Complicated Campuses: Universities, Middle-Class Politics, and State-Society Relations in Brazil, 1955-1990

Colin M. Snider

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Approved by the Dissertation Committee:

Chairperson

[Signatures]
Complicated Campuses: Universities, Middle-Class Politics, and State-Society Relations in Brazil, 1955-1990

By

Colin M. Snider

B.A., History, English Literature, and Spanish, Ohio Northern University, 2002
M.A., History, University of New Mexico, 2004

DISSERTATION

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

History

The University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, New Mexico

May, 2011
DEDICATION

In memory of my grandparents, who taught me the joys of learning and the importance of always asking questions.

In honor of my parents, who taught me the importance of working hard, striving to improve, and persevering in the face of all challenges.

In tribute to my wife, whose support helped me through it all and who never doubted my ability, even when I did.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I must first thank Dr. Judy Bieber, my advisor and dissertation chair, for all of her contributions. When I first enrolled in her Modern Brazil seminar in my second semester of my Masters program, I suspect neither she nor I imagined we would be working together for the next eight years. Through those years, her support has kept me going, be it through her classes that helped me to develop this current project or through her tireless efforts as I researched and wrote. While always a friend, she was also often able to startle me by asking difficult questions that had never crossed my mind, prompting me to think about my work and the world more generally in new ways. When I began writing the dissertation, I had little idea of where the final project would end up, yet she was always there to nudge me along, often seeing my arguments and ideas better than I myself did. I owe her debts that I can never repay, but I hope this thank you begins to repay those debts in some small measure.

I also thank my committee members, Dr. Elizabeth Hutchison, Dr. Linda Hall, Dr. Victoria Langland, and Dr. Margo Milleret. Their contributions to my academic development far exceed their recommendations for this study. Throughout the years, they have pushed me and helped me to develop as a scholar through classes, conferences, and comments. While the path was not always easy for me, they were always there with words of encouragement, and for that, I am eternally grateful to each of them.

I extend my gratitude to the Latin American and Iberian Institute, whose Field Research Grant allowed me to travel to Brazil on a preliminary research trip
in 2005 and whose Ph.D. Fellowship allowed me to conduct intense archival research and begin writing the dissertation. My research was also made possible through a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad grant, and I thank the U.S. Department of Education for the incredible opportunity. I also thank the Student Research and Allocations Committee and the History Graduate Student Association at the University of New Mexico, whose funding allowed me to spend a month conducting preliminary research in Rio de Janeiro in 2005.

Many, many friends aided me in my long journey through the dissertation. Teresa Cribelli, Heather Roller, Kari Zimmerman, Ann Schneider, Yuko Miki, Patricia Acerbi, and Ben Cowan provided wonderful friendship and support during my time in Brazil. Justin Barber provided invaluable comments as I was writing it, and I thank him for that and for his willingness to tackle the modern nation-state despite his own research interests. Through my years at the University of New Mexico, so many friends contributed to this project indirectly, be it through moral support, intellectual discussions, or just sitting over beers and venting, and although their names are too many to list here, they are not forgotten.

I thank my family for supporting me through the process and believing I could complete the dissertation, even when I myself was not so sure. I also appreciate that they were able to keep the “so when will you be finished?” line of questioning to a minimum, even though it was no doubt difficult for them sometimes. I never could have completed my dissertation without their ongoing support and encouragement.
Finally, to my wife Daniella, I offer a simple but heartfelt thank you for everything. The words do not adequately express the depth and sincerity of my gratitude, but you know nonetheless.
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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

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M.A., History
Ph.D., History

