

Spring 5-28-1963

The Role of the Contested Delegations at the 1952 Republican Convention

Raymond C. Cowan Jr.

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
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
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EXERCISE

COTTON CONTENT

THE ROLE OF THE CONTESTED SOUTHERN DELEGATIONS
AT THE 1952 REPUBLICAN CONVENTION

by

Raymond G. Cowan, Jr.

A Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Government

The University of New Mexico

1963

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AT THE BAR



IN THE YEAR 1884

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
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
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
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
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INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

The national convention of an American political party is power politics of the first order. Finley Peter Dunne's character, Mr. Dooley, has said, "Politics ain't beanbag". Politics is never beanbag, even on the local level. In national conventions, careers are smashed, hopes and dreams are dashed, kings are made and broken, plots and plans are devised and executed, success and failure permeate the proceedings. In addition to the effect on men, the party is forced to make decisions that affect the future of the party as well as the nation.

The presidential nominating process provides a quadrennial test of party organization from the precinct to the national committee. Factional conflicts occur at every level. Sometimes these conflicts involve national issues; often they involve national candidates; always they involve the power relationship of party operators, local, state and national. The national convention provides the clearest view of the nature of a political party and the relationship between its various elements. It seems that the party's entire past is reflected and its future revealed in the proceedings.

The Republican Party suffers from a deep split among its members. This division goes much deeper than the dissensions between the East and Midwest, big business and small business, suburb and rural. In the decade between 1858 and 1868, the business groups acquired the position of ascendancy, and the progressive-minded

politicians were left to seek such influence and rewards as were possible.

The basic nature of this early division is revealed by its persistence. While at times the split is healed on the surface, it has remained a fact of life with which the Republican Party must contend. In the 1880's it was the Stalwarts against the Half-Breeds; in the 1900's Regulars against the Progressives; today it is the Old Guard against the Modern Republicans. This split is only partly explained in terms of section, class and economic interest. At the bottom it is ideological. Clinton Rossiter calls this a split between "the sophisticated conservatism of corporation executives and the traditional conservatism of small-town leaders."¹ James MacGregor Burns refers to it as between the Congressional wing and the Presidential wing -- a division maintained by the different constituencies of Congressmen and the President.²

In its present form the Republican discord emerged for the first time at the Philadelphia convention of 1940. The candidacy of Wendell Willkie, who had once been a delegate to a Democratic national convention, turned two vague tendencies "into two proud camps."³ Willkie promised to be a better, cleaner and more efficient New Dealer than Franklin Roosevelt. This group became known as the

¹Clinton Rossiter, Parties and Politics in America (Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 143.

²James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Four Party Politics in America (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 192.

³Rossiter, 144.

politicians were left with influence and power as well
possible.

The main impact of this party system is revealed by the
paradoxical. While at first the party is based on the number, it
has remained a fact of life with the Republican Party since
1860. In the 1860's it was the Democrats against the Whigs;
in the 1880's against the Progressives; today it is the
Germans against the Latin Americans. This split is only partly
explained in terms of nation, class and economic interests. In the
past it is ideological. Election politics exists with a split between
"the established conservatism of middle-class America and the
traditional conservatism of middle-class America." The
Democrats are at the bottom of the Congressional wing and the
Republicans at the top. A division is reflected by the different
of Congress and the President.

In the present time the Democrats elected changed but the
first time to the United States Government of 1860. The
Republicans, who had been a minority in a two-party system
convention, elected two major Republicans "this was a great
victory" and it was a victory, and more efficient than
before than before. This was a great victory.

¹ "The American Party, 1860-1864" by James M. Smith, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 117.
² "The American Party, 1860-1864" by James M. Smith, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 117.
³ "The American Party, 1860-1864" by James M. Smith, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 117.

Eastern or International wing of the party. Basically international and business minded, it was the more progressive element. Willkie's opponent for the nomination, Robert A. Taft, promised to roll history back at least a few years, to reject much of the New Deal. This Midwestern or Old Guard group was conservative and colored with nationalism and even isolationism. The contest between these two groups pointed up the basic conflict within the Republican Party.

The split continued through the 1944 and 1948 conventions. The liberal wing of the party accepted the United Nations, the Truman Doctrine and NATO. Each time the progressive wing won the nomination and lost the election. Each time the conservative wing continued to wield its influence on party philosophy and politics from the Congress where it was able to maintain itself.

After Willkie's defeat followed by that of Dewey in 1944 and 1948, the Taft wing became even more determined to rescue the party from the "Easterners". Taft himself believed that the defeats were caused by the acceptance of the New Deal ideology. To him, victory could come only if the Republicans returned to "orthodox" Republicanism. As Taft viewed it, the campaigns of Willkie and Dewey had failed to provide a meaningful choice so the conservative supporters stayed home.

In 1952, the convention contest was between Taft, the conservative and Dwight D. Eisenhower, backed by the moderates. The apparent issue had been the technical one of delegates' credentials, but the real issue was who should speak for the Republican Party: the regulars who worked for the national party round-the-clock and round-the-year in lean times and good, or local politicians who

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

moved in on the party opportunistically when prospects looked bright? As it had in 1912, controversy centered in the South. Then the William H. Taft-controlled convention had re-nominated the President and had sent the future Bull Moosers out of the convention shouting, "steam roller" and "naked theft".

The 1952 contest between Taft and Eisenhower presumed the victor would have a strong voice in determining the policies and politics of the party. Though neither could establish the direction of the party alone, the outcome of the contest would determine the course of Republican policy.

The delegates to the 1952 Republican convention were in four categories: (1) those committed to Eisenhower, (2) those committed to Taft, (3) those committed to neither candidate, (4) those whose credentials were contested.

The study here is concerned with the last category of delegates--especially the contested Southern delegates. The basic question is to evaluate the role of contested Southern delegations. No attempt will be made to study the kaleidoscope of convention activities. Instead it will focus only on the contested delegations and the relation of the candidates to that contest.

Chronologically, the study will examine the nature of the candidacy of both Taft and Eisenhower and the strengths and weaknesses of each. The purpose here is to point up the aspects of each candidate that relates to the seating contests.

Next, it is necessary to examine the nature of the Republican Party in the South and to examine the ingredients that make the conflict possible. Each of the contests will be examined at the

state level to show the details of the contest and the relation of the candidates to the contest.

The effect of the contest on the pre-convention campaigning and the use of the contests as an issue will be examined. The effect questioned here is how the contests were utilized by the candidates and what influence the contests had on other delegates.

Finally, this study will examine the convention itself. Here we are concerned with all of the ramifications of the contests-- their use as an issue, the relation with the candidates, and the strategy of the candidates in using the seating contests as a stepping stone to the nomination.

The summary will attempt to evaluate the influence of the seating contest on the final nomination. In addition, an attempt will be made to show how this influence was affected and why it was possible.

An examination of the contested Southern delegations will provide some information concerning why Eisenhower won and why Taft lost the nomination. It will also provide some information on the nature of the Republican Party in the South and provide some basis for determining the role the South has in the future of the Republican Party.

A further value of this study is to provide partial insight into the Republican Party as it existed in 1952. At the convention the two major divisions of the party were deadlocked and the final decision was influenced by the party's most ineffective component-- the Southern wing of the party. A study of this kind may also lead to further questions as to the future development of the Republican

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Party. Was Richard Nixon's easy nomination in 1960, for example, an indication of healing the Republican split or only an example of Nixon's political brilliance that made him satisfactory to both elements? Or does his subsequent defeat in the general election indicate that the breach still exists and that he was wholly satisfactory to none of the major elements?

The most interesting questions of all, has the one-party South been broken by the insurgent movement, and what is the future of the Republican Party in the South? are left unanswered. However, some background information on the subject is provided. The value of any study lies not only with the questions that are answered, but with the new questions it poses and in the information that the study provides for answering or examining future questions.

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CHAPTER I

THE NATIONAL SCENE

Taft's Candidacy

On October 16, 1951, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio threw his hat in the presidential ring for the third time. He had first been a serious candidate¹ in 1940 when he lost the nomination to Wendell Willkie. In 1944, he had stepped aside so that his senatorial colleague from Ohio, John Bricker, could run. In 1948, Taft made his most serious bid for the nomination before being defeated by Thomas E. Dewey, governor of New York. Now in 1952, he would have his last chance at the nomination.

In the fall of 1951, Taft's chances looked good. Dewey, twice defeated in presidential elections, was out of the running. In addition, the Dewey-led-Eastern-wing of the Republican Party had yet to decide on a willing candidate. Earl Warren of California looked like a possible contender, primarily because of the large California delegation. Other possibilities of the "dark horse" class included Everett Dirksen of Illinois, Harold Stassen of Minnesota and General Douglas MacArthur.

Taft was the first to announce as an avowed candidate. His

¹Taft was the Ohio Republican delegation's pre-convention favorite son candidate in 1936, for one purpose of holding the uncommitted Ohio delegation together.

announcement was, in fact, a statement of his over-all strategy. He said, in part,

. . . I have taken this action because I am convinced that a majority of the Republicans in those states and throughout the nation really desire me to be the candidate for the party. That majority is especially pronounced among those most interested in the Republican Party and most determined to restore Republican principles of liberty, integrity and sound judgement to the councils of the nation

I am going to run because I believe I can conduct the only kind of campaign which will elect a Republican to office.

I believe we can extend to the entire nation the methods which we used in Ohio--a forthright presentation of our case to the people of the country⁵

Taft was attacking, in effect, the campaigns of Willkie and Dewey as "me-too" on the New Deal and calling for a return to true Republican principles. In addition he began to counter his old nemises; the "can't win" charge. He asked the voters to look at his victory in Ohio's 1950 senatorial contest as proof of his prowess as a vote getter.⁶

This announcement urged Republicans to reject the "me-tooism" of Willkie and Dewey and accept the leadership of Taft. He argued: There have been enough of the "me-too" campaigns. Now, Republicans should turn to "Mr. Republican", "Mr. Integrity". The Republicans need a "gut" candidate--not someone like Dewey in 1948. Don't believe it when they say, Taft can't win--look what I did in Ohio.

Thus Taft established the tone of his campaign. He would run as a "true" Republican and a fighter for the Republican principles.

⁵New York Times, October 17, 1951, p. 1.

⁶In 1950, Taft had defeated J. T. Ferguson by a 431,000 vote margin in the Ohio senatorial contest.

EXHIBIT

announced that, in fact, a statement of his own-all strategy. He said, in part,

I have taken this action because I am convinced that majority of the Republicans in this State and throughout the nation really believe as to the candidate in the party. That is, as a result of my own study and investigation, I believe in the Republican Party and want to contribute to the success of the principles of liberty, integrity and sound judgment in the conduct of the nation. I am going to run because I believe I can become the only kind of a candidate who will elect a Republican to office. I believe we can stand on the right side of the issues which so much of the country is fighting for. In case of the people of the country.

That was striking, in effect, the campaign of "Liberty and Dewey as 'action' on the New Deal and calling for a return to the Republican platform. In addition he began to conduct the campaign; the "anti" slogan. He asked the people to look at his victory in Ohio's 1950 senatorial contest as proof of his promise as a vote getter.

This announcement urged Republicans to reject the "un-American" of Ellsberg and Dewey and support the leadership of Taft. He stated there have been enough of the "action" campaign. Now, Republicans should turn to "Mr. Republicanism", "Mr. Integrity". The Republicans used a "gilt" candidate--and someone like Dewey in 1950. Don't let leave it when they say, "Let's see" what's what I did in Ohio. That Taft established the basis of his campaign. He would run as a "strong" Republican and a champion for the Republican platform.

New York Times, October 15, 1951, p. 1.

In 1950, Taft had received 4.7% of the vote in the vote margin in the senatorial contest.

Taft's Strength

Taft entered the campaign for the Republican presidential nomination as the leading member of the Republican Party. He was Mr. Republican. He, who believed it was the duty of the opposition party to oppose, had led the Republican Congressional delegation in opposing the Fair Deal policies of Democratic President Harry S. Truman. As leader of the Congressional delegation, Taft had been, in fact, the leader of the Republican Party.⁷

Taft's main source of strength was with the party regulars. His strength was not in converts but in the faithful. Taft was an organization man who understood the value of political rewards to the party regulars and to a strong party organization.⁸ As he traveled about making speeches, he made a point of meeting with county chairmen and precinct workers and "talking shop", explaining how he won in Ohio. One party worker remarked, "If Taft were elected, I would know everybody in his cabinet. But who in the hell would I know if it were Ike?"⁹

A second facet of the same appeal was that Taft was a party regular who had earned his spurs in party battles and was not an interloper. He had led the Republican opposition to the New Deal-

⁷The leadership of the party out of power is usually assumed by the Congressional delegation. This is especially true when the out party controls the legislature but not the presidency.

⁸Paul T. David, Malcolm Moos, Ralph M. Goldman, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952. Vol. III. The National Story (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1954), pp. 47-48.

⁹"Taft or Eisenhower", Life, Vol. 31. (August 6, 1951), 42.

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Fair Deal actions of the Democrats. His status as party leader was earned.

Because of Taft's strength with the regular party workers and officials, Taft had gained control of the Republican National Committee. In 1949, Hugh Scott, a Dewey supporter, resigned as National Committee Chairman and was replaced by Guy Gabrielson, a Taft man. The extent of Taft's control is indicated by the convention officials selected by the national committee: General Douglas MacArthur, keynoter; William Halleahan, temporary chairman; Joe Martin, permanent chairman.¹⁰ All of these were Taft supporters.

Taft also drew strength from his position as Senate Republican leader. The Congressional Republicans strongly supported him. A poll of the House of Representatives, taken by Representative Walter Norblad of Oregon in February of 1952, showed 81 of the responding 144 supported Taft, while 37 supported Eisenhower.¹¹ This support is further reflected in the list of speakers for the National Convention. It contained 2 of the 25 Republican governors.¹²

In his denunciation of the campaigns of Willkie and Dewey Taft pointed out that these had failed, because they did not give the conservative voter a meaningful choice. He believed the failure of Dewey in 1948 indicated the need for a hard-hitting campaign against the Democrats; and that only he, Taft, could lead that type

¹⁰"The Eye of the Nation", Time, Vol. 40 (July 14, 1952), 23-24.

¹¹As quoted in Paul T. David, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952: The National Story, Vol. 1, p. 48.

¹²Time, Vol. 40 (July 14, 1952), 23-24.

of campaign.¹³ It was Taft who had led the Republican Congress in the development of the issues that would permit the Republicans to make a fight in 1952: "Corruption, Communism and Cronyism."¹⁴

A further factor in Taft's strength was his experience. He had been in the Congress since 1936 and during the lean years for Republicans had risen rapidly to the role of leader of the Republican Party in the Senate. While some doubted his administrative ability, his legislative ability was unquestioned.¹⁵

His personality and public image were basic to Taft's political approach. He was known as "Mr. Integrity". This was a fundamental part of his appeal. While many would disagree with his stand on issues, Taft was never accused of being a politically motivated person. He believed that he was "right" and was leading the fight against the "wrong".¹⁶

Taft's record as a vote getter was presented to the people as a known factor. He had defeated J. T. Ferguson in 1950, by the largest margin in Ohio's history. He had never been defeated in an election and would support the entire ticket.

