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The Indians of New Mexico in the Civil War

Mary Bewley

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THE INDIANS OF NEW MEXICO IN THE CIVIL WAR

By

Mary Bewley

A Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in History

University of New Mexico

1938

TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
AT WASHINGTON

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This thesis, directed and approved by the candidate's committee, has been accepted by the Graduate Committee of the University of New Mexico in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is a study of the place of the New Mexico Indians in the Civil War and of their relationship to the governments involved.

The part which New Mexico played in the struggle between the North and South was so overshadowed by the conflict in the East that little mention of it is made in general accounts. The Indian as a participant has received even less consideration.

Unfortunately the story of these tribes can be found only in the writings of the white man, for the Indian has left no records and the few recent attempts, such as have been made by Dane and Mary Coolidge and Paul I. Wellman, to present the Indians' side appear to have little value historically because they are popularly written.

The chief sources of material used in this study are the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, the Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the years 1861-1865, and the files of the local newspapers, the Santa Fe New Mexican, the Santa Fe Gazette, and the Albuquerque Rio Abajo Press.

In securing the necessary documents and reference books, I have received valuable aid from the staffs of the libraries of the University of New Mexico and of the Museum in Santa Fe. My obligation to Doctor Dorothy Woodward is even greater.

INTRODUCTION

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only in the writings of the white man, for the Indian

has no records and the few records that exist are

few made by him and many collected by the white man.

Present the Indian, who except for a few

slaves, only because they are generally white.

The chief reason for neglect and the

the Official Records of the War and the

the Record of the Confederacy of the War

years 1861-1865, and the list of the Indian

States of New Mexico, the Indian

Albuquerque and San Antonio

In summary the necessary documents to

I have received valuable aid from the

of the University of New Mexico and of the

My obligation to the University of New Mexico

Without her help and encouragement I would have become confused and most certainly have gone astray on the highways and byways of New Mexico of the Civil War days.

Without his help and encouragement I could have become con-
fused and more seriously have come rather on the ground and
byways of New Mexico of the Civil War days.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

With the peaceful occupation of New Mexico by General Stephen W. Kearney in 1846 and the ratifying of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, the United States added to its territory a little-known region of mountains, cañons, and mesas, and assumed guardianship over a mixed population of Indians, Mexicans, and mestizos,--groups definitely hostile to each other. Among the thirty thousand Indians who inhabited this country there were Pueblos, Utes, and the hostile tribes of Apaches and Navajos, whose raids were a constant source of terror both to the Pueblos and to the Mexicans.

But General Kearney confidently promised the citizens of Las Vegas, and of the other villages of which he took possession on his way to the capital and over whom he proclaimed the authority of the American government, that

. . . those who remain peaceably at home, tending to their crops and their herds shall be protected by me in their property, their persons and their religion. . . .

From the Mexican Government you have never received protection. The Apaches and Navajos come down from the mountains and carry off your sheep and even your women, whenever they please. My government will correct all this. It will keep off the Indians, protect you in your persons and property. . . .¹

¹ Frank C. Lockwood, The Apache Indians (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1938), p. 74.

The proclamation was made at Las Vegas on August 15, 1846.

It is said that while he was making one such speech a band of Navajos drove off his stock.²

The United States, it is needless to say, was not able to fulfill these promises. Indeed, the first efforts to do so met with a more complete failure than Mexico had experienced.³ The American military force was altogether inadequate, "the Indian Office was evidently unprepared to enter upon the task that legitimately fell to its lot of taking charge of the Indians of the southwest",⁴ and as Washington was for years without a definite policy in regard to New Mexico, there was much friction between the military and the civil authorities.

No Indian agent was appointed until 1849, yet before this time the military leaders had made several attempts to establish peace with the Indians by making treaties. In September 1846, Major William Gilpin was sent with two companies to Abiqui, in the Ute country, and Lieutenant-Colonel Congreve Jackson ordered with three companies to Cebolleta, near the Navajo region. They were to protect the inhabitants of the frontier and were instructed to invite the chiefs of

² Dane Coolidge and Mary Roberts Coolidge, The Navajo Indians (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1930), p. 15.

³ Annie Heloise Abel, editor, The Official Correspondence of James S. Calhoun (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1915), pp. 386-7.

⁴ Ibid., p. xiii.

the two tribes to come and hold council with General Kearney. Soon afterwards Major Gilpin brought a delegation of Utes to Santa Fe. The General "gave them much good advice . . . [and] some trifling presents, which, however, were esteemed of great value among them"; and, in turn, the Indians promised to be "peaceable, orderly, to respect the lives and property of the Mexicans, and to be obedient to the laws of the United States."⁵ On September 30th, an Apache chief and about thirty members of his tribe came in for a "grand council" with Kearney and promised to be good and faithful citizens of the United States.⁶ In November, at Ojo Osa, or Bear Spring, in the Navajo country, before beginning his march to Chihuahua, Colonel Alexander W. Doniphan, with a force of some 330 Americans, made a treaty with 500 Navajos, "including all the head chiefs of each of the cantons, composing the powerful tribe of Mountain Lords and Scourgers of New Mexico." The terms of the treaty included the promise of firm and lasting peace between Americans and Navajos, "Americans" meaning also the Mexicans and Pueblos; mutual trade to be carried on and full protection mutually given; and all prisoners and property, taken after August 18th, were to be

⁵ William Elsey Connelley, Doniphan's Expedition and the Conquest of New Mexico and California (Kansas City: Bryant and Douglass Book and Stationery Company, 1907), p. 250.

In this account the Indians are referred to as the Eutaws or the Yutas. The name appears elsewhere as Utahs.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 252-3.

the first of the year, and the second of the year.

Some of the most important of the year are the first of the year.

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restored.⁷ As this treaty proved to have no effect, Colonel E. W. B. Newby in 1848, arranged another with the same tribe and again in 1849, Colonel John M. Washington, who followed Colonel Newby in command of both military and civil affairs, led an expedition against the Navajos. He was accompanied by James S. Calhoun, first Indian agent for this territory.⁸

Although Agent Calhoun had previously had no experience in the Southwest and his appointment was made chiefly for political reasons, the choice was to prove a wise one. In forwarding his commission from Washington on April 7, 1849, William Medill, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, admitted that

So little is known here of the condition and situation of the Indians in that region that no specific instructions can be given at present; and the Department relies on you to furnish it with such statistical and other information as will give just and full understanding of every particular relating to them . . .⁹

Upon his arrival in July, Calhoun had at once set to work gathering information, which he transmitted to Washington in the form of carefully detailed reports. He recognized the necessity of using different methods in

⁷ Connelley, op. cit., pp. 305-7.

⁸ Abel, op. cit., p. 3.

⁹ Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 1530-1888 (San Francisco: The History Company, 1888), p. 463.

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 1843, William Medill, Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
 explained that

So little is known here of the conditions and situa-
 tion of the Indians in that region that no specific
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dealing with the Pueblos and the nomadic Indians. Evidence of his wisdom and foresight is seen in his warning the Government that immediate steps should be taken to clarify the Indian pueblo land titles.¹⁰ It is significant, too, that his plan for placing the wild tribes on reservations was finally adopted--though not until after many years of warfare carried on at tremendous expense, both in money and lives.¹¹

In the heart of the Navajo country is the Cañon de Chelley which for a century and a half was the shelter and stronghold of the Navajo Indians. It was there on September 9, 1849, that Agent Calhoun and Colonel Washington signed a treaty with Mariano Martinez, Head Chief, and Chapitone, Second Chief, of that nation. In this agreement the Indians acknowledged themselves "under the exclusive jurisdiction and protection of the government of the United States" and promised "perpetual peace and friendship."¹²

As Indian agent, Calhoun arranged treaties with the Utes and the Pueblos also. The agreement with the Utes was similar to that made with the Navajos and was signed December

¹⁰ Leo Crane, Desert Drums (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1928), p. 18.

¹¹ "Some of his important proposals, wrenched back to life by the galvanic battery of public opinion, were beginning to function in 1924." Crane, op. cit., p. 4.

¹² An interesting account of this treaty as told from the Navajo point of view by Henry Chee Dodge, who was for many years Chief of the Navajo Council, is given by Coolidge, The Navajo Indian, pp. 18-19. Abel, op. cit., p. 22.

dealing with the Pueblo and the nomadic Indians. Evidence of his wisdom and foresight is seen in his warning the Government that immediate steps should be taken to clarify the Indian public land titles. It is significant, too, that his plan for placing the wild tribes on reservations was finally adopted--though not until after many years of warfare carried on at tremendous expense, both in money and lives. 11

In the heart of the Navajo country is the Canyon de Chelly which for a century and a half was the shelter and stronghold of the Navajo Indians. It was there on September 9, 1849, that Agent Colburn and Colonel Washington signed a treaty with Mariano Martinez, Head Chief, and his sons, Second Chief, of that nation. In this agreement the Indians acknowledged themselves under the exclusive jurisdiction and protection of the Government of the United States, and provided "perpetual peace and friendship." 12

The Indian agent, Colburn, entered friendly relations with the Utes and the Pueblo also. The agreement with the Utes was similar to that made with the Navajo and was signed December

10. See Drake, Desert Ruins (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1926), p. 18.

11. "Some of his important proposals, presented back to life by the active policy of public opinion, were included in the report in 1854." Crow, op. cit., p. 44.

12. An interesting account of this treaty as told from the Navajo point of view by Henry Ross, who was present, is given in Colburn, The Navajo Indian, pp. 18-19. Ibid., op. cit., p. 44.

of the same year by twenty-nine chiefs.¹³ In July 1850, the ten pueblos of Santa Clara, Tesuque, Nambe, Santo Domingo, Jemes, San Felipe, Cochiti, San Ildefonso, Santa Ana, and Cia accepted the jurisdiction and protection of the United States, and the Government agreed that the respective pueblos were "to be governed by their own laws and customs, and such authorities as they may prescribe, subject only to the controlling power of the Government of the United States."¹⁴

Calhoun was appointed governor of the Territory in January 1851, retaining the duties of superintendent of Indian affairs. The following month all existing laws on trade and intercourse with the Indians were extended over New Mexico by Congress, and provision was made for the appointment of four agents.¹⁵ In April, Governor Calhoun and Major John Munroe, Commander of the Department of New Mexico, which was the Ninth Military Department, made a treaty with Chacon, Chief of the Jicarillas, and Lobo, Chief of the Mescaleros. At this time all the Apaches east of the Rio Grande declared their "unconditional submission to the Government of the United States" and agreed "to remove to such lands and limits as said Government may assign for their use, and build thereon Pueblos, and cultivate the soil for their support."¹⁶

¹³ Abel, op. cit., p. 127.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 238-246.

¹⁵ Bancroft, op. cit., p. 663.

¹⁶ Abel, op. cit., p. 315.

Major Munroe served as military commander from October 1849 to July 1851. During this time he had established several new posts, among which was Fort Webster in the southwestern part of the Territory, designed to hold the Gila Apaches in check, and had stationed troops at all the most important settlements; but the Indians continued to give trouble.¹⁷ Many and bitter were the complaints against the military. In a memorial dated June 30, 1851, the members of the Territorial Legislature informed the President of the United States that "the masterly inactivity of the Government troops does not afford that protection from foray and rapine which the present unhappy and distracted state of this territory imperatively demands."¹⁸

Possibly as a result of these complaints, Colonel E. V. Sumner was sent to Santa Fe in July to assume command of the department. His first act was to break up the post there, "that sink of vice and extravagance [sic]," and to withdraw the troops from Las Vegas, Albuquerque, and several smaller towns, establishing instead a garrison at Fort Union on the line of communication with Missouri.¹⁹

The department commander and the governor often disagreed on the manner of dealing with the Indians. When the

¹⁷ Abel, op. cit., p. 290.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 367.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 417.

Major Norton served as military commander from 1849 to July 1851. During this time he had established several new posts, among which was Fort Webster in the southwestern part of the Territory, designed to hold the Indians in check, and had stationed troops at all the important settlements; but the Indians continued to give trouble. ¹⁷ Navy and other were the complaints against the military. In a memorial dated June 30, 1851, the members of the Territorial Legislature informed the President of the United States that "the westerly insubordination of the Government does not afford that protection from foreign and native which the present unhappily and distracted state of this Territory imperatively demands. ¹⁸

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- 17. Idol., 2d, 312, p. 293.
- 18. Idol., 2d, 327.
- 19. Idol., 2d, 317.

two officials held a council with about 200 Navajos at Jemes in December 1851, Sumner complained to his superior officer:

They promised to keep quiet and to restore all their Mexican prisoners, and as a pledge that they would keep faith they gave up three hostages. I was opposed entirely to any presents being given to this people, until they have been put on probation for at least six months. They have violated every treaty that has ever been made with them and it would have been better to have held them for a time, with a rod of iron over their heads. The Governor gave them presents to the amount of 2, or 3, thousand dollars, and these Indians will undoubtedly feel that their submission had been purchased.²⁰

On the other hand Calhoun criticized the inaction and delay of the army, and proposed plans which were, of course, rejected. His correspondence with Sumner is extremely bitter, but this may be in part explained by the fact that in the last months of his service he was very sick. In June 1852, he left Santa Fe for the States and died on the way. He had been handicapped, both as Indian agent and as governor, by insufficient funds, by the interference of unscrupulous politicians and traders, by the lack of cooperation from the military, and by the want of support from Washington: yet he worked unceasingly to regulate the affairs of both Indians and Mexicans in a manner just to all.

In spite of the objections raised by John Greiner, one of the Indian agents, Colonel Sumner assumed charge of Indian affairs during the few months before the arrival of the new governor. He made a treaty with the Mescaleros and later,

²⁰ Abel, op. cit., p. 434.

accompanied by Greiner and Samuel Baird, another agent, entered into an agreement with the Gila Apaches at Acoma. In the latter part of the summer he reported that all the Indians were at peace.²¹

William Carr Lane became governor of the Territory and superintendent of Indian affairs in September 1852. He believed, as many later officials were to contend, that feeding the Indians was the cheapest and most effective method of keeping them quiet. He made treaties with several tribes of Apaches in the northeastern and southwestern regions, and promoted two experiments in placing some of these tribes on farms. But after spending some \$20,000 without waiting for the approval of the treaties, he was forced, by lack of funds, to stop the issuance of rations--and the Apaches promptly became more unmanageable than ever.²²

Governor David Merriwether, who followed Lane in office from 1853 to 1857, advocated buying up all the Indian titles to lands near the settlements, paying for these in annuities, and making deductions for any depredations committed. During his term treaties were made with the Jicarillas, Mimbres, Mescaleros, Utes, and Navajos. In the agreement with the Mescaleros in 1855, a reservation for them

²¹ Abel, op. cit., pp. 542-544.

²² Bancroft, op. cit., p. 664.

was to be established near Fort Stanton, a newly established post in their country. None of these treaties, however, was approved, but an agency for them was placed at Fort Stanton under Michael Steck, whose sympathy and encouragement induced many of these Apaches during the next three years to engage in farming to a small extent and to keep the peace.²³

In 1857 the offices of governor and Indian superintendent were separated and James L. Collins, a resident of New Mexico, was appointed superintendent. He served until 1863 and, according to Bancroft, was earnest and capable, but "so hampered by lack of means, conflicting or insufficient instructions, lack of a definite policy and . . . misunderstanding with the military authorities" that he could accomplish little. During the years 1856-7 "a kind of precarious peace" was enjoyed, but during the next winter troubles with the Navajos became so serious that successive campaigns were made against them by General Garland and Colonel Bonneville;²⁴ the Indians, however, continued their raids, becoming more and more bold. On the night of April 30, 1860, a force of about a thousand Navajos attacked Fort Defiance, "the only instance", says Twitchell, "where any hostile Indians in New Mexico since the American occupation, ever

²³ Bancroft, op. cit., p. 670; Ralph Emerson Twitchell, Leading Facts of New Mexico History (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: The Torch Press, 1902), II, 302.