Abstract

This dissertation examines universities and the development of middle-class politics in Brazil in the latter half of the twentieth century. It asks: how did the middle class become increasingly important to Brazilian politics and society? By focusing on the university system as both a physical and discursive site of negotiation, the dissertation traces how the military, bureaucrats, business leaders, pedagogues, students, and parents entered into complex debates over education and national development. Drawing from police records, bureaucratic archives, private collections, and oral interviews, it studies how the middle class and the state under military rule strengthened the role of the middle class by connecting university education, development, and white-collar professions. Thus, the analysis moves beyond narratives of repression and resistance to examine the complex nature of state-society relations before and during Brazil’s military dictatorship, and reveals considerable ideological heterogeneity within the student population. In doing so, it contributes to the political and social history of Brazil, as well as adding to the small but increasingly important scholarship on the middle class in Latin America.
The dissertation shows how universities became increasingly central to middle class politics. Early chapters trace the rise of universities’ importance to different visions of national development. When the military dictatorship rose to power in 1964, universities functioned both as physical sites to resist the dictatorship as well as discursive fields where society and the state debated Brazil’s future. In these discursive struggles, groups with widely varying ideologies coalesced around the idea of expanding the middle class as the primary vehicle for national development. As increasing economic turbulence and gradual political opening took place after 1975, students and university-trained professionals with particular material and political expectations became a major force in the push for a return to democratization. By the dictatorship’s end in 1985, the emphasis on university education across the previous thirty years had helped the middle class emerge as a major voice in Brazilian society and politics.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AI-5</td>
<td><em>Ato Institucional No. 5</em> (Institutional Act No. 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDES</td>
<td><em>Associação Nacional dos Docentes de Ensino Superior</em> (National Association of Higher Education Docents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td><em>Ação Popular</em> (Popular Action)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td><em>Aliança Nacional Renovadora</em> (National Alliance for Renovation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BID</td>
<td><em>Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento</em> (Inter-American Development Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIRD</td>
<td><em>Banco Internacional para Reconstrução e Desenvolvimento</em> (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNDES</td>
<td><em>Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento</em> (National Bank of Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPES</td>
<td><em>Coordenação/Campanha de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior</em> (Improvement Campaign/Coordination of Higher Education Personnel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td><em>Confederação Nacional da Educação</em> (National Confederation of Education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPB</td>
<td><em>Confederação dos Professores do Brasil</em> (Brazilian Teachers’ Confederation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRUTAC</td>
<td><em>Centros Rurais de Treinamento e Ação Comunitárias</em> (Rural University Centers for Training and Community Action)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td><em>Diretórios Acadêmicos</em> (Academic Directories)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAU</td>
<td><em>Departamento de Assuntos Universitários</em> (Department of University Subjects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCE</td>
<td><em>Diretório Central dos Estudantes</em> (Students’ Central Directory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEE</td>
<td><em>Diretório Estadual de Estudantes</em> (State Directory of Students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESu</td>
<td><em>Departamento de Ensino Superior</em> (Department of Higher Education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNE</td>
<td><em>Diretório Nacional dos Estudantes</em> (National Directory of Students)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSI</td>
<td><em>Divisão de Segurança e Informações</em> (Division of Security and Information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENE</td>
<td><em>Encontro Nacional dos Estudantes</em> (National Meeting of Students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESG</td>
<td><em>Escola Superior de Guerra</em> (Higher War College)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GT</td>
<td><em>Grupdo de Trabalho</em> (Work Group) [for 1968 University Reform]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPÊS</td>
<td><em>Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais</em> (Institute for Social Research and Studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUC</td>
<td><em>Juventude Universitária Católica</em> (Catholic University)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDB</td>
<td>Lei de Diretrizes e Bases (Law of Directives and Basic Reforms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDB</td>
<td>Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEC</td>
<td>Ministério da Educação e Cultura (Ministry of Education and Culture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR-8</td>
<td>Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro (Revolutionary Movement 8 of October)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAB</td>
<td>Organização de Advogados do Brasil (Brazilian Lawyers’ Organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCB</td>
<td>Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party) [Leninist]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCdoB</td>
<td>Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of Brazil [Maoist])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>Partido Democrático Trabalhista (Democratic Laborers’ Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB</td>
<td>Partido Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PND</td>
<td>Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento (National Development Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Partido Democrático Social (Social Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>Partido Democrático Trabalhista (Democratic Labor Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTB</td>
<td>Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUC-RJ</td>
<td>Pontifícia Universidade Católica – Rio de Janeiro (Pontifical Catholic University-Rio de Janeiro)</td>
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<td>PUC-SP</td>
<td>Pontifícia Universidade Católica – São Paulo (Pontifical Catholic University-São Paulo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNI</td>
<td>Serviço Nacional de Informações (National Information Service)</td>
</tr>
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<td>UBES</td>
<td>União Brasileiro de Estudantes Secundaristas (Brazilian Union of Secondary Students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCMG</td>
<td>Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais (Catholic University of Minas Gerais)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDN</td>
<td>União Democrático Nacional (National Democratic Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEE</td>
<td>União Estadual dos Estudantes (State Students’ Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UERJ</td>
<td>Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro (State University of Rio de Janeiro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFAL</td>
<td>Universidade Federal de Alagoas (Federal University of Alagoas)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFAM</td>
<td>Universidade Federal de Amazonas (Federal University of Amazonas)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFBA</td>
<td>Universidade Federal da Bahia (Federal University of Bahia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFES</td>
<td>Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo (Federal University of Espírito Santo)</td>
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<td>UFF</td>
<td>Universidade Federal Fluminense (Fluminense Federal University)</td>
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<td>UFGO</td>
<td>Universidade Federal de Goiás (Federal University of Goiás)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFMG</td>
<td>Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Federal University of Minas Gerais)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFOP</td>
<td>Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto (Federal University of Ouro Preto)</td>
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<td>UFPE</td>
<td>Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (Federal University of Pernambuco)</td>
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<td>Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte)</td>
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<td>Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul)</td>
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<td>UFRJ</td>
<td>Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFRRJ</td>
<td>Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro (Rural Federal University of Rio de Janeiro)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UME</td>
<td>União Metropolitana dos Estudantes (Metropolitan Union of Students)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNATE</td>
<td>União Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Educação (National Union of Education Workers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UnB</td>
<td>Universidade de Brasília (University of Brasilia)</td>
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<td>União Nacional dos Estudantes (National Union of Students)</td>
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<td>UniRio</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USP</td>
<td>Universidade de São Paulo (University of São Paulo)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

During Brazil’s 2006 presidential debates, Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva made his case for re-election by highlighting the fact that during his first administration, Brazil had finally established a federal university in every state.\(^1\) According to Lula, this accomplishment spoke to the country’s progress under his government, as each state could now provide its own citizens with free higher education. To an outsider, citing federal universities in every state may have seemed like an odd issue for Lula to raise. Yet his emphasis on the federal universities marked the end of a decades-long process in Brazilian development and education. Since the 1950s, politicians, students, bureaucrats, military officers, pedagogues, parents, and professionals had been pushing for the expansion and improvement of Brazil’s higher education system. Between 1955 and 1990, these disparate groups invoked modern developmentalist thought to transform the Brazilian university system. In spite of widely varying political ideologies, these actors often found common ground in envisioning the universities as arenas that would privilege middle class growth and participation in Brazil’s political, economic, and social life. Even with the end of the military dictatorship in 1985, universities continued to be central to politics and society throughout the 1990s and up to the 2006 presidential elections. Lula’s boast confirms just how important universities were to national politics.

\(^{1}\) The final federal university was the Federal University of Tocantins. Although created through presidential decree in May 2000, the university only began to function in 2003, during Lula’s first term. Indeed, during the debate, Lula claimed he should be re-elected so that he could finish overseeing the University’s development.
This dissertation uses the Brazilian university system to examine the rise of middle class politics between the years of 1955 and 1990. Although a minority of Brazilians attended universities in this time period, colleges and universities were important sites of physical and discursive conflict between the Brazilian state and society. While leftist student leaders and right-wing military hard-liners might have been polar opposites in many regards, they, along with other social groups, all had a major stake in the status and conditions of Brazilian universities. Students and poorer families viewed universities as means to acquire greater material comfort and social mobility, while the government saw universities as central to Brazil’s ability to assume its rightful place within the “developed world.” As social, political, and economic realities changed in Brazil between 1964 and 1985, the focus of students, military leaders, white-collar professionals, and bureaucrats shifted as well, responding to external factors like the oil crises of the 1970s as well as to internal challenges like the gradual return to democracy in the 1980s. Yet as the military ceded control in 1985, the impact of the debate over universities did not disappear. Throughout the remainder of the decade and into the 1990s, university reform would continue to occupy a major space in political and social discourse. In this period, Brazil’s growing middle class played a major role in national politics and society, and the universities continued to be a major axis around which these debates and struggles revolved.

