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Foreword: Out From Under the Shadow of the Federal Constitution: An Overlooked American Constitutionalism

Christian G. Fritz*

Introduction

Most scholars of constitutional law and history equate American constitutionalism with the Federal constitution. This spotlight on the Federal constitution rests on a series of modern assumptions that elevate the status of the Federal constitution over the rich history of state constitutions, and inevitably neglect the central constitutional tenet of the American Revolution—the sovereignty of the people. Viewing American constitutionalism from the perspective of the constitutional legacy of the Revolution suggests a modified paradigm in which state constitutions play a critical role in our understanding the full meaning of American constitutionalism. The American Revolution established that henceforth, in America, governments rested on the sovereignty of the people. All American patriots accepted the fact that the foundational source of governmental power derived from the collective sovereignty of the people. Consensus on this principle, however, did not produce a consensus on what that principle meant or how the principle might be employed. At times, Post-Revolutionary Americans emphasized an actual, active, and ongoing role for the people while at other times the collective sovereign was depicted in more theoretical, passive, and residual terms. In short, all could agree on the sovereignty of the people, but just what that principle meant eluded a shared understanding.1

A broader conception of American “constitutionalism” requires coming to terms with the constitutional legacy of the Revolution—the sovereignty of the people—and allows for a full exploration of the varied experiences of all of America’s written constitutions. The challenges presented by the concept of a collective sovereign during the early years of the American republic were more profound than most commentators have acknowledged. There was, of course, the basic question of identity: who were the people? and how did one recognize when they had spoken authoritatively? The idea of a collective sovereign introduced a tension and implicit challenge to one of the most sacrosanct constitutional values that we take for granted today—the rule of law as written and enforced by elected officials. The acknowledgment of

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2 While American revolutionaries spoke with one voice in affirming the sovereignty of the people, they lacked a singular voice about who counted as “the people.” Initially, “the people” excluded women, those lacking property, Native Americans, and African Americans—even as the Revolution stimulated challenges to such exclusion. The inherently dynamic process of an expanding definition of “the people”—clearly implicating the issue of slavery—forms part of the broader and important story of how American political life became more democratic. See Gordon S. Woods, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (1991); Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America (2005).
sovereignty linked to the authority of the people opened up the possibility that the collective sovereign might be expressed without such constraints. The claims for a broader popular authority—reflected in the slogan of 
*vox populi, vox dei* (the voice of the people is the voice of God) and its corollary commitment to the rule of raw majoritarianism would today be rejected out of hand as inconsistent with our notion of codified proceduralism as one of the cornerstones of the modern notion of the rule of law. Such a perspective was hardly so clear, unequivocal, and uncontested during the early years of our Republic. Initially, the powerful constitutional idea and vocabulary of a collective sovereign as often expressed in the Post-Revolutionary period could (and did) push and pull people in various ways and produced a far more complicated calculus than we are willing to entertain today. Nonetheless, the historical experience with written constitutions in America suggests that the rule of law, as written and administered by representatives of the people, was not so inevitable to all Americans of earlier generations, particularly among those willing to extend the logic of the sovereignty of the people to its fullest extent.

This article starts by describing the conventional paradigm of American constitutionalism—focused on the creation and interpretation of the Federal constitution. That view, however, fails to consider the rich American experience with the formulation and revision of state constitutions, while elevating the Federal constitution as the ultimate American model. The article then suggests why a more complete paradigm that fully integrates state constitution-making facilitates our understanding of the meaning of the early struggle of the American people to exercise their constitutionally based “sovereign” power to govern themselves, in all of its shapes and forms. That understanding is important as we continue to grapple with the legitimacy of invoking the direct and affirmative exercise of that sovereignty in the context of modern political life.

I. The Conventional Paradigm of American Constitutionalism

The study of American constitutional history has long been dominated by the study of the Framers of the Federal constitution, the document they produced, and its subsequent interpretation. Those interested in the political theory of American constitutional government routinely limit themselves to the ideas of the Framers and the debates surrounding the ratification

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of the Federal constitution. Indeed, the study of The Federalist Papers has become a cottage industry, a major sub-field of American constitutional thought. Thus, for most scholars, political thinking about the Federal constitution remains the basic, if not exclusive, source for understanding “American” constitutionalism.

Imbedded in the conventional paradigm is the widely accepted belief that American constitutionalism experienced a crucial transition of ideas between Independence and the framing of the Federal constitution, best exemplified in Gordon Wood’s extremely influential book The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787. Wood believes that although Americans toyed with different ideas after the Revolution, the Federal constitution of 1787 represented a new “science of politics”—a matured understanding of how to create popularly-based governments through constitutional conventions and popular ratification that had garnered a consensus among Americans about constitutions and their formation. In fairness to Wood, his work focused on the period 1776 to 1787. Although the Federal constitution formed the endpoint for his study, Wood implied that American thinking about written constitutions by the late 1780s was fully formed. Scholars examining periods after the formation of the Federal constitution

4 See e.g., CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 1988); MICHAEL A GILLESPIE & MICHAEL LEINESCH, RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION (1989); DAVID A. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1989); JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2003), 5 (“Any account of American constitutionalism, after all, must explain what it is about the Constitution that raises it above ordinary politics”) See also, Alison L. Lacroix, The Authority for Federalism: Madison’s Negative and the Origins of Federal Ideology, 28 LAW & Hist. Rev. 451, 452 (2010) (noting the scholarly tendency to regard the Federal Convention as “a sui generis moment of genius that set the terms of debate but that resists efforts to place it in a broader temporal context extending before, as well as after, 1787.”)


6 A good example is DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888 (1985). Even when constitutional law scholars have criticized the emphasis given to the role of the courts in the constitutional system, the focus invariably remains on the Federal constitution. See e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993). The leading textbooks on constitutional law also reflect that focus. See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Kathleen M. Sullivan ed., 16 ed. 2007); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 2ed. 1991); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed., 1988).


routinely extrapolate from Wood’s study and assume the prevailing influence in these later periods of the ideas Wood attributes to the 1780s.

