ameer as to his reception of a Russian mission after his refusal to accept a British one." If this mission failed, Lord Lytton continued, stronger measures would have to be considered, otherwise Russia might conceivably obtain territory and political influence which would render the Northwest Frontier of India untenable.⁶

⁵ The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, III, 84-85.

⁶ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, ed. G. E. Buckle, 3 vols. (New York, 1928), II, 636, citing ltr, Lytton to Q.V., 31 August, 1871.

however, related to the fact that the
to maintain an independent
control between the two
and the fact that the
obtaining information
occurs in the
a tendency to
The results of the
Progress with regard to the
were shown as follows:

The following table shows the results of the
when the two groups were compared.

EFFICIENCY	
EZERASE BOND	
RAS CONTENT	
1.00	1.00
0.95	0.95
0.90	0.90
0.85	0.85
0.80	0.80
0.75	0.75
0.70	0.70
0.65	0.65
0.60	0.60
0.55	0.55
0.50	0.50
0.45	0.45
0.40	0.40
0.35	0.35
0.30	0.30
0.25	0.25
0.20	0.20
0.15	0.15
0.10	0.10
0.05	0.05
0.00	0.00

The following table shows the results of the
when the two groups were compared.
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00

The eventuality that Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission might not be received, as Lord Lytton feared, came to pass in September, 1878, at Ali Masjid, where the party was refused permission to proceed over the border into Afghanistan.⁷ It is at this moment that the documentary material discloses the interest with which Queen Victoria followed the developments. In her journal entry dated October 6, 1878, she noted the deep concern which the cabinet was manifesting over the Afghan affair. While Queen Victoria regretted the fact that Lord Lytton had apparently gone beyond the original instructions of the cabinet by sending the mission, she asserted that "now, of course, we must punish the insult, and support Lord Lytton." The Queen was confident that there would be no repetition of the debacle at Cabul in 1840, for she believed "this time the Kyberins, and the other Hill tribes are with us." The unknown factor, in her estimation, was the possibility of Russian aid in behalf of the emir. Queen Victoria was highly critical of Russia, asserting that the intransigent attitude of the Afghans would no doubt find the former "at the bottom of it all."⁸

Queen Victoria did not let the matter rest. From her autumnal retreat at Balmoral in Scotland, she kept in touch

⁷ The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, III, 86.

⁸ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, II, 641, citing extract from the Queen's journal, 6 October, 1878.

letter of December 3, 1878, to the Marquis of Salisbury, she further emphasized that the danger of Russia entering actively on the side of the emir might be thwarted by a frank statement of Russia's role on the part of the government. She felt certain that the support of the public would be obtained for the government's policy and Russia, recognizing this fact, "will change her tone."¹² To Lord Lytton, on December 6, 1878, she dispatched a letter subsequent upon British victories at Peiwar Kotal, offering "her congratulations and the expression of pride and satisfaction at the brilliant successes of her brave, noble soldiers, which is the greatest importance in every way; but in no way surprises her, for British soldiers always do their duty and almost always are victorious. . . ."¹³

The final outcome was victory for Great Britain as the forces of opposition melted away and Sher Ali fled to Turkestan for sanctuary. His son, Yakub Khan, succeeded him and agreed in May, 1879, to the treaty of Gandamak. The terms required that a British resident be received at Cabul, that foreign relations be conducted in accordance with the advice of the British government, particularly that neither foreign alliances nor foreign wars be entered upon without

¹² Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, II, 649, citing ltr., Q.V. to Salisbury, 3 December, 1878.

¹³ Letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd. series, II, 650, citing ltr., Q.V. to Lytton, 6 December, 1878.

British consular authorities and the British Consul in
Canton and Shanghai and the British Consul in
political order in the country.

14 The Consular Authorities of British Consulate
III, 88.

ICY
BOND
T

II

In keeping with the terms of the treaty, a British residency headed by Sir Louis Cavagnari, who had negotiated the Treaty of Gandamak, was established in Cabul on July 24, 1879. His reception and the seemingly peaceful situation caused troops to be withdrawn from Cabul toward Candahar and Jellalabad. However, this peace was misleading for it lasted only until September 3, when an Afghan garrison revolted and brutally massacred Sir Louis Cavagnari and his staff. The Emir, Yakub Khan, took no steps to protect them.¹⁵

The news of the massacre reached the Queen and Disraeli by way of a telegram from Lord Lytton, dated September 6, 1879, from Simla, the summer capitol of India. The Queen immediately telegraphed Disraeli from Balmoral that "we must act with great energy and no hanging back, or fear to be found fault with must deter us from strong and prompt measures."¹⁶ In a subsequent letter to Disraeli, after hastening to express "her horror and distress at this terrible catastrophe,"¹⁷

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ W. F. Monypenny and George E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, 2 vols. (New York, 1929), II, 1351.