Late Arrivals: Universities in Brazil

Universities were key to visions of development in twentieth-century Brazil. Unlike its Spanish American neighbors, some of whom had universities in
the 16th century, Brazil did not have a fully formed university system until the
1930s. The reasons were numerous, and depended in no small part on the
Portuguese crown’s efforts to control all education and dissemination of
knowledge (including outlawing printing presses in Brazil) into the early 1800s,
when the Portuguese court relocated to Rio de Janeiro during the Napoleonic
invasion. Even after gaining independence in 1822, many Brazilians continued to
matriculate at the University of Coimbra in Portugal for their higher education,
while those who remained in Brazil attended new law schools in São Paulo and
Olinda. These independent faculdades, or colleges began to flourish in the mid-
to late-1800s, creating a web of isolated, unconnected, and highly specialized
engineering, medical, and law schools.

Only in the 1900s did Brazilian politicians and educators begin forming
universities, and even those early efforts often petered out. The first official
university in Brazil was the University of Manaus, formed in 1909, but defunct by
1926. Similarly, the University of São Paulo was formed in 1911, but was
dissolved by 1917, though it did lay the foundation for the eventual foundation in
1934 of the University of São Paulo that still exists today. The University of
Paraná was created in 1912, but like its predecessors in Manaus and São Paulo, it

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2 Mexico’s first university, the Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo,
formed in 1540, and the Real e Pontificia Universidad de México was established in Mexico City
in 1551. In the Dominican Republic, the Universidad Santo Tomas de Aquino was founded in
1538.

3 See Kristin Schultz, *Tropical Versailles: Empire, Monarchy, and the Portuguese Royal
Court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821*, (New York: Routledge, 2001), and Raimundo Martin da
Silva, “Four Centuries of Struggle: The Idea of a Brazilian University and Its History,” Ph.D.

4 Andrew J. Kirkendall, *Class Mates: Male Student Culture and the Making of a Political
Class in Nineteenth-Century Brazil*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002).
had dissolved by 1922. In this context, the University of Rio de Janeiro was
founded relatively late, in 1920. This university never closed, later becoming the
University of Brazil and, by the 1970s, the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
(UFRJ). However, the University of Rio de Janeiro’s status as the first official
university in Brazil remains a point of contention, as it was originally little more
than the combination of already-extant Law, Medicine, and Engineering schools
in the city, designed to impress Belgium’s king and queen upon their visit to
Brazil in 1922.  

As late as the 1930s, Brazil still had very few universities in the modern
sense of the word. This situation began to change during the years of Getúlio
Vargas (1930-1945). Vargas transformed Brazil, centralizing the Brazilian state
and affecting everything from labor laws to gender roles to cultural projects to
education. The government finally established the Ministry of Education and
Health (MES) in the early-1930s after years of calls for a federal ministry devoted

5  For various views on this debate, see Luiz Antonio Cunha, A Universidade Temporã,
Chapter 3, and da Silva, “Four Centuries of Struggle” Chapter V. For the visit of the Belgian
royalty and its effect on culture and landscape in Rio de Janeiro, see Sueann Caulfield, In Defense
of Honor: Sexual Morality, Modernity, and Nation in Early-Twentieth-Century Brazil, (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2000), Chapter 2. Here, I will consider the University of Rio de Janeiro to
be Brazil’s “first” university.

6  For a general narrative of the Vargas years, see Thomas E, Skidmore, Politics in Brazil
1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy, 40th anniversary edition, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007). For a detailed analysis of Vargas, see Robert M. Levine, Father of the Poor? Vargas
and His Era, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). For detailed analyses on labor,
gender, and culture during the Vargas years, see John D. French, The Brazilian Workers’ ABC:
Class Conflict and Alliance in Modern São Paulo, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Industrial Class, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993); Susan K. Besse, Restructuring
Patriarchy: The Modernization of Gender Inequality in Brazil, 1914-1940, (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1996); and Daryle Williams, Culture Wars in Brazil: The First
Curiously, while Vargas’s government centralized federal authority in many ways, education remained decentralized. The MES did begin to attempt to govern higher education by issuing Brazil’s first comprehensive university policy, and it assumed full control of the nascent federal university system, but by and large, in its early years the MES simply “established norms for states and municipalities to follow.” As a result, during the Vargas years, reformers and doctors were responsible for the reform campaigns that turned elementary and high schools into nation-building institutions that would create patriotic (and hygienic) citizens. Higher education was the exception. The government assumed control of the nascent federal university system, and established nationwide regulations that private universities like the Catholic Universities and state universities like the University of São Paulo would have to follow. As important as the formation of MES was to future university policy, perhaps more importantly, the National Student Union (União Nacional de Estudantes, UNE) formed in 1937, just as Brazil entered the Estado Novo dictatorship (1937-1945).

Students first mobilized in the late 1700s, when a Brazilian youth approached Thomas Jefferson in Paris and sought his support for an intellectuals’ rebellion in Minas Gerais. Throughout the 1800s, students (and future political leaders) in Brazil’s law schools at Olinda and São Paulo participated in events

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9 Dávila, *Diploma of Whiteness*, p. 32.
like the conservative political shift of 1850 and the abolition of slavery in 1888.10
In 1910, students from isolated professional schools gathered, hosting the First
National Congress of Students, but nothing came of the event. Thus, UNE marked
the first time that students had formed their own organization. In 1938 UNE held
its first national meeting which they called, for some reason, the “Second National
Congress of Students.” At that meeting, UNE proclaimed the need for university
reform.11 However, given the still-small numbers of universities, students during
the Estado Novo tended to focus on political reforms rather than educational ones,
pushing for Brazil’s entrance into World War II on the side of the Allies and then
for a return to democracy in 1945.12

Social and military pressure forced Vargas out of office in 1945, and
General Eurico Gaspar Dutra became president. Educational transformation
continued during Dutra’s administration (1946-1951). In 1948, Minister of
Education and Health Clemente Mariani submitted the “Law of Directives and
Basic Rights” (LDB) to Congress. In its original form, the LDB focused on broad
educational reforms at all levels, including pledging twelve percent of the national
budget and twenty percent of municipal budgets to education, making primary