Taft's Weakness

Taft also had weaknesses as a candidate. As is often true,

¹³Taft failed to realize that Truman, in 1948, had run as much against the Republican 80th Congress which was led by Taft, as much as he ran against Dewey.

¹⁴William S. White, The Taft Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 174.

¹⁵Raymond Moley, "Senator and the General," Newsweek, Vol. 39 (January 21, 1952), p. 96.

¹⁶White, 126.

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political assets are also liabilities. The congressional leadership that made his candidacy possible was also a disadvantage. It had alienated many voters. His record weakened him with those groups whose votes he would need in the general election; that is, the independent vote and swing voters from the Democratic Party.

A corollary of this weakness is Taft's identification as a politician. As Ivan Hinderaker points out, the American people prefer a man who has a "political mind" but whose acts do not appear political.¹⁷ While Taft could hardly be classified as a Thurlow Weed, he was closely identified with the party machinery.

Another weakness was his lack of voter appeal. A part of this was his political identification, but there were other factors. One of these was his colorless public speaking.¹⁸ His public image was uninspiring. Throughout his public career attempts were made to humanize Taft. As a recent study points out, referring to the 1936 Republican Primary in Ohio,

In their speeches Robert talked about issues, Martha (his wife) talked about Robert. In a sense the wife's task was the hardest; Robert Taft was an honest product but not very attractively packaged.¹⁹

By 1952, the cast was changed, but their roles were the same. Taft's publicity had the usual pictures of Taft with Indian headdresses or cowboy hats; but always Taft looked incongruous and uncomfortable.

¹⁷Ivan Hinderaker, Party Politics (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956), p. 466.

¹⁸Eugene H. Roseboom, A History of Presidential Elections (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1957), p. 460.

¹⁹Charles Judah and George Winston Smith, The Unchosen (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), p. 230.

In the political field, one of Taft's weaknesses was his ties with Congressional leaders with whom he was very strong. However, state organizations are more often controlled by a state's governor through the use of patronage than by the Representatives and Senators. This is especially true, because the Republican Party had been removed from federal patronage since 1933. Patronage that was available came from the state.

The most telling weakness of Taft was the charge, "he can't win". Taft could not understand this. He had never lost a statewide election; he had carried Ohio by almost a half-million votes. Yet this tag was his constant nemesis. To the Republican leaders, primarily interested in winning, it became a major issue. Taft, in his drive for the nomination, not only had to prove he was the choice of the Republicans, but also that he could win the election. David Ingalls, Taft's campaign manager, had pointed to Taft's margin of victory in Ohio. He argued that Truman would be the Democratic candidate and that Truman's prestige was so low anyone could beat him. He said Eisenhower was popular, because no one knew how he stood on any issue while Taft had a solid following.²⁰ Ingalls had some success in convincing the party professionals, but Taft would have to fight the public opinion polls as much as the other candidates.

Eisenhower's Candidacy

The name of Dwight D. Eisenhower was first entered in the race for Republican presidential nomination in 1950. This occurred

²⁰"Campaign Crisis", Newseek, Vol. 39 (April 7, 1952), pp. 31-32.

EXHIBIT
COTTON CONTENT
WHITE RATES

The first section of the report is devoted to a description of the cotton content of the white rates. It is found that the cotton content of the white rates is generally higher than that of the other rates. This is due to the fact that the white rates are generally made from a higher quality of cotton than the other rates. The second section of the report is devoted to a description of the cotton content of the other rates. It is found that the cotton content of the other rates is generally lower than that of the white rates. This is due to the fact that the other rates are generally made from a lower quality of cotton than the white rates. The third section of the report is devoted to a description of the cotton content of the other rates. It is found that the cotton content of the other rates is generally lower than that of the white rates. This is due to the fact that the other rates are generally made from a lower quality of cotton than the white rates.

Exhibit was in the report

The report of the committee on the cotton content of the white rates is as follows: The cotton content of the white rates is generally higher than that of the other rates. This is due to the fact that the white rates are generally made from a higher quality of cotton than the other rates.

during a television appearance by Thomas E. Dewey on "Meet the Press". Dewey again definitely removed himself from consideration, then he referred to a "great world figure, . . . a man who understands the problems of the world" whom he, Dewey, would recommend to the New York delegation.²¹ The next day Eisenhower disclaimed Dewey's suggestion and said he had "had no change in sentiment about the presidency."²² After these announcements Eisenhower's name was never out of the picture albeit occasionally clouded by doubt.

To the Eastern wing of the Republican Party a major drawback to Eisenhower was his doubtful party affiliation.²³ In October of 1950, he had been recalled to active duty and appointed as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. When he left for Europe in January 1951, his political affiliation was still unknown. In September, 1951, an old friend, Ray A. Roberts, said Eisenhower had confided to him that he was "a good Kansas Republican."²⁴ During the summer of 1951, a steady stream of leading Republicans visited his Paris headquarters. On September 30, 1951, Sherman Adams, governor of New Hampshire, announced that Eisenhower's name would be entered in the New Hampshire primary.²⁵ He was also endorsed by many Republican governors attending

²¹New York Herald Tribune, October 16, 1950.

²²David, Presidential Nominating Politics, Vol. I, 26.

²³Eisenhower had been mentioned by both Democrats and Republicans as a candidate in 1948, and had stated he was not available for high public office.

²⁴David, Presidential Nominating Politics, Vol. I, 27.

²⁵New York Times, October 1, 1951.

the governors' conference in Tennessee. Among them were Peterson of Nebraska, Adams of New Hampshire, Arn of Kansas, Dewey of New York, Kohler of Wisconsin, Thornton of Colorado and Langlee of Washington.²⁶

While there had been no public announcement by Eisenhower, this list of gubernatorial endorsement indicates something more substantial than hope that he would be a candidate. In addition his supporters had made some gains in gathering organizational support.

Eisenhower's candidacy was not clarified until January of 1952. On January 6, 1952, Henry Cabot Lodge made the following announcement:

I have been asked by Governor Sherman Adams of New Hampshire to enter General Eisenhower as a candidate for the presidency on the Republican ticket in the New Hampshire primary. I have assured Governor Adams that General Eisenhower is in to the finish. General Eisenhower has personally assured me that he is a Republican I invite you to check this in Paris I am speaking for the General and I will not be repudiated.²⁷

Eisenhower, in Paris, issued a statement confirming Lodge's statement, saying in part,

. . . Under no circumstance will I ask for relief from this assignment in order to seek nomination to political office and I shall not participate in the pre-convention activities of others who may have such intention with respect to me In the absence of a clear cut call to political duty, I shall contrive to devote my full attention . . . to the task to which I am assigned.²⁸

Eisenhower had clearly left himself a loop hole. In his 1948 rejection of moves to nominate him, he had stated that military officers should not seek high political office "in the absence of

²⁶David, Presidential Nominating Politics, Vol. I, 27.

²⁷New York Times, January 7, 1952, p. 1.

²⁸New York Times, January 8, 1952.

W E B

THE (AMERICAN) JOURNAL

Volume 1, Number 1, January 1902. Published by the American Journal Company, New York.

With Special Reference to the History and Literature of the United States.

First of the Series. Edited by W. E. B. DuBois.

Subscription price, \$1.00 per annum in advance.

Single copies, 50 cents.

Published by the American Journal Company, New York.

Entered as Second-Class Matter, January 1, 1902.

Postpaid.

I have been a member of the American Journal Company since its inception.

to the extent of my ability.

on the American Journal.

and I have been a member of the American Journal Company since its inception.

to the extent of my ability.

on the American Journal.

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some obvious and overriding reasons."²⁹ Now referring to his earlier sentiments he could still be a candidate. More important, however, were the words "clear-cut call." Plainly he was still hoping for a draft--but if the draft didn't come, he was committed to a campaign.

Eisenhower's Strength

Eisenhower's greatest strength as a candidate was his great personal prestige. Only Eisenhower and MacArthur had emerged from World War II as true military heroes, and MacArthur failed to capitalize politically on this feeling. Eisenhower's popularity extended beyond gratitude--it was charismatic leadership. His popularity approached a feeling of hero worship among much of the populace. The term "grandfather image" has been applied to Eisenhower's popularity. His public image was certainly one of wisdom, leadership and benevolence.

A part of his popularity was his integrity. His unwillingness to conduct a political type campaign seemed to be further evidence of this. Thus his appeal was as a leader who was above the politics that seemed so much a part of the Truman Administration.

In more concrete aspects, Eisenhower had a career that had trained him to administer large organizations. This administrative ability was a major part of his appeal to the politicians.

Eisenhower's understanding of foreign affairs and experience in dealing with foreign leaders was also pressed as a major advantage. The Eisenhower backers pointed out that military affairs and foreign

²⁹ Judah, The Unchosen, 244.

policy were the most compelling issues facing America and who knew these better than their candidate?

This strength of Eisenhower was more effective toward winning popular rather than party convention votes. Nonetheless, the party professionals backing Eisenhower pointed out that Eisenhower was a winner. This appealed to the non-committed delegates. Thus the most telling argument for Eisenhower was the coattail argument.³⁰ Supporters argued that Eisenhower was so strong he could bring a Republican House and Senate into national office with him. His coattails were so broad that he could aid state and local candidates as well. To the victory starved professionals this was to be the most persuasive appeal of Eisenhower.

Eisenhower's Weakness

As with Taft, Eisenhower's weakness was derived from the same sources as his strengths. Eisenhower's lack of experience in civil government was a common answer to the claim to the virtues as a soldier. The appeal as being above politics was important, but it indicates that his total experience had been in the military.

Where Taft lost some support because of his stand on issues, Eisenhower's stand was unclear. While this may sometimes be an advantage in an election, the party professional was trying to evaluate an unknown--would Eisenhower's views be appealing in his county or precinct?

The general's appeal on foreign affairs was moderated by the

³⁰David, Presidential Nominating Politics, Vol. I, 48.

fact that he had been a part in forming the foreign policy he was now to criticize. It placed him in the uncomfortable role of having served the administration he was trying to replace. When Taft rejected Truman's hope that bipartisan foreign policy would not be upset, and in fact rejected the entire concept of bipartisan foreign policy,³¹ he was clearly attempting to unite Eisenhower and the Truman foreign policy.

Eisenhower's late entry into the race placed him at a distinct disadvantage. This disadvantage was compounded by the early strategy of Eisenhower managers. Possibly in deference to Eisenhower's desire for a draft, the early campaign seemed to be aimed at gaining voter strength rather than delegates. The hopes for a draft were heightened by his victory in the New Hampshire primary where he defeated Taft by 11,000 votes.³² In the March Minnesota primary,³³ Eisenhower received a write-in vote of over 100,000.³⁴ However, on April 1st, the draft hopes were dashed. With both Nebraska and Wisconsin voting on the same day, Taft³⁵ won 24 out of the 30 Wisconsin delegates³⁶; and in Nebraska with both Eisenhower and he running as write-in candidates, he beat both Eisenhower and Stassen.³⁷

³¹"Bipartisan? No!", Newseek, Vol. 39 (February 4, 1952), p. 20.

³²David, Presidential Nominating Politics, Vol. I, 32.

³³Taft had not entered the Minnesota primary out of deference to Harold Stassen, the favority son candidate.

³⁴David, Presidential Nominating Politics, Vol. I, 32.

³⁵Eisenhower was not entered but both Warren and Stassen were.

³⁶Judah, The Unchosen, 247.

³⁷Taft won 36% of the total in Nebraska's advisory preference poll.

lead that he had been a part in forming the League during his
new to criticism. It placed him in the same class as the
narrow the administration he was trying to replace. The
joined Truman's hope that opposition leaders would not
oppose, and in fact rejected the entire concept of bipartisan
policy, it was clearly intended to split the Democrats and
Truman's League policy.

Truman's League policy into three phases: as a political
disadvantage. This advantage was expected to be the only strategy
of Eisenhower campaign. Possibly in reference to Eisenhower's
also for a brief, the early campaign was to be aimed at gaining
voter strength rather than defeating. The hope for a third year
highlighted by his victory in the New Hampshire primary where he
defeated Taft by 11,000 votes.³² In the March Wisconsin primary,³³
Eisenhower received a vote-in vote of over 100,000. However, on
April 1st, the state laws were changed. With both parties and
Wisconsin voting on the same day, Taft won 22 out of the 30
Wisconsin delegates³⁴ and in 1952 with both Eisenhower and Taft
running as write-in candidates, he beat both Eisenhower and Taft.³⁵

³²Wright, *Imperial Presidency*, Vol. 1, 1952, p. 20.

³³Wright, *Imperial Presidency*, Vol. 1, 1952.

³⁴Taft had not entered the Wisconsin primary as of yet
so Harold Stearns, the favorite son candidate.

³⁵Wright, *Imperial Presidency*, Vol. 1, 1952.

³⁶Eisenhower was not entered but both Taft and Truman were.

³⁷Wright, *The Presidency*, 1957.

³⁸Taft won 30% of the vote in Wisconsin's primary preference

The result was two-fold. Taft had challenged doubts as to his vote-getting ability, and Eisenhower was not going to get a draft--it was a fight to the finish.

On April 2, 1952, Eisenhower asked the Secretary of Defense to be relieved of his duties. His relief date was set at June 1, 1952, about one month before the convention.

The April defeat not only brought Eisenhower into the field, but changed the Eisenhower strategy. It now aimed directly at getting delegates, and his managers concentrated on both uncommitted delegates and an effort to convert those Taft-committed delegates who were not bound by law. In order to facilitate this they needed organizational strength. An April tally of delegates showed Taft with 201, Eisenhower with 88.³⁸ In a poll comparing Taft and Eisenhower with Stevenson, Eisenhower could beat Stevenson by 59% to 31%, but Taft was losing 44% to 45%.³⁹ The inference was that Eisenhower could win the election, but could he win the nomination?

The area most available to Eisenhower raids on Taft strength was the South where there were 299 delegates; and, more important, there existed a number of insurgent organizations with which to challenge the already committed Taft delegates.

³⁸"A Rolling Taft Gathers the Delegates", Life, Vol. 32 (April 21, 1952), pp. 34-35.

³⁹Judah, The Unchosen, 248.

The results was two-fold. First, the organization was able to
better ability, and, secondly, the organization was able to gain a better
a fight to the finish.