¹⁷ Three days later, on the 9th of September, Queen Victoria wrote a letter expressing her grief and sympathy to Lady Cavagnari, wife of the murdered resident.

grounds that "it is not for aggrandizement, but to prevent war and bloodshed. . . , " for "the Ameer can't manage his people."¹⁹

As if the trouble in Afghanistan that fall of 1879 was not sufficient in itself, the Queen was faced with a growing dissatisfaction in Parliament over the situation. The Opposition was violently opposed to Disraeli's imperial policy and was raising the issue preparatory to going to the people in the general election of 1880. The Liberals claimed that the Cabul disaster was the result of the Conservative Party's refusal to follow Lord Northbrook's non-interference policy in Afghanistan and indicated that they, if returned to power, would not make the same mistakes.²⁰ Queen Victoria, in a letter written on the 21st of September, to the Marchioness of Ely, her Lady of the Bedchamber, to whom she often entrusted confidences, voiced feelingly her hope that the security of India might be left out of the realm of party politics. At the same time, Victoria let the Marchioness know that if the Opposition intended "any lowering of the position of this Country by letting Russia have her way in the East, or by letting down our Empire in India. . . , "

¹⁹ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 43-44, citing ltr., Q.V. to Beaconsfield, 11 September, 1879. Queen Victoria made accurate use of historical facts because the illustration used took place during the years 1845-46.

²⁰ Disraeli, II, 1354.

to the future of that country.²³ In a letter to him on October 2, 1879, she reminded him of his previous assertion that the treaty of Gandamak was no longer in effect and that stronger measures (her annexionist policy?) were required. In the spirit of a homily she observed:

. . . in the Queen's long experience, half measures, temporizing with Cabinet and Parliament, are of no use. Don't make promises and declarations to satisfy Parliament, especially not when the honour and safety of the country and the great Empire and Colonies belonging to it are concerned.

Perhaps to bolster Disraeli's flagging spirits, Victoria injected into her militant views a note of flattery when she said, "Lord Beaconsfield has restored the honour of Great Britain to an extraordinary degree," but she admonished him, "he must be now VERY firm and do what is required for the safety of India. Russia is very inimical and gives us stabs in the back."²⁴

The recapture of Cabul by the British armies brought to light incriminating letters between Sher Ali and the Russians. Some of these were immediately dispatched to England. In a letter sent to the Queen on December 3, 1878, Disraeli brought to her attention that a cabinet meeting had been held the previous night which he had not attended. The incriminating letters were not submitted to it. He

²³ Disraeli, II, 1354.

²⁴ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 50, citing ltr., Q.V. to Beaconsfield, 2 October, 1879.

stated the reason for this action was the belief that not only was the moment inopportune but that there were other letters on their way to England. Furthermore the Cabinet thought that perhaps the letters would be valuable to Lord Dufferin (departing at that time as Ambassador to Russia). In case of a difficult position England would have "the moral influence which results from Russia being conscious that we possess the documents and can produce them at a moments notice."²⁵

The proceedings of the cabinet on December 2 and 3, 1879, as recounted in Disraeli's letter of December 3 were not entirely satisfactory to Queen Victoria. She regarded the failure to submit the letters to the cabinet as a lost opportunity to solidify cabinet support behind an annexationist policy. Thus she wrote to Disraeli that "silence or concealment upon this treacherous correspondence the Queen deprecates and deplores as exhibiting great weakness."²⁶ On the subject of Afghanistan itself, the proposal of the cabinet, according to Disraeli, was to consider it as a disintegrating state: "to retain what was necessary for your Majesty's Empire, and dispose of the rest in a manner which would be most conducive to its permanent interests. This

²⁵ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 56, citing ltr., Beaconsfield to Q.V., 3 December, 1879.