²⁴ Bancroft, op. cit., pp. 660-662.

was to be established near Fort Stanton, a newly established post in their country. None of these frontier, however, was approved, but an agency for them was placed at Fort Stanton under Michael Steck, whose sympathy and encouragement induced many of these Indians during the next three years to engage in fighting to a small extent and to keep the peace. In 1857 the office of Governor and Indian Commissioner was separated and James L. Collins, a resident of New Mexico, was appointed superintendent. He served until 1863 and, according to Bancroft, was earnest and capable, but so hampered by lack of means, conflicting or inconsistent instructions, lack of a definite policy and . . . standing with the military authorities that he could accomplish little. During the years 1858-7 a kind of truce was enjoyed, but during the next winter troubles with the Navajos became so serious that successive campaigns were made against them by General Canby and Colonel Sanborn. The Indians, however, continued their raids, becoming more and more bold. On the night of April 30, 1860, a force of about a thousand Navajos attacked Fort Belknap, "the only instance," says Witcomb, "where any hostile Indians in New Mexico since the American occupation, even

23 Bancroft, op. cit., p. 670; Ralph Marston (Witcomb), Leading Facts of New Mexico History (Oscar Reisch, Iowa City, 1902), p. 307.

24 Bancroft, op. cit., pp. 660-662.

attacked a strongly garrisoned post."²⁵ Although the Americans repulsed them without any serious loss, Washington ordered an active campaign against the savages, and this Colonel Canby undertook in the winter of 1860-1. In this expedition he had, in addition to the regular troops, a large force of volunteers, among whom were many Pueblo and Ute Indians. There was not much accomplished in actual fighting, but the heavy loss of stock caused the Indians to ask for peace. An armistice was granted in February for three months and all troops were withdrawn except two companies at Fort Fauntleroy.²⁶ In the south, at this time, the Apaches were becoming increasingly hostile and in the north, there was fear that the Mormons were "tampering with" the Utes.²⁷

Such was the situation in New Mexico immediately before the outbreak of the Civil War. The Pueblos gave the Government no trouble, but lived under the constant threat of attack from the wild tribes; the Mexicans indulged in reprisals against the Navajos and Apaches, hardly less serious than the depredations of these Indians against them; the army officers and Indian agents disagreed on the proper policy to be followed in enforcing peace; the troops continued to make futile expeditions against the marauders; and the Territorial officials and legislature repeatedly and vainly petitioned the authorities in Washington to supply adequate funds and troops to remedy the situation.

²⁵ Twitchell, op. cit., p. 316.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 317-18; Bancroft, loc. cit.

²⁷ Bancroft, op. cit., p. 677.

estimated a strongly fortified position. The
Americans reported that the position was
occupied by five companies of regulars and
Colonel Carey reported in the afternoon of the 1st of June
that the position was held by a single company of regulars
force of volunteers, many of whom were killed and the
Indians. There was also much booty taken by the Indians,
but the heavy loss of a few hundred Indians in the
process. The position was reached by the Indians on the 2nd
and all provisions within a short time were
destroyed. In the evening of the 2nd the Indians
possessed themselves of the position and the Indians
that the women were being held in the
house and the situation in the morning was
the outbreak of the Civil War. The Indians were the
main trouble, but they were the cause of the
from the wild tribes. The Indians were the cause of
against the new order and the new order was the
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and Indian women displayed on the new order and the
in a similar manner the new order was the cause of
those that the Indians, and the new order was the
legals were respected and the new order was the cause of
Washington to a very different situation and the new order was the cause of
situation.

Washington, D.C., July 1, 1861.
The President, July 1, 1861.
The Secretary of War, July 1, 1861.

CHAPTER II

THE CONFEDERATE INVASION

Affairs in the eastern United States were becoming so engrossing and the situation was assuming so serious an aspect at this time that Congress paid scant attention to petitions from the Territory of New Mexico. The distance and uncertainty of communication between the territorial and national capitals contributed to the delay and seeming lack of interest on the part of the Federal Government. There were no telephones, telegraph, or railroads, mails were carried from Independence to Santa Fe only every fifteen days, and the Santa Fe trade was almost the only connecting link between the States and the Southwest.

In 1860, in spite of the fact that difficulties with the Comanche Indians were increasing, the military escort was withdrawn from mail and wagon trains across the plains. This withdrawal caused the members of the Legislature of New Mexico to report to Congress that "without an effective remedy to this situation, the mails will not be received and no other kind of commerce will be able to travel and journey through the plains. Our great trade with the United States will have to suffer a complete cessation."¹

¹ Memorial to Congress, New Mexico Territorial Legislature, 9th Session, 1859-60, (unpublished document, Archives, University of New Mexico).

On April 12, 1861, Fort Sumter was fired on and the Civil War had begun. In May orders were issued from Washington for the raising of two regiments of volunteer troops to replace most of the regular troops in New Mexico. These volunteers were intended to protect the Territory "both against hostile Indians and domestic foes,"² notwithstanding the fact that the experience of the past years had proved that even the regular army had not been able to give adequate protection against the Indians alone!

Early in the war rumors of a threatened invasion of New Mexico alarmed the Union officers. The Territory was, in itself, of little importance in Confederate plans, although there were military supplies at Fort Union worth capturing and possible recruits to the Confederacy to be won. But it was for greater gains than these that the campaign was undertaken. The occupation of New Mexico was to be but the first step in a grander scheme of conquest by which the Confederate States would become a nation reaching from the Atlantic to the Pacific.³

² Letter of Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, to the Governor of New Mexico, May 17, 1861. The War of the Rebellion, A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), Series III, I, 210-211. These records will hereafter be referred to as O. R.

³ Charles S. Walker, "Causes of the Confederate Invasion of New Mexico," New Mexico Historical Review, VII (April, 1933), 76-97.

In the summer of 1861 there were many factors which might have led the Southern leaders to believe that New Mexico could be easily taken. Several of these officers, including General H. H. Sibley who was later to lead the invading force, had served with the United States army in the Territory before the Southern states seceded and they were well aware of the apparently indifferent attitude which Washington had maintained toward this department. They had received word of the orders for the removal of the United States regular troops from the territory and they believed that the hostility of the Indians could be made to operate to the advantage of the Confederacy.⁴ Then, too, they knew that the native New Mexicans had not been given the protection promised them by the United States Federal government, and hoped that, after a few Confederate victories, these citizens might be won over to the side of the rebellion.⁵ Many of the American settlers were in sympathy with the South, particularly in the southern part of the Territory where the residents felt that they had not been treated fairly by the government at Santa Fe. On March 16, 1861, "the people of Arizona" had held a convention in Mesilla, at which time they repudiated the authority of the United States and had

⁴ Chief Justice M. H. McWillie to President Jefferson Davis, June 30, 1861, O. R. I, IV, 96.

⁵ Bancroft, op. cit., p. 685.

petitioned for recognition as a territory of the Confederate States.⁶

*In July of that year, Colonel John R. Baylor, Commanding Second Regiment of Texas Mounted Rifles, occupied Fort Fillmore near Mesilla and captured the entire Union force stationed there. On August 1st, he formally annexed and proclaimed himself the governor of the "Territory of Arizona," which was to include all that part of New Mexico south of the 24th parallel. The following December, General Sibley arrived at Mesilla, the capital of the new territory, and assumed command of all the Confederate forces on the Rio Grande, at and above Fort Quitman, and all troops in the Territory of New Mexico and Arizona, the forces to be known as the "Army of New Mexico."⁷

Meanwhile Colonel Canby, the Federal leader in charge of the Department of New Mexico, was using every means at his command in preparing to resist the invaders. Governor Connelley had issued a call for volunteers which was answered by such numbers that the governor had announced that the force was sufficient for the expulsion of the Confederates.⁸ Canby,

⁶ Rupert Norval Richardson and Carl Coke Rister, The Greater Southwest (Glendale, California: The Arthur H. Clarke Company, 1934).

Charles S. Walker has made an interesting study of the population of New Mexico in 1860, but finds no preponderance of inhabitants from the southern states. Walker, op. cit., pp. 90-91.

⁷ General Orders, December 14, 1861, O. R., 157-58. I, IV.

⁸ Bancroft, op. cit., pp. 689-90.

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In July of that year, Colonel John R. Baylor, Jr.,

leading Second Regiment of Texas Mounted Rifles, occupied

Fort Wilmore near Dallas and captured the entire Union

force stationed there. He named it the Territory of

and proclaimed himself the governor of the "Territory of

Arizona," which was to include all that part of New Mexico

south of the 34th parallel. The following December, General

Baylor moved at Mesilla, the capital of the new territory,

and assumed command of all the Confederate forces on the Rio

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territory of New Mexico and Arizona. The forces he had

as the "Army of New Mexico."

Meanwhile Colonel Canby, the Federal leader in charge

of the Department of New Mexico, was making every effort to

prevent its seceding to join the insurrection. Governor

Canby had issued a call for volunteers which was answered

by such numbers that the governor had announced that the force

was sufficient for the occupation of the Confederate States.

8. Report General Richardson and John S. Hildreth, General Sherman's (1864) Campaign, California: The Pacific States Publishing Co., 1904.

Charles S. Wilson has made an interesting study of the politics of New Mexico in 1863, but little is known of the influence from the southern states. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

General Sherman, December 1, 1863, to the President.

Report of the Committee on the Pacific States, 1864.

however, did not share Connelley's confidence in the ability of these troops, and called upon Governor Gilpin of Colorado to raise additional volunteers.⁹ *Late in the year he reported to the Adjutant General in Washington:

The volunteer troops are improving slowly in discipline and instruction. They are not efficient, and, in my judgment, cannot be made so in any reasonable period. They are deficient in self-reliance and military spirit, and their ignorance of the English language and want of capacity for instruction are serious obstacles to a rapid improvement. For Indian or partisan warfare and in conjunction with regular troops or volunteers of American origin, they will make valuable auxiliaries, and their services are in these respects already of considerable importance. . . . The New Mexican volunteers, without the support of regular troops or of volunteers drawn from some other section of the country, cannot be relied on to resist an invasion of the country if one is attempted.¹⁰

That there was no help to be received from the Government is evident from the reply of Secretary of War Cameron to an urgent appeal of Judge Perry Bracchus, a former justice of the Supreme Court of New Mexico. "Just as soon as matters culminate here I will give earnest attention to the wants of the Territory of New Mexico. The safety of the national capital must first be insured, and when this shall have been accomplished we will try to make every exposed point secure against rebel attack."¹¹

General Sibley's forces began their advance in February 1862, and were victorious in their first engagement with

⁹ See Canby's correspondence with Governor Gilpin, O.R., I, IV, 53, 63, 68, 72, 73, 82.

¹⁰ Canby to Adjutant General, Washington, December 8, 1861, O. R., I, IV, 78.

¹¹ Cameron to Judge Perry Bracchus, September 14, 1861, O. R., III, I, 514.

Canby's troops at Valverde. Continuing northward, Sibley took Albuquerque and Santa Fe, neither town offering any resistance, and then he planned to assemble all his forces at the capital before making an attack on Fort Union.

The Federal supplies had been concentrated at that post, about ninety miles northeast of Santa Fe. Since the Union forces were not strong enough to stop the Confederates, the officers at the fort were preparing to destroy everything rather than let it fall into the hands of the Rebels. It was at this time that a regiment of Colorado volunteers, "for the most part tough grizzly miners," commanded by Colonel J. P. Slough, marched south from Denver through snow nearly a foot deep, reaching Fort Union on March 11th. After being thoroughly equipped there, they, together with some of the regular army from Fort Union, moved toward Santa Fe. An unexpected encounter with a part of the Confederate force in Apache Cañon, on March 27th, ended in victory for neither side, and the battle was continued at Pigeon's Ranch on the following day. It is said that in actual fighting the Rebels had the advantage, but as a detachment of Coloradans under Major Chivington succeeded in destroying the Texans' supplies and killing their mules they could not continue the advance.¹²

According to Bancroft, this virtually ended the invaders' campaign. Sibley was forced to retreat to Fort Bliss in Texas,

¹² Richardson, op. cit., pp. 265-267; Twitchell, op. cit., p. 382.

where he arrived with less than half his original force.

"The 'Pike's Peakers' had proved more than a match for the 'Texas rangers' saving New Mexico for the union."¹³

When the news reached California that the Confederates were in possession of Arizona and planning to push on to the coast, the Union army officers in that state determined to take the offensive. The famous California Column was organized under Colonel James H. Carleton and the march to the Rio Grande was made for the double purpose of protecting California and aiding General Canby. While the "Column" reached New Mexico too late to fight against the Confederates, they remained to play an important part in the war against the hostile Indians.

The effect of the invasion upon the government relations with the Apaches and Navajos was unfortunate in the extreme. The posts at Forts Buchanan and Breckenridge had been abandoned in July 1861, possibly at the order of Major Isaac Lynde, commanding the southern district of New Mexico, before his surrender to Colonel Baylor at Fort Fillmore. Bancroft feels that there may be some foundation for the belief that the country was given over to the Apaches because of the number of southern sympathizers there, though he states that the order might have been given

¹³ Bancroft, *op. cit.*, p. 697; Twitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

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for the belief that the country was given over to the
Apaches because of the number of southern sympathizers there,
though he states that the order might have been given

simply as a move to reinforce Fort Fillmore.¹⁴ The following version is given by J. Ross Brown in his Adventures in the Apache Country:

During the month of July the only Federal troops in the Territory shamefully and without cause abandoned it, and marched from Fort Breckenridge and Fort Buchanan to Cook's Spring, when they heard the Texan rebels were coming. Without waiting to ascertain the number or prepare for any defense, they burned all their wagons, spiked their cannon, and packed their provisions on mules over the mountains to Fort Craig.¹⁵

In any event, the withdrawal of the troops, followed as it was by the discontinuance of the Overland Mail along the southern route, caused wild rejoicing among the Apaches, who believed that they had at last forced the hated Americans to leave. The settlers in the Rio Bonito and Rio Mimbres valleys, being now utterly at the mercy of these savages, fled from their homes giving up "the promise of abundant-yield in crops."¹⁶ William P. Dole, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, reported in November 1861:

This supposed success has greatly encouraged and emboldened them [the Apaches] so that there is ample reason to fear they will engage in still more formidable and daring atrocities. In many parts of the territory our agents are driven from their agencies and thus all present control is lost and the Indians left to the unrestrained commission of their depredation.¹⁷

¹⁴ Bancroft, op. cit., footnote p. 512.

¹⁵ Quoted in Twitchell, op. cit., footnote pp. 408-409.

¹⁶ Report of Superintendent James L. Collins, October 8, 1861, Report of the Commission of Indian Affairs for the Year 1861, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1861), p. 122. These reports will hereafter be referred to as I. A. R.

¹⁷ Report of Commissioner Dole, November, 1861, I. A. R. 1861, p. 37.

simply as a move to release Fort Belknap. The following

version is given by J. Ross Brown in his History of Montana

Country:

During the month of July the only Indian band in the Territory assembled and without cause attacked and marched from Fort Belknap and Fort Benton to Cook's Spring, where they spent the night. The next morning, without warning to assist in the attack, they came for my defense, they turned all their arms against their cannon, and packed their provisions and miles over the mountains to Fort Grear.

In any event, the withdrawal of the troops, followed

as it was by the dissatisfaction of the Indians, and

southern route, caused with rejoicing among the Indians, who

believed that they had at last found the needed assistance to

leave. The settlers in the Big Hole and Big Lost

villages, being now utterly at the mercy of these savages, fled

from their homes giving up the promise of assistance.

18. William F. Hole, Commissioner of Indian Affairs,

reported in November 1881:

This supposed success has greatly encouraged and emboldened them [the Indians] so that there is much reason to fear they will engage in still more bloody and daring atrocities. In my opinion of the Territory our agents are driven from their positions and thus all present progress is lost and the Indians left to the unrestricted commission of their depredations.

14. Bancroft, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 112.

15. Cited in Twissell, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 112.

16. Report of Superintendent J. C. McLaughlin, 1881.

1881, Report of the Commission of Indian Affairs for the year 1881, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1881.

