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The Pre-Convention Campaign of 1936

Roy R. Banner

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
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THE PRE-CONVENTION CAMPAIGN OF 1936

MASTER OF ARTS

George W. ...
By

June 5, 1937
Roy R. Banner

Thesis committee
Thomas C. ...
A Thesis

**Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Government**

University of New Mexico

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PREFACE

In national politics there are two broad periods during every four years. The first period begins with the inauguration of the president-elect and continues until the selection at the nominating conventions of the party nominees for the next presidential campaign. The latter period deals with the endeavors of the political parties to elect their nominees in the presidential election.

This study is an examination of American political behavior during the first period; from March, 1933, to the convening of the national nominating conventions of the major parties in the summer of 1936. A review and evaluation of the Roosevelt Administration is followed by a chapter on the candidates seeking the presidential nomination. The chapter on the pre-convention technique of both parties, and the contest among aspirants within each party to become the presidential nominee completes the work.

The sources of this study are current publications, magazines, and The New York Times. The author utilizes the same methodology as did Dr. Roy V. Peel and Dr. Thomas C. Donnelly in their study of the 1932 presidential campaign entitled, The 1932 Campaign: An Analysis.

In national politics there are two broad periods during every four years. The first period begins with the inauguration of the president-elect and continues until the election at the nominating convention of the party nominees for the next presidential campaign. The latter period deals with the endowment of the political parties to elect their nominees in the presidential election.

This study is an examination of American political behavior during the first period, from March, 1912, to the convening of the national nominating conventions of the major parties in the summer of 1916. A review and evaluation of the necessary administration is followed by a chapter on the candidates seeking the presidential nomination. The chapter on the presidential campaign techniques of both parties, and the contest among aspirants within each party to become the presidential nominee comprises the work.

The sources of this study are current publications,

... and the author wishes to express his appreciation to the many individuals who assisted him in the study of the 1916 presidential campaign. The author wishes to express his appreciation to the many individuals who assisted him in the study of the 1916 presidential campaign.

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CHAPTER I

THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION

(1932-36)

The problems which faced the first Roosevelt Administration fall logically into five broad categories: Finance; Agriculture; Industry and Transportation; Relief and Public Works; and Foreign Affairs.

In developing each category the legislative situation will be described first. It will then be followed by a treatment of the administrative machinery created to carry out the legislation. And finally the effects of the legislation will be considered in the light of current information.

Let us now look at the record.

FINANCE

At the very advent of his inauguration, President Roosevelt had to overcome a serious financial crisis. The panic of depositors was the result of several factors: the effects of the depression; bad banking practices extending over a long period; and the absence of a sound national banking policy.¹

A banking panic in some section of the nation had been periodically occurring since the fall of 1930. Help

¹ "Balance Sheet of the New Deal", (supplement), New Republic, 87:140, June 10, 1936.

from stronger banks, local capitalists, and later, aid from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had at first succeeded in localizing each failure. Nevertheless, Nevada had a twelve day holiday late in 1930; and Louisiana, after several escapes, had a financial collapse in early 1933. On February 14, 1933, the Governor of Michigan issued a proclamation, which temporarily closed all banks throughout the state, in an attempt to straighten out the affairs of the \$51,000,000. Union Guardian Trust Company of Detroit. When the eight-day moratorium expired and no way had been found to reopen the Detroit banks, a national banking panic followed.²

By March 2, 1933, there were twenty-one states and the District of Columbia which had either suspended or restricted banking operations. On the eve of the president's inauguration, the panic had reached the financial centers of New York and Chicago, resulting in the announcement of banking holidays by the governors of New York and Illinois.³

President Hoover communicated with the president-elect, seeking his cooperation in mitigating the crisis.⁴ Responding, Roosevelt called at the White House in the

² Mauritz A. Hallgren, The Gay Reformer, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1935), pp. 104-06.

³ Louis M. Hacker, A Short History of the New Deal, (New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1934), pp. 74-77.

⁴ Mauritz A. Hallgren, op. cit. pp. 106-09.

latter days of 1932 and again in early 1933. However, the President-elect refused to cooperate with President Hoover in a joint attempt to restore the confidence of frenzied depositors. The following excerpt of a letter from Roosevelt to Hoover explains his point of view:

I think you will recognize that it will be unwise for me to accept an apparent joint responsibility with you when, as a matter of constitutional fact, I would be wholly lacking in any attendant authority.⁵

But in his inaugural address to a frightened nation, the new president removed all fears that he would not act immediately. He declared, in part:

The money changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of civilization . . . The only thing we have to fear is fear itself-- nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror.⁶

By the evening of inauguration day, the Cabinet had been confirmed by the Senate, sworn in at the White House, and had taken over their respective departments.

After prolonged conferences with his advisers and bankers, it became evident that the president had two broad alternatives from which to choose. Some of the President's advisers wanted to nationalize the banking system. The President thought better of Professor Holey and the bankers, and acted to salvage the status quo.⁷

⁵ Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Looking Forward. (New York: John May Co., 1933), pp. 261-63.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 265-67.

⁷ Mauritz A. Hallgren, Op. Cit., pp. 113-14.

ORIGINAL

A presidential Proclamation issued under the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917:

- (1) Ordered all banks closed from March 6 to March 9. (A further order on March 9 closed the banks until the President should make a contrary proclamation.)
- (2) Prohibited the withdrawal or transfer of gold or silver.⁸

On March 9, the Seventy-Third Congress met in a special session called by the President. It immediately passed the Emergency Banking Act without referring it to a committee in either House. This was a bill granting the government authority to reopen those banks already in sound condition and to reorganize those which were unsound. The act also authorized national banks to issue preferred stock in order to obtain additional capital.⁹

This action by the New Administration succeeded in quieting the panic spirit and restoring a measure of confidence. Two weeks after inauguration, a majority of the banks had been reopened and the holdings of the Federal Reserve system had been increased by \$327,000,000 in gold.¹⁰

Most citizens were stimulated by the fact that the President and Congress had actually accomplished something. Many among the Left did not, however, enjoy this transient optimism. Norman Thomas expressed this

⁸ Congressional Digest, 12:99-100, April, 1933.

⁹ United States Statutes At Large, 48,1:1-8, 1934.

¹⁰ Charles Merz, "Roosevelts First Year", The New York Times, Section VIII, March 4, 1934, pp. 1.

point of view:

The government saved the bankers from their own folly only to surrender the system back to them for their power and immense profit.¹¹

Neither was this enthusiasm reflected in general business conditions. The inflationary movement was becoming stronger because business conditions had not improved with the advent of the new Administration. This was apparent on April 17, 1933, when the farm-bill amendment authorizing the remonetization of silver was defeated by ten votes in the Senate. Two days later President Roosevelt yielded to the inflationists and declared an embargo on all exports of gold.

This action incensed the foreign press which protested that the United States was deliberately abandoning the gold standard in order that its bargaining position might become greater in the coming World's Economic Conference.¹²

The inflationists having gained Administration approval, the Senate on April 26 adopted their amendment to the farm bill. This measure empowered the President:

- (1) To provide for the expansion of credit by arranging for the purchase of three billion dollars of government bonds through the Federal Reserve Banks.
- (2) To issue three billion dollars in greenbacks.
- (3) To authorize the unlimited coinage of silver at a ratio with gold to be fixed within his

¹¹ Norman Thomas, "What Has Roosevelt Accomplished?", Nation, 136:399, April 12, 1933.

¹² Ernest Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution: First Phase, (New York: Viking Press, Inc., 1933), pp. 121.

100-100000

point of view

The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of the results of the study conducted by the author.

Method

Business records were obtained from the company's files.

Results

Results were obtained from the analysis of the data.

Conclusions

Conclusions were drawn from the results of the study.

References

References were made to the literature on the subject.

Appendix

Appendix A contains the raw data from the study.

Appendix B contains the results of the statistical analysis.

Appendix C contains the results of the regression analysis.

Appendix D contains the results of the correlation analysis.

Appendix E contains the results of the factor analysis.

Appendix F contains the results of the cluster analysis.

Appendix G contains the results of the discriminant analysis.

Appendix H contains the results of the principal component analysis.

Appendix I contains the results of the canonical discriminant analysis.

Appendix J contains the results of the linear discriminant analysis.

Appendix K contains the results of the quadratic discriminant analysis.

Appendix L contains the results of the cubic discriminant analysis.

Appendix M contains the results of the quartic discriminant analysis.

Appendix N contains the results of the quintic discriminant analysis.

Appendix O contains the results of the sextic discriminant analysis.

Appendix P contains the results of the septic discriminant analysis.

Appendix Q contains the results of the octic discriminant analysis.

Appendix R contains the results of the nonic discriminant analysis.

own discretion.

- (4) To reduce the gold content of the dollar by not more than fifty per cent. ¹³

After several days of debate in which right-wing Republicans made sound money their first direct issue with the New Deal, ¹⁴ the Agricultural Adjustment Act passed Congress with the inflation amendment as a rider.

Just before the special session adjourned, a joint resolution abolished the gold payment clause in all public and private obligations. This abandonment of the gold standard evoked violent criticism from the conservative press. Many critics were of the opinion that the repeal of the gold clause was a means of strengthening the bargaining position of the United States in the coming World's Economic Conference. ¹⁵

Public opinion demanded banking reform from Congress. Depositors lost millions with the failure of important banks to reopen after the national bank holiday. Congress was excited by information such as the Comptroller of the Currency during the Hoover Administration, John W. Cole, gave to a Senate sub-committee to the effect that defalcations of bank presidents were routine matters. ¹⁶ What thoroughly aroused public opinion and

¹³ United States Statutes At Large, 48,1:51-54.

¹⁴ Ernest Lindley, Op. Cit., pp. 121-122.

¹⁵ Mauritz A. Hallgren, Op. Cit., pp. 135.

¹⁶ E. Francis Brown, "American Recovery: First Phase", Current History, 38:455, July, 1933.

CHRONICLE

climaxed the impetus for banking reform was the Senate's Morgan Investigation.¹⁷

Completely supported by the President,¹⁸ the investigation began on May 23, 1933, despite vitriolic attacks on its merits by Senator Glass. According to an admirer, President Roosevelt encouraged wavering Senators to continue the probe in order

to establish definitely and expose the position of the bankers in the economic and political world as a necessary preliminary to reform.¹⁹

The disclosures of this investigation astounded observers. It was shown that neither Mr. Morgan nor any of his twenty partners paid an income tax either in 1931 or 1932 as a result of deficiencies in existing federal income tax laws. Among those who had been on a preferred stock list to subscribe to a Morgan subsidiary were two prominent figures now in the Roosevelt Administration; namely, Secretary of the Treasury Woodin, and Ambassador at Large Norman Davis. The control which Mr. Morgan had over railroad and utility empires, and his staggering profits in boom years were also sensational revelations. J. P. Morgan and Company was confirmed as a sinister power.²⁰

¹⁷ E. Francis Brown, "American Recovery: First Phase", Current History, 38:465, July, 1933.

¹⁸ Louis H. Hacker, A Short History of the New Deal, pp. 62.

¹⁹ Ernest K. Lindley, op. cit., pp. 138-39.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 140.

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of the bankers in the economic and political
world as a necessary preliminary to reform.

The disclosure of this investigation amounted to
nothing. It was shown that neither Mr. Norton nor any of
his twenty partners held an income tax claim in 1931 or
1932 as a result of delinquencies in existing federal in-
come tax laws. Among them was Paul W. Warburg, a
stock list in substance to a foreign subsidiary was the
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Mr. Norton and Company was confirmed as a sinister

power.

It is possible that "American Recovery First 1935,"
Nathan's history, 1935-1936, 1935.

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1935-1936.

Despite the strong impetus for banking reform, the Administration favored postponement until the regular session of Congress. The Administration was not in favor of the Glass-Steagall act being debated in Congress for two principal reasons. The President and the Secretary of the Treasury were in favor of government control over the Federal Reserve System. This was not incorporated in Senator Glass' bill as he desired the Federal Reserve System to remain the property of private bankers. But a deposit insurance provision was embodied in the Glass bill to which the Administration was opposed.²¹

However, during the closing days of the special session the Glass-Steagall act was enacted with the Administration's tacit approval.²² The act prohibited interlocking directorates between commercial and private banks and excluded private banks from doing both an investment and deposit business. Other provisions provided for deposit insurance and allowed national banks to establish branch banks in states whose laws allowed branch banking.²³

This measure severed investment from deposit banking, but placed no control over investment banking. Many liberals deemed it imperative that the government regulate

²¹ Ernest Lindley, op. cit., pp. 136-137

²² Louis W. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 63.

²³ "Record of Seventy-Third Congress", The New York Times, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1934.

investment banking in order to prevent future panics of the 1933 type.²⁴

After preliminary conversations between leading world statesmen had been held at Washington, the World's Economic Conference convened in London on June 12, 1933. The insistence of European delegations upon considering only the problem of currency stabilization caused other world problems to be relegated to the background. Secretary of the Treasury Woodin in a statement to the press on May 16 declared the United States would not agree to stabilization proposals. Although he had previously pledged the United States to such an agreement,²⁵ the President in a final note to the Conference emphatically rejected currency stabilization.²⁶

The Administration's belated conclusion was that the United States was absorbed in an internal inflationary program and could not sacrifice recovery gains for a world currency agreement. Louis Hacker observed that the President was choosing a policy of self-sufficiency instead of recovery by world agreement, and the possible revitalization once more of world trade. In the face of the decision of the United States, the Conference had no

24 Mauritz A. Hallgren, The Gay Reformer, pp. 226.

25 The New York Times, pp. 1, May 17, 1933.

26 Ibid., pp. 211.

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on May 15 declared the United States would not agree to
stabilization proposals. Although he had previously
pledged the United States to such an agreement,⁵⁵ the
President in a final note to the Conference emphatically
rejected currency stabilization.⁵⁶

The stabilizationists failed to recognize that
the United States was absorbed in an internal inflation-
ary program and could not sacrifice recovery gains for a
world currency agreement. Louis Brandeis observed that the
President was choosing a policy of self-sufficiency in-
stead of recovery by world agreement, and the possible
revitalization came out of world trade. In the face of
the decision of the United States, the Conference had no

⁵⁴ Maurice A. Miller, *The New England*, pp. 225.
⁵⁵ *The New York Times*, p. 1, May 17, 1933.
⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 211.

choice but to adjourn.²⁷

By the middle of October, 1933, prices had undergone serious reaction. The New York Times' index of business had declined from ninety-nine on July 15 to seventy-six and six-tenths on October 21.²⁸ A great decline in farm prices at a time when farm products were ready for the market resulted in a wave of farm strikes accompanied by violence.²⁹ Yielding again to the inflationists, particularly Professor Warren, President Roosevelt announced on October 22 the gold purchase plan to the American people. In his radio address, the President declared:

The United States must take firmly in its own hands the control of the gold value of our dollar....As a further effective means to this end, I am going to establish a government market for gold in the United States.³⁰

On October 25, 1933, the President announced that gold purchases would be extended into foreign markets at prices to be determined by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.³¹

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation began immediately to purchase gold and continued this operation for

²⁷ Louis M. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 55-57.

²⁸ Charles Mers, "Roosevelt's First Year", The New York Times, Section VIII, pp. 1, March 4, 1934.

²⁹ Louis M. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 57.

³⁰ "Official Statements by President Roosevelt on His Gold Policy", Congressional Digest, 13:12, January, 1934.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 13.

a number of months. Although the dollar soon declined in relation to foreign currencies, commodity prices did not rise correspondingly. By the end of 1933, although the dollar had depreciated approximately thirty-seven per cent, the wholesale price index had risen during the same period only eighteen per cent.³²

Regardless of its possible success, the gold-purchase plan was severely criticized by the conservative press. A prominent conservative Democrat, Alfred E. Smith, declared himself for "gold dollars as against baloney dollars."³³

Despite considerable conservative agitation and the failure of this manoeuvre to raise prices considerably, the President persevered in his course. Attempting to further stimulate prices, the President on December 21, 1933, ordered the Treasury to buy all the silver mined in the United States during the next four years at a price twenty-one cents above the market price.³⁴ When the commodity price of silver had risen from forty-three cents to sixty-four cents, the original Treasury price, the Treasury kept on raising its quotation until the price of silver was finally stabilized at seventy-seven cents an ounce.³⁵

32 The New York Times, January 1, 1934, pp. 4.

33 Alfred E. Smith, "An Open Letter to the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York", New Outlook, 188:9-10, December, 1933.

34 Charles Mera, op. cit., pp. 58.

35 Mauritz A. Hallgren, op. cit., pp. 130.

number of members. Although the dollar was declined in
the line to foreign currencies, especially where it was
the corresponding. By the end of 1933, although the
dollar had depreciated appreciably, thirty-seven per cent,
the wholesale price index had risen during the same period
only slightly less.

Depreciation of the domestic currency, the mis-
management and severe criticism of the conservative
policy, a prominent conservative movement, lifted it, which
helped itself for gold dollars as against foreign
dollars.

People considered the conservative situation and the
policy of this movement to raise prices considerably.
The movement returned to his country. According to
the economic principle, the President on September 21,
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silver was finally established at seventy-seven cents an ounce.²³

22 The New York Times, January 1, 1934, p. 1.
23 Alfred E. Kahn, "The Silver Problem in the United
States at the Close of the War," The Economic Review,
January, 1935.

24 Economic News, p. 11, p. 12.
25 American A. Walling, p. 11, p. 12.

This program was accompanied by no marked change in the economic conditions of the nation although silver-mine owners and speculators found the plan very profitable.³⁶

There were, however, international repercussions from these policies. The flight from the franc towards the end of 1933 could be directly traced to the fear that the inflationary policy of the United States would drive gold-blee nations off the gold standard.³⁷ The silver policy had dangerous deflationary effects on the currency standard of China and Mexico.³⁸

On January 15, 1934, Mr. Roosevelt asked Congress to enact a measure which would allow direct dollar devaluation. This act empowered the President:

- (1) To fix the limits of gold content of the dollar.
- (2) To authorize the Treasury to impound the vast stocks of gold held by the Federal Reserve Banks.
- (3) To "manage" the dollar within the limit of fifty per cent depreciation.
- (4) To assure to the government whatever profit might result from an increase in the value of gold.
- (5) To use part of this profit to create a fund of two billion dollars with which to stabilize the dollar.³⁹

This legislation being passed by Congress, President Roosevelt fixed the value of the dollar at fifty-

36 Ibid.; Louis H. Hacker, Op. Cit., pp. 38.

37 Paul Einzig, World Finance, 1914-1935, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1935), pp. 259-60.

38 Ibid., pp. 272.

39 United States Statutes At Large, 48;1:337-44.

nine and six-hundredths cents in terms of its old parity.⁴⁰

Although the gold content of the dollar had been reduced forty-one per cent, prices according to the wholesale commodity index of the Department of Labor had by May, 1934, risen only twenty-two per cent.⁴¹ This failure of prices to rise correspondingly resulted in more pressure from the inflationists. The House passed the Thomas-Dies Silver Purchase Act calling for the nationalization of all silver and for purchases in the world market by the Secretary of Treasury of not less than fifty million ounces a month. The purchased silver was to be used as a basis for silver certificates.⁴²

With Roosevelt opposing this innovation, Secretary Morgenthau published a list of silver-mine owners. This failing to weaken the inflationist's strength, the Administration compromised when it consented to the enactment of a modified silver purchase act.⁴³

The Silver Purchase Act of 1934 proposed:

- (1) A new national policy to increase the use of silver in the country's monetary

40 Charles Herz, op. cit.

41 Louis M. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 59.

42 E. Francis Brown, "Work of Congress," Current History, 40:329, June, 1934.

43 Louis M. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

stocks "with the ultimate objective of having and maintaining one-fourth of the monetary value in silver to three-fourths in gold."

- (2) Authorizing the President to purchase silver to attain this objective ultimately.
- (3) Restricting the price to be paid for domestic silver to not more than fifty cents an ounce.
- (4) A tax of fifty per cent. on the profits accruing from dealings in silver.
- (5) Nationalization of silver, at the President's discretion.⁴⁴

This measure was clearly political and not economic, and was recognized as such by foreign governments and financiers. There were no drastic disturbances occurring abroad as when earlier inflationary moves of the New Deal were carried out.⁴⁵

The Senate Banking Investigation of 1933 had disclosed loopholes in the federal income tax laws. One aim of the Revenue Act of 1934 was to eradicate these defects. This act provided for publicity of relevant facts relating to the income tax return. Other provisions removed part of the burden on small income taxpayers in the "earned income" class and shifted it to those whose incomes came from the "unearned sources."⁴⁶

The Municipal Bankruptcy Act aimed to relieve muni-

44 United States Statutes at Large, 46,1: 1179-82.

45 E. Francis Brown, "Record of Congress", Current History, 40:466, July, 1934.

46 "Record of Seventy-Third Congress", The New York Times, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1934.

cipalities hopelessly in debt. Under existing law all bondholders had to consent to readjustment of the outstanding debt of the city before such action could be contemplated. This bill provided that for two years local taxing units might petition the federal courts to approve plans for the readjustment of their debts if fifty-one per cent of the bondholders consented. The plan for readjustment was not to be authorized by the court until approved by bondholders holding three-fourths of the amount of outstanding securities.⁴⁷ This act then enabled cities to scale down their debt burden provided the great majority of bondholders desired such action.

In June, 1935, the Share the Wealth Movement led by Senator Long was at its pinnacle while the political prestige of the President was ebbing. Manoeuvring adroitly, the President, in a special message to Congress, urged a revision of the federal tax program with a view of encouraging a wider distribution of wealth. Progressives became so enthused over this surprise message that twenty-two senators drew up a "round-robin"

⁴⁷ United States Statutes At Large, 48,1: 798-803.

and declared their willingness to stay in Washington until adequate income taxes were enacted.⁴⁸

After a White House conference, Administration leaders decided to attach the new program to the bill continuing "nuisance taxes" and pass it before the latter elapsed on June 30. Opposition from the Right, however, prevented the use of this scheme. The President then retreated from a position demanding immediate legislation, and the bill was the subject of delaying committee hearings.⁴⁹

When finally reported out of the House committee on July 30, 1935, the bill was estimated to bring in only \$270,000,000 annually. This prompted the Left and many Republicans, particularly Senator Vandenberg, to dismiss this tax bill as a bid to the "have-nots" of Coughlin, Long, and Townsend.⁵⁰

The Revenue Act of 1935 provided for an increase in surtaxes on individual incomes and an increase in the excess-profits, corporation income, inheritance and gift taxes. That the increase was slight is apparent from the estimated revenue which the bill proposes to add to the income of the Treasury.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Charles A. Beard, "Looking Forward to 1936", Current History, 42:515, August, 1935.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 516.

⁵⁰ Loc. cit.

⁵¹ Charles A. Beard, "Labors of Congress", Current History, 43:69-70, October, 1935.

The banking Act of 1935 was enacted after the deadlock between Senator Glass and the Administration had been removed by compromises. The question of who should control the buying and selling of federal securities, the bankers or the government, was compromised by the creation of an open market committee consisting of seven members of the Board of Governors and five members elected by the regional Federal Reserve Banks. The Board of Governors of seven members was created in place of the old Federal Reserve Board.⁵² As the Board of Governors was to be appointed by the President, on the open market committee the Government had the controlling voice.

The central Board of Governors was also empowered to raise the ratio of reserves against deposits with a view to imposing a check on the use of bank deposits for speculative purposes. The banking lobby succeeded in instituting prescribed limits to this regulation of the ratio of reserves. The insurance of bank deposits was extended to \$5000 for each depositor. Another provision commanded large state banks to join the Federal Reserve System by 1942 if they were to have their deposits insured.⁵³

This step towards centralization and stabilization

⁵² United States Statutes At Large, 49,1:1014-28, 1936.

⁵³ Loc. cit.

REQUIREMENT BOND

of banking was taken amid objections from the bankers and their protagonist, Senator Glass.⁵⁴

The resolve of the Administration to keep firm control over the currency was also expressed in the Gold Clause Act. This act deprived claimants of the right to sue the United States in connection with any gold-clause securities, any coin or currency, or any claim arising out of changes in the metallic content of the dollar.⁵⁵

In his message to Congress of March 3, 1936, the President declared that the judicial invalidation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the court order to refund processing taxes had cost the Treasury a loss of over one billion dollars for the year 1936-37. Also, he observed, the expenses of government had been increased by the Bonus Act. Congress was then left to provide the needed \$786,000,000 annually for the next three years with only the President's general suggestions of:

- (1) A tax to recover the returned processing taxes.
- (2) An increase in corporation income and undistributed profits taxes.⁵⁶

Although industry and finance protested against

⁵⁴ Charles A. Beard, "Looking Forward to 1936", Current History, 42:520, August, 1935.

⁵⁵ Charles A. Beard, "Labors of Congress", Current History, 43:70, October, 1935.

⁵⁶ "The Administration's New Tax Proposal", Congressional Digest, 15:133, May, 1936.

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the President's tax suggestions, the act as passed incorporated his general principles. The House enacted a high tax on undistributed corporate earnings graduated up to 42 per cent as the salient feature of its bill. But the Senate reduced the undivided profits tax to seven per cent and made up the deficiency by an increase in corporate income, stock dividend and small income taxes, and by a high windfall tax of eighty per cent on refunded processing taxes. Eventually the Senate's bill was enacted by the House.

The restoration of public confidence in the banking system was one of the outstanding achievements of Mr. Roosevelt's entire administration. After the banks had been salvaged, the Administration had legislation enacted which was designed to prevent future crises of the 1933 type. A deposit insurance system was installed which aided in restoring the confidence of depositors in the banks. Deposit banking was separated from investment banking. Centralized control over the banking system by the government followed the enactment of the Banking Act of 1935.

In the field of taxation, many loopholes in the federal income tax laws were removed by the Revenue Acts

57 "Record of the Seventy-Fourth Congress", New York Times, June 22, 1936, pp. 22.

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of 1934 and 1935. The Revenue Act of 1936 was an advance towards basing the federal tax structure on the principle of ability to pay. By encouraging Congress to enact this measure so close to his reelection date, the President proved himself a statesman.

The federal debt was increased from \$21,441,000,000 in April, 1933, to \$31,425,000,000 on April 30, 1936. The new obligations of \$10,000,000,000 carried lower interest rates than the older bonds. The average interest rate on the public debt decreased from three and four-tenths per cent in March, 1933, to two and fifty-four hundredths per cent in November, 1935.⁵⁸ Although the vast expenditures of the Administration may be of a debatable social value, the financing of the new obligations was carried out in an excellent manner.

AGRICULTURE

Farm income in the United States had dropped from \$16,000,000,000 in 1919 to \$11,000,000,000 in 1929 and to \$5,300,000,000 in 1932. The plight of six million five hundred thousand farmers was further intensified by the burden of \$9,500,000,000 in mortgages. Due to the enormous deflation of values and the subsequent decrease in his income, the farmers' plight in 1933 was

⁵⁸ "Balance Sheet of the New Deal", (Supplement), New Republic, 87:148, June 10, 1936.

almost hopeless.⁵⁹

The New Deal aimed to restore the prosperity of the farmer principally by means of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. This measure embodied the principle of a grant of subsidies to farmers in return for acreage reduction. Concerning this act, the President in his message of March 16, 1933, declared in part:

"I tell you frankly that it is a new and untrod path, but I tell you with equal frankness that an unprecedented condition calls for the trial of new means to rescue agriculture. If a fair administrative trial of it is made and it does not produce the hoped-for results, I shall be the first to acknowledge it and advise you."⁶⁰

The sums paid out to the farmer for rental of the acreage withdrawn were to be met from the processing tax. Although the incidence of the processing tax would obviously rest on the consumer, Secretary Wallace hopefully prophesied:

The slight contribution the consumer will make through retail prices will be more than compensated for by the revived power of farmers to buy goods and services the city has to sell.⁶¹

Although opposition to the proposed measure existed, the prestige of the President forced the passage of the act.

The income of farmers was to be raised through

⁵⁹ Bernhard Ostrolenk, "The Farm Problem Becomes More Urgent", The New York Times, Section VIII, pp. 1, December, 1932.

⁶⁰ "What Congress Has Done About Farm Relief", Congressional Digest, 13:292, December, 1934.

⁶¹ E. Francis Brown, "Farm Relief", Current History, 38:206-07, May, 1933.

cotton option contracts, rental or benefit payments, and market agreements. The processing tax was to be levied on the "first domestic processing of the basic commodity concerned", and the sums obtained were to constitute the fund out of which benefit payments were to be made. To carry out these provisions, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was established.⁶²

Cotton was the first commodity for which a "planned limitation" was instituted. By July 12, partly as a result of the propaganda campaign, seventy-three per cent of the total cultivation of cotton had been signed up.⁶³ According to a later report of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the farm program of the Administration had in a year resulted in an increase of gross farm income of one hundred per cent for the cotton growers.⁶⁴

Wheat was now dealt with in similar fashion. The Government sought to enter into agreements with the principal wheat nations for the purpose of cutting acreage and regulating wheat importations on an international basis. Under the brief agreement of August 25, 1933, the United States pledged itself to reduce wheat acreage

⁶² E. Francis Brown, "Farm Relief", Current History, 38:206-07, May, 1933.

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 35.

⁶⁴ Loc. cit.

action upon contracts, rental or benefit payments, and
market agreements. The processing tax was to be levied
on the "first domestic processing of the basic commodity
concerned" and the same amount was to constitute the
fund out of which benefit payments were to be made. To
carry out these provisions, the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration was authorized.

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According to a later report of the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Administration, the farm program of the Adminis-
tration had in a year resulted in an increase of gross farm
income of one hundred per cent for the cotton growers.²³
There was one detail still to be settled. The
Government sought to enter into agreements with the pri-
vate plantations for the purpose of reducing acreage
and regulating export operations on an international
scale. Under the first agreement of August 22, 1933,
the United States pledged itself to reduce wheat acreage

22 E. Francis Brown, "Farm Relief", Current His-
tory, January-February, 1933.

23 Ibid., p. 53.

24 Ibid., p. 53.

fifteen per cent.⁶⁵ The 1933-34 farm price for wheat was seventy-four cents compared to the 1932-33 price of thirty-eighty and six-tenths cents per bushel.

There were other factors which influenced this increase in the price of wheat and other agricultural commodities. Of these factors, the drought, the AAA program, and the Administration's inflationary program, it was probably the inflationary program which was most responsible for the general price increases.⁶⁶

By the end of June, 1934, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration had succeeded in drawing up some forty marketing agreements with agricultural groups and industries.⁶⁷

But despite this apparent cooperation of agriculture with the AAA, the program was met with difficult obstacles from its beginning. It was quickly learned by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration that acreage reduction did not correspond with yield reduction and that higher farm prices did not necessarily imply increased agricultural purchasing power.⁶⁸

Intensive cultivation of acreage without any decrease in production was the immediate difficulty in cotton. When the cotton growers and other farmers were

⁶⁵ Op. cit., pp. 35.

⁶⁶ Loc. cit., Harry W. Laidler, A Program for Modern America, (New York: The Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1936), pp. 192-93.

⁶⁷ Louis M. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 38.

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 93.

induced to take millions of acres out of cultivation, they naturally "plowed under" the less fertile sections of their fields. Thereby, although acreage cultivation had decreased twenty-five per cent, the years' cotton crop was equal to that of 1932.⁶⁹ Many farmers refused to reduce their cultivation hoping to benefit from the reduction of their competitors' crop. A flagrant example of this occurred in the case of winter wheat planting for 1934. Only one-half of the sought-for reduction was pledged by the farmers. Many farmers also shifted to the production of uncontrolled crops glutting the market with crops for which subsidies were not being paid.⁷⁰

The acreage reduction program cost the consumer through processing taxes at least \$150,000,000 in 1933 and \$1,000,000,000 in 1934.⁷¹ While the income of many farmers was increased, the unendurable plight of share-croppers was made worse. The government bounty was not usually shared with the farm tenant and the share-cropper who actually tilled the land.⁷²

So marked had the shifting to other crops become that Congress had to legislate again to amend the AAA. The Jones-Connally Farm Relief Act of April 7, 1934, amended the AAA so as to include under its program six additional products--beef and dairy cattle, peanuts, rye,

69 loc. cit.