²⁶ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 56, citing ltr., Q.V. to Beaconsfield, 4 December, 1879.

would permit us, if necessary, to allow Persia to hold Herat as your Majesty's feudatory."²⁷ This statement raised doubts in her mind. She quoted Mr. Thompson, Minister to Persia, as saying "that the Shah would pay no tribute for Herat. If he does not, he is free and independent, and may always be gained over, Lord Lytton thinks (and the Queen agrees), to Russia." In the light of such a danger she begged Disraeli to consider the question "whether England can safely incur the responsibilities of Government as far as Herat, and what strong guarantees can the Shah give that would secure his good faith in acting with us?" She herself confessed that she doubted whether the Shah would act in good faith and urged Disraeli to delay a decision until more information was at hand, especially in regard "to the nature of the securities to be demanded from Persia."²⁸

While Queen Victoria strove to influence a sound policy of annexation, she did not overlook the importance of the conduct of the war in shaping the final result. Writing to Disraeli on 17 December, 1879, the Queen took note of the fact that the difficult straits of General Roberts and the inability of General Gough to advance were causing her

²⁷ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 56-57, citing ltr., Beaconsfield to Q.V., 3 December, 1879.

²⁸ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 57-58, Citing ltr., Q.V. to Beaconsfield, 4 December, 1879.

both anxiety and distress.²⁹ Her comment in this respect was that "reinforcements must be sent to the front, and troops sent out so that other parts of India may not be left unguarded." Her main bone of contention would appear to have been a difference of opinion with Lord Cranbrook, the Secretary for India, as to how far the public should be taken into confidence with regard to the details of the campaign. Cranbrook was in favour of concealing nothing, but the Queen had a definite policy in mind. She gave this advice to Disraeli: "we must be very secret and reticent as to what we intend to do . . . and act very vigorously and firmly. . . ."

He was to "be firm on that point," because, "publicity is the ruin of all warfare."³⁰

²⁹ Lord Roberts had been forced to retire from Balahis-ser to the Sherpur cantonment by an Afghan attack on the 14th of December. General Gough was unable to advance to his aid. Cabul was reoccupied by Roberts on the 22nd.

³⁰ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 59-60, citing ltr., Q.V. to Beaconsfield, 17 December, 1879.

both anxiety and distrust. The situation was that "reinforced" and the troops sent out to the front. Ben Halliday, a member of the committee, have been a difference of opinion. The committee for the latter, and the committee for the former, had a definite point of view. The committee for the former, in its confidence with regard to the latter, was in favor of a more definite point of view. The committee for the latter, in its confidence with regard to the former, was in favor of a more definite point of view. The committee for the former, in its confidence with regard to the latter, was in favor of a more definite point of view. The committee for the latter, in its confidence with regard to the former, was in favor of a more definite point of view.

EFFICIENCY

ERASE BOARD

RECOMMENDATION

30 letters of the committee, dated 1911, are being referred to the committee for the former, in its confidence with regard to the latter, was in favor of a more definite point of view.

III

Following the eventual reconquest of Afghanistan by the British in 1880, the India Office allowed itself to be entirely led by Lord Lytton. The country was considered as a disintegrated state, and as such Candahar became the capital of a new western tributary state with its governor appointed by the Viceroy. Little progress had been made toward settling the Afghan problem before Disraeli, in April, 1880, feeling secure on the basis of winning two by-elections that his party would be returned to Parliament in a majority, committed his government to a general election. The results were disastrous for the Conservatives. The Liberals came into parliament largely on a sweeping condemnation of Disraeli's foreign policy in which the Afghan War played an important part. The election had been fought over clear cut issues of policy and the nation repudiated the extreme course offered by the Conservatives for one of caution and safety that was more in keeping with the national character.³¹

Disraeli telegraphed April 2, 1880, the news of the Conservative defeat to the Queen while she was vacationing at Baden-Baden. This information distressed the Queen greatly and she wired back, "nothing more than trouble and trial await me. I consider it a great misfortune."³²

89. ³¹ The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, III,

³² Disraeli, II, 1397.

Following the... the British in 1947... actively led by... a distinguished... of a new... pointed by the... settling the... feeling across... his party would... stated his government... have participated... Disraeli's... important... issues of policy... offered by the... that was more... Disraeli... Conservative... at... and was... await me.

Apart from her general dislike of Gladstone, she was quick to sense the danger for many projects in which she had an interest, among which was the presence of the British in Afghanistan. She strove to have Disraeli's expansionist policy put on the basis of a national policy rather than that of party politics. She expressed a hope that she could have faith in her government as she had in the past "but that this must entirely depend on their conduct." She not only did not want the domestic or foreign policy tampered with but she wanted "no change in India, no hasty retreat from Afghanistan, and no cutting down of estimates," which meant "in short no lowering of the high position this country holds, and ought always to hold."³³

This alarm deepened with the appointment of Lord Ripon as Viceroy of India to replace Lord Lytton who had resigned with the fall of Disraeli's government. It would appear safe to interpret as indicative of her fears her expressions as to "a doubt to his being strong enough and firm enough for the post" and her "earnest hope that no sudden reversal of policy" would follow Lord Ripon's arrival in India because "such a change would be disastrous and would give rise to serious trouble. . . ."³⁴

³³ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 75-76, citing ltr. A.V. to Ponsonby.