These reports will be referred to as 1881.

17. Report of Commissioner Hole, November, 1881.

An even better understanding of the menace which these Indians constituted may be gained from an editorial printed in the Mesilla Times of October 3, 1861.

[The Apaches] seem to have united and their tribes have gathered in hosts, and commenced a war of extermination against the whites in earnest. . . . We have Indians all around us; the slightest journey must be performed in numbers and with armed bodies of men; the highways of a continent are impassable but to armies. Every day brings from the east, west, north, and south, appalling additions to our black list of Indian murders--houses deserted, friends fallen victims to the savage foe.¹⁸

And farther north the Navajos, taking advantage of the fact that all available troops were being used against the Confederates, were growing ever bolder in their raids. The armistice granted them in February 1861, had been extended for twelve months, but apparently had no restraining effect upon them. Undoubtedly illegal attacks were made on the Indians by the citizens and both sides accused the other of breaking the peace agreement.¹⁹

Throughout this trying period, however, the Pueblos remained peaceable and loyal to the Government and the friendly Mohuache Utes even went so far as to offer their services "for the protection of white settlers against the assaults of rebels as well as savage foes."²⁰

¹⁸ Quoted in Collins' Report, I. A. R., 1861, p. 123.

¹⁹ Frank D. Reeve, "Federal Indian Policy," New Mexico Historical Review, XII (July, 1937), p. 245.

²⁰ Dole's Report, I. A. R., 1861, p. 39.

for even better understanding of the various tribes
Indiana constituted may be gained from an official printed
in the Seattle Times of October 3, 1901.

The Indians seem to have failed and their tribes
have gathered in hosts, and commenced a war of exter-
mination against the whites in earnest. The Indians
all agreed on the subject of the extermination of the
whites in earnest and with united heart to kill the
highways of a continent are impassable but to travel
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18 Quoted in Collins' Report, I. S. B., 1861, p. 125.
19 Frank D. Beeve, "Federal Indian Policy," 186-
Mexican Historical Review, XII (1937), p. 242.
20 Hale's Report, I. S. B., 1861, p. 28.

CHAPTER III

CONFEDERATE RELATIONS WITH THE INDIANS

The story of the heroic march made by the Colorado Volunteers through the snows of the mountains and the no less arduous journey of the California Column through the heat of the desert to reinforce the Union troops in New Mexico has been told both by those who took part in the expeditions and by numerous historians. Unfortunately we have no account of the Confederate invasion written from the southern viewpoint. The high hopes and bitter disappointments which the Southern leaders must have experienced can only be surmised from the reports found in the Civil War records.

There are comparatively few letters dealing with the Indians in the Confederate correspondence relative to New Mexico, but we find Colonel John R. Baylor, soon after he took possession of the "Territory of Arizona," planning to send agents to the Pimas and other friendly Indians, because he deemed it "important to secure their aid and goodwill."¹ On April 5, 1862, Captain S. Hunter was able to report that he had visited the Pima Villages and had "negotiated friendly relations" with that tribe.²

¹ General John R. Baylor to General Earl Van Dorn, September 24, 1861, O. R., I, IV, 109-110.

² Hunter to Baylor, April 5, 1862, O. R., I, IX, 707-708.

?
not
over 10
reports

CHAPTER III

CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS WITH THE ARMY

The story of the events which led to the

Volunteers through the hands of the government and the

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There are undoubtedly few better sources than

letters in the Confederate correspondence of the

Mexico, but we find Robert Johnston's letters

took possession of the "territory of Arizona,"

and access to the mines and other strategic

he deemed it "important to secure their aid and

On April 2, 1862, Johnston's letter was

he had visited the San Ysidro and had

friendly relations" with that tribe.

1 General John A. Rawlinson to General Earl Warren,
September 24, 1861, p. 1, 100-110.

2 Rawlinson to Rawlinson, April 2, 1862, p. 1, 100-110.

In his message to the First Congress of the Confederacy, President Davis emphasized the importance of preserving peace with the Indians on the frontier. At the same time he reported the appointment of Albert Pike, Commissioner of the Confederate Government to all the Indian tribes west of Arkansas and south of Kansas.³

One attempt to organize the New Mexico Indians for service in the Confederate army is mentioned in the Indian Office Affairs Report for the year 1863.

Sometime in the month of May last a party consisting of nineteen rebel officers duly commissioned and authorized to organize the Indians and what rebels they might find in Colorado and New Mexico against the Government of the United States while passing through the country of the Great and Little Osages were attacked and the whole party slaughtered by these Indians.⁴

In the latter part of 1864, realizing the desperate need of the Confederacy for reinforcements, Colonel Baylor suggested to James A. Selden, Secretary of War, that "a formidable alliance might be made with the numerous Indian tribes on the route between Missouri and New Mexico."⁵ Again in January he proposed the re-occupation of the Territory and asserted that "by using the numerous Indian tribes living on

³ James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, 1861-65 (Nashville, 1905), I, 149.

⁴ Annie Heloise Abel, American Indian as a Participant in the Civil War, (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clarke Company, 1919) II, footnote, 238.

⁵ Baylor to Selden, December 21, 1864, O.R., IV, III, 990-961.

the Overland route to Santa Fe that line of communication could be so interrupted as to make any reenforcements over that route very hazardous and uncertain."⁶

This suggestion was approved by President Davis and on the day before Lee's surrender at Appomattox, Pike was authorized to form an alliance with the Comanches to enable the Confederate Government to use them as auxiliaries.⁷

During the short time the Texans controlled the southern part of the territory they encountered the same kind of difficulties with the hostile Indians that the United States had experienced since American occupation and in the few engagements recorded, found the same treachery and hatred.

Lieutenant John R. Pulliam gave an interesting report of an Indian attack on four men detailed as spies, in the Gallinas mountains about 75 miles northeast of Fort Stanton, to watch all roads leading to that post by which an enemy might approach. Disobeying instructions, they had built a fire in a place visible to anyone going to the spring and were cooking breakfast when they saw three Indians running over an adjoining hill. They attempted to saddle their horses but found themselves surrounded by Indians who showered them with arrows. The soldiers sought protection behind trees but to

⁶ Baylor to Selden, January 24, 1865, O. R., IV, III, p. 1035.

⁷ General E. Kirby Smith to Albert Pike, April 8, 1865, O. R., I, XLVIII, Pt. II, 1266-71.

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6
Baylor to Seiden, January 24, 1885, O. R., IV,
III, p. 1035.
General E. Kirby Smith to Albert Pike, April 6,
1865, O. R., I, XLVIII, pt. II, 1232-VI.

their horror found that their rifles would not fire. They drew their revolvers but were soon dislodged from their positions. "Every tree shielded an Indian for a considerable distance on all sides. The fight, which was a running one, was continued for nearly two hours. . . ." Three of the men were killed and scalped, and the fourth escaped only by galloping "down an almost perpendicular mountain." He reported having been followed ten miles by the Indians--only the fleetness of his horse saving him.⁸

The report of Colonel Baylor to General Van Dorn on August 5, carried an account of the disastrous expedition of a Lieutenant Mays and a party of ten men against an Apache village. In a desperate fight all were killed except a Mexican who brought the news back to headquarters. The colonel urged that more men be sent to him "as I can't hold the United States troops in check and operate against the Indians with the limited number of men under my command."⁹

On October 14, 1861, he described the critical position of the citizens and miners in the western part of the Territory and reported that, although he was unable to give all necessary assistance, he had sent Major E. Waller with a

✓⁸ Pulliam to Baylor, September 1, 1861, O. R., I, IV, 24.

✓⁹ Baylor to Van Dorn, August 25, 1861, O. R., I, IV, 25-26.

their horses found that their rifles were not there. They
gave their rifles to the men and then returned to their
positions. "Every rifle was in position for a long time
distance on all sides. The fight, which was a running
was continued for nearly two hours. The men of the
were killed and wounded, and the fight ended with the
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The report of Colonel Taylor to General Ives on
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village. In a desperate fight all were killed except
the men who brought the news back to headquarters. The
colonel urged that there was no more to be done at
the United States troops in order and orders during the
Indians with the listed number of men under my command.
On October 12, 1881, he described the critical position
of his command and where in the Western part of the
territory reported that, although he was unable to give all
necessary assistance, he had sent Major M. J. Taylor with

Philip H. Taylor, Lieutenant I. Taylor, and
Taylor to the town, August 12, 1881, to the
23-24

detachment of one hundred men to render what aid he could.¹⁰

In March, 1862, Colonel Baylor, justifying his orders by saying that the Congress of the Confederate States had passed a law declaring extermination to all hostile Indians, sent the following instructions to Captain Thomas Helm, Commanding Arizona Guards:

You will . . . use all means to persuade the Apaches or any tribe to come in for the purpose of making peace, and when you get them together kill all the grown Indians and take the children prisoners and sell them to defray the expense of killing the Indians. Buy whiskey and such other goods as may be necessary for the Indians and I will order vouchers given to cover the amount expended. Leave nothing undone to insure success, and have a sufficient number of men around to allow no Indians to escape. . . . To your judgment I entrust this important matter and look to you for success against these cursed pests who have already murdered over 100 men in this Territory.¹¹

It is gratifying to know that this policy did not meet with the approval of President Davis or Secretary of War Randolph. In consequence of the order Colonel Baylor was stripped of his authority in the territory, while his letter to the President, asserting that only by extermination and slavery of the Indians could the frontier be made safe, was dismissed as "an avowal of an infamous crime and the assertion of what should not be true in relation to the troops in Texas."¹²

¹⁰ Baylor to Colonel H. E. McCulloch, October 14, 1861, O. R., I, IV, 120.

¹¹ Baylor to Helm, March 20, 1862, O. R., I, L, Pt. I, 942.

¹² President Davis to Secretary of War, March 29, 1863, O. R., Series I, XV, 919.

Statement of one individual to another in a letter.

In March, 1961, the following letter was received:

by letter from the Government of the State of Texas.

passed a law regarding the State of Texas.

sent the following information to the State of Texas.

Concerning the State of Texas.

For the purpose of the State of Texas.

or any other person in the State of Texas.

and that the State of Texas is a free state.

and that the State of Texas is a free state.

the exercise of the State of Texas.

other persons in the State of Texas.

will order the State of Texas.

leave nothing to the State of Texas.

about the State of Texas.

the State of Texas.

one law in the State of Texas.

who have already received the State of Texas.

It is written in the State of Texas.

with the approval of the State of Texas.

handwritten in the State of Texas.

assigned of his authority in the State of Texas.

to the President, Secretary of the State of Texas.

history of the State of Texas.

discussed in the State of Texas.

tion of the State of Texas.

Texas.

to the State of Texas.

to the State of Texas.

Northern officers accused the Confederates, not only of making no attempt to protect the citizens under their control, but of encouraging the Apaches in their depredations. Rebel officers, in turn, declared that the government troops were guilty of inciting the savages to further attacks on southern sympathizers. From the evidence it would appear that the Indians of the wild tribes, neither understanding nor caring about the issues over which the white men were fighting, took this opportunity to wage war on Unionist and Rebel alike, in the vain hope that they might drive all their enemies from the lands which they considered their own.

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enemies from the lands which they considered their own.

CHAPTER IV

PUEBLO INDIANS

The term "Union" may be applied to but three groups of Indians in New Mexico during the years 1861-62, and to them only in a limited sense. They organized no troops and fought no battles against the Rebels, but they did remain loyal to the United States and lent assistance in various ways. These tribes were the Pueblos, the Utes, and the Jicarilla Apaches. The other Apache tribes and the Navajo Indians, while they were in no sense sympathetic toward the Confederates, were definitely hostile to the Union troops and were a constant source of embarrassment to them.

As the Territory of New Mexico at that time extended as far west as California, the Pueblo tribes of what is now the state of Arizona came under the authority of the Indian agency at Santa Fe. The Pimas, Maricopas, and Papagos in the south, and the Moquis, now known as Hopis, in the north. Within the present boundaries of New Mexico were the Zuñis and the nineteen villages of the central part, whose inhabitants were known simply as the "Pueblos".

Keeping in touch with all the Pueblos was an extremely difficult task. The distance between villages was sometimes three or four hundred miles and, while the Confederates were in possession of the "Territory of Arizona", all Government contact with the Indians of that region was cut off. During

CHAPTER IV

THE INDIAN

The term "Indian" may be applied to all native peoples of
America in New Mexico during the years 1598-1600, and to them

only in a limited sense. They organized no nation and lived

no nation against the people, but they did remain in the

the United States and lost themselves in various ways. These

tribes were the Pueblo, the Navajo, and the Hopi. The Pueblo

the other Indian tribes and the Navajo Indian, who lived

were in no sense aggressive toward the Spaniards. There

deliberately hostile to the Indian people and were a constant

source of annoyance to them.

In the history of New Mexico we find the Spaniards

as far west as California, the Pueblo tribes of the north

the state of Arizona and under the authority of the Indian

agency at Santa Fe. The Navajo, the Hopi, and the Pueblo

the south, and the Navajo, now known as Navajo, in the north.

Within the present boundaries of New Mexico were the Navajo

and the Hopi tribes of the present day. These tribes

Indians were known simply as the "Indians."

Beginning in 1598 with all the tribes and an extensive

difficult task. The Spaniards between 1598 and 1600

these or four hundred miles and, while the Spaniards were

in possession of the territory of Arizona, all Spaniards

contact with the Indians of that period was not all Spaniards

these months, however, while the Indians were being "sub-
jected to the influence of the enemy from Texas, they
remained faithful to the Government and obstinate to the
approaches of the invader."¹

James L. Collins, who was superintendent of Indian
Affairs from 1857-63, spoke highly of the southwestern Pueblos,
considering them more than semi-civilized. As evidence of
their industry and success in farming he pointed out that they
were able to sell to Colonel James H. Carleton, commanding the
troops from California and later as Brigadier-General to be in
command of the Department of New Mexico, more than a million
pounds of wheat--their surplus of the year's crop.²

Colonel Carleton, writing from Fort Barrett on May 24,
1862, described the Pimas and Maricopas as being the finest
Indians he had ever seen. They would be, he felt sure, of
great service both to the military and to the Overland Mail
which was to follow a route through their country "as soon
as the rebels are brushed away from Mesilla," and he begged
that arms and ammunition be furnished them to defend them-
selves against their hereditary foes, the Apaches.³

As their value as a barrier between the frontier
settlements and the hostile tribes was recognized by the

¹ Ward's Report, I. A. R., 1865, p. 166.

² Collins' Report, I. A. R., 1862, p. 239.

³ Carleton to Major Richard C. Drum, May 24, 1862,
O. R., I, L, Pt. I, 1094-1095.

these months, however, while the Indians were being
taught to the influence of the United States, they
remained faithful to the Government and obedient to the
speeches of the Governor.

James L. Collins, who was superintendent of Indian
affairs from 1857-60, wrote a history of the country in 1860,
considering that more than half of the population of the
territory and people in 1850 were of Indian descent. They
were able to sell to General James W. Wadsworth, Secretary of the
Territory from California and Texas on Indian Affairs, and in
command of the Department of the Interior, were paid a million
dollars of which the balance of the year's work.

Colonel Carlton, writing a history of the Territory in 1862,
described the time and circumstances of the first
Indians he had ever seen. They would be the last of
great service both to the military and to the Government and
which was to follow a year through their country, as seen
as the rebels are brushed away from Mexico, and he hoped
that arms and ammunition be furnished them so that they
might resist their predatory forays, the speech.