70 Ibid., pp. 95.

71 Ibid., pp. 96.

72 Harry W. Laidler, op. cit., pp. 193-94.

induced to send millions of acres out of cultivation,
they naturally "planned ahead" the land for the seasons
of their choice. Therefore, although average cultivation
has decreased twenty-five per cent, the year's harvest
crop has equal to that of 1933.¹⁰ Many farmers refused
to remove their cultivation hoping to benefit from the
production of their competitors' crops. A significant example
of this occurred in the case of winter wheat planting for
1934. Only one-half of the acreage-for 1933 was
planted by the farmers. Many farmers also shifted to the
production of unsown crops which the market with
crops for which subsidies were not being paid.¹¹
The average production program over the seasons through
producing losses at least \$150,000,000 in 1933 and \$1,000,
\$20,000 in 1934.¹² While the income of many farmers was
diminished, the unmarketable surplus of wheat programs was
also reduced. The government barely can not usually afford
also the high wheat and the wheat-staple and ultimately
aligned the land.¹³
to market had the selling to other crops because
that farmers had no incentive again to extend the land.
The House-Committee report dated 27 April 7, 1934,
mentioned the Act as an incentive under the program via
additional production--best and dairy cattle, hogs, etc.,

10. See also.
11. Ibid., pp. 20.
12. Ibid., pp. 22.
13. See also, pp. 23-24.

barley, flax and grain sorghums.⁷³

On April 21, the Bankhead Cotton Control Act was passed with drastic provisions which regimented cotton growers for the year 1934-35. It levied a tax of fifty per cent of the average market price upon cotton in excess of the production quota. Cotton states were allotted quotas on the basis of their yields for the previous five years. Quotas in turn were fixed by the states for the counties who distributed tax exemption certificates and benefit payments for the amounts allotted to them. The Secretary of Agriculture was granted the prerogative of prohibiting the raising of other cash crops on cotton acreage withdrawn from cultivation. Finally, the act provided for the extension of the measure for an additional year if two-thirds of the cotton growers were favorable to such an extension.⁷⁴

Further extension of the principle of the Bankhead bill was made by Congress on May 1. This measure, the Jones-Costigan Sugar Act, added to the basic agricultural commodities sugar cane and sugar beets. It also fixed the domestic production of each commodity and authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to put all sugar imports on a quota basis.⁷⁵

The Tobacco Control act regimented tobacco growers according to the principle of the Bankhead and Jones-Cos-

⁷³ "Record of Seventy-Third Congress," The New York Times, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1934.

⁷⁴ Loc. cit.

⁷⁵ Loc. cit.

tigan bills. Growers signing up for production limitation were to agree to reduce their 1934 tobacco crop by thirty per cent. All those who did not comply were to be penalized through the imposition of a confiscatory tax. If three-fourths of the growers approved, this ^{act} was to be in existence for an additional year.⁷⁶

Certainly, all these acts were steps toward that governmental control against which Secretary Wallace had protested in his pamphlet, "America Must Choose." The Secretary had said:

If we finally go all the way toward nationalism, it may be necessary to have compulsory control of marketing, licensing of plowed lands, and base and surplus quotas for every farmer for every product for each month in the year.

Aside from a few intellectuals, those who were clamoring against the regimentation of agriculture neglected the fact that in all these acts the farmers themselves had to confirm their continuance after one year of imposition.

Fearing an adverse decision by the Supreme Court, Congress amended the AAA in August, 1935. The amended act provided for the continuance of crop control and subsidies to complying growers. Official administration of markets was substituted for administration through licensed handlers. Restriction of agricultural imports which threatened the American price structure was authorized. To counter suits for the recovery of processing taxes

76 Loc. cit.

already paid, the act required the plaintiff to show that no part of his tax had been passed on to the consumer or back to the purchaser.⁷⁷

A poll of farmers on the corn and hog program taken in October, 1935, satisfied the Administration as the farmers voted six to one in favor of the AAA.

The joy of friends of the AAA was transient, however, as the Supreme Court on January 6, 1936, by a vote of six to three, invalidated the new act. In the majority opinion, Justice Roberts declared:

This Act invades the reserved rights of the States. It is a statutory plan to regulate and control the agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the Federal Government.⁷⁸

Repercussions followed this court decision. Payments to farmers under contract were halted and processors began suing the government for the refunding of illegally collected taxes. The Administration had Congress rescind the laws providing for compulsory control over cotton, tobacco and potato growing.

In public statements Mr. Roosevelt made it plain that an equivalent to the AAA would be enacted. In his Jackson Day Address he declared that he was studying both opinions, emphasizing his words.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Charles A. Beard, "Labors of Congress", Current History, 43:65, October, 1935.

⁷⁸ Charles A. Beard, "AAA and the Supreme Court", Current History, 43:517, February, 1936.

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 519.

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The provisions of the new AAA were announced on January 16, 1936. The Federal Government would enter into contracts with farmers to prevent soil erosion until January, 1936. After that date the states would be prepared to cooperate and would carry out the provisions of "planned limitation" in a manner analogous to the administration of federal grants-in-aid for agricultural education.⁸⁰

With the election approaching, so popular a bill was certain of enactment by Congress. The title of the new bill was the "Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act". The ostensible purpose of this act was "to prevent soil erosion and thereby preserve natural resources, navigability of rivers and harbors, protect public health". As a further constitutional precaution, the act refrained from specifying the interest on whom the tax burden was to fall. By this means processors were deprived of a valid reason for challenging its constitutionality.⁸¹

Embedded among constitutional phrases was a provision authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to re-establish and maintain the ratio between the purchasing power of net income per person on farms and that of the

⁸⁰ Charles A. Beard, "National Issues", Current History, 43:629-30, March, 1936.

⁸¹ Charles A. Beard, "The Work of Congress", Current History, 44:69-70, April, 1936.

income per person not on farms which prevailed from August, 1909, to July, 1914.⁸²

Limitation of farm production was not the only means utilized by the New Deal in relieving the economic ills of the farmers. The Agriculture Adjustment Act had also provided for a broad inflationary program. The President was authorized to expand the Federal Reserve credits by as much as three billion dollars in Treasury notes secured solely by the credit of the United States. He was also given the discretionary power of devaluing the gold content of the dollar as much as fifty per cent. We have noted the results of these provisions.⁸³

Another section of the Agricultural Adjustment Act arranged for farm mortgage relief. Authorization was granted for the refinancing of farm mortgages through the issuance of \$2,000,000,000 in government bonds, only the interest of which was guaranteed by the government.⁸⁴

To supplement this section of the AAA, Congress passed the Farm Credit Act. This measure aimed to strengthen the federal machinery dealing with short-term and medium-term loans for the production and marketing of agricultural products. New banking and credit agencies were created by this bill, namely, a Central Bank for Cooperatives, twelve regional Banks for Cooperatives, and twelve

⁸² Loc. cit.

⁸³ "Record of Seventy-Third Congress", The New York Times, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1934.

⁸⁴ Loc. cit.

ly payments and with interest at one per cent. If the mortgagee objected to this form of settlement, the farmer could retain possession under a "reasonable" rental for five years. During this period all bankruptcy proceedings were to be in abeyance.⁸⁷

Although undoubtedly a significant step towards coping with the nation's debt problem,⁸⁸ this act was invalidated by the Supreme Court in an unanimous decision on May 27, 1935. The Supreme Court declared that the Fifth Amendment had been abrogated by the Frazier-Lenke law because private property had been taken for public use without just compensation.⁸⁹

Congress reacted to this decision by enacting the Frazier-Lenke Act Number Two. This act permitted the farmer to retain his farm for three years after foreclosure while paying the mortgagee a "reasonable rent".⁹⁰

Later sessions of Congress continued to respond to pleas from agrarian legislators for a more radical Frazier-Lenke act. This measure provided that the Federal government would supply the funds for the farmers

⁸⁷ Loc. cit.

⁸⁸ Loc. cit.

⁸⁹ The New York Times, pp. 1, col. 7, May 28, 1935.

⁹⁰ United States Statutes At Large, 49,1:942-45.

to pay off their mortgages or to buy back their lands. The government would get new mortgages from the farmers amortized over forty-seven years.

These new mortgages were to be the security for a Federal bond issue of three billion dollars bearing one and one-half per cent interest. If the bonds were not bought by the public, the Federal Reserve would issue three billion dollars in currency upon the security of the mortgages.⁹¹

It was this provision that frightened the Administration into tabling the act in the committee. But by petition of two hundred and eighteen members of the House, the measure was brought out of the committee for consideration. With both the Administration and conservative Republicans opposed, the act was defeated.

Congress relieved the debt charges of the farmers by more orthodox means. The Commodity Credit Act of 1935 was but one of several measures by which the Administration mitigated the liquidation of debtors. This measure provided for better extension of credits to the mortgaged farmers.⁹²

⁹¹ "The Voice of Voltaire", Time, pp. 12-13, May 25, 1936.

⁹² "Record of Seventy-Fourth Congress", The New York Times, pp. 15, June 22, 1936.

ПРОМЫСЛО

INDUSTRY & TRANSPORTATION

In 1933, the depths of the depression had been reached and imminent catastrophe seemed about to overwhelm the American economic structure.

The studies of F. C. Mills and Simon Kuznets, made for the National Bureau of Economic Research, show that between 1929 and 1932 the total physical output of goods in the United States had been reduced thirty-seven per cent. Total labor income in all industries had declined forty per cent, and total property income thirty-one per cent.⁹³

With the decrease of prices, unparalleled deflation followed. The unemployed were estimated at from 13,600,000 to 17,000,000. The seasonally adjusted index of industrial production (in terms of 1923-25 as 100) stood in March, 1933, at fifty-nine. On the same index basis, construction stood at fourteen, factory employment at fifty-nine and factory payrolls at thirty-seven.⁹⁴

One device utilized by the Administration to restore prosperity was NIRAism.

On April 6, 1933, the Senate passed the Black Thirty-hour Week Bill. The Administration's forces opposed this measure. They sought in vain to amend the proposed thir-

⁹³ Louis Hacker, A Short History of the New Deal, pp. 19.

⁹⁴ loc. cit.

INVESTIGATION

In 1933, the degree of the depression had been reached and business conditions seemed about to improve in the following economic aspects.

The studies of J. C. Miller and Simon Kuznets, and for the National Bureau of Economic Research, show that between 1925 and 1933 the total physical output of goods in the United States had been reduced thirty-seven per cent. Total labor income in all industries had declined forty per cent, and total property income thirty-one per cent.

With the increase of prices, uncontrolled deflation followed. The unemployment rate remained at over 15,000,000 in 1933, 1934. The economically adjusted index of industrial production (in terms of 1926-27 as 100) stood in 1933, 1934, at fifty-nine. In the same index, the construction stood at twenty, factory equipment at fifty-nine and factory payrolls at thirty-seven.

The deficit suffered by the Administration in 1933-34 was approximately one billion. On April 6, 1933, the Senate passed the Bank Holiday Bill. The Administration's budget showed this measure. They sought in vain to amend the proposed bill.

It is to be noted, a sharp decline in the price level. 1933-34. 1934-35. 1935-36.

ty-hour week to thirty-six hours. A similar bill was introduced in the House and favorably reported out of a committee despite Administration disapproval. A Cabinet Committee under the leadership of Secretary of Labor Perkins drafted a substitute for the Connery Bill before the House. This proposal provided for a maximum forty-hour and five day week to all industry. The Secretaries of Labor and Commerce were to appoint a fair wage board in each industry. This board would submit wages for the various industries to be enforced by the Secretary of Labor. The anti-trust laws were to be relaxed to authorize the establishment of trade associations in industry.⁹⁵

The Black and Perkins bills evoked panic among the conservative press. Nevertheless, the annual meeting of the United States Chamber of Commerce in May, 1933, went on record in favor of industrial regulation through trade associations under governmental supervision.⁹⁶

Various business and administration leaders now came forward with plans for a bill that would eliminate what they termed, "objectionable features in the Black and Perkins bills".⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Ernest K. Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution: First Phase, pp. 154-55.

⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 155-57.

⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 157-58.

The National Industrial Recovery Act in its final form was a compromise between two of these groups--of a bill drafted by General Johnson and the plan of the Wagner-Dickinson clique. General Johnson would have granted rigid licensing power to the President in organizing industry. Trade associations would regulate prices, trade practices, production, wages and hours.⁹⁸ The group led by Senator Wagner desired a minimum of governmental direction and the protection of labor by collective bargaining.⁹⁹

The National Recovery Act set-up a plan for governmental "partnership" with industry. Any trade association might draft a code of fair competition which became law on approval of the President. On industries failing to comply with codes, the President could impose licenses. Although the anti-trust laws were to be suspended, every employer would have to comply with maximum hours, minimum wages and other working provisions approved or prescribed by the President. One provision provided for the elimination of child labor.¹⁰⁰

Section 7a was claimed to guarantee collective bargaining. This clause was drafted, however, so that the open shop was not made illegal. Therefore, collective bargaining would result only if the Administration enforced it through the codes.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ John T. Flynn, "Whose Child Is the NRA?", Harper's Magazine, 69:392, September, 1934.

⁹⁹ Ernest K. Lindley, op. cit., pp. 158-59.

¹⁰⁰ "Record of Seventy-Third Congress", The New York Times, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1934.

¹⁰¹ John T. Flynn, op. cit., pp. 393.

The National Industrial Recovery Act in its final form was a compromise between two of these groups--of a bill drafted by Senator Johnson and the plan of the Wagner-McAdams bill. Senator Johnson would have granted right of collective bargaining to the President in organizing industry. The association would regulate prices, trade practices, production, wages and hours. The group led by Senator Wagner created a minimum of governmental direction and protection of labor by collective bargaining.

The National Recovery Act set up a plan for general "partnership" with industry. Any trade association might draft a code of fair competition which would be approved by the President. On industries failing to comply with code, the President could impose license. Although the anti-trust laws were to be amended, every employer would have to comply with certain hours, minimum wages and other working provisions approved or prescribed by the President. One provision provided for the election of child labor.

Section 7 was aimed to guarantee collective bargaining. This clause was drafted, however, so that the open shop was not made illegal. Therefore, collective bargaining would result only if the administration intervened through the codes.

98 John F. Ryan, *Where Child is the Law*, 1934.
99 *Washington Post*, September, 1934.
100 Ernest E. Lindley, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-23.
101 *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1934, pp. 12-13, 1934.
102 John F. Ryan, *op. cit.*, pp. 122.

The authority over industry which the act would grant the President evoked charges of dictatorship from factions of the conservative press.¹⁰² Some members of the Left had little desire for the passage of the NIRA being of the opinion:

that the NIRA was brought forward to defeat the Black and Connery bills...to give employers modifications of the anti-trust laws and the privilege of self-rule in industry.¹⁰³

Nevertheless, the bill passed Congress with little trouble and was signed by the President. The United States Chamber of Commerce, Charles M. Schwab, Eugene Grace and other business leaders were lavish in praise of this measure.¹⁰⁴

The National Recovery Administration was the agency created to supervise the preparation of codes and to enforce their observance. It was composed of the Secretary of Commerce, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Director of the Budget, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, and the Recovery Administrator, Hugh S. Johnson.

The National Recovery Administration urged immediate agreement in the various trades upon codes of fair competition and threatened compulsion if the trades did not act upon their own accord. But a month after the passage of the NIRA, only one code, that of cotton tex-

102 Ernest K. Lindley, op. cit., pp. 162.

103 John T. Flynn, op. cit., pp. 390-91.

104 Mauritz A. Hallgren, op. cit., pp. 172.

ties, had been accepted and promulgated.¹⁰⁵ After the industries had agreed upon codes, they were to submit the codes to the National Recovery Administrator and the President who accepted or rejected them.¹⁰⁶

The delay in the submittance and acceptance of the codes redounded to the profit of manufacturers who operated full time producing goods which could later be sold at higher prices under the NRA.¹⁰⁷

Realizing that the submission of codes must be accelerated, the National Recovery Administration drew-up a blanket code. This code called for a working week of thirty-five hours for industrial and forty for white-collar workers, banned child labor, and set minimum wages at forty cents an hour for industrial workers and from \$12 to \$15 a week for white-collar workers.¹⁰⁸

On July 24, 1933, the President opened the "blanket code" campaign with a nation-wide appeal to the American people. As the law did not empower compulsion, the success of the blanket-codes depended upon propaganda and the prestige of the President.¹⁰⁹

One week after the President's address, 700,000 employers had signed the blanket-codes.¹¹⁰ These employers

¹⁰⁵ E. Francis Brown, "The Recovery Administration", Current History, 38:589, August, 1933.

¹⁰⁶ Louis M. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 45.

¹⁰⁷ E. Francis Brown, "The Great American Experiment", Current History, 38:715, September, 1933.

¹⁰⁸ Louis M. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 46.

¹⁰⁹ Ernest K. Lindley, op. cit., pp. 236.

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complying were given the "Blue Eagle" insignia to be displayed to the public. Consumers were urged over the radio, through the press, and by other means of propaganda to buy nothing that did not bear the "blue-eagle" label. Employers not complying with the codes were branded traitors, or according to the vocabulary of General Johnson, "chiselers".¹¹¹

The shipbuilding industry was persuaded to sign its code by a huge naval building program.¹¹² By August 4, an impressive number of codes had been promulgated. Nevertheless, the oil, coal, and automobile industries refused to submit codes recognizing the right of labor to bargain collectively. On August 19, the President had General Johnson compel the oil industry to formulate a code. On the same day, the steel and lumber industries presented codes acceptable to the Administration. Steel left no doubt that it would never consent to unionization.¹¹³

All of the automobile industry but the Ford Motor Company were finally enticed into signing a code by the National Recovery Administration. This was accomplished by sabotaging collective bargaining with a provision in this code that employers

may exercise their right to select, retain, or advance employees on the basis of individual merit, without regard to their membership or non-membership in any organization.¹¹⁴

111 Mauritz A. Hallgren, op. cit., pp. 173-74.

112 Ernest K. Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution: First Phase, pp. 238.

113 Ibid., pp. 238-40.

114 E. Francis Brown, "America Under NRA", Current History, 39:80, October, 1933.

On August 28, 1933, the President threatened to impose a code upon the coal operators unless an acceptable one was proposed within twenty-four hours. The last of the basic industries was thus forced into an agreement. However, it was not until September 16, with the threat of a nation-wide strike about to occur, that the coal operators recognized the bargaining power of the United Mine Workers.¹¹⁵

The reason for the delay of the trades in presenting their codes was twofold. They could not agree among themselves, and they were all strongly opposed to collective bargaining.¹¹⁶

One means of weakening Section 7a of the NIRA was the organizing of company unions by the employer under his domination. However, the employers could not prevent bona fide labor unions from gaining members. The United Mine Workers, for example, obtained 150,000 new recruits within thirty days.¹¹⁷

Another factor which weakened Section 7a was the attitude of General Johnson. On July 7, 1933, he aided employers by ruling that the law recognizes the right of individual workers to bargain for their own conditions of employment.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ E. Francis Brown, "Labor Under the New Deal", Current History, 39:205, November, 1933.

¹¹⁶ Ernest K. Lindley, op. cit., pp. 238-42.

¹¹⁷ Ernest K. Lindley, op. cit., pp. 241.

¹¹⁸ Mauritz Hallgren, The Gay Reformer, pp. 209.

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labor responded to this and other attempts to sabotage collective bargaining by a wave of strikes.¹¹⁹

With labor troubles endangering his program, Roosevelt appointed on August 5th a National Labor Board to settle industrial disputes. This Board, however, acted very slowly. When it did act, many concerns, particularly the Weirton Steel Company, ignored its decisions. As the Board wanted to avoid a court test of the NIRA, it could not safely enforce its decisions.¹²⁰

If one had analyzed the code provisions, he would have understood the growing militancy of labor. The only industries which under the codes went much beyond the abolition of child labor and a very minimum wage were those in which labor was strongly organized.¹²¹ In January, 1934, out of two hundred and thirty-four codes promulgated, only fifteen had provided for less than the forty hour week.¹²²

At first, the President was able to personally intervene and stop many of the strikes. For example, in September, 1933, he forced the steel industry to meet the miners' demand that the "captive mines" be put under the codes.¹²³

¹¹⁹ Loc. cit.

¹²⁰ Louis Hacker, A Short History of the New Deal, pp. 117-118.

¹²¹ Ernest Lindley, op. cit., pp. 255.

¹²² Louis Hacker, op. cit., pp. 47.

¹²³ E. Francis Brown, "Labor Under the New Deal", Loc. cit.

But by the summer of 1934 strikes were occurring everywhere including the longshoremen and marine workers of the Pacific and Gulf ports, fruit and vegetable pickers of California, Ohio, and New Jersey, iron ore and copper miners of the Far West, coal miners of the middle eastern states, steel workers of the Middle West, taxi drivers, shoe workers and meat workers of New York, and truckers of Minneapolis.¹²⁴

As a means of pacifying labor, Congress passed on June 16, 1934, the Labor Disputes Joint Resolution. This measure authorized the President to establish boards to investigate matters in dispute between the workers and employers arising out of the NRA, and to prescribe such rules and regulation as might become necessary. The boards were further empowered to hold elections by secret ballot in the various plants for the purpose of determining representation for collective bargaining.¹²⁵

On June 26, the President established the National Longshoremen's Board to investigate and arbitrate the bitter strike of marine workers in San Francisco. The National Labor Relations Board was now established to coordinate the various functions of the Labor Disputes Resolution and act as a court of last review for special boards. This board was composed of three members and worked in conjunction with the Labor Department, being indepen-

¹²⁴ Louis M. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 120-23.

¹²⁵ "Record of Seventy-Third Congress", New York Times, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1934.

dent of the NRA.¹²⁶ The National Labor Board was now abolished. The National Steel Relations Board and special boards for other industries were established to arbitrate and investigate violations of the codes. These special boards were of the same status as the National Longshoremen's Board mentioned before.¹²⁷

The National Labor Relations Board went rapidly into action in contrast with the inactivity of the old National Labor Board. Many decisions were made, all of them upholding collective bargaining. The Board declared, for instance, that an employer was under obligation to recognize a union if the union membership included a majority of the workers. The National Labor Relations Board held that the employer was bound to negotiate in good faith with his employees before the requirements of the NRA were satisfied.¹²⁸

As for company unions, it was held that an employer who dominated or financed such a union violated the right of self-organization of his employees. The prompt reinstatement of workers dismissed because of union activities or sympathies was ordered.¹²⁹

The National Labor Relations Board had, however, little power to force compliance with its decisions, due

¹²⁶ Louis H. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 124.

¹²⁷ Loc. cit.

¹²⁸ Harry W. Laidler, A Program for Modern America, pp. 139-41.

¹²⁹ Loc. cit.

to the deficiencies of the statute and to the refusal of other government departments to cooperate. It could only determine when a violation of the NRA had occurred and then recommend to the Compliance Division of the NRA that the offender's Blue Eagle be removed. The National Labor Relations Board might also request the Department of Justice to institute court proceedings against offenders of the NRA.¹³⁰


The Compliance Division of the NRA began to insist on independent review. The Department of Justice refused to bring action except as the result of powerful pressure. In 1934, for example, the Department of Justice filed only two cases of the many cited to it by the National Labor Relations Board.¹³¹ In its report to President Roosevelt on February 12, 1935, the National Labor Relations Board admitted that compliance had been obtained in only seventeen out of sixty-eight cases.¹³²

We now pause to review the attitude of industry towards the NRA, which had by this time become clear. From the introduction of the measure, industry had sought by every means to weaken Section 7a. What industry desired most was authority to establish control of business by its own leaders. As early as November 1, 1933, Mr.

¹³⁰ loc. cit.

¹³¹ loc. cit.

¹³² Ibid., pp. 141



Gerard Swope, President of the General Electric Company and at that time on the Industrial Advisory Board of the NRA, had proposed such a plan. He had proposed that the functions of the NRA be vested in a privately conducted National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, under a minimum of governmental supervision.¹³³

Although some leaders of business were in favor of the NRA, certainly a few were not. The newspaper code was attacked by the conservative press as a threat to freedom of the press.¹³⁴ And Mr. Roosevelt's ordering that government markets be closed to the anti-NRA, Mr. Ford, brought charges of regimentation from conservative Republicans in the Senate.¹³⁵

In early 1934, charges began to be made that the monopolists were in control of the NRA machinery and were fixing prices to drive small enterprises out of business.¹³⁶ Largely due to the efforts of Senators Borah and Nye, the National Recovery Review Board was established to investigate the truth of these charges.¹³⁷

In March, 1934, while the National Recovery Review Board was collecting evidence, the report of the Federal Trade Commission confirmed strengthening of monopoly practices under the NRA. Specifically, the report called attention to the Iron and Steel Institute, the Code Author-

¹³³ Louis M. Hacker, A Short History of the New Deal, pp. 110.

¹³⁴ Loc. cit.

¹³⁵ Ibid., pp. 339

¹³⁶ Louis M. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 139.

¹³⁷ Loc. cit.

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ity for the steel industry. The report declared that the Iron and Steel Institute had instituted price fixing and price increases. Two or three companies were dominating the Code Authority and were using the code to legalize practices which under the Federal Trade Commission had been previously outlawed.¹³⁸

The report of the National Recovery Review Board was identical in its conclusions to that of the Federal Trade Commission. The Board made public its report on May 21, 1934. It charged that the NRA was fostering monopoly and oppressing small industry, that certain codes were openly being administered by monopoly interests, and that prices to consumers were at the mercy of monopoly control.¹³⁹

While the National Recovery Administration issued heated denials of monopoly and persuaded Roosevelt to dissolve the National Recovery Review Board, it did change its policy slightly. On June 7, 1934, General Johnson declared that the policy of price fixing in codes was to be drastically changed. However, the NRA Administration soon modified his former intention so that the changes in the codes would be worked out in consultation with industry.¹⁴⁰

138 The New York Times, pp. 1, col. 6, March 21, 1934.

139 Ibid., pp. 8, col. 1, March 22, 1934.

140 Louis M. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 114.

In an executive order of October 31, 1934, the President organized the heads of agencies concerned with fundamental economic matters into a National Emergency Council. Under this re-organization, the National Recovery Administration was abolished and its duties given to the National Emergency Council. General Johnson resigned as Administrator of the NRA and Mr. Donald Richberg was installed in his place.¹⁴¹

The NRA was to terminate on June 16, 1935. During the opening months of Congress, the President in his congressional messages had nothing specific to say about the expiring measure. Perhaps this was a measure of strategy, for on March 29, the President suddenly presented to Congress a complete NRA measure as a substitute for the terminating act.¹⁴² The new act provided that codes were to be limited to industries actually engaged in or substantially affecting interstate commerce. Violations of Section 7a were to be met by the employees bringing suits against the employer for damages suffered in violation. Smaller industries would be dropped entirely from code control. Provisions against monopolistic practices were incorporated in the draft, but the President was to be given full authority to use price-fixing and production control if necessary.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Charles A. Beard, "Confusion Rules In Washington", Current History, 41:334-35, December, 1934.

¹⁴² Charles A. Beard, "Congress at Work", Current History, 42:185, May, 1935.

¹⁴³ Loc. cit.

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In short, small industry was to be free whereas the basic industries were to be integrated under government control.¹⁴⁴

It was not until May 1, 1935, that a Senate Committee acted on these suggestions. The Committee then reported in favor of a ten months's extension of the NRA in amended form without taking notice of the President's act.

Before any further action on the new NRA could be contemplated, the Supreme Court in a unanimous decision invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act. The Court declared that the code-making provisions of the Act constituted an invalid transfer of legislative powers from Congress to the President and other persons not endowed with legislative power by the Constitution. The Court disposed of the wage and hour provisions of the codes by holding that they dealt with local, not interstate commerce, and were thus beyond the constitutional purview of Congress.¹⁴⁵

Although the decision of the Supreme Court in the NIRA case disconcerted the broad regulation of industry by the Roosevelt Administration, the NRA was not completely forsaken. Under the drastically amended NRA of June 14, the Recovery Administration continued studies of hours, wages, and trade practices with a view of reviving the

¹⁴⁴ Id.

¹⁴⁵ Ambrose Deskow, Editor, Historic Opinions of the United States Supreme Court, (New York: Vanguard Press, Inc., 1935), pp. 487-521.

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NRA at a future date.¹⁴⁶ Voluntary codes of "fair competition" were accepted by several industries who realized the benefits of Niraism.¹⁴⁷

The collective bargaining principle of Niraism was embodied in the Wagner Labor Disputes Bill. Certain labor practices on the part of the employer were declared illegal. They were the refusal of the employer to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, the domination of an employer of a labor organization and the discrimination against a worker because of membership in any labor organization. Representatives selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit were made the exclusive representatives of all the employees in the unit. Provision was made for a National Labor Relations Board empowered to enforce the clauses of the act. The Board was authorized to apply to specified Federal courts for appropriate decrees enforcing its orders.¹⁴⁸

The Wagner Act prohibited interference and coercion by employers and sought to maintain collective bargaining. Yet it failed to define these terms in detail, paving the way for questionable judicial interpretation. This act, however, was

¹⁴⁶ Charles A. Beard, "Looking Forward to 1936," Current History, August, 1935, 42:519, August, 1935

¹⁴⁷ Charles A. Beard, "Social Change V. The Constitution," Current History, 42:49, July, 1935.

¹⁴⁸ United States Statutes At Large, 49, 1:449-57.

a direct advancement over former legislation.¹⁴⁹

Mr. Roosevelt urged the passage of the Guffey-Snyder Coal Act despite the criticism made by many conservatives that it was unconstitutional. In an open letter to the Chairman of the House Committee in charge of the bill, President Roosevelt declared in closing:

I hope your committee will not permit doubts as to constitutionality, however reasonable to block the suggested legislation.¹⁵⁰

This ignoring of the judiciary fomented strong criticism from the conservative Republicans in Congress.¹⁵¹

But the measure had the support of powerful mining interests in the bituminous coal fields, organized labor, and the President, and easily passed Congress.¹⁵² It called for the creation in the Department of the Interior of a National Bituminous Coal Commission of five members. Under the surveillance of the Commission, producers were to organize a bituminous coal code. A punitive excise tax was to be imposed on all coal mined and 90 per cent. of the tax refunded to operators complying with the code. District boards were to be established in twenty-three coal districts with power to fix minimum prices for coal, and make rules and regulations

¹⁴⁹ Charles A. Beard, "Looking Forward to 1936," Current History, August, 1935, 42:519, August, 1935.

¹⁵⁰ Charles A. Beard, "The New Deal's Rough Road," 42:632, September, 1935, Current History.

¹⁵¹ Loc. cit.

¹⁵² Charles A. Beard, "Labors of Congress," Current History, 43:65-66, October, 1935.

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for the distribution and marketing of the commodity. The Commission was also authorized to establish maximum prices and to protect the consumer from undue exploitation. Employees were under the law granted the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice. No employee could be forced to join a company union. A Bituminous Coal Labor Board was established to settle disputes, conduct labor elections, and determine the status of a union relative to the company. The Labor Board consisted of three members, one to represent the producers, employees, and the public respectively.¹⁵³

During the ensuing months, the district boards which set prices subject to review by the national commission, set them somewhat similar to the monopolistic practices of the NRA code authorities. The relaxation of the anti-trust laws made monopolistic practices much easier, as under the NHA. Provisions for control in the public's interest were very sketchy in the act, the consumer's representative on the commission being empowered chiefly to call for records and testimony. But the act did establish a mechanism for collective bargaining and is to be praised as an advance in this respect.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³ United States Statutes At Large, 49,1:991-1010.

¹⁵⁴ Harry W. Laidler, A Program For Modern America, p. 226.

for the distribution and marketing of the commodity. The Commission was also authorized to establish maximum prices and to protect the consumer from undue exploitation. Employees were under the law granted the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice. No employer could be forced to join a company union. A minimum wage labor board was established to settle disputes, control labor relations, and determine the status of a union relative to the company. The labor board consisted of three members, one to represent the producers, employees, and the public respectively. 152

During the ensuing months, the district boards which had been subject to review by the national commission, and then referred either to the congressional committee or the NLRB for consideration. The formation of the anti-trust laws with congressional provisions such as that in the NLRB provisions for control in the public's interest were very timely in the act, the economy's representative on the commission being empowered solely to call for records and testimony. But the act did establish a mechanism for collective bargaining and it is to be praised as an advance in labor reform. 153

152 United States Statutes at Large, 65, 1:601-1010.

153 Harry W. Laidler, A Program for Modern America.

The Supreme Court, in May, 1936, declared the act invalid, as expected. The federal government, it was held, invaded states' rights in regulating miners' wages and hours, since labor conditions are "local" and mining is not inter-state commerce. The punitive excise tax was also declared unconstitutional because it was not levied for revenue purposes but to enforce a power which the federal government did not otherwise have. Since the wage and hour provisions were inseparable from the rest of the act, the Court invalidated the entire act.¹⁵⁵

So far we have primarily observed how the attempt of the Roosevelt Administration to regulate industry was frustrated by the Supreme Court. In the Administration's broad reform program, there were other changes made of an enduring nature.

THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

During the War, Congress had built the huge Wilson Dam and power plant at Muscle Shoals, Alabama for the purpose of obtaining nitrogen for explosives. After the war, Senator Norris and others engaged in a constant struggle with the power interests over government use of this plant for the generation of hydro-electric power for commercial purposes.

¹⁵⁵ The New York Times, pp. 14, col. 1, May 19, 1936.

The Supreme Court, in 1905, declared that the
invasion, as suggested. The Court's decision, it was held,
invaded states' rights in violation of the Constitution,
hence, since labor contracts are "local" and binding in
not inter-state commerce. The Court's decision was not
decided unanimously because it was not held that
revenue purposes but to achieve a result which the
Government did not expect. Since the Court's
most provisions were inoperative from the time of the act,
the Court invalidated the whole act.

So far we have primarily looked at the effect of
the Supreme Court's decision on the Federal Reserve
Trusts of the Federal Reserve. In the Administration
trusts Federal Reserve, there were other agencies which
as essential agencies.

THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

During the war, Congress had held the Federal Reserve
and power plant of Federal Reserve, however, the war
was of continuing interest for the Federal Reserve. From the war, the
Federal Reserve and others engaged in a campaign with the
power interests over government and of the Federal Reserve
generation of hydro-electric power for commercial purposes.

For the Federal Reserve, see, Vol. 1, p. 100.

In his message of April 10, 1933, President Roosevelt amazed Congress by asking for the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority. This government corporation was to plan and direct the development of a region of approximately 640,000 miles.¹⁵⁶ Past proposed acts had never gone beyond operation of Muscle Shoals alone.¹⁵⁷

Flood control, reforestation, the checking of soil erosion, the elimination of agricultural use of marginal lands, and the distribution and diversification of industry were the major assignments of the Authority.¹⁵⁸

After the passage of the President's measure, Senator Norris extolled it as "the best Muscle Shoals Bill we have ever had."¹⁵⁹

It was not long until the Authority frankly stated that one of its objects was to furnish a "yardstick" by which the reasonableness of prices charged by private utilities could be evaluated. In its contracts with distributing plants, the Authority demanded that electricity be sold to the ultimate consumer around two cents a kilowatt hour. This distinctly contrasts with the rates of private utilities, which

¹⁵⁶ "Record of Seventy Third Congress," The New York Times, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1934.

¹⁵⁷ Harry W. Laidler, op. cit., p. 308.

¹⁵⁸ "Record of Seventy Third Congress," The New York Times, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1934.

¹⁵⁹ Ernest T. Lindley, op. cit., p. 112.

In his message of April 12, 1935, President Roosevelt announced Congress by asking for the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority. This government corporation was to plan and direct the development of a region of approximately 450,000 acres. Last proposed water had never been beyond operation of Muscle Shoals alone. 187

Flood control, reforestation, the opening of soil erosion, the elimination of agricultural use of marginal lands, and the distribution and diversification of industry were the major assignments of the Authority. 188

After the passage of the President's message, Senator Norris explained it as "the best Muscle Shoals Bill we have ever had." 189

It was not long until the Authority formally stated that one of its objects was to furnish a "hydroelectric" power the responsibility of which was charged by private utilities could be avoided. In the contrast with distribution plants, the Authority demanded that electricity be sold to the utility consumer around two cents a kilowatt hour. This directly contrasts with the rates of private utilities, which

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- 186 "Report of Twenty Third Congress," THE NEW YORK TIMES, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1934.
- 187 Henry W. Laidlaw, pp. 211, p. 208.
- 188 "Report of Twenty Third Congress," THE NEW YORK TIMES, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1934.
- 189 Ernest T. Lincoln, pp. 211, p. 182.

vary from five to seven cents per kilowatt hour.¹⁶⁰

Projects of the same nature but of less magnitude than the Tennessee Valley Authority were likewise undertaken in the States of Oregon and Washington in developing the possibilities of the water power offered by the Columbia River.¹⁶¹

The Electric Home and Farm Authority and the Rural Electrification Commission were established to assist in the transmission and distribution of electricity in rural areas.¹⁶²

REGULATION OF THE SALE OF SECURITIES.

Prior to 1933, the purchaser of securities knew little of anything about the properties behind the securities, the individuals who were controlling them, or the utility of the enterprise. Thus the buying and selling of securities took on many gambling features. Under these circumstances, the buyer was exposed to watered stock, sales to insiders on inside information, a maze of inter-company transactions, and other devices of corporate finance.¹⁶³

The Securities Act of 1933 was designed to cope with this situation. The Act provided for a sworn statement

¹⁶⁰ Harry W. Laidler, op. cit., p. 309-10

¹⁶¹ Charles A. Beard, and George H. E. Smith, The Future Comes (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933) pp. 139-40.

¹⁶² Harry W. Laidler, op. cit., pp. 310-11.

¹⁶³ Charles A. Beard, and George H. E. Smith, Op. cit., pp. 94-95.

from the seller including a full description of detailed factors surrounding the issuance of the security to be registered with the Federal Trade Commission. If the registration form contained an untrue statement of a material fact, or omitted a material fact, everyone concerned with the issuance of the securities was liable for damages.¹⁶⁴

This was the means employed by the Administration to prevent the flagrant abuses of the past. The act was bitterly opposed and criticized by the financial interests principally on the ground that its enforcement prevented the orderly movement of capital into new enterprises.¹⁶⁵

REGULATION OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorized, among other things, the creation of a Securities and Exchange Commission empowered to license the stock exchange. The Federal Reserve Board was vested with power to prescribe rules with respect to the credit extended and maintained on any security.¹⁶⁶

The listing of securities was to be with the Securities and Exchange Commission instead of the Federal Trade Commission as was provided in the Securities Act of 1933.

¹⁶⁴ "Record of the Seventy-Third Congress," The New York Times, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1934.

¹⁶⁵ Charles A. Beard, and George H. E. Smith, op. cit., pp. 95-99.

¹⁶⁶ "Record of the Seventy-Third Congress", loc. cit.

This Commission was to be appointed by the President and granted discretionary control in its activities.¹⁶⁷ Although the extension of government authority over the stock market was regarded as a definite advance, John T. Flynn regretted the lodging of discretion in the Commission instead of the establishment of prescribed regulations.¹⁶⁸

DISSOLUTION OF HOLDING COMPANIES

In early 1935, the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill was introduced in Congress and referred to the committees on interstate commerce. This act provided for the simplification of public utility holding company systems and the elimination of holding companies not economically and geographically interrelated. This was to be accomplished by all interstate holding companies registering with the Securities Exchange Commission which ^{was} then empowered to determine the status of the holding company. The Holding Companies were to institute uniform accounting systems. They were to also make periodic reports to the Securities Exchange Commission which in turn would make reports to the public of its investigations and findings.¹⁶⁹

167 United States Statutes At Large, 48,1:74-96, 1934.

168 John T. Flynn, "The Marines Land In Wall Street", Harpers Magazine, 169:148-55, July, 1934.

169 "The Wheeler-Rayburn Bill", Congressional Digest, 14:139, May, 1935.

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The most drastic provision in the proposed act provided for the liquidation of holding companies by 1940. Around this so-called "death sentence" clause, a bitter battle was waged between the power interests and the Administration. The President was determined to retain this clause in the final draft of the act.¹⁷⁰

The "death sentence" was embodied in the Senate's measure but the House after a sharp contest between the power lobby and the Administration provided for a substitute to this clause. This substitution provision permitted the Securities Exchange Commission to simplify the structure of holding companies and dissolve them as the public interest might require.¹⁷¹

So great were the passions aroused that both the House and the Senate began conducting investigations into the influence exerted by the utility lobby and the Administration. Republican Representative Brewster declared that Thomas Corcoran of the RFC threatened to stop a power project in Maine unless he voted with the Administration. Counter evidence was offered to the effect that Mr. Brewster was told that he would not be a desirable counsel for the Federal Government on the Maine power project if he was

¹⁷⁰ Charles A. Beard, "Looking Forward to 1936", Current History, 42:519-20, August, 1935.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 520.

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out of sympathy with the President's program.¹⁷² The Senate Investigation revealed that the power interests had spent millions to disseminate propaganda and utilize every conceivable means to defeat the "death" clause. Thousands of bogus telegrams, for example, were sent to the members of Congress urging them to vote against the "death" clause.¹⁷³

Due to the publicity given to the investigations, the Administration expected to reverse some of the opposition in the House against the "death sentence". However, a motion to instruct members of the joint conference committee created to accept the Senate Bill was defeated on August 6, 1935. The House further rebuffed the Administration by voting to instruct its conferees to insist upon the exclusion of "outsiders" from the joint conference committee. This was aimed at government experts who had been sitting in committee meetings as advisers.¹⁷⁴

This struggle was finally ended by a compromise measure passing Congress just before adjournment. Its passage was facilitated by more revelations of the Senate

¹⁷² Charles A. Beard, "The New Deal's Rough Road", Current History, 42:630, September, 1935.

¹⁷³ Loc. cit.; Harry W. Laidler, A Program For Modern America, pp. 785-86.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 630-31.

Committee investigating lobbies.¹⁷⁵ In the compromise some leeway was given to the Securities Exchange Commission in dissolving higher holding companies and the period of performing the dissolving was extended to after 1942. Holding companies beyond the second degree were absolutely forbidden and the Federal Power Commission was empowered to regulate the rates and services of electrical concerns doing an interstate business. Charles A. Beard termed the compromise essentially an Administration victory.¹⁷⁶

After the passage of the act, the powerful utility concerns refused to register with the Securities Exchange Commission. They sought to weaken the government in its defense of the validity of the law by instituting some thirty suits against the constitutionality of the Wheeler-Rayburn Act.¹⁷⁷ A test case has yet to come before the Supreme Court.

AIR MAIL REFORM

The disclosures of the Senate Committee investigating ocean and air mail contracts were so sensational that Post-

¹⁷⁵ Charles A. Beard, "Labors of Congress", Current History, 42:66, October, 1935.

¹⁷⁶ Loc. cit.

¹⁷⁷ Charles A. Beard, "Industry's Attack On The New Deal", Current History, 43:404, January, 1936.

master General Farley on February 9, 1934, annulled all air mail contracts. In an executive order, the President directed that the War Department assume the duty of transporting the mail by air. The Investigating Committee had declared that officials of the air lines were making tremendous profits through speculation in the stock of the companies. They were further receiving exorbitant salaries from an industry which had to depend theoretically on a government subsidy.¹⁷⁸


While proposed laws for regulating the air mails were being considered, Congress passed an act permitting the army to carry the air mail for one year.¹⁷⁹

At the end of March, 1934, Postmaster General Farley asked for bids for the transportation of the air mail from companies whose contracts had not been annulled. Those whose contracts had been canceled were ineligible to bid along with the others until their personnel had been reorganized. By the end of April the ineligible companies had been reorganized and submitted their bids. Some lines bid as low as seventeen and one-half cents a mile although the former limit was forty-one to forty-five cents a mile.¹⁸⁰ During May the private air companies resumed

¹⁷⁸ E. Francis Brown, "Business Evils", Current History, 39:724-25, March, 1934.

¹⁷⁹ E. Francis Brown, "The Aviation Scandal", Current History, 40:74, April, 1934.

¹⁸⁰ E. Francis Brown, "The Work of Congress", Current History, 40:330, June, 1934.



the flying of the mail.¹⁸¹

On June 12, 1934, the President approved a permanent air mail act which authorized the award of air mail contracts to the lowest bidders.. The measure prohibited interlocking directorates or holding companies of corporations from carrying the air mail. The number of contracts to be held by any one company was restricted to three and each company was required to file information concerning its organization and financial connections. Primary air routes were prescribed and air mail postage rates reduced to six cents an ounce.¹⁸²

After a broad survey had been completed of the air companies, Congress passed another Air-Mail Act on August 14, 1935. Air routes were enlarged and defined. The Interstate Commerce Commission was empowered to determine maximum rates. The burden of proof for rate increases was placed on the companies. Furthermore, the National Labor Relations Board was allowed to enforce its decisions in regard to the air companies.¹⁸³

RAILROAD AND COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL

Upon the financial stability of the railroads par-

¹⁸¹ Loc. cit.

¹⁸² "Record of Seventy-Third Congress", The New York Times, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1935.

¹⁸³ United States Statutes At Large, 49,1:614-19.

tially depends that of the many insurance companies, educational, religious, and philanthropic institutions which have \$6,500,000,000 invested in railroad securities.¹⁸⁴

Railroad operating revenues of class I railroads decreased from \$6,360,423,213 in 1923 to \$3,161,928,625 in 1932.¹⁸⁵ The railroads appeared to be in a state of rout and the Emergency Transportation Act of 1933 was enacted to aid them in collecting and consolidating their forces.¹⁸⁶

The office of Federal Coordinator of Transportation was established to centralize control over this organ of transportation. The decisions of the Federal Coordinator were to have the force of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. They could be nullified only by an appeal to the Interstate Commerce Commission.¹⁸⁷

To advise with the coordinator regional coordinating committees for the East, West, and South were set up. A protective labor clause prohibited reductions beyond certain amounts in the number of employees, in the service of a carrier, and in their compensation.¹⁸⁸

Another act in the interest of regulation and control was the Communications Act of 1934. This measure

184 Charles A. Beard and George H. E. Smith, The Future Comes, pp. 64.

185 Loc. cit.

186 Ibid., pp. 65.

187 United States Statutes At Large, 48,1:211-12.

188 Loc. cit.

created the Federal Communications Commission to regulate the nation's interstate and foreign communications services by telephone, telegraph, cable, and radio. Former powers of this nature vested in the Federal Radio Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission were now transferred to the new Federal Communications Commission.¹⁸⁹

MORE LABOR LEGISLATION


During the Seventy-Third Session of Congress, machinery was established to attempt to bring about rapid re-employment of labor. The Wagner National Employment System Act approved in June, 1933, authorized the establishment of a national employment system. The United States Employment Service was created by this act to bring about cooperation among the states in promoting reemployment.¹⁹⁰

Just before the close of the Seventy-Third Session, Congress took definite steps in the interests of labor passing the Railway Pension Act and the Cresser-Dill Railway Labor Act. The former act provided for a comprehensive retirement system for railroad employees based on employer and employee contributions.¹⁹¹ The latter piece of legis-

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 1064-65.

¹⁹⁰ "Record of the Seventy-Third Congress", The New York Times, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1934.

¹⁹¹ Loc. cit.



lation provided for the settlement of labor disputes affecting workers on the railways and in express and sleeping-car companies. Disputes were to be adjusted through collective bargaining, company unions were outlawed, and bi-partisan boards were established for arbitration purposes.¹⁹²

On May 6, 1935, the Supreme Court held the Railroad Retirement Act invalid in a five to four decision. The Court held that the providing of pensions lay beyond the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce and also violated private property without due process of law.¹⁹³


Before adjourning, Congress passed the Wagner-Crosser Retirement Act to take the place of the invalidated law. The base of the new act was shifted from the commerce power of Congress to its taxing power. Carriers and their employees were to be taxed and out of the funds collected the Treasury was to pay retirement allowances.¹⁹⁴

By its ability to stipulate provisions in its contracts, the Federal Government improved labor conditions through the Walsh-Healey Government Contracts Act of 1936. This act stipulated that public contracts made by the government

¹⁹² Loc. cit.

¹⁹³ Ibid., May 7, 1935, pp. 1.

¹⁹⁴ Charles A. Beard, "Labors of Congress", Current History, 43:66, October, 1935.



should include several provisions. Manufacturers must agree in their contracts with the government to pay prevailing wages, to provide for an eight hour day and a forty hour week, to employ no person under sixteen years of age, and to provide sanitary working conditions. Violators of the provisions of this bill were to be barred from bidding on government contracts for three years and suffer other penalties. This act did not apply when the government bought articles in the open market or when it found its business seriously impaired by the annulling of contracts.¹⁹⁵

SOCIAL SECURITY

Due to the efforts of the President, a Social Security Act was introduced in Congress in January, 1935. The first section of the proposed act provided for immediate grants from the Federal Treasury to the States. These grants were to constitute the funds out of which old age pensions would be paid to all who had reached sixty-five. This federal subsidy would match State contributions up to the amount of \$15 per month per person.¹⁹⁶

The second section of the act contemplated the establishment of old-age annuities applicable to those who

¹⁹⁵ "Record of Seventy-Fourth Congress", The New York Times, pp. 15, June 22, 1936.

¹⁹⁶ Charles A. Beard, "Work of Congress", Current History, 42:235, June, 1935.

reach the age of sixty-five by 1942. In no instance were the annuities to exceed \$65. monthly. The funds for these annuities were to be derived from a tax on payrolls of employers and the wages of employees in all but agricultural industries.¹⁹⁷

These pension provisions were climaxed by an unemployment benefit plan. Beginning in 1936, a federal tax was to be levied on payrolls to provide reserves against unemployment. If a state adopted an Unemployment Benefit act, then a large rebate would be allowed the state from the Federal tax. In this manner, the states were influenced to act but left free to make such local variation in their program as was appropriate.¹⁹⁸

Under minor provisions, assistance was provided for dependent mothers and the blind along with other health and welfare activities.¹⁹⁹

The Wagner-Lewis Act passed Congress incorporating the suggestions of the President.²⁰⁰

This piece of legislation was criticized by the Left for being only a half-way reform. The highly decentralized administration of this program was declared inadequate. A national system of insurance was urged instead of the Wagner-Lewis state system with its few standards for state unemployment systems.²⁰¹

197 Loc. cit.

198 Loc. cit.

199 Loc. cit.

200 United States Statutes At Large, 49,1:620-48.

201 Harry W. Laidler, A Program For Modern America, pp. 43-55.

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Another criticism from the same source was the contention that the federal government should contribute to the unemployment fund in place of, or in addition to the employers. Finally, the act was attacked for providing meagre benefits and for levying inadequate taxes to meet its own contemplated program.²⁰²

In the field of Industry and Transportation, the National Industrial Recovery Act, received paramount consideration. Further labor legislation, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Wheeler-Rayburn Holding Company Act, the Securities and Stock Exchange Acts, and Air Mail legislation were then described. Railroad legislation, regulation of communication's services, and social security legislation completed this category.

RELIEF AND PUBLIC WORKS

During the first month of the Roosevelt Administration two bills were introduced in Congress designed to cope with the unemployment problem.

The Civilian Conservation Corp Reforestation Act authorized the establishment of a "civilian conservation corp" of two hundred and fifty thousand unemployed men. They were to be enrolled for one year, paid thirty dollars per month, and placed under the supervision of army officers. This agency was to engage in reforestation, road building, disease and flood control, and soil con-

²⁰² loc. cit.

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servation. Means of subsistence were to be supplied to the enrolled unmarried citizens in addition to their receipt of thirty dollars.²⁰³ Organized labor was very hostile to the act because it felt that the low wages paid would tend to lower the wage scale throughout the nation. After the passage of this act, President Roosevelt skillfully pacified labor by the appointment of a labor leader as director of this work.²⁰⁴

The second measure, the Costigan-Lewis Sagner Emergency Relief Act, authorized the expending of \$500,000,000 by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration created by this act. This appropriation was to be distributed throughout the states and municipalities, one half of the fund being made available for restricted grants, and the remainder being matched by the state or local governmental agency.²⁰⁵

With the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act, Congress attacked the unemployment problem in a more extensive manner. The second section of this measure created a fund of \$3,300,000,000 for the establishment of a federal public works program. The Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works (FEA) was established to

²⁰³ "Record of Seventy-Third Congress", The New York Times, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1934.

²⁰⁴ Ernest K. Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution: First Phase, pp. 101-02.

²⁰⁵ "Record of Seventy-Third Congress", loc. cit.

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administer the expending of this fund.²⁰⁶ The act was so drafted that appropriations could be made against funds of over three billions for almost every conceivable purpose that Congress desired from loans to hospitals to the construction of naval vessels.²⁰⁷

Public Works Administrator Ickes immediately set up the PWA organization. The country was divided into ten regional zones, each under a regional administrator.²⁰⁸

Although by June, 1934, the PWA had allotted its entire fund, not more than one-third of the fund at most had been spent.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, the Administrator estimated that only about one-half billion of the fund would be disbursed during 1935.²¹⁰

The slow progress of the public works program was due to the many requirements which had to be fulfilled before Administrator Ickes would approve individual projects. The policies of the PWA demanded that before the approval of a project was granted reasonable security for the repayment of loans had to be provided. In addition, the so-

206 Loc. cit.

207 Louis H. Hacker, A Short History of The New Deal, pp. 51.

208 E. Francis Brown, "The Great American Experiment", Current History, 38:719, September, 1933.

209 Louis H. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 52.

210 Loc. cit.

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- 200 Louis E. Hatcher, *A Short History of the PWA*, pp. 21.
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cial desirability of the project had to be determined by a careful economic, engineering, financial, and legal examination.²¹¹

Employment brought about by the PWA was very disappointing.²¹² With winter approaching in 1933 and only a few hundred thousand men employed, the Civil Works Administration was established in an attempt to employ four million men as soon as possible.²¹³ Administrator Hopkins actively accomplished this task, but in doing so the improvised works program became a prey to graft.²¹⁴ Nor was the social value of the jobs created great. Nevertheless aid was rendered to the unemployed on an unparalleled scale and large sums of money were put into circulation.²¹⁵

The original plan of the Administration had been that the PWA would have a plan matured by the summer of 1934 for the employment of millions of workers. The CWA was the contemplated makeshift to alleviate the unemployment problem during the winter of 1933-34.²¹⁶ But by April, 1934, with the liquidation of the CWA, the PWA was not in a position to promote the employment of millions due to the slowness with which it had progressed.²¹⁷

²¹¹ Ibid., pp. 51-52.

²¹² Harry W. Laidler, A Program For Modern America, pp. 156.

²¹³ E. Francis Brown, "Relief and Public Works", Current History, 39:458-59, January, 1934.

²¹⁴ Louis M. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 79.

²¹⁵ Harry W. Laidler, op. cit., pp. 156.

²¹⁶ Loc. cit.

²¹⁷ E. Francis Brown, op. cit., pp. 40.

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- 211 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
212 Harry W. Laidler, "The Federal Reserve Bank," pp. 122.
213 E. Francis Brown, "Unemployment and Public Works," *Economic History*, 28:122-28, January, 1932.
214 Louis B. Bunker, pp. 212, pp. 79.
215 Harry W. Laidler, pp. 212, pp. 122.
216 Ibid. 217
217 E. Francis Brown, pp. 212, pp. 40.

So with the demobilization of the CWA a new works program had to be established under the Federal Emergency Relief Administration created by the Wagner-Lewis Emergency Relief Act of 1933.²¹⁸ An added appropriation of almost one billion dollars was approved by President Roosevelt to enable the FERA to carry out the former task of the Civil Works Administration. This program continued until the fall of 1935 when it was absorbed into the newly created Works Progress Administration. It employed around two and a quarter million persons in emergency work and about three million more were placed on direct relief of various kinds.²¹⁹

In addition to emergency work and direct relief, FERA developed special programs such as rural rehabilitation, drought relief, transient camps, emergency education embracing nursery schools, adult education, vocational rehabilitation, college-student aid, and public health services.²²⁰

Another relief agency which worked together with the agencies mentioned was the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, created in October, 1933. Its function was to purchase agricultural and other commodities, utilizing these surpluses for the relief of the unemployed.²²¹ A quarter of billion dollars had been expended in this manner by 1936.²²²

²¹⁸ Loc. cit.

²¹⁹ Louis M. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 71.

²²⁰ The Editors of the Economist, The New Deal: An Analysis and Appraisal, pp. 7-12.

²²¹ Loc. cit.

²²² Louis M. Hacker, loc., cit.

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- 1. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration, pp. 1-12.
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- 9. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration, pp. 1-12.
- 10. The Federal Surplus Relief Administration, pp. 1-12.

When Congress convened in January, 1935, President Roosevelt boldly asked for an appropriation of \$4,800,000,000 in one lump sum to be spent at his discretion in promoting recovery and providing work relief for the unemployed. Without the slightest outline as to how the money was to be spent, the House immediately passed an act to this effect. In the Senate, however, Progressives and Republicans announced that they must have some specifications before voting nearly five billions of dollars in a single appropriation to the President.²²⁴

The President then tentatively suggested that two billions would be spent for work relief wages. Three and one-half million workers were to be employed at an average pay of \$50. per month or thirty-eight cents an hour.²²⁵ This declaration caused a furore in trade union circles. On February 21, the Senate passed the McCarran Amendment to the President's House bill. This amendment stated that the same rates of pay would be given on projects financed under this act as prevailed for work of a similar nature in the place where the work was located. With the President threatening to veto the entire act if the McCarran Amendment were retained, the Senate reconsidered this change

²²⁴ Charles A. Beard, "The Month In America", Current History, 41:718-19, March, 1935.

²²⁵ Harry W. Laidler, op. cit., pp. 159.

and rejected it.²²⁶ Administration supporters maintained that the adoption of the McCarran Amendment would mean an average wage of around eighty cents an hour. They concluded their argument with the fact that the payment of this wage scale would increase by nearly two and one-half billion the amount of the appropriation, making the total outlay too great for the nation to stand at that time.²²⁷

A compromise amendment was finally enacted whereby prevailing wages would be paid only after an investigation had been made and it had been determined that the rate of wages paid was affecting adversely the prevailing wage rate.²²⁸

Related to this struggle over the rate of wages was another over the type of works which the Administration should foster. Secretary Ickes urged that substantial projects of permanent usefulness be undertaken with full standard wages paid only to those workers qualified to participate in the project. These types of projects, he felt, would indirectly employ many in manufacturing and transporting materials. Administrator Hopkins urged the establishment of projects in which the government should give as much work as possible very speedily. Direct labor

²²⁶ "Balance Sheet of the New Deal", (Supplement), New Republic, 87:145-47, June 10, 1936.

²²⁷ Harry W. Laidler, A Program For Modern America, pp. 160.

²²⁸ Charles A. Beard, "Congress At Work", Current History, 42:83-84.

cost would be most of the expense of this type of project.²²⁹

With the passage of the Work Relief Bill, Mr. Hopkins was made Administrator and his principles of relief were put into operation, excepting quick application of the works program.

It was not until November 1, 1935, that the start of the vast works program was made.²³⁰ Whether this procrastination was due to political reasons or to the lack of proper planning one is left to choose for himself. Generous provisions from the fund were given to the assistance of youth (The National Youth Administration), rural rehabilitation, rural electrification, and housing. However, whether it was timed or not, the full effects of the WPA were not felt until close to election time in 1936.²³¹

President Roosevelt fixed a maximum of ninety-three dollars and fifty cents monthly for pay on the new program. The agitation that followed in labor circles caused the President to comprise and give each State Works Progress Administrator authority to determine the hours and rate of work on each project. Labor pressure in several states then resulted in prevailing wage schedules.²³²

²²⁹ Harry W. Laidler, op. cit., pp. 160.

²³⁰ "Too Slow, Mr. Roosevelt", Business Week, pp. 40, August 3, 1935.

²³¹ "Balance Sheet of the New Deal", (Supplement), New Republic, 87:147, June 10, 1936.

²³² Harry W. Laidler, op. cit., pp. 161.

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See Henry V. Ladd, op. cit., pp. 120.

See "The New Deal," by Roosevelt, *Business Week*, pp. 40.

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See "Business Week," op. cit., (supplement),
August 10, 1933.

See Henry V. Ladd, op. cit., pp. 141.

The WPA was severely criticized throughout 1936. In an improvised program of such extensive effort much waste and misappropriation resulted. Politics played a greater part in the selection of local relief administrators than in any previous relief organization. When demands for investigation were made in Congress, they did not receive Administration support and were rejected.²³³

Despite the expenditure of something like ten billion dollars by the federal government from 1933-37 for relief and public works, in 1936, according to the New Republic, there were still twenty-five millions on relief.²³⁴

Relief was extended to home owners by the Home Owners's Refinancing Act approved June 13, 1933. The Home Owners Loan Corporation was created by this legislation. The HOLC was to refinance mortgages by exchanging its bonds, whose interest was guaranteed, for the liens of the mortgagees.²³⁵

Starting slowly, the HOLC succeeded in refinancing three hundred and forty thousand home mortgages by June, 1934.²³⁶

²³³ Congressional Digest, 15:177-84, June, 1936.

²³⁴ "Balance Sheet of the New Deal", op. cit., 87: 146.

²³⁵ "Record of Seventy-Third Congress", The New York Times, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1934.

²³⁶ Louis M. Hacker, A Short History of the New Deal, pp. 69.

This measure of home relief was considerably improved by the Home Owners Loan Act of 1934. This latter act guaranteed the principal as well as the interest of the HOLC bonds. The HOLC was permitted to advance loans not only to make necessary repairs, but also for modernization, enlargement, and rebuilding of homes.²³⁷

Congress continued passing home relief measures by enacting the National Housing Act in June, 1934. This measure provided for a thoroughgoing scheme of home financing and mortgage insurance. National mortgage associations were established empowered to purchase and sell first mortgages and borrow money through the issue of these securities. A National Housing Administrator was appointed with authority to administer the housing renovation and modernization, the mutual mortgage insurance program, and the national association feature of the act.²³⁸


The Housing program of the Administration was restricted to only a very few projects. In the beginning an organized attack on slums seemed possible. But no such erection of dwellings for families in deplorable circumstances was ever carried out.²³⁹

Under the FWA, the Housing Division was given authority to make grants and loans to local authorities up to a total

237 "Record of Seventy-Third Congress", loc. cit.

238 Loc. cit.

239 Louis M. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 53.



of \$150,000,000 for large scale housing projects. The Federal government, however, had by 1936 allocated grants and loans for only fifty projects which when completed would provide housing accommodations for only a few thousand of the many millions needing such dwellings. Less than \$50,000,000 had been loaned for these undertakings.²⁴⁰

The original plan for subsistence homesteads was likewise never carried beyond its incipency. The idea was to remove submarginal farmers and unemployed industrial workers into a newly created semi-rural village. A provision in the NIRA appropriated \$25,000,000 for making loans and otherwise aiding in the purchase of subsistence homesteads. The Division of Subsistence Homesteads created in the Department of the Interior decided to use this fund to set up demonstration projects.²⁴¹

After about ten demonstration settlements had been erected, the romantic nature of the original plans of Under Secretary Tugwell became evident. It was discovered that the cost of resettling homesteaders would amount to \$2500 per family, and then the problem of providing employment for the homesteader had to be met.²⁴²

The resettlement Administration created by executive order under the authority of the Emergency relief Appro-

²⁴⁰ Harry W. Laidler, A Program For Modern America, pp. 172.

²⁴¹ Louis Hacker, op. cit., pp. 100.

²⁴² Ibid., pp. 102-05.

priation Act of 1935 attempted to carry out on a small scale the plans of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads. Although needed aid was given to three hundred and fifty thousand farm families on poor lands, the idea of resettling the unemployed in farm communities was gradually abandoned.²⁴³

The widespread relief and works program of the Administration might be classified as successful to the extent that it provided the necessities of life to millions of Americans. The conclusion is inescapable that the Housing and Resettlement Programs showed little results for their efforts.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In the busy days of early 1933, the President invited the representatives of foreign governments to Washington so that important problems in the coming World's Economic Conference could be discussed in advance. While these delegates were sailing from Europe to the United States, the United States officially announced the abandonment of the gold standard. This action had the immediate effect of provoking the gold-bloc nations who feared international repercussions from an inflationary policy by the United States.²⁴⁴

²⁴³ Harry W. Laidler, op. cit., pp. 208.

²⁴⁴ Ernest Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution: The First Phase, pp. 178-84.

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In private conversations at Washington, the President mollified foreign representatives. They were assured that the United States was ardently in favor of currency stabilization and would work for its adoption at the conference.²⁴⁵

Despite these preliminary conversations between leading world statesmen, negotiations during the Conference which opened on June 12, 1933, indicated that its foundations were not stable.