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education obligatory, and expanding the university system. However, the law stalled as Brazilian politicians dealt with the return of Getúlio Vargas’s populist administration in 1950 and his suicide in 1954, military instability in the 1955 elections, and the creation of Brasília under Juscelino Kubitschek. These events, in combination with ongoing debates about the extent of the reforms, meant the LDB would not pass into law for thirteen years. Even so, the university system gradually expanded under Mariani’s guidance. This expansion would continue in the second Vargas administration of 1951-1954. In 1953, he reorganized the cabinet, creating the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) and giving Health its own ministry. By the time Vargas committed suicide amidst political scandal in 1954, Brazil had sixteen universities. Although Brazil was still lagging in higher education compared to its Latin American neighbors, the Vargas years laid the foundation for the creation of a university system in Brazil. Over the next 30

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13 See, for example: “Carta de Paulo de Almeida Salles a Anísio Teixeira, informando-lhe envio de cópia da moção aprovada pelo plenário da assembleia de fundação da associação de pais e alunos na Universidade Mackenzie, São Paulo,” Photos 159-164, Roll 40, AT c 1960.06.25, CPDOC; “Entrevista concedida ao Diário de Noticias versando sobre questões educacionais no Brasil,” CMa pi Mariani, C. 1953.09.17, CPDOC; “Apresentação na Comissão de Educação do Senado Federal sobre sua gestão no Ministério da Educação e Saúde,” CMa pi Mariani, C. 1977.09.01, CPDOC; “Documentos sobre educação. Entre eles, a Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional, a questão da educação gratuita nas escolas particulares e a federalização de estabelecimentos de ensino superior,” GC k 1951.01.10, CPDOC; and “Correspondência entre Anísio Teixeira e Lourenço Filho,” LF c 1929.10.24, CPDOC.

14 See Luiz Antônio Cunha, A Universidade crítica: o ensino superior na República Populista, (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Francisco Alves Editora S/A, 1983). Evidence of the debate over which schools to federalize between 1945-1950 is available in Clemente Mariani’s private archive at the Centro de Documentação e Pesquisa de História Contemporânea do Brasil (herein, CPDOC) at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) in Rio de Janeiro. See, for example, CPDOC, Cma mes ce 1950.12.23.

15 It would remain the Ministry of Education and Culture until 1985, when the new democratic government separated Education and Culture into two separate ministries. Curiously, the Ministry of Education is still commonly referred to as “MEC” to this day, perhaps revealing just how much education dominated the MEC’s agenda.

16 Cunha, Universidade Crítica, p. 95.
years, as Brazil went from a democracy to a military regime and witnessed economic rises and collapses, this system would rapidly grow and take on a new importance in Brazilian society, even as Brazilian political life experienced extreme upheaval.

*From Republic to Military Regime and Back: National Politics in Brazil, 1955-1985*

After Vargas’s suicide, Brazil initially seemed to be headed towards a new era of success. When Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) took office, Brazil’s future seemed boundless, with the prosperity and development of the country symbolized by the modernist, airplane-shaped capital of Brasília and the rapid industrial growth of the country. However, cracks were already beginning to emerge in the political and economic landscape. Kubitschek had only been able to assume office after War Minister Marshal Henrique Lott launched a pre-emptive coup in 1955 in order to ensure Kubitschek’s inauguration in the face of right-wing opposition from within the civilian and military sectors.17 While Kubitschek became popular as the face of Brazilian development, his state-sponsored growth programs led to rising inflation by the end of the 1950s. In the 1960 elections, the right pinned its hopes on the erratic Jânio Quadros, while the Brazilian electorate promoted the “Jan-Jan” ballot of Quadros for President and the leftist Brazilian Workers Party’s candidate João “Jango” Goulart for vice president.18 Public opinion and an anti-corruption campaign swept the two into office.

17 Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil 1930-1964*, pp. 149-158.
Shortly after the 1961 inauguration, Quadros’s erratic behavior and independence began to appear. He sought to forge a foreign policy path that depended neither on the United States nor the Soviet bloc, and alienated his former right-wing supporters by awarding Ché Guevara the Cruzeiro do Sul Order, one of Brazil’s highest honors.19 Congress grew increasingly worried with Quadros’s moves. When in August 1961 Quadros tendered his resignation (for reasons that remain cloudy even today), Congress accepted, and Brazil was thrown into political turmoil. While people had been thrilled with the Jan-Jan ballot, many right-wing politicians, middle class sectors, and most importantly, the military, were strongly opposed to Goulart assuming the presidency, fearing his leftism. Complicating the matter, Goulart was on a diplomatic mission to China when Quadros stepped down, which only further damaged Goulart’s image among opponents. Military leaders stepped in to prevent the transition, but Goulart’s brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, with the support of UNE and other organizations, masterfully executed the “campaign for legality,” taking to the radio waves to demand that Brazil’s Constitution be obeyed and Goulart become president. In the face of growing opposition, the military agreed to let Goulart assume office, but only on the condition that it be with greatly reduced powers. Thus, in September 1961, Goulart became president, but now had to work with a prime minister and a parliamentary cabinet. In late-1962, people went to the polls

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18 Brazil had split-ballot elections between 1945 and 1964, allowing for candidates from two different parties to be elected to the presidency and vice-presidency.