On April 2, 1952, Eisenhower asked the Secretary of Defense
to be relieved of his duties. The relief came on April 3,
1952, about one month before the November.
The April 2 date was only a temporary measure into the
not changed the fundamental strategy. It was still the same
getting delegates, and his manager's concentration on the
delegates and an effort to correct those delegates' behavior
who were not bound by law. It was a deliberate and very hard
organizational strategy. At first, the delegates showed that
with the Eisenhower administration. In a self-organizing way, the
the administration, Eisenhower could not be removed by the
to the fact that the fact was facing him to the fact that the
Eisenhower could win the election, but could not win the election
The most serious to Eisenhower was the fact that the
was the fact that there were 100 delegates and more members
there existed a number of important organizations which were
challenge the already committed fact delegates.

The following table shows the delegates to the
(April 2, 1952) to the fact that the
Eisenhower administration.

TABLE 1
DELEGATES TO THE
EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER II

THE SCENE IN THE SOUTH

The Republican Party in the South⁴⁰

In 1952, the Southern delegates to the National Republican Convention numbered 229. This amounts to approximately one-sixth of the convention and one-third of the total number needed to nominate. This serves to illustrate the power position of the Southern Republicans. Their importance in the contest for the nomination was evident. The Taft and Eisenhower leaders recognized it. However, the nature of the Republican Party in the South presented difficulty to both factions.

The Republican Party in the South is often neither Republican nor a political party, and it is frequently difficult to even identify Republicans. V. O. Key, Jr. reported a case where a Negro leader regularly voted in the Democratic primary but refused to join the Arkansas Negro Democratic Association. He believed that this would be embarrassing when he served as a delegate to the Republican state convention.⁴¹ Thus to conclude that Republicans are those who do not vote in Democratic primaries is misleading. Even the delegates

⁴⁰The remarks made here are general statements about the Republican Party in the South. Exceptions abound and are mentioned only when necessary to problems under discussion.

⁴¹V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), p. 277.

to state conventions serve as a poor index. A resolution in the Democratic convention in Texas to exclude two delegates who had recently served as delegates to the Republican state convention was passed only after considerable effort.⁴²

If the purpose of a political party is to contest elections in order to gain control of the government,⁴³ then the Republican organization in much of the South is not a political party. Its goal then is to control patronage. Since the party has little chance of gaining primacy in state elections, it must rely on federal patronage when the Republicans capture the White House.

To achieve this aim the southern Republicans occupy a unique position within their party. They play an insignificant party role in the general election, but an important one in the convention.

The southern Republican leader is interested in two interrelated questions. First, how are their votes to be cast in the national party convention and second, how is federal patronage to be dispensed at home if Republicans gain control of the national government?

To consider the second question first, the dispensation of patronage is the basis for southern Republican organization. V. O. Key, Jr. has referred to southern Republican leaders as patronage managers and palace politicians.⁴⁴ The southern leader must be in

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Thomas R. Adams, Elements of Government (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 211.

⁴⁴Key, 292.

control of the state machinery in order to have the patronage to dole out. The status of "official" state organization, Key points out, is often the result of recognition by the national convention and Republican presidents.⁴⁵ Hence the southern leader is apt to have strong ties with the political leaders who control the convention.

This alliance between the national and southern leaders is mutually beneficial. The national leaders interested in delegate votes are willing to extend recognition to the faction of the state party able to deliver the delegate votes. The southern leader, interested in patronage, depends upon the national leader to protect its recognition as the "official" state party and to provide the patronage when available.

Both groups find it beneficial to keep the Republican Party in the South weak and small. The national party leader finds it easier to deal with a small clique whose past record has given some assurances of delivering the delegates. The southern leader finds that a small party makes it easier to maintain the tight control necessary to delivering the delegate votes. A small party, moreover, makes easier the maneuvers necessary to maintain control of the state party. Of course, the smaller the party the larger the slice of patronage pie.

Delegates to party conventions have been accused of corruption and dealing away their votes. The status of the southern delegates makes this charge more likely to be true of these delegates than those from other areas. As Alexander Heard points out, "Dele-

⁴⁵Ibid.

gates from other states do not differ in these regards, but Southerners enjoy an advantage."⁴⁶ They go to the convention unrestrained by what the Republican voters want; they are not bound by any primary. Nor are they required to answer to the group of politicians who make up the real constituency of delegates from other states.⁴⁷ The southern delegation is free to make its own deals and to maneuver more freely.

Thus, in those states without Republican office holders or where the Republican Party is non-competitive, the party has become a social club operating without reference to the electorate.⁴⁸ The party is not without internal conflicts. One of these is the basic conflict between the "ins" and the "outs"--or better those that have patronage and recognition and those that do not. These factional fights within the state organization usually shape up into a contest for seats in the national convention. The apparent issues are usually hazy legal ones concerning the method of selection of delegates, but the real fight is usually to see which presidential aspirant will get the state's delegate votes.

Taft and the Southern Republicans

Drew Pearson, in 1948, wrote of Taft's "well-oiled political machine in the South;" and newspaper headlines read, "Dewey Backers

⁴⁶Alexander Heard, A Two Party South? (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952), p. 97.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 57.

states from other states to not differ in those respects, but Southern
 states enjoy an advantage. And they go to the convention under the
 by what the Republican voters want they are bound by any majority.
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 the real fight is usually to see which presidential aspirant will
 get the state's delegate votes.

Taft and the Southern Republicans

New Haven, in 1912, wrote of Taft's "well-known political
 machine in the South," and newspaper headlines read, "Power Politics

Alexander Heard, The Party Bosses (Chicago: Hull University
 of North Carolina Press, 1937), p. 27.

17 Jan.

18 Jan., p. 27.

Plan Drive to Break Taft's Hold on South."⁴⁹ Before the campaign for the 1952 nomination, the South was generally conceded to be in the Taft camp. One reason for this strength was his conservatism. The southern oligarchies have traditionally bolstered the conservative wing of the Republican Party. Strong ties bind southern Republicans and those of the orthodox Midwestern wing. One of the strongest of these has been economics. Both sections represent agricultural interests and have similar feelings regarding tariffs and other national issues. The southern Republicans have supported conservatives William Howard Taft in 1912, Warren G. Harding in 1920 and Calvin Coolidge in 1924.

In addition to the historical ties with the conservative wing of the Republican Party, Taft's record in Congress had helped to solidify his position in the South. A leading exponent of anti-New Deal philosophy, he had expressed views similar to those of southern Republicans. Alexander Heard reported that the resentment in the South against the New and Fair Deals had resulted in a mild increase in southern Republican sentiment. The significance is that the South's increase in Republican votes was larger than the increase in the rest of the nation.⁵⁰

Taft did not rely, however, on only the South's historical ties with the conservative wing. He built his own strength. As a candidate in 1940 and 1948, he cultivated southern leaders. In both the 1940 and 1948 conventions, his percentage of support from the

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 122.

⁵⁰Ibid., Table 8, p. 34.

South was larger than the percentage of his support from the whole convention.⁵¹

A second source of Taft's southern strength was his control of the national machinery. The southern leaders depend on the national machine for strength in maintaining their control on state machines. Taft supporter Guy Gabrielson was the national chairman. From this position he had influence on party disputes arising from contested delegations, disputes over patronage and intra-state rivalries.

This influence was increased by Taft's control of the national committee. Consequently in 1952, in any battles for delegates Taft was in a strong position. In 1948, the dispute over which of two contesting Georgia delegations should be seated, a pro-Dewey national committee overruled National Chairman Carroll Reece, a Taft supporter and seated the Dewey faction. This decision was upheld by a Dewey dominated credentials committee. Taft was not going to be in this weak position at the 1952 convention. He controlled the national committee and the credentials committee as well as the national chairman.

Thus in any seating contests the Taft group from a state would have a distinct advantage. To the southern leaders this support was necessary to maintain their recognition as the "official" delegation and the subsequent patronage.

In all this Taft was playing the old political game by the time-honored rules of politics. The southern Republicans who con-

⁵¹For a detailed examination of convention support for Taft, see Heard, Tables 15, 16, 17, 18.

trolled the state machinery knew this game and played by the same rules. They knew Taft, who even during the lean years since 1932, had seen that the South got a share of the limited patronage. Thus in 1948, Drew Pearson reported that Taft got a job for the son of a Mississippi Republican leader, and that some of the work of the Taft law firm had been given to a leader of a Louisiana Republican leader.⁵² But even so the amount of patronage available was symbolic rather than substantial. Being cut off from federal patronage had weakened the state organization and especially the control of the leaders.

Eisenhower and the Southern Republicans

Eisenhower entered the fight for southern delegates at a disadvantage. His lack of control of the national, state and convention machinery weakened him and made it necessary to work outside the regular party organization. To the "regular" southern delegates this was political treachery, inasmuch as the seating of Eisenhower delegates meant the over-throw of the existing state organization. This, because Taft controlled the national machinery, could be accomplished only by means of a floor fight. Many southern delegates believed Eisenhower had entered the fight for the nomination rather unwillingly and hoped this to be unlikely. But even if it did occur, they told themselves it would be difficult, if not impossible, to get state delegates to refute their leadership as represented in the national committee and the credentials committee.

⁵²Birmingham News, March 7, 1947.

...the first meeting...
...COLLISION CONTENT...

...had seen that the...
...in 1960, when...

...a situation...
...this law firm...

...leader, 28...
...rather than...

...examined the...
...leader.

...Bismarck and...

...Bismarck was...

...advantage...
...machinery...

...regular...
...this was...

...delays...
...This, because...

...reestablished...
...believed...

...willingly...
...they told...

...get...
...national...

...28...
...

The Eisenhower leadership also was a problem. Eisenhower himself lacked personal ties with the southern bosses. In addition the major leadership of his faction was drawn from the Eastern wing of the party. This group was the one Taft called "me-too" or New and Fair Deal policies. The conservative southern leadership, supported by an apparent dislike of the New and Fair Deal policies, found this type of leadership least acceptable. Dewey and Lodge represented the Eastern business interest of which the South had been historically suspicious--even in the pre-Civil War era.

In such a situation the Eisenhower problem was to determine on what basis could he appeal to the southern leaders and how could he convert that appeal into victory?

But "Ike" had one lethal weapon on his side--the scent of victory. To some southern leaders, hardened politicians, unlikely to be influenced by campaign oratory, his strength was simply that he could win in November which Taft could not. This was perhaps more appealing in the South than elsewhere for there the Republican Party was in a precarious position. Unlike other areas, they could afford no errors in the convention. Other states might vote against the winning candidate in the convention and then redeem themselves by delivering their state in the general election. To the South such a "second chance" was rare. To support the wrong candidate might leave them high and dry when patronage was distributed. This was to be a prime consideration.

In this situation the Eisenhower strategy was to work through the existing intra-party rivalries. The out-faction would form the nucleus for his fight in the South. The "regular" southern organiza-

The Birmingham Independent also was a proponent. Birmingham
himself looked forward to the coming of the Independent. In London
the major leadership of the Independent was known from the very beginning
of the party. This group was the one that called "London" on the
and their local policies. The conservative movement in London, and
parted by an apparent dislike of the Independent and its policies,
found this type of leadership very acceptable. They were not
represented the Independent movement of which the Independent
been historically significant even in the Independent era.
In such a situation the Birmingham Independent was so determined
what could be done to the Independent movement and how could he
convert that appeal into victory?
The Independent had one local opponent in this case—the Independent
victory. To some extent, however, the Independent was already
to be influenced by another factor, the Independent was already
he could win in the Independent which this could mean. This was perhaps
appealing in the Independent than the Independent Party
was in a previous election. Unlike other areas, they could claim
no errors in the Independent. Other areas might vote against the
winning candidate in the Independent and then remain themselves by
delivering their votes in the general election. To the Independent
a "second chance" was given. To prevent the Independent candidate
leave their high and dry when the Independent was defeated. This was
to be a winning combination.
In this situation the Birmingham Independent was a very strong
the existing Independent Party. The Independent would not be
necessity for him to be in the Independent. The Independent movement in London

tions, based as they were on patronage, were vulnerable on two counts. First patronage itself became a symbol, and to appeal to patronage was to appeal to the heart of the organization. Secondly, the efforts of the organization to remain small in order to better control patronage made it weak. The Republican Party had been cut off from federal patronage for twenty years. With none from the states available, the southern machines began to contract in order to preserve themselves. As a consequence with little strength in issues or in personalities, they were vulnerable to pressure and appeals from a group which seemed to offer the best opportunity to regain the national government and its largesse. Patronage is an important source of strength to a political organization; but when it is its primary strength, its absence makes splits and rivalries within the organization more likely.

Thus in 1952, the out-groups were already in existence. Eisenhower had only to provide national leadership and a rallying point.

In addition, he furnished an incentive to a growing group of southern Republicans who were interested in contesting state elections and winning those elections. This group included Wilson Williams of Georgia, J. F. Lucey of Texas, and John M. Wisdom of Louisiana. Around this state leadership gathered persons interested in developing a two-party system, persons interested only in unseating the existing faction and persons who were personal supporters of Eisenhower but needing state leadership, and reformers interested in cleaning up the state party.

Eisenhower had something to offer to all of these groups: his

coattails, his strength with Independents and "fringe" Democrats, his delegate strength in a floor fight, the crusade to "clean up the mess" in Washington, and above all the promise of victory in November, if he could win the nomination.

coastal, his strength with the people of the coast.

His strength in a large part of the country.

and in the north, and also in the south.

It is said in the north.

SECTION CONTENT

EXERCISE

WILFRED ELLIS

CHAPTER III
THE STATE CONTESTS

Georgia

Georgia is one of the strongest Democratic states in the Union. It normally votes Democratic by 80%, with recent exceptions in 1928, 1948 and 1952. Yet it played a major role in the Republican convention of 1952.

In 1952 there were two Republican parties in Georgia, the "Tucker faction" and the "Foster faction." There were two state central committees, two sets of officers, two nominating conventions and two contesting national convention delegations.

Historically the split began in the 1920's when a Negro named Ben S. Davis, leader of the Republican Party in Georgia, was charged with unsavory patronage. A movement to "house clean" left the Negroes outside the political organization.

After several "compromises," the final split came in 1944 when the state central committee met; and the secretary omitted 22 Negro members' names from the roll.⁵³ On May 23, the convention adjourned to another hall from which the Negroes were excluded. Those who remained in the original hall elected W. Roscoe Tucker as its chairman. They were, therefore, designated the "Tucker faction".

⁵³The Constitution (Atlanta), May 23, 24, 1952, p. 1.

COLLOID CONTENT
E E R V A S E
V I T E R S I M I T S

Georgia

Georgia is one of the poorest states in the South. It normally votes Democratic in the Presidential elections of 1948 and 1952. Yet in 1948 it elected a Republican Governor, Herman Tamm, and in 1952 it elected a Republican Governor, James V. Eastland.

In 1952 there were two political parties in Georgia, the "Fusion" party and the "Fusion" party. The "Fusion" party was a coalition of the Democratic and Republican parties, and the "Fusion" party was a coalition of the Democratic and Republican parties.

Historically the split between the two parties was based on the issue of race. The "Fusion" party was a coalition of the Democratic and Republican parties, and the "Fusion" party was a coalition of the Democratic and Republican parties.