Prime Minister MacDonald of Great Britain, Chairman of the Conference, in his opening address, embarrassed the American delegation by referring to the war debts, which were not on the agenda of the Conference. Secretary Hull delivered the next address indicting economic nationalism and high tariffs. After this address, the Conference became stalemated due to the failure of the gold-bloc nations to obtain currency stabilization.²⁴⁶

At first, the possibilities of a world currency agreement seemed great. Stabilization rumours were widespread. On June 16, President Roosevelt suddenly had the Secretary of the Treasury repudiate these reports. A note of Mr. Roosevelt's to the Conference confirmed Secretary Woodin's repudiation of international currency stabilization.²⁴⁷

245 Mauritz Hallgren, The Gay Reformer, pp. 136.

246 Ernest Lindley, op. cit., pp. 198-214.

247 Ibid., pp. 201.

In a last effort to get the United States to agree to stabilization, England sent an appeal to the United States imploring the President to stop the speculation of dollars on foreign exchanges. The reply of Mr. Roosevelt ended whatever hopes of currency stabilization which still existed, and forced the adjournment of the Conference.²⁴⁸ The President emphatically rejected proposals of stabilization, declaring that he

would regard it as a catastrophe amounting to a world tragedy if the great conference of nations ...should..allow itself to be diverted by the proposal of a purely artificial and temporary experiment affecting the monetary exchange of a few nations only.²⁴⁹

Although it took the President of the United States a while to realize the fact, the United States was at that time too much absorbed in an internal inflationary program to have any real concern for international currency stabilization.²⁵⁰

The American representatives to the Conference issued contradictory public statements and were never in concurrence throughout its existence.²⁵¹ Secretary Hull's jealousy of Professor Moley became so intense that he cabled his resignation to the President.²⁵²

248 Mauritz Hallgren, op. cit., pp. 140.

249 Loc. cit.

250 Ibid.; Hallgren, pp. 140-41; Hacker, pp. 57; Lindley, pp. 217.

251 Ernest Lindley, op. cit., pp. 210-16.

252 Ibid., pp. 215-16.

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Secretary of State Hull whose prestige had reached such a low point, accomplished as much as was possible from the seventh Pan American Conference at Montevideo, Uruguay, in December, 1933. An anti-aggression pact was the principal treaty resulting from this meeting of American states around the council table. Most important of all the developments, however, was the impression made on South and Latin America by Secretary Hull. His sincerity made them believe that the United States under the Roosevelt Administration would respect their sovereignty. Indeed, this marked a change in the policy of the United States towards Latin and South America.²⁵³

With the Conference adjourning on December 26, 1933, only Cuba and Haiti still bore grievances against yankee intervention and imperialism.²⁵⁴

In the kaleidoscopic tumult that shook Cuba in late 1933 and early 1934, the hand of the United States was plainly visible. Since 1925, the dictatorship of the reactionary forces in Cuba had been maintained primarily due to the influence of the State Department.²⁵⁵ So this intervention diplomatically in 1933 and 1934 was no innovation by the United States.

²⁵³ Ernest Gruening, "Pan-Americanism Reborn", Current History, 39:530-34, January, 1934.

²⁵⁴ Ernest Gruening, "Haiti For the Haitians", Current History, 40:418, July, 1934.

²⁵⁵ Raymond Leslie Buell, The New York Times, pp. 3, col. 6, August 12, 1933.

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A revolution in August, 1933, supported by the United States under the new Roosevelt government, resulted in a government being formed which immediately obtained the recognition of the United States.²⁵⁶ A further revolution from below and without the aid of the United States succeeded and the leftist government of Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin was installed. The United States refused to recognize this government and placed gunboats around the island. Whether agents of the United States intrigued against this radical Cuban government is not definitely known. However, the policy of non-recognition meant the withholding of necessary credit for the harvesting of the sugar crop and thus the ultimate downfall of the leftist government. After another coup de etat had disposed the Grau government, a new conservative Cuban government was promptly recognized by the United States.²⁵⁷

Dr. Grau interpreted his downfall as did all Cuban politicians when he declared, "I fell because Washington willed it".²⁵⁸

Since 1901, the United States under the Platt Amendment had reserved the right to intervene in Cuba when that state was not adequately protecting the life, property,

²⁵⁶ Hubert Herring, "Another Chance For Cuba", Current History, 40:658, March, 1934.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 657-59.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 658.

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and individual liberty of American citizens. A new treaty between the United States and Cuba ratified by the Senate in May, 1934, rescinded the Platt Amendment.²⁵⁹ This was but a step towards restoring Cuban sovereignty for the United States still maintained economic suzerainty over the island and retained its naval base at Guantanamo.²⁶⁰

The supergovernment which the United States had maintained through control of the Bank of Haiti came to an end in May, 1934. An arrangement between President Roosevelt and the President of Haiti on that date terminated the financial control of this island by the National City Bank of New York City. The Haitian government was to acquire control of the Bank of Haiti.²⁶¹ In the middle of 1934, the last of the American marines were withdrawn from the island.²⁶²

Championing a policy of peace in the Americas, the United States embargoed arms shipments from the Chaco warring nations, Bolivia and Paraguay, by a resolution to that effect in 1934.

In 1936, the President penned brief messages to twenty-six American states, who promptly accepted his invitation to a future Conference to be held in Buenos Aires,

²⁵⁹ Charles W. Hackett, "Cuba's New Sovereignty", Current History, 40:471, July, 1934.

²⁶⁰ Harry W. Laidler, A Program For Modern America, pp. 427.

²⁶¹ Ernest Gruening, "Haiti For The Haitians", op. cit., 40:424.

²⁶² Louis M. Hacker, A Short History of the New Deal, pp. 78.

CHROMIUM

Argentina.

The belated recognition of Soviet Russia by the United States on November 17, 1933, resulted primarily from the pressure of business interests who desired to take away the markets of foreign rivals.²⁶³

The ostensible reason for past-non-recognition was the refusal of Soviet Russia to recognize the contracted debts of the former Czarist and Kerensky governments.²⁶⁴ The United States now tactfully agreed to take up all financial questions through regular diplomatic channels after recognition. The Soviet Union agreed to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the United States, and the United States made the same guarantee to the Soviet envoy, Maksim Litvinov.²⁶⁵

Hoped of commercial gains through Soviet recognition were frustrated by passage of the Johnson Act on April 4, 1934, by Congress. This measure rendered credit to the Soviet government through the Export-Import Bank impossible until Russian debts to America had been settled.²⁶⁶

²⁶³ Louis M. Sears, A History of American Foreign Relations, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1935), pp. 625.

²⁶⁴ Edgar S. Furness, The Basis of Soviet Recognition, 39:312.

²⁶⁵ Louis M. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 74.

²⁶⁶ "Record of Seventy-Third Congress", The New York Times, pp. 24, June 17, 1934.

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The buying and selling of securities in the United States by any country in default in the payment of its debts to the United States was made illegal. Loans to municipalities and other subdivisions of debt-defaulting nations were not prohibited, nor were loans to foreign corporations effected. This measure, not initiated by the Administration, made foreign financing in the United States more difficult.

By the granting of Philippine independence in March, 1934, the United States was relieved of the burden of defending the island. Another reason for granting independence was to eliminate the trade concessions which Philippine products enjoyed in the United States.


An act for Philippine independence had passed Congress over President Hoover's veto in early 1933. This act authorized what amounted to the establishment of an American protectorate under a Filipino chief executive.²⁶⁷

In October, 1933, the Philippine legislature refused to accept the Hawes-Cutting Independence measure because certain tariffs on essential Philippine products were to be raised in and Philippine immigration was to be barred from the United States.²⁶⁸

In March, 1934, Congress passed the Administration's Tydings-McDuffie act which offered the islanders indepen-

²⁶⁷ Louis M. Hacker, loc. cit.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 76-77.



dence on practically the same terms as did the Hawes-Cut-ting act. The important exception was the agreement of the United States to abandon military posts on the is-lands and to open negotiations with the same purpose in view for navalbases.²⁶⁹

The Philippine legislature accepted the latter inde-pendence act despite its dissatisfaction with its econo-mic and immigration provisions. The Filipinos soon learned what independence meant--Congress immediately levied a prohibitive excise tax on cocoanut oil and copra coming into the United States thereby crippling the main industries of the islands.²⁷⁰

Although relieved of defending the Philippines, the United States adopted a nationalistic army and navy policy unparalleled in the peacetime history of the nation.

In 1933, almost one quarter of a billion dollars was allotted from the PWA for the construction of vessels.²⁷¹ The Vinson Naval Parity Act passed in March, 1934, provided for the building of American naval strength up to the limits established by the Washington and London Treaties of 1922 and 1930 respectively. The estimated cost of this program was three-quarters of a billion dollars.²⁷²

²⁶⁹ E. Francis Brown, "Philippine Independence", Current History, 40:76, April, 1934.

²⁷⁰ Louis H. Hacker, op. cit., pp. 77.

²⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 52.

²⁷² "Record of Seventy-Third Congress", loc. cit.

The War Department Appropriation Act of April, 1934, authorized an increase of forty per cent in the army. The personnel of the national guard was enlarged and the citizens' military camp expanded likewise. The estimated cost of this program was \$400,000,000.²⁷³

During the 1934-35 session of Congress, army and navy appropriations advanced to the colossal sum of \$830,000,000. The 1936 military appropriation bill called for around a billion dollars.²⁷⁴


Thus while the Nye committee was exposing the power of the war profiteers, they were making their greatest "scoop" in the peace-time history of the United States.

The startling revelations of the Nye Committee ultimately resulted in the passage of the Neutrality Act of 1935.²⁷⁵ This measure made certain actions of the President mandatory upon the outbreak of war between foreign nations. The President must issue a proclamation making it illegal to sell arms, ammunition or implements of war to belligerents. Submarines were prohibited from stopping in American ports. The President was granted discretionary power in determining when the time was opportune to

²⁷³ Harry W. Laidler, A Program For Modern America, pp. 424.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 423.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 419.



proclaim that

no citizen of the United States shall travel on any vessel of any belligerent nation except at his own risk.²⁷⁶

This compromise measure did not have full Administration support. It failed to include in the list of prescribed raw materials cotton and copper which are essential for explosives and shells.²⁷⁷ Nor did it prevent the making of loans to belligerent countries.²⁷⁸

In October, 1935, with the outbreak of war between Italy and Ethiopia, President Roosevelt issued a proclamation forbidding the exportation of munitions destined for either belligerent nation. He later declared in an additional proclamation that passengers and merchants sailed and traded at their own risk. Valuable quantities of oil, however, reached Italy via the United States illustrating the incompleteness of the Neutrality Act of 1935.²⁷⁹

In 1936, Congress amended the Neutrality Act of 1935 and extended it to May 1, 1937. New insertions forbade any loans or credits to belligerents other than ordinary commercial credits and short-time obligations which the

²⁷⁶ United States Statutes At Large, 49,1:1681.

²⁷⁷ Harry W. Laidler, op. cit., pp. 419-20.

²⁷⁸ The Johnson Debt Default Act of 1934 made foreign financing more difficult.

²⁷⁹ "Making Our Neutrality Effective", Christian Century, pp. 544-45, December 4, 1935.

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no citizen of the United States shall travel on
any vessel of any belligerent nation except as
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This provision means that we have full authority
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commercial credits and short-time obligations when the
The United States Minister at London, 1917-1918.
Mr. W. H. Taft, 1917-1918, pp. 412-50.
The Johnson Act, 1917, Act of 1917 made
foreign financing more difficult.
The United States Neutrality Act, 1917, pp. 444-45, December 4, 1917.

President could exempt from the prohibition of loans at his discretion. The act did not apply to an American state engaged in war with a non-American state providing the American state was not cooperating with the non-American state in such a war.²⁸⁰

The Act was still incomplete in that it failed to prohibit the sale to belligerents of many commodities essential to the maintenance of modern warfare such as oil, copper and the like.²⁸¹

The United States made two attempts to join international organizations during the first term of Mr. Roosevelt.

Former Secretary of State Henry Stimson had signed a protocol with members of the World Court whereby under certain conditions the United States would become a member of that body. The protocol provided that in case no agreement between the United States and the League of Nations could be reached as to what constituted a dispute in which the United States had an interest, the United States could withdraw from the Court without imputations of unfriendliness.²⁸²

²⁸⁰ United States Statutes At Large, 49,1: 1152-1153.

²⁸¹ Harry W. Laidler, op. cit., pp. 421.

²⁸² "Senate Rejection of the World Court", Literary Digest, 119:56, February 16, 1936.

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200 United States Relations with Japan, 1911-1922
1922
201 Harry W. Ladd, pp. 211-212.
202 "General Relations of the World Court", 1922-
203 Ladd, pp. 212-213, February 12, 1922.

A lukewarm attempt by the Administration to get Senate ratification of this treaty failed. An immense number of telegrams stimulated by the Hearst press, Father Coughlin, and other nationalistic figures and societies frightened wavering Senators into voting against the ratification.²⁸³

The United States joined the International Labor Organization in an unobtrusive manner. A Joint Resolution was quietly passed by Congress whereby the United States became a member of that organization without the isolationists and nationalists becoming aware of the fact. The aim of this organization was to advance labor legislation through world coordination.²⁸⁴

We have reserved to the last what is probably the most stimulating aspect of foreign affairs of the Roosevelt Administration.

In an effort to restore the pre-depression trade of the United States, the Administration asked Congress to pass the Reciprocal Tariff Act of 1934. Congress passed this measure which authorized the President to negotiate trade agreements with foreign governments for a period of three years without the traditional consent of the Senate. To effect these agreements the President was empowered to raise or lower tariff rates by not more than fifty per

²⁸³ Loc. cit.

²⁸⁴ E. J. Phelan, Manley Hudson, J. T. Shotwell, "United States And The International Labor Organization," International Conciliation, pp. 107-51, April. 1935.

A historic attempt to bring about a
general realization of the world
number of religious, scientific, and
cultural, and other institutions
frustrated meeting and other
situation.

The United States, Japan, and
Germany in an attempt to bring
was greatly feared by the world
became a member of the United Nations
national and international
aim of this organization was to
through world coordination.
We have been very busy in the
most extensive system of
self administration.

In an effort to reach a
the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Soviet Union, the
this system should be
these years without any
to allow these agreements
to raise or lower the level of

1945 100 111
United States and the
International Organization

cent.²⁸⁵

It was significant that former Secretary of the Treasury, Ogden L. Mills, and former Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, supported this policy of Secretary of State Hull.

Eight out of ten countries which first signed agreements with the United States were nations which normally sold more to the United States than they bought. Thus their economic interests were directly advanced by the agreements. In all the sixteen agreements made by 1937, the benefits of concessions were extended to all nations which did not discriminate against the trade of the treaty-signing nations.²⁸⁶

Since the signing of these treaties, trade between these nations and the United States has increased slightly.²⁸⁷ But since most of the agreements have been in effect only a short while, it is not possible to accurately determine their commercial benefit.

The foreign policy of the first Roosevelt Administration, we have observed, was primarily determined by domestic problems. However, individual situations did not always follow this formula. The inertia of traditions as well as the pressure of capital seeking outlet compelled the government of Mr. Roosevelt to modify its policy of econ-

²⁸⁵ "Record of Seventy-Third Congress", The New York Times, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1934.

²⁸⁶ The Editors of the Economist, The New Deal, An Analysis and Appraisal, pp. 117-19.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 119.

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Significant Nations

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100 Record of Twenty-Fifth Congress, 1937-1938, pp. 24-25, June 17, 1938.

101 The Editors of the Encyclopedia, 1938, pp. 117-118.

102 Ibid., pp. 118.

omic nationalism.²⁸⁸

In the main, Secretary Hull accomplished two achievements. Respect for the sovereignty of American nations became a cardinal point in American foreign policy. Secondly, the United States made an idealistic effort to revive world trade by signing reciprocal trade treaties with sixteen nations.

RETROSPECT

The emergency action of the Roosevelt Administration was successful in alleviating the banking crisis of 1933. The inflationary, wage, and limitation of production policies resulted in a higher price level. Profits increased. The income of the workers and farmers increased slightly. Government borrowing and spending further stimulated economic activity.

As the effect of these activities, an economic boom resulted. By 1936, the prosperity period of the business cycle had been reached.

Besides promoting economic recovery, the New Deal enacted a long list of reforms. These measures were intended to make capitalism more palatable to the masses. Because of the strong opposition of the capitalist and upper middle class, the Administration had in many instances to compromise. Many of the reforms were thus rendered inef-

²⁸⁸ Louis M. Sears, A History of American Foreign Relations, pp. 620-22.

fective. Court action made others unenforceable for the time being. The New Deal deserves credit for the number of impressive changes it attempted. The results obtained from recovery and reform activities, compared to what is necessary for the establishment of social justice in our society, have been disappointing.

Relief there was but just enough to keep its recipients fed and clothed. Recovery there has been but real recovery for only a few. There has been no permanent readjustment of agriculture to meet its changed environment. Moreover, the paramount political problem of how America is to construct a socially regulated economy within her present Constitution was neglected. Considering what might have been done, much seems to have been left undone.

But compare the blundering but well intentioned attempt of Mr. Roosevelt with the Opposition. Compared to what the Republicans have previously done and the amount of understanding of our problems that they showed, or what reactionaries now propose to do, the New Deal stands out as a striking advance in the attitude and action of our federal government.

CHAPTER II

PRESIDENTIAL POSSIBILITIES

Now that we have narrated and evaluated the record of the first Administration of President Roosevelt, a survey of the presidential candidates in the 1936 campaign follows. The last chapter is reserved for a description of the contest within the major parties for delegates to the nominating conventions.

As head of the powerful federal patronage organization, the President of the United States is normally certain to control enough delegates to dictate his renomination at the party nominating convention.¹ Since the activities of the federal government expanded enormously from 1932 to 1936, President Roosevelt had at his disposal probably more patronage than any other President since 1860. So it was almost certain that President Roosevelt would secure his renomination from the convention. What made the race for president interesting within the Democratic party was the color of the candidates and the fact that ^asplit in the party was threatened.

President Roosevelt had two rivals for the nomination, Senator Huey P. Long of Louisiana, and Governor Eugene Talmadge of Georgia. Neither could have obtained

¹ Thomas C. Donnelly and Roy C. Peel, The 1932 Campaign, pp. 20.

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pledged delegates to the convention but from a few southern states. It seemed likely, however, that Senator Long would belt the convention and split the Democratic party in the South. The President's chances of reelection would thereby be decreased.

The Senator from Louisiana who threatened to bring about the defeat of the Democratic party in 1936 was born in a log cabin on a red earth farm in Winn Parish, Louisiana. As a boy, his work on the farm was interrupted only by the all day Sunday and Wednesday night sermons which he was forced to attend at the rural Baptist Church.² From these sermons he acquired his homely knowledge of the Bible, which later helped make him a Governor and United States Senator.³

Long graduated from a rural high school in 1910. After attending the University of Oklahoma for one year, he changed to the University of Tulane, where he finished the three years' law course in one year. He was given a special examination on May 15, 1915, and admitted to the bar.⁴

For three years, the young lawyer fought the corporations of Louisiana who were flagrantly exploiting the state. At twenty-four, he campaigned for the office of Railroad Commissioner. The fearlessness with which Huey

2 Carleton Beals, The Story of Huey P. Long, pp. 29.

3 Ibid., pp. 31.

4 Ibid., pp. 34.

Long attacked the corporations and his popularity among rural parishes led to his election.⁵

By charging the corporations of Louisiana with corruption and fraud, Huey Long established a state-wide reputation as a friend of the people. The corporation-controlled legislature of Louisiana tried to impeach him but could not obtain the necessary votes. Long was reelected to the Railroad Commission by a large majority.⁶

In 1924, Long sought the governorship of Louisiana. In the ensuing campaign, he severely attacked the utilities and the "New Orleans Ring". His platform promised free school books, free ferries and bridges, and lower rates for gas and electricity.

Huey Long lost the Gubernatorial election in 1924 by ten thousand votes. His defeat was attributed to the fact that election day was rainy and the rural parishes failed to vote heavily. Another factor was that a Ku Klux Klan candidate and a Catholic candidate were running for Governor, partly at the insistence of the political enemies of Huey Long. The people were thus stimulated to vote according to their religious prejudices instead of for Huey Long.⁷ From 1924 to 1928, Long engaged in private law practice. In 1928 he was elected Governor of Louisiana but his enemies in the same election obtained control over the legislature and all minor offices. Huey Long's victory in 1928 was the

5 Ibid., pp. 39.

6 Ibid., pp. 44-46.

7 Ibid., pp. 53-64.

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greatest ever accorded a gubernatorial candidate in Louisiana, his majority being almost forty-five thousand votes.⁸

On May 21, 1928, Governor Long was inaugurated. And then things began to happen. There were few traditions or ceremonies the new Governor did not violate. He conducted the affairs of state from the bed in his hotel room. He surrounded himself with bodyguards and turned the National Guard into his private army of storm troopers. He created an international incident by receiving the Commander of a German battleship in a pair of green pajamas.

The Standard Oil Company and other corporations of Louisiana were angered by the imposition of new severance taxes and the constant attacks which Governor Long made on them. As a result, impeachment proceedings were instituted in the legislature against the Governor and for awhile seemed likely to end the career of Mr. Long. However, in the ensuing Senate trial, Governor Long found fifteen Senators who signed a round robin that they would not vote for his impeachment regardless of the evidence presented. So enough votes were not available to impeach the Governor.⁹

During his term as Governor, Mr. Long provided free texts for the secondary schools and freeschool buses. Telephone, gas, and electric rates were reduced slightly but many corporations had their assessments lowered in

8 Ibid., pp. 79-86.

9 Ibid., pp. 126-64.

in return. Poll taxes were abolished. Roads were built in all sections of Louisiana loyal to Governor Long.¹⁰

By 1930, the political machine of Governor Long controlled the state, and his entire ticket was elected. Governor Long was elected to the Senate. Nevertheless, for fourteen months he was forced to remain in Louisiana to prevent Lieutenant Governor Cyr from declaring himself Governor. Finally, putting the state capital under martial law, Senator Long left for Washington and the United States Senate. At intervals, the Senator from Louisiana would disappear from the Senate for a week. Louisiana newspapers would report him coming home to handle the legislature and to order the new Governor around. Then the Senator from Louisiana would suddenly return to the Senate.¹¹

Senator Long was attracted to the liberal Senator Norris. It was due to his influence that Senator Long decided to support Governor Roosevelt of New York for the presidential nomination in 1932.¹²

At the Chicago Convention, Huey Long was a national figure. He refused to present the claims of his contested delegation from Louisiana to the proper committee because it was dominated by his enemies. All claims concerning the delegation from Louisiana were disposed of by the entire national convention. The delegation of Senator Long

10 Ibid., pp. 237-39.

11 Ibid., pp. 236.

12 Ibid., pp. 238.

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¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 237-38.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 238.

¹² Ibid., pp. 238.

was seated in the convention after a prolonged debate. Senator Long then used all his influence to help Franklin Roosevelt secure the presidential nomination.¹³

With the national convention adjourned, Senator Long decided to campaign in Arkansas for the reelection of Senator Caraway. Mrs. Caraway was opposed by six candidates in the democratic senatorial primary and was not not given a chance of being reelected. Senator Long had become attached to Senator Caraway because she had voted in the Senate for his motion to limit private fortunes. He also had an immense hatred for Senator Joe Robinson who was the political leader of Arkansas at this time. When the votes had been counted, Mrs. Caraway, who was not really considered a serious candidate up to a week before her election, received as many votes as all six of her opponents combined.¹⁴

Flushed with victory, Senator Long returned to Louisiana determined to accomplish the same result for his friend, John Overton. After three weeks of Senator Long's campaigning through rural Louisiana, John Overton was elected to the United States Senate by fifty-six thousand votes.¹⁵

The following facts help to explain the extreme hostility of Senator Long to the Administration: On March 9, 1933, the Emergency Banking Bill was introduced in Congress by the Administration in an effort to mitigate the banking

13 Ibid., pp. 239-40.

14 Ibid., pp. 240-248.

15 Ibid., pp. 248-49.

crisis. Senator Long by a short filibuster succeeded in modifying this act. His federal patronage was withheld.¹⁶ Senator Harrison of Mississippi was recognized in the naming of the Collector of the Port of New Orleans.¹⁷ Secret service agents began investigating Long's personal income tax over a period of years. They also investigated possible irregularities in a loan Senator Long had helped obtain for an insurance company through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Perhaps this move "to get" Long was inspired by financial interests whom he had offended. It might have resulted from Long's attacks on the National Administration.¹⁸ Federal patronage was now bestowed upon the enemies of Senator Long in an effort to destroy his power.¹⁹ By the summer of 1933, the Administration and the Senator were definitely at odds.²⁰

Back in Louisiana, the legislature passed acts giving Long control of the election machinery of local government. The power of his enemies in New Orleans was thus considerably weakened and the dictatorship of Senator Long made more complete.²¹

The Share the Wealth Society was an organization promoted by Senator Long to consolidate his national power. It

16 Arthur Krock, "Long's Death Eases Roosevelt's Road", The New York Times, pp. 6, col. 2, September 11, 1935.

17 Loc. cit.

18 Carleton Beals, The Story of Huey P. Long, pp. 259.

19 Ibid., pp. 266-68.

20 Ibid., pp. 263.

21 Ibid., pp. 269-71.

increased tremendously in members during 1934 and 1935 among the rural areas of the South. This increase was due to the driving power and popularity of the Senator. The Louisiana Progress, the newspaper of the Share the Wealth Society, was sent free to all members. In the Roosevelt Hotel, New Orleans, 1935, Long gaily tried out campaign songs advocating his candidacy for the presidency. He announced his own candidacy. He announced he would support Senator Borah or any liberal who would run against Roosevelt.

In early 1935, Senator Long introduced a resolution in the Senate demanding an investigation of the activities of Postmaster General Farley. A myriad of charges were made by Long against Farley. The widespread publicity given Long's Senate speeches increased the unpopularity of the Postmaster General.²²

A few days later the McCarran Amendment to the Work Relief Act was adopted due to Long breaking a tie Senate vote by shouting that Mrs. Caraway, absent, would vote "aye".²³

The Administration thought it necessary that Senator Long be answered. Farley, Ickes, General Johnson, Robinson, and others all began attacking Senator Long and ex-tolling the Administration which the Louisiana Senator was

²² Ibid., pp. 294-96.

²³ Ibid., pp. 297.

criticizing so vehemently.

In a radio address over the National Broadcasting network, General Hugh Johnson labelled Father Coughlin and Huey Long "pied pipers" who were seeking to lead the nation to chaos and destruction.²⁴

The nation awaited the reply of Senator Long and Father Coughlin. Senator Long with the largest radio audience he had ever addressed, ignored the past address of Johnson and presented his Share the Wealth Plan. His offer of \$5000 annually to each family was either demagogic hypocrisy or economic ignorance. But as a vote-getting bait to the millions of unemployed and the poor, the plan was astute.²⁵

In one of his intermittent returns to Louisiana, Senator Long had the legislature pass acts which empowered state agencies to supervise the expenditure of relief funds. Administrator Ickes of the PWA could "go slap-damn to hell", Senator Long told the press. Louisiana would take care of its own relief. Administrator Ickes retorted that Long was suffering from "halitosis of the intellect" and removed \$648,000 relief funds immediately pending for Louisiana. After these enactments, Long believed that the federal government could no longer use the relief money to fight him in Louisiana.²⁶

24 Ibid., pp. 294-96.

25 Ibid., pp. 308-13.

26 Ibid., pp. 326-32.

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Administrator Baker of the FSA could "go ship-ton to hell,"
Senator Long told the press. Louisiana would take care of
its own relief. Administrator James Pearson had long been
collecting from "benefits of the insured" and removed
\$200,000 relief funds immediately pending for Louisiana.
After these announcements, Long believed that the federal govern-
ment could no longer use the relief money to fight its in-

Louisiana.²⁶

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- 24 Ibid., pp. 274-28.
 - 25 Ibid., pp. 275-13.
 - 26 Ibid., pp. 280-32.

Senator Long had Administration leaders worried. He was openly threatening to run for President on a ticket of his own. The President's prestige seemed to be ebbing and he needed the southern states which Huey Long had an excellent chance of carrying if he ran for President.

On April 27, Senator Long addressed the annual conference of Milo Reno's Farmers' Holiday Association and was cheered loudly. On May 2, 1935, he was attacking Roosevelt over the National Broadcasting network. On May 13, he was headlined for attacking the questionable record of Farley on the Senate floor again.²⁷

A small group of Senators were opposing an Administration measure allowing NRA employees to be exempt from Senate confirmation. In opposition to this measure, Senator Long made one of the most remarkable one-man filibusters in American history. He began at twelve-thirty noon and talked until five in the morning.²⁸ Roosevelt unexpectedly presented a new tax program to Congress calling for an increase in levies on higher income brackets and on inheritances. Senator Long welcomed the President into the "Share the Wealth" fold.²⁹

With Congress debating the tax proposals of the President, Senator Long rushed back to Louisiana and had the legislature pass twenty-six bills in forty-five minutes.³⁰ One law made it a criminal offense for anyone to

27 Ibid., pp. 397-99.

28 Ibid., pp. 399-401.

29 Ibid., pp. 401.

30 Ibid., pp. 402.

use federal funds for political purposes.

At this time, Senator Long, according to Mr. Forrest Davis in his book, "The Kingfish", was in close touch with Wall Street interests organizing opposition to Roosevelt.³¹


At the height of his power, Senator Huey P. Long was assassinated on September 8, 1935. At the time, more federal money was being allotted to his enemies. A new Congressional investigation of him was being considered. The income tax evasion trials of his lieutenants were soon to continue. Senator Long had engaged in another filibuster up until the time set for closing the session of the Senate, in a vain effort to force consideration of the cotton and wheat acts. He was having the legislature pass more punitive legislation to offset federal patronage. Long was preparing for the 1936 campaign in which he was going to run for the presidency on a ticket of his own.³²

Huey Long's uniqueness lay in the fact that he used the manners of a clown to achieve his ends. Unlike most of the Deep South demagogues, who have preceded him, he was no flag-waving politician. Instead, he concealed his furious energies and hatreds beneath a joke, a comic phrase, or an act of deliberate buffoonery.³³

³¹ Hamilton Basso, "Our Gene", New Republic, 86:31, February 19, 1936.

³² Carleton Beals, The Story of Huey Long, pp. 403.

³³ "Huey Long", New Republic, 85:146, September, 1935.



With Senator Long removed from the national political scene, the chances of Mr. Roosevelt's reelection were materially increased. As a dynamic and intrepid foe of President Roosevelt, the Senator from Louisiana could have made him trouble in regions to which the President had to look for support. Republican strategists had counted on Senator Long to increase their chances of success in 1936. With Senator Long's death, President Roosevelt was certain of a less serious division of forces in the South and West.³⁴

Only one other Democrat stood in President Roosevelt's way for renomination. He was Governor Eugene Talmadge of Georgia.

After graduating from the law school of the University of Georgia in 1907, Mr. Talmadge married a widow with extensive farm lands and farmed for eleven years.³⁵ After holding the minor offices of Solicitor of McRae City Court and Attorney for Telfor County, Eugene Talmadge ran for Commissioner of Agriculture. He was elected and served three terms in this office from 1927 to 1933. The Commissioner of Agriculture received notoriety for his gambling on the Chicago hog market with state funds. He bought up a few carloads of Georgia hogs and sent them off to Chicago. They killed "soft" and the state of Georgia was minus some

³⁴ Charles A. Beard, "Huey Long's Legacy", Current History, 43:189, November, 1935.

³⁵ Benjamin Stolberg, "Buzz Windrop, Governor of Georgia", Nation, 142-316, March 11, 1936.