³⁴ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 90-91, citing ltr. Ponsonby to Hartington, 28 April, 1880.

Against from her...
...to assess the...
...had an interest, among which...
...in Afghanistan. This...
...policy put on the basis of...
...that of party politics. The...
...have faith in her Government...
...that this must entirely...
...only did not want the...
...with but she wanted...
...from Afghanistan, and...
...meant "in short in...
...holds, and ought also...
...This...
...as...
...with the fall of...
...best to interest...
...as to "a...
...for the...
...of policy...
...cause "such a...
...to various...

23 Letter of...
...24 Letter of...
...25 Letter of...

The fears of Victoria that the advent of the Liberals would jeopardize her favoured policy in Afghanistan were confirmed in May, 1880. Lord Hartington notified Queen Victoria by letter from the India Office on the 25th of a change in policy for Afghanistan. The Liberal government proposed to place on record a statement of the general position in Afghanistan, to state the alternative courses of action open to them with their advantages and disadvantages and "without binding Lord Ripon's freedom of action . . . indicate the policy which your Majesty's Government are disposed to adopt, and the objects which they have mainly in view." The principal objects which the government viewed favourably were the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan as early as possible and the "re-establishment of a settled, independent and if possible a friendly government." The letter went on to state that "they [the government] are somewhat disposed to regret the decision of the late Government to insist upon the separation of Candahar from Cabul." However, Lord Ripon had been directed to consider the situation carefully, i.e., "the extent which your Majesty's Government is pledged to the new Ruler of Candahar."³⁵

It is evident from the material available that Gladstone also informed the Queen that such a statement would be made.

³⁵ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 103-104, citing ltr., Hartington to Q.V., 25 May, 1880.

She immediately dispatched her reaction on the 30th of May, urging him to commit himself "to no retrograde movement," because "any too positive declaration one way or another might become very serious." And in order to give more force to her views she reminded him as she had Disraeli of "the case of the Punjab, where we fought for and reinstated the young sovereign, and had afterwards to annex it."³⁶

Meanwhile a new situation had also developed in Afghanistan. Abdurraham Khan who had been exiled by Sher Ali, his uncle, to Turkestan, returned to Afghanistan. He was hailed as the Emir of Northern Afghanistan. Immediately the British entered into negotiations with him. On July 22, 1880, he was installed as Emir in Cabul after his acceptance of the Treaty of Gandamak. However, the area around Candahar was retained by the British under a separate ruler and the question of a British resident was not pressed.³⁷

Late in July, Yakub Khan, a younger son of Sher Ali, at the head of a large army severely defeated the British under General Burrows at Maiwand near Candahar. Candahar itself was hard pressed. This action for the moment raised the question whether the Afghans themselves would resolve

³⁶ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 105, citing telegram, Q.V. to Gladstone, 30 May, 1880; Philip Guedalla, The Queen and Mr. Gladstone, 2 vols. (London, 1933), II, 89, citing ltr., Q.V. to Gladstone, 30 May, 1880.

³⁷ The Cambridge History of British Policy, III, 90.

the situation in Afghanistan and Candahar without any aid from the Liberal government.

When Queen Victoria was informed of this catastrophe, she immediately dispatched a telegram to Lord Ripon in India stating she was "much distressed at the sad and alarming news," and urged him "to maintain the honour and safety of the empire."³⁸ Ponsonby, writing for the Queen to Mr. Childers, Secretary of War, admitted that it was too soon to form an opinion of the consequences of the defeat. He believed more troops would have to be sent out and therefore any thought of reduction of army estimates would have to be shelved.³⁹

The Queen used every means of communication with the Viceroy to seek the causes for such a debacle. She believed in light of the lives lost such mistakes were serious and should be rectified. Therefore a full scale investigation should be started. Once again a grave note crept into her letter due to the severe repercussions that could result from this defeat, probably looking back to one of the causes of the Sepoy Mutiny. She told him

. . . all will look to him and to the Queen Empress's army to maintain the honour, dignity, and safety of

³⁸ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 123-124, citing telegram Q.V. to Ripon, 28 July, 1880.