As their value as a barrier between the frontier
settlements and the hostile tribes was recognized by the

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1. Wadsworth's Report, I. A. R., 1857, p. 100.
 2. Collins' Report, I. A. R., 1860, p. 100.
 3. Carlton to Major Richard O. Butler, May 20, 1862.
O. R., I, 1, 108-109.

military authorities, the commander's request was granted. They were presented with one hundred muskets and ten thousand rounds of ammunition with which they "did much good service in the protection of that border from the forays of the wild Indians."⁴

The Moquis, who live in villages on high mesas in the northwestern part of the Territory, were visited in 1861 by John Ward, the Pueblo Indian agent. He reported their condition to be most deplorable. They were entirely surrounded by fierce Navajo and Apache tribes whose raids had done much toward reducing these Pueblos to poverty. They had been robbed by citizens of New Mexico, too, during an independent campaign against the Navajos. The Mexicans had entered their pueblos and taken the "very corn they had in store for their subsistence. This was done under the plea that the Moquis were in league with the Navajoes"⁵

In December, 1863, while fighting the Navajos, Colonel Kit Carson took advantage of the enmity between the two tribes and succeeded in getting representatives from all the villages except one to accompany him on the war-path. He reported that they were of "some service and manifested a great desire to aid us in every respect."⁶

⁴ Collins' Report, I. A. R., 1862, p. 239.

⁵ Ward to Steck, I. A. R., 1865, p. 172.

⁶ Edwin L. Sabin, Kit Carson Days (New York: The Press of the Pioneers, Inc., 1935) II, 874, citing Carson's report to Assistant-Adjutant General, Dec. 6, 1863.

military authorities, the commander's request was granted. They were presented with one hundred blankets and ten pounds of ammunition with which they "did much good service in the protection of that border from the depredations of the Indians."

The Mojave, who live in villages on high mesas in the northwestern part of the territory, were visited in 1880 by John Ward, the Indian agent. He reported their condition to be most deplorable. They were entirely swayed by the Navajo and Apache tribes whose raids had been going toward reducing these people to poverty. They had been robbed by citizens of New Mexico, too, during an independent campaign against the Navajo. The Mexicans had conducted their people and given the "very poor thing" in store for their subsistence. This was done under the idea that the Navajo were in league with the Mexicans.

In December, 1880, while fighting the Navajo, Colonel Kit Carson took advantage of the animosity between the two tribes and succeeded in getting representatives from all the villages except one to accompany him on the war-path. He reported that they were of "some service and manifested a great desire to aid us in every respect."

4 Collins' Report, I. A. R., 1882, p. 232.
5 Ward to Stock, I. A. R., 1880, p. 147.
6 Edwin L. Sabin, Kit Carson Days (New York: The Pioneer, Inc., 1935) 11, 12, citing Carson's report to assistant adjutant general, Dec. 6, 1880.

Colonel Carson also spoke of the suffering among these people and urged that the attention of the government be called to their needs.⁷ In 1865, believing that the failing water supply was chiefly responsible for their distress, Commissioner William P. Dole recommended that steps "at once be taken to remove these inoffensive people to a more favorable locality."⁸

Although the Zuñi Indians are listed among the friendly pueblos, their loyalty to the Government was sometimes questioned. General Carleton had reason in 1863, to suspect that they were aiding the hostile Navajos and suggested to Colonel Carson that he seize six of the principal men of their village to be held as hostages until all the Navajos were given up.⁹ It was during the same campaign, however, that Colonel Carson had occasion to praise the zeal and ability of the Zuñis whom he had employed as spies.

In the summer of 1864 there was evidence that the Zuñis were using their influence to keep the Navajos from going to the reservation at the Bosque Redondo, the new fort on the Pecos where all the captive Apache and Navajo Indians were being concentrated, and that they were selling powder and lead to the Apaches in the Sierra Blanca and Mogollon

⁷ Sabin, loc. cit.

⁸ Dole's Report, I. A. R., 1864, p. 181.

⁹ Carleton to Carson, September 19, 1865, O. R., I, XXVI, Pt. I, 727.

Colonel Carson also spoke of the suffering among the people and urged that the attention of the government be called to their needs. In 1883, believing that the Indian water supply was chiefly responsible for their distress, Commissioner William F. Cole recommended that steps be taken to remove these Indians to a more favorable locality.⁷

Although the Gila Indians are located among the friendly people, their loyalty to the Government has sometimes been questioned. General Huxford had reason in 1883 to suspect that they were aiding the hostile Navajos and attempting to obtain arms that he seized six of the principal men of their village to be held as hostages until all the Navajos had been up.⁸ It was during the same campaign, however, that Colonel Carson had occasion to praise the zeal and ability of the Gila whom he had employed as guides.

In the summer of 1884 there was evidence that the Gila were using their influence to keep the Navajos from going to the reservation at the Fort Huachuca, the new location where all the captive Navajos and Gila Indians were being concentrated, and that they were selling powder and lead to the Apaches in the Sierra Blanca and Mescalero

7 Gila, loc. cit.
 8 Cole's Report, I. R. 1883, p. 121.
 9 Carson to Carson, September 12, 1883, I. R. 1883, p. 127.

region.¹⁰ Major Eaton was sent to their pueblo in August, and reported that while it was true that a few of these Indians had been guilty of discouraging the Navajos from surrendering, he believed "the general disposition of the Zuñi Indians to be good." The whole trouble lay in the fact that "they did not wholly understand their position between the Government and the Indians at war with same." The Major carefully explained to the head men what was expected of them and received their promises of aid.¹¹ While he did not put much reliance in these promises, General Carleton suggested to Major Junius Shaw on March 23, 1865, that he might possibly enlist the help of the Zuñis in the capture of Manuelito, powerful Navajo chief.¹²

In central New Mexico, along the Rio Grande live the most prosperous of all the Indians in the Territory. "The Indians of the Pueblos," wrote Superintendent Collins in 1861, "are in a condition from which it will require but a small advance to make them useful citizens; the wand of education is the only desideratum which prevents them from obtaining this very desirable position."¹³

¹⁰ Carleton to Commanding Officer, Fort Wingate, August 11, 1864, O. R., I, XLI, Pt. II, 661.

¹¹ Eaton to Assistant Adjutant General, August 11, 1864, O. R., I, XLI, Pt. II, 325.

¹² Carleton to Shaw, March 23, 1865, O. R., I, XLVIII, Pt. I, 1246-1247.

¹³ Collins' Report, I.A.R., 1861, p. 126. This magic "wand", in spite of the urgent pleas of Indian agents, was not to be supplied by the government during the Civil War years.

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In central New Mexico, along the Rio Grande live the most prosperous of all the Indians in the Territory. "The Indians of the Pueblos," wrote Superintendent Collins in 1881, "are in a condition from which it will require but a small advance to make them useful citizens; the want of education is the only desideratum which prevents them from obtaining this very desirable position."¹³

¹⁰ Carleton to Commanding Officer, Fort Wingate, August 11, 1884, O. R., I, XII, Pt. II, 681.

¹¹ Eaton to Assistant Adjutant General, August 11, 1884, O. R., I, XII, Pt. II, 385.

¹² Carleton to Shaw, March 23, 1885, O. R., I, XIVIII, Pt. I, 1266-1267.

¹³ Collins' Report, I. A. R., 1881, p. 128. This "wonder" in spite of the urgent pleas of Indian agents, was not to be supplied by the Government during the Civil War years.

The fields and vineyards furnished the Pueblos with ample food for their needs and few of them cared to accumulate money. It seems, however, that the Indians of Isleta, a village thirteen miles south of Albuquerque, did possess wealth in the American sense of the word. Bradford L. Prince, in his Spanish Mission Churches of New Mexico, tells the story of how the governor of the pueblo, Ambrosio Abeytia, came to the assistance of the Union commander in 1862. It was during the Confederate invasion when there was no money with which to pay the soldiers, and no help to be had from the Government, banks, or merchants. When the "officers were almost in despair . . . (Abeytia) without any hesitation . . . furnished the American commander with \$18,000, in specie, merely taking a receipt in recognition of the obligation." Twelve years later when the matter was brought to the attention of President Grant, the money was returned with the thanks of the government.¹⁴

All of the reports of the agents are filled with praise for the industry and honesty of the Pueblos. In striking contrast to the record of constant depredations made by the nomadic Indians is the statement that "in the first judicial district of New Mexico, which includes about one-half the Pueblo population, during a period of ten years

¹⁴ L. Bradford Prince, Spanish Mission Churches of New Mexico (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: The Torch Press, 1915), pp. 198-199.

but one case of theft was brought before that court committed by a Pueblo.¹⁵

John Ward, Pueblo agent for many years, proved a sympathetic friend to these Indians and a true champion of their rights. He made a careful study of their history, religion, superstitions, and customs and tried to convince authorities at Washington of their very great need for schools. He pointed out that under Spanish and Mexican rule the Pueblos had been taught by missionaries, while in the eighteen years of American control no provision whatever had been made for their education.¹⁶ Although the loyalty of these Indians was unquestioned, their industry commended, and their worthiness acknowledged, the Federal government, during the years 1861-1865, was more concerned with driving out the Rebel invaders and subduing the hostile Indians than with trying to improve the condition of the friendly Pueblos.

¹⁵ Steck to Dole, October 10, 1864, I. A. R., 1864, p. 181.

¹⁶ Ward to Steck, June 30, 1864, I. A. R., 1864, p. 189.

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16 Steck to Cole, October 10, 1884, I. A. R. 1884.
p. 181.

16 Ward to Steck, June 30, 1884, I. A. R. 1884, p. 181.

CHAPTER V

UTES AND JICARILLA APACHES

Of the many tribes of Ute Indians, only three came properly within the limits of New Mexico in this period: the Capotes and Payuches, or Nomenuches, ranged over the northwestern part of the Territory, while the Mohuaches were located in the northeastern portion.

As a tribe the Utes were poor, owning nothing except a few horses. They had lived chiefly by hunting (or thieving) and as the game grew increasingly scarce they came to rely more and more upon the agencies for their supplies. As they were a wandering tribe they had no houses, but lived in lodges "made of coarse cotton drilling or (Osnaburg,) shaped like a Sibley tent." Jose Mansinares, Indian agent, gave as one reason for their failure to settle down the fact that the Mexican authorities had never recognized their right to any of the territory over which they roamed and should they attempt to locate in any one place they would immediately be dispossessed by the Mexicans. Although he admitted that the Utes showed no inclination to work, Mansinares felt that if they were placed on reservations of their own, they could be induced to take an interest in farming.¹

The Mohuaches were described in 1857 by Kit Carson,

¹ Mansinares to Collins, September 3, I. A. R., 1862, p. 246.

then Indian agent at Taos, as "the most noble and virtuous tribe within our territory." They were not at that time "addicted to the use of ardent spirits" and Agent Carson urged that they be removed as far as possible from the settlements "as Indians generally learn the vices and not the virtues of civilized man."² Together with the Jicarilla Apaches, the Mohuaches were recognized as possessing "the balance of power in the Territory of New Mexico," standing as they did between the unfriendly Indians and the whites. To keep them from committing depredations, "for they will steal before they will starve," the government was requested in 1861 and again in 1862, to supply them liberally with food.³

These two tribes come under the same agency, being closely associated by location, habits, and temperament. They had intermarried to a great extent and the Indians themselves said that "both tribes recognized each other as one family and one blood, and that the Great Spirit only could separate them."⁴

In August, 1861, their agency was moved from Taos to Maxwell's Ranch in the Cimarron valley on the east side of the Taos mountains. They lived chiefly in this region and their visits across the mountains to the agency at Taos to get their

² Sabin, Kit Carson Days, II, 834.

³ Report of Army, I. A. R., 1861, p. 127.

⁴ Labadi to Delgado, I. A. R., 1865, p. 172.

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² Babin, Kit Carson Days, II, 834.
³ Report of Army, I. A. R., 1881, p. 127.
⁴ Babin to Deland, I. A. R., 1882, p. 170.

presents had become the occasion for getting drunk and creating a disturbance. The dealers who sold the whiskey could not be prosecuted because of the existence of a law of the Territory which allowed the Pueblos to buy liquor. "The Utahs and Apaches would get the Pueblos to buy it for them; they would get drunk together, and get into fights with each other." In the Cimarron valley where there were only about fifteen Americans and eighty Mexican families and where these tribes were entirely out of the reach of the Pueblos, the agent had much more control over them. Thirteen months after the change, their agent, William F. M. Arny, reported that the number of depredations had been greatly lessened and that the Indians were sober and obedient.⁵

During the invasion of 1861-62, the Utes and Jicarillas remained friendly to the United States, although, according to Agent Arny's report, they had been "tampered with by the agents of the so-called 'Southern Confederacy', who made all kinds of misrepresentations to them in order to make them dissatisfied with the federal government." Not only did they remain loyal to the Federal Government, but on several occasions offered their services for the protection of the citizens "against the rebels and hostile Indians, and on one occasion they were employed by the military commander of this department for about a month as scouts, in which capacity they rendered efficient service."⁶

⁵ Arny to Collins, I. A. R., 1862, p. 242.

⁶ Ibid.

In his expedition against the Navajos in 1863, Colonel Carson was joined by nineteen Ute warriors, five of whom he employed as spies. So valuable did their services prove that on July 24th he requested permission to employ thirty more to be used as spies. At the same time he asked that the Utes be allowed to keep the four women and seventeen children as well as the property which they had captured "for their own use and benefit . . . as there is no other way to sufficiently recompense these Indians for their invaluable services and as a means of insuring their continued zeal and activity." The colonel was satisfied that the future of these prisoners would be "much better than if sent even to the Bosque Redondo," and there was the additional advantage that if the Utes disposed of their captives to the Mexicans, as they usually did, the Indians would "require no further attention on the part of the Government."⁷

General Carleton emphatically refused this request, ordering all captives to be sent to Santa Fe "by the first practicable opportunity," but said that "to stimulate the zeal" of the Utes a bonus of twenty dollars might be paid for every serviceable horse or mule.⁸ The following day Colonel Carson reported:

⁷ Carson to Carleton, July 24, 1863, O. R., I, XXVI, Pt. I, 233.

⁸ Carleton to Carson, August 18, 1863, O. R., I, XXVI, Pt. I, 235.

in his expedition against the Navaho in 1863. Colonel
Garson was joined by nineteen Nez Perce warriors, five of whom he
employed as spies. He valuable did their services were
on July 25th he requested permission to employ thirty more to
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be allowed to keep the four women and children captured as well
as the property which they had captured for their own use
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He added, "and there was the additional advantage that if the
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7. Garson to Garson, July 24, 1863, O. R., I, 235.
8. Garson to Garson, August 18, 1863, O. R., I, 235.

The Utes have left the command to return to their homes, ostensibly because they could not get the herds captured by Captains Berney and Pfeiffer, as they stated that it was the understanding with the general that they were to receive all the stock captured during the campaign. The real cause, however, was the fact that they now had sufficient stock and captures.⁹

The Utes were particularly war-like and "known to be the bravest Indians in the country."¹⁰ A notable example of their fortitude was related by Agent Army. It seems that a camp of ten lodges of Utes was attacked by a large number of Plains Indians, but Benito, the Ute chief, having been warned of their approach, had already ordered the women and children to mount their horses and escape.

. . . Twelve Utahs drew themselves up in a battle array against the three or four hundred, and fought until nine of the Utahs were killed, one wounded, and two remained unhurt. The two seized the wounded chief, Sesareva, and the dead chief, Benito, and dragged them to some bushes, where they made a stand and fought the whole of the Indians until they retreated, and they saved the scalp of Benito and the life of Sesareva, and also the lives of all the women and children. Such an instance of bravery is scarcely to be found either in civilized or savage history.¹¹

The need for placing the Indians on reservations was urged by Agent Army, in whose opinion they were just as uncivilized in 1862 as they had been when the American government first took them in charge. The ranging which they did

⁹ Carson to Cutler, August 19, 1863, O. R., I, XXVI, Pt. I, 237.

¹⁰ Editorial in the Santa Fe New Mexican, for October 21, 1864.

¹¹ Army to Collins, I. A. R., 1862, p. 242.

over such a vast territory made it extremely difficult to keep them under control and almost impossible to provide schools for them. Agent Army had, it seems, made plans to provide some sort of schooling for the Utes and Jicarillas about the time he was made Secretary of the Territory,¹² but his successor, Levi Keithly, apparently did not carry out the project.