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twenty thousand dollars.³⁶

Impeachment proceedings were instituted against Commissioner Talmadge but he persuaded enough members of the Georgia legislature "farm-bloc" to sign petitions demanding that impeachment proceedings be dropped.³⁷

Talmadge also distinguished himself as Commissioner of Agriculture by belonging to the "Black Shirts", an organization whose chief sport was to go night-riding among share-croppers. He surrounded himself with outspoken negrophobes, Jew-haters, and flag-wavers.³⁸

In 1932, Talmadge sought the governorship of Georgia. His activities as Commissioner ^{of} Agriculture had publicized him throughout the state. This was the paramount factor in his election.³⁹

As long as the federal government allocated the funds and Governor Talmadge appointed jobholders on the FERA and WPA, he did not oppose the Administration. But the Administration determined to stop Talmadge's use of the relief funds to establish a political machine. So the federal government began handling the work relief funds in Georgia.⁴⁰

36 Hamilton Basso, "Our Gene", New Republic, 86: 35-36, February 19, 1936.

37 Loc. cit.

38 Benjamin Stolberg, op. cit., pp. 316-18.

39 Hamilton Basso, op. cit., pp. 35-37.

40 Loc. cit.

Twenty thousand dollars. 25

Impressment proceedings were instituted against
Commissioner Talmage but he persuaded enough members of
the Georgia legislature "for-bid" to sign petitions de-
manding that impressment proceedings be stopped. 27

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of Agriculture by belonging to the "Black Belt", an
organization whose chief sport was to go night-riding
among slave-holders. He surrounded himself with out-
spoken negro-haters, tea-haters, and fire-eaters. 28

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the relief funds to establish a political machine. 30
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in Georgia. 31

32 Hamilton Jones, "Our Hero", New Republic, 1931.
33-35, February 19, 1935.

37 192-215

38 Benjamin Franklin, 19-215-15.

39 Hamilton Jones, 19-215-27.

40 192-215

The Governor soon began condemning the New Deal after his loss of work relief patronage. This action helped publicize him nationally. Other activities of the Georgia Governor also brought him attention. Through his control of the State Senate, he forced the adjournment of the 1935 legislature without an appropriation act for 1936. Consequently, the state of Georgia had not enough funds to operate through 1936. The Governor ruled that \$7,500,000 of unexpended balances of the State treasury were available for this use. The State Comptroller and State Treasurer refused to countersign warrants signed by Governor Talmadge which were drawn on these funds. Both state officers were then removed from office, one forcibly.⁴¹ The Governor was severely criticized for this action. He retaliated by declaring the situation had been created by the Administration to prevent him from campaigning against Roosevelt.⁴²

A boom was instituted for Talmadge's candidacy for the presidency. A Georgia newspaper conducted a popularity poll between Talmadge and Roosevelt. There were rumors in 1935 of a deal between Senator Long and Talmadge to stop Roosevelt.⁴³ Although the political

41 "Drama In Georgia", Literary Digest, 121:9, March 7, 1936.

42 Loc. cit.

43 Hamilton Basso, loc. cit.

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⁴¹ "Press in Georgia", Literary Digest, 191:2, March 7, 1936.

⁴² ibid.

⁴³ Hamilton James, ibid.

philosophy of Long and Talmadge was contradictory, they both had an intense hatred for the President. Also they both were opportunists who desired to bring about the president's defeat at any cost. Long's death ended the possibility of their running against Roosevelt on an independent coalition ticket.⁴⁴

In early 1936, Governor Talmadge issued a call for a "Grass Roots" Democratic Convention to be held in Macon, Georgia, on January 29, 1936. Co-signer to this call was John Thomas Kirby, a millionaire Texan who was active in the American Liberty League and the Southern Committee to Uphold the Constitution.

These organizations were special-interest societies designed to detach conservative Democrats from their support of President Roosevelt. Their main weapon was the use of "front page" spokesmen--industrial, financial, and academic--to attack specific policies of the Administration. An effective supplement to this device was the Liberty League's attack upon New Deal legislation in the courts.⁴⁵

The Liberty League helped finance the "Grass Roots" Convention by a donation of \$5,000. On January 29, 1936, the Convention convened. Governor Talmadge attacked the Administration with ribald vigor:

You have to help in this fight to see that no Communist or Socialist steals the Democratic nomination...Let's don't allow a bunch of Reds

44 Loc. cit.

45 Wallace Sayre, "Political Groundswell", Current History, 44:59, June, 1936.

philosophy of Long and Talmage was contradictory. They both had an intense hatred for the President. Also they both were opportunists who desired to bring about the President's defeat at any cost. Long's death ended the possibility of their running against Roosevelt as an independent coalition ticket.⁴⁵

In early 1936, Governor Talmage issued a call for a "United Front" Democratic Convention to be held in August, on January 29, 1936. Co-signer to this call was John Thomas Kirby, a millionaire farmer who was active in the American Liberty League and the Southern Committee to Uphold the Constitution.

These organizations were special-interest coalitions designed to detach conservative Democrats from their support of President Roosevelt. Their main weapon was the use of "front page" newspaper--editorial, financial, and analysis--to attack specific policies of the Administration. An effective supplement to this device was the Liberty League's attack upon New Deal legislation in the courts.⁴⁶

The Liberty League helped finance the "United Front" convention by a donation of \$5,000. On January 29, 1936, the convention convened. Governor Talmage attacked the Administration with timely vigor:

You have to help in this fight to get that no Communist or Socialist enters the Democratic nomination... Let's don't allow a word of hate

45. See also: "United Front," *Atlantic City, N.J., Political Greenbacker*, (Atlantic City, 1936), 14:132, June, 1936.

to have four more years in office...If the New dealers pick their own Supreme Court, the wheels of democracy will catch fire and burn down freedom. Shall we barter away Americanism for Communism?⁴⁶

This address was heard all over the nation via the radio. Due to its intemperate and inflammatory nature, the Federal Communications Commission ordered an examination of it with the purpose of preventing future assaults of this nature.⁴⁷

Among the notables who addressed this convention of three thousand delegates were the Reverend Gerald K. Smith and Thomas L. Dixon, the professional negro baiter. The Literary Digest found that most of the nation's press did not approve of the ribald tactics of Governor Talmadge and John Kirby. The political prestige of Governor Talmadge declined following this convention.⁴⁸

This was later evidenced by the disastrous defeat Governor Talmadge received in the Democratic primary when he tried to defeat Senator Russell and obtain the nomination for the Senate.⁴⁹

Governor Talmadge never seriously threatened Democratic unity in the 1936 campaign outside the state of Georgia. It was Senator Huey Long and his influence among the share-croppers and poor farmers of Arkansas, East Texas, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Caro-

⁴⁶ Hamilton Basso. "Our Gene", New Republic, 86: 36, February 19, 1936.

⁴⁷ Literary Digest, 121:5, February 8, 1936.

⁴⁸ Loc. cit.

⁴⁹ "Georgia Battle Smashes Talmadge", News Week, 8:11-12, September 19, 1936.

to have four more years in office... If the new
delegates pick their own Supreme Court, the whole
of democracy will catch fire and burn down Georgia.
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66 Nathan Leary, "Our Game", New Hampshire, 1955.
32, February 10, 1955.

67 Literary Digest, 1955, February 2, 1955.
68 Ibid. 1955.

69 "Georgia Battle Between Talmadge", News Radio.
6-11-55, September 19, 1955.

lina which caused the Roosevelt-Farley section of the Democratic party worry. With the demise of Senator Long, the unification of the Democratic party during the campaign was more secure.

In describing Republican aspirants for the presidency, it is first necessary to make clear the status of former President Herbert Hoover. He had been elected to the presidency in 1928 by a tremendous majority. But in 1932, he was defeated by a Democratic landslide. The President, who had entered the White House with his followers boasting that he would end poverty, retired in 1933 amidst an economic depression, a very discouraged man.⁵⁰

Back in Palo Alto, California, his home, the former President planned a come-back to defeat the man who had beaten him so easily in 1932. He hated the personality and policies of Franklin Roosevelt. He pictured himself as a Grover Cleveland who would recapture the lost popularity he formerly held among the American people.⁵¹

To accomplish this task it was necessary to remove the Depression portrait of Herbert Hoover which was so firm in the mass mind of the American people. Back in 1932-33 the countenance of President Hoover did everything but inspire public confidence. John T. Flynn be-

⁵⁰ "What Is Herbert Hoover?", Time, 26:15, October, 1935.

⁵¹ Loc. cit.; "Who But Herbert Hoover", New Republic, 85:92, December 4, 1935.

lieved that his speeches tended to suggest thoughts of suicide or bankruptcy instead of recovery.⁵²

To remove this Depression ikon and create a renovated "Hoover" personality was the task of the propaganda agents. Hoover's nomination in 1928 was the result of publicity; the same mechanisms were now put to work with the hope of giving him the leadership of the Republican party in 1936.⁵³

One of his former secretaries, Mr. Walter H. Newton, presented through the Saturday Evening Post what was purported to be an inside account of the depression and the banking crisis of 1933. According to this apologia everybody was responsible for the depression and the banking crisis but President Hoover. The depression was international. President Hoover had labored night and day to restore prosperity. He was at last succeeding as evidenced by the boom in early 1932. But in the election of 1932 Franklin Roosevelt and the inflationists so frightened the business world that all confidence was lost again and frantic depositors precipitated the banking crisis. President Hoover tried in every possible way to mitigate the crisis but could not get any cooperation from President-elect Roosevelt and was hence helpless with the Democratic Congress.⁵⁴

⁵² John T. Flynn, "Other People's Money", New Republic, 86:137-38, March 11, 1936.

⁵³ "What Is Herbert Hoover?", Time, 26:15, October 14, 1935.

⁵⁴ W. S. Meyers and W. A. Newton, "Origins of the Banking Panic of March 4, 1933", Saturday Evening Post, 207:5-7, June 8, 1935.

The real villains then were Franklin Roosevelt and the inflationists because they had frightened the nation into a panic and then obstinately refused to do what President Hoover felt was necessary to stay the breakdown when it came just before Roosevelt's inauguration.⁵⁵

This story of the banking crisis began to be utilized by Republicans to offset repeated Democratic claims of how President Roosevelt had saved the nation from chaos in 1933.

Ben S. Allen, publicity agent for Hoover, utilized another device to restore the ex-President's popularity. In his intermittent speeches before Republican organizations indicting the policies of the New Deal, Hoover surprised his listeners with the humor that abounded in his criticism. He was a "new Hoover" flourishing in irony and humor, speaking in short vigorous sentences. The tired man who drove gloomily down Pennsylvania Avenue in 1933 anxious to retire from it all was no more. A renovated personality of "cheery quirks and merry quips" greeted and entertained Republican organizations throughout the nation.⁵⁶

The publicity agents had done an excellent job. Among his own party, Mr. Hoover's popularity increased. But there were limits to this application of propaganda technique.

⁵⁵ Loc. cit.

⁵⁶ "Presidential Prose", Time, 26:9, December 30, 1935; John T. Flynn, "Other People's Money", loc. cit.

The ordinary American citizen blamed Mr. Hoover for the most disastrous depression in the history of the United States. Despite all propaganda to the contrary, that bitter memory could not be forgotten in two or three years. Furthermore, Democratic propagandists intended to see that this portrait of Hoover still continued in the minds of the people. As the pre-convention campaign went on, outstanding Republicans began vying with each other in declaring to the public that Mr. Hoover would not be a candidate in 1936. But Hoover continued to criticize the New Deal before Republican organizations as the "Happy Engineer". He still had close connections with the party organization. Hoover, therefore, received consideration as a presidential contender. It was not until a few days before the Republican convention convened that he finally publicly disavowed his candidacy.⁵⁷

Three active candidates for the nomination overshadowed former President Hoover and relegated him to the background in their spirited race for the party nomination. They were Governor Alfred Landon of Kansas, Newspaper Publisher Frank Knox of Chicago, Illinois, and Senator William Edgar Borah of Idaho.

A political synopsis of Governor Landon begins with his matriculation at the University of Kansas. There he

⁵⁷ The New York Times, Section IV, pp. 3, col. 1, May 24, 1937.

Continued

earned the nickname of "the Fox", because he was skillful in manipulating campus politics inside and outside of his fraternity.⁵⁸

After graduation, young Landon learned to handle oil leases while working in a Kansas bank. Furthering his father's occupation, he entered the oil business and was very successful. While traveling over Kansas he also made innumerable acquaintances who were to aid him in his later political career. He was initiated into the intricacies of Kansas politics by serving as private secretary to Governor Henry J. Allen.⁵⁹

Landon's father was an ardent admirer of former President Theodore Roosevelt; so it was to be expected that before long his son would become a member of the inner circle of the liberal wing of the Republican party in Kansas. In 1912, both father and son supported Theodore Roosevelt for President instead of the regular party candidate, William Howard Taft.⁶⁰

Two years later Alfred Landon campaigned for William Allen White who ran independently against the Klan-supported Democratic and Republican candidates.⁶¹

58 "The Landon Boom", Fortune, 13:120, March, 1936.

59 Loc. cit.

60 Raymond C. Swing, "Presidential Possibilities", Nation, 142:39, January 8, 1936.

61 Loc. cit.

Until 1928 Mr. Landon did not participate in politics again, devoting his time to the oil business. In that year, he managed the campaign of Clyde Reed, liberal Republican State Chairman.⁶²

In 1930, Governor Clyde Reed was up for renomination. On the same ticket was Alfred Landon running for precinct committeeman in Independence, Kansas. Intraparty opposition was strong against Reed, and both he and Landon were defeated. The Reed faction in the ensuing election pledged their support to the Democratic candidate, Harry Woodring, who was elected governor.⁶³

Throughout 1931, Alfred Landon was busy rejoining the dissident elements of the Republican party in Kansas. Following his harmonizing program, Landon received the Republican nomination for governor in 1932. In a Roosevelt year and against a Governor who had a creditable record, Alfred Landon was elected by a six thousand vote margin.⁶⁴

Although the Republicans had only a majority of two in both houses of the state legislature, Governor Landon kept the legislature in control. This was the result of the personal magnetism of "the Fox." Although he was a

62 "The Landon Boom", Fortune, 13:122, March 1936.

63 Loc. cit.

64 Loc. cit.

poor public speaker due to his droning along in a continuous monotone, as a conversationalist Mr. Landon had convincing charm and personal magnetism. Governor Landon managed not only to keep the friendship of the Kansas City Star which had been against his election, but that of the Star's bitter enemy, the Journal-Post.⁶⁵

Early in his term, influential Republicans were implicated in a forgery of municipal bonds amounting to about one million dollars. Governor Landon had them prosecuted with vigor and the State Treasurer and a prominent banker were imprisoned.⁶⁶ Courage was also shown by Landon in his attacks on Big Business. Furthermore, he soundly rebuked super-patriots for their remarks concerning university professors.⁶⁷

It was Governor Landon's fiscal policy which later was extolled so much in the newspapers. In reality, too much credit for the fiscal condition of Kansas cannot be given to Governor Woodring. Although Mr. Hearst's newspapers and magazines played Landon up as the Kansas Coolidge, Governor Landon was careful to qualify his statements concerning the financial condition of Kansas.⁶⁸

The facts are these. The Tax Limitation Act limited local levying units to a maximum levy for each tax pur-

65 Ibid., pp. 124.

66 Loc. cit.

67 Loc. cit.

68 Ibid., pp. 126.

pose and maximum over-all levy. The Cash Basis Act forbade a municipality to incur an obligation for which it had not cash on hand. And the Budget Act compelled the local governments to publish their budgets well in advance after local hearings.

The Tax Limitation Law was first proposed by Governor Woodring in the 1932 election and was opposed by Candidate Landon who promised tax limitation but of a less rigid nature. Later the act was enacted by the Landon Administration. The Budget Law was enacted by the Woodring Administration and made more rigid by Governor Landon. Governor Landon did institute the Cash Basis Act.⁶⁹

Because tax collections decreased in Kansas during the depression, the cash-basis law worked a real hardship in many localities and to many state employees. But during the same years the local units actually reduced their bonded indebtedness by \$17,000,000.⁷⁰

In further effecting economies, both Governor Woodring and Landon reduced teachers salaries, Governor Landon more rigidly than Woodring. A new state income tax law went in force in 1935. This measure produced \$1,000,000 in 1935 and made the balancing of the state budget easier. Hundreds of millions of federal funds were expended within

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 126-28.

⁷⁰ Avie Carlson, "The Man From Kansas: A Portrait", Harpers Magazine, 172:564-85, April, 1936.

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Kansas, which otherwise the state would have to obtain from its own resources. With all this aid, Governor Landon reduced real estate taxes and the bonded indebtedness of municipalities.⁷¹

In 1934, Alfred Landon was reelected Governor by a tremendous majority being the only Republican Governor to be reelected in the Roosevelt landslide of that year.⁷²

By the summer of 1935, it was apparent that the Kansas budget had been balanced for another fiscal year. Also some eleven thousand sub-divisional taxing agencies--cities, school districts, etc.--had been compelled by law to balance their budgets.

On November 7, 1934, the Kansas City Journal-Post in an election follow-up story had mentioned Alfred Landon seriously as a presidential contender for the first time.⁷³ Although a similar story was carried by the United Press, the flurry of interest was only momentary. Anti-New Dealism was not yet strong in the nation. The President had just won a notable victory in the mid-term Congressional elections.

But in the summer of 1935, there seemed to be a great deal of opposition to the Administration. Republican dailies everywhere pictured to their readers the vast extravagances

71 "The Landon Boom", Fortune, 13:126-28, March, 1936.

72 Ibid., pp. 76.

73 Ibid., pp. 77.

of the WPA. Alfred Landon, "the budget balancer", contrasted so obviously with the reckless spender, President Roosevelt.⁷⁴ There was another factor which added to Alfred Landon's importance as a presidential prospect. He was known as a mild Western Progressive.

So, the boom was on.

Very soon His Excellency, the President Maker, Mr. W. R. Hearst, who soon grows tired of his proteges, became interested in Kansas's Governor Landon. A group of Hearst writers investigated the past political life of Governor Landon (Most certainly, they never told the boss that Alfred Landon had upheld academic freedom). Hearst was satisfied. Damon Runyon and other writers of the many Hearst newspapers, magazines, and radio stations were drafted to publicize the Kansas Governor.⁷⁵

The Governor of Kansas was becoming known nationally. Friends of Landon and all Kansas newspapers beamed with local pride. "Landon for President" Clubs were being formed. Amidst all, "the Fox" remained taciturn. It wasn't long before a typical Landon speech lauding the economy of Kansas aroused indignant statements from Administrator Harry Hopkins. The New Deal was beginning to take note of the Kansas Governor.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 79.

⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 77.

⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 119.

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In December, 1935, Hearst chartered a private railway car and visited his candidate at Topeka along with Publisher Paul Block and the eminent Mr. Arthur Brisbane.

By January, 1936, Republican and Hearst papers had written of the economy of Kansas and of its homespun Governor until to every American citizen this was no longer "news".⁷⁷

On the seventy-fifth anniversary of the admittance of Kansas to the Union, Governor Landon unofficially announced his candidacy for the Presidency. Instead of speaking of Kansans and Kansas Day, the Governor of Kansas chose to deliver a censorious criticism of the New Deal.⁷⁸

The fact that Landon was from the Middle West; that he was elected amid a Democratic landslide in 1932 and 1934; and that he had balanced the budget of Kansas was effectively dramatized by Mr. Hearst. As a result, Landon, the synthetic candidate, became the outstanding presidential contender.

The most conservative Republican presidential contender, Frank Knox, was reared in Grand Rapids, Michigan, where his father was the proprietor of a grocery store. In early life he had to endure much poverty. Later the Frank Knox for President Committee utilized this fact to form the slogan, "Frank Knox, from a log cabin to the Presidency."⁷⁹

77 Ibid., pp. 120.

78 Loc. cit.

79 "Who Is Frank Knox?", Pamphlet Issued By the Knox-For-President Committee.

Knox worked his way through three years of college by spading gardens. He quit as a Senior to enroll in the United States Army to fight the Spaniards in Cuba. He was sworn into the service by Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt. Being a husky young man of the same type as the "irrepressible Teddy", Knox soon became one of his most ardent admirers.⁸⁰

The Spanish-American War over, Knox went back to Grand Rapids, and got a job as a cub reporter on the Grand Rapids Herald. Another cub reporter, Arthur H. Vandenberg, began work for the same paper on the same day.⁸¹

Knox evidenced business ability and became city editor and then circulation manager of the paper. In 1902, he and his partner bought the Lake Superior Journal published in Sault St. Marie, Michigan, a frontier town. The paper prospered and before long another competing daily was purchased and an evening edition added. Knox's campaign against vice, gambling, and civic corruption made him enemies.⁸²

In 1910, a citizen of Sault Ste Marie, Chase Osborn, ran for the office of Governor of Michigan. Knox was his campaign manager. Fighting the state machine and the corporations, they won both the primary and the election that followed. Frank Knox was appointed Chairman of the Republi-

⁸⁰ "Who Is Frank Knox?", Fortune, 12:112, November, 1935..

⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 112-14.

⁸² Ibid., pp. 114.

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can State Central Committee.⁸³

President Taft called Knox to the White House and asked him if he would manage his campaign in Michigan in 1912. Knox agreed unless Theodore Roosevelt were in the race. Roosevelt finally became a presidential contender. After the Republican convention had rejected Roosevelt, a conclave of Progressives met in Chicago and nominated him for the presidency. At this convention, Frank Knox was Chairman of the Credentials Committee. But when the Progressives ran a slate of candidates in Michigan, Knox withdrew supporting them and quit the campaign.⁸⁴

The partners sold their newspaper in Sault Ste Marie and started another in Manchester, New Hampshire. This new daily, the Manchester Leader, finally absorbed both of the other local newspapers and soon had a circulation larger than all the other New Hampshire dailies combined.⁸⁵

From 1915 to 1917, Editor Knox severely criticized the pacific policy of Woodrow Wilson towards Germany. When the United States declared war against Germany, he immediately enlisted. By the close of the war, Knox had become a Colonel.⁸⁶

In the campaign of 1920, Frank Knox and many former followers of Theodore Roosevelt supported the candidacy of

83 Loc. cit.

84 Ibid., pp. 114-16.

85 Ibid., pp. 116-18.

86 Ibid., pp. 116.

and State Central Committee. 62

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In the campaign of 1920, Frank Knox and Mary Leverett Folger of Theodore Roosevelt supported the candidacy of

62 121-111
63 121-112
64 121-113
65 121-114

General Leonard Wood. In the convention, Colonel Knox was chosen floor manager of the Wood forces which were subsequently beaten with the emerging of Harding as a compromise candidate.⁸⁷

In 1922, Knox's newspaper successfully defeated the imposition of a state income tax by the New Hampshire legislature. By 1924 no leader of either political party was willing to oppose this measure. So Colonel Knox was drafted by the reactionary Republicans to run for governor in the coming campaign. He was opposed in the primary by a progressive, John Winant, and defeated.⁸⁸

After this defeat, Colonel Knox retired temporarily from politics and devoted his energies to the conservative Manchester Leader. From the early twenties, William Randolph Hearst had made business overtures to the owner and publisher of the Manchester Leader. In 1926, Colonel Knox visited Mr. Hearst and arranged to manage his two Boston papers. In less than one year, Mr. Hearst made Colonel Knox general manager of all his newspapers.⁸⁹

Differences between Knox and Hearst over the economy policy of Colonel Knox during the depression led to his resignation on January 1, 1931. Hearst wanted to except his high-salaried talent to salary reductions. Knox de-

⁸⁷ Loc. cit.

⁸⁸ Loc. cit.

⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 116-18.

to correspondingly reduce the salaries of all employees throughout the depression.⁹⁰

In 1931, Colonel Knox purchased the Chicago Daily News, one of the largest newspapers in the United States. This marked the pinnacle of his career as a newspaper publisher.⁹¹

His first anti-new deal editorial was published in August, 1933, when the Administration placed a blanket-code on industry. Others incessantly followed despite the great loss of circulation which resulted. Late in 1934, while abroad, Colonel Knox wired the Chicago Daily News a series of editorials indicting the New Deal. He compared the "planned economy" of Mr. Roosevelt's with European dictatorships. Many conservative Republicans began to see Colonel Knox as the party hope for 1936.⁹²

Back in the United States, Knox began making speeches asking rich Republicans to pledge money in advance for the 1936 campaign. His initial ventures being highly successful so far as the raising of money was concerned, he continued indicting the New Deal and pleading for campaign funds. His forceful criticism of the Administration was particularly pleasing to the more conservative of Republicans. Knox's many contacts with Republican organiza-

90 Ibid., pp. 118.

91 Ibid., pp. 110-111.

92 Ibid., pp. 121.

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20 Ibid., pp. 115.

21 Ibid., pp. 110-111.

22 Ibid., pp. 121.

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A Knox for President Committee was formed headed by a former national commander of the American Legion. Hence the pre-convention campaign appellation, "Knox is the Legion's candidate".⁹⁴

Throughout 1935, Colonel Knox continued touring the nation indicting the New Deal and President Roosevelt with intemperate speeches and the cliches of reactionarism. His many speeches with their acid animosity towards President Roosevelt, their want of constructive social thought, and their pietism toward the Constitution placed him in the same class as the American Liberty League.⁹⁵ This was strikingly in contrast to his earlier beliefs when he was a reform editor in Michigan, fought the Michigan Central, and managed a Governor's campaign who later taxed the railroads on a broad scale for the first time.⁹⁶

Since Colonel Knox had no executive record as a politician, it was only by his record as an editor and by his speeches that he could be judged as a presidential aspirant. As an editor he had been a complete success financially. His paper was not his personal political organ. The freedom of writers on the Chicago Daily News was very great compared to other Chicago papers. As an editor, he had been

93 loc. cit.

94 Harry Thorton Moore, "Candidate Knox: Editor and Soldier", New Republic, 86:159, March 18, 1936.

95 Ibid., pp. 160.

96 "Presidential Possibilities", Nation, 142:219, February 19, 1936.

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82 Ibid., p. 151.
83 Harry Thornton Moore, "Candidate Knox: Editor and
Soldier", New Republic, 25:155, March 12, 1935.
84 Ibid., p. 155.
85 "Presidential Possibilities", Rolling Stone, January,
February 19, 1935.

highly reactionary, since the war particularly. But his paper never receded to the degrading level of the Chicago Tribune or Hearst's Chicago newspapers.⁹⁷

His speeches had an appeal to the most conservative Republicans, but made his election practically impossible. Colonel Knox wrote Communism into the New Deal long before Alfred Smith exposed the red menace to the American Liberty League. He outdid Alfred Smith by declaring that the New Deal's ultimate aim was to destroy the home and family. With liberalism strong in America in 1936, Knox could never have been elected.⁹⁸

The third active presidential contender in 1936, Senator William E. Borah, had long been a national figure. It is very difficult to select the outstanding moments of his career. Borah was in the headlines when Herbert Hoover was an obscure engineer, Woodrow Wilson was trying to write history, and Alfred Smith was a Tammany lieutenant.

Borah was the son of an Illinois farmer who was poor and puritannical. As a boy, he was inclined to withdraw into himself, reading constantly.⁹⁹

After completing the course offered at the Southern Illinois Academy, Borah enrolled and graduated from the law school of the University of Kansas. He was admitted

⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 219-20.

⁹⁸ Harry Thorton Moore, op. cit., pp. 160.

⁹⁹ Henry F. Pringle, "The Real Senator Borah", World's Work, 57:140, December, 1928.

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27 Ibid., pp. 219-20.

28 Harry Thurston Horn, op. cit., pp. 100.

29 Henry F. Pringle, "The Best American Novel,"

Socialist, 27:140, December, 1930.

to the bar in 1889.

While practicing law in Boise, Idaho, Borah entered politics and soon became a leader in the Republican State Machine. After serving as Secretary to Governor McConnell, Borah married his daughter in 1895. The next year he ran for Congress on an independent ticket supporting the free-silver policy of Bryan unsuccessfully.¹⁰⁰

Borah achieved prominence as a result of a mine riot in northern Idaho where several men were killed in a battle between union and non-union forces. Several of the union participants were charged with murder by the special prosecutor for the state, William E. Borah. He became well-known for the spectacular manner in which he conducted this case.¹⁰¹

In 1905, he participated in another celebrated case. A former governor of Idaho who had been vigorous in putting down mine riots was assassinated. As special prosecutor for the state, Borah charged William Haywood and other radical labor leaders with conspiracy to murder the Governor. Clarence Darrow defended the labor leaders successfully.¹⁰²

This was Borah's last trial. In 1903 he had presented himself to the legislature as a candidate for the United

100 Loc. cit.

101 Ibid., pp. 141.

102 Ibid., pp. 141-42.

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States Senate to be refused that office. The leaders of the legislature feared his independence. In 1907, after the Haywood trial, his prestige was so great that the legislature was forced to appoint him Senator from Idaho.¹⁰³

In Washington the "Old Guard" felt Borah was safe because of his national fame as a labor prosecutor, and placed him on the Committee on Labor and Education.¹⁰⁴

With Theodore Roosevelt demanding anti-trust legislation, Senator Borah lent his oratory to the cause of destroying monopolies. He scared the startled "Old Guard" by demanding an investigation into the working conditions of the steel mills as well as of the sugar trust. He worked for the creation of the Department of Labor. The Senator called for popular election of Senators and urged a measure which would compel publicizing of campaign expenditures.¹⁰⁵

When Theodore Roosevelt announced his candidacy for the Republican nomination in 1912, the Senator from Idaho was his close adviser and ardent supporter until the leaving of the Republican Convention by the Progressives. Some critics attributed Borah's refusal to support Roosevelt after he had bolted the Republican party to this fact. Borah was asking the Idaho legislature to reappoint him to the Senate in 1913. His appointment would have been endangered if he bolted his party and supported Theodore Roosevelt.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Ibid., pp. 142.

¹⁰⁴ Loc. cit.

¹⁰⁵ Loc. cit.

¹⁰⁶ William Murphy, "Presidential Possibilities", Nation, 134:247, March 2, 1932.

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Outstanding in the record of Borah during the pre-war era was his championing of the income tax amendment. This and other reforms of the Wilsonian era were rendered negligible by the war, for whose declaration Senator Borah voted.

Although he was a constant advocate of disarmament and always lent his oratory to pleas for international peace, Senator Borah was one of the irreconcilables who fought the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and the entrance of the United States into the League of Nations. Woodrow Wilson told his friends that of all the opponents of the Treaty of Versailles he believed Borah alone was moved sincerely by high motives.¹⁰⁷ Senator Borah closed the argument against the United States entering the League with one of his greatest addresses.¹⁰⁸

After the victory of Harding, Senator Borah who had been elected to the Senate this time, was made Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Borah's intense nationalism influenced the foreign policies of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover considerably.¹⁰⁹

It was largely due to the efforts of Borah that Harding called the Washington Conference. On the other

¹⁰⁷ Henry F. Fringie, "The Real Senator Borah", World's Work, 57:143, December, 1928.

¹⁰⁸ Loc. cit.

¹⁰⁹ "Long Ago and Far Away", Time, 27:21-23, March 30, 1936.

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hand, Senator Borah fought intensely the Four-Power Treaty, and the entrance of the United States into the World Court. This demanding of an international conference on one hand and the nationalism of Borah on the other was but another of his many inconsistencies.¹¹⁰

With the death of Harding and the coming into power of Coolidge, Senator Borah had an opportunity to become vice-president. The story goes around still that Coolidge called Borah to the White House and asked him if he would care to run on the presidential ticket in the 1924 campaign. Senator Borah is supposed to have flabbergasted President Coolidge by asking which end of the ticket could he, Borah, run on.¹¹¹

In 1924, as in every campaign year since 1912, there was a minor Borah boom. Senator Borah, however, refused to support his progressive colleague, Senator LaFollette when the latter ran for president on the independent progressive ticket.¹¹²

In 1928, Senator Borah campaigned militantly for Herbert Hoover despite the fact that he had previously denounced him and publicly disagreed with him on most of the issues of the day. The explanation of this inconsistency

110 Henry F. Pringle, op. cit., pp. 133.

111 Ibid., pp. 138-39.

112 Jonathan Mitchell, "Borah Knows Best", New Republic, 85:333-34, January 29, 1936.

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110 Henry A. Friendly, op. cit., pp. 122.

111 Ibid., pp. 122-23.

112 Jackson Lindsell, "Borah Knows Best", NEA
Bulletin, 28:142-43, January 22, 1928.

according to Borah was as follows: enforcement of prohibition was the principal issue in the 1926 campaign and Hoover stood for strict enforcement against repealist Alfred Smith. Borah was strong supporter of prohibition.¹¹³

After the election of Hoover, Senator Borah opposed him over everything from the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act to the appointment of prohibition agents.¹¹⁴

After this interim insurgency, Senator Borah supported Herbert Hoover against Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. Party regularity on election day is one certain characteristic of the Idahoan.¹¹⁵

During the first year of the Roosevelt Administration, Borah voted for most of the President's measures. He was a constant supporter of silver inflation. Late in 1934, Borah along with Senator Nye began to effectively expose the failure of the Roosevelt Administration to control big business.¹¹⁶

His first actual attack on the principles of the New Deal occurred in early 1934. It was in the form of a telegram to Governor Herbert Lehman of New York, congratulating him on resisting the proposal of Mayor F. H. LaGuardia of New York City for greater control by the state over municipal finance.