The overwhelming majority of the modern literature analyzing American constitutionalism, whether by historians, political scientists, or legal scholars, accepts the Wood paradigm, despite the fact that later constitutional disputes and debates in state constitutional conventions before the Civil War (which Wood’s study did not examine) demonstrate that the federal model of 1787 did not hold sway in later periods.9

Few authors challenge that the Federal constitution marked the endpoint of constitutional ideas from 1776 to 1787 or that the Federal constitution reflected the “matured” understanding of Americans at the Founding about the nature of written constitutions.10 Consequently, it is hardly surprising that federal and state courts routinely embrace The Creation of the American Republic as reflecting the proper viewpoint of American constitutionalism.11 Even so, a distinct and rich state constitutional tradition resting on the authority of the people always existed, and has continued to develop throughout our history. Thus, any attempt to describe American constitutionalism must also include the rich and varied experiences of the creation and amendment of state constitutions.

Nonetheless, the prevailing sense remains that events at the state level are of little significance for understanding American constitutionalism, and there are three circumstances that reinforce that general viewpoint: first, is the natural pre-eminence of the Federal constitution, in the wake of the historical growth of federal power, and the expansion of federal constitutional rights; second, is the denigration of the importance of the first post-revolutionary state constitutions; and third, is the failure to appreciate that the different shape and content of modern state constitutions does not detract from the importance of the traditions that have developed in their formation and amendment. A fair evaluation of each frees us from the exclusive focus on the Federal constitution and opens a path to a more complete understanding

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9 Fritz, American Sovereigns.


11 For federal court citations, see Fritz, Fallacies of American Constitutionalism, 1327 at 1330n6.
of American constitutionalism, which includes, as it must, the rich tradition found in the history of state constitutions and the struggle over the role of the people as the collective sovereign.

A. The Pre-eminence of the Federal Constitution

During its first seventy-five years of existence, the national government created under the Federal constitution played a relatively small role in the lives of most Americans. Until the Civil War (and even after), state and local governments created and operating under state constitutions had a far larger role in the lives of their citizens. The historian Phillip Paludan has summarized the pre-Civil War situation as follows,

The national government did not tax the public at large. It had no powers in matters of health, education, welfare, morals, sanitation, safety, or local transportation. In short, practically every activity that affected the lives of Americans was the province of either state or local government—and more often than not it was local. As summarized by the legal historian Lawrence Friedman, “during most of American history, economic and social development—not to mention conflict and dispute—centered on the states.” In contrast, “little was expected of the national government” during the nineteenth century.

After the Civil War, and more particularly during the course of the twentieth century, the development of federal power under the federal constitution, coupled with the growth of federal judicial review and the expansion of the federal bill of rights as a primary protector of individuals from the unwarranted actions of state government, has led to an historical focus on federal rather than state constitutional matters. As the historian Richard Beeman has noted:

Within the historical community in general there has been an understandable inclination to go where the action is, and the steady growth of federal power has quite naturally led

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12 As Don Fehrenbacher has put it, nineteenth-century state constitution-making “is completely terra incognita for most Americans in spite of the fact that until well after the Civil War, state governments had considerably more influence than the federal government on social institutions, economic enterprise, and the quality of American life.” See DON E. FEHRENBACKER, CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE SLAVEHOLDING SOUTH (1989), 2.

13 Phillip Shaw Paludan, The American Civil War Considered as a Crisis in Law and Order, 77 AM. HIST. REV. 1013 at 1021 (1972).

14 Lawrence M. Friedman, State Constitutions in Historical Perspective 496 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1988), 33, 34 (noting that for a considerable time Washington, D.C. was “not the nerve center of the nation, but more like a dinosaur’s tiny mind, a clump of nerves in a vast, decentralized body”).

historians to conclude that most of the action has been occurring within the various branches of the federal government.\textsuperscript{16}

Given the over-arching and pervasive presence of the national government in the lives of Americans today, it is understandable that the constitution under whose authority that government has expanded would garner the most attention, with the result that the Federal constitution has become the symbol of American constitutionalism.\textsuperscript{17} The perceived primacy of the Federal constitution in the lives of modern Americans, however, does not justify the widespread neglect of the history of state constitution-making as part of the tradition of American constitutionalism.

B. Historical Reputation of the First State Constitutions

Most modern observers question the constitutional legitimacy of the earliest American constitutions that emerged without special conventions followed by ratification. Historians, political scientists, and legal scholars largely agree that state constitution-makers in the early revolutionary period failed to distinguish fundamental from ordinary law because they did not use procedures later associated with the creation of constitutions.\textsuperscript{18} According to this view, Americans during the Revolutionary period either experienced “confusion” about creating fundamental law or “unfamiliarity with constitution-making.”\textsuperscript{19} The political scientist Donald Lutz asserts that “the distinction between normal legislation and extraordinary political acts such as the design and approval of constitutions was only partial in 1776.”\textsuperscript{20} The historian Jack Rakove considers the early state constitutions “not truly constitutional at all,”\textsuperscript{21} because they

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\item For how the Federal constitution predominates in the popular iconography of American constitutionalism, see Michael Kammen, \textit{A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture} (1986).
\item See, e.g., Willi Paul Adams, \textit{The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era} 64, 69, 72, 75 (1980); Peter S. Onuf, \textit{State-Making in Revolutionary America: Independent Vermont as a Case Study}, 67 J. Am. Hist 797, 813 (1981); Forrest McDonald, \textit{States’ Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio}, 1776-1876, at 8 (2000); Akhil Reed Amar, \textit{America’s Constitution: A Biography} 287 (2005) (suggesting “a strong argument could be made” that the first state constitutions “were little more than fancy statutes”).
\item Donald S. Lutz, \textit{The Origins of American Constitutionalism} 99 (1988). Because the first state constitutions were not “written by specially elected conventions and ratified by the people,” Lutz rejected the view that Americans appreciated fundamental law from the start of the Revolution. See Lutz, \textit{Popular Consent and Popular Control} 64. See also Orth, \textit{‘Fundamental Principles’ in North Carolina Constitutional History} 1357, 1358 (asserting the distinction between ordinary and fundamental law “not yet clearly marked” by 1776); Russell L. Caplan, \textit{Constitutional Brinkmanship: Amending the Constitution by National Convention} 13 (1988) (describing most state constitutions as ordinary legislation).
\item Jack N. Rakove, \textit{The Super-Legality of the Constitution, or, a Federalist Critique of Bruce Ackerman’s Neo-Federalism}, 108 Yale L.J. 1944 (1999).
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“rested on no authority greater than ordinary acts of legislation.” Early state constitution-makers were engaged in “a hasty experiment” at a time when they had not yet “fully learned to regard a written constitution as supreme fundamental law.” Thus, the first state constitutions lacked constitutional legitimacy because “a true constitution required its formation by a body appointed for that purpose alone, and then ratified by the people.”