Agent Keithly had little sympathy for the Indians under his care. He felt that their friendly attitude did not result from any sincerity or integrity on their part, but was attributable to the presents and supplies received from the government.

. . . I have studied the character of the Mohuache Utahs and the Jicarilla Apaches with care and attention, and find them to be collectively and individually devoid of anything like generosity, honesty, or good faith. Notwithstanding their solemn promises, they have not abstained from committing depredations on the property of our citizens. This is, perhaps, owing in a great measure to the indulgence of a beneficent government and the long forbearance of the people. So long as those Indians are permitted to roam at will over the country, just so long will they prove a scourge to the Territory.¹³

By 1864 the reservation for the Apaches and Navajos had been established at the Bosque Redondo. Acting upon instructions received, Agent Keithly attempted to persuade the Jicarillas to settle there, explaining the great benefits

¹² Army to Collins, I. A. R., 1862, 243.

¹³ Keithley to Steck, I. A. R., 1863, 152.

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¹² Army to Collins, I. A. B., 1862, 243.

¹³ Keithly to Stock, I. A. B., 1863, 123.

to be derived from doing so. They admitted that all he said was true, but only for the white race. "God from the beginning had ordained the Americans and Mexicans to be tillers of the soil, while they, the Indians should follow the war-path and the chase."¹⁴ Evidently aware that at the Bosque they would have to work for their maintenance they much preferred to lead their usual vagabond life, relying upon what they could steal from the citizens, and beg from the government.

Late in 1864 General Carleton ordered Colonel Kit Carson to lead an expedition against the Comanches and Kiawas, who had been attacking the trains on the route from New Mexico to the United States. In addition to his regular and volunteer troops he was to enlist as many Utes, Apaches, and Navajos as would accompany him.

Of the two hundred fifty warriors at the Maxwell Ranch Agency, Colonel Carson estimated that he could probably persuade one hundred to go with him, but he warned Carleton that if their families were not cared for these Indians would not remain long in the field. "I regard them of great importance on this expedition and after organizing and starting I desire that proper means be placed at my disposal to insure their remaining with me and to make them contented."¹⁵ In reply the general said that he had neither the means nor the right to provide food for the families of the Utes and Apaches--

¹⁴ Keithley to Dole, I. A. R., 1864, 201.

¹⁵ Carson to Carleton, October 18, 1864, O. R., I, XLI, Pt. IV, 99.

to be derived from doing so. They admitted that all he said was true, but only for the white race. God took the negro. King had exhorted the Americans and Mexicans to be allies of the soil, while they, the Indians should follow the white man and the chase. "It is evidently aware that at the time they would have to work for their maintenance they must be able to lead their usual way of life, relying upon what they could steal from the citizens, and beg from the government. Late in 1864 General Carleton ordered Colonel Kit Carson to lead an expedition against the Comanches and Kiowas who had been attacking the trains on the route from New Mexico to the United States. In addition to his regular and volunteer troops he was to enlist as many Utes, Apaches, and Navajos as would accompany him. Of the two hundred fifty warriors at the Hualapai Agency, Colonel Carson estimated that he could probably provide one hundred to go with him, and he wanted Carson to take if their families were not cared for these Indians would not remain long in the field. "I regard them of great importance on this expedition and after organizing and starting I desire that proper means be placed at my disposal to insure their remaining with me and to make them comfortable." In reply the general said that he had neither the means nor the right to provide food for the families of the Utes and Apaches.

14 Keithley to Dole, I. A. N., 1864, 201.

15 Carson to Carleton, October 18, 1864, I. A. N., 211. XLI, pt. IV, 99.

that should be done by the Indian Department--but he did promise to issue sugar and coffee to the Indians from Fort Bascom.¹⁶

After much bargaining eighty-two Utes and Jicarillas agreed to accompany the expedition, which got under way on November 3rd, and fought gallantly in the Battle of Adobe Walls which followed.¹⁷

In January, 1865, by order of the Secretary of the Interior, the Mohuaches were assigned to the Colorado agency. This region had been their former home and in the fall Superintendent Delgado reported that a portion of the tribe had returned. At this time he strongly recommended that the remainder of the group be removed to Colorado at once and that all of the Jicarillas be placed at the Bosque Redondo. This would both save the expense of the agency and protect the northeastern section of the Territory from the depredations of the two bands.¹⁸ At this news Agent Labadi, who had been transferred to the Cimarron agency, wrote that both tribes were very "sad and sorrowful." They said that the "Great Spirit created them in the country they inhabit; that from the day they saw the first light they had remained there; that the remains of their parents were buried there; and that its climate and healthy waters helped them to make a pleasant living."

The description Agent Labadi gave of the Jicarillas was

¹⁶ Carleton to Carson, October 20, 1864, O. R., I, XLI, Pt. IV, 151.

¹⁷ Sabin, Op. cit., p. 735.

¹⁸ Report of Delgado, I. A. R., 1865, p. 161.

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in decided contrast to that of the former agent. He termed them one of the most advanced in civilization of the wild tribes. As they had shown an interest in agriculture he believed that if the government would place them on a good reservation in their own country and establish schools for them, they would soon be able to earn their living honestly.¹⁹

The Capotes and Nomennuches of the West were reported at this time as having for the last few years conducted themselves well. Formidable and war-like, they had given much protection against the inroads of the Navajos. Although they had shown themselves "averse to being settled on a reservation, feeling no disposition to work," Delgado felt that with the proper management they might be induced to do so. He concludes his report with the recommendation that a reservation be established for them in the San Juan valley within the limits of the country over which they ranged.²⁰

The Utes and the Apaches were finally separated in 1878, when the three bands of Utes were removed to the Colorado reservation. In 1880, the Jicarillas were placed at Fort Stanton.

¹⁹ Labadi to Delgado, I. A. R., 1865, p. 173.

²⁰ Report of Delgado, I. A. R., 1865, p. 163.

in decided contrast to that of the former, the latter is

not one of the most important in the history of the city.

Indeed, as it was shown in the case of the former, the

latter is not one of the most important in the history of the city.

Preservation is, in fact, a matter of the highest importance.

It is, in fact, a matter of the highest importance.

The question of preservation is, in fact, a matter of the highest importance.

at this time as having been the case for many years past.

Indeed, it is a matter of the highest importance.

protection against the action of the elements, which is

not a mere matter of taste, but a matter of the highest importance.

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CHAPTER VI

THE HOSTILE APACHES

The hostile Apaches may be divided into two general groups; the Mescaleros, who lived in the southeastern portion of the territory, ranging the whole eastern frontier as far north as Fort Union, and the Gila Apaches, who inhabited the country, watered by the Gila and Mimbres rivers, west of Mesilla. There were in all about eight thousand of these Indians who, occupying as they did wild and almost inaccessible mountain regions, were a formidable force to deal with.¹

There is recorded but one short period in their early history when they were not on the war-path. During the thirty years immediately preceding Mexican independence, "under the wise policy of the [Spanish] government and the untiring efforts of the Jesuit Fathers, they remained at peace, and many of them found employment as shepherds to watch over the immense herds of cattle and sheep that securely fed on every mountain and in every valley of the country."² With the establishment of the Mexican Republic, however, there was a change in the policy toward the Indians which resulted

¹ Collins' Report, I. A. R., 1862, p. 238.

These groups are subdivided into various tribes, designated often by the name of the region occupied--as Mimbres, and Mogollons.

² Steck to Dole, I. A. R., 1863, p. 207.

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

The history of the United States is a story of growth and expansion. From a small colony of settlers on the eastern coast, the nation grew to encompass a vast continent. The early years were marked by struggle and hardship, but the spirit of innovation and determination led to remarkable achievements. The American Revolution was a pivotal moment, establishing the principles of liberty and self-governance. The subsequent years saw the nation expand westward, driven by the desire for land and opportunity. The Civil War, a dark chapter in the nation's history, ultimately preserved the Union and laid the foundation for a more unified and powerful country. The late 19th and early 20th centuries were characterized by rapid industrialization and the rise of a new American identity. The nation's role in the world grew increasingly significant, culminating in its leadership during the two world wars. Today, the United States stands as a global superpower, a testament to the resilience and vision of its people.

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
Continued on next page

in a renewal of their hatred of the whites and in open warfare. The occupation of the country by the Americans brought little, if any, improvement in the management of the Apaches. Our records reveal many instances of misunderstanding and of grave injustice to the Indians, but they also furnish examples of endurance, resolution, and high courage on the part of the Americans.

The Indian agent for all the southern Apache tribes from 1855 to 1860 was Dr. Michael Steck, a man who contended that "human nature exhibits itself in the Indian as in the Anglo-Saxon: supply the wants of either and the disposition to revolt is suppressed or materially weakened." He accordingly provided the Apaches with liberal amounts of food and, for a time, succeeded in keeping them quiet. A great many of the Mescaleros settled down and planted "large breadths of corn."³ In 1860, he secured authority to establish a reservation for his Indians near the present Arizona-New Mexico line, but before the project could be put into effect gold had been found in the western area, bringing in many people indifferent to the rights of the red man, and the Territory had been invaded by the Confederates, cutting off all contact between the agencies and their charges.

In the spring of 1861, Colonel W. W. Loring, Department Commander, ordered an expedition against the Mescaleros

³ Steck to Dole, loc. cit.

under the leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel George Crittenden. Within two months time the campaign was reported to have been satisfactorily concluded, the Indians suing for peace and promising to refrain from future hostilities.⁴

Colonel E. R. S. Canby succeeded Loring as commander of the department and in June admitted that Indian raids were continuing. He added, however, that a number of depredations attributed to the savages had, upon investigation, proved to have been committed by citizens.⁵ In July attacks were reported in the neighborhood of Fort Fillmore, near Mesilla. Major Lynde, who was in command of the post at that time, was requested to send mounted troops in pursuit of the Indians, but this he refused to do, saying that "when the volunteers called for were forthcoming" he would then assist them.⁶

At about this time the abandonment of Forts Breckenridge and Buchanan was ordered, to be followed soon afterwards by the surrender of Forts Fillmore and Stanton, thus relinquishing all forts in the southern part of the Territory. The Apaches, being under no restraint now, became "insolent

⁴ Loring to Colonel E. D. Townsend, A. A. G., May 19, 1861, O. R., I, I, 604.

⁵ Canby to A. A. G., June 5, 1861, O. R., I, IV, 50.

⁶ Lynde to A. A. G., July 21, 1861, O. R., I, III, 60.

and defiant," indulging in all manner of outrage.⁷ Even after the agency at Fort Stanton was closed, Lorenzo Labadie, the Mescalero agent, tried to keep in touch with the Indians and to exercise some sort of control over them, but little was accomplished until the Confederates were driven out of the territory and General Carleton's troops had marched in.

The California Column left Fort Yuma, most eastern fort in California, the last of April, 1862, and on July 4th the advance detachment raised the national colors over their encampment on the Rio Grande. The march had not been made, however, without conflict with the Apaches. When, on June 15th, Colonel Carleton had attempted to send a message to General Canby from Tucson, the three couriers were attacked by the Indians at Apache Pass,⁸ two were killed, and the third escaped death at the hands of the savages only to be captured by the Confederates at Mesilla.⁹

Another engagement with the Indians at this pass, on June 25th, was reported by Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre. While he was superintending the watering of the horses at the springs, he heard four shots--the signal that Indians were approaching.

⁷ Dole's Report, I. A. R., 1862, p. 35.

⁸ Apache Pass, a narrow cañon about two miles long on the old road to California, had long been a favorite hiding place for Apaches. There they would lie in wait until travelers or troops stopped at the springs in the cañon for water, when they would make a sudden attack and after killing and robbing their victims, escape to the mountains.

⁹ J. M. McNulty's Report, October 1, 1863, O. R., I, IX, 594-604.

and defiant," indicating in all manner of outburst, after the agency at Fort Stanton was closed, leaving the messengers agent, tried to keep in touch with the Indians and to exercise some sort of control over them, the Indians was accompanied until the Confederates were driven out of the territory and General Crockett's troops had returned to the California Column left Fort Yuma, about September 1884 in California, the last of April, 1885, and on July 25, 1885 advance detachment retained the national colors over their encampment on the Rio Grande. The camp had not been seen, however, without conflict with the Apaches. Then, on June 18th, Colonel Crockett had attempted to send a message to General Canby from Tucson, the three couriers were killed by the Indians at Apache Pass, two were killed, and the third escaped back at the hands of the savages only to be captured by the Confederates at Mesilla.

Another engagement with the Indians at this time, on June 25th, was reported by Lieutenant-Colonel Frye. While he was superintending the watering of the horses at the spring, he heard four shots--the signal that Indians were approaching.

V. Deane's Report, I. A. B., 1885, p. 45.

8. Apache Pass, a narrow cañon about two miles long on the old road to California, had long been a favorite hiding place for Apaches. There they would lie in wait until travelers or troops stopped at the spring in the cañon for water, when they would make a sudden attack and either killing and robbing their victims, escape to the mountains.

9. J. W. McWhorter's Report, October 1, 1885, I. A. B., IX, 504-505.

Seeing that they carried a white flag, the Colonel took an interpreter with him and went out to meet them, but was almost an hour in getting near enough to ask for the chief. By that time there were about seventy-five or a hundred warriors, all armed with rifles or pistols and many of them mounted. Eyre explained that his men were Americans who merely wished to travel through the country unmolested. He also told the chief that there was a great captain (Colonel Carleton) at Tucson who desired to talk with all the Apache chiefs, in order to make peace with them and to give them presents. The Indians promised that neither men nor animals would be interfered with and, after receiving presents of food and tobacco, they asked the American commander to meet them again at sunset, and rode away. When Eyre rejoined his troops he learned that three of his men were missing, having, against express orders, wandered away from camp. After an hour's search their bodies were found. The Indians had murdered them and stripped them of their clothing, and scalped two of them. Instant pursuit was ordered, but soon given up as useless for the Indians were lost in the mountains.¹⁰

Captain Thomas L. Roberts was in command of the First Infantry California Volunteers, escorting the Government wagon train with supplies for Colonel Eyre's men. On July 15th, Roberts' men, who were in advance of the train, were attacked


¹⁰ Eyre to Cutler, July 6, 1862, O. R., I, IX, 586-587.

by several hundred Indians at a place about one-half mile from Apache Pass. The troops fought them off and reached the springs but the Indians "seemed very loath" to let them have water and kept up a "rattling fire" from their position high among the rocks above them. The Californians, dividing into two parties of skirmishers, climbed up the steep sides of the cañon and shelled the high points. This proved too much for the Apaches and they scattered, allowing the soldiers to get water for themselves and their horses. Roberts then fell back to join the train, having lost two men in the battle. The next day, although they encountered about the same difficulty, they succeeded in not only getting water, but in camping at the springs over night. The third morning, still under occasional fire from the Indians, they marched the remainder of the distance through the narrow cañon and gained the open country on the east.¹¹

General Carleton now saw that the control of Apache Pass was absolutely essential for the safe movement of his troops to and from California, and by September, 1862, had established a post at that point. It was known as Fort Bowie and was to be garrisoned by two companies of infantry and one of cavalry, who would not only afford protection to persons going through the cañon, but would also take the field against the Indians in that vicinity.¹²

¹¹ Journal of Captain Thomas L. Roberts, O. R., I, L, Pt. I, 131-132.

¹² Carleton to Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Drum, September 20, 1862; O. R., I, IX, 565. Carleton to West, October 3, 1862, O. R., I, L, Pt. II, 147-148.



On September 2nd, shortly before reaching the Rio Grande, Captain E. D. Shirland had a short battle with the Indians. A number had approached him carrying a white flag, but as they seemed unwilling to talk and as more and more Indians continued to come from all directions, both on foot and on horseback, the captain realized that the flag was simply a ruse to delay his men until they could be surrounded. He made a running fight of it and, though he was pursued by the mounted Indians for a short way, he escaped with only three men wounded. The Indians lost four men killed and possibly twenty wounded.¹³

Carleton had by this time been made brigadier-general and on September 1862, assumed command of the Department of New Mexico, replacing General E. R. S. Canby. The Confederates had been driven well across the Texas line and the Overland Mail had been reestablished. General Carleton now determined to wage war on the hostile Indians until they should be justly punished and completely subdued. The Apaches, in the southern part of the Territory had been more directly affected by the invasion than the northern tribes and it was to them that he first turned his attention.