After several years of the "Fusion" party, the "Fusion" party was a coalition of the Democratic and Republican parties, and the "Fusion" party was a coalition of the Democratic and Republican parties.

Those who remained in the "Fusion" party were the "Fusion" party, and the "Fusion" party was a coalition of the Democratic and Republican parties.

The Constitution (Article I, Section 2, Clause 3)

This group sent an equally divided group of Negroes and whites to the 1944 Republican Convention, where their seating was approved by the national committee and upheld by the credentials committee. This group had been sent with instructions to support the Dewey nomination.

The second group, in their new convention hall, elected Roy G. Foster as their state chairman. Because only three Negroes were admitted, the group was tagged the "Lily Whites". They elected and sent an uninstructed delegation, but this delegation failed to be seated.

Even though the Tucker faction had been seated, the Foster faction won control of the state's Republican slate of presidential electors. The Tucker faction charged this was by collusion between the Foster faction and the state Democratic administration.

In 1952, Georgia was entitled to 17 delegates. Ten of these were to be divided among each of the 10 congressional districts. In addition, 3 districts qualified for an extra delegate on the basis of past voting; and the state was granted 4 delegates-at-large.

Both factions apportioned the 17 delegates on the same formula; each of the 10 district conventions would select a national convention delegate, and the state convention would select the delegates-at-large. Each of the state conventions issued calls for district meetings and urged that all who were in accord with the Republican principles attend the meetings to be held at the county courthouses. District and state convention delegates were apportioned on the basis of the Republican vote in the 1948 presidential election. Each county received 1 delegate and 1 alternate with a bonus for every additional 300 votes in the Tucker faction and 200 in the Foster

faction.

These delegates were selected at "mass meetings". Because of the scarcity of Republicans in Georgia plus the fact that even those existing were divided into two camps, many of the meetings could hardly be so described.

The Tucker convention met in Atlanta, duly transacted its business of electing W. Roscoe Tucker as chairman and selected its state central committee. The Atlanta Constitution reported June 1, that while there were both Eisenhower and Taft buttons in evidence, there was no presidential preference shown.

The Tucker faction, known as the "Atlanta crowd," had gained many adherents, especially in the persons of former Democrats and Independents who sought to support Eisenhower and to help build a two-party state.⁵⁴

Many of the Tucker delegation were also the faction leaders throughout the state. They reflected, for the most part, a business and professional background. There were 5 Negroes among the 17 delegates. The delegation had the use of the experience of 10 members who had attended the 1948 national convention.

The Foster faction met in Macon in a meeting which was reported to have "all the ear-marks of a Taft rally."⁵⁵ This convention ratified the districts' selection of delegates and alternates. It then

⁵⁴Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman and Malcolm Moos, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol. 3, The South (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954), p. 99.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 97.

London.

These delegates were the first of a series of meetings of the secretariat of the League of Nations, which were held in London in 1920. The secretariat was divided into three sections, each of which was largely self-sufficient.

The first section was the secretariat of the League of Nations, which was responsible for the general administration of the League. The second section was the secretariat of the League of Nations, which was responsible for the general administration of the League. The third section was the secretariat of the League of Nations, which was responsible for the general administration of the League.

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took the unusual step of designating the delegates as both district delegates and alternate, and as delegates-at-large and alternates-at-large.

This step was taken in view of Rule 14b of the Republican National Rules of 1948 which permitted the national party officials to refer district contests back to the state committee. Since the Tucker state committee was currently being recognized by the national committee, it was possible that the Tucker group could sit in judgment on the Foster claims in the inevitable contests to follow. The at-large status was a hopeful gesture to the Taft-controlled national committee to recognize the unanimous allegiance of the Foster faction to Taft.

The inevitable contest between delegations came in June when the Foster group filed suit asking that it be declared the legal representatives of the Republican Party in Georgia. Before the date of the scheduled hearing, the Republican National Committee, acting under Rule 14b, sent all of the contested delegations back to the Tucker state committee for settlement. On June 25, Judge Chester A. Byars issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the state committee from acting until after his decision. There is no evidence that either of the major national factions--Eisenhower or Taft--intervened openly. National committeeman Harry Sommers stated later that he conferred with Taft managers but found them disinterested.

Judge Byars ruled, on June 30, in favor of the Foster group but stated that his ruling was only on the "parent" organization and his ruling had no intention of influencing the Republican National

Committee in regard to the seating contest.⁵⁶

The Foster faction, however, was to use this case in presenting its arguments before the National Committee, the Credentials Committee and later the Republican National Convention.

Louisiana

The Republican situation in Louisiana was quite similar to that in Georgia. Louisiana, a heavily Democratic state, had last cast its electoral vote for a Republican in 1876. The Democratic strength is probably best shown by the registration figures of October, 1952. There were 1,086,417 registered Democrats and 5,290 registered Republicans.⁵⁷

In state elections there have been some pockets of Republicanism such as the Third and First Congressional districts where recent candidates have polled more than one-third of the votes.

As with Georgia, we find in Louisiana a minor party in terms of strength, struggling to exist and multiply and at the same time dissipating its energy on intra-party rivalries.

The split in the Republican Party of Louisiana began in 1948 when John M. Wisdom was selected to head a movement to overthrow the leadership of John E. Jackson. Wisdom was to lead a group who stated it was working for a two-party state.

Jackson had been leader of the Republican Party in Louisiana for 25 years and since 1934 its national committeeman. Jackson's

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 101.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 265.

control was not only in his membership in the national committee but also through the state central committee, composed of about one-hundred members, a majority of whom were loyal Old Guard Republicans.

The Wisdom group had little success in its movement against the Jackson faction. Then in 1950, Wisdom aligned himself with Hugh Scott. Scott, from Pennsylvania, had been chairman of the national committee and had been ousted by a group which included Jackson. Scott, at this time, was already engaged in engineering an Eisenhower boom. In 1951, allied with some former Democrats, he organized an "Americans for Eisenhower" movement. This group, although bipartisan in name, leadership, following, and financing, became the organization by which Wisdom sought to overthrow the Jackson group. It was also through this group that Wisdom led the fight for Eisenhower over Taft in Louisiana.

Louisiana law requires that members of the state central committee be elected in a January primary. If a candidate is unopposed, he may be declared elected by the committee without a primary vote. A person, to be eligible for membership to the central committee and other committees, must have been registered with the party for at least 5 continuous years. There are many vacancies on the various committees, because in many parishes there are no eligible Republicans who want the job or who can be drafted. The five-year requirement usually perpetuates control in the same hands year after year and favors the long term "conservative" Republican over the new "liberal" Republican.

The state committee has a maximum membership of one-hundred

members. Twenty of these were apportioned to the parish of Orleans (the city of New Orleans) and the remaining 80 to the 63 other parishes.

The state central committee in 1952, consisted of 55 members only 12 of whom had been elected. The remaining members had been uncontested in primaries and been declared elected by the state central committee. Of the 12 elected members, all but 1 were members of the Wisdom faction; and all had come from the Orleans parish. The primaries from this parish had been sharply contested on an Eisenhower versus Taft line. The remaining members of the committee were of the Jackson faction and were Taft supporters.⁵⁸

The delegates to the Republican National Convention were to be chosen by conventions. The district delegates were selected by district convention, and the at-large delegates selected by the state convention. The delegates to district and state conventions were to be chosen by mass meetings under the auspices of the district member or members of the state committee. Each district convention and state convention was to receive delegates apportioned on the basis of 1 delegate for every 1,000 Republican votes, or fraction thereof, in the last presidential election. This formula tended to give over-representation to the districts with fewer than 1,000 Republican votes. Of the 15 delegates to national convention, 13 were contested; 9 of these were of district selection and 4 selected at-large.

The meetings were generally held in April in New Orleans. Most

⁵⁸Ibid.

members. Twenty of these were sent to the nation of the
(the city of New Orleans) and the remaining 50 to the other
parties.

The state central committee in 1872, consisted of 25 members
only 12 of whom had been elected. The remaining members had been

appointed in various and been elected in the state
central committee. Of the 12 elected members, 11 had 1 year members
of the Union League; and 11 had 1 year of the Union League. The
primary from this party had been elected in the Union League
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The delegates to the Republican National Convention were to

be chosen by convention. The district delegates were elected by
district convention, and the at-large delegates elected by the

state convention. The delegates to the Union League and state convention
were to be chosen by vote meeting with the purpose of the district

number of members of the state convention. Each district convention
and state convention was to receive delegates proportional to the

base of 1 delegate for every 1,000 registered voters in the
district, in the last presidential election. This number was to

give over-representation to the districts with fewer than 1,000
Republican voters. Of the 12 delegates to national convention, 10

were contested; 9 of these were of district election and 1 elected
at-large.

The meeting was generally held at night in New Orleans. Lord

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of these occurred in private homes, garages or yards. The notification of the meetings was conducted by the party with substantial additional publicity coming from the "Americans for Eisenhower" who, in addition to date, place, and time of the meetings, urged all Republicans to bring their registration certificates to the meetings.

These meetings led to numerous charges of arbitrary or un-parliamentary tactics; usually these charges were against the Jackson group members of which chairmanned most of the meetings. One of these is illustrative of many of the others.

In the West Baton Rouge Parish, at the town of Port Allen, one Taft man and four Eisenhower men constituted the Parish mass meeting. The Taft man was Robert Butler.

Butler was named temporary chairman by the pro-Taft state committee. Butler called the meeting to order at his mother's house.

In rapid order, he called for nominations for permanent chairman, nominated himself, closed the nomination, elected himself; then did the same as a delegate to the state convention.

At the state convention . . . the credentials committee . . . seated Butler as a delegate.

The delegate selected in protest by the four Eisenhower men was not seated.⁵⁹

At the state convention the 44 contests over seats to the convention were all decided in favor of the Taft delegates by the pro-Taft, Jackson-controlled credentials committee. The convention then proceeded to nominate and elect 4 delegates-at-large. At the same time the Wisdom group was meeting in a rump session and named its own delegates-at-large.

Each delegation contained 1 Negro: the Wisdom delegation had 2 women. The Wisdom delegation consisted of 13 Eisenhower and 2

⁵⁹The New Republic, Vol. CXXVI (June 2, 1952), quoted in New Orleans Item (May 2, 1952), p. 5.

Taft delegates. These two came from strongly pro-Taft districts, and the Wisdom group made no effort to challenge the choice of Taft delegates.

The Wisdom group claimed that the Jackson group had stolen the delegate election through authoritarian and unparliamentary tactics. They claimed that they were the legal delegation and made reference to hundreds of affidavits which would prove this in the Chicago convention. They appealed to the people of the state to support them and the hope of the Republican Party.

The Jackson group, clearly in a position of strength, chose only to deny the charges, pleaded for a united front and to await the chance to plead the case of their Taft delegation before a Taft-controlled national convention.

Texas

The situation in Texas, prior to the national convention, was basically similar to the situation in Louisiana and Georgia. The factor that brought the Texas fight into the limelight of national attention was the degree of publicity given to the charges of a Texas "steal". While the other states, discussed here, played prominent roles in the convention, the key state was Texas. It is possible that the nomination and subsequent election of Eisenhower may have been decided in Texas a few weeks prior to the national convention. While Taft was later to claim that four-fifths of the newspapers of the country were anti-Taft,⁶⁰ there is little doubt that the Texas

⁶⁰New York Times, November 25, 1959, p. 14.

half a century. There has been a long, long time, and
the Jackson group made it clear to everyone that this
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The Jackson group showed that the Jackson group was a group
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newspapers were instrumental in bringing the Texas fight to national prominence. National coverage was provided by the hundreds of newsmen who flocked into Texas. It was this group that kept the nation informed and kept the story alive.

The Republican Party of Texas has often been considered a private club for the state officials of the Republican Party. Prior to 1952, there was little activity directed towards expansion of membership.

The beginnings of the split in the Republican Party can be found in the Democratic Party of Texas. The conflict over civil rights within the Democratic Party caused many members to bolt the party in 1948. These bolters were primarily of a conservative mind and joined with conservative groups from other southern states into the Dixiecrat Party.

In 1952, the liberals were in a numerical minority; and it was this group that bolted the Democratic Party. This group joined with the Republicans and played an active roll in a liberal-conservative split within that party.

R. B. Creager, long-time Republican leader in Texas and national committeeman, died in 1950. His position within the party was filled by Henry Zweifel who won easily over J. H. Porter, who contested the Zweifel election. Zweifel was to continue in the footsteps of Creager while Porter was to assume the leadership of the Eisenhower forces in Texas.

The Republican Party of Texas, under Creager's leadership, had heavily supported Taft in the Past. In 1940, it cast all of 26 votes

for Taft; in 1948 Taft won 29 of 33 votes. Zweifel hoped that in 1952 he could cast Texas' 38 votes for Taft.⁶¹

One of the major reasons for the nation-wide interest in Texas was caused by the manner in which each side claimed legal support for its arguments. This was the result of the confusion caused by the Texas Election Code of 1952.

The Texas election statutes provide that both the district delegates and the delegates-at-large be elected by state convention. This is contrary to the usual practice, as seen in Louisiana and Georgia, wherein the district conventions elect their delegates, while only the at-large delegates are elected by the state convention. The system in Texas tends to grant greater influence and power to the state central committee than the more usual system.

Delegates to the state convention were chosen by the county convention whose delegates had been elected at the precinct meetings. It was at the precinct level that the conflict within the law was first felt.

The Election Code of 1951 contains a provision: "Any qualified voter whose name appears on the certified list of qualified voters, shall be permitted to participate in and vote in said (precinct) convention."⁶²

This statement would seem to provide a convention with both

⁶¹Malcolm Moos, The Republicans: A History of Their Party (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 351.

⁶²Texas, Election Code, (1951), Reprint Bulletin, Secretary of State, p. 3.

Democrats and Republicans voting, similar to an open type primary.

The statute specifically states that to attend both conventions on the "same day" is prohibited. This statement seems to underline the contention that membership and participation could not be limited to registered party members. It was on this basis that Taft followers charged that the Democrats had invaded and controlled the Republican precinct conventions.

The 1951 code retains a phrase from the old election code which seems to restrict precinct convention activity to "voters of said political party."⁶³

It was on the basis of this confusing and conflicting contradiction in law that the two factions based their legal fights. These legal conflicts began with the campaign for delegates and was continued at every state level and finally carried over to the national convention, stopping just short of an all-out floor fight.

The Porter faction saw in Eisenhower a candidate to whom they could rally Democrats, Independents and Republicans. They hoped that with Eisenhower as their candidate they could win control of the state from the "Old Guard" whom they had termed the "never-say-win Old Guard".⁶⁴

Because of their lack of organization experience and the varied make-up of the group, the Porter-Lane faction (Porter had been joined by Alvin H. Lane of Dallas) set up extensive training schools for its leaders. They held practice caucuses throughout the

⁶³Ibid., p. 4.