To the extent early state constitution-making departed from the expected procedural steps embodied in the federal model, those first state constitutions invite denigration that is wholly unjustified. Although some Americans at the time called for constitutional conventions and others for popular ratification, most of America’s first constitutions were drafted under exigent circumstances by revolutionary conventions without ratification. The revolutionary conventions made executive, legislative, and even judicial decisions and drafted the constitution for the revolutionary government. The consent of the people supporting the revolutionary cause gave these conventions their authority, including the power to promulgate constitutions. Only after these constitutions established governments for the new states would formal legislative branches emerge.

Early American constitution-makers knew what made a constitution legitimate. Many traced their new constitutions’ legitimacy to special elections that preceded the conventions. The people elected these conventions with knowledge that one thing the convention could do was write the constitution. A legitimate constitution depended on whether the sovereign people authorized it, not whether a particular procedure was used or whether revolutionary conventions were free of other responsibilities, such as passing ordinary legislation. It was the people as the collective sovereign who authorized drafting those first constitutions that gave them their legitimacy, not whether they used procedures that matched what was later understood to be necessary to create fundamental law.

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24 Jack N. Rakove, Thinking Like a Constitution, 24 J. Early Am. Republic 1, 13 (2004). These assessments, based on the lack of the convention/ratification model in the early state constitutions, fail to acknowledge that the early state constitutional methodologies persisted long after the so-called federal “model” of 1787. Thus, the assumptions underlying the canonical story of constitutional developments from 1776 to 1787 have encouraged a presentism that assumes a (nonexistent) straight and inexorable line between the ideas of the Federal Founding and our ideas of constitutionalism today.

25 Fritz, American Sovereigns 33.

26 Even some who question the legitimacy of the early state constitutions acknowledge that the provincial congresses enacting them “were not altogether unaware of the special character of these ‘laws.’” Adams, The First American Constitutions 64.

The revolutionaries focused on substance, not form, in drafting constitutions. All but two of the eleven first state constitutions emerged from revolutionary conventions after representatives to those bodies were specially elected for that purpose or elected with the common understanding that they would create a constitution for the state. The two states that did not hold elections before their legislatures promulgated their initial constitutions were South Carolina and Virginia. Even without such elections, people in those states assumed that by electing representatives in favor of independence they were also authorizing the creation of a constitution, albeit a temporary one. Indeed, Americans widely accepted the people as the source of constitutions even if they disagreed about the process of constitution-making.28

Today the idea that we know the will of the sovereign primarily through the use of specific formal procedures—such as elections and constitutional amendment—seems self-evident. For the revolutionary generation this was not immediately apparent. The recent experience of their successful revolution clearly taught them that proceduralism was not the only way to recognize when the sovereign had spoken. Often during the Revolution there was no way that traditionally accepted procedures could lend legitimacy to their struggle. Proceduralism provided one way, but not the only way, to confirm that the people had expressed their will. But with military victory, applying the principle of the collective sovereign’s ability to act directly, without the aid of procedural verification, became a growing source of dispute for America’s leaders, and between those leaders and some of their constituents.

One instance of the supple utility of the authority of the people to overcome supposedly mandatory procedures came with the revision of Pennsylvania’s 1776 Constitution. Critics of that constitution were stymied in their efforts for constitutional change. They had been unable to muster the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds vote by a Council of Censors that only met every seven years to consider whether or not to hold a new constitutional convention. By 1790 those critics controlled the legislature and they bypassed the 1776 constitution’s requirements for constitutional change by initiating a convention themselves. They argued that “the people” as the sovereign could replace the existing constitution without following its procedures, and called for elections of delegates to a constitutional convention that created a new constitution for the state.29 This was precisely the same tactic that had been used to replace the Articles of Confederation with the Federal constitution.30

during the initial period of constitution-making and invariably arose as an afterthought. Fritz, American Sovereigns, 35.

28 Fritz, American Sovereigns, 31-35.


30 Fritz, American Sovereigns, 138-41.
It is important to appreciate that for Americans of earlier generations the issue of constitutional revision and change was not so clear or simple as it is often depicted today. Americans living before the Civil War acknowledged the role and utilization of procedure and process in the course of framing or changing constitutions. Importantly however, Americans engaged in constitution-making before the Civil War did not assume that using such procedures was the *exclusive means* through which constitutional change could be accomplished by invoking the sovereign authority of the people.

Thus, the lack of a uniform convention/ratification system for state constitutional creation in the early days of the republic is not grounds for ignoring the rich traditions developed in early state constitution-making, rooted in the sovereignty of the people. Any complete description of American constitutionalism must take into account the force of those early successful efforts at a constitutional order founded on the authority of a collective sovereign.

C. Modern Reputation of State Constitutions

The Federal constitution exhibits two key characteristics: brevity and permanence. In contrast, what characterizes most state constitutions today is the amount of detail (often referred to as “constitutional legislation”) coupled with an ease and frequency of amendment. The length and detail of many of state constitutions is often contrasted unfavorably with the much shorter Federal constitution,\(^{31}\) supposedly free of such constitutional legislation.\(^{32}\) The existence of constitutional legislation strikes the modern constitutional commentator as incongruous in a document considered to be fundamental law and whose rightful character is presumed to be concerned with more general principles and broad outlines for governmental operation.\(^{33}\) The legal historian Willard Hurst, writing in 1950, anticipated scholars of today when he asserted that an ideal constitution only contained “fundamentals” and that constitutional legislation

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31 Critics point to provisions like the those that forfeit legislative office for accepting a railroad pass, *see, e.g.*, New Mexico 1912 Constitution, Art. IV, sec 37 *reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS* 104 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979); without considering the value of such passes, and the contemporary purpose of such provisions to prevent railroads from corrupting the legislative process. *See also* Oklahoma 1907 Constitution, Art. XX, sec 2 *reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS* 159 (providing that the “flash test” for “all kerosene oil for illuminating purposes shall be 115 degrees Fahrenheit.”