Colonel Christopher Carson, one of the most famous of Indian fighters, was ordered with five companies to reoccupy

¹³ Shirland to Assistant Adjutant-General, New Mexico, September 2, 1862, I, L, Pt. I, 111-113.

Fort Stanton, which was in the heart of the Mescalero country, and on the twelfth of October he received the following orders from General Carleton:

You will make war upon the Mescaleros and upon all other Indians you may find in the Mescalero country, until further orders. All Indian men of that tribe are to be killed whenever and wherever you can find them; the women and children will not be harmed, but you will take them prisoners and feed them at Fort Stanton until you receive other instructions about them. If the Indians send in a flag and desire to treat for peace say to the bearer that when the people of New Mexico were attacked by the Texans, the Mescaleros broke their treaty of peace and murdered innocent people and ran off their stock; that now our hands are untied and that you have been sent to punish them for their treachery and their crimes; that you have no power to make peace; that you are there to kill them wherever you find them; that if they beg for peace their chiefs and 20 of their principal men must come to Santa Fe to have a talk here; but tell them frankly that you will keep after their people and slay them until you receive orders to desist from headquarters; that this making treaties for them to break whenever they have an interest in breaking them will not be done any more; that that time has passed by; that we have no faith in their promises; that we believe if we kill some of their men in fair open war they will be apt to remember that it will be better for them to remain at peace than to be at war. I trust that this severity in the long run, will be the most humane course that could be pursued toward these Indians. . . .

The whole duty can be summed up in a few words; the Indians are to be soundly whipped, without parleys or councils except as above.¹⁴

At the same time orders were issued for two other expeditions against the Mescaleros. A force of two companies from Fort Fillmore under Captain William M. Cleave was to "proceed by the way of Dog Cañon and operate to the eastward and southward of that noted haunt of the Mescaleros" while a

¹⁴ Carleton to Carson, October 12, 1862, O. R., I, XV, 579.

similar force commanded by Captain Roberts was to come up from Franklin, Texas, on the southeast. The two officers were to cooperate with Colonel Carson and yet to be independent of him. They, too, were ordered not to hold any council with the Indians, but to slay the men whenever and wherever they were found.¹⁵

So there began what has been termed a "war of scarcely concealed extermination."¹⁶ The methods employed by the leaders were severely criticized by Carleton's opponents and, in at least one instance, neither he nor Carson appears to have felt that the Indians received fair treatment. In October, 1862, while scouting with his troop, Captain James Graydon had come upon Manuelito, an old Mescalero chief, with a number of his band. Ignoring the Indians' signals for peace and a talk, Graydon fired into them, killing Manuelito, Jose Largo (another chief), nine warriors, and a woman, besides wounding a number of others and carrying off seventeen horses and mules. It developed later that the old chief and his people had been on their way to Santa Fe to beg for peace, and, furthermore, that

¹⁵ Carleton to West, October 11, 1862, O.R., I, XV, 580.

¹⁶ Frederick L. Paxson, The Last American Frontier (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1922), p. 160.

Paul I. Wellman in Death in the Desert (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1935) in comparing the methods used by generals in Union and Confederate armies said, "The North, however, was not so meticulous. Soon after General Carleton took over the command of the Southwest from General E.R.S. Canby, he instituted the very policy (that of extermination suggested by Colonel Baylor) which the South had refused to sanction. There was no disapproval from Washington as there had been from Richmond." P. 85.

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were to cooperate with the other side in the
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General Carleton was nevertheless convinced that application of force was the only way to solve the problem and James Collins, then superintendent of Indian affairs, agreed with him. Agent Labadi was ordered to accompany Colonel Carson on his expedition against the Mescaleros and was instructed to "neither propose nor accept offers of peace until the band shall have been properly punished, in accordance with the orders of General Carleton."¹⁸

While no record of any important engagements is to be found in the official correspondence of the next few months, Edwin L. Sabin, in his Kit Carson Days, describes an encounter which a Captain Van Cleave had in November, 1862. Meeting about one hundred warriors in the gateway pass of Dog Cañon, southwest of Fort Stanton, he "whipped them in a fair

¹⁷ Edwin Legrand Sabin, Kit Carson Days (New York: The Press of the Pioneers, 1935) II, 703-704.

¹⁸ Collins' Report, I. A. R., 1862, p. 238.

There was a certain trader, Charles Beach, who was in some way implicated in the matter, receiving his share of the booty. When the attack was brought to the attention of Garfield, he instructed Carson to make an investigation and if he were not satisfied that the attack had been fair and honest he was to see that all the horses and mules were returned to the survivors of the band. Carson was later arrested. General Garfield was nevertheless convinced that application of force was the only way to secure the provisions and James Collins, then superintendent of Indian affairs, agreed with him. A court martial was ordered to accompany Colonel Carson on his expedition against the bandits and was instructed to "either propose and accept offers of peace until the band shall have been properly punished, or, if necessary, with the orders of General Garfield." While no record of any important engagement is to be found in the official correspondence of the next few months, Edwin A. Sabin, in his Kit Carson Days, describes an encounter with a Captain Van Cleave and in November, 1869, meeting about one hundred warriors in the gateway north of Fort Canon, northwest of Fort Stanton, he "whipped them in a fair

IV. Edwin A. Sabin, Kit Carson Days (New York: The Press of the Knickerbocker, 1908) II, 773-774.
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Collins, Report, I. A. R., 1869, p. 204.

fight and drove them before him."¹⁹ Sabin also tells how a number of Mescalero leaders, "alarmed by the rough methods of this campaign--a campaign in which the only argument on the field was that of arms" hurried to Fort Stanton to surrender to Kit Carson. As the Colonel had no authority to deal with them, he sent them on to Santa Fe under escort and accompanied by their agent. Chief "The Ready," as spokesman for the Indians, begged General Carleton for peace:

You are stronger than we. We have fought you so long as we had rifles and powder; but your weapons are better than ours. . . . we are worn out; we have no more heart; your troops are everywhere. . . . you have driven us from our last and best stronghold, and we have no more heart. Do with us as may seem good to you, but do not forget we are men and braves.²⁰

But the General's only answer was that all the Mescaleros who wanted to keep the peace were to go to the new fort [Fort Sumner] at the Bosque Redondo where they would be cared for and fed. He could promise them no protection if they did not give themselves up as the soldiers had been ordered to hunt all the Indians in the Mescalero country.

"The Ready" and his band were sent by the next wagon train to Fort Sumner, from which post the "repentant" Indians were sent out to bring in the rebellious ones.²¹ The fact that

¹⁹ Sabin, op. cit., p. 704.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 705, quoting speech of Chief Gian-nah-tah to General Carleton, November 23, 1862 as quoted in Dennis Massacres of the Mountains, p. 383.

²¹ Sabin, op. cit., p. 204.

he did not intend to keep the Mescaleros there permanently appears in his letter to Colonel Carson, November 25, 1862. "The result of this will be that, eventually, we shall have the whole tribe at the Bosque Redondo, and then we can conclude a definite treaty, and let them all return again to inhabit their proper country."²² By February 1, 1863, the commander reported to Brigadier-General Lorenzo Thomas:

The Mescalero Apaches have been completely subdued. I have now 350 of that tribe at Fort Sumner and en route thither. They comprise all that are left of these Indians, except a few who have either run off into Mexico or joined the Gila Apaches. I shall try to settle what have come in on a reservation near Fort Stanton and have them plant fields for their subsistence the coming year.²³

The February issue of the Rio Abajo Press, Albuquerque weekly newspaper, quoted Kit Carson as saying that the valleys of the Bonito and Pecos rivers might be cultivated without further danger from Indian attacks. The editor of the paper felt that there was reason to believe that we will have what we have not had for years --perfect peace."²⁴ While "perfect peace" was not to be realized for many more years, it was estimated that by May a hundred families had opened up farms in that region.²⁵

²² Sabin, Op. cit., letter from Carleton to Carson, quoted

²³ Carleton to Thomas, February 1, 1863, O.R., I, XV, 670.

²⁴ Editorial in the Rio Abajo Press (Albuquerque), February 3, 1863.

²⁵ Carleton to Major-General H. W. Halleck, O. R., I, IV, 723.

Although Colonel Carson was relieved of his duties at Fort Stanton the last of February, 1863, there were enough Mescaleros still at large to cause endless trouble. The summary of activities, published by the military department, shows that hardly a week passed without some attack upon the flocks and herds of the citizens, upon supply trains, or upon small bands of travelers. Troops were sent in pursuits, frequently overtaking and recapturing the stolen property and sometimes killing two, three, or even as many as six Apaches. More often, however, the report ends with the statement, "The Indians made their escape."²⁶

Nevertheless, progress was being made at the Bosque Redondo. In his report for 1863, Superintendent Steck stated that "410 Mescaleros in charge of their efficient agent, Lorenzo Labadi, have been induced to quit the war path for the better walk of labor,"²⁷ while the agent, himself, was enthusiastic about the improvement his Indians had made. They had, he said, conducted themselves well; they had displayed both willingness and endurance in helping the soldiers track down Navajo thieves; and they had shown an interest in agriculture, having cultivated two hundred acres. The quartermaster at the post had paid the Indians in money for the fodder they had raised, and with this money they could buy anything they wished.

²⁶ Synopsis of operations in the Department of New Mexico, May 16-December 28, 1863, O.R., XXVI, Pt. I, 23-32.

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Steck's Report, I. A. R., 1863, p. 67.

The great pleasure which they took in this would, the agent felt, encourage them to be better farmers in the future.²⁸

On December 23, 1863, General Carleton reported a "handsome little battle on the open plains" between a handful of cavalry assisted by thirty Mescalero Indians sent out from Fort Sumner and about one hundred thirty Navajos. The regular troops did not arrive in time to take part and "most of the work was done by the Mescaleros." The fight resulted in the killing of twelve Navajos and in recapturing 9,889 sheep as well as a good deal of other property. The gallant conduct of Agent Labadi, who led his Indians, is praised, and the distinguished bravery of two of the Apache chiefs, Cadette and [Ojo] Blanco, receives special mention. The general begged that he might have authority to issue a suit of clothes to each of the thirty Indians who took part in this engagement, declaring that "the government should give them some token of its appreciation of such fidelity and gallantry. They volunteered for the service, and fought without the hope of reward."²⁹

During the year 1864 the Apaches at the reservation continued their good conduct and expeditions against the Navajos. Their agent declared, "The Mescaleros are ever prompt to serve the government, and when thus employed are cheerful and

²⁸ Labadi to Steck, I.A.R., 1863.

²⁹ Carleton to Thomas, December 23, 1863, O. R., I, XXVI, Pt. I, 260.

The most extensive which they took in this month, the agent
will, however, when he is better acquainted in the future.
On December 22, 1883, General Johnston reported a
"small battle" between the "Reds" and the "Whites" on the
of cavalry assisted by thirty mounted Indians and fifty
foot soldiers and about one hundred thirty horses. The result
troops did not arrive in time to take part and "most of the
work was done by the regulars." The fight resulted in the
killing of twelve "Reds" and in the capture of 200 horses and
well as a good deal of other property. The captured property
of some "Reds" who had the Indians, is retained, and the dis-
tinguished property of two of the "Reds" chiefs, retained and
the Indians, received special attention. The general is not
is right have authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus
the "Reds" Indians who had been in this country, retaining
that the government should give them some portion of the spoils
of each tribe and property. They wished to see
the service, and to fight without the loss of reward.
During the year 1883 the Indians at the reservation
considered their good conduct and satisfaction with the service
their agent declared. The reservation are that property, however
the government, and that they employed the military.

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obedient as regular soldiers." But he complained that the land which the Apaches had worked so diligently the year before, the fields which they had been so eager to enlarge, had been turned over to the Navajos who had lately been brought to the Bosque.

In January, 1864, the President of the United States, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Indian affairs and the Secretary of the Interior, ordered that a reserve forty miles square, with Fort Sumner as its center, should be made for the Apache Indians. The military authorities later decided to settle the Navajos there as well, and by June, 1864 had brought in over five thousand of that tribe.³⁰

Agent Labadi protested that the intrusion of so many thousands of Navajos had set his Apaches "in an extraordinary tremor." He continued:

The Navajos . . . never cease to threaten them when they recur to their former difficulties. During the summer many difficulties have arisen between the two tribes--the Apaches in defence of their fields and gardens and the Navajoes in endeavoring to destroy them. The commander of the post made use of every means to prevent these abuses, but without effect. They fought; the Navajoes were confined in the guard house, shots were sometimes fired at them by the guard, but all could not prevent them from stealing from the Apaches. . . . Between the Navajo Indians and the insects they left but little to harvest.³¹

³⁰ Editorial in Santa Fe New Mexican, June 3, 1864.

³¹ Labadi to Steck, I. A. R., 1864, p. 203.

On the 1st of January 1900, the following was received from the

London Convention of the British Association of the Advancement of Science

at the request of the Committee of the Association, the following

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Had the Navajos not been placed on their reservation, Agent Labadi felt that both the Jicarillas and the Mescaleros would have been willing to settle there and in a few years would have become self-supporting.

Meanwhile a determined war was being waged against the Gila Apaches. In 1861, a series of blunders on the part of a young American army officer had turned the hostility of the Gilas into a deadly hatred. Cochise, a chief who "in courage, energy, and intelligence was incomparable as a leader and a strategist" had been unjustly accused of a crime and, in the resulting difficulties, three of his relatives had been executed. The Indian leader had sworn vengeance on the entire white population and "from his impregnable strongholds he dispatched far and wide small bands of picked warriors to plunder wagon trains, stampede cattle and horses, and murder unprotected settlers." It was useless to follow them for with their perfect knowledge of every "trail, canyon, and cave for a hundred miles in every direction" they could easily elude their pursuers. In the summer when the southern military posts were abandoned, Cochise and his followers believed that they had succeeded in driving out the troops and their attacks upon the settlements became even more frequent and violent.³²

Not until January 1863, was General Carleton ready to

³² Lockwood, op. cit., pp. 100-108.

deal with the Gila Apaches. He then planned an expedition which would punish them for their "frequent and recent murders and depredations" and which would also open up the Piño Alto gold mining region. His interest in the gold mines of Arizona was later to become a source of harsh criticism against the general, but at that time his plans were approved. An editorial in the Rio Abajo Press for January 27th, which gave him high praise, ended enthusiastically:

With a military commander who has the welfare of the Territory at heart as General Carleton is daily demonstrating that he has, a more auspicious era has never dawned upon New Mexico than that which commenced in 1863. Although one short year ago war-clouds lowered around us, and our Territory was devastated by hostile neighbors, CIVILIZED and savage, yet the bright star of New Mexico is in the ascendent, and will soon assume its place in the zenith of our national Constellation.³³

The first important victory in the campaign against the Gilas was Captain Edward Shirland's capture of Mangas Coloradas [Red Sleeves]. This chief was described by Captain John C. Cremony, who is said to have known him well, as "the greatest and most talented Apache of the nineteenth century . . . [one who] exercised influence never equalled by any savage of our time."³⁴ In reporting the capture, General Carleton called him "doubtless the worst Indian within our

³³ Editorial in Rio Abajo Press (Albuquerque) Jan. 27, 1863.