114 Loc. cit.

115 Henry F. Pringle, op. cit. pp. 133-44; "Will Borah Run?", Nation, 141:285, September 11, 1935.

116 Louis M. Hacker, A Short History of the New Deal, pp. 112.

CHRONOLOGICAL

Senator Borah declared in his telegram to Governor Lehman:

It is distinctly a matter of congratulation that the Governor of a great state in these days of wild grasping for power and utter disregard of personal rights shall say once and for all that such things are essentially un-American.¹¹⁷

With the Borah boom progressing due to his attacks upon the New Deal in the Senate, Senator Huey Long offered Borah his support, in case Borah received the nomination. Senator Nye and Representative Hamilton Fish were early conspicuous supporters of Senator Borah among the important personages in the Republican Party.¹¹⁸

In late 1935, the Idaho Senator announced that he was out to obtain the nomination by every fair means and would enter the primaries.

The gravest objection of Senator Borah's candidacy was his age. The oldest man ever elected President was William Henry Harrison, who was sixty-eight at his inauguration. Since the Civil War no man over fifty-six has ever become an inhabitant of the White House. Since Borah was approaching seventy-two, the argument that he was too old to be president prevailed.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Raymond Clapper, "Senate Leaders and Orators", Review of Reviews, 89:29, February, 1934.

¹¹⁸ Jonathan Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 133.

¹¹⁹ "Will Borah Run?", Nation, 141:285, September 11, 1935.

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117. Raymond Clapper, "Senator's Leaders and Critics",
NATIONAL JOURNAL, 1935, 1936.

118. American Historical, 22, 115, 116.

119. "Will Hatch Run?", NATION, 1935, 1936, September 11.

An objection to Senator Borah as a presidential prospect was his unpopularity with many politicians of his own party due to his inability to remain long as a member of any group. (Borah's reluctance to cooperate with anybody at any time is recorded as follows by Washington comment. The Senator couldn't really enjoy his horseback rides in Rock Creek Park because he had to go in the same direction as his horse.) A political lifetime of non-allegiance and inconsistency had alienated many party leaders whose support he now needed.¹²⁰

Another factor which weakened the Senator from Idaho as a candidate was the belief that his candidacy was insincere. Governor C. Ben Ross had been reelected and was very popular among Idahoans. He was an avowed candidate for the Senate in 1936. Many were of the opinion that Senator Borah's presidential boom was a ruse to enable him to be more certain of defeating Governor Ross for the Senate.¹²¹ These rumors were partially answered by a close friend of Borah's announcing his candidacy for the Senate.¹²²

Borah's reverence for his interpretation of the constitution was to his favor and disfavor alike. Certainly this characteristic found favor among the conservatives. But most conservatives were already hostile to him because

¹²⁰ "Borah As A Candidate", New Republic, 86:97, March 4, 1936.

¹²¹ Richard Neuberger, "Behind the Borah Boom", Current History, 43:463, February, 1936.

¹²² "Borah As A Candidate", loc. cit.

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he had supported silver inflation and had voted for the greenback bonus bill in 1933. Also he was severely indicting monopolies and was vehemently criticising the "Old Guard",^{as} the tool of corporate and financial interests. Borah's reverence for his interpretation of the Constitution harmed his candidacy in this way. Because Borah believed the anti-lynching acts proposed before Congress were unconstitutional he openly opposed them. What was worse politically, he openly opposed them in public statements during the pre-convention campaign. This attitude made northern negroes who were normally Republican hostile to his candidacy.¹²³

In Borah's favor as a candidate was his long and colorful career in the Senate. The Idaho Senator was a national figure. He alone among the active prospective candidates had a reputation as a progressive. Borah was distinct among other candidates likewise in that probably he alone could muster the mass support to give Franklin Roosevelt a race.¹²⁴

Among the many darkhorse candidates, two stood out, Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan and Senator Lester J. Dickinson of Iowa.

¹²³ "Long Ago and Far Away", Time, 27:210, March 30, 1936.

¹²⁴ "Will Borah Run?", loc. cit.; Jonathan Mitchell, loc. cit.; "Borah As A Candidate", loc. cit.

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Senator Arthur Vandenberg was the son of a harness maker. The depression of 1893 ruined his father's business and forced the nine-year-old son to make his own living in the world.¹²⁵ He worked as the proprietor of a push-car freight service and at other odd jobs. He lost his job as a factory clerk when he took time off to watch a parade of Theodore Roosevelt's.¹²⁶

While being employed as office-boy cub reporter on the Grand Rapids Herald, Vandenberg had as his associate cub reporter Frank Knox, later a rival for the Republican nomination in 1936.¹²⁷ Before he was twenty years old, Vandenberg had written over a hundred short stories, all but one of them being rejected by magazine editors. He left the Grand Rapids Herald to write advertising copy for Colliers Weekly.

Before long the young man decided he would become a lawyer and enrolled at the University of Michigan. After attending the University for one year, he returned to the Herald. At the age of twenty-two, Vandenberg became Editor and General Manager of the Herald.¹²⁸

125 "Dark Horse", Literary Digest, 121:5, May 23, 1936.

126 Loc. cit.

127 Loc. cit.

128 Loc. cit.

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He entered politics via the Young Men's Republican Club of Grand Rapids. For ten years he served on the Michigan Republican State Committee. Then he was elected Chairman of the Republican State Committee.

From 1916 to 1928, Vandenberg's career was writing. One important cue to his personality is his three books on Alexander Hamilton. The first of these, The Great American, was published while Vandenberg was editor of the Grand Rapids Herald. It is a panegyric of Alexander Hamilton, the hero of Vandenberg. The second book, If Hamilton Were Here Today, was published in 1923. Hamilton was made to disapprove of the impending presidential candidacy of Robert LaFollette. The third book, The Trail of Tradition, published in 1926, was an account of American foreign policy from the Administration of Washington to that of Harding.¹²⁹

Although he had previously refused the Republican Gubernatorial nomination, Vandenberg announced his candidacy for the Republican nomination for United States Senator in 1928, in opposition to Senator Ferris. The sudden death of Ferris resulted in Governor Green appointing Vandenberg to fill the vacancy. In the next election, Vandenberg was chosen to succeed himself by the largest majority ever given to any Michigan candidate in a state election.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ Jonathan Mitchell, "Vandenberg, The Man With A Mummy", New Republic, 86:274, April 15, 1936.

¹³⁰ "Presidential Possibilities", Literary Digest, 120:39, September 28, 1935.

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Early in the Roosevelt Administration, Senator Vandenberg introduced the bank deposit insurance plan while the Senate was debating the Glass-Steagall Act. Altered in the House of Representatives, the plan was finally adopted.¹³¹

In the midst of a democratic landslide in the congressional elections of 1934, Senator Vandenberg was re-elected.

His legislative record expressed his mild conservatism. He voted for the Social Security Act, the Gold Reserve Act, and for the Securities Act of 1933. But he voted against the NRA, AAA, the Work Relief Act of 1935, the Holding Company Act, the Cuffey Coal Act, the Wagner Labor Relations Act and the Reciprocal Tariff Act. He worked for neutrality legislation and for civil service in the Post Office Department.¹³²

Vandenberg declared that he still read The Federalist once a year because this work was an incomparable storehouse of wisdom and inspiration. A large man, with rugged features, particularly a bulging brow, the Senator from Michigan in his flights of oratory often created the impression that he was extraordinarily wise.¹³³

Senator Vandenberg proposed a Democratic-Republican

¹³¹ Loc. cit.

¹³² Ernest K. Lindley, "Rivals In the G.O.P. Camp", Current History, 43:566, March, 1936.

¹³³ Jonathan Mitchell, "The Man With a Mummy", New Republic, 86:247-75, April 15, 1936.

coalition to defeat the New Deal, which he found paralleled in the first administration of Washington, in which were both Hamilton and Jefferson. He was the outstanding Republican politician in 1936 who foresaw the necessity of such a coalition to defeat President Roosevelt. Vandenberg proposed that reactionaries and conservatives of both parties unite in opposing what they regarded as un-American tendencies in the New Deal.¹³⁴

Senator Vandenberg without any machine or active campaign, occupied the position of a dark horse in the convention. He sedulously kept out of the quarrel between Senator Borah and the Republican National Committee. During the session of Congress before the convention, he made himself the spokesman of Senate Republicans. The Passamaquoddy and Florida ship-canal projects were the object of the Senator's criticism. He exposed what he termed the graft in the WPA. Vandenberg was mostly responsible for the charge that the main recipients of AAA payments were grasping farm corporations.¹³⁵

Senator Vandenberg had created the public impression that he was a progressive. But those on the inside of the Republican party knew he was a conservative. In case of a convention deadlock he was the ideal compromise candidate. Otherwise he could sagaciously await 1940.

134 Loc. cit.

135 Loc. cit.

The other outstanding dark horse candidate, Senator Dickinson, had ancestors who had farmed for twelve generations. He worked his way through Cornell College at Mount Vernon, Iowa. In 1899 he received the LL.D. degree from the University of Iowa. Dickinson practiced law in a small Iowa town and entered politics as an independent progressive. After serving as a county prosecutor for four years, he became a candidate for Congress in 1918. He won the primary campaign against a Congressman who had voted against and opposed the World War. Dickinson advocated the continuance of the war.¹³⁶

Congressman Dickinson was renominated and reelected to Congress until 1930, many times without opposition in the primary or ensuing election. During the twenties he was the leader of the Middle Western "farm bloc" in the House of Representatives.¹³⁷

In the Cleveland Convention of 1924, Dickinson was put forward as a candidate for the vice-presidential nomination but was defeated. In 1932 he was the keynoter at the Republican convention.

In 1930, Dickinson was elected to the Senate. Even in 1933, Senator Dickinson who had learned to orate by practicing back of a barn on his father's Iowa farm, damned the New Deal as a rattle-brained project doomed to an ig-

¹³⁶ Richard Barry, "Dark Horse Dickinson", Review of Reviews, 93:70-76, February, 1936.

¹³⁷ Loc. cit.

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The first part of the paper is devoted to a general discussion of the problem. It is shown that the problem is of great importance in the theory of the structure of matter. The second part is devoted to a detailed analysis of the problem. It is shown that the problem is of great importance in the theory of the structure of matter. The third part is devoted to a detailed analysis of the problem. It is shown that the problem is of great importance in the theory of the structure of matter. The fourth part is devoted to a detailed analysis of the problem. It is shown that the problem is of great importance in the theory of the structure of matter. The fifth part is devoted to a detailed analysis of the problem. It is shown that the problem is of great importance in the theory of the structure of matter. The sixth part is devoted to a detailed analysis of the problem. It is shown that the problem is of great importance in the theory of the structure of matter. The seventh part is devoted to a detailed analysis of the problem. It is shown that the problem is of great importance in the theory of the structure of matter. The eighth part is devoted to a detailed analysis of the problem. It is shown that the problem is of great importance in the theory of the structure of matter. The ninth part is devoted to a detailed analysis of the problem. It is shown that the problem is of great importance in the theory of the structure of matter. The tenth part is devoted to a detailed analysis of the problem. It is shown that the problem is of great importance in the theory of the structure of matter.

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nominous end.¹³⁸

Although Iowa received more benefits than any other state from the AAA, Senator Dickinson severely criticized this means of solving the farm problem. The Congressman who had embarrassed Coolidge, Hoover, and Harding by advocating loans to the farmers was being embarrassed himself as his re-election was made precarious by his indictment of the AAA.¹³⁹

In November, 1935, a convention of Young Republicans met at Des Moines, Iowa. Senator Dickinson was the outstanding Republican present, and his name was freely mentioned as a presidential contender. He was a dark horse contender whose sole chance of being chosen as the Republican nominee was a convention deadlock and a resulting compromise.

There were other minor candidates who received consideration for the Republican presidential nomination. They were Governor Harold Hoffman of New Jersey, Comptroller of the Currency J. R. McCarl, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., and Justice Owen J. Roberts.

Until the Lindberg Kidnaping Case, Governor Hoffman received consideration in the press as the possible nominee.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ "Presidential Possibilities", Literary Digest, 120:39, November 23, 1935.

¹³⁹ Richard Barry, loc. cit.

¹⁴⁰ "The Hoffman Case", Time, 27:20, April 13, 1936.

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candidate whose name stood out among the many

local names was a conventional Democrat and a leading

conservative.

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were Governor Harold Burton of New Jersey, Congressman of

the country J. A. Baker, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.,

and Justice Owen J. Roberts.

Until the Lincoln Evening Post, Governor Hoffman

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inee. 140

138 "Presidential Possibilities", Lincoln Evening

Post, November 22, 1935.

139 Robert G. G. 139, 141.

140 "The National Post", New York, April 12, 1936.

His first asset as a candidate was his enviable war record. Hoffman during the World War became a captain in the front lines at the age of twenty-one.¹⁴¹ His second asset was his success in running for public office. Hoffman entered politics as city treasurer of South Amboy, New Jersey. At twenty-seven he was elected to the lower house of the New Jersey legislature. At twenty-eight he became Mayor of South Amboy. At thirty, his popularity had increased until he could be elected to the House of Representatives. Four years later he became Motor Vehicle Commissioner of New Jersey and distinguished himself by writing many articles on how to drive automobiles.

It was Hoffman's selection as Governor by the people of New Jersey that started a mild presidential boom for him. His party was disorganized and scandalized. Opposed to his candidacy for Governor was a capable Democrat. The Democratic candidate furthermore was on the same ticket as A. Harry Moore who was the Democratic nominee for the Senate. Moore, who had been chief executive of New Jersey twice, won by two hundred thousand votes but Hoffman defeated Moore's colleague by twelve thousand votes.¹⁴²

Hoffman's success seemed to be partly due to his

¹⁴¹ Frederick S. Osborne, "You Can't Beat Him!", Review of Reviews, 91:20-21, April 13, 1936.

¹⁴² Loc. cit.

vaudeville method of campaigning. He managed to insert a great deal of humor in his speeches. At his rallies he presided, in the words of his critics, as a "master of ceremonies" over programs which might have been presented over the variety stage.¹⁴³

His election to the office of Governor in the midst of the national Democratic landslide of 1934 gave him much publicity. By his inaugural address, Governor Hoffman showed that he understood the problems which faced the state of New Jersey. If he could make a creditable success out of governing New Jersey, he would be in line as a presidential contender.¹⁴⁴

His activities in the Lindbergh Case ended all hopes of Governor Hoffman becoming the Republican nominee in 1936. The plea of Bruno Hauptmann, convicted kidnapper and murderer of Charles Augustus Lindbergh, Jr. for clemency or delay of his scheduled execution had been denied by the New Jersey Court of Pardons, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court. Governor Hoffman suddenly granted Hauptmann a thirty day reprieve hinting that new evidence had been presented in regard to Hauptmann's guilt of the accused crimes. Other complications in the case resulted in a further delay of

143 Loc. cit.

144 Loc. cit.

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forty-eight hours before the execution of Hauptmann followed.¹⁴⁵

Many were of the opinion that Governor Hoffman had hoped to take advantage of the Hauptmann case and his questionable guilt to make a national reputation for himself. Had he succeeded through his efforts in proving Hauptmann innocent or in revealing the whole story of the Hopewell crime, he would have become a national figure. Hence his political prestige would increase enormously.¹⁴⁶

Regardless of whatever inspired Hoffman's interest in the Lindbergh case, a desire either for justice or for his own political advancement, his activities had political repercussions. The failure of any further tangible evidence to be presented to the public during the reprieve period resulted in demands for the impeachment of Hoffman in the press. The President of Princeton University and thirty-three of his faculty petitioned the New Jersey legislature to investigate Governor Hoffman's activities.¹⁴⁷

Governor Hoffman's presidential boom ended. Franklin Fort, a former floor manager for Herbert Hoover in a national convention, challenged Hoffman's selection to the national convention by running against him as a candidate for delegate-at-large.¹⁴⁸

145 "The Hoffman Case", loc. cit.

146 Ibid., pp. 21.

147 Loc. cit.

148 Loc. cit.

A political synopsis of John Raymond McCarl begins with the fact that he came to Washington in 1914 as Secretary to Senator George Norris. In 1918 he was made Secretary of the Republican Congressional Committee. In 1921 he was appointed Comptroller General of the United States.

It was his job as head of the General Accounting Office to see that federal funds were collected and disbursed within the law. Paul Ward concludes that he did not always act according to the very letter of the law as evidenced by the Salt Creek Royalty oil contract and other frauds of the Harding Administration.¹⁴⁹

Comptroller McCarl proceeded to clash with every Secretary of the Navy from Harding's Administration to that of Roosevelt's over McCarl's refusal to give mileage to the officer returning home while awaiting further orders.¹⁵⁰ He was also publicized for refusing to sanction purchases of bottled mineral waters by diplomats in dysenteric foreign nations.¹⁵¹

The coming of the New Deal expanded Comptroller McCarl's theater of operation. By hair-splitting decisions he prevented slum clearance and low-cost housing projects, soil erosion control, and subsistence homestead projects. No one was hamstrung by McCarl more than Presi-

¹⁴⁹ Paul W. Ward, "Ickes Surrenders to Bureaucracy," Nation, 142:680-81, June 12, 1935.

¹⁵⁰ "Tight Fist Relaxed", Literary Digest, 12296, July 11, 1936.

¹⁵¹ Paul W. Ward, loc. cit.

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It was his job as head of the General Accounting Office to see that Federal funds were collected and distributed within the law. From that position that he did not always act according to the very letter of the law as evidenced by the fact that he kept all contracts and other records of the Harding Administration. Comptroller Robert proceeded to work with every Secretary of the Navy from Harding's Administration to that of Roosevelt's over Robert's refusal to give witness in the office following some while waiting for an order. He was also published for refusing to sanction purchases of listed aircraft by diplomats in 1934. He was also published for refusing to sanction purchases of listed foreign nations.

The coming of the New Deal expanded Comptroller Robert's scope of operation. By anti-trust legislation he prevented anti-trust and low-cost business projects, anti-trust control, and anti-trust business projects. He was also published for refusing to sanction projects. He was also published for refusing to sanction projects. He was also published for refusing to sanction projects.

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dent Roosevelt. He would not permit the President to allocate \$15,000,000 of the \$525,000,000 drought-relief fund to the gigantic forest shelter-belt scheme. When the President tried to use \$33,000 of the 1935 relief appropriation for the erection of a factory in Reedsville, West Virginia, Comptroller McCarl refused to sign the warrant.¹⁵²

McCarl attained such a high nuisance value that so many officers of the executive branches of the government began submitting plans to him for approval in advance of any attempt to place them in actual operation.¹⁵³

He tried to have the Works Relief Act of 1935 amended so that each project would have to bear his approval. He attempted to get Congress to put the Tennessee Valley Authority under the control of the General Accounting Office.¹⁵⁴

Being unable under the law to succeed himself, McCarl sought the Republican presidential nomination. The conservative press lauded him for his scrutiny over the activities of the Roosevelt Administration. McCarl was considered an early presidential possibility by commentators.

In the early speculation concerning the Republican nominee, many thought Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. the logical

152 Loc. cit.; "Tight Fist Relaxed", loc. cit.

153 Paul W. Ward, loc. cit.

154 Loc. cit.

1936 opponent of his distant relative, Franklin Roosevelt, whom he once called a "maverick".¹⁵⁵

This son of former President Theodore Roosevelt completed the four year course at Harvard University in three years. From 1918 to 1924 he was variously a partner of a Wall street banking firm, one of the founders of the Plattsburg Training Camp, a member of the New York Assembly, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy.¹⁵⁶

In 1924 he unsuccessfully campaigned as the Republican nominee against Alfred Smith for Governor. From 1924 to 1929, he led scientific expeditions to Asia. On his return to the United States in 1929, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. was appointed Governor of Puerto Rico, and, in 1932, Governor General of the Philippines.¹⁵⁷

Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.'s greatest asset as a possible candidate was his enviable war record. He rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel during the World War and received many medals of honor.¹⁵⁸ His second asset was the name of Roosevelt. But he did not think like a Roosevelt in politics. His conservative opinions contrasted with the ideas of his father and those of Franklin Roosevelt.

When the preconvention campaign progressed into the stage of candidates actively seeking nomination, Colonel Roosevelt retired to the background.

¹⁵⁵ "Presidential Possibility", Literary Digest, 120:39, November 2, 1935.

¹⁵⁶ Loc. cit.

¹⁵⁷ Loc. cit.

¹⁵⁸ Loc. cit.

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Owen J. Roberts accidentally entered public life. The District Attorney of Philadelphia ran across an article of his in a law journal. He insisted on the writer becoming his assistant. So Roberts resigned from his position as a professor in the University of Pennsylvania Law School, which he had held for twenty years to become assistant District Attorney.¹⁵⁹

As the vigorous government prosecutor in the Tea Pot Dome case, Roberts received national prominence. In 1930, he was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Hoover. The new justice was unanimously confirmed by the Senate.¹⁶⁰

On the Supreme Court, Justice Roberts and Chief Justice Hughes occupied an anomalous position. They shared the balance of power between the conservatives and liberals. In most of the New Deal cases, Roberts and Hughes joined the conservatives and invalidated many important phases of the Roosevelt program.

The Republicans, after the invalidation of New Deal legislation, sought to make the Constitution the principal campaign issue. Justice Roberts was a Republican, the youngest member on the Court. For awhile there was much talk of drafting him to oppose Roosevelt.¹⁶¹

159 Mr. Justice Roberts, Fortune, 13:1924, May, 1936.

160 Loc. cit.

161 Loc. cit.

When J. Roberts accidentally entered public life.
The District Attorney of Philadelphia was across an arch-
rival of his in a law journal. He insisted on the writer
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1900, he was appointed to the Supreme Court by President
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In the Supreme Court, Justice Roberts and Chief
Justice Hughes occupied an unusual position. They
acted as a kind of pivot between the conservatives
and liberals. In most of the great cases, Roberts and
Hughes joined the conservatives and insulated any in-
formation from the liberal group.

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source of law. Justice Roberts was a Republican, the
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1901 Mr. Justice Roberts, 1902, 1903, 1904, 1905.

1906 1907 1908

1909 1910 1911

When the active candidates for the Republican nomination appeared, Justice Roberts was forgotten. It probably would have been unwise for the Republicans to nominate Roberts. Roberts' nomination would undoubtedly have made the Supreme Court a direct campaign issue. In the event of his decisive defeat, the position of the Supreme Court would have been decidedly weakened.

This completes the review of Republican presidential contenders in the preconvention campaign of 1936. The important minor parties in 1936 included the Union, Socialist, and Communist. A survey of the candidates and the campaign of these parties follows.

The candidate of the Union Party for President in 1936 was William Lemke, Congressman from North Dakota. Lemke spent the first part of his life on a farm in the North Dakota frontier country. He worked his way through the University of North Dakota and later graduated from the Yale Law School.

Lemke returned to the West and practiced law in the thriving town of Fargo, North Dakota. He began to specialize in cases involving farms, their owners, and the granges they had wrought for their own protection in the market place. For nearly three decades, Lemke associated with every farm organization in the Northwest as spokesman and as legal adviser.¹⁶²

¹⁶² Herbert Harris, "William Lemke", Current History, 45:90, October, 1936.

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When the farmers formed their Non-Partisan League to combat the alleged mulctings of the "grain trusters", Mr. Lemke became a member of the League's national executive committee. Each evening President Townley and Mr. Lemke gathered the farmer representatives together and drilled them in speech-making. Before long the league captured control of the Republican party and the state government.¹⁶³

Mr. Lemke became chairman of the North Dakota Republican central committee. While the Non-Partisan League was legislating its many reforms, he was State Attorney General. In 1920, Mr. Lemke was recalled as the result of charges that he and his friends had caused the state-owned bank to deposit funds in an institution they knew to be insolvent.¹⁶⁴

Lemke was embittered as a result of the recall election and retired to private law practice. In 1932 Mr. Lemke emerged again upon the American political scene and was elected to the House of Representatives as a pro-New Deal Republican. He was reelected in 1934 after voting for virtually all Administration measures.¹⁶⁵

He voted for almost all New Deal measures in 1935 and 1936. As creator of legislation, he devoted his talents chiefly to the Frazier-Lemke act of 1936. To get this bill

¹⁶³ Jonathan Mitchell, "Liberty Bill Lemke", New Republic, 88:9, August 12, 1936.

¹⁶⁴ Paul W. Ward, "Lemke! Crackpot For President", Nation, 143:35, July 11, 1936.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 36.

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out of the committee where the Administration forces desired it to remain, Lemke obtained the signatures of two hundred and eight members of the House. Due to Administration pressure, the Frazier-Lemke Act was defeated in the House after its consideration had been forced by Representative Lemke.

After the defeat of this measure, Congressman Lemke was embittered against President Roosevelt. When Father Coughlin asked him to run for president on a third party ticket with his support, he accepted. The Union party was manufactured and Dr. Townsend and Reverend Gerald K. Smith were influenced to support Coughlin's candidate for the presidency.

Although Coughlin and Lemke announced that they expected to carry several mid-western states and force the election of the 1936 president into the House of Representatives, they had no chance of doing so. Lemke was handicapped by being unable to get on the ballot in several states and by the fact that it takes more than a few months to build a political machine.¹⁶⁶

Although he was supported by nearly all liberal farm organizations in the northwest, Lemke was not known out of that section. Organized labor was solidly behind President Roosevelt and liberals in the east shunned Lemke's candidacy due to the influences supporting him.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 34.

¹⁶⁷ Jonathan Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 8-10.

out of the committee where the Administration forces de-
clined to remain, Lusk obtained the signatures of two
members and eight members of the House. The Administration
position presented, the President-Lusk and was defeated in
the House after the consideration had been forced by Repre-
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After the defeat of this measure, Congressman Lusk
was nominated against President Roosevelt. When Lusk
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that section. Organized labor was actively behind Lusk's
last Roosevelt and Lusk in the east abandoned Lusk's
candidate due to the influence supporting him.

Privately Lemke had no illusions about entering the White House in 1936 but hoped instead to make the Unionist campaign an instrument for capturing the balance of power in the House by filling that body with Townsendites, Coughlinites, and other followers.¹⁶⁸

The utmost Lemke could realistically hope for was to detract enough votes from President Roosevelt to give Alfred Landon a western state of two. His associates were, however, not so certain that he would carry even his own state of North Dakota although his reelection as Congressman at large from that state was conceded.¹⁶⁹

The candidate of the Socialist Party, Norman Thomas, was the son of a Presbyterian minister. He studied at Bucknell and at Princeton's theological seminary. Until the advent of the World War, Thomas served in the ministry. The elders of the church for whom Thomas was pastor resented his active opposition to the entrance of the United States on the side of the Allies. Thomas left the church to become a member of the Socialist party.¹⁷⁰

After the war he helped to organize the American Civil Liberties Union. A few years later he became a director of the League for Industrial Democracy. An editorship of the Nation and a brief period as editor of the labor

¹⁶⁸ Paul W. Ward, loc. cit.

¹⁶⁹ Jonathan Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 10.

¹⁷⁰ Edward Livinson, "Norman Thomas", Current History, 45:73, October, 1936.

daily, The New York Leader, followed.

Norman Thomas assumed leadership of the Socialist party in 1924. That year the party supported Robert La-Follette for the presidency, Thomas being the party's candidate for the Governorship of New York State.¹⁷¹

Thomas succeeded in winning attention for the Socialist cause as no other Socialist politician. His fluency in speaking as well as his unchallenged sincerity aided him in building up a following. But what made him well known throughout the nation was his constant championing of the cause of labor and the underprivileged.¹⁷²

In 1929, in his campaign for the mayoralty of New York City, Thomas had the support of the New York World-Telegram and The New York World. After his defeat, Thomas waged a brilliant campaign in 1932 amazing even his partisans by polling almost a million votes.¹⁷³

In 1936, many right-wing Socialists thought they were bound to support Roosevelt because of the reforms he had instituted. Thomas, the party nominee and a left-wing Socialist, pictured the New Deal as patchwork of the many evils of modern capitalism. He pointed out that the Democratic party was composed of liberal rainbow-chasers, Southern industrialists, and bigots, and corrupt city machines of the North. Therefore, to vote for Roosevelt was

¹⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 74.

¹⁷² Ibid., pp. 70-75.

¹⁷³ Ibid., pp. 74.

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to vote for the other reactionaries who would win with him. The aims of socialism could not be thus attained.¹⁷⁴

Thomas's sturdy avowal of his Socialist faith was his paramount liability as a candidate. He disregarded the political popularity he might have obtained by compromise. To him might well be applied Eugene Deb's famous affirmation, "When I rise, it will be with the working class, not from it."¹⁷⁵

The Communist candidate, Earl Browder, was a socialist sympathizer at the age of fourteen when he was delivering messages for Western Union. From 1915-17, he was office manager for the Farmer's Cooperative Store in Olathe, Kansas.

When America entered the World War, Earl and William Browder formed the "League for Democratic Control," which sought a court order to restrain the Governor and sheriff from putting draft laws into operation. As a consequence of this action, both brothers were imprisoned in Leavenworth Penitentiary.¹⁷⁶

When he was paroled, Browder joined the Communist Party then headed by William Z. Foster who encouraged him to travel. Browder travelled in Europe and Asia. He attended the Third Congress of the Communist International. In 1927 he went to China as a member of the International

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 70-75.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 70.

¹⁷⁶ "Meet Earl Browder", Current History, 45:94, October, 1936.

to vote for the other revolutionaries and would win this
election. The aim of revolutionaries was to change
the situation of the revolutionaries. He disagreed
his personal liability as a candidate. He disagreed
the political position. He might have obtained by com-
mitment. To his right will be applied against the
revolutionaries. When I rise, it will be with the working
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175 1944, pp. 100-101.
175 1944, pp. 73.
175 1944, pp. 100-101.
October, 1950.

Worker's Delegation and was elected executive director of the Trade Union Secretariat in Hankow. While in China he taught Chinese laborers the technique of collective bargaining.

On his return to the United States in 1929, orders from Moscow resulted in Browder being appointed Secretary General of the Communist party in the United States.¹⁷⁷

Under Browder's supervision the party quadrupled its active membership until in 1936 it had fifty-one thousand dues-paying workers, along with an additional seven hundred thousand to eight hundred thousand in mass organizations allied to the party.¹⁷⁸

Browder's address in accepting the Communist Party platform and nomination for the Presidency disclosed his attitude toward the 1936 campaign.

Friends, you have placed upon me a heavy responsibility. You call me to carry the standard of the Communist Party and its platform which alone, of all parties and platforms, gives the correct answer to all the most burning problems of the people ...We see that the chief enemy of the peace, freedom, and prosperity of the American people is the Republican Party and its reactionary allies, Hearst, the Liberty League, Wall Street...The self-styled Union Party of Lemke and Father Coughlin is the product of a Hearst-Liberty League intrigue. Lemke is clearly but a stooge for Landon ...The issue in the 1936 election is not a choice between socialism or capitalism. It is a choice between progress and reaction, between democracy and the path towards fascism.¹⁷⁹

177 Ibid., pp. 95.

178 Loc. cit.

179 Ibid., pp. 96.

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This completes the review of presidential contenders. The pathway of each presidential aspirant's rise to his position is briefly as follows:

..... Huey P. Long: Lawyer; State Railroad Commissioner; Governor of Louisiana; United States Senator.

Eugene Talmadge: Lawyer; State Commissioner of Agriculture; Governor of Georgia.

*Herbert C. Hoover: Engineer; Mining Expert; Director in Mining Companies; Relief Administrator for Belgium; Food Administrator for the United States; Chairman of American Relief Administration; Secretary of Commerce; President of the United States.

*Alfred M. Landon: Businessman; Campaign Manager of Republican Gubernatorial candidate; Governor of Kansas.

*Frank Knox: Reporter; Editor; Publisher; Chairman of Michigan State Republican Central Committee; Colonel in the United States Army; Republican Candidate for Governor of New Hampshire; General Manager of all Hearst newspapers; Owner and Publisher.

*William E. Borah: Lawyer; United States Senator from Idaho; Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

*Arthur Vandenberg: Reporter; Editor; Author; Chairman of Republican Central Committee; United States Senator from Michigan; (dark horse candidate.)

Lester J. Dickinson: Lawyer; Congressman; United States Senator from Iowa; Temporary Chairman Republican National Convention. 1932.

Harold G. Hoffman: Captain in United States Army; City Treasurer; Member of New Jersey Assembly; Congressman; Motor Vehicle Commissioner of New Jersey; Governor of New Jersey.