19 To understand Quadros’s erratic nature, one need only to know that less than two months before awarding Guevara, he sent the military to break a strike among the law students in Recife. They had begun to strike after the dean of the school had banned a meeting. The guest speaker at that meeting was to be none other than Guevara’s mother. See Skidmore, Politics in Brazil 1930-1964, pp. 391-392 (fn. 15).
and overwhelmingly voted to restore full presidential authority to Goulart in a plebiscite. Rapid inflation and an increasingly polarized political atmosphere left Goulart more and more isolated politically, however, as moderates like Kubitschek began to doubt Goulart’s policies. In response, he took a page from his mentor Vargas and appealed to workers and leftists while supporting sergeants who had revolted against their military superiors. This leftward shift and support of what military leaders saw as insubordination ultimately led to the military rising up against Goulart with broad middle class and political support. On March 31, troops moved on Rio de Janeiro from Minas Gerais, and by April 1, Goulart was out of office.20

While Brazil’s military had become involved in Brazilian politics before in the twentieth century, 1964 marked the first time that it assumed full political control. The military immediately began stripping left-wing politicians and labor leaders of their political rights and clamping down on opposition. Shortly after the coup, the Congress elected Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco president (1964-1967). Castelo Branco immediately made inflation, which had reached 100 percent by 1964, his top priority, and spent much of his three years trying to turn Brazil’s economy around. Although Castelo Branco represented what many have considered the “moderate” branch of the military dictatorship, he also increased political repression, most notably in the Institutional Act No. 2 (AI-2), which
abolished all old political parties, created two new officially-sanctioned parties, and made gubernatorial and presidential elections indirect. His administration also tried to outlaw UNE with mixed success, forcing the organization into “semi-clandestinity.”

Arthur Costa e Silva (1967-1969) succeeded Castelo Branco and represented the rise of the hard-liners within the military. Political and social unrest increased during his administration. Between 1964 and 1968, the number of radical leftist groups had expanded rapidly. The Leninist Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro, PCB) splintered as some members advocated continuing on the path of revolution from within the system; others, led by Carlos Marighela, advocated a more violent path to revolution, and the Maoist Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil, PCdoB) increasingly gained strength as the decade progressed. In addition to these two major groups, several other splinter groups of Communists, generally referred to as “Dissidences” and allied neither with the PCB or the PCdoB, had formed, taking on a dizzying array of acronyms like VAR-Palmares, MR-8, and POLOP. By 1968, most of these groups consisted of university students in either the “ranks” or as leaders.

Nor were these the only ways in which society had become increasingly polarized. By 1968, workers were striking and hundreds of thousands of students, parents, artists, and others took to the streets to protest the regime’s growing repression. In September, congressman Márcio Moreira Alves innocuously suggested that Brazilian women not date soldiers as a form of protest in what
came to be known as the “Lysistrata speech.” Outraged, military leadership demanded Congress strip Alves of his congressional immunity so that the military could charge him with treason. When Congress refused to do so, the military used the speech and Congress’s intransigence as a pretext to issue Institutional Act No. 5 (AI-5) in December 1968, ushering in a new repressive phase in Brazil.

Unrest continued into 1969 as the military tried to strengthen its control. Costa e Silva suffered a stroke in August 1969, leading to a one-month military junta, followed by the election of Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969-1974). Often considered a figurehead leader, some scholars have characterized Médici as a hands-off president who gave his ministers and the military apparatus relatively free reign to implement torture and other repressive practices.\(^\text{21}\) As a result, his presidency simultaneously saw rapid economic growth that exceeded 10 percent a year in, commonly referred to as the “Brazilian miracle,” even as the security apparatus entered a new phase of repression that witnessed widespread torture, disappearances, and sustained campaigns against both urban and rural guerrillas.

In 1974, Congress elected Ernesto Geisel president. A member of Castelo Branco’s staff, Geisel marked a return of the “moderates” to the presidency. Geisel tried to rein in the abuses of hard-liners in the security apparatus and promoted a top-down “slow, gradual” return to democracy. However, the economic situation worsened during Geisel’s administration as Brazil confronted the international oil crises and the consequences of the high foreign loans that had spurred growth during the “miracle.” By 1979, when João Baptista Figueiredo

became the final military president, inflation was once again spiraling out of control, reaching over 100 percent (the same rate that had helped bring down Goulart) in the early 1980s. Although Figueiredo tried to continue the top-down “distensão e abertura” (“distension and opening”) begun under Geisel, a 1979 general amnesty that allowed exiles to return and pardoned political prisoners and torturers in the security apparatus alike made military control of the democratization process more difficult. Growing political opposition had more room to maneuver in the context of abertura, and the economic turmoil led to popular mobilizations against the dictatorship. New political parties (including Lula’s Workers’ Party, or PT) formed, and in 1985, a broad political coalition in Congress elected opposition leader (and former Prime Minister under João Goulart) Tancredo Neves president of Brazil. On the eve of inauguration, however, Neves died, and vice-presidential candidate José Sarney, who had been a member of the pro-military party until the early 1984, became Brazil’s first civilian president in twenty-one years.

**Historiography**

By focusing on the period immediately prior to and during the dictatorship, this project participates in a diverse historical literature of state, class, and education in modern Brazil. The most prolific writing on the Brazilian state and society in the twentieth century has focused on the populist administrations of Getúlio Vargas. The path-breaking work of Robert Levine demonstrated how Vargas finally centralized the Brazilian state and its consequences for Brazilian society. More narrowly focused monographs by
Barbara Weinstein, John French, Joel Wolfe, Jerry Dávila, and Daryle Williams followed, focusing on labor, education, and the politics of culture during the Vargas era. Thus, scholars have gained a strong understanding of Brazilian state formation and associated social changes in the years up to Vargas’s suicide in 1954.

In comparison, the body of work on the post-Vargas era, including the dictatorship, is relatively scant. A brief burst of production and analysis of Brazil’s military governments followed the dictatorship’s end in 1985. Thomas E. Skidmore, Maria Helena Moreira Alves, and Alfred Stepan all provide narratives of the political and economic history of the dictatorship. Lawrence Weschler compares the efforts to deal with torture in Brazil and Uruguay during the transition to democratization. Kenneth Serbin offers important insights into the complex relation between the Catholic Church and the military government. More recently, Victoria Langland’s dissertation focuses on the student movement

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and memory during the dictatorship, as well as examining gender within the student movement, particularly in the 1960s. Ben Cowan’s work examines the ways in which the dictatorship associated “subversion” and sexuality. Mala Htun’s work has considered the complex nature of state-society relations in the struggles for women’s issues in dictatorships and democracies in South America, including Brazil. In Brazil, Carlos Fico has extensively considered the effect of the dictatorship on collective memory and Brazilian identity. Elio Gaspari’s comprehensive four-volume set provides an incredibly detailed political narrative of the dictatorship from 1964-1977, drawing on private collections from some of Brazil’s highest-ranking military officials to reveal the internal divisions within the military as well as the broader political challenges between the dictatorship and society.