⁶⁴David, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol. 3, p. 319.

state to teach parliamentary procedure and organization. They had recognized early that the entire party machinery was in the hands of the opposition faction.

In February, Zweifel and the state central committee devised a pledge to be signed by all participants at the Republican precinct conventions. This pledge states: "I am a Republican and desire to participate in Republican Party activities in the year 1952."⁶⁵ The purpose of this pledge was to discourage the "one-day Republicans" when the Zweifel faction anticipated.

The Porter faction countered with the following, published widely throughout the state:

If asked to sign a declaration that you will support the Republican nominee, SIGN IT! The Supreme Court of Texas held that, in effect, you can vote Republican one day, Democratic the next, and vote in the general election the next day. You CAN vote in BOTH Democratic and Republican elections.--DO NOT BE INTIMIDATED ⁶⁶

To counteract growing Eisenhower activities, the Zweifel faction and the state central committee in April issued an invitation to all "anti-Fair Deal" Democrats and any other persons, disgruntled with the party, to join with them in driving for the election of the Republican Party in Texas.

The cost of these and other state-wide advertisements in addition to campaign literature and publications made the expenditures of both parties enormous. Joseph Alsop estimated that the Eisenhower faction spent from 3 to 6 million dollars in Texas.⁶⁷

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶El Paso Times, February 20, 1952, p. 6.

⁶⁷Washington Post, October 17, 1952.

This may have been a record amount spent by a party in a pre-convention campaign. This clearly shows the importance of Texas to the Republican cause and also indicates why this struggle was getting nationwide news coverage.

The Zweifel faction chairmanned the vast majority of the precinct meetings. However they were overwhelmed at the masses of people that turned out. Many of the meeting places had to be abandoned and a larger place found.

The Taft supporters were in the majority in the San Antonio area, but this was the exception, as they were outnumbered in most other and--especially the urban areas. The Houston Chronicle reported that in its home county the Eisenhower forces had won precinct victories by a margin of 4 to 1.

In Precinct 176 of Harris County, 476 persons attended the meeting and 4 Taft supporters walked out; in Precinct 38, 340 attended and 6 Taftites walked out; 260 attended in Precinct 70, 4 Taftites walked out. The precinct meeting, presided over by Zweifel in his own home, voted overwhelmingly for Eisenhower and Zweifel "bolted" to his front lawn.⁶⁸

Charges of high-handed and nonparliamentary procedures were leveled at both groups. The Zweifel faction was charged with holding a precinct meeting in a moving car. The Zweifel faction began to chant their accusation of Democratic voting in Republican Party meetings and conventions. This was to become their battle cry throughout all of Texas, possibly rivaling, if only for a short time,

⁶⁸David, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol. 3, p. 321.

the cry of "Remember the Alamo".

Two-hundred twenty-eight county conventions were held in Texas' 254 counties. Out of these 228 counties, 31 meetings had bolts and subsequent rump sessions. These 31 counties contained 519 out of 1060 votes in the state Republican convention.⁶⁹

The Zweifel forces contended that these groups of pro-Eisenhower forces were, in actuality, Democrats. Zweifel stated, according to Newsweek, that the "Majority is not always right" and that the state executive committee "knows what is best for the people."⁷⁰ An appeal was made to Taft to intercede to prevent a national scandal in Texas.⁷¹ Taft remained silent.

Alvin H. Lane contacted Republican National Committee Chairman, Guy Gabrielson, and warned him of the Zweifel faction's intention to place all Taft delegates on the temporary state convention rolls. Gabrielson replied that this was a matter for the credentials committee at Chicago.⁷²

An appeal by the Zweifel faction to the Texas courts was thrown out. Taft charged they were trying to elect the weakest candidate for the Republicans and the strongest for the Democratic Party.⁷³

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Newsweek, June 9, 1952.

⁷¹New York Times, May 25, 1952, p. 1.

⁷²David, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol. 3, p. 322.

⁷³New York Times, June 23, 1952, p. 10.

Porter-Lane supporters were charged with being "Dirt-dabbers,"⁷⁴ one-day Republicans and even traitors to their own Democratic Party. The press was having a field day. And the big events of the state convention were yet to occur.

With this background of intense feeling within the state and nation-wide news coverage, the state convention convened. On May 26, one day prior to the opening of the convention, the state central committee met as the credentials committee to hear and decide the contests between 31 rival county delegations. Attendance at this meeting was limited to the contesting delegations, one at a time, and their attorneys. The meeting convened at 10:00 A.M. and adjourned at 6:00 A.M.

As news began to leak out of the hearings, it became more and more evident that the Taft delegation were to be seated. The rulings of the credentials committee seemed to be based on the fact that the Eisenhower delegations were not "true" Republicans. Late in the morning, after a clear Taft majority had been established, several split delegations were allowed and 2 Eisenhower delegations were seated. Of the 31 contests, 26 had been decided in favor of Taft. The New York Times, on May 25, 1952, quoted Zweifel as stating that the Republican Party had been saved from "mob rule". This quote places his statement one day before the credentials committee met.

The convention met on May 27 and the rejected Eisenhower delegates were denied admission. The Porter faction, having anticipated a lock-out, had secured a hall across from the convention where they

⁷⁴A wasp of the Southwest that does not build its own nest, but invades the nest of other wasps.

held a rump session.

The Zweifel-led meeting consisted of one-thousand sixty delegates of whom approximately eight-hundred were Taft men and two-hundred Eisenhower supporters. All contested delegates were allowed to vote on motions involving their own permanent seating.⁷⁵ The convention reversed decisions of the credentials committee on two occasions, substituting a Taft delegation for an Eisenhower delegation and changing a delegation from one-half Eisenhower and one-half Taft to a full Taft delegation.⁷⁶ Alvin Lane was granted the floor, and he led a walkout of all the Eisenhower delegates to their meeting place.

The Zweifel faction selected an uninstructed delegation of 38 delegates and 38 alternates. The division of this group was considered to be 30 for Taft, 4 for MacArthur and 4 for Eisenhower.⁷⁷

The Porter-Lane faction meeting was filled with cries of "steal", "railroad" and other terms to describe the tactics of their rivals. This convention chose 33 delegates instructed for Eisenhower and 5 instructed for Taft.

Each faction now girded itself for the battle of press releases before the show-down in Chicago.

Both Eisenhower and Taft, realizing the political danger of intervention into a "family" feud, had thus far remained aloof. Now,

⁷⁵The rule of the National Convention that permitted the same action was to be a major stumbling block for Taft.

⁷⁶David, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol. 3, p. 325.

⁷⁷Ibid.

however, the fight was growing to national proportions; and both candidates felt the need to speak out.

Eisenhower, in a speech in Dallas, struck out at the Zweifel faction and Taft who had apparently condoned its actions. Eisenhower's speech in Dallas was one of many as he moved towards the Chicago convention. In this Dallas speech of June 21, Eisenhower called the Texas affair a "betrayal of the whole Republican Party and its principles."⁷⁸ In this, one of his most aggressive speeches, he charged Taft with masterminding the "deliberate and ruthless disfranchisement"⁷⁹ of the people of Texas. He concluded with a cry that the "rustlers had stolen the Texas birthright instead of steers."⁸⁰

Taft, in a nation-wide newspaper advertisement on June 23, countered with the argument of the Texas and national Taft supporters. He charged that the Texas dispute was a case of Democrats trying to nominate the strongest candidate for themselves and the weakest for the Republicans. He further charged that Eisenhower leaders had urged people to sign the Republican pledge that Zweifel had offered and said that the Eisenhower forces had implied that they could later repudiate that pledge and vote in the Democratic Party at a later date.⁸¹

This was the one defense on the part of Taft and his supporters. They were claiming that the pro-Eisenhower faction were not bona

⁷⁸New York Times, June 22, 1952.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰New York Times, June 22, 1952.

⁸¹New York Times, June 23, 1952.

fide Republicans and would later revert to their true selves--Democrats. Taft did not deny that the Eisenhower faction was in a majority at all levels of Texas conventions. Taft treated this as unimportant and indeed it was--if one accepts his premise.

The Eisenhower forces in Texas maintained a single theme in answer to Taftites. They pointed to their numerical majority and claimed that Taft's failure to recognize this was proof of Taft's intent to "steal" the delegates.

Another item was added to the confusion in mid-June. Mrs. C. P. Howard, the secretary of the Republican national committee, decided that all of the Texas contested delegation, both district and at-large, should be settled at Chicago. This verdict was based on Rule 4b of the national rules as adopted in 1948. This rule states in part, "and only contests affecting delegates-at-large shall be presented to the national convention." She reasoned that since all the delegates were selected by the state convention, all Texas delegate disputes should be settled at Chicago.⁸² If these contests had been returned to the state committee, a quick decision in favor of Taft could have been expected. This was then a move in favor of the Eisenhower forces.

The battle between Taft and Eisenhower at the national level and Zweifel and Porter-Lane groups at the local level insured a lively time in Chicago. As the convention grew nearer, both factions stepped up their charges in preparation for the final struggle in Chicago.

⁸²Davis, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol. 3, p. 326.

the negotiations and would later revert to their usual position. It is not clear that the Eisenhower administration was in a position to do all levels of work. It is possible that the administration was indeed in a position to do so.

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CHAPTER IV

THE CONTESTS ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL

National Committee Action

The Republican National Committee began hearing the delegate contests on July 1, 1952. The predicted clash between Taft and Eisenhower forces was not long in coming. The Eisenhower forces believed that the proceedings should be televised to the nation. While Taft, himself, said he was agreeable to a live broadcast,⁸³ his followers argued that broadcasts would not be in keeping with the judicial nature of the proceedings. The Taft faction won out by a vote of 60 to 40.⁸⁴

The National Committee faced a total of 96 contested delegate seats. Twenty-eight of these were local and did not involve Taft or Eisenhower supporters.

The real contest was over the 68 seats from Georgia, Louisiana and Texas. An old pattern had reemerged. In the 1912 Republican Convention the critical fight was over the seating of the contested southern delegation. Then, the seating of delegates pledged to William Howard Taft, the Senator's father, had caused Theodore Roosevelt's supporters to withdraw and form the "Bull Moose" Party.

⁸³New York Times, July 2, 1952.

⁸⁴Ibid.

THE CONVENTION ON THE 15TH OF JULY

National Committee

The National Committee for the American People was organized on July 1, 1938. The committee was organized by Elsie Bower Jones who had been in contact with the committee since the time of the trial, himself, and he was a member of the committee. Following the trial, the committee was organized and the committee was organized on the 15th of July. The committee was organized on the 15th of July.

The National Committee for the American People was organized on the 15th of July. The committee was organized on the 15th of July. The committee was organized on the 15th of July.

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Now, in 1952, the Republicans, meeting in the same city, faced the same problem.

The first contest to be heard was the Georgia conflict. The case involved the entire delegation of 17 delegate votes. The Tucker faction was reported to be 13 for Eisenhower, 2 for Taft, 1 for Warren on the first ballot.⁸⁵ The Foster faction was expected to cast all 17 of its votes for Taft.⁸⁶

The National Committee heard arguments from both sides on July 2. The pro-Eisenhower group expected Georgia's National Committeeman Harry Sommers, a member of the Tucker faction, to speak in favor of seating the Tucker group, despite his personal support of Taft. This speech never came. Later when the Foster faction said they would support Sommers for re-election as National Committeeman, the Tucker faction accused Sommers of being a traitor.⁸⁷

The Eisenhower leadership felt reasonably sure that their supporters would be seated. They had grounds for their optimism. The so-called "Georgia Regulars" had been seated in both 1944 and 1948. This feeling was strengthened; because, as mentioned, the Georgia National Committeeman was a member of that faction.⁸⁸

However, Sommers choose to desert the Tucker group for the

⁸⁵Atlanta Constitution, June 3, 1952.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷On the first nominating ballot after changes, the Georgia delegation voted 16 to 1 for Eisenhower. The lone hold out for Taft was Sommers. Later W. Roscoe Tucker was selected to succeed Harry Sommers as national committeeman.

⁸⁸Newsweek, Vol. 40, (July 14, 1952), pp. 21-22.

Now, in 1967, the Department has received a number of requests for more information.

The first request was received from the Department of the Interior, which was involved in the study of the effects of the proposed project on the environment. The Department has been asked to provide information on the effects of the project on the environment, and on the effects of the project on the economy.

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one headed by Foster. The National Committee, under Taft's control, also reversed precedent and seated the Foster (Taft) faction by a vote of 62 to 39.⁸⁹

The Louisiana contest involved 13 of the state's 15 votes. The two votes not contested were Taft delegates. The National Committee allowed each side 90 minutes to present its case. The pro-Eisenhower faction led by John M. Wisdom presented numerous witnesses and affidavits in support of their argument charging Taft supporters with "stealing" delegates. John E. Jackson presented the pro-Taft argument without witnesses or affidavits. The National Committee in closed session voted to give Eisenhower 2 delegates of the contested 13. Thus the Georgia delegation, as approved by the National Committee, was expected to vote 13 for Taft, 2 for Eisenhower.

The Texas question involved 38 delegate votes. The question before the National Committee was whether to seat the faction led by National Committeeman Henry Zweifel, which was split 34 for Taft and 4 for Eisenhower, or the Porter slate which was divided 33 for Eisenhower and 5 for Taft. National Committee Chairman Guy Gabrielson opened the Texas session on July 4, by reading a telegram from Herbert Hoover urging each side to select a representative to meet with him and see "if we could find a basis of agreement."⁹⁰

Gabrielson next read a letter from Taft giving a detailed analysis of the Texas situation. Taft proposed a compromise that

⁸⁹David, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol. 3, p. 102.

⁹⁰David, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol. 1, p. 70.

was passed by a vote of 52 to 47. The two voices not mentioned were those of the Louisiana delegation.

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would give Taft 22 delegates and Eisenhower 16.⁹¹ Taft said that this offer was so "generous that its equity cannot be questioned,"⁹²

Senator Lodge, speaking for the Eisenhower leadership, rejected both offers. Lodge said,

I cannot imagine anything more undemocratic than for three men in a private meeting to arrogate unto themselves the power to disenfranchise many thousands of Americans.⁹³

To Taft's offer Lodge replied simply, "The General is a no deal man."⁹⁴

The National Committee thereupon approved the Taft proposal giving Taft 22 and Eisenhower 16 delegates by a vote of 60 to 41. This vote came after an attempt to seat the entire Porter faction had been voted down by a 58 to 43 vote.⁹⁵

The National Committee, strongly controlled by Taft men, thought they had aided Taft's cause on the contested delegations. Of the 68 contested southern delegations Taft had been given 50, Eisenhower 16. However, subsequent events revealed that it had given the General an issue with which to attack Taft, win delegates and appeal to the nation.

⁹¹For full Text, Official Proceedings of the 25th Republican National Convention, pp. 207-209.

⁹²Ibid., p. 209.

⁹³New York Times, July 5, 1952.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵David, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol. 1, p. 70.