32 G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 10 (1998) (noting that the typical state constitutions is over three times the length of the Federal constitution). While the Federal constitution contains less legislative matter than do many state constitutions, it is hardly free of constitutional legislation, including its provisions protecting slavery. See, e.g. Art. I sec 8 (“Congress shall have power...To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures; To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States”), Art. I sec 9 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.”).

33 WILLIAMS, LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 24 (identifying “the view that a state constitution should legitimately limit itself to provisions structuring and allocating governmental powers and limiting those powers to protect the people”).
undermined the “dignity” of state constitutions.34 The legal scholar A.E. Dick Howard also captured this view when he observed:

Whatever the reasons for the great length and detail of the typical state constitution, commentators speak with one voice when they submit that such detail is simply not compatible with the traditional assumption that a constitution is properly the repository of the fundamental ordering principles of society, and that all else should be left to the statute books.35

The second perceived praiseworthy characteristic of the Federal constitution—its permanence—has also helped to undermine the reputation of state constitutions as fundamental law because of their ease and frequency of revision. John Vile, a political scientist and a leading scholar of the Federal constitution’s revision process, has commented favorably on the adoption by the Federal Framers of a constitutional revision process, operating in “vivid contrast” to the states’ experience with more frequent constitutional changes.36 His assumption that infrequent constitutional change best accords with the nature of constitutionalism is shared by many other scholars who believe that the frequent change of state constitutions “denigrates” them and signifies a constitution’s ill health.37 Indeed, more than a few scholars have questioned whether today’s state constitutions—given their detail and frequent amendment—even deserve the name “constitutions.”38

A normative argument can certainly be made for avoiding frequent and continual constitutional changes, but one cannot ignore the counter view that ease of revision serves


38 See, e.g. James A. Gardner, What is a State Constitution? 24 Rutgers Law J. 1025, 1025-1026 (2003) (asserting that state constitution “are not ‘constitutions’ as we understand the term”).

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important purposes at the state level and is premised on a foundational principle of American constitutionalism—the right of the people to alter their governments at will. Ultimately, Americans developed competing views over the ease of amending constitutions, while agreeing that their constitutions would continue to improve.\(^39\)

The critics of ease in amendment fail to appreciate the manner in which state constitution-making served as a vibrant and shifting arena for crucial constitutional conversations of an engaged citizenry. The key to understanding the growing length of nineteenth and early twentieth-century constitutions lies in their framers’ understanding that one of the principal purposes of the constitutions they were drafting was to impose limits—substantive as well as procedural—on the powers of state legislatures. Although post-eighteenth century state constitution-makers debated the value of adopting so-called constitutional legislation, ultimately convention delegates defended the need and propriety of placing such material in the fundamental law of the states when necessary to constrain state or private institutional power. Restraining corporations and limiting governmental debt provided the most dramatic nineteenth century expression of the need for constitution-based constraints. In the case of controlling corporate power, including railroads, conventions asserted that legislatures were institutionally incapable of responding. Moreover, many delegates regarded the control of corporations and debt as matters on which the people had given conventions a mandate to act.\(^40\)

For many state constitutional delegates, the constitutional control of particular legislative matters was less a departure from authentic constitution-making than the need to address challenges and problems unknown to the eighteenth century Federal Framers. The reputation of James Madison and his contemporaries hardly intimidated subsequent state constitutional delegates. They felt perfectly adequate to the task of constitution-making because the nature of the enterprise had substantially changed since the “early days of the republic” when “government


On the idea of improvements in constitution-making, see for example, John Marshall to Arthur Lee, April 17, 1784, in 1 The Papers of John Marshall 120 (Herbert A. Johnson et al., eds., 1974) (expressing the view that new constitution making might now proceed with “more experience & less prejudice” than that which marked America’s first written constitutions); William Peden, ed., Notes on the State of Virginia 118 (1955) (Thomas Jefferson describing Virginia’s 1776 constitution in 1785 as being formed “when we were new and unexperienced in the science of government”); James Madison to Caleb Wallace, August 23, 1785, in 8 The Papers of James Madison 355 (William T. Hutchinson et al., eds., 1973) (advising potential Kentucky constitution-makers to preserve the means of future revision because they inevitably lacked “the same lights for framing a good establishment now” as they would “have 15 or 20 Years hence”).

was yet but an experiment.” 41 Thus, contrary to the hero worship frequently encountered in today’s perception of the Federal Framers, nineteenth century convention delegates perceived their work as part of a progressive science of constitution-making, as they confronted more difficult and sophisticated issues of economic and commercial regulation than those faced by the country’s first constitution-makers.42 And in so doing, they built upon and enriched the tradition of American Constitutionalism—a value that must be recognized and appreciated as an important part of that tradition.

II. A More Complete Paradigm of American Constitutionalism

A. The Often-Ignored Early Tradition

After the Revolution, Americans were committed to the principle that all the constitutions they drafted to establish their new governments had to rest on the concept of a sovereign source linked to the people. In the course of drafting state constitutions, identifying the sovereign was relatively straightforward: the people of each state formed the collective sovereign behind each state constitution. In the case of the Federal constitution drafted in 1787, identifying its sovereign source proved to be a more challenging question. That constitution divided governmental power between the national and state governments and that division created a puzzle in identifying the sovereign of the Federal constitution. The Federal constitution initially invited two different views of the collective sovereign that underlay that constitution—either the people of the discrete states acting collectively, or one undifferentiated national American people. Ultimately three iterations of that sovereign source were advanced before the Civil War—the national people, the people in the states collectively, or the states themselves. Despite the different possibilities, the key point is that in both the federal and state context the central question remained how to identify the sovereign that underlay the written constitution.

Most importantly, there were many more instances of struggles over the legitimating authority of the collective sovereign at the state level both before and after the Federal constitution than were ever raised with respect to the Federal constitution. Indeed, the very attribute that is used to discredit state constitutions (their frequent revision) made it more likely that such questions of constitutionalism would arise in the state context. Thus, the study of state constitutions provides substantially greater opportunities to explore how Americans have struggled over the constitutional authority of “the people.”