³⁹ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 125, citing ltr., Ponsonby to Childers, 2 August, 1880.

her great Indian Empire, the prestige of which has suffered by what occurred at Cabul last August and again now.⁴⁰

Under these circumstances the brilliant victory of General Roberts on September 1, over Yakub Khan brought universal joy and relief in which the Queen shared. In her letter of the 5th of September, 1880, she pressed upon Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary, to support her annexationist policy. She told him that "we must not stop here," with one victory, "but entirely defeat Ayub [Yakub] Khan, and destroy his power." She reiterated her policy when she said, "Candahar must be retained."⁴¹

The issue over Candahar was joined the first week of September. The Liberals soon announced their definite course of action, confirming Victoria's worst fears. The Cabinet in their discussions on the future status of Candahar decided to reunite it to Afghanistan if the new Emir Abdurrahman was capable of governing.⁴² This decision surprised the Queen. She patiently and with great tenacity continued to urge a more cautious policy. She replied to Lord Hartington in September, 1880, that she could not "understand the necessity

⁴⁰ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 125-126, citing ltr., Q.V. to Ripon, 5 August, 1880.

⁴¹ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 136, citing ltr., Q.V. to Granville, 4 September, 1880.

⁴² Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 137, citing telegram, Hartington to Q.V., 6 September, 1880.

for the immediate announcement of any decision with respect to Candahar."⁴³ She appealed for less hasty actions until more information had been received especially from the military men on the frontier. She felt that to give up Candahar because as opposition they had objected to the policy of Disraeli "would be a deplorable course to follow and would lead to inevitable confusion and disaster." The Queen realized, however, there might be reasons for turning it over to the new Afghan emir which would outweigh the strong strategic arguments for its retention but she had to be convinced that those reasons were sufficiently strong and based on the opinions of able military commanders and not a decision based "on political and party expediency."⁴⁴

Queen Victoria on 25 October, 1880, received a letter from Lord Hartington accompanying a dispatch for her concurrence from the India Office in regard to the retention of Candahar. He carefully outlined the policy prepared by the government and tried to allay any fears the Queen might have over reuniting it with Afghanistan. The dispatch was the result of consideration of all factors involved. The cabinet believed that the situation could not be handled upon purely military lines although generally the military believed its

⁴³ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 137-138, citing telegram, Q.V. to Hartington, 7 September, 1880.

⁴⁴ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 138-139, citing ltr., Ponsonby to Hartington, 8 September, 1880.

retention was necessary for strategical purposes. Hartington believed the political and administrative features outweighed the strategical and would impose a much greater burden upon India than would any foreign invasion.⁴⁵

In another letter a fortnight later, 6 November, Lord Hartington amplified the reasons why Candahar was not necessary for strategical purposes. The conclusions arrived at by the government were that no occupation of any part of Afghanistan was necessary for the security of India because an unruly and divided Afghanistan was a better buffer state than a half subdued and discontented nation could be. Hartington assured Queen Victoria that the actions of the government were not hasty and considerable discretion in all matters was entrusted to the Government of India.⁴⁶

Two days later Victoria replied to Hartington's letter of explanation. She carefully answered all his reasoning with her own. She believed Abdurrahman, the Emir of Afghanistan, would not be strengthened politically by Candahar because he was still engaged in civil war with Yakub Khan. Therefore the internal situation was not suitable for returning Candahar to Afghanistan. With respect to the external situation, she pointed to the fact "that

⁴⁵ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 150-151, citing ltr., Hartington to Q.V., 25 October, 1880.

⁴⁶ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 154-155, citing ltr., Hartington to Q.V., 6 November, 1880.

Russian troops are about to enter Persia for the purpose of assisting the Shah against the Kurds," and she felt it was "probable that they will not leave the country again." Indeed, the abandonment of Candahar would expose Great Britain to the diplomatic accusation that she was not strong enough to hold ground in the face of the renewed Russian expansion. In the light of these facts, and the advent of winter which would hold the troops in Candahar the Queen could not understand "why any decision is to be hurriedly formed at what seems to her a most inopportune moment with respect to our movement in the spring." Again she called upon her ministers, as she had done so often, to call upon military men who had been in that theater of operations for their opinions, before important decisions affecting India were reached.⁴⁷

The issue of Candahar between the Queen and Gladstone reached its climax in the speech from the throne January 5, 1881. From the Queen's Journal an entry for that day shows that she received the speech for her approval in which she found the announcement of the abandonment of Candahar without her "having heard a word about it." This was a direct reversal of the policy of the fallen government with which the Queen had been in complete accord. She immediately dispatched a telegram to Gladstone in which she strongly objected to the paragraph on Candahar since she had been "assured

⁴⁷ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 156-157, citing ltr., Q.V. to Hartington, 8 November, 1880.