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Texas as an Issue

The Texas Republican State Convention at Mineral Wells on May 27, 1952, received nation-wide attention. Extensive articles appeared in such leading publications as The New York Times, Time, Newsweek and Life.⁹⁶ Texas newspapers were also unanimous in their condemnation of the convention action. One editorial said,

The unvarnished version of the Texas Republican Convention at Mineral Wells a few days ago should go in the record with gloves off Many thousands of good Texans, feeling that Mr. Taft is an honorable and able man, favor his candidacy. But not one of them, in good conscience, would condone the fraud and deceit practiced by the Texas Taft machine in the illegal seating of many delegates that gave them control of the convention.⁹⁷

The Taft forces remained adamant in arguing that they had prevented the Democrats from taking over the Republican Party in Texas.

Eisenhower supporters throughout the nation began to make the most of the Texas issue. Taft appearing as a guest on Columbia Broadcasting System's television show "See It Now," asserted that the Eisenhower forces were trying to make an issue out of Texas, and "I think they'd rather have the issue than the delegates."⁹⁸ Taft was only partly right. The General needed an issue, and he needed delegates; but he could not get the delegates without an issue. Now he had one issue. The Texas contest went deeper than a contest for delegates or even a moral issue. The real problem was that Eisenhower

⁹⁶See: The New York Times, May 25, 1952 and May 26, 1952; Time, June 9, 1952, pp. 20-22; Newsweek, July 9, 1952, pp. 25-26, 100; Life, June 9, 1952, pp. 41-44.

⁹⁷Dallas Morning News, June 1, 1952.

⁹⁸New York Times, June 4, 1952.

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had declared himself so late in the campaign that his only hope of success was to capture the uncommitted delegates and to "cancel commitments already made to Taft."⁹⁹

To Taft, these delegate fights were the normal course of events which would be settled by the National Committee, the Convention Credentials Committee and, if needed, the convention itself. This was the normal course of action. The leader who controlled the National Committee and the convention would determine the results. If this were not true, then what was the value of controlling the party machinery or the value of the machinery itself?

The Texas issue became the core of the first Eisenhower crusade. It was led by Lodge and Dewey. With self-righteous indignation they turned the whole affair into a struggle of "good versus evil."¹⁰⁰ Eisenhower, in a Denver speech stated, "I will roar across the country for a clean decent operation."¹⁰¹ In a nationally televised speech from Ames, Iowa, he stated the issue was a:

straight issue between right and wrong Political integrity and majority rule are the cornerstones of American Government. Those who seek to ignore them or scoff at them or destroy them, do damage not only to our party but to the nation. It is because these issues are at stake that I am in this fight.¹⁰²

Other Eisenhower leaders charged Taft with "chicanery," "crookedness,"

⁹⁹Richard C. Bain, Convention Decisions and Voting Records (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute, 1960), p. 280.

¹⁰⁰William S. White, The Taft Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 177.

¹⁰¹New York Times, June 28, 1952.

¹⁰²New York Times, July 4, 1952.

"theft." In Texas, Eisenhower referred to the Texas Taft Republicans as "rustlers".¹⁰³

The decisions of the National Committee added fire to the Eisenhower charges. The ban on television was a significant part of the crusade.

Nothing since the campaign had started had given such impetus to the Ike campaign as the Committee ban on T. V. The ban made them wonder if Ike's charges that he was being robbed of delegates might not be justified.¹⁰⁴

The Committee's action in awarding 50 contested delegates to Taft and only 16 to Eisenhower certainly did nothing to counter the charges that the Taft machine was stealing the nomination.

The Governors' Manifesto

A major attack on the Taft forces came from the annual Governors' Conference held at Houston, Texas. Most of the 25 Republican governors were present; and while the business of the conference was to deal with state problems, the attention centered on the upcoming Republican Convention. Dewey, attending the conference, sent a telegram on July 1, to the National Committee urging that the Credentials Committee's hearing be opened to television. "Let the people see and hear the evidence."¹⁰⁵ This was a pop-gun compared to the bomb which followed.

Governor Dan Thorton of Colorado and Governor J. Bracken Lee

¹⁰³Dallas Morning News, June 21, 1952.

¹⁰⁴Newsweek, Vol. 40, (July 4, 1952), p. 18.

¹⁰⁵David, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol. 1, p.

of Utah held a press conference on July 2, 1952. The following day they released a manifesto signed by 23 of the 25 Republican governors which had been privately prepared.¹⁰⁶ It urged that contested delegates not be allowed to vote in the national convention until after the contests had been settled.¹⁰⁷ This was more than a simple change in the rules of procedure. It was designed to hurt Taft. Under the rules of the Republican Convention and sanctioned by long practice, the temporary roll of delegates as made up by the National Committee had formed the basis for opening the convention. Delegates on this temporary roll could vote on any question whether the delegates were contested or uncontested. The one exception to this was that contested delegates could not vote on their own contest. They could, however, vote on other contested delegates.

The governors' manifesto stressed the moral aspect of their argument.

We believe that if contested delegations are permitted to vote on the seating of other contested state delegates, the Republican Party, no matter who ultimately may become the Republican nominee, will enter a vital and difficult campaign under a serious moral cloud.¹⁰⁸

The Eisenhower strategists recognized that the delegate strength of both Taft and Eisenhower was extremely close. The decision-making power seemed to be in the hands of the southern delegates, especially those contested delegations. In a close roll call on

¹⁰⁶The authors of this manifesto have not been publicly identified.

¹⁰⁷New York Times, July 3, 1952.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

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seating a contested delegation, the votes of the other contested delegates might provide the balance and determine who was seated. This in turn might be the determining factor in the fight for the nomination.

The manifesto also hurt Taft in its implications. It appeared that the 23 governors who had signed the manifesto were against Taft.¹⁰⁹ This was destined to have an effect on the uncommitted delegates. The manifesto also added fuel to the charge that Taft was attempting to steal the nomination.

Taft counter-attacked as best he could. He and Gabrielson charged the Eisenhower forces of trying to change the rules in the middle of the game. In a carefully reasoned reply, pointed to the historical precedents for continuing under the old rules, Gabrielson declared that in changing the rules,

We would make it possible for ruthless, selfish men to prevent any delegate from voting in the next Republican convention--merely by filing contests in every state and territory. And we would be taking this step, not in justice, equity or fair play, but for temporary political expediency.¹¹⁰

He also attacked the self-righteous attitude of Dewey and others. He pointed out that if the rule was so bad, why hadn't they changed it when they controlled the convention:

It is difficult for me to understand why some of those who controlled the Republican National Conventions in 1944 and 1948 did not seek such a rule then, but demand it now.¹¹¹

The governors' manifesto formed the basic part of the

¹⁰⁹Judah, The Unchosen, p. 254.

¹¹⁰New York Times, July 4, 1952.

¹¹¹Ibid.

meeting a constant situation, the value of the grain harvested
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Eisenhower strategy. The manifesto, transformed into a proposed amendment to the convention rules, was to provide an early vote. The strategy was that an early vote should be arranged on which the uncommitted delegates and even some committed to another candidate would find themselves forced to vote in a direction favorable to Eisenhower. This would serve to commit them to Eisenhower's fortunes by that much.¹¹²

The Eisenhower forces continued their pressure on Taft by maintaining their charges of "theft". Citizens for Eisenhower Committee took a full page advertisement in the Chicago Tribune which read in part:

The eyes of the nation are on you. The nation may differ as to WHO should be nominated. But the nation agrees that there must by no shadow of doubt that the winner of the Republican nomination--no matter who he may be--was honestly nominated, in a free and unrigged convention.¹¹³

The Taft force, recognizing the trouble ahead, made several attempts, behind the scene, to divide the disputed delegates with Eisenhower. Eisenhower leaders spurned any deal. They now had a moral issue, and moral issues could not be compromised. The influence this fight would have on the uncommitted delegates would outweigh the few delegates they might get from a deal with Taft. Dewey preferred to invoke the sixth Commandment, "Thou shalt not steal," and remain adamant.

Taft was wholly capable of dealing with a dispute over delegate credentials. But when Eisenhower refused to compromise and

¹¹²Bain, Convention Decisions and Voting Records, pp. 213-214.

¹¹³Judah, The Unchosen, p. 254, quoting the Chicago Tribune.

stood on morals, he was simply uncomprehending. "He had no genuine understanding of the meaning of what was afoot."¹¹⁴

It was in this atmosphere of evangelical fervor sweeping Chicago, that the delegates gathered. Eisenhower whistle-stopping to Chicago, filled his speeches with charges of "star chamber methods" and "smoke-filled rooms". The Eisenhower strategy had been carefully planned to reach a peak just before the convention. The governors' manifesto had been that peak.

¹¹⁴White, The Taft Story, p. 177.

CHAPTER V

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION

On Monday July 7, the 1952 Republican Convention was called to order in Chicago. The contest between Eisenhower and Taft was still neck and neck. On July 6, the Associated Press final tabulation of delegates showed Taft 438 uncontested delegates, 72 contested but temporarily seated for a total of 530. Eisenhower had 406 uncontested, 21 contested but temporarily seated for a total of 427. This tabulation reported 118 uncommitted delegates.¹¹⁵ Eisenhower, to win, had to get all of the uncommitted delegates plus some of the delegates committed to other candidates such as Earl Warren or Harold Stassen.

The Eisenhower strategy had been designed for this purpose. The key to success was the uncommitted delegates. In order to garner these delegates Eisenhower had to do more than win. He had to beat Taft. This may sound like a truism, but in essence the problem was to beat Taft. It appeared that Taft, with his solid core of ardent supporters and his control of the convention machinery, would be in a stronger position in a long series of balloting. Eisenhower must beat Taft on an early vote. He had to show that he, not Taft, controlled the majority of the delegates and hence the convention.

To capture the uncommitted delegates, Eisenhower had to first

¹¹⁵New York Times, July 6, 1952.

CHAPTER V

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION

On Monday July 7, the 1952 Republican Convention was called to order in Chicago. The contest between Eisenhower and Taft was still neck and neck. On July 6, the Associated Press Poll tabulation of delegates showed Taft 133 uncommitted delegates, 73 contested but temporarily seated for a total of 206. Eisenhower had 105 uncommitted, 21 contested but temporarily seated for a total of 126. This tabulation reported 118 uncommitted delegates. The Associated Press had to get all of the uncommitted delegates and some of the delegates committed to other candidates such as Earl Warren or Wendell Willkie. The Eisenhower strategy had been designed for this purpose. The key to success was the uncommitted delegates. In order to gather these delegates Eisenhower had to do more than win. He had to beat Taft. This was sound like a strategy, but in essence the problem was to beat Taft. It appeared that Taft, with his solid core of support and his control of the convention machinery, would be in a stronger position in a long series of balloting. Eisenhower must beat Taft on an early vote. He had to show that he, not Taft, controlled the majority of the delegates and hence the convention. To capture the uncommitted delegates, Eisenhower had to first

The New York Times, July 6, 1952.

cancel Taft's lead in delegates, for the elimination of all contested delegates would bring the General within 80 votes of Taft. To accomplish this would mean a rules change. Eisenhower felt he could depend on the nature of the governors' manifesto to gain enough votes to permit a rules change. After elimination of the contested delegates by the "fair play" rule, Eisenhower could then fight Taft for those contested delegates in a floor fight, which the General had a chance to win. A victory in these fights would show his strength to the uncommitted delegates and decisively defeat Taft in a convention that was controlled by Taft. It appeared a formidable task, but Eisenhower could hardly have asked for more favorable circumstances under which to achieve it.

Langlie Amendment

The first stage of the Eisenhower strategy developed almost immediately after the convention opened. On Monday, John W. Bricker of Ohio made the usual motion to adopt the previous rules. This would have premitted temporarily seated but contested delegates to vote on all contests other than their own. Contested delegates from Louisiana and Texas, for example, could vote to seat pro-Taft delegates from Georgia.

Governor Arthur B. Langlie of Washington, representing the pro-Eisenhower group, immediately offered a substitute for the Bricker motion. The Langlie Amendment¹¹⁶ provided that no contested delegate, if seated temporarily by less than a two-thirds majority of the

¹¹⁶For full text see Appendix A.

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National Convention, could vote on any other contested delegation until he himself was seated by a vote of the whole convention.¹¹⁷

Congressman Clarence J. Brown of Ohio immediately demanded recognition and proposed an amendment to the Langlie Amendment:

I move, Mr. Chairman, to amend the Langlie substitute by changing the figures 68 as appear in line 9, striking out those figures and substituting in place thereof the figure 61, and further to delete from the accompanying list of delegates the seven delegates from districts of Louisiana who were not under contest before the National Committee, and under this rule, in my opinion, and I believe in the opinion of almost everyone, should not be under contest here.¹¹⁸

Brown's contention was that the 7 delegates had been contested, and the contests were decided by the state committee of Louisiana in accordance with the 1948 convention rules. Brown's amendment raised the question as to whether the convention could adopt a rule which would operate retroactively to deny seats assigned by previously accepted rules. Brown charged that if this were true, it would be possible for anyone to offer an amendment to the rules and "place the legality of every district delegate in peril."¹¹⁹

The Brown Amendment was an attempt to present a narrow legalistic issue in which the merits were on the Taft side of the case. In the confusion of the convention hall fine legal distinctions were impossible.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷Republican National Committee, Official Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Republican National Convention, reported by George L. Hart, Official Reporter (Chicago, 1952), p. 27.

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 29.

¹¹⁹Bain, Convention Decisions and Voting Records, p. 281.

¹²⁰David, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol. 1, p.

National Government, would vote on any other constitutional amendment until he himself was elected by a vote of the whole government. The Government of the United States, however, is not a democracy, and recognition and respect for the rights of the people is not a matter of course.

I have, Mr. Chairman, to make a few remarks on the subject of changing the figure of the dollar. It is a matter of great importance, and one which has been discussed for many years. The dollar is the basis of our currency, and it is essential that it should be maintained at a level which will enable us to compete with the world. I believe it is the duty of the Government to maintain the dollar at a level which will enable us to do so.

There is a question as to whether the dollar should be maintained at its present level, or whether it should be raised. It is a question which has been discussed for many years, and it is one which is of great importance to the United States. It is a question which is of great importance to the United States, and it is one which is of great importance to the United States. It is a question which is of great importance to the United States, and it is one which is of great importance to the United States.

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The debate on the Langlie Amendment and the Brown Amendment lasted for two hours. Both sides appealed to the convention for "fair play"--defined differently. The Taft forces argued that it was against the principles of fair play to change the rules in the middle of the game. Delegate Clarence A. Barnes of Massachusetts argued, "Rules and procedures were not made for a day."¹²¹

Although the pro-Taft speakers cited the precedent of 24 conventions, it became obvious that they had abandoned hope of carrying Bricker's original motion. Bricker himself proposed to accept the Langlie substitute if Langlie would accept Brown's amendment.¹²²

The Taft arguments were closed by Senator C. Wayland Brooks of Illinois and Charles I. Dawson of Kentucky. Dawson pointed out the inconsistency in the Langlie argument. For example, Dawson showed the illogic of agreeing to allow contested delegates--against whom the original charge was that they had obtained their credentials by fraud--to vote before being seated by the convention, even if seated on the temporary roll by vote of the National Committee.¹²³

The pro-Eisenhower supporters argued that it was a transgression of fair play principles to allow delegates whose credentials were in question to vote on questions of credentials for other delegates in whose success or failure they had a common interest. They noted the importance of the Republicans to enter the general election without

¹²¹Republican National Committee, Official Report . . ., p. 33.