John R. McCarl: Secretary to United States Senator Norris; Secretary to Republican Congressional Committee; Comptroller General of the United States.

Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.: Banker; Member of New York Assembly; Lieutenant Colonel in United States Army; Republican nominee for Governor of New York; Explorer; Governor of Porto Rico; Governor General of the Philippines.

Owen J. Roberts: College Professor; Assistant District Attorney of Philadelphia; Government Prosecutor in Tea Pot Dome Case; Member of Supreme Court of the United States.

William Lenke: Lawyer; Chairman of North Dakota Republican Central Committee; Attorney General of North Dakota; Congressman.

Norman Thomas: Minister; Director in League For Industrial Democracy; Editor of Nation, Socialist Nominee for Governor of New York, 1924; for Mayor of New York City, 1929; for President of the United States, 1928-1932.

Earl Browder: Messenger Boy; Office Manager; World Traveller; General Secretary of Communist Party; Communist nominee for President in 1932.

CHAPTER III

THE PRE-CONVENTION CAMPAIGN

Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic Party won an overwhelming victory in the election of 1932. Roosevelt carried forty-two of the forty-eight states. He succeeded in winning his own state of New York by a plurality of 600,000 votes and Illinois by 450,000. Of the large states, he lost only Pennsylvania. Hoover's own state of California gave Roosevelt a plurality of almost half a million. Texas voted for him, eight to one.¹

The new Congress which was called in special session on March 9, 1933, reflected the tremendous majority of the Democratic party in the preceding election. The House of Representatives contained three hundred and thirteen Democrats, one hundred and seventeen Republicans, and five Farmer-Laborites. The reorganized Senate was composed of sixty Democrats as against a total of thirty-six Republicans and insurgents.

Despite the great victory of the Democratic party and Franklin Roosevelt at the polls, their prestige was not secure. Mr. Roosevelt was inaugurated during one of the most critical periods in the history of the United States. The President and the Democratic party could remain in power only by acting to solve the many problems facing the nation.

The dramatic and sudden manner in which the President

1 Review of Reviews, 67:12, April, 1933.

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salvaged the banking system made a profound impression upon the American people. As the prestige of President Roosevelt increased during the ensuing months, Democratic leadership was made more secure.

The poll of the Literary Digest conducted preceding the Congressional elections of 1934 presaged the continuance of Democratic ascendancy until at least 1936. A three-to-two vote of confidence was given to the President by this poll.²

But this was only a synthetic test of the President's popularity. Roosevelt astutely prepared for the coming elections. During the closing months of the Seventy-Third Session of Congress, he introduced a comprehensive program of social legislation. The President declared that these measures would be introduced for consideration in the next session of Congress. Thus the President faced the congressional campaign of 1934 advocating a broad extension of New Deal activities.³

The many measures which the President encouraged Congress to enact in 1933 and 1934 angered in several instances the financial and industrial capitalists. Since they were a power within the Democratic party, another task was forced upon Roosevelt besides defeating the Republicans. It

2 Literary Digest, 117:3, July 7, 1934.

3 Charles A. Beard, "The Month In America", Current History, 40:648, September, 1934.

seemed best to keep conservative Democrats from overtly opposing policies of the New Deal. By all means, they were to be prevented from forming a coalition with the Republicans in the ensuing elections.

At first, the opposition to Roosevelt within the Democratic party, seemed to be confined principally to Alfred Smith. Towards the close of 1933, Smith began attacking the monetary and relief policies of the Administration in his magazine, The New Outlook.

On August 22, 1934, however, more opposition to the President crystallized. A new organization, the American Liberty League, announced its formation and purposes. Its leadership consisted of John W. Davis, Irene du Pont, Alfred Smith, Nathan Miller, and James Wadsworth. These individuals were soon joined by Governor Joseph B. Ely of Massachusetts, who was opposed to the socialism which he forecast as the logical outcome of the continuance of the New Deal. The avowed purpose of the American Liberty League was to uphold the Constitution and to preserve liberty of person and property. Its real purpose was to win over conservative Democrats in opposition to President Roosevelt.⁴

With the Congressional elections approaching, there was outwardly unity within the Democratic party. But, under the surface, members of the Liberty League through

⁴ Wallace Sayre, "Political Groundswell", Current History, 44:53-60, June, 1936.

...to keep conservative Democrats from overtly
opposing policies of the New Deal. By all means, they
were to be prevented from forming a coalition with the
Republicans in the Senate.

At first, the opposition to Roosevelt within the
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ministration in the Senate. The New Deal.

On August 12, 1935, however, vote opposition to the
President crystallized. A new organization, the American
Liberty League, announced its formation and purposes. Its
membership consisted of John A. Hyde, Thomas W. Whit
field, Nathan Miller, and James Woodbury. These
individuals were soon joined by Governor Joseph E. Rife of
Mississippi, who was opposed to the Federal Reserve which he
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With the Congressional elections approaching, there
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under the surface, activity of the Liberty League through
its National Office, National Headquarters, Bureau
Bureau, 1415-20, New York, N.Y.

Bainbridge Colby, former Secretary of State in Wilson's Administration, were trying to lure such conservative senators as Glass and Byrd of Virginia, Gore of Oklahoma, and Bailey of South Carolina away from supporting President Roosevelt.⁵

The Republican party was completely demoralized by its disastrous defeat in 1932. During most of 1933, the prestige of the President was so great that most Republicans voted for his measures. But towards the end of 1933 when the conservative press began attacking Roosevelt, conservative Republicans began denouncing him also.

As ^{was} to be expected after the defeat of 1932, a movement to liberalize the Republican party was instituted. It failed because the national organization was completely in the hands of the conservative element which had dominated the party since 1920.

The conservatives were, however, bitterly divided among themselves. This was evidenced by the meeting of the Republican National Committee in June, 1934, for the purpose of selecting a National Chairman to lead the party in the coming Congressional campaign. Disagreement between the Hooverites and the anti-Hooverites delayed the selection of the National Chairman. Finally an "old Guardsman", Charles Hilles from New York persuaded the committee to choose a compromise candidate, Henry Fletcher, former Am-

5 "News and Comment From the Nation's Capital", Literary Digest, 117:13, June 22, 1934.

bassador to Italy.⁶

The platform adopted by the Committee revealed the arguments which the Republican party utilized in the Congressional campaign that followed. Offering nothing constructive in place of the New Deal, the platform declared in essence:

American institutions and American civilization are in greater danger today than at any time since the foundation of the republic.

A small group in Washington, vested with temporary authority, is seeking covertly to alter the framework of American institutions. In place of individual initiative they seek to substitute complete government control over all agricultural production, over all business activity.⁷


Chairman Fletcher amplified the Republican case in a later address. He declared that the Republican party was in favor of upholding the Constitution, "our existing system of individual saving", and "individual rights and liberties" of the people. In the main, the Roosevelt Administration was attacked; for the "bureaucracy" it had created, for its "regimentation" of industry and agriculture, for having Congress surrender to the President powers "comparable only to those possessed by Hitler and Mussolini". Instead of regimenting industry, Chairman Fletcher explained the position of the Republican party as follows:

We believe that standards of decency can be maintained under the law by industry itself, without regimentation and State direction.⁸

6 Time, 23:16, June 18, 1934.

7 The New York Times, pp. 1, col. 4, June 7, 1934.

8 Ibid., pp. 18, col. 1, July 8, 1934.



On November 6, 1934, the Democratic party and President Roosevelt received a sensational vote of confidence from the people. Hitherto, every party in power had lost seats in the House after the mid-term elections. The average loss had been forty-nine. Republicans rejoiced in 1936 when the Coolidge Administration lost only nine seats in the House. The Democrats would have been probably delighted had they lost no more than thirty of their majority in the House of Representatives.⁹

But instead of losing seats, they made gains in both Houses of Congress. The new Senate, which met on January 3, 1935, contained sixty-nine Democrats, twenty-five Republicans, one Progressive, and one Farmer-Laborite. In the House of Representatives the Democrats had three hundred and twenty-seven seats to one hundred and three for the Republicans. From the previous Congress, the Democrats had gained nine in the Senate and thirteen in the House of Representatives.

With his renomination practically assured in 1936 after the Congressional victory of 1934, the President's primary pre-convention problem was to keep the Democratic party united behind his standard.

Since the President's re-election seemed very likely, business leaders decided it was best to make friends and keep Roosevelt to the Right as much as possible. A few

⁹ "What the New Deal Landslide Means", Literary Digest, 117:50, November 17, 1934.

On November 6, 1954, the Democratic party and President Eisenhower received a substantial vote of confidence from the people. However, every party in power had lost seats in the House after the mid-term elections. The average loss had been forty-nine. Republicans rejected in 1954 when the Congress adjourned had only nine seats in the House. The Democrats would have been probably defeated had they lost no more than thirty of their majority in the House of Representatives.

But instead of losing seats, they made gains in both houses of Congress. The new Senate, which met on January 3, 1955, contained sixty-nine Democrats, twenty-five Republicans, one Progressive, and one Independent. In the House of Representatives the Democrats had thirty members and twenty-seven seats in the House and three for the Republicans. With the previous Congress, the Democrats had gained nine in the Senate and thirteen in the House of Representatives.

With this reinforcement practically secured in 1954 after the Congressional victory of 1954, the President's primary governmental problem was to keep the Democratic party united behind his standards.

Since the President's re-election seemed very likely, business leaders decided it was best to make friends and keep Roosevelt to the right as much as possible. A few

business and banking leaders began acclaiming the New Deal. Mr. Roosevelt's strategy was to try and please every group if it was possible to consistently do so. So he was not hostile to the new attitude of industry.¹⁰

During January and February, 1935, the President's prestige declined precipitously. Anyone who would have predicted this decline in early January, 1935, would have been considered a wishful thinking Republican. But such are the drifting sands of party politics.¹¹

As the President's popularity declined, that of Senator Long increased. With the Louisiana Senator openly avowing his candidacy for the presidency, speculation began as to the President's chances of being reelected. The chances of Senator Long carrying Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, and possibly other Southern states were thought good. In the North, an independent ticket might obtain the support of the Progressives in Wisconsin and liberals in other states. The liberals were exasperated with the President at the time for several reasons. The President's support had been given to the Democratic opponents of Independent-Republicans and Progressives in the congressional elections of 1934. The most flagrant betrayal of the President's progressive supporters had been the strong backing given to the Democratic opponent of Senator Bronson Cutting of New Mexico. Likewise many liberals began to believe

¹⁰ T.R.B., "Washington Notes", New Republic, 82:158, March 20, 1935.

¹¹ Ibid., 82:87, March 6, 1935.

that the President would never accomplish any fundamental reform but would always try to please everybody. Further discord between Progressives and Roosevelt arose over the \$4,800,000,000 work relief appropriation. Roosevelt tried to force this appropriation through Congress without any specification being made for the dispensation of this vast fund.¹³

The Republicans hopefully observed the rift between the President and the liberals of both parties. Possibly if the Republican convention nominated an inoffensive candidate, he could be elected. Otherwise widespread dissension within the Democratic party might cause the selection of the President to be determined by the House of Representatives as in 1800 and 1824.¹⁴

The Progressives might choose the President as the lesser of evils to support in 1936 instead of Senator Long. But regardless of the attitude of the Progressives, Senator Long, it was believed, could be counted on to divide Southern democracy.

The Senator proposed to send an anti-Roosevelt delegation to the Democratic national convention. He intended to dramatize his opposition to the president to the limit of his resources. Certainly Long expected to be voted down almost unanimously. But then he would unfurl the Share-the-Wealth banner and organize a national revolt

¹³ Loc. cit.

¹⁴ Charles A. Beard, "The President Loses Prestige", Current History, 42:68, April, 1935.

that the Commission has been very successful in its work. It has been able to secure the cooperation of the various departments and to bring about a more efficient administration of the Government. The Commission has also been able to secure the cooperation of the various departments and to bring about a more efficient administration of the Government.

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against the party in power. He would not have been deterred by his inability to create a national organization or by the fact that he had not the remotest chance of winning. Senator Long was obsessed by two aims--to defeat Roosevelt in 1936 and to secure his own nomination from a radicalized Democratic convention in 1940.¹⁵

Long continued his agitation against Roosevelt until the Senator's assassination in September, 1935. With Long dead, chances of Democratic unity in 1936 were decidedly increased.

However, Democratic party unity was likewise threatened by dissident conservative Democrats. The Southern Committee to Uphold the Constitution was formed to aid the Liberty League in fostering a conservative Democratic revolt. Alfred Smith, former Governor Ely of Massachusetts, Joh W. Davis, Democratic nominee for President in 1924, former Chief Justice Pattangall of Maine, and former Governor Ritchie of Maryland were the principal leaders of this movement. Bainbridge Colby was their chief agent in contacting conservative Democratic Senators.¹⁶

It had been the policy of this element since the summer of 1934 to advocate an independent Democratic constitutional movement. This movement finally failed principally because Roosevelt chose not to stress very strongly the constitutional issue in the campaign. If Roosevelt

¹⁵ J. Frederick Essary, "An X-Ray of the Campaign," Atlantic Monthly, 157:95, January, 1936.

¹⁶ T.R.B., "Washington Notes," New Republic, 84: 157, September 18, 1935.

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is J. Fredrick Bassett, "An Era of the Campaign," Atlantic Monthly, 137:25, January, 1936.
is T.R.S., "Washington Notes," New Republic, 84: 187, September 18, 1935.

had seriously advocated a constitutional amendment granting Congress the power to control working conditions, the conservative Democrats would probably have opposed his reelection. Although his principal measures, the NRA and the AAA, were invalidated, he chose not to advocate immediate constitutional change.¹⁷

Failing in their effort to form an independent party movement, the opposing conservatives attempted to overcome party partisanship and unite against the President. A possible Republican-Democratic coalition was publicized to get the conservative reaction in both parties. This was such to the liking of those who controlled the organization of the Republican party. The following resolution of December 16, 1935, evidenced this fact:

The United States is facing as grave a crisis as has arisen in its history. The coming election will determine whether we hold to the American system of government or whether we shall sit idly by and allow it to be replaced by a socialistic dictatorship.....We appeal specifically to the millions of constitutional Jeffersonian Democrats for their aid. 18

However, among the Democratic forces this movement never advanced beyond the consideration stage.

Throughout the latter part of 1935 the conservative press in its editorials charged the President with subverting the Constitution and destroying the American system of government. Through news releases, the American Liberty League, American Bankers Association, National Manufacturers Association, United States Chamber of Commerce, Republican

17 Loc. cit.

18 Charles A. Beard, "Challenge to the New Deal", Current History, 43:519, February, 1936.

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National Committee, and the Jeffersonian Democrats filled the remainder of the conservative newspapers with anti-new deal propaganda.

In his message of January 3, 1936, the President answered his critics without referring to them directly. His message was read to Congress in person but was meant more for the nation listening over the radio. Informally beginning his campaign for re-election, President Roosevelt declared:

In March, 1933, I spoke of the practices of the money changers who stood indicted in the court of public opinion....I said that they had admitted their failure and had abdicated.

Abdicated? Yes, in 1933, but now with the passing of danger they forget their damaging admissions and withdraw their abdication. They seek the restoration of their selfish power....

They steal the livery of great national constitutional ideals to serve discredited special interests.....

They engage in vast propaganda to spread fear and discord among the people.....Their weapon is the weapon of fear....But the fear as they (our economic autocracy), instill today is not material fear, normal fear; it is synthetic, manufactured, poisonous fear that is being spread subtly, expensively and cleverly by the same people who cried in those other days--"Save us, save us, else we perish!"

Having exposed his critics, the president then invited them to offer constructive criticism. Did they intend to repeal all that the New Deal had accomplished? The Administration had been specific in its affirmative action. Let the critics of finance and industry be specific in their negative action.

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The counter attack of the conservatives was made on January 25, 1936. It was the same old bogey of Moscow. Alfred Smith addressed the Liberty League, but in reality his address was meant for the nation listening over the radio. The New Deal was assailed on several grounds. The measures of Roosevelt were communistic. The President had deliberately sought to contravene the Constitution and the Supreme Court. He had betrayed his 1932 platform on which he had been elected. Furthermore billions of dollars had been wasted extravagantly. If the Democratic national convention "heartily endorsed" this record, Mr. Smith and other "Jeffersonian and Cleveland Democrats" would be obliged to "take a walk".²⁰

The temper of Smith's address was as absurd as his conclusion:

Now in conclusion, let me give this solemn warning. There can be only one capital, Washington or Moscow...There can be only one victor. If the Constitution wins, we win. But if the Constitution--stop! stop! there--the Constitution can't lose! The fact is, it has already won, but the news has not reached certain ears.²¹

Arthur Krock interpreted Smith's address as the advance notice of a possible conservative revolt within the Democratic party that would be as important as the bolt of conservative Democrats in 1896.²² A bolt by Smith, it was believed, would endanger the President's carrying of New York State where Smith's political prestige was the greatest.²³

²⁰ The New York Times, p.2, January, 1936

²¹ Ibid. cit.

²² Ibid., p.16, col.5, January 27, 1936.

²³ Ibid., Section IV, p.3, col.1., Feb. 2, 1936

The task of replying to Mr. Smith's strictures was given to Senator Joseph Robinson of Arkansas, chief Administration spokesman in the Senate. In his radio address of January 29, the Arkansas Senator answered chronologically each of the complaints made against the New Deal by Smith in his Liberty League address. To each charge, Senator Robinson quoted a contradictory utterance made by Smith on the same or similar subject in years gone by. Most of the quotations were from campaign speeches or remarks made by Smith in 1932 and 1933.

The suggestion that Mr. Roosevelt was fostering Communism was ridiculed by Senator Robinson. In answering Mr. Smith, he had nothing to say concerning Smith's threat to "take a walk" if the Democratic Convention endorsed the Roosevelt policies.²⁴

As a relief to the serious performance of the month came the carnival of the "Jeffersonian Democrats" at Macon, Georgia. On January 30, one speaker after another denounced Mr. Roosevelt and his program. This convention, partly financed by the Liberty League, went on record opposing negroes, the New Deal, and the teachings of Karl Marx. A platform was adopted which repudiated President Roosevelt as the party leader. Governor Eugene Tamm²⁵ was called upon to lead the "Jeffersonian Democrats" in their holy war to drive the Communists from Washington.

In the ensuing months Roosevelt Democrats were selected as delegates to the national convention in every state. Whatever conservative opposition that existed the

24 Ibid., p.1, col.8, January 29, 1936.

25 Ibid., p.1, col.1, January 30, 1936.

President easily overcame.

Delegates to the national conventions are selected in three ways. In fifteen states both parties elect their delegates in uniform primaries. These primaries are held by the regular election officers and the voter is entitled to receive the ballot of his respective party. In addition to these fifteen states mentioned, the Republicans hold a similar primary in Maryland. In other states delegates chosen in a number of ways meet in State Conventions and formally vote on candidates for the national convention. In still other States, the State party Committees, through their officers, name national convention delegates without consulting the electors.²⁶ In states of the latter type, the President was certain of a pledged delegation.

The interest in the securing of delegates was not due to the fact that the President's renomination was endangered. What was of interest was the effort of conservative dissidents to defeat the President in a few states and thus obtain an opposition bloc in the convention. Conservative opposition was reputed to be strongest in the border states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, and in Massachusetts and Georgia.

Governor Talmadge had an excellent opportunity to immediately test the President's popularity. A state-wide preferential primary was desired by the Roosevelt forces. The Talmadge-controlled State Democratic Committee feared Roosevelt's popularity and refused to authorize

²⁶ Charles R. Michael, "Conventions in the Making," The New York Times, Section IV, p. 7, col. 4, April 5, 1936.

the primary. So nine counties of Georgia arranged for a presidential preference primary in the regular county primary.²⁷ In Seminole County, the first to hold the presidential preference primary, President Roosevelt was victorious over Governor Talmadge, 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1.²⁸ In the next county primary, that of Harris County, the President defeated the Governor of Georgia, 24 to 1. Due to the influence of friends of Governor Talmadge the remaining scheduled county presidential preference primaries were cancelled.²⁹

The President's friends now asked the State Democratic Executive Committee to authorize a state preferential primary instead of the county one which had been called off. The Committee agreed to have the primary and it was scheduled for April 10. According to Governor Talmadge's instructions, the Committee provided that the scheduled state preferential primary would also be cancelled if only one candidate filed. As President Roosevelt was the only candidate to file, the primary was cancelled and President Roosevelt given the right to name the Georgia delegation to the national convention.³⁰

If Governor Talmadge was afraid to test his popularity against that of the President, northern conservatives were not. Colonel Breckinridge, former Secretary of War under President Wilson, chose to run against the President in the primaries of Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio, New Jersey,

27 Ibid., p.33, col.4, February 23, 1936.

28 Ibid., p. 1, col.5, March 5, 1936.

29 The New York Times, p. 2, col.2, March 12, 1936.

30 Ibid., p. 31, col.5, May 17, 1936.

and Massachusetts. Although a member of the Liberty League, Colonel Breckinridge was not widely known. In most of the states in which his candidacy was filed, he made no active campaign. In Ohio and Massachusetts the President defeated Breckinridge by enormous majorities. As it was in Massachusetts that the conservative Democrats had openly opposed the President during the primary, this was a disappointment to their hopes. In the Pennsylvania primary, the President obtained 700,000 votes to 40,000 for Breckinridge. As Colonel Breckinridge had conducted no active campaign in Pennsylvania, the conservative press pointed to his total vote as evidence of opposition to Roosevelt.³¹ Both the President and his opponent conducted an active campaign in Maryland. Advocating a platform which might have been drafted by the Liberty League, Breckinridge called for "uncompromising support" of the Supreme Court and the "reestablishment of the orderly processes of American constitutional life." He demanded the maintenance of the rights of the states as against the encroaching federal government. The Brain Trust and the President also received their share of criticism.³²

President Roosevelt defeated Colonel Breckinridge by a five-to-one majority. This was psychologically encouraging to conservative Democrats who were opposing the

³¹ The New York Times, Section IV, p. 7, col.2, May 3, 1936.

³² The New York Times, p. 7, col. 1, March 5, 1936.

President, and to the Republicans. However, President Roosevelt in most of the primaries had received more votes, unopposed, than all the Republican candidates combined. So the ten per cent who voted against him in Maryland were the exception.³³

Continued appeals for a coalition against Roosevelt were made to conservative Democrats by Republican leaders, particularly Senator Vandenberg, and Colonel Roosevelt, Jr.

One day before the national convention convened in Philadelphia, the delegates were sent an open telegram signed by Alfred E. Smith, Bainbridge Colby, James A. Reed, Joseph B. Ely and Daniel F. Cohalan. The message called upon the delegates to repudiate President Roosevelt and nominate a "genuine Democrat." Otherwise the telegram concluded, "patriotic voters of all parties will know unhesitatingly to what standard they must rally".³⁴ The signers of the telegram realized that the convention was in control of the President. Their real purpose in sending the message was for propaganda purposes.³⁵

Postmaster General Farley expressed the Administration's attitude to this threat to bolt the Democratic party:

33 "Primaries Dissolve Political Prophecy", Ibid., Section IV, pp. 3, Col. 1, May 10, 1936.

34 Ibid., pp. 1, col. 6, June 27, 1936.


35 Ibid., pp. 2, col. 3.

No one is surprised by the report that certain people prominent in organizations like the Liberty League will send telegrams to the convention or issue statements...The objectives and connections of people of this kind are by this time thoroughly well known to every American.³⁶

This appeal was the culmination of a long and aggressive attack upon the President and his policies by insurgent conservative Democrats. If one judged their actions by the past, they would undoubtedly carry through their threat to leave the party. But the President had received so satisfactory a primary vote that it was apparent a conservative bolt would attract few votes from his standard. Amid mild excitement over this threatened bolt, the Democratic National Convention convened.

The Republican pre-convention campaign began in late 1933 and early 1934. At this time, the Republican press concluded that the depression emergency was sufficiently over to warrant the resumption of normal partisanship. In the 1934 Congressional campaign the Republican party was disastrously defeated again. Despite these defeats, liberalization efforts were fruitless because the party organization remained firmly in control of the Old Guard. Not until 1936 would there exist a chance for liberalizing the party. The strategy of the present leaders was to make a conservative frontal attack on the Roosevelt Administration. The "Smash the New Deal" movement was insti-

36 Loc. cit.



tuted. Republican leaders sought to make public scandals of all points of weakness in the New Deal.³⁷

The Republicans were simply doing what the anti-administration party always does as the first preliminary to the coming presidential election--brewing issues. The Roosevelt Administration was smeared precisely as the Democratic National Committee had smeared the Hoover Administration from 1929 to 1932. By the Autumn of 1935 opposition newspapers and orators were busy depicting the sins of the Administration with a continuity like that of a planned barrage.³⁸

Throughout 1934 former President Hoover fitted into the Republican strategy of "smearing Roosevelt". Due to his many addresses indicting the Roosevelt Administration, he dominated the political scene from the Republican side. The threat that he would seek the nomination was implied in his utterances. Mr. Hoover was a candidate to be reckoned with principally because of his close connection to the party national organization.³⁹

The former President demanded clarification of the Administration's intentions regarding the amendment of the Constitution. His defense of the Supreme Court and

³⁷ Duncan Aikman, "The Campaign Thunder Begins", The New York Times, Section VII, pp. 1, April 26, 1936.

³⁸ Loc. cit.

³⁹ Charles Michael, "Republican Candidates Lining Up", The New York Times, Section IV, pp. 7, col. 2, July 7, 1935.

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of all points of weakness in the New Deal.

The Republicans were simply being told that the anti-adminis-
tration party always done as the first preliminary to the
coming presidential election-campaign season. The House-
hold Administration was treated precisely as the Democratic
National Committee had treated the Hoover Administration
from 1923 to 1928. By the autumn of 1933 opposition news-
papers and editors were busy depicting the state of the ad-
ministration with a subtlety like that of a Spanish bar-

page.

For example, 1934 former President Hoover listed into
the opposition strategy of "conservative conservatism". One to
his many attacks including the Hoover administration,
he included the political scene from the Republican side.
The point that he would make the position was implied
in the statement. Mr. Hoover was a candidate to be re-
elected with principal support of his close connection to
the party's political organization.

The former President demanded clarification of the
administration's position regarding the amendment of
the Constitution. His defense of the Hoover party and
the New Deal began, "The Campaign for the Hoover Party",
New York Times, Section VII, pp. 1, April 25, 1933.

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the Constitution in press releases between trains on his way East was a way the titular head of the Republican party attempted to develop issues.

Hoover's militancy worried many Republican leaders. They believed that he was inextricably associated in the public mind with hard times and indecision. Many would have much preferred that the former President renounce his candidacy and devote his efforts to criticising the New Deal.⁴⁰

It was clear that Mr. Hoover sought either his own nomination or that of a follower. He was working for platform declarations which would vindicate his four years in the White House.

Partly to deprive the Hoover clique of control of the Republican party, Senator Borah became a presidential contender. The Idaho Senator was determined to block Hoover's renomination. He was much surprised when in 1935 his candidacy was greeted with enthusiasm. His followers included for the time those who thought Mr. Hoover's renomination was very unwise. Most amazing was the support given to Borah by Republican leaders. Robert H. Lucas, former executive director of the Republican National Committee, conducted a private poll. Letters were sent

⁴⁰ Arthur Krock, "In Washington," The New York Times, pp. 6, col. 5, August 15, 1935.

out to three thousand county chairmen, four hundred and fifty city leaders, and eight hundred "Young Republicans". Their advice was asked concerning various persons mentioned for the Republican nomination. Senator Borah received a large majority of votes as the first choice for the presidential nominee.⁴¹

No doubt many of these leaders, particularly those from the East, did not share some of Borah's liberal or inflationary opinions. But they realized that Borah alone of the prospective candidates was a national figure --that he alone had a chance to defeat the President.⁴²

What stirred Borah to action was the manoeuvre of the Old Guard to have uninstructed delegations sent to the national convention. Hilles of New York, Borahback of Connecticut, Brown of Ohio, and Reed of Pennsylvania could then combine their uninstructed delegates into a bloc. By their control over these delegates the Old Guard could dominate the 1936 convention. Senator Borah decided to frustrate these plans. He determined to enter many primaries and garner a sizeable bloc of delegates. He would then be in a position at the convention to help write the platform and select the Republican nominee.⁴³

41 The New York Times, pp. 2, col. 4, August 12, 1935.

42 Loc. cit.

43 "Borah Declares War on the Old Guard", The New York Times, pp. 5, col. 1, November 4, 1935.

Borah was not backed by money which could influence uninstructed delegations. Instructed delegates were the obvious need of his candidacy.⁴⁴

On January 29, Senator Borah informally opened his campaign for the presidential nomination. In an address delivered before a small audience in Brooklyn, New York, the Senator denounced the Old Guard. He declared that the nominee of the national convention must not be determined in secret with "selfish interests pulling the strings". The Senator averred that it was his purpose to see that this did not happen.⁴⁵

To enter the Ohio presidential preference primary, the candidate must declare his candidacy. On February 4, Borah announced his candidacy formally for the presidential nomination. He filed for the Ohio primary and several others. In his many campaign addresses, the Senator denounced the uninstructed delegate system used in Eastern states. He insisted that his rivals submit their candidacies to the electors. Borah charged that big business interests dominated the leaders of the uninstructed delegations and that they were planning to give their votes to Governor Landon in the convention. They had declined to elect delegates for the Kansan because to do so would have weakened Landon's appeal to liberals of the West.⁴⁶

44 Loc. cit.

45 The New York Times, pp. 1, col. 6, January 29, 1936.

46 Ibid., pp. 1, col. 6, February 5, 1936.

It was apparent in early April, 1936, that Governor Landon would be the probable nominee. In reality the winner of the uninstructed delegations would obtain the nomination. Governor Landon far outdistanced his rivals in garnering delegates but the uninstructed delegates were greater than those endorsed to him by four times.⁴⁷

Angered by the great amount of uninstructed delegations, Senator Borah threatened to bolt the Republican party. On March 22, in a Chicago address he declared:

I am going to reserve the absolute freedom to look over the candidate and platform and then make my decision.⁴⁸

Borah became hostile to Landon's candidacy for two principal reasons. Landon was ^asynthetic candidate manufactured by the press. He refused to state his attitude on national affairs. The eastern leaders were particularly friendly to Landon. So Borah became very suspicious of the Landon candidacy. It was rumored that the Senator would expose Landon in a radio address.

Borah's antipathy towards Landon was to the liking of Senator Vandenberg. The Michigan Senator carefully kept out of the row between Borah and the Old Guard. He was an excellent friend of Borah's. Likewise he was favored by most conservatives excepting the DuPonts who resented his activities in the munitions investigation. Vandenberg

⁴⁷ Charles R. Michael, "Conventions in the Making", The New York Times, Section IV, pp. 7, col. 4, April, 1936.

⁴⁸ The New York Times, pp. 1, col. 2, March 23, 1936.

attended no party conferences and signed no list of committee designations. His independence and ability to please everybody made him the probable nominee in the event of a convention deadlock.⁴⁹

On April 2, Borah was completely defeated in the New York primary. As the opposition to him in this state was strongly organized, he blundered in entering the primary. The result was the collapse of the Borah boom in the east.⁵⁰

Illinois Republicans had not expected Borah to invade that state. Long before Borah entered the primaries, the State Republican Central Committee endorsed Colonel Knox as a candidate. Republican county committees in ninety-nine out of one hundred and two counties declared for Knox. Every Republican organization in Chicago was on record as favoring the publisher.⁵¹ The Borah challenge was backed by an element of voters that in recent years had been in and out of alliance with the LaFollette movement in Wisconsin. Knox believed Borah's complete defeat would enhance his prestige. Therefore he made hundreds of speeches and gave many parties and din-

49 Arthur Krock, "Borah's Bolt Threat Sands Party Gears", The New York Times, Section IV, pp. 3, March 29, 1936.

50 The New York Times, pp. 1, col. 5, April 4, 1936.

51 "Hard Test Faces Borah in Illinois", The New York Times, Section IV, pp. 11, col. 1, April 12, 1936.

ners. Borah made only six speeches. In the preferential presidential primary, Knox received a plurality of eighty thousand. However, Senator Borah carried thirteen of the fifteen downstate Congressional districts. Although in Illinois the primary was not binding, it strongly influenced the delegates. The state's delegation would be divided. Senator Borah would probably have twenty-six of the fifty seven delegates. This was undoubtedly a victory for Borah.⁵²

When seven hundred and eighty-six of the one thousand and one delegates had been selected, Borah had twenty-one delegates from Wisconsin, eight from Idaho, and probably twenty-six from Illinois. He had won the Nebraska primary unopposed but the primary was not binding and the delegates would not commit themselves.⁵³

In the Ohio Primary, Borah would have had to effect a political revolution to win. At the head of the Old Guard delegates were two powerful leaders of the state, Walter Brown, former Postmaster General, and State Chairman Edward Schorr. Every city machine but that of Akron's backed the Old Guard delegates. A "favorite son" candidate, Robert A. Taft, opposed Senator Borah. In the primary, Taft obtained forty-seven delegates to Borah's five. According to the Ohio law the delegates were nominally committed to abide by the primary results. However, in reality they were free to vote as they pleased in the conven-

52 The New York Times, pp. 1, April 16, 1936.

53 Ibid., Section IV, pp. 3, April 19, 1936.

tion.⁵⁴

After Borah's defeat in the Ohio primary and Landon's campaign had developed into a bandwagon rush, one question dominated the pre-convention activity. Would the Landon candidacy be acceptable to Borah? Would Borah expose Landon as he had threatened to do? Would he support Landon if he were nominated or bolt the ticket? Politicians anxiously awaited the Senator's last pre-convention address of May the twenty-eighth hoping that he would clarify his intentions.