EFFICIENT
ERASE BOND
RECONTENT

nothing should be yet declared as to the abandonment," and requested that it be "altered or the part about Candahar left out." In vain while waiting for a reply from Gladstone she assured the attending ministers at her council that she would approve the speech generally if they would omit a statement on Candahar. They were adamant and waited for a reply from Gladstone. This defense by the Queen for retaining Candahar was a last ditch stand in a losing battle. She had lost the fight over annexing Afghanistan but Candahar she was determined to retain.⁴⁸

Gladstone replied to the Queen's objections to the speech that it was deemed "impossible to withhold from Parliament the basis of policy." However, he did try to assure her that there was no definite date set because he stated that in the address the "terms of the announcement are studiously guarded as to time." The Queen was not to be put off with mere words. She sent a memorandum to Gladstone in which she told him she had "commanded" the minister to attendance "to convey to the Cabinet her disapproval of that part of the Speech referring to Candahar" and had given her assent only "on the express understanding that the Cabinet will give her assurance, that should circumstances

⁴⁸ Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 178-179, citing extract from the Queen's Journal, 5 January, 1881; The Queen and Mr. Gladstone, II, 133, citing telegram, Q.V. to Gladstone, 5 January, 1881.

arise rendering the retention of Candahar desirable, the Government will not hesitate to hold that position." The Queen was assured by Gladstone who had taken her objections to the Cabinet, that they would retain Candahar if the occasion required but the Queen had lost her battle. The statement was carried in the Commons but censured in the Lords. British troops were withdrawn from Candahar which was then turned over to Abdurrahman who succeeded in policing his country by driving Yakub Khan into Persia.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ The Queen and Mr. Gladstone, II, 133-134; Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, III, 180, citing ltr., Gladstone to Q.V., 7 January, 1881.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Queen Victoria was a conscientious woman. Her letters illustrate clearly her mastery of details and her facility for long hours of desk work. Fortunately for the historian, the Queen did not make much use of personal contacts with her ministers but preferred to use correspondence. Thus her letters give at times a valuable insight into her attitude toward imperial policy as illustrated by the two major crises in Indian affairs.

From the amount of correspondence available dealing with the many problems of the Indian Mutiny and the Second Afghan War, it is apparent that the Queen had a great interest in India and for its future as a part of her empire. In nearly every situation she was ready with clear and concise advice on a course of policy for her government to follow. She took every opportunity to press upon her cabinets and especially upon her prime ministers that her views were the best and should become governmental policy.

In contrast to a fairly widespread opinion held by many scholars Queen Victoria was an imperialist in outlook as early as 1876. Frank Hardie in his monographic study points out that she was imperialistic only in her old age.¹

¹ Frank Hardie, The Political Influence of Queen Victoria (London, 1935), p. 174.

ONE

Of course there can be some debate over when old age begins but she was only fifty-seven when the second Afghan crisis developed and in the light of her long reign she was comparatively a young woman. From this study of the two major crises in Indian affairs, it is possible to say that at the age of fifty-seven the Queen was thinking imperially and was urging her governments to think likewise. She was a firm believer in Britain shouldering the "white man's burden." This can be illustrated by her constant agitation for the complete annexation of Afghanistan on the grounds that native rulers were unable to manage their people and therefore those territories would be better off under British guidance.

Victoria had a benevolent attitude toward the native population. As Queen-Empress of India she manifested often her desire for the well-being of her Indian subjects. This is best illustrated in the Indian Mutiny when she was shocked by the vindictive attitude of the British in India toward her Indian subjects. India was the gem of her crown. At a well advanced age she undertook the study of Hindustani and replaced many of her old servants with Indian personnel.

This great sovereign distrusted Russia, especially in regard to its continuous expansion in Central Asia. Although she was not a lover of war, Queen Victoria was willing to engage in a costly struggle to thwart Russian ambitions

Of course there are many other things that are true

but the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

developed and the only thing that is true is that the world is

in the East. Believing as she did in the doctrine of territorial compensation, she was eager to add territory to her Indian Empire in order to counter Russian gains in the area northwest of Afghanistan.

These crises represent in reality two distinct periods in the Queen's reign. The years from 1837 to 1861 can be considered the first period. Thus traces can be found of a woman who leaned first heavily upon her ministers and then upon her husband, the politically acute Albert. It is the belief of many scholars of the Victorian period that the decisions of the Queen were greatly influenced by her husband. The four decades from 1861 to 1901, which constitute the second period of her queenship, are the years of a woman completely self-reliant. Her letters after the death of the Prince Consort show a firm grasp of governmental and foreign affairs. In reaching a decision she no longer relied on advisors but reached her decisions through her own resources. These years witness a new phase in the Queen's relationship with the cabinet. Victoria attempted to make government a personal matter and constantly gave advice to her cabinet. In her estimation, her views were the correct ones to follow. To arrive at her conclusions she made great use of men who had been in the troubled areas of her vast empire and was constantly urging her cabinet to do the same.