¹²²Bain, Convention Decisions and Voting Records, p. 282.

¹²³Ibid.

any charges of corruption.¹²⁴

If the purpose of the Brown Amendment was to appeal to the moderates and uncommitted delegates by trying to show Eisenhower was too greedy, it did not work. The Brown Amendment was defeated on a roll call by a vote of 658 to 548. The Eisenhower delegates had gained support from both Warren and Stassen. The California delegation cast all 70 of its votes against the Brown Amendment, and Stassen's Minnesota delegates had given all 28 of their votes to the Eisenhower group. The two large uncommitted delegations, Michigan and Pennsylvania, supported the Eisenhower forces. Michigan voted 45 against to 1 for, and Pennsylvania 57 against to 13 for the Brown Amendment.¹²⁵

After their defeat on the Brown Amendment, the Taft forces moved the adoption of the Langlie Amendment. It was unanimously carried by a voice vote.¹²⁶

The significance of the Brown vote may be over-rated. However, while it did not mean that the Warren, Stassen, or uncommitted delegates were now in the Eisenhower camp, it was "ominous in that they had temporarily committed themselves to the Eisenhower crusade. Having once donned the garments of purity it was difficult to discard them."¹²⁷ The 548 votes for the Brown Amendment were also significant. These represented the rock-ribbed Taft supporters. While

¹²⁴Republican National Committee, Official Report . . ., p. 37.

¹²⁵Ibid., pp. 48-49.

¹²⁶Ibid., p. 50.

¹²⁷Judah, The Unchosen, p. 255.

548 was short of the 604 needed to nominate, it indicated the very solid Taft support and the control of those delegates. The significance of this solid support in a series of nominating ballots was disquieting to Eisenhower. Paul T. David concludes that if this vote did not stop Taft, he had almost certainly lost his chance to win on the first ballot.¹²⁸ It may also be concluded that in the face of this rock-ribbed support that Eisenhower must win on the first ballot or at least a very early ballot, as the history of Taft supporters in previous national conventions gave evidence of their personal attachment and loyalty to Taft. This core would serve Taft as solid support in a long series of nominating ballots.

Credentials Committee Action

On Tuesday, July 8, it was the credentials committee that occupied the spot light. The credentials committee was the second group to sit in judgement of the contested delegations; the first having been the national committee. The Eisenhower forces had little hope of winning the fight in the credentials committee; however, it was a necessary preliminary to the anticipated floor fight. It was to serve a purpose in the fight, however. These proceedings were to be televised and presented an opportunity to rally delegate and public support.

The credentials committee was constituted of 1 member from each delegation, irregardless of size. In theory the members would vote as individuals in a semi-judicial capacity, but in most cases

¹²⁸David, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol. 1, p. 76.

it could be assumed that they were in agreement with the majority sentiment in their respective delegations.

The Georgia contest, because it was first alphabetically, was the first to be heard; and because it was first, it assumed crucial significance. The credentials committee, after hearing arguments, voted 3 to 21 to sustain the National Committee and seat the pro-Taft Foster faction.¹²⁹ The minority vote of 21 states plus the Virgin Islands represented states with a total of 646 delegate votes. This was considerably more than a majority of the 1,138 votes that could be cast in the convention while contested delegations were unable to vote. Thus the Taft victory in the credentials committee could be read as an Eisenhower victory in the whole convention.¹³⁰

Senator Lodge issued the following statement after the Georgia vote:

The Georgia contest will now go to the floor of the convention, where 1206 delegates will have the final authority to decide the case on its merits. I am confident that the delegates, when they hear the presentation of the contest, will vote to seat the legally elected Eisenhower delegates from Georgia. The convention is a people's convention and we have always had complete confidence in the judgement of the delegates.¹³¹

Taft commented simply that he was pleased. He said the Foster faction was really the legal Republican Party in Georgia, and this had been decided by the Georgia courts.¹³²

¹²⁹Republican National Committee, Official Report . . ., p. 167.

¹³⁰David, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol. 1, p. 77.

¹³¹New York Times, July 9, 1952.

¹³²Ibid.

it could be assumed that they were in agreement with the majority sentiment in their respective delegations. The Georgia delegation, however, was first of all a body of individuals, the first to be heard and because it was first, it seemed almost significant. The resolution committee, after having announced, voted 3 to 2 to sustain the National Committee and send the resolution to the National Convention. The minority vote of 21 states and the 11th Island represented about a third of the delegates present. This was considerably more than a majority of the 1,138 votes that could be cast in the convention while the resolution committee would be vote. Thus the first victory in the resolution committee could be read as an important victory in the whole convention. 113

Senator Lodge issued the following statement after the Georgia

votes:

The Georgia convention will now go to the floor of the convention where 1,138 delegates will have the final authority to decide the case on the matter. I am confident that the delegates, who have heard the presentation of the matter, will vote to send the locally elected National Committee to the National Convention. The convention is a people's convention and we have always had complete confidence in the judgment of the delegates. 114

That committee simply that he was elected. He said the Georgia faction was really the local Republican Party in Georgia, and this had been decided by the Georgia voters. 115

Republican National Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1906-1912, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1912-1916, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1916-1920, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1920-1924, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1924-1928, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1928-1932, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1932-1936, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1936-1940, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1940-1944, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1944-1948, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1948-1952, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1952-1956, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1956-1960, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1960-1964, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1964-1968, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1968-1972, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1972-1976, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1976-1980, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1980-1984, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1984-1988, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1988-1992, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1992-1996, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
1996-2000, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2000-2004, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2004-2008, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2008-2012, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2012-2016, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2016-2020, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2020-2024, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2024-2028, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2028-2032, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2032-2036, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2036-2040, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2040-2044, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2044-2048, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2048-2052, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2052-2056, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2056-2060, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2060-2064, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2064-2068, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2068-2072, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2072-2076, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2076-2080, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2080-2084, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2084-2088, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2088-2092, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2092-2096, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.
2096-2100, Presidential Committee, Circular Letter, May 2, 1912.

The Louisiana contest was heard on Wednesday, July 9, before the credentials committee. Wisdom, arguing for the seating of his pro-Eisenhower faction, called this,

not just another southern contest. The hope of the Republican Party for future growth in the South will rest on your decision and so will the integrity and moral soundness of the Republican Party.¹³³

The committee adjourned early Wednesday morning without taking a vote. When the committee reconvened Wednesday morning, Delegate T. Eugene Worrel of Virginia made a motion in which the Taft forces proposed to give all 13 contested Louisiana delegates to Eisenhower instead of the 11 for Taft, 2 for Eisenhower split.¹³⁴ This motion was quickly approved by a 50 to 0 vote. This proposal was apparently an attempt to remove the stigma of "steal" that was attached to Taft's candidacy and to be a peace offering by Taft.

This proposal was rebuffed by the Eisenhower leaders. Lodge said that both the Georgia and Texas contests would be brought to the convention floor

since they are stains on the integrity of our party that we must erase if we are to go to the people with clean hands and ask them to have faith in our party to lead the nation in the years that lie ahead.¹³⁵

Eisenhower could not deal or bargain. It was not a political convention but a crusade: "Charismatic leadership requires perfect virtue in the leader."¹³⁶

¹³³New York Times, July 10, 1952.

¹³⁴Ibid.

¹³⁵Ibid.

¹³⁶Judah, The Unchosen, p. 249.

The long anticipated Texas fight moved rather smoothly through the credentials committee. The committee voted 27 to 24 to adopt the "compromise" delegation which had originally been suggested by Taft. This gave Taft 22 delegates and Eisenhower 16 delegates. This compromise failed to please either of the contending Texas delegations.¹³⁷

The effect of the credentials committee seemed to be to uphold Taft and to strengthen his position with the whole convention. However in both the Georgia and Texas votes, the minority group represented more than a majority of the delegates. These members of the credentials committee at least represented the views of the majority of their delegations. This would certainly modify any conclusion on a Taft victory in the committee.

In addition, the admission of television cameras into the committee hearings provided the General and his forces with an excellent opportunity to advertise their crusade. The Taft forces were unable to cope with this situation. They had been hurt when they refused to allow television into the national committee hearings.¹³⁸ To insist on the ban again would have caused additional impetus to the charge that Taft was stealing the nomination. To admit television was to give Eisenhower a platform from which to influence delegates.

So the credentials committee settled nothing. The situation remained much the same. Taft had attempted to compromise with Eisenhower on Louisiana and been rebuffed. The final decision was yet to be made on the convention floor.

¹³⁷David, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol. 1, p. 78.

¹³⁸Newsweek, Vol. 40, (July 21, 1952), p. 23.

The long anticipated Texas fight would shortly follow the credentials committee. The committee voted 27 to 23 to allow the "protestant" delegation which had originally been suspended to vote. This gave half 23 delegates and Eisenhower 12 delegates. The protestant failed to please either of the remaining Texas delegations. The effort of the credentials committee seemed to be to keep Telf and to strengthen the coalition with the whole convention. Even in both the Georgia and Texas votes, the minority group seemed to have more than a majority of the delegates. These matters in the credentials committee at least represented the views of the majority of their delegations. This would certainly modify any association on a full victory in the committee.

In addition, the addition of California seemed into the committee hearings provided the General and his forces with an excellent opportunity to emphasize their crusade. The Telf forces were unable to cope with this situation. They had been hurt when they refused to allow California into the national committee hearings. To insist on the ban again would have caused additional damage to the charges that Telf was obstructing the nomination. To avoid California was to give Eisenhower a picture of a picture of a picture. As the credentials committee worked nothing. The situation remained much the same. Telf had attempted to compromise with Eisenhower on Louisiana and been rebuffed. The final decision was yet to be made on the convention floor.

David, Presidential Nomination Process in 1952, Vol. 1, p. 177.

Eisenhower, Vol. 40, (July 22, 1952), p. 177.

On the Convention Floor

While the credentials committee was holding hearings, the convention was listening to a series of speeches designed to fill the time until the committee could report. The committee sent word that it would be prepared for the Wednesday night meeting.

The Wednesday evening meeting opened promptly and in an aura of anticipation. Another floor fight seemed inevitable, and the nomination might depend on the outcome.

Delegate Ross Rizley of Oklahoma, chairman of the credentials committee took the platform to deliver the majority report. The first report was on the Florida delegates. The majority report was unanimously accepted by a voice vote. Then came Georgia. This was the key vote. As the Georgia decision went so would that of Texas.

Chairman Rizley moved to seat the Georgia delegates on the temporary roll. Immediately Donald Eastvald, an Eisenhower supporter from Washington, presented the minority report of the credentials committee on Georgia.

Each side was allowed 45 minutes in which to present its case. The minority report stressed the fact that the pro-Eisenhower Tucker faction had been seated in both the 1944 and 1948 conventions. They also pointed out that Tucker was the state chairman, and that this group had fulfilled the financial quota requirement set up by the national committee.¹³⁹

The majority relied more on the decisions of the national committee and majority credentials decision. They stated that a

¹³⁹Bain, Convention Decisions and Voting Records, p. 283.

reversal of these decisions would discredit those bodies and therefore the party that had selected them. They also referred to the judgement of a Georgia judge who had declared the Foster faction to be the legitimate party of Georgia.

Senator Dirksen of Illinois, speaking for the majority report, almost precipitated a riot. He remarked to the New York delegation, where Governor Dewey sat as delegation chairman, that the Republican Party "had a habit of winning conventions and losing election." He then mentioned Dewey by name and stated, "We followed you before and you took us down the road to defeat."¹⁴⁰ The convention became an uproar. Some delegates were cheering Dirksen for his public attack on Dewey, while others were booing him for his attack on the party's titular leader before a nation-wide television audience. Whether Dirksen's speech hurt or helped Taft is conjecture.

The Eisenhower group, pressing the advantage gained in the Brown vote, took the opportunity to show its strength and to further draw uncommitted delegates into the Eisenhower camp by demanding a roll call. For the second time Eisenhower scored an impressive convention victory as the minority report was accepted by the convention, 607 to 531.¹⁴¹

An examination of the state delegation votes on both the Brown Amendment and the Georgia contest shows that there was a close relationship. A significant shift was in the Michigan delegation.

¹⁴⁰David, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol. 1, p. 80.

¹⁴¹Bain, Convention Decisions and Voting Records, p. 284.

There had been only one vote against the rules change. On seating Georgia there were 14 against the minority report. This was the first indication of Taft's strength in this important uncommitted delegation. It was far below Taft's expectation.

A closer examination shows that if the delegate voting had held firm from one vote to another, it should have been 640 to 498;¹⁴² instead it was 607 to 531. Two important factors appear in this. First that the Brown vote was not a true indicator. Richard C. Bain reports that the correlation between the Brown vote and the eventual nominating ballot was $+ .74$.¹⁴³ While this is generally high, the figure was probably lowered by the many delegates who felt pressure to vote with Eisenhower on this issue but had not decided to vote for Eisenhower himself. On the Georgia vote the correlation was $+ .81$. This is more indicative of the factional division.

The second significant factor was the lack of Taft strength among the uncommitted delegates. The Brown vote might be written off as a moral vote, but the Georgia vote was on an issue of Taft versus Eisenhower delegates. It meant votes for one or the other. Taft picked up 13 votes among the Michigan delegates. In the Pennsylvania delegation he gained only 5. In Maryland he gained only 4. It would seem that Eisenhower was going to win the southern contested delegates and the uncommitted delegates as well.

The Texas contest appeared to be the showdown. Again Chairman Rizley moved the acceptance of the majority report of the credentials

¹⁴²Omitted were the 68 votes ruled out by the Langlie Amendment.

¹⁴³Bain, Convention Decisions and Voting Records, p. 286.

There had been only one vote against the union among the delegates. Georgia there were 13 against the minority report. This was the first indication of left strength in this important caucus delegation. It was the before that's expectation.

A closer examination shows that 11 the delegate voting had held their own one vote to another. It should have been 10 to 10. Instead it was 10 to 11. Two important factors appear in this. First that the Brown vote was not a true indicator. Second, 11. This reports that the correlation between the Brown vote and the eventual nominating ballot was 10 to 11. While this is generally right, the figures was probably favored by the many delegates who felt pressure to vote with Eisenhower or this cause but not decided to vote for Eisenhower himself. On the basis vote the correlation was 10 to 11. This is not indicative of the traditional division.