³⁴ John C. Cremony, Life Among the Apaches, pp. 176-177, cited by Wellman, op. cit., p. 86.

boundaries, and one who has been the cause of more murders and of more torturing and burning at the stake in this country than all the others together."³⁵ Mangas Coloradas had claimed authority over all his tribe but when he was brought in to Fort McLane and charged with the atrocities committed by members of his band, he protested his innocence and expressed a desire for peace. He was made to understand that he could no longer evade punishment and was warned that if he attempted to escape he would be shot. General West, commanding the post where the chief was held prisoner, reported that between midnight and dawn he tried three times to escape, and on the third attempt was killed by a guard.³⁶ The general commended Captain Shirland and his command "for the determination with which, despite of cold and hunger, they continued to seek the enemy for a much longer time and at greater distance than they went provided for, and the thorough execution of their work when they did finally track the Indians to their rancheria."³⁷ This capture was followed soon afterwards by an attack on Mangas Coloradas' band, in which eleven Indians were killed and one wounded.

³⁵ Carleton to Thomas, February 1, 1863, O. R., I, XV, 670.

³⁶ According to Paul Wellman's version, General West's final instructions to the soldiers guarding the chief were so worded that they were virtual orders to kill. (Death in the Desert, p. 85).

On March 22, 1863, finding that the Apaches had stolen sixty horses from Fort West, which had been established just a month earlier, in the southern Mogollon mountains, Major William McCleave, with one hundred mounted men started in pursuit. After four days' hard riding they came upon the camp of the Gilas, which they surrounded, killing twenty-five Indians and destroying all provisions. The troops rounded up the stolen horses, together with many belonging to the Indians, and started back to Fort West. While passing through a narrow cañon on their return, they were surprised by a large force of Indians who attacked them from the cliffs on both sides. Instantly the soldiers were ascending "the perpendicular walls of the cañon by climbing one over the other. This was done amidst showers of arrows. As soon as they reached the top the Indians fled in every direction."³⁸ The entire campaign lasted fourteen days and was one which, "for alacrity and endurance in pursuit and bravery in attack," Lockwood considers unsurpassed in the history of Apache warfare.³⁹

In June of that same year, a band of Mimbres Indians fell upon a small body of New Mexico Volunteers who were in advance of a train coming across the Jornado del Muerto.⁴⁰

³⁸ Summary of Events, Jan.-May, 1863, O.R., I, XV, 227-31.

³⁹ Lockwood, op. cit., p. 146.

⁴⁰ The Jornado del Muerto (One-Day March of the Dead) was a stretch of eighty desert miles on the old stage route from New Mexico to California.

A Lieutenant Bargie was killed, his body mutilated, and his head carried off as a trophy. As a result of this attack, General West determined that these Indians "must be exterminated to a man" and to this end he established Major McCleave with his command at the Mimbres River, with orders to operate from that point against the Indians in the surrounding mountains and near the headwaters of the Gila.⁴¹ Little success followed this move.

Early in the year, 1864, General Carleton renewed his efforts to subdue the Gilas. Expeditions were ordered to go out from the eight military posts in the Gila Apache country, the troops to remain in the field for two months. He hoped that "the covering of so much ground by detachments of determined men, moving simultaneously from so many different points, must produce a moral effect upon the Indians which it is hoped will convince them of the folly long to hold out against us." But the results were disappointing. There were in all two hundred sixteen Indians killed and many more wounded; a large number of horses, cattle, and sheep recovered, but an even greater number stolen; many acres of crops belonging to the Apaches were destroyed by the troops, but this only served to increase the Indians' hatred of the whites.⁴²

The end of the year found the Gilas still unsubdued. General Carleton had failed in his attempt to conquer and

41 West to Cutler, August 15, 1863, O. R., I, L, Pt. II, 571.

42 Lockwood, op. cit., pp. 153-5.

control them and in January, 1865, the military forces of Arizona were detached from New Mexico and placed under the Department of California. This failure was not due, however, to any lack of energy, perseverance, or bravery on the part of either officers or men. The general's instructions to the commanding officer at Fort Craig are indicative of the spirit shown in the numerous campaigns: "Every man must be a Cossack in going lightly equipped, and a hero when the Indians are come up with."⁴³ But the Americans were defeated by the country itself, which furnished the Apaches with "hiding places too rough and remote for soldier or civilian to attack with success."⁴⁴

Because of constant quarreling with the Navajos, the Mescaleros left the Bosque Redondo in November, 1866, and again became a roaming and hostile tribe. In 1873 a reservation was set off for them at Fort Stanton, where they were kept more or less under control. By 1882 they showed some slight improvement in conduct and since that time have given the government no serious trouble.⁴⁵

Open warfare continued between the Gila Apaches and the government troops until 1870, after which time a number of unsuccessful attempts were made to place them on reservations. Bancroft attributes the disastrous raids of the period from

⁴³ Carleton to C. O., Fort Craig, August 12, 1864, O. R., I, XLI, Pt. II, 674.

⁴⁴ Lockwood, op. cit., p. 157.

⁴⁵ Bancroft, op. cit., p. 744.

1877 to 1882 to the unwise policy of the Indian Department, which was an attempt to force removals "against the wishes of the Indians, in disregard to the promises made, and against the protests of the military authorities." Since 1882 the Gilas, too, have lived in comparative peace,⁴⁶ and at present on all reservations the Apaches are prosperous and industrious.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Bancroft, op. cit., pp. 744-747.

⁴⁷ Lockwood, op. cit., p. 339.

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CHAPTER VII

THE NAVAJO INDIANS

The story of the Navajo Indians has more of glamour, perhaps, than that of any other tribe of the west. Writers have called these Indians the "Lords of the North," the "Bedouins of the southwest", and the "Tartars of America", but to the early American officers they were perfidious, bloodthirsty, and rapacious--the scourge of New Mexico and the hereditary despoilers of the people of the Territory. While Navajos were acknowledged to be hardy and intelligent, successful agriculturalists and skilful manufacturers of various fabrics, such as blankets and baskets, and superior to all other wild tribes, yet they were "no more to be trusted than the wolves that run through the mountains."¹ Numbering some ten thousand² at the time of the Civil War, they ranged over the country from the Rio Grande to the Colorado³ and from the San Juan on the north to the Gila River on the south.⁴ The region they inhabited is exceedingly rugged with high mesas and deep cañons, so difficult of access that it afforded them effective protection against their enemies.⁵ But there

¹ Carleton to Thomas, September 6, 1863, I.A.R., 1863, p. 112.

² Bancroft, op. cit., p. 673. There is seemingly no agreement on the actual number in the tribe, figures varying anywhere from 5 to 20 thousand with writers.

³ Connelley, op. cit., p. 305.

⁴ Bancroft, loc. cit.

⁵ Abel, editor, The Official Correspondence of James S. Calhoun, Washington: G. O. P., 1915, p. 7, Governor Bent to Commissioner Medill, November 10, 1846.

were also fertile valleys in this territory which they cultivated and in 1849, Agent James S. Calhoun wrote to the commissioner in Washington:

Let it be remembered that the Navajos have all the necessities of life--and grow large quantities of corn and wheat, raise immense flocks of sheep and goats, and a great number of fine horses and mules--and rob and murder, and seize captives, because it is a business of life in which they delight.⁶

Secure as they were in their mountain strongholds they made war on other Indian tribes as well as on Mexicans and were hated and feared by all. When the Americans took possession of New Mexico in 1846, the Navajos professed friendship and acknowledged the sovereignty of the United States government, but they soon came "to regard the Americans with old foes, and to regard chronic war with the United States as their normal occupation."⁷

Between the years 1846 and 1861, the Navajos made six treaties with the officials of the government and broke them all before they could be ratified. General Carleton explained this in part by saying that they had no government that could make treaties; they were a patriarchal people and one set of families might enter into agreements which would not be considered at all binding by the others.⁸ Another explanation

⁶ Abel, op. cit., p. 155, Calhoun to Medill, February 28, 1850.

⁷ Bancroft, op. cit., p. 674.

⁸ Carleton to Thomas, I.A.R., 1863, p. 112.

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given is that it was the old men who talked peace and signed treaties while the young men carried on the depredations.⁹

The efforts of the Americans to protect the interests of the people of New Mexico were considerably hindered by the counter raids made by the citizens against the Indians.

The century-old warfare between the Mexicans and Indians was one of raids and counter raids, with both groups stealing stock and capturing prisoners to sell and enslave and being equally to blame for its continuation. General Canby, department commander, wrote to the Assistant Adjutant-General December 1, 1861:

Each successive war^f has reduced the Navajoes in strength and wealth, and has, by reducing them to poverty, added to the strength of the ladrones, or war party. There is no doubt that many of these difficulties, if not caused, have at least been greatly aggravated, by the illegal acts of a portion of the Mexican people, and in some cases have been the direct cause of the difficulties that have immediately followed them. The consequences of these acts have almost invariably fallen upon that portion of the Navajoes known as the peace party and upon those of the inhabitants who have property to lose, while the aggressors profit by the sale of their booty and captives. These acts are not restrained by the moral sense of the community, and so long as these marauders find a ready sale for their plunder and for their captives, it will be impossible to prevent these depredations and the consequent retaliations by the Indians.¹⁰

The commander advocated placing the Navajos on reservations so far removed from the settlements that they would be

⁹ Coolidge, op. cit. p. 15.

¹⁰ Canby to Assistant Adjutant General, December 1, 1861, O. R., I, IV, 77.

entirely isolated from the Mexicans. He felt that this was the only solution of the problem other than that of absolute extermination. James L. Collins, superintendent of Indian affairs at the time, agreed that they should be placed on reservations where they could be kept under control.¹¹ "The virtual license with which he [the Navajo] is now permitted to conduct himself . . . gives him assurance in his own powers, and has a tendency to lessen his respect for the authority of the government."¹²

After the rather ineffectual campaign conducted by General Canby in the winter of 1860-61¹³ no expeditions were made by the government forces for two years. With the exception of two companies of cavalry stationed at Fort Fauntleroy all regular troops were withdrawn from the Indian country for defense against the Confederates.¹⁴

In September 1862, Governor Connelly, declaring that it was the duty of the people to "relieve themselves of the evils they are suffering and administer such chastisement to these marauders [Navajos] as they deserve" ordered the militia to organize, "never to be disbanded until we have secured indemnity for the past and security for the future."¹⁵ But all

¹¹ Canby to Assistant Adjutant General, loc. cit.

¹² Collins' Report, I. A. R., 1861, p. 122.

¹³ See above, Chapter II.

¹⁴ Twitchell, op. cit., p. 320.

¹⁵ Governor's Proclamation, September, 1862, I. A. R., 1862, p. 247.

efforts to promote a general movement by the militia were unsuccessful.¹⁶

The following month some two hundred residents of Bernalillo, Valencia, and Socorro counties petitioned the governor for permission to conduct an independent campaign against the Navajos. The citizens were to furnish their own arms and equipment and to have "for their compensation such spoil as they may take from said Indians." The license was denied on the grounds that such expeditions did not discriminate between the friendly and unfriendly Indians.¹⁷

Superintendent Collins at this time admitted that no civil authority could be exercised over these Indians until "they are thoroughly convinced of the power of the government to enforce its will among them. So long has our leniency been felt by them that they have construed it into weakness and inability to execute threats that have been made against them."¹⁸ The fact that treaty making had become a mere farce was recognized by the press. A report of one of the numerous robberies committed by the Navajos concluded sarcastically: "The object of the Indians is, doubtless, to induce our authorities to concede them the amusement of making a treaty, with the usual accompaniments of red cloth, domestic, tobacco, etc."¹⁹

¹⁶ Bancroft, op. cit., p. 678.

¹⁷ H.S. Johnson to Gov. Connelly, October 23, 1862, I. A. R., 1862, 249.

¹⁸ Collins' Report, I. A. R., 1862, p. 240.

¹⁹ Rio Abajo Press, March 3, 1863.

To the great surprise of certain Navajo chiefs, eighteen of whom had come to Santa Fe, in the winter of 1862-63, to talk "permanent peace," General Carleton refused to consider another treaty. If they really wanted peace and protection, he told them, they could go to the Bosque Redondo and, furthermore, unless they gave some "binding guarantees" that there would be no future depredations, the whole tribe would be severely punished.²⁰

The Navajos, of course, paid no attention to such threats but continued their murders and robberies. With the limited resources at hand the commander felt it unwise to attempt campaigns against more than one tribe at a time,²¹ but by June he believed that the Apaches were sufficiently under control for him to begin operations against the Navajo. Accordingly he ordered Kit Carson to

proceed without delay to a point in the Navajo country known as Pueblo Colorado, and there establish a defensible depot for his supplies and hospital, and thence to prosecute a vigorous war upon the men of this tribe until it is considered, at these headquarters, that they have been effectually punished for their long-continued atrocities.²²

A large military force was to have accompanied Colonel Carson, but chiefly because of continued trouble with the Mescaleros, only four companies were in the first detachment which left Los Lunas on July 7th. Going by way of Fort

²⁰ Twitchell, op. cit., footnote pp. 430-431; Sabin, op. cit., pp. 788-9.

²¹ Carleton to Thomas, Feb., 1, 1863, O.R., I, XV, 670.

²² Sabin, op. cit., quoting General Orders (No. 15) June 15, 1863, 709.

Wingate and Fort Defiance they picked up supplies and did some fair scouting en route. It was on this march that the Ute warriors won such high praise from Colonel Carson for their valuable services in ferriting out straggling parties of Navajos.²³ On July 23rd, about twenty miles slightly southwest of Fort Defiance, camp was established on the site which had been selected for the new post, to be known as Fort Canby.²⁴ At this point the colonel was joined by Captain Asa B. Carey, a young West Pointer who was to be of great assistance to him, and by Captain Albert Pfeiffer, whose intense hatred of the Indians caused by the recent brutal murder of his wife by the Apaches, made him perhaps the most relentless and merciless of the American officers in the command.²⁵

Operations were begun at once, which resulted in killing a few Navajos, capturing a number of women and children, and destroying several hundred acres of grain, one field, the colonel declared, containing a hundred acres of as fine corn as he had ever seen. After examining the country in the neighborhood of Cañon de Chelley with particular care, he expressed the belief that there were few Indians, and those "of the very poorest," in the cañon. As they seemed to have

²³ Carson to Carleton, July 24, 1863, O. R., I, XXVI, Pt. I, 233. For activities of Utes see above Chapter V.

²⁴ Sabin, op. cit., p. 713.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 709-11.

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no livestock and were entirely dependent upon the corn which his soldiers had destroyed, Colonel Carson felt that they would be obliged either to accept General Carleton's terms or to flee south to the Red River where there were wealthy members of the tribe living. On the 24th of August he encamped at a place where his guide told him General Canby had spent several days in 1860, at which time the Indians had been "very numerous and bold, coming in sight of the troops in large numbers on the high mesas to the left of the route." Now, however, there was not one to be seen and from all appearances there had been none in the vicinity for a long time. In October Colonel Carson admitted that little positive injury had been inflicted on the Navajos, but felt the hardships and fatigue undergone were compensated for by their having learned where the Indians had fled with their stock and having gained an accurate knowledge of the country.²⁶

From Fort Wingate, for expeditions were also being made from posts other than Fort Canby, reports were not particularly encouraging. Troops in pursuit of the Navajos often reached their camping places to find that the Indians had escaped, or perhaps they would even get close enough to see the savages, only to have them mount and ride away before the soldiers were within gunshot. The total results of a two weeks scout were: killed, 6 men and 2 women; captured, 14 Indians, large and

²⁶ Carson's reports, August 31 and October 5, 1863, O. R., I, XXVI, Pt. I, 250-254.

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small, (with one Mexican captive rescued), and 1500 head of sheep and goats, and 17 head of horses, mules, burros, and colts.²⁷

At Fort Sumner, the troops were being reenforced by the Mescalero Apaches, who fought against their old enemies with alacrity and gallantry,²⁸ and from the other posts "a glad muster of suddenly valiant Utes, Pueblos, Apaches and Mexican citizens took to the trail of reprisal in blood and booty."²⁹

The whole campaign was described many years later by Captain Carey as

. . . one of constant hard scouting with now and then a skirmish; the idea being to wear the Indians out by capture of their herds of sheep and ponies (they had no other live stock), the destruction of their fields of corn, beans, pumpkins, etc.; the covering by occupancy by small detachments of troops, of all water supply which in the end should result in acceptance by them of General Carleton's terms.³⁰

And it accomplished its purpose. During the first week in September, 1863, fifty-one Navajos were sent to the Bosque Redondo. At this time General Carleton wrote to General Thomas that it was his purpose to send all captive Navajos as well as Apaches to the reservation on the Pecos where they would be fed and cared for until they would be able to support

²⁷ Captain Rafael Chacon's report, September, 1863, O. R., I, XXVI, Pt. I, 257-259.