As the dictatorship neared its forty-year anniversary in 2004, a number of conferences within the academic community led to edited volumes that analyzed


the state and society during the dictatorship from various angles. However, none of these works concentrates on issues of class politics and identity or use social history methodology. Instead, their efforts focus primarily on torture, censorship, and resistance to the dictatorship. As a result, the scholarship on the post-1955 period in Brazil has generally provided narratives based on the economic policies and political repression of the military government.

In studying the political context of the dictatorship, students occupy a major space in the scholarship. Numerous works have focused on UNE’s resistance, culminating in massive street protests and a subsequent government crackdown that led to Brazil’s repressive “years of lead” (anos de chumbo) following 1968. These works have provided detailed narratives and documentary materials of the student movement’s leftist leaders, often drawing heavily from the memories of those leaders. However, these works neglect the great majority of students who were neither directly involved in UNE nor were political radicals. Thus, a more nuanced and complete understanding of student demands outside of the UNE leadership is lacking for the military dictatorship, and an admittedly vocal minority of activists has taken on almost mythical proportions.


Similarly, scholarship on universities in Brazil has tended to neglect the dictatorship and post-dictatorship periods. Luiz Antônio da Cunha, Raimundo Martin da Silva, and Maria de Lourdes de A. Fávero have considered the role of the university in Brazil, tracing its ideological roots back to Jesuit educators in the 1500s, yet these works have several thematic and chronological limitations. Silva’s dissertation and Fávero’s work on universities both stop in 1945, just as Brazil’s university system really began to develop. Cunha’s work extends further, tracing the history of Brazilian universities in theory, formation, and policy between 1500 and 1968, yet even he stops his analysis of universities at the exact moment when Brazil’s military finally issued its University Reform (Reforma Universitária). Additionally, these works collectively do little to address how universities actually operated in Brazil or analyze the linkages between academic institutions, political movements, and class politics. Rather, these scholars tend to treat the university as an abstract and autonomous institution, divorced from state-society relations outside of isolated incidents of popular mobilization. 33

Explorations of middle-class politics and culture are also fleeting in Latin America specifically but in world history more generally, as U.S historian Robert D. Johnston has observed. 34 Johnston’s work provides important theoretical and

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conceptual questions that demand greater attention to the middle class as a complicated, heterogeneous social category. Some scholars have begun to consider how the middle forms and operates in different contexts in Latin America. Patrick Barr-Melej and David O. Parker have provided important analyses for class formation and national politics in the early twentieth century in Chile and Peru, respectively.\textsuperscript{35} For Brazil, Brian Owensby demonstrates that, as late as 1950, the middle “classes” still lacked unity.\textsuperscript{36} Cristina Peixoto-Mehrtens’ urban history emphasizes the role middle-class professionals played in politics and regional identity-formation in São Paulo in the Vargas Era.\textsuperscript{37} Maureen O’Dougherty’s later ethnographic study, by contrast, argues that consumerism and university education lent coherence to the Brazilian middle class by the 1990s.\textsuperscript{38} However, the era between 1950 and 1990, when the middle class came to fully develop its own sense of identity and politics, remains largely unexplored.

\textit{Methodology}

In discussing middle-class politics, it is important to first address what exactly “middle class” meant and means in Brazil. While economic data are


useful, class identity transcends mere income. Social and cultural factors such as profession and family background all play an important part in class identity in Brazil and elsewhere. As Brian Owensby has demonstrated, the Brazilian middle class began emerging as early as the 1920s; yet even by the 1950s, as a whole the middle sectors had little in the way of positive identity beyond ephemeral political, economic, and social anxieties. Even in the mid-twentieth century, Brazil’s middle class identified itself primarily in the negative – “not-rich/not-poor” – and lacked a cohesive unifying identity. 39 Yet as Maureen O’Dougherty’s ethnographic work demonstrates, by the late-1980s and early-1990s, the middle class had a strong understanding of its own consumptive patterns, material expectations, and socio-economic status in relation to other Brazilians.

This dissertation defines middle class as white-collar professionals with sufficient income levels to provide access to non-essential material goods, yet who remain highly susceptible to economic upheaval. In other words, Brazil’s middle class had greater fiscal flexibility and material expectations than the majority working classes, yet at the same time, were more vulnerable to economic crises than elites. This definition is supported with reference to censuses, government studies, and other economic data while also considering social and cultural markers of class, such as one’s neighborhood and ownership of an apartment, a car, or the most recent non-essential appliances. Additionally, professors’ unions and national engineering or medical students’ organizations in the 1970s and 1980s helped reinforce class identity and defined class interests in

39 Owensby, *Intimate Ironies.*
society more generally. Although participation in these groups was not universal, their demands and concerns reflected broader class-based material interests. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I turn to Brazilians’ own self-identification through my own personal interviews as well as a number of published interviews and testimonies. These interviews provide the clearest markers of what jobs, material goods, and lifestyles constituted a “middle class,” giving a particularly Brazilian flavor to our understanding of class. For example, nearly all of the students who participated in the Projeto Memória Estudantil project claimed to come from middle-class backgrounds, generally with a father in a field like engineering, law, journalism, or public administration, and a mother who often “earned a degree but never participated in a profession.”40 By emphasizing Brazilians’ own perception of what it meant to be middle class and analyzing who was included or excluded, this work avoids the temptation of “defining the middle class a priori,” as David Parker urges.41 By referring to these diverse class-markers, this dissertation traces how the economic the middle class solidified its identity in the latter half of the twentieth century.