41 Andrew J. Marsh, Official Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the Constitutional Convention of the State of Nevada 564 (1864). See also 1 Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of California 203 (1880-1881) (from the perspective of a delegate to California’s 1878 convention precedents drawn from Virginia’s 1829 convention “no more serve to illustrate the present machinery of constitutional conventions than the lumbering old family coaches they used to ride to the capitol in, are like the railroad cars and steamers in which the same journeys are now performed”).

After declaring independence, Americans saw themselves as revolutionaries, but not as rebels. They maintained this distinction because they had exercised a people’s collective right to cast off an abusive king—George III. But in rejecting the king, Americans had no ready replacement with a traditional claim on their loyalty. Few American revolutionaries worried about this. In creating governments to replace those established under the authority of the king, Americans saw themselves as the sovereign, giving rise to a distinctive constitutionalism in America that would prove extraordinarily powerful and difficult to control.

America’s theory of government did not break novel intellectual ground. The idea of basing government on the people’s authority and consent had clear seventeenth and eighteenth century roots—extending as far back as the Glorious Revolution. Even before Independence, some supporters of the American cause in Britain saw the colonists’ struggle as vindicating “the rights of sovereignty…in the people themselves.” Thus, American revolutionaries did not discover the people’s sovereignty. Rather, they inherited that idea and put it to powerful use. Actually building governments on that foundation, however, was new to world history. As a South Carolina pamphleteer observed, Americans could fashion their own governments because they had freed themselves from “the control of hereditary rulers and arbitrary force.” It made America’s revolution, John Adams noted in 1776, “the most compleat, unexpected, and remarkable of any in the History of Nations.” Their chief innovation and enduring constitutional legacy came from actually involving the people in forming and re-forming new governments. Yet, the profound question remained how much power would they permit themselves to exert.

43 On the English origins of the sovereignty of the people and consent as the basis of government, see John Phillip Reid, 3 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 97-101, 107-10 (1991).


48 On the theoretical role of “the people” under English constitutionalism, see Reid, 3 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 109 (describing the people’s sovereignty as “mere theory”). For the American constitutional contribution, see R.R. Palmer, The People as Constituent Power in THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN THE
The British constitution was a product of tradition and history and was not enacted, but simply existed. The written American constitutions were the express and unilateral orders of the new American sovereign—the people. The written nature of American constitutions was a crucial characteristic of the process of establishing governments, making state constitutional revisions a valuable window into the minds of American sovereigns.49

Written state constitutions adopted in the 1770s reflected Americans’ belief that they could, as Thomas Paine explained in Common Sense, exercise their “power to begin the world over again.”50 A congressional delegate from Connecticut, Oliver Wolcott, described America’s constitution-making in 1776 as a “Real” and not a theoretical expression of the people's will.51 In a Fourth of July oration in 1778, historian David Ramsay captured the challenge of America's constitutions: “We are the first people in the world who have had it in their power to choose their own form of government.”52

Defining “constitutionalism” to include the underlying source of legitimacy on which written constitutions rest in America directs our attention to the constitutional legacy of the American Revolution. That legacy, of course, entailed the recognition of sovereignty of the people not only as the justification for independence, but as the indispensable basis for the new American governments created in the wake of the Revolution. The written constitutions that created those governments—both at the state and ultimately at the national level—rest on the idea of a collective sovereign—the American people.53

49 See Wayne Franklin, The U.S. Constitution and the Textuality of American Culture in Writing a National Identity: Political, Economic, and Cultural Perspectives on The Written Constitution 10 (Vivien Hart & Shannon C. Stimson, eds., 1993) (asserting that Americans had “virtually no practical experience” in drafting written constitutions before 1776); JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER: A SOURCE BOOK OF EARLY AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 4 (1991), 4 (describing “the connection between the American constitutions' written nature, their supreme legal authority, and their capacity to render definite and fixed the forms and limits of governmental power”). For earlier experience with constitutional texts, see LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, 23-49.


51 Oliver Wolcott to Samuel Lyman, May 16, 1776 in 1 LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 449 (8 vols., Edmund C. Burnett, ed., 1921-1936)


53 The displacement of the sovereignty in the person of the king with the collective sovereign—the people—was most dramatically symbolized when a crowd of American patriots and soldiers pulled down the statue of George III in Battery Park in New York City after the Declaration of Independence was publicly read at the direction of the Continental Congress. For the toppling of the statue, see Charles D. Desbler, How the Declaration Was Received in the Old Thirteen, 85 HARPER’S NEW MONTHLY MAGAZINE 172 (1892); Arthur S. Marks, The Statue of King George
The authority of the people as the justification for the new governments created in the wake of the Revolution was universally shared and accepted by American patriots. Much more problematic and difficult was grappling with the implications of a collective sovereign, including identifying who “the people” were, what they could do and when one knew when “the people” had acted or “spoken.” These questions were enormously important, and the answers led to some ambiguity, but included powerful ideas of great consequence.

The ambiguity surfaced repeatedly in the course of the struggle to control the meaning of the collective sovereign within American constitutionalism because “the people” potentially played overlapping roles under a written constitution. First, the people acted as the empowering sovereign, when they created, amended, revised, or even abolished the constitution. As the collective sovereign, however, the people were not limited in revising their constitution through constitutional revision procedures. As the sovereign, they were ultimately free to use and invoke their authority as they saw fit.

In creating the new American constitutions, the people also created a structure for a republican form of government. Because government was subordinate to the people and representatives were the people’s agents, the people might act in a second more focused capacity as “the ruler” to monitor the constitutional order established under their authority. One way they did this—but not the only way—was through the electoral process in which they selected legislative representatives and state executives. These elections were not acts by a “sovereign.” They were simply choices by “the ruler” to designate agents to run the government, much the way a sovereign king might select ministers. As electors, they could refuse to continue those agents of government in office for any reason.

American constitutions also accommodated a role for the people as “the ruled.” In this third capacity the people—as individuals or in groups—had rights granted by the constitution to express their views on the policy and conduct of the government or even on the constitutionality of government actions. In so acting they did not act with the authority of the collective sovereign. When the people petitioned government or assembled to express their views they were simply engaged in a political role anticipated for the people in governments framed by constitutional authority. After the fact, it is possible to identify how the idea of a collective sovereign lent itself to these varying understandings of the role of “the people.” At the time, however, eighteenth-century Americans were rarely explicit about these multiple roles.