The second significant factor was the lack of left strength among the uncommitted delegates. The Brown vote might be written off as a casual vote, but the Georgia vote was an example of left versus Eisenhower delegates. It meant votes for one or the other. Left picked up 13 votes among the Michigan delegates. In the Iowa delegate delegation he gained only 5. In Michigan he gained only 1. It would seem that Eisenhower was going to win the southern contested delegates and the uncommitted delegates as well.

The Texas contest appeared to be the shakedown. Again Eisenhower picked up the acceptance of the majority report of the Credentials

11. Outlined were the 58 votes picked out by the Credentials Committee.
11. Again, Convention delegates and voting delegates, 11.

committee. Again Eastvald moved the minority report. Each side was allocated 45 minutes for debate. A surprise move came after the debate had raged for an hour and a half. Delegate Ernest Palmer, Jr. of Iowa, a Taft supporter, moved that the convention "unanimously support the substitute motion to adopt the minority report."¹⁴⁴ This motion, unanimously adopted, ended the dispute and Eisenhower gained 38 Texas delegates.

Anticipating an adverse vote as had been the case in the Georgia contest, the Taft leaders had wanted to avoid another roll call defeat. Of this, Taft said in his memorandum:

We were 38 votes short of winning the Georgia contest and apparently the same votes would have prevailed in the contest on Texas.¹⁴⁵

The Nomination

The actual business for which the delegates had assembled came on Thursday, the fourth day of the convention. The convention was ready to nominate a candidate.

As the roll call began, Alabama yielded to Illinois. The eloquent Everett Dirksen, who had already stirred the convention into an uproar, nominated Robert A. Taft. Dirksen presented Taft as "Mr. Republican, Mr. Integrity and Mr. American". He was contrasted with those who had led and lost the last four elections. Dirksen said these "were so occupied with the engaging task of dividing America into economic, social and minority groups that they forgot

¹⁴⁴Republican National Committee, Official Report . . ., p. 71.

¹⁴⁵New York Times, November 25, 1959, Section C., p. 14.

the American vote.¹⁴⁶ This was the vote that Taft would call upon to win.

Senator William Knowland of California nominated the second candidate--Governor Earl Warren of California. Warren's chances of victory would depend on a deadlock between Taft and Eisenhower after which the convention might turn to him.

The third candidate, Dwight D. Eisenhower, was nominated by Governor Theodore R. McKeldin of Maryland.¹⁴⁷ Governor McKeldin stressed the identification of Eisenhower's name with victory. Not only was he a man upon whom all Republicans could unite but all Americans.

The fourth nomination was Harold Stassen of Minnesota, who was nominated by Mr. C. Edward Howard of Minnesota. Finally the last nominee, General Douglas MacArthur, was placed in nomination by Delegate Fred Coogan of Oklahoma. After the demonstration the convention recessed at 2:34 A.M.

The convention reconvened at 11:40 on Friday, July 12, for the first roll call. The vote was interrupted for numerous polling of the delegations. Midway through the balloting--after Montana, the twenty-fourth state--the totals stood: Eisenhower 256, Taft 228, Warren 71, Stassen 20, MacArthur 1. New York split 92 to 4 for Eisenhower. Pennsylvania divided 53 to 15 for the General. As the

¹⁴⁶Republican National Committee, Official Report . . ., p. 72.

¹⁴⁷Maryland's 24 delegates had been instructed by the state convention to vote the first ballot for Governor McKeldin. However, during a caucus on Monday July 7, Governor McKeldin announced he would nominate Eisenhower. The delegation eventually gave 16 votes to Eisenhower, 8 to Taft.

the previous vote, and this was the first time since 1892

to date.

Senator William Jennings Bryan, who had been

candidate for Governor of Nebraska in 1892, was

again nominated for Governor of Nebraska in 1896.

which the convention elected the following

the first candidate, Judge E. A. Hoar, of Nebraska.

Governor Theodore Tilton, of Nebraska, who

expressed the intention of resigning his office, was

only one of a man upon whom all Republicans could unite and

act.

The fourth nomination was David C. Hoar, of Nebraska, who

was nominated by Mr. C. Hoar, second of Nebraska, who

nominated General Douglas Houghton, who had been

Deputy Chief of Police of Omaha, at the same time

also received 23,000 votes.

The convention recommended at 10:30 on Friday, July 12, 1896,

the first roll call. The vote was distributed as follows:

of the delegates. Henry Brown, the delegate from Nebraska, the

twenty-fourth minute of the session. The roll call was

Henry W. Stassen 20, MacArthur 1, New York 1, and 100

eleven. Henry W. Stassen divided 22 to 10 Stassen, and the

the following National Committee, William H. Stassen, of Nebraska.

Henry W. Stassen's 21 delegates had been named to the

convention to vote the first roll call on Friday, July 12, 1896.

during a session on Monday, July 13, Governor Hoar, who had

would not be Stassen, the delegate from Nebraska, was

vote moved on it became apparent that Eisenhower would come close to the 604 votes needed to nominate. At the end of the roll call the vote stood: Eisenhower 595, Taft 500, Warren 81, Stassen 20, MacArthur 10.¹⁴⁸

Then Minnesota began to signal for recognition. When recognized, senior Senator Thye, speaking for his delegation, put an end to the balloting. Senator Thye said, "Mr. Chairman, Minnesota wishes to change its vote to Eisenhower."¹⁴⁹

It was all over with the switch of Minnesota's votes. Minnesota had previously voted 9 for Eisenhower, 19 for Stassen; thus Minnesota put Eisenhower over by 614 to Taft's 500.

Senator Knowland of California and Senator Bricker of Ohio shared the honor of making the motion to make the vote unanimous. The Eisenhower victory was made unanimous, but the acceptance was not unanimous.

A typical reaction was the statement made by Judge Charles I. Dawson of Kentucky:

These bandwagon fellows are going to wake up on election day and find that instead of jumping on a bandwagon, they've been taking a ride on a hearse. They're taking a hearse trip to a grave that can't be dug deep enough to cover up the corpses of malicious and even dishonest conduct which has characterized the Eisenhower campaign on the floor.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸Bain, Convention Decisions and Voting Records, Appendix D.

¹⁴⁹David, Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, Vol. 1 p. 94.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 97-98.

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The fissure between the two groups was deep. Significantly 280 die-hard delegates remained with Taft, refusing to shift their votes. Seventy-seven Warren delegates and 4 MacArthur delegates also refrained from changing their votes before the final motion.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been
admitted to the office of the Secretary of the State of New York
since the last report of the Secretary of the State of New York
was published.

COLTON COLLEGE
EVERETT
MITCHELL

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The fight for the 1952 Republican nomination was the result of two separate but related developments. One was the contest between Taft and Eisenhower for control of the party machinery. The second was the growing desire of newly active elements for a greater voice within the party and to revitalize the Republican Party.¹⁵¹ Both of these elements were present in the South. Eisenhower did not create "New Republicanism", but there was a mutual affinity between the man and the movement.

In the South, there was a growing insurgent movement, especially in Texas and Louisiana. It is important to remember that these movements had roots going back much farther than the Eisenhower candidacy. The southern fights were dominated by the problem of party realignment in the South. The problem was more complex than just which faction of the Republican Party was in the majority. It involved the question of whether and to what extent Democrats, former or otherwise, should be welcomed into the Republican Party in hope of using their support for a general election victory in November.¹⁵² Eisenhower took advantage of these movements and the movements used in Eisenhower's

¹⁵¹Ibid., p. 167.

¹⁵²Ibid.

The first of these is the fact that the
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Eisenhower utilized these insurgent movements in two ways. First he used the groups as a means to challenge Taft's delegates in the seating contests and to thus challenge Taft's control of the party machinery. Secondly, he used these contests to charge Taft with attempting to steal the nomination.

The southern contests were an extremely important part of the Eisenhower strategy. The decision in the national convention to seat the insurgents represented a real upset, a reversal of previous expectations from the point of view of the established state party leadership.¹⁵³

The means by which Eisenhower brought about this upset are politically significant. The first factor was the nature of the Republican Party in the South. It was extremely weak and subject to outside pressure. The organization was based upon patronage from the national level. The regulars had kept it dependent on patronage; and therefore built in their own defeat so that after almost twenty years of Democratic control of the national government, the southern Republican Party was hardly in existence. Consequently, the "regular" organization was vulnerable to the pressures of the rising insurgent groups. This group of "New Republicans" found their cause aided by the Eisenhower "crusade". With the General as a focal point, they developed increasing pressure on the existing organizations; and using him as a spiritual symbol, and the opinion polls as evidence of his potential, they were able to attack the existing

¹⁵³Ibid.

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organization on its own grounds---patronage. It was a cooperative project. Eisenhower badly needed the southern delegates in order to challenge Taft's control of the national machinery. The insurgent groups needed Eisenhower's support in order to be seated at the convention and thus establish their claim to legitimacy and patronage.

Taft, in his "Analysis of the Results of the Chicago Convention,"¹⁵⁴ wrote of the events as he saw them. Taft points out the importance of the contested southern delegates. Eisenhower used the southern delegations in two ways. He needed their votes in the convention. This was important, but was secondary in the eventual outcome. Eisenhower found that their greatest value was in creating an issue on which to attack Taft directly. Taft, in his memorandum, points out that "four-fifths of the influenced newspapers were opposed to me continuously and vociferously and many turned themselves into propaganda sheets for my opponents."¹⁵⁵ He thus contends that it was this control of the press that allowed Eisenhower to make a moral issue out of the Texas dispute.

It was Texas as a moral issue that made all that followed possible. With Texas as an issue, built on the insurgent movements, Eisenhower was able to take the initiative away from Taft and to place him in the position of defending what Eisenhower described as "a steal".

The establishment of Texas as a moral issue made possible the governors' manifesto and brought Eisenhower's first string into play.

¹⁵⁴New York Times, November 27, 1959.

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

For it was the Texas issue that enabled the governors to bring pressure on their delegations in the form of national newspaper campaigns. The governors had more influence with the delegates of their states, especially through patronage, than did the Senators and Congressmen. The governors' manifesto was important to the Eisenhower strategy since it would provide for a rule change that would increase the chances of seating pro-Eisenhower delegates from the South. The publicly issued manifesto also served to put the spotlight of public attention on the rules change and to increase the sensitivity of the delegates to public opinion and political pressure from home.

In the convention, the rules fight provided the first glimpse of the effectiveness of the Eisenhower strategy. By making the southern delegate contests a public issue on which he would not compromise, Eisenhower had placed the pressure of public opinion on the uncommitted delegates. The morality question made it easy for the uncommitted delegates to support Eisenhower on the rules change. By thus supporting him, they had become less uncommitted and had given Eisenhower, in effect, a vote of confidence.

By changing the rules, the convention had placed at least a psychological smear on any attempts to accept the credentials committee reports. The acceptance of the "fair play" amendment certainly placed a cloud of doubt on the morality of the "regular" organizations from the South.

Thus when the vote came on the Georgia contest, the convention had already given a vote of confidence to Eisenhower on the Langlie Amendment and weakened the historical relationship between the

Southern Republicans and the national machinery. In addition the momentum of the convention had shifted to Eisenhower, and uncommitted delegates would find it difficult to buck the tide.

Taft's defeat on the Georgia issue served both to illustrate the extent of the Eisenhower momentum and furthered that momentum. The extent to which Eisenhower captured the uncommitted delegates on the Georgia vote revealed the handwriting on the wall.

The uncommitted delegates were the key to the nomination. Even if Taft had received all of the contested southern delegations, he would not have been nominated on the first ballot. The question for both candidates was how to win the uncommitted delegates.

Taft proposed to control the party machinery, overwhelm Eisenhower in the pre-convention fighting, and to leave the uncommitted delegates with no choice but to accept him. This type of power politics and heavy handed use of the national machinery could best be used in the southern contests. If Taft could seat the contested southern delegates through his control of the machinery, it would place him very close to the number needed for nomination. Once this close he could use his powerful machinery to hammer enough delegates into line to go over the top. The key in Taft's strategy was the southern delegation. He would need their votes to get close enough; and secondly, he would use the contested delegation fight to exhibit his control of the national machinery and his power within the organization.

The Eisenhower strategy also evolved around the southern delegations. Here was the softest part of the Taft organization--the group most vulnerable to pressure. Eisenhower supporters adroitly

utilized the patronage-starved weakness of the southern delegations as the source for their own strength.

Eisenhower also needed the contested delegations. He needed their votes to get close enough to Taft to contest the nomination. However, he would use the contests to attack Taft, to create a public issue of the battle between the insurgents and the regulars, and to influence the uncommitted delegations. Where Taft hoped to hammer the uncommitted into his camp, Eisenhower sought to draw their support by wresting control of the convention from Taft. This he was able to do by using the contested delegation fights to show his strength.

The political prestige of an uncommitted delegation depends greatly on its support of the eventual winner. Eisenhower's public strength with voters was an important factor. However, it seems that his leaders also made better use of his strength than did Taft's; and instead of forcing them into his camp as Taft attempted, they were able to lure them into the fold willingly.

It can be concluded then that one of the main factors in the final deposition of the uncommitted delegations was Eisenhower's victory in the contested southern delegation fights. Eisenhower was able to win, because he took advantage of the weak southern organizations. Already weak because of the nature of its leadership and lack of patronage, the regular organization was further weakened by their defeat in the convention. The southern wing of the party was bound to Taft by ideology and tradition. In addition it needed support from the national committee to maintain its position. Its defeat in the convention resulted in seating the insurgents and a

new alliance of state and national leaders. The need by the regulars of the South for support from the national committee controlled by Taft, and also the need for patronage which seemed more likely to come from Eisenhower, subjected the state organizations to cross pressures. As a result the insurgent movement was able to press home its demands for recognition.

It was the pressure of the demands that made the Eisenhower campaign a success. In effect, Eisenhower made use of local rebellions to attack and defeat Taft and win the campaign. The spoils of the battle were the uncommitted delegations, but the battle was over the contested southern delegations.

APPENDIX A

The following is the complete text of the rules change known as the Langlie Amendment:

RESOLVED. That until the permanent organization is effected and permanent rules adopted this Convention be governed by the rules of the National Convention of 1948; provided that no person on the temporary roll of the Convention whose right to be seated as a delegate or alternate is being contested, except those placed on the temporary roll by the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the members of the National Committee, namely the 68 persons listed as delegates and the 68 persons listed as alternates in the list now handed to the Secretary of the Convention--the delegates and alternates listed include all the delegates and alternates listed on the temporary roll of Georgia, Louisiana, except Districts 4 and 5, and all the delegates and alternates from Texas--shall be entitled to vote in the Convention or in any committee thereof until by vote of the Convention the contest as to such person has been finally decided and such person has been permanently seated, except that each such contest shall be determined separately and decided before the next such contest is taken up and that any such person so seated shall forthwith be entitled to vote in the Convention or in any committee thereof to the membership of which he has been designated.

(Official Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth
Republican National Convention, pp. 27-28.)

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