40 Quote from Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Franklin Martins, p. 1. Martins’ mother had gotten her degree in pharmacy, but as was the case with many students’ families at the time, she ended up being a housewife while the father worked. For just a small sampling of other students who came from middle-class backgrounds as they themselves defined it, see personal interview with F.G., 10 September 2007, and Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Adriano Diogo, Antônio Carlos Peixoto, Bernardo Joffily, Cacá Diegues, César Maia, Cláudio Fonteles, Comba Porto, Daniel Aarão Reis, Franklin Martins, Geraldo Siqueira Filho, Gisela Mendonça, Jean Marc von der Weid, Juca Ferreira, Luis Raul Machado, Luis Roberto Tenório, Marcelo Cerqueira, Maria Augusto Carneiro Ribeiro, Paulo de Tarso Venceslau, Roberto Amaral, Sepúlveda Pertence, and Vladimir Palmeira, among others. For the small number of students whose parents were from poor backgrounds, see personal interview with D.N., 26 August 2007, and Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Aldo Rebelo, Amâncio Paulino de Carvalho, and José Genoino.

41 Parker, The Idea of the Middle-Class, p. ix.
Using these characteristics to define the middle class, it becomes clear that university education plays a central role in the formation of a middle class identity. Most directly, the university degree and the access it provided to non-manual white-collar jobs as lawyers, journalists, professors, teachers, engineers, and doctors made it a keystone in middle class identity.\footnote{Although teachers generally attended normal schools, the model of teachers’ colleges gained traction in the 1960s, and the dictatorship would emphasize the importance in training and education for them as well. Additionally, as we shall see in Chapter 6, teachers regularly mobilized to protect material interests that were similar to those of other white-collar professionals. Thus, although university education was not always required (or even achievable) for many teachers, this study considers them as a part of the middle-class due to their status as white-collar professionals.} As Brian Owensby has demonstrated, already by the 1940s, entering white-collar professions that defined the middle class required a degree.\footnote{Owensby, \textit{Intimate Ironies}, p. 89.} Yet the importance of higher education did not stop there. With the acquisition of white-collar jobs, individuals also had access to the material goods associated with the middle class. Thus, university education came to function as the keystone of “being” middle-class.

Because the material, cultural, and social benefits of a university degree were central to middle-class identity in this period, universities themselves became a major engine driving middle-class politics in Brazil in the latter half of the twentieth century. Students used failings in the university system to challenge the political authority of the military regime and to carve out their own political voice in the new context of authoritarian rule. Parents came out in favor of expanding the university system so that their children could have access to greater levels of social mobility than the parents themselves had. Additionally, the increasing importance of the university-trained middle class politics emerged not
only from the middle class’s own internal forces, but through external forces as well. Thus, as the dictatorship privileged white-collar professionals in its own developmentalist policies, it gave a greater political heft to these professionals that professors, doctors, engineers, and others would increasingly employ as the dictatorship neared its end. As a result, the growing social and political importance of the middle class was a synergistic process between the state and society.

In this way, universities came to be a major factor in middle-class politics. In dealing with such disparate elements of the middle class, including radical and non-radical students alike, and the military regime, universities were contested institutions. Indeed, the late development of a Brazilian university system compared to other parts of the Americas made the institution all the more unformed and potentially malleable, leaving plenty of space for competing groups to project widely varying ideals and hopes into the universities. Where the military saw universities as a means to create a white-collar professional class that would catapult Brazil into the “developed” world and offer a “strategic” means to legitimate the dictatorship, the growing middle class projected their desire for social mobility and material gain into a university degree, making university education a “practical” need to many in Brazil. Yet universities themselves brought these different groups together, serving as the unifying discursive field through which political and social actors from all parts of the political spectrum entered into dialog. Through debates over the roles of universities and university-

trained white-collar professionals, divergent groups formulated a single vision of the university as central to personal and national development in Brazil, even while their opinions of what constituted “development” varied greatly. Thus, universities in Brazil functioned as discursive sites in which everybody had a stake; they were expansive and pliable, unifying various groups that had similar goals but wildly varying ideologies.

Most visibly, universities in Brazil during the military dictatorship were physical spaces where the dialog between the military regime and students and faculty played out, often in violent ways. When the military invaded campuses in Rio de Janeiro in 1966, in Brasília in 1968 or in any number of other instances throughout the country, the brutality of that dialog was on display for all of Brazil to see. The expulsion of “dangerous” professors also revealed the ways in which the military could enforce its will on campuses. Yet such instances stand out exactly because of their uniqueness.45 Just as importantly, universities occupied central places in the discursive struggle over development, class, and nation in Brazil, whether through new state policies, professional outrage over the inability to find jobs upon graduation, or on-campus student protests and pamphlets.

demanding reform. In this way, universities were both physical and discursive sites of contestation and negotiation.

Two theoretical frameworks are useful in understanding the universities’ role in Brazilian discourse. Maxine Molyneux’s understanding of practical interests and strategic interests provides us with a valuable way to understand the heterogeneous demands students and other groups made. According to Molyneux, strategic interests focus on subordination and “the formulation of an alternative, more satisfactory set of arrangements to those which exist,” while practical interests focus on “an immediate perceived need, and they do not generally entail a strategic goal.” In the case of student demands in Brazil in the 1964-1985 period, objectives like an end to the dictatorship or torture constituted strategic interests, while issues like better restaurant food or improved educational infrastructure constituted practical interests. Although Molyneux’s original framework applies to women’s movements, her understanding of strategic issues and practical needs is also valuable in understanding the various demands Brazilian students made.

In analyzing universities as discursive battlefields, Michel de Certeau’s understanding of strategic struggles and tactical struggles is also useful. Unlike Molyneux, who focuses on interest groups, de Certeau’s framing of tactical and strategic struggles provides a framework that incorporates physical and rhetorical sites of struggle. According to de Certeau, tactical struggles over issues such as

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amnesty and an end to repression, or what Molyneux would consider “strategic demands,” lacked a physical locus from which students could base their critiques of the government. Instead, these struggles were defined by particular temporal events, such as the death of a colleague or the declaration of new repressive measures that were beyond the students’ control. Though these struggles were reactive, students were able to use these events to push for broader political struggles. By contrast, de Certeau’s strategic struggles are firmly tied to physical spaces, such as universities. In Brazil, students used their experiences on the campuses to challenge the military’s authority by criticizing its educational policies, the lack of infrastructural development, saturated job markets, and other issues.\(^48\) In doing so, they both defined the issues that the military regime would have to deal with, while also struggling with and responding to the government’s own vision over the role the university should play in Brazilian development and democracy. While Molyneux and de Certeau apply the term “strategic” to two different dynamics of struggle, the broader distinction between more concrete, physically situated demands versus more amorphous and abstract political principles is the essential distinction I wish to make here.