Differentiating among the people acting as the collective sovereign, as “the rulers” or as “the ruled” was not easy because the distinctions were subtle. Thus, it should not be surprising that Americans before the Civil War struggled mightily to come to terms with the constitutionalism launched by the Declaration of Independence. Ideas of a collective sovereign were expounded and acted upon in the course of winning the Revolution, but the different roles the people might play as a consequence of accepting the concept of a collective sovereign were not a figment of the revolutionary imagination. The belief that the people collectively ruled could

be sustained despite the knowledge that “government is always something other than the actual people who are governed by it, that governors and governed cannot be in fact identical.”

Americans believed that the people were simultaneously the sovereign and the ruled during constitution-making of the revolutionary-era. This raised the question of whether the people, as the newly recognized sovereign in America, could ever “oppress” itself, justifying the right of revolution that Americans had exercised in 1776. As expressed in the Declaration of Independence, natural law taught that the people were “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights” and could alter or abolish government “destructive” of those rights. For Thomas Jefferson the Declaration was the last-ditch effort of an oppressed people—the position many Americans saw themselves in 1776. Jefferson’s litany of colonial grievances showed that Americans met their burden to exercise the natural law right of revolution. Invoking the right of revolution in the wake of declaring Independence implicitly assumed the existence of two parties to the contract, one of whose breach warranted Independence. But as America’s new constitutions merged the ruler and ruled into one, they created anomalies in how and whether the right of revolution might apply in post-revolutionary America.

The constitutional logic of recognizing the people as the sovereign may have suggested that the right of revolution no longer applied in America. This did not develop instantly or uniformly after the establishment of American governments. Some of the first state constitutions included “alter or abolish” provisions that mirrored the traditional right of revolution. For example, Maryland’s 1776 bill of rights acknowledged that “whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual,” the people could “reform the old, or establish a new government.”

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55 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). Both natural law and English constitutional doctrine provided a basis for the colonists to exercise a right to revolt against a monarch’s oppression. See FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS, 13-14.

56 Maryland 1776 Constitution, Bill of Rights, Sec. 4, Nov. 3, 1776 in THE DECISIVE BLOW IS STRUCK: A FACSIMILE EDITION OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1776 AND THE FIRST MARYLAND CONSTITUTION (Edward C. Papenfuse & Gregory A Stiverson, eds., 1977). Even state constitutions like Maryland’s—that resembled a traditional right of revolution harking back to the natural law precondition of oppression—were not necessarily interpreted after the Revolution as limiting their use. In 1787, Maryland’s legislators debated whether that state’s 1776 “alter or abolish” provision could only be used by the people if they were oppressed. Some Maryland legislators agreed that the people could resist their governors if those officials subverted the purposes of government as declared in the constitution. Yet this extreme situation was not an indispensable precondition. The Revolution, noted one legislator, William Paca, established that government’s “power is derived from the people…to be exercised for their welfare and happiness.” As “the judges” of when they think “it is not so employed,” the people could “announce it by memorials, remonstrances, or instructions.” Government officials risked being voted out of office if they ignored such efforts “or if the magnitude of the case requires it” the people could resume “the powers of government.” Thus, in one breath, Paca canvassed the possibilities of the people acting as “the ruled” by exerting political pressure, “the ruler” by exercising their electoral power, and the collective sovereign if they reclaimed their ultimate sovereignty. William Paca to Alexander Contee Hanson, May 10, 1787 in REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND THE REVOLUTION: THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OF 1787 at 117 (Melvin Yazawa, ed., 1975).
Other state constitutions adopted different versions of this right to “alter or abolish” that did not sound like the traditional right of revolution. For example, Virginia’s 1776 constitution spoke only of the people’s right to change government “inadequate” or “contrary” to its rightful purposes while Pennsylvania’s 1776 constitution spoke of the people being able to “alter, or abolish” government in any manner “judged most conducive” to the public welfare.57

Increasingly, however, as Americans included it in their state constitutions, the right of revolution came to be seen as a constitutional principle permitting the people as sovereign to control government and revise their constitutions without limit. In this way the right broke loose from its traditional moorings of resistance to oppression. The alter or abolish provisions could now be read with a different meaning so that it was consistent with the constitutional principle that in America, the sovereign was the people.58

Significantly, while such an “alter or abolish” provision failed to make its way into the Federal constitution, Federalists—and most prominently James Madison—clearly identified the source of authority of their handiwork and drafting of a constitution as resting on the sovereignty of the people. Madison repeatedly argued that the Federal constitution drafted in Philadelphia would only come to life with the “breath” of the sovereign people.59 Moreover, he made it clear that whatever irregularities there might have been in altering America’s first Federal constitution—the Articles of Confederation—the sovereignty of the people would cure any of those procedural defects.60

B. The Persistence of An Active Exercise of the People’s Sovereignty

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57 Virginia 1776 Constitution, Bill of Rights, Sec. 3, in The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America [hereinafter Federal and State Constitutions] 3813 (Vol. VII) (Francis Newton Thorpe, ed., 1909); Pennsylvania 1776 Constitution, in Federal and State Constitutions, Vol. V, at 3083. Subsequent state constitutions drafted long after the Federal constitution continued to express the people’s freedom to alter or abolish governments, provisions that persist into the twentieth century. See, e.g., Oklahoma’s present 1907 constitution that identifies the right of the people to “alter or reform” government whenever the “public good may require it.” Okla. Const. of 1907, art. II, Sec. 1, reprinted in 8 Sources and Documents of United States Constitutions 97; Fritz, Fallacies of American Constitutionalism, 276-77.


60 As Madison put it during the Federal convention, “The people were in fact, the fountain of all power, and by resorting to them, all difficulties were got over. They could alter constitutions as they pleased. It was a principle in the Bills of rights, that first principles might be resorted to.” James Madison (August 31, 1787) in Records of the Federal Convention, 476 (Vol. II).
This understanding of constitutionalism as including the source of legitimacy derived from “the people” was not confined to the founding generation. It persists today as the reason for why we attribute legitimacy to written constitutions as fundamental law, and questions of constitutionalism continue to challenge Americans as the heirs of the constitutional legacy left by the Revolutionary generation. Indeed such questions will continue to confront American society as long as the sovereignty of the people remains our constitutional touchstone. In coming to terms with that history and constitutional legacy, the experience of state constitutions is not merely part of the debate over American constitutionalism. Rather, state constitutions are the focal point and the principal arena within which conversations and debate over questions of constitutionalism have taken place (and will continue to take place). In the final analysis, that fact offers the compelling justification for a constitutional paradigm that puts state constitutions front and center.