Senator Borah in his address warned the Republican party that his future party affiliation hinged upon whether the convention acted to get rid of the domination of the Old Guard. He declared that the convention had better not permit the Hilles-Roraback clique to control the nominee and shape the platform. Borah's intimation was worded so cautiously that it imposed no restriction upon the Senator's future course. He remained the enigmatic candidate.⁵⁵

It was the speech of a politician who desired to leave to the imagination his future course. Regardless of its ambiguities, his address was clear in one category.

⁵⁴ "Hard Fight is Faced by Borah", The New York Times, Section IV, pp. 11, col. 6, March 22, 1936.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 13, May 29, 1936.

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After Brown's defeat in the Ohio primary and loss
don's campaign had developed into a hard-fought race, and
questioned continued for pre-convention activity. Would
the London candidacy be acceptable to Brown? Would Brown
accept London as he had threatened to do? Would he ac-
cept London if he were nominated as half the ticket? This
question actually settled the Senator's last pre-convention
dilemma of May 20, twenty-eight days before he would
declare his intention.

Senator Brown in his address warned the Republican
party that his former party affiliation hinged upon whether
the convention acted to get rid of the domination of the
Old Guard. He declared that the convention had failed and
would be a bitter-tempered effort to control the machine
and shape the platform. Brown's intention was written
so obviously that it seemed no repetition upon the
Senator's future course. He retained the original con-
dition.

And the question of a platform was settled in
favor of the Republican his future course. Repetition of
the declaration, his address was clear in one category.

22 "Dance Hall in Road to Brown", THE NEW YORK
Times, Section IV, pp. 11, col. 3, March 22, 1930.
23 Ibid., pp. 12, col. 1, 1930.

It was definitely unfriendly to Governor Landon. The mention of the pre-convention activity of the oil interests was directed at the Governor as perhaps was that of the financial and corporate interests. The attack upon these interests was aimed at specific supporters of Governor Landon who controlled the uninstructed delegations.⁵⁶

In a last effort to prevent Governor Landon from obtaining the nomination, a "Stop Landon" coalition was being formed. This movement was cheered by Borah's attack on Landon. However, hopes of an effective coalition to prevent Landon's nomination were frustrated by Senator Borah. Arriving in Cleveland on the convention eve, he refused to participate in such a movement.

The early advantage which Senator Borah enjoyed in the Republican presidential race was due to the belief that he alone could win back the independent vote that had deserted the party in 1932 and 1934. This made Borah acceptable to the rank and file of party leaders as their ambition was to get back in office regardless of the views of the party nominee. But to the Old Guard leaders and the Hooverites, Borah was unacceptable regardless of his popularity. For the time being they backed Colonel Frank Knox.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 16, col. 5, May 23, 1936.

⁵⁷ "Borah Declares War on the Old Guard", The New York Times, pp. 5, col. 1, November 4, 1935.

The Knox candidacy was well started by July, 1935. Conservative agents were active in his behalf in the East and South. Colonel John F. Harris, Republican National Committeeman from Florida, was particularly active in marshalling pro-Knox delegates in the southern states. Colonel Knox urged his candidacy by incessant speech making in all parts of the nation. He perfected his organization in Illinois. Knox probably would have been the choice of the eastern leaders to defeat Borah had not Landon appeared on the scene.⁵⁸ With close to one hundred scattered delegates pledged to his banner at the convention, Knox made one last effort to defeat Landon by a coalition of the Borah-Hoover-Vandenburg-Knox forces.

On the plains of Kansas which formed an oasis in the Republican desert of 1932 and 1934, Governor Alfred Landon was being "built up" in the summer of 1935. The Landon candidacy^{was} promulgated by his friends as a "favorite son" movement which would enable the Governor to strengthen himself as a candidate for the Senate in 1938.⁵⁹ Unexpected support from Western and Middle Atlantic States led Landon to believe he could muster from seventy to one hundred delegates at the convention. He developed vice

⁵⁸ Charles R. Michael, "Republican Candidates Lining Up", The New York Times, Section IV, pp. 7, col. 2, July 7, 1935.

⁵⁹ The New York Times, pp. 1, col. 2, January 30, 1936.

presidential ambitions.⁶⁰ Then came July 1, 1935, the end of Kansas's fiscal year. The American press announced that Landon had balanced the Kansas budget. A mild sensation resulted. Former Vice-President Curtis began advocating Landon's candidacy. Hearst became interested. All the Hearst publications backed the "Kansas Coolidge". The unprecedented publicity which was given to Landon made him known to every rank and file Republican. The budget balancing feat appealed to eastern conservatives. He was from the Middle West. Landon was a "natural". While Kansas beamed with local pride, Governor Landon remained taciturn, seemingly busily occupied with the affairs of Kansas.⁶¹

The phenomenal boom of Governor Landon demands analysis. An obscure "favorite-son" candidate in March, 1935, he was the outstanding contender by November and was dominating the field by the end of the year. The clue to his position was a combination of geography, political economy, and publicity.

Geography: Ever since the defeat of the Hoover Administration increasing sentiment in Republican circles

⁶⁰ Charles R. Michael, "Republican Candidates Lining Up", The New York Times, Section IV, pp. 7, col. 2, July 7,

⁶¹ E. Francis Brown, "Landon's Phenomenal Boom", The New York Times, Section IV. pp. 4, col. 4, June 14, 1936.

had been revealed for a Western presidential candidate. Landon's election in 1932 and in 1934 as the only farm-state Republican Governor made him a logical Western choice.⁶²

Political Economy: The Kansas budget as well as that of state subdivisions was balanced in 1935. This record in the light of the federal budget's condition, made Landon a "natural".⁶³

Publicity: Personal attainments are not the major consideration in presidential politics. It is excellent publicity and clever inside management that consolidates the candidate's assets. Landon was a synthetic candidate built up by the press. His inside management was carried out by John D. Hamilton. Hamilton was a Topeka lawyer who made a strong bid for the Republican National Chairmanship in 1934. He was made counsel for the Republican National Committee when the National Chairmanship was given to Henry Fletcher. Hamilton made the eastern contacts which resulted in Landon's obtaining the support of eastern bosses. He had trouble with the Hilles-Roraback clique of the Old Guard because they were aware of the ambitions of Mr. Hamilton. With Landon the titular head of the party,

⁶² Arthur Krock, "In Washington", The New York Times, pp. 18, col. 5, February 5, 1936.

⁶³ Loc. cit.

Hamilton would rule instead of the Old Guard.⁶⁴

To some extent Landon owed his position to geographical location and to his record as Governor of Kansas. John Hamilton and Mr. Hearst were also important factors.⁶⁵

With the ascendancy of Landon, and Borah, Knox, Vandenberg, and Hoover in the background, political scientists could speculate. In thirteen of the twenty conventions held by the Republican party in its eighty years of existence, the presidential nominee had been chosen on the first ballot. In the remaining seven conventions, only twice had the leader been chosen in the early balloting, and these were exceptional men--Blaine in 1884 and Hughes in 1916. Would the story of the five other conventions be repeated in 1936?

On the same day, January 29, 1936, the two outstanding Republican presidential contenders, Governor Landon and Senator Borah, informally announced their candidacies. In his Kansas Day address to the nation over the radio, Governor Landon had little to say about the problems of Kansas. Instead he assailed the waste and politics of the relief administration, although declaring himself for relief. He praised the Supreme Court specifically for its invalidation of the NRA. He demanded a

64 Loc. cit.

65 Loc. cit.

restored balance of the Federal budget, but without economies at the expense of a farmer. In short, Governor Landon offered himself as the sound, mediocre, old-fashioned American executive to a land presumably resentful and alarmed over brain trusts, radicals, and spoilsmen.⁶⁶

The Landon strategy, now that his boom was thoroughly launched, was to keep out of all primaries except those in his own and neighboring states. These he was expected to win easily. Meanwhile private arrangements would be made by the Landon managers to get delegates lightly pledged to others, or uninstructed, to come over to Mr. Landon. Senator Borah forced the abandonment of this strategy. He charged in his addresses that the Old Guard was attempting to give the uninstructed delegations to the candidate who pleased them most. Suppose after a "Blackstone hotel conference" a group of "favorite son" and uninstructed delegates suddenly switched to Landon. Nominee Landon would then be represented as the choice of big business. So Governor Landon's advisers amended their tactics. Instead of entering the Governor in a few sure primaries, they decided to enter him in one or two primaries in each section of the country. Should Landon suffer no damaging defeat at the hands of a weak rival in an important Commonwealth, the Landon managers felt confident that their nominee would be chosen on the convention floor. If Landon

⁶⁶ The New York Times, pp. 1, col. 2, January 30, 1936.

could come to the convention with a strong pledged delegation, he would be in a position to be nominated by growing support on the convention floor. The significant conferences and recesses which had characterized other Republican conventions would be avoided. The association between Landon and the Old Guard would be weakened.⁶⁷

Advance notice of eastern support for the Governor came after a secret conclave of Republican leaders from four eastern states. This conference was composed of several Republican leaders from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts. The leaders decided to send their two hundred and thirty delegates to the convention uninstructed. They would veer to Governor Landon if he entered the convention with commanding power from the West.⁶⁸

One state convention after another expressed a preference for, or instructed its delegates for Landon. A tabulation taken on April 5 showed Landon had sixty-five instructed delegates. By this time one hundred and sixty-five uninstructed delegates had been selected. The state conventions of Oklahoma, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, and New Mexico had instructed their delegations for Landon.⁶⁹ However, Landon had incurred the enmity of Hoover and Borah. Also, the Old Guard controlled most of the unin-

⁶⁷ Arthur Krock, "Washington Notes", The New York Times, pp. 20, col. 5, February 28, 1936.

⁶⁸ The New York Times, pp. 1, col. 1, February 4, 1936.

⁶⁹ Charles R. Michael, "Conventions in the Making", The New York Times, Section IV, pp. 7, April 5, 1936.

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structed delegations which were not definitely secure for the Kansas Governor. Landon was far ahead, but a coalition among the opposition was possible. This would render his nomination precarious.⁷⁰

The Landon boom received a temporary setback with the appointment of the temporary and permanent Chairmen for the convention by the Republican National Committee. The Landon forces promoted Colonel Wayland C. Brooks, Republican nominee for Governor of Illinois, for the temporary chairmanship (Keynoter). Brooks had just won a victory over the Old Guard in the Illinois primary. Landon's chances would be enhanced if his candidate was selected as keynoter. The Old Guard controlled the national committee. They refused to adhere to the wishes of the Landon forces. Senator Steiwer of Oregon was chosen keynoter and Representative Bertrand Snell, Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, from New York, Permanent Chairman.⁷¹

This move was clever in that it united widely diverted sections of the nation and gave divergent degrees of Republican conservatism consideration. Senator Steiwer supported much of the New Deal legislation. Mr. Snell had been a consistent conservative opponent of the Roosevelt Administration.⁷²

⁷⁰ Loc. cit.

⁷¹ Arthur Krock, "Washington Notes", The New York Times, pp. 20, col. 5, April 24, 1936.

⁷² Loc. cit.

Although Governor Landon still occupied a commanding position, several factors still endangered his selection as the nominee. Senator Borah was declaring that Landon represented corporation interests. The Borah, Vandenberg, Hoover, and Knox forces were making overtures concerning a possible coalition against Landon. In the event of such a "Stop Landon" combination, arguments could be easily supplied for eliminating the Kansan. He was inexperienced in national affairs. He remained cloistered in the West never explaining his views upon pressing issues of the day. Landon made just three speeches during the pre-convention campaign. Landon submitted his candidacy to the primaries in only a few instances. This action showed that he intended to win the nomination by capturing the uninstructed delegations of the financial and industrial interests. Furthermore, because of this connection between Landon and the Old Guard, Borah was threatening to bolt the party. An open address by Borah announcing his intentions to bolt if Landon were nominated would seriously have weakened Landon's candidacy.⁷³

Senator Vandenberg was slowly emerging as a serious contender. He had become the Republican leader in the Senate and held that position throughout the 1936 session of Congress. He was to be presented to the convention by the Michigan delegation. Vandenberg carefully avoided

⁷³ Charles R. Michael, "Stop Landon' Forces Make Some Headway", The New York Times, pp. 16, col. 5, May,²⁰ 1936.


antagonizing any candidate. His hopes depended upon the formation of a "Stop Landon" combination strong enough to prevent the Kansan's nomination. Then Vandenberg would be the logical compromise candidate to whom the convention could turn.⁷⁴

With the "Stop Landon" forces still disorganized, Landon continued to garner delegates. With seven hundred and eighty-six delegates selected, four hundred and sixty-eight were uninstructed. Landon had one hundred and thirty-nine endorsed or instructed for him. In the Massachusetts primary, five-sixths of the Republicans who wrote in the name of their candidate in the presidential preference blank voted for Landon. The magnitude of Landon's victory in Massachusetts climaxed his campaign. In the New Jersey primary, Governor Landon defeated Senator Borah by a five-to-one majority. This primary certified what Massachusetts had indicated--that Governor Landon was the choice of eastern Republicans.⁷⁵

Hoover became hostile to Landon because the Hearst-Merriam forces entered a Landon ticket in the California preference primary. Hearst was ardently supporting Landon. Governor Merriam was interested in obtaining national patronage in the event Landon was elected. Hoover had hoped to go to the convention with an uninstructed dele-

⁷⁴ Loc. cit.

⁷⁵ The New York Times, pp. 17, col. 5, May 20, 1936.



gation which would acknowledge his leadership. Instead, he was confronted with seemingly formidable opposition. Offers were given to both Merriam and Hearst to name some members of the uninstructed delegation. Both refused, preferring to defeat the Hoover forces in the primary. Hoover secured the support of the three leading Republican newspapers in California: The Los Angeles Times, The San Francisco Chronicle, and The Oakland Tribune.⁷⁶

In the primary the Landon delegates were defeated by the Hoover uninstructed delegates. However, of the forty-four delegates elected, sixteen were claimed as friendly to Landon and ready to go to his aid on the second ballot unless the "Stop Landon" movement became formidable.⁷⁷

In South Dakota, Landon won an unexpected and close victory over Senator Borah. This state had been regarded as almost certain Borah territory. Its capture gave added impetus to the Landon bandwagon movement. On May 24, Herbert Hoover finally announced to the world that he was not a candidate for re-election. This indicated the inability of the Knox, Vandenberg, Borah, and Hoover forces to come together and form a combination.⁷⁸ A tabulation taken on May 30 showed Landon had one hundred and seventy-nine delegates endorsed or instructed for him.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ George P. West, "California G.O.P. Split In Primary", The New York Times, pp. 11, col. 4, April 12, 1936.

⁷⁷ Arthur Krock, op. cit., pp. 22, May 7, 1936.

⁷⁸ The New York Times, pp. 2, col. 5, June 3, 1936.

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 26, col. 1, May 31, 1936.

In 1928 Herbert Hoover had been the dominating candidate but several opponents had pledged delegations. A few days before the convention convened an announcement by Vare, Pennsylvania boss, that his delegation favored Hoover had resulted in a convention stampede for the Californian.⁸⁰ The Hoover victory of 1928 was analogous to the Landon stampede of 1936. J. Henry Roraback, Connecticut boss, announced that the uninstructed Connecticut delegation would vote for Landon on the first ballot.⁸¹ Other uninstructed delegations from southern and eastern states followed Connecticut in supporting Landon. Texas climbed on the bandwagon on June 4. New York and Pennsylvania wavered. Hilles and Reed had trouble holding their delegations in line while they bargained with the Landon managers.⁸²

A last desperate conference was held by the leaders of Borah's and Knox's candidacies. Would a "Stop Landon" movement finally materialize? If it did not, Landon's nomination was certain. It was rumored that Hoover in his convention speech would present a picture of the candidate which the party should nominate--and it would not resemble Landon.⁸³

⁸⁰ Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, The 1928 Campaign, (New York: R. R. Smith, 1931), pp. 29.

⁸¹ The New York Times, pp. 2, col. 5, June 3, 1936.

⁸² Ibid., pp. 1, col. 6, June 4, 1936.

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 1, col. 6, June 8, 1936.

The Landon forces intensified their efforts to win over the uninstructed delegations before the "Stop Landon" movement crystallized. It was announced that Landon would be nominated on the first ballot. The opposition awaited the arrival of the Senator from Idaho hoping that he would participate in their proposed coalition. He arrived, refused to participate in the "Stop Landon" movement, and--retired for a nap.⁸⁴

Borah had threatened to bolt the convention if Landon were nominated. Why then did he refuse to participate in the coalition to eliminate the Kansas Governor? Governor Landon had sent an influential mediator to assuage the Senator. It was Mr. William Allen White, Borah's old classmate at the University of Kansas. Perhaps Mr. White influenced Borah to refuse to join Knox, Hoover, and Vandenberg in opposing Landon.⁸⁵

No one any more really tries to understand the Senator from Idaho. However, everyone understood this fact. After Borah refused to join the "Stop Landon" combination, the nomination of Landon was secure. The New York Times wanted to be objective and conducted a poll. This poll forecast Landon's probable nomination on the first ballot.⁸⁶

84 Ibid., pp. 1, col. 6, June 8, 1936.

85 Arthur Krock, "Washington Notes", The New York Times, pp. 44, May 20, 1936.

86 Ibid., pp. 15, col. 1, June 9, 1936.

The date each state selected its delegates to the Republican national convention, the method by which the delegates were chosen, the candidate for whom they were instructed, and a few important details about contests are given in the following table:

DATE:	STATE:	METHOD OF SELECTING DELEGATES:	SIZE OF DELEGATION:
May 5	Alabama	Convention	13
	Delegation uninstructed. Slight favor for Landon among one or two delegates.		
May 2	Arkansas	Convention	6
	State convention selected uninstructed delegation. However, it approved an expression of good will towards the candidacy of Governor Landon.		
May 5	California	Primary	44
	Herbert Hoover, with the backing of the State organization and leading newspapers, was able to elect his picked uninstructed delegates. Landon-instructed delegates were entered in the primary by William Randolph Hearst and Governor Merriam. They were badly defeated. Most of the uninstructed delegates elected recognized the leadership of Hoover at the coming convention. The Landon forces claimed sixteen delegates as friendly to Landon and ready to go to his aid in later balloting.		
April 25	Colorado	Convention	12
	State Convention selected uninstructed delegation. Landon sentiment strong.		
May 5	Connecticut	Convention	19
	Uninstructed delegation selected. Landon sentiment so strong that delegation was in danger of getting out of Noraback's control. Vandenberg candidacy also approved by a few delegates.		

The date each state notified its delegates to the
Republican national convention, the state of which the
delegates were chosen, the number of delegates sent,
and a few important details about each state
are given in the following table:

DATE	STATE	DELEGATES
May 2	Alabama	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Arkansas	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	California	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Colorado	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Connecticut	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Delaware	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	District of Columbia	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Florida	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Georgia	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Idaho	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Illinois	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Indiana	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Iowa	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Kansas	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Kentucky	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Louisiana	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Maine	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Maryland	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Massachusetts	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Michigan	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Minnesota	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Mississippi	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Missouri	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Montana	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Nebraska	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Nevada	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	New Hampshire	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	New Jersey	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	New Mexico	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	New York	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	North Carolina	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	North Dakota	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Ohio	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Oklahoma	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Oregon	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Pennsylvania	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Rhode Island	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	South Carolina	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	South Dakota	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Tennessee	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Texas	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Vermont	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Virginia	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Washington	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	West Virginia	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Wisconsin	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.
May 2	Wyoming	Delegates notified on May 2, 1912. Total number of delegates sent, 10.

DATE:	STATE:	METHOD OF SELECTING DELEGATES:	SIZE OF DELEGATION:
April 22	Delaware	Convention	9
	Uninstructed delegation selected but many delegates were favorable to the nomination of Governor Landon.		
April 30	Florida	convention	12
	Uninstructed delegation selected. Unit rule invoked on delegates. Convention recommended that entire delegation consider the candidacy of Governor Alfred Landon. J. L. Replogle of Palm Beach endorsed for Vice-President.		
May 9	Georgia	Convention	14
	Delegates uninstructed for presidential nomination but instructed for nomination of J. L. Replogle of Palm Beach, Florida, for Vice-President.		
May 9	Idaho	Convention	8
	Unit rule invoked. Delegation instructed for Senator Borah.		
April 14	Illinois	Primary and Convention	57
	Colonel Knox had the complete support of the state organization. Senator Borah waged a four day campaign and made only six speeches. Knox defeated Borah in the primary due to his large Chicago vote. However, Borah carried thirteen of the fifteen downstate congressional districts. Although the primary was not binding, it gave Borah a sizeable bloc of votes. His managers claimed twenty-six of the state's delegates. The Republican State Committee meeting on May 22, urged the nomination of Knox and instructed eight delegates at large to vote for the publisher.		
June 3	Indiana	Convention	28
	Despite considerable opposition, the State convention went on record favoring the nomination of Governor Landon and instructed four		

DATE

April 10

April 11

May 1

May 2

April 12

June 1

DATE:	STATE:	METHOD OF SELECTING DELEGATES:	SIZE OF DELEGATION:
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delegates at large to vote for his candidacy. Considerable Knox and Hoover sentiment existed among the delegation. In early balloting the Landon forces could be sure of from ten to twenty votes.

February 28	Iowa	Convention	22
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Delegation uninstructed. A favorite son and dark-horse candidate, Senator Dickinson, had great influence with the delegation.

March 2	Kansas	Convention	18
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State Convention pledged four and district conventions fourteen delegates to Governor Landon until he was nominated or released them.

March 31	Kentucky	Convention	22
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Convention invoked unit rule and instructed delegation for Landon. Four delegates uninstructed by district conventions were exempt from unit rule. Among the uninstructed delegates there existed much sentiment for the candidacy of Colonel Knox.

	Louisiana	Convention	12
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Delegation uninstructed. Sentiment for Landon existed among the delegates.

April 2	Maine	Convention	12
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
Delegation uninstructed but strongly disposed to support Colonel Knox for nomination. Landon could count on the support of a very few delegates.

May 9	Maryland	Convention	16
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Delegation committed to candidacy of Governor Harry W. Nice, favorite son candidate. State leaders were strongly disposed towards Landon.

April 28	Massachusetts	Primary	33
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Uninstructed delegation elected. No presidential contender made any appeal for endorsement other



DATE:	STATE:	METHOD OF SELECTING DELEGATES:	SIZE OF DELEGATION:
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than mild appeal by several Landon-For-President Clubs. The many Landon "write-ins" was unexpected and materially advanced his candidacy in the east. The primary was not binding. It was a victory for Governor Landon.

May 2	Michigan	Convention	38
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Delegation instructed to present the candidacy of Vandenberg to the convention. Not instructed as to voting. Delegation strongly disposed towards Vandenberg candidacy.

April 18	Minnesota	Convention	22
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Delegation uninstructed. Disputed between supporters of Landon, Knox, and Borah. Landon forces claimed at least fourteen delegates while the advocates of Knox's candidacy saw eight delegates favoring his nomination. Borah could claim between four and eight delegates. The Minnesota delegates were the most divided of any state.

	Mississippi	Convention	11
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
Delegation uninstructed, but majority of delegates favored Landon.

April 27	Missouri	Convention	30
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Congressional district conventions selected sixteen delegates instructed for Landon, six delegates which endorsed his candidacy, and four delegates at large for Landon giving him in all twenty-six delegates from Missouri.

May 19	Montana	Convention	8
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State Railroad Commissioner, Leonard C. Young lined up the state for Landon. Although an uninstructed and unpledged delegation was chosen, an unofficial poll of members showed strong sentiment for the Kansas Governor. A few delegates favored Knox or Vandenberg.



DATE:	STATE:	METHOD OF SELECTING DELEGATES:	SIZE OF DELEGATION:
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April 14	Nebraska	Primary	14
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Senator Borah was unopposed in the primary. He won a five-to-one victory over the "write-ins" for Landon and other presidential contenders. The preference result was not mandatory and the delegates remained uncommitted.

May 16	Nevada	Convention	6
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Delegation uninstructed, but strongly disposed towards Landon.

March 10	New Hampshire	Primary	11
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Colonel Knox had long been prominent in New Hampshire politics. Although the Landon forces conducted a campaign, the uninstructed delegates elected were all favorable to Colonel Knox. Landon was the second choice of the delegation.

May 19	New Jersey	Primary	32
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Having the support of the state organization, Landon defeated Borah by about four-to-one. Although the preferential vote was not binding upon the delegates, they favored Landon. He was sure of almost the entire delegation.

March 2	New Mexico	Convention	6
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State Republican convention unanimously endorsed Landon's candidacy for presidential nomination.

April 2	New York	Primary and Convention	90
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Senator Borah opposed the uninstructed delegates of the Old Guard in the primary. The Old Guard delegates defeated the Borah delegates generally by large majorities in every one of the nine congressional districts in which Borah supporters made contests. The control by the Old Guard over party organization was thus strengthened. Although the delegation was nominally uninstructed, surveys taken by party leaders in both up-State and metropolitan dis-

DATE:	STATE:	METHOD OF SELECTING DELEGATES:	SIZE OF DELEGATION:
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tricts showed that sentiment was so strong for Landon that he would probably receive the support of the New York delegation. Although the delegation was almost certain to support Landon's candidacy, it remained uncommitted while the Old Guard bargained with Hamilton.

March 24	North Carolina	Convention	23
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Delegation uninstructed. Judge I. M. Weekins, a favorite son, endorsed for presidential nomination. Delegates strongly disposed to Landon.

May 12	North Dakota	Convention	8
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Delegation uninstructed. Landon sentiment among a majority of delegates.

May 12	Ohio	Primary	52
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In a hotly contested primary, the state organization decisively defeated Senator Borah. Robert A. Taft, a favorite son, received the state organization vote. The Brown-Schorr, Taft forces elected eight delegates at large and thirty-nine district delegates. Senator Borah obtained five delegates. There was much Landon and Knox sentiment among the uninstructed delegates.

March 16	Oklahoma	Convention	21
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
Delegation placed under unit rule and instructed to vote for Governor Landon.

May 15	Oregon	Primary	10
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Senator Borah was unopposed in the primary. The delegation was unbound, but legally committed to use its best efforts in behalf of the candidate under whose name they appeared on the ballot.

April 28	Pennsylvania	Primary	75
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Senator Borah was opposed in the primary by the uninstructed delegates of the state party



DATE:	STATE:	METHOD OF SELECTING DELEGATES:	SIZE OF DELEGATION:
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organization. Many delegates signed affidavits in advance to support the candidate who received the highest number of votes. As a result of Borah's primary record, a caucus of Republican Pennsylvanian delegates assured Borah of eighteen votes in the early balloting. The delegates were for the most part in control of the Old Guard and after the early balloting would vote as the party leaders dictated.

May 20	Rhode Island	Convention	8
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Delegation uninstructed and uncertain.

	South Carolina	Convention	10
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Delegation uninstructed but strongly disposed towards the candidacy of Governor Landon.

May 5	South Dakota	Primary	8
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Landon and Borah waged strong primary contest, Borah was supported by Senator Norbeck but defeated by a very slight vote. This was a surprise and enhanced the candidacy of Landon. Although the primary was not binding and the delegates remained nominally uninstructed, Landon was their choice of the candidates.

May 5	Tennessee	Convention	17
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
Seven Congressional district conventions pledged eleven delegates to Governor Landon. The State Republican Convention endorsed Landon's candidacy and instructed four delegates at large to support him. Only one delegate not instructed for Landon.

May 26	Texas	Convention	25
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State convention selected uninstructed delegation, but delegates were strong for Landon.

May 3	Utah	Convention	8
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Delegation uninstructed. State convention refused to pledge its delegation to Borah. Borah sentiment existed among a few delegates.



DATE:	STATE:	METHOD OF SELECTING DELEGATES:	SIZE OF DELEGATION:
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April 11	Virginia	Convention	17
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Two congressional district conventions pledged four delegates to Landon. The State convention endorsed Landon but selected uninstructed delegation.

May 13	Vermont	Convention	9
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Delegation uninstructed but disposed towards Landon.

May 9	Washington	Convention	16
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Delegation uninstructed. State convention rejected resolution to endorse Landon.

May 12	West Virginia	Primary	16
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Senator Borah was unopposed in primary. However, the state organization which was backing Landon succeeded in electing fifteen of its uninstructed delegates. A victory for Landon.

April 7	Wisconsin	Primary	24
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Senator Borah opposed the party organization in the primary, which was binding. His ticket was loosely put together and picked by political leaders who had in the past acquired much consideration in Republican party councils. The opposing uninstructed delegates were selected at party caucuses and at a conference of the state executive committee. They were defeated in the primary by the Borah forces.

May 15	Wyoming	Convention	6
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Delegation uninstructed. A convention straw vote designed to be advisory to the delegates revealed strong sentiment for Landon. The Landon forces could rely on obtaining most of this delegation in the early balloting.

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CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY

The World War interrupted the attempt of progressives to bring to our economic system a greater measure of social justice. After the War the corporate and financial interests gained ascendancy in the federal government. It was not until the policies of these interests led to the market crash of 1929 and the subsequent depression that the American people rejected them and elected an Administration which promised thoroughgoing social and economic reform.


The Roosevelt Administration proceeded to make an effort to alleviate some of the more glaring evils of modern capitalism. Also policies were soon adopted which brought the nation out of economic chaos into capitalist recovery and prosperity. This is the achievement of the New Deal.

According to Administrator Hopkins, twenty-five million were still on relief in 1936. Those who were employed received wages incommensurate with their needs in a great majority of instances. So despite its efforts, the New Deal had not provided an economy capable of caring for the needs of the American people. It was but

a step in that direction. The great mass of people, however, are pleased and seem to be supporting the President. However, those who benefited most from prosperity, the corporate and financial interests, are strongly opposed to Roosevelt. Every conceivable device was utilized to bring about his defeat in 1936. We have noted the activities of the American Liberty League and the conservative Democratic dissidents. We have seen the ribald tactics of Talmadge who was the willing tool of these interests.

Besides attempting to weaken the President's support within the Democratic party, the leaders of finance and industry sought also to maintain their control of the Republican party. They controlled the party organization in almost all of the eastern and southern states. The delegates selected by these states, we have observed, were picked by the state organization regardless of whether they were selected by the convention or by the primary. It became apparent then that the Republican National Convention would be dominated by the Old Guard, by the party leaders who were the representatives of big business.

The selection of the delegates was as undemocratic a process within the Democratic party as it was within the Republican party. President Roosevelt controlled all




state organizations through patronage. His renomination was certain. It was only in the primaries that any test of his popularity occurred at all. Roosevelt was usually unopposed and in the same primary there was generally a contest between Republican presidential contenders. Under these conditions, Roosevelt almost invariably received a vote greater than the combined vote of the Republican presidential contenders. This indicated that Roosevelt's popularity had not declined and that his reelection was probable.

The Old Guard was the dominating factor in selecting the Republican nominee. The ensuing election was an electoral struggle between the mild liberalism of Roosevelt and the confused conservatism of the candidate selected by the Republican party.

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
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REPORT

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The report of the Secretary of the Department, dated January 1, 1901, contains a full and complete statement of the work done during the year 1900, and of the progress of the work during the year 1901.

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
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
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
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
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