She used every method at her command to influence

Y
OND

the cabinets' decisions. Unfortunately, her influence was greatly modified by constitutional procedure. She was unable to attend cabinet meetings. Therefore she could offer advice but in many cases it was upon decisions that had already been made by the cabinet and were thus hard to reverse, even if they so desired. Under these circumstances, it was unlikely that her influence would be great. The decision by the cabinet as to the future of Candahar caught the Queen by surprise and in spite of all her efforts to have it retained as a part of India, the cabinet's policy was carried out. The only direct evidence of her influence on a decision was in the sending of reinforcements to India to combat the Mutiny. But, since this knowledge comes from the diary of the Prince Consort, it may be biased in the Queen's favour. Her position obviously gave aid and comfort to imperialistic thinkers in England. However, it is difficult to ascertain how much Queen Victoria contributed to their success.

REPLIOGRAPHY

EFFICIENCY
ERASE BOND
RAC CONTENT

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Benson, A. C. and Viscount Esher, editors, The Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st series, 3 vols.; London: John Murray, 1908.

This series contains the edited letters of Queen Victoria between the years 1837 and 1861. It contains some of the primary material on which this thesis is based.

Buckle, G. E., editor, The Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, 3 vols.; New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1928.

Volumes II and III provided the source material for the Second Afghan War.

Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond, The Life of Lord Granville, 1815-1891, 2 vols.; London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1905.

Particularly valuable for the letters between Lord Canning, Viceroy of India, and Granville during the Indian Mutiny. Provides excellent on the spot coverage of the situation.

Forbes-Mitchell, William, Reminiscences of the Great Mutiny, 1857-1859; including the relief, siege and capture of Lucknow, and the campaigns in Rohilkund and Oude; London: MacMillan and Company, 1904. 295 pp.

A personal narrative hinged about the Mutiny written by a sergeant in the 93rd. Sutherland Highlanders. Provides interesting background material.

Guedalla, Philip, editor, The Queen and Mr. Gladstone, 2 vols.; London: Hodder Stoughton Limited, 1938.

Another collection of correspondence with a written commentary by the author. A fine primary source for the Victorian period covering both domestic and foreign affairs.

Jagow, Kurt, editor, The Letters of the Prince Consort, 1831-1861, New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1938. 381 pp.

This edition of the Prince Consort's letters is concerned mostly with European affairs although some mention is made of India in the correspondence.

Benjamin A. G. and President of the Board of Directors
of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
1908

This report contains a full and complete statement
of the business of the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company for the year 1908.
1908

Volume 1 of the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company's Reports for the year 1908.
1908

EFFICIENCY EZERASE-BO

THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY
1908

1. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company
has been successful in its efforts to increase
the efficiency of its service.
2. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company
has been successful in its efforts to increase
the efficiency of its service.

3. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company
has been successful in its efforts to increase
the efficiency of its service.
4. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company
has been successful in its efforts to increase
the efficiency of its service.

5. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company
has been successful in its efforts to increase
the efficiency of its service.
6. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company
has been successful in its efforts to increase
the efficiency of its service.

Martin, Theodore, The Life of His Royal Highness, The Prince Consort, 5 vols.; London: Smith, Elder, and Company, 1879.

The classic study of the life of the Prince Consort written by permission of Victoria with access to much material of the period. Volume IV provided additional correspondence covering the Indian Mutiny.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Anson, Sir William R., The Law and Custom of the Constitution, 2 vols.; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1935.

Volume II useful in obtaining information on the powers of the crown.

Benson, E. F., Queen Victoria, London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1935. 409 pp.

An excellent study of Queen Victoria.

Bolitho, Hector, Victoria, the Widow and Her Son, New York: Appleton Century Co., Inc., 1934, 418 pp.

Does not bear too heavily upon the period covered in this thesis. Deals mainly with the end of the century.

Dodwell, H. H., editor, The Cambridge History of India, 6 vols.; New York: MacMillan and Company, 1929.

Volumes V and VI valuable for the First Afghan War, the Indian Mutiny, Second Afghan War, and the armies of the East India Company and the Royal Indian army. A standard tool.