Re-orienting our conventional frame of reference challenges the assumption that American constitutionalism developed in a “straight-line” from 1787. Instead of confining our interest to what fifty-five delegates drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, attention is now due to the thousands of delegates grappling with constitution-making in well over two hundred state constitutional conventions since the Revolution. That wider framework will force us to acknowledge that a so-called “American” constitutionalism cannot be distilled from the experience with the Federal constitution alone.

In drafting and revising nineteenth century constitutions, American constitution-makers repeatedly acknowledged that “alter or abolish” provisions were “practical” principles that gave American republics their “distinctive character.” In Virginia's 1829 convention, James Monroe observed, “Ours is a Government of the people: it may properly be called self-government. I wish it may be preserved forever in the hands of the people. Our revolution was prosecuted on those principles, and all the Constitutions which have been adopted in this country are founded on the same basis.” In Pennsylvania’s 1837 constitutional convention, one delegate described the “alter or abolish” provision as “a living and governing principle” and asserted that the people “have never parted with their inalienable right to alter, reform, or abolish their government.” Even delegates who refused “to join in the wild shout—Vox Populi, Vox Dei—the voice of the

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61 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-1830 [TO WHICH ARE SUBJOINED, THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA AND THE VOTES OF THE PEOPLE 56 (1830). See also DEBATE ON THE CONVENTION QUESTION, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF THE LEGISLATURE OF NORTH CAROLINA, DECEMBER 18 AND 19, 1821 at 56 (1822) (J.S. Smith insisting that the people’s right “to alter their constitution at pleasure” must be accompanied with a “remedy” to “act upon it”); PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, COMMENCED AND HELD AT HARRISBURG, ON THE SECOND DAY OF MAY, 1837 (14 vols., 1837-1839), I:116 (Earle asserting that “more order” and “stability of laws” existed under state constitutions in which “the people enjoyed practical sovereignty”), XII:92 (Brown taking it “for granted” that “any rules” the convention thought “proper to lay down in reference to future changes in the fundamental law, will be disregarded by the people…at any time when a change shall appear to them to be desirable”).

62 Virginia, DEBATES (1829-1830), 429.

63 Pennsylvania, DEBATES (1837-1838), IV:328; (Woodward), I:343 (Woodward).
people, is the voice of God!” believed, along with “every true republican” that “the people are the only true source, from which power can emanate.”

Debate over a proposal for a ten-year moratorium on constitutional amendments in Pennsylvania’s 1837 convention reflected the consensus about the sovereign authority in America. Such a moratorium, asserted one delegate, conflicted with the people’s inherent “right to alter, reform or abolish their government, in such manner as they may think proper.” Accordingly, “When the people feel the need of a change, and see in your constitution the assertion of their right to make such change, whenever they may deem fit, they will not always wait five or nine years, for the opportunity of doing it in a particular mode.” Preserving “peace, order, and republican government” meant giving “the people the sovereignty” and “its exercise at all times.” Although frequently disagreeing with the first speaker, another delegate joined in opposing the moratorium. Equally “averse to tying up the hands of the people,” he thought “they ought not to be debarred from having their wishes carried into effect,” whenever they wanted to change the constitution. By a substantial majority the convention rejected the ten-year time limit.

By the late 1830s, Americans had considerable experience drawing upon the people’s inherent authority to justify constitutional revision in the absence of provisions for change or which did not follow constitutional procedures. In 1837, James Buchanan—a lawyer, senator from Pennsylvania, and future Democratic President—justified constitutional conventions meeting under the direct authority of the sovereignty of the people. The issue of the constitutional authority of the sovereign people surfaced repeatedly during the post-revolutionary era when western territories sought statehood. Tensions were longstanding between the rights of the people in territorial regions to act on their own initiative versus the authority of Congress to control the process under the Northwest Ordinance. Thus, when congressional debate turned to the issue of Michigan’s admission as a state in 1837, claims for the right of “the people” to sanction self-government were hardly new. Without waiting for Congress to pass an enabling act inviting the Michigan territory to organize itself for statehood, the territory drafted a constitution in a constitutional convention held in 1835. Speaking on the floor of Congress, Buchanan described the situation of a people confronted by a legislature that persistently refused to reform

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64 Pennsylvania, DEBATES (1837-1838), VII:169 (Biddle).
65 Pennsylvania, DEBATES (1837-1838), XII:230 (Earle).
66 Id.
67 Pennsylvania, DEBATES (1837-1838), XII: 231 (Earle).
69 The vote was 78 against and 35 in favor. See also LAURA J. SCALIA, AMERICA’S JEFFERSONIAN EXPERIMENT: REMAKING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 1820-1850 p. 6 (1999) (identifying the “meaning of America’s commitment to popular sovereignty” as “frequently the primary” agenda issue of constitutional conventions meeting before the Civil War).
70 FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS, 47-79.
voting rights and political representation. Under those circumstances, Buchanan would seek “to persuade the people to hold a convention of their own” and “call upon them peaceably and quietly to exert their own sovereign authority in effecting a change in their form of government.” Such a step, he insisted, was not “sedition or rebellion.”

Although the Civil War altered the terms of constitutional debate and shaped how Americans thought about the nature of the Union and the sovereign source of the Federal constitution, it did not dispose of the question of grappling with the legitimizing authority of “the people” in revising state constitutions. This question arose early in the course of California’s 1878 constitutional convention when the seating of a delegate was challenged. The issue was whether an elected delegate, also a district court judge, could participate in the convention given a provision of the existing 1849 constitution that made such judges “ineligible to any other office than a judicial office during their term.” At one level, debate focused on interpreting the word “office” and the applicability of the constitutional provision, but the issue also prompted an extended discussion of the convention’s ability to invoke revolutionary constitutionalism. The deeper issue entailed the relevance, impact and authority of a pre-existing constitutional provision on a later constitutional convention. During the debate the question widened to whether the convention manifested the people’s collective sovereignty and was therefore beyond the control of a legislature, an enabling act, or even a pre-existing constitution. At the same time the question was raised about whether constitutional conventions were constrained to act in accordance with provisions that triggered their existence.