²⁸ See above, Chapter VI.

²⁹ Sabin, op. cit., p. 714.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 711, quoting letter of General Asa R. Carey, written in 1909.

themselves. He recommended that the war be relentlessly prosecuted until all the Indians had moved to the reservation, there to become agricultural people and cease to be nomads.³¹ To Colonel Carson, the commander wrote:

You are right in believing that I do not wish to have those destroyed who are willing to come in. . . Say to them "Go to the Bosque Redondo, or we will pursue and destroy you. We will not make peace on any other terms. You have deceived us too often, and robbed and murdered our people too long, to trust you again at large in your own country. This war shall be pursued against you if it takes years, now that we have begun, until you cease to exist or move. There can be no other talk on the subject." As winter approaches you will have better luck.³²

General Carleton had learned that the winter was the best time to fight Indians, for in the snow the trails were not so easily lost and in the severe cold the Indians were more ready to accept the white man's terms, which included food and clothing. And it was in January, 1864, during bitterly cold weather that the most spectacular achievement of the campaign was made--the capture of Cañon de Chelly, the "great fortress of the tribe since time out of mind."³³

On January 6th, Colonel Carson left Fort Canby with 14 officers and 375 enlisted men. The snow was so deep in the mountains that the men were three days in making the trip to Pueblo Colorado, a distance which usually required

³¹ Carleton to Thomas, September 6, 1863, I.A.R., 1863, p. 112.

³² Carleton to Carson, September 19, 1863, O. R., I, XXVI, Pt. I, 727-8.

³³ Carleton to Thomas, O. R., I, XXXIV, Pt. I, 71.

but one day. There he was joined by an ox train carrying supplies. At the end of five days only twenty-five miles had been covered and twenty-seven oxen had died. After lightening the loads, leaving behind ten days' supplies under guard of twenty-five men, Colonel Carson pushed on to the west opening of Cañon de Chelley. On the 13th two commands were sent out to explore the north and south rims before any attempt should be made to enter the cañon. The colonel, who accompanied Captain Carey's scouts along the north side, was by this time becoming very anxious about the safety of Captain Pfeiffer. With his company the captain had left Fort Canby on the 6th with orders to proceed to the east opening of the canon. Carson had planned first to see that all exits were effectively guarded and then to attack simultaneously from the east and west ends of the cañon, thus trapping all the Indians. To his great surprise he found, when he returned to the main camp on the 14th, that Captain Pfeiffer, without waiting for the support of the other troops, had "accomplished a feat never before accomplished in war time--that of passing through the Cañon de Chelle from east to west, and this without having had a single casualty."³⁴

Captain Pfeiffer reported that the march from Fort Canby had been "somewhat impeded" by the snow, which in some places reached a depth of eighteen inches, causing him to

³⁴ Carson's Report, January 23, 1864, O. R., I, XXXIV, Pt. I, 73.

lose the trail several times, and by the cold which had been so severe that two of his men had frozen their feet. They had reached the east entrance on the 11th, one of the sergeants having already brought in eight half-starving Navajo women and children. For the advance into the cañon the command was divided into three parties, the first, a guard of 15 men with picks and shovels to clear the way. For the first twelve miles, as the cañon was very narrow with almost perpendicular sides, they had to travel on the bed of a frozen stream, causing the rear guard a great deal of difficulty with the animals which were continually breaking through the ice. They captured four more prisoners that day, all nearly famished and naked.

As they moved forward the next day, Indians ran along the rocky ledge on both sides, "whooping, yelling and cursing, firing shots and throwing stones." The Americans killed two men and "one squaw, who obstinately persisted in hurling rocks and pieces of wood at the soldiers." So fighting his way along, the Captain came to a point where the precipices were about 1200 or 1500 feet high. At some places the cañon spread out "like a beautiful savanna," where the corn fields were "laid out with farmer-like taste and supplied with acequias for irrigation." Farther on the high projecting rocks and caverns afforded excellent hiding places for the savages and, said Captain Pfeiffer:

lose the trail seaward. In a few minutes the party
had reached the edge of the ice. The men
agreed having already decided that the
women and children. The command was divided into
of 15 men with picks and shovels. The first
first twelve miles, and the rest of the party
perpendicular ridge. They had to travel in a
frozen stream, causing the party to travel in a
only with the animals. They had to travel in a
through the ice. They carried their loads on sleds
all heavily laden with supplies.
As they moved forward, the party found that the
the rocky ledge on both sides. The party found that
flying birds and the wind blowing. The party found
men and "one square, who had been in the party
rocks and pieces of wood. The party found that
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were about 1200 or 1500 feet high. The party
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several and, said Captain.

. . . here they were enabled to jump about on the ledge. . . like mountain cats, hallooing at me, swearing and cursing and threatening vengeance on my command in every variety of Spanish they were capable of mastering. A couple of shots from my soldiers with their trusty rifles caused the red-skins to disperse instantly, and gave me a safe passage through the celebrated Gibraltar of Navajodom. At the place where I encamped the curl of the smoke from my fire ascended to where a large body of Indians were resting over my head, but the height was so great that the Indians did not look larger than crows . .

On the 13th, the company completed the remaining eight miles and appeared at the main camp with nineteen captive.³⁵ Although Colonel Carson expressed his "great satisfaction as well as surprise, Captain Pfeiffer had exceeded his authority in going through the cañon without orders and so received no official recognition of his accomplishment.

It was decided to make a return trip from the west to the east entrance in order to destroy the peach orchards, which Captain Pfeiffer had seen but been unable to reach, and to acquire additional information about the cañon. Captain Carey, at his own request, was put in charge of the detachment. Reaching the point where the cañon divides he chose the south branch, which he later learned was the main one, instead of the north which had been followed by the first command. As he advanced a number of Indians signalled from the cliffs above that they would like to come to him. He agreed and, according to his estimate, when he had made camp about 150 full grown Indians, besides many children, came in to talk


³⁵ Pfeiffer's Report, January 20, 1864, O. R., I, XXXIV, Pt. I, 76-78.

Through his Navajo interpreter, the captain "informed them of the humane intentions of the department commander concerning them, and that a full and complete submission to his wishes was required, and that under no other circumstances would they be treated with, except as enemies to be fought." The Indians declared they were ready to surrender and would go anywhere the American officer wished to take them but before accompanying him they wanted to return to their homes in the mountains to bring in their families. Captain Carey consented to this but warned them that they must report to Fort Canby within ten days. The following day the Americans resumed their march, recording such observations as they could, and making sketches as they went along. By the time they reached headquarters 105 Navajos had joined them, and others continued to arrive at the camp in groups of from three to ten.³⁶

The purpose of the expedition had been achieved. While only 23 Indians had been killed, 200 had surrendered voluntarily and the Cañon de Chelley had "ceased to be a mystery."³⁷ What was of even greater importance was the fact that the spirit of the Navajos had been broken. Their great stronghold had been invaded and their fields and orchards were ruined; they had nothing left. Moreover, they soon learned that the

³⁶ Carey's Report, January 21, 1864, O. R., I, XXXIV, Pt. 78-80.

³⁷ Carson to Cutler, January 23, 1864, O. R., I, XXXIV, Pt. I, 74.



Indians who gave themselves up were treated kindly, that the desire of the government was "not to destroy, but to save them."³⁸

So it was that they began to surrender in large numbers. By the middle of February there were 1150 Navajos at Fort Canby waiting to be sent to the reservation. A letter from the post described them as being:

hungry, tired, and weary. They seem thoroughly crushed, and are anxious to get to the Bosque which they now seem to regard as their resting place. The kind manner in which they have been treated after their terrible chastisement seems to have had a fine effect. . . . We may safely predict that before mid-summer the Navajo country will be uninhabited. . . .³⁹

On March 6, 1864, Captain John Thompson left Fort Canby to escort the Indians on that long slow march across the plains which is still referred to by the Navajos as the "Big Walk,"⁴⁰ He had in his charge 2400 Indians, 400 horses, and 3000 sheep and goats. With him was a train of thirty wagons and "the cavalcade and pedestrians combined form[ed] a spectacle seldom seen anywhere outside of the savage domain."⁴¹

By this time the Santa Fe Gazette had begun to predict an early peace and the governor had even set aside a day of thanksgiving, proclaiming:

³⁸ Carson to Cutler, loc. cit.

³⁹ Letter in Rio Abajo Press, February 23, 1864.

⁴⁰ Coolidge, op. cit., p. 26.

⁴¹ Letter in Rio Abajo Press, March 22, 1864.

Those great scourges of the Territory, the Mescalero and Navajo tribes of Indians have been completely subdued and now lie disarmed and incapable of further mischief at the feet of our government."⁴²

But on April 10th, Kit Carson who was then in charge of affairs at the reservation, reported that while there were 8000 Navajos there or on their way, he believed that at least half the tribe were still at large.⁴³ Among the chiefs who stubbornly refused to come in was Manuelito whose influence extended over a large number of Indians. It was said that he had been on the point of surrendering when he was told by the Zufis that at the Bosque they would be made slaves. On hearing this Manuelito took some three or four hundred of his people as far west as the Colorado Chico and refused to leave even when the officers threatened to send the Utes against him.⁴⁴

The great experiment of civilizing the Navajo had begun, however, when the first group was sent to the Bosque Redondo. How he proposed to accomplish this General Carleton had explained to General Thomas in September, 1863:

⁴² Governor's Proclamation quoted from Gazette in the Santa Fe New Mexican, September 2, 1864.

⁴³ Sabin, op. cit., p. 724.

⁴⁴ Cutler to Eaton, August 1, 1864, O. R., I, XLI, Pt. II, 325.

It was not until September, 1866 that Manuelito surrendered and then he was forced to do so, not because of inability longer to elude the American troops, but because starvation threatened them all. Reeve, op. cit., p. 254.

To collect them together, little by little, onto a reservation, away from the haunts, and hills, and hiding places of their country; there be kind to them; there teach their children how to read and write; teach them the arts of peace; teach them the truths of Christianity. Soon they will acquire new habits, new ideas, and new modes of life; and the old Indians will die off and carry with them all latent longings for murdering and robbing. The young ones will take their places without these longings and thus little by little, they will become a happy and contented people; and Navajo wars will be remembered as something that belongs entirely to the past.⁴⁵

Although admirable in theory the plan was to meet bitter opposition from the start and in the end to prove unsuccessful. Superintendent Collins, who had supported General Carleton, had been removed from office in May, 1863, to be replaced by Dr. Michael Steck who refused to lend his assistance to the project in any way. He contended that it was a mistake to place the Navajos at the Bosque Redondo not only because there was not enough arable land to support both them and the Apaches, but because it would be difficult to manage two such powerful tribes on the same reservation. He agreed that the reservation system was the only wise way to deal with the wild tribes but he argued that they should be located in their own country.⁴⁶

Many of the citizens also strongly opposed the plan, believing that some of the best grazing lands of the territory were being turned over to the Indians. The Santa Fe New Mexican was particularly bitter in its attacks, accusing

⁴⁵ Carleton to Thomas, September 6, 1863, I.A.R., 1863, p. 112.

⁴⁶ Steck to Dole, December 10, 1863, I.A.R., 1864, p. 207.

General Carleton of jeopardizing the interest of the citizens to benefit the "lazy, thieving Indian."⁴⁷ The editor protested against New Mexico's being made a "Botany Bay for law-braving Indians, and the heart of the Territory appropriated to such a purpose."⁴⁸

Both the former superintendent, James L. Collins, and the governor gave General Carleton generous support. The controversy became largely a political one, the fight being carried on by the opposition in the columns of the New Mexican and by the defense in the Gazette, with both newspapers making extravagant claims and unreasonable charges.

Superintendent Steck went farther in his opposition, however, than merely sending unfavorable reports to Washington. He refused to issue food to the Navajos on the grounds that "as prisoners of war they belonged properly to the military department and should be held by them until hostilities ceased with the tribe."⁴⁹ To meet one emergency the troops were put on half rations until the temporary food shortage was over.⁵⁰ Dr. Steck also persisted in issuing licenses to traders in the Indian country and in talking peace with the Indians who had not surrendered, in spite of the fact that the general

⁴⁷ Editorial, New Mexican, September 2, 1864.

⁴⁸ Ibid., December 23, 1864.

⁴⁹ Steck to Dole, January 25, 1864. I.A.R., 1864, p. 211.

⁵⁰ Reeve, op. cit., p. 260.

had asked that all negotiations be conducted through the military.⁵¹

The appeals which were made to the Secretary of the Interior by both the military and Indian departments were so conflicting that in 1865 a special investigation was made. Instead of settling the question definitely, however, Congress decided to accept General Carleton's plan temporarily.⁵²

In the meantime even more serious difficulties were being confronted at the reservation itself. Crops were repeatedly destroyed by the army worm, by hail and by drought; many Indians died from diseases contracted from the white men; and large numbers of them deserted from sheer homesickness.⁵³ But the Navajos were troubled most of all by the fact that they were "living away from their sacred mountains. They felt they were dying off because of this, and believe that the whole tribe would have died if they had not been allowed to return to their country."⁵⁴

⁵¹ Carson to Carleton, December 16, 1864, O. R., I, XLI, Pt. I, 943. Carleton to Steck, March 16, 1865, O. R., I, XLVIII, Pt. I, 1195.

⁵² Commissioner D. N. Cooley to Hon. James Harlan, I. A. R., 1865, p. 21.

⁵³ Sabin, op. cit., p. 727.

⁵⁴ Hester Jones, "Report on Historical Investigation at Crown Point," (unpublished manuscript, University of New Mexico, 1932).

After fighting for four years against such odds, the government decided to send them back to their old territory and a reservation of 5,200 square miles was set aside for them in northwestern New Mexico, where they have since lived in comparative peace.⁵⁵

"The Bosque Redondo," says Bancroft, "as a means of civilizing the Indians. . . proved a total failure." Nevertheless he believed that

As a military measure, to gain complete control of the Navajos, to show them the power of the government, to make them appreciate the value of their old home, to prepare the way for a treaty, and to teach the Indians their true interest in keeping the treaty, General Carleton's policy of removal, as compared with any other likely to have been adopted at that time, must be considered a wise one.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Bancroft, op. cit., p. 732.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 731.


CONCLUSION

The Indians of New Mexico were participants in the Civil War only in a limited sense. No treaty alliances were made with them and no Indian troops were organized for service in either army. Yet their good-will was sought by both Union and Confederate leaders, and the Pueblos, Utes, and Jicarilla Apaches did lend some small assistance to the North. On the whole, however, their interest in and influence upon the outcome of the struggle was negligible.

The War, nevertheless, affected their relations with the United States government. During the Confederate Invasion all regular troops were withdrawn from the Indian country and all of the agencies were closed in the southern part of the Territory, with the consequent loss of all contact between government and Indians. Later in the years 1862-1865, the strong hand and firm conviction of General Carleton brought about the adoption of the first definite policy toward the hostile tribes.

But the problem of the Indians was by no means solved at the close of the War. There were to be many more years of conflict between the American troops and the savage, many more experiments tried and discarded before peace was attained.

The blame for the continued warfare was attributed to various factors: the harsh measures of the military, the bungling methods of the agents, and the unscrupulous dealings of the politicians. That the responsibility did not rest alone



in these conditions, Secretary Stanton recognized in 1864. When Bishop Whipple went to Washington to protest against the treatment of the Indians, the Secretary said, ". . . the Government never reforms an evil until the people demand it. Tell him that when he reaches the heart of the American people, the Indians will be saved.'

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