Ensor, R. C., England, 1879-1914, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936. 634 pp.

A secondary book of considerable value for the flavour and the spirit of the times of Victoria.

Hardie, Frank, The Political Influence of Queen Victoria, 1861-1901, London: Oxford University Press, 1935. 258 pp.

This book devotes considerable space to the influence of the Queen on domestic matters. Little or nothing is said about her influence on colonial affairs.

Knaplund, Paul, The British Empire, 1815-1939, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941. 850 pp.

An excellent text with very good chapters on India.

Laski, Harold J., Parliamentary Government in England, New York: Viking Press, 1938. 383 pp.

A good modern monograph on the development of Parliament. Discusses constitutional role of Queen Victoria and her relation to the cabinet and parliament.

Lyall, Alfred, British Dominion in India, London: John Murray, 1929. 390 pp.

A good secondary study of British rule in India with some excellent maps of the Indian area.

Marriott, Sir John A. R., The Mechanism of the Modern State, 2 vols.; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1927.

This work sets forth the actual working of the English constitution. Provided considerable information in regard to Queen Victoria's position as ruler.

May, Sir Thomas Erskine, The Constitutional History of England, 1760-1860, 3 vols.; London: 1912.

Moneyppenny, W. F., and G. E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, 2 vols.; New York: MacMillan and Company, 1929.

The classic study of Benjamin Disraeli. Provided additional source material (letters) between Disraeli and Victoria.

Morley, John, The Life of Gladstone, 2 vols.; New York: Macmillan and Company, 1906.

The standard work of Gladstone. Added little material but helpful in understanding the Queen's relation to the government.

Newton, A. P., A Hundred Years of the British Empire, London: MacMillan and Company, 1942.

An excellent monograph on the Second British Empire. It gave great assistance in understanding the school of the Little Englanders and Imperialists.

Knobloch, "The
... ..

In
... ..
... ..

A good
... ..
... ..

well,
... ..

A good
... ..

... ..
... ..

This
... ..
... ..

... ..
... ..

... ..
... ..

... ..
... ..

... ..
... ..

... ..
... ..

... ..
... ..

... ..
... ..

... ..
... ..

Ponsonby, Arthur, Queen Victoria, New York: MacMillan and Company, 1933. 140 pp.

A short biography of the Queen. Added very little to the already excellently covered field.

Smellie, K. P., A Hundred Years of British Government, New York: MacMillan and Company, 1937. 468 pp.

A help in filling in the gaps of Victoria's constitutional position.

Smith, Vincent A., The Oxford History of India, second edition; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1921. 784 pp.

A brief textual history of India with some excellent maps.

Strachey, Lytton, Queen Victoria, New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1921. 429 pp.

Ward, Sir A. W., Sir G. W. Prothero, and Sir Stanley Leathes, editors, The Cambridge Modern History, 12 vols.; New York: MacMillan and Company, 1934.

In volumes XI and XII a much more concise account of the Indian Mutiny, and the Afghan Wars is to be found than in the Cambridge History of India. However, both were of great value.

Ward, Sir A. W., and G. P. Gooch, The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 3 vols.; New York: MacMillan and Company, 1923.

Considerable use of this work was made for material concerning Russia's expansion in Asia and the diplomacies behind the Afghan Wars. A valuable and useful too.

Pennancey, Arthur. Green Victoria. New York: Macmillan and Company, 1933. 140 pp.

A short biography of the Queen. Added very little to the already extensively covered field.



Smellie, R. F. A Hundred Years of British Government in New York: Macmillan and Company, 1937. 308 pp.

A help in filling in the gaps of Victoria's reign. Fictional position.

Smith, Vincent A. The Oxford History of India, second edition. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1921. 780 pp.

A brief textual history of India with some excellent maps.

Sturges, Lytton. Green Victoria. New York: Macmillan and Company, 1931. 122 pp.

Ward, Sir A. W., Sir G. W. Prothero, and Sir Stanley Leathes, editors. The Cambridge Modern History, 12 vols. New York: Macmillan and Company, 1933.

In volumes XI and XII a much more concise account of the Indian Empire, and the Afghan War is to be found than in the Cambridge History of India. However, both were of great value.

Ward, Sir A. W., and G. P. Goon. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 3 vols. New York: Macmillan and Company, 1933.

Considerable use of this work was made for material concerning Russia's expansion in Asia and the diplomatic behind the Afghan War. A valuable and useful tool.



IMPORTANT!

Special care should be taken to prevent loss or damage of this volume. If lost or damaged, it must be paid for at the current rate of typing.