The debate over the power and role of the convention was framed by a committee’s majority report recommending seating the delegate. The majority report interpreted the intent of the 1849 constitutional provision as preventing judges from using their position to advance themselves in the executive or legislative departments. It rejected as an overly narrow and literal interpretation that membership in the present convention constituted an “office,” observing that the 1849 constitution did not “anticipate what should be done under a succeeding Constitution.”

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74 1 id. at183-84, 190-91, 200, 210.

75 1 id. at 175, 199, 204, 211.

76 1 id. at 216.

77 1 id. at 172.
The majority report emphasized the extraordinary nature of a convention. The convention worked on a different level than the “everyday operations” of the executive, legislative, or judicial branches.  

Rather, a convention:

outranks them all; it is their creator, and fixes limits to their spheres of action, and boundaries to their powers. It is occasional, exceptional, brief, and peculiar; it represents the people in their primary capacity, and forms the organic, fundamental, and paramount law of state. Its members are mere agents or delegates of the people, and they have no power to adopt or create, but, at most, can only propose and present to the people a draft of a constitution for their adoption or rejection.

Therefore, confusing the process of making “new organic law” with normal governmental operations was akin to mistaking the architect of “a grand edifice with the people who subsequently occupy it.” The breadth of the provision on constitutional revision left the people “free to select whom they pleased.” Likewise, the statute calling the convention had no “limitation or restriction.” In the final analysis, the majority could not “assume for a moment that the Convention which framed the present [1849] Constitution intended to trammel the succeeding generation in any such manner in the formation of a new or revised organic law.”

A minority report of the committee, on the other hand, claimed that the majority embraced a discredited theory of the sovereignty of constitutional conventions, a theory the minority expressly rejected. The minority acknowledged the people as the basis of government and their right to change that government, but in terms that presupposed adherence to procedure. Constitutional conventions could express public opinion, but conventions that swept aside constitutions and reduced society “into its individual elements” simply implied “revolution.”

The minority did not countenance such a convention nor would they accept the implication that “every provision of the present Constitution, regulating the calling and purpose of this Convention, may be ignored at will.” Rather, the existing constitution continued to bind the present convention.

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78 1 id.
79 1 id.
80 1 id.
81 1 id.
82 1 id.
83 1 id. at 173.
84 1 id. at 175.
85 1 id.
In the end, nineteenth century state constitutional delegates continued to disagree about the powers of conventions. On one hand, those who argued for a more expansive potential stressed the authority of the collective sovereign and the role of convention delegates as representatives of this ultimate constitutional power. Their opponents emphasized the pre-existing authority of prior constitutions as the manifestation of that collective sovereignty. They insisted that until existing constitutions were changed through the procedures spelled out in those documents, conventions possessed the limited power of merely making suggestions that required formal ratification by the people. Both the expansive and constrained views of the collective sovereign drew from debates over the authority of the people unleashed with the Revolution. Most important, these late nineteenth century debates clearly demonstrate that the Federal constitution’s framing did not end the dialogue over American constitutionalism.

Indeed, California also provides an even more recent example of the persistence of questions of constitutionalism during the debate over the state’s budget crisis, exacerbated by written constitutional provisions that constrain that state government’s choices in dealing with its budget. At one point in the debate some suggested bypassing existing constitutional revision procedures by invoking the authority of the people. To many, such “circumvention” of revision provisions simply seems beyond the “constitutional pale.” The fact that California’s constitution specifies the procedures for its revision seems—from the perspective of our modern assumptions of proceduralism—to settle the matter. The point is not that the practice of earlier generations of Americans in granting substantive authority for “the people” to act directly and circumvent procedures necessarily justifies the flirtation with circumvention in the present California debate or that present day assumptions about proceduralism preclude such circumvention. Rather, the debate illustrates the enduring presence of competing questions of constitutionalism that take us back to the issue of the underlying source of constitutional legitimacy and the scope of the authority of the people.

Conclusion

In elevating the Federal constitution to the status of the one true model of American constitutionalism, modern scholars and commentators ignore the significance of state constitutional developments. In doing so, they discount the deeply rooted commitment—derived from the Revolutionary era—to the overarching authority of the people as the collective sovereign. Indeed, in a good number of the early state constitutions the principle was expressly articulated that the sovereign people framing those constitutions reserved to themselves the power to exercise that sovereignty whenever they were dissatisfied with their governments. It is that historically grounded notion of the direct and active power of the collective sovereign potentially exercised by the people that is lost in the traditional paradigm of American constitutionalism, and what must be included in a more accurate understanding of that concept.

Modern scholars and commentators have been comfortable in ignoring what can be learned from state constitutional history because there is no “alter or abolish” clause in the

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86 California Constitution, Art. 13 (limiting taxes and imposing 2/3 legislative vote in order to adopt the budget and raise taxes.)
Federal constitution acknowledging the active constitutional role of the people beyond the election of their government. That fact is coupled with the knowledge that the Federal Framers gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 were fully aware of the dangers presented by Shays Rebellion in Western Massachusetts, and other such incidents where “the people” sought to exercise their sovereign control over government. While committed to the sovereignty of the people, they were perhaps consciously creating a government where the direct and active exercise of that sovereignty would be carefully circumscribed by constitutionally declared procedural requirements for change.  

A more direct and active form of the sovereignty of the people—the driving principle of the American Revolution—may have appeared to be tamed by the structural and procedural constraints of the Federal constitution. However, it took the experience of the Civil War to cement proceduralism in federal constitutional jurisprudence. Moreover, the possible exercise of that more direct and active expression of a collective sovereign remained a vibrant concept within the history of American state constitutions, both before and after 1787, and persists into the present day. Clearly, 1787 was neither the starting point, nor the end point, of American constitutionalism. It is only by recognizing and integrating the longer history of state constitution-making and revision that we can forge a comprehensive and more accurate paradigm of American constitutionalism. Doing so not only corrects the historical record; it may also help us arrive at a more reasoned conversation over what should be a continual debate over questions that involve the value of increased direct citizen participation in government—through the use of the tools of the initiative and referendum, liberalized processes of constitutional amendment, or proportional representation, just to name a few examples.

87 FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS, 119-52.