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\(^{48}\) Michel de Certeau originally came up with the notion of “tactics” versus “strategies.” According to de Certeau, the former are temporal struggles, in which a group or groups have no “proper locus” in which they can challenge authority. Thus, tactics are dependent upon and gain validity through specific temporal moments beyond the group’s initial control. By contrast, strategies are grounded in spatial relations, in which there is a proper, physical place “that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats […] can be managed.” While de Certeau’s insistence that tactics are merely an “art of the weak” and his suggestion of tactics and strategies as an either/or proposition are limited, his typology of different types of resistance is useful nonetheless. See Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 35-39.
Students did not simply employ these tactics and strategies in a vacuum. Their complaints and protests continued to respond to the military’s policies in a complex nexus of discursive struggle between students and the state under military rule. Throughout the twenty-one years of the dictatorship, military governments and students were very much aware of the others’ demands, actions, and rhetoric. Just as the Brazilian military continued to use the state to mold educational policy to visions of development and to try to prevent student agitation, students continued to challenge the state’s policies and the conditions of the universities at individual campuses throughout the country. In this regard, students were involved in a constant interaction and dialogue with state policies, adapting to and shaping the new political and educational landscape. As students expressed their concern over issues as diverse as torture, amnesty, campus restaurants, and high expulsion rates, they discursively contested and demonstrated against the state’s definitions not only of what role the universities would play, but how democracy and economic development in Brazil actually functioned. These definitions often directly engaged with and reshaped the military’s visions, impacting governmental policy as much as governmental policies affected students’ concerns in the 1970s. This process could and did include coercion, in the form of arrests, torture, and even deaths of students. It also included limited consent, as when students framed their arguments by accepting some of the military government’s new educational policies in the 1970s but reshaped them to their own expectations and interests as an emerging middle class. In acknowledging some of the government’s reforms and rejecting
others, students engaged in a “dialectic of culture”\textsuperscript{49} with technocrats, politicians, and the state under military rule. All of these processes reveal the ways in which the middle class increasingly participated in a process of cultural hegemony with the government that drew on Gramsci’s original understanding of hegemony as both coercion \textit{and} consent.\textsuperscript{50}

As the Brazilian middle class grew and took on an increasing importance in the military’s vision of development in the 1960s and 1970s, middle-class actors increasingly interacted with the military government, entering into a hegemonic struggle over their role and future. This relationship often took on a coercive nature, as the military responded to student protests with repression and clamped down on freedom of expression. Yet it also involved consent, as when students challenged the military for failing to fulfill the promises of the 1968 university reform. In doing so, they implicitly accepted the military’s new policy even while criticizing the military for failing to meet their expectations. Nor was this consent negotiated solely from the bottom up. In its implementation of

\textsuperscript{49} E.P. Thompson, “Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle Without Class?” \textit{Social History} 3:2 (1978): 133-165. William Roseberry was rightly critical of the simple polarization inherent in Thompson’s original “field of force,” which, as Roseberry put it, “is bipolar, and most of the social situations with which we are familiar are infinitely more complex.” In the case of Brazil, Roseberry’s critique is accurate; students were far too heterogeneous to completely oppose the state or its policies in the bipolar manner that Thompson suggested. However, the fact that various groups were struggling with the state over the cultural, social, and political role of universities, in a complex process that continued to influence and be influenced by state policy, makes Thompson’s understanding of a cultural dialectic germane. See William Roseberry, “Hegemony and the Language of Contention,” in Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., \textit{Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico}, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), pp. 355-366.

\textsuperscript{50} Although the question of how to define “hegemony” is present throughout Gramsci’s work, his “Notes on Italian History” are particularly useful in dealing with this question in depth. See Antonio Gramsci, \textit{Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci}, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds., (New York: International Publishers, 1999), pp. 40-120.
university reform, the military dictatorship found itself agreeing with students on the shortcomings of the university system in the 1960s, even while their ideologies differed. Thus, with university reform, the military dictatorship sought not only to improve national development, but to increase its support and the population’s consent by addressing one of the biggest issues that students and others had used to challenge the regime’s legitimacy in the 1960s. The middle class and the military government as “historical blocs” (however internally heterogeneous) sought “legitimation” through hegemonic struggles. These hegemonic struggles between the state and society during Brazil’s dictatorship ebbed and flowed as middle-class identity solidified, in turn leading to a middle class that, “as it develop[ed] in the economic sphere, [found] some values more congenial than others, more resonant with its everyday experience.”51 When the military governments could not address those values, the middle class turned against the dictatorship, revealing the limitations of the military’s hegemonic efforts towards legitimacy and ultimately fueling the return to democracy in Brazil in 1985. The idea of the “historical bloc,” however, must be used cautiously. It connotes homogeneity when “historical blocs” could actually be quite heterogeneous within.

Finally, in focusing on these debates over development, it is important to contextualize what exactly development meant. Ever since the formation of Brazil’s First Republic in 1889, the political and economic elites had been concerned with Brazil’s modernization and “development.” Promises to meet

Brazil’s full developmental potential dated back to the founding of the First Republic in 1889, as evidenced in Brazil’s most enduring positivist symbol, the national flag, which bears the slogan “Order and Progress” to this date.

Throughout the 20th century, presidents made promises to meet Brazil’s potential, be it extending telegraph wires while exploring Brazil’s interior in the early 20th century, the centralization of federal power and increased industrialization of the Vargas Years, projects like Brasília and the Rio do Vale steelworks during the Kubitschek years, or Goulart’s promises to make Brazil economically independent of foreign powers.52

In the second half of the twentieth century, different groups in Brazil had different understandings of what constituted “national development.” Yet the debates over development between 1955 and 1990 originated from a context particular to Brazil. The beginning of the 1929 Great Depression had catastrophic effects on Brazil’s economy, which was based on coffee exportation. With the global economic crash, demand for coffee and other goods like sugar plummeted, and Brazil had no major alternative source of income for the national economy. In response, Getúlio Vargas began a policy of import-substitution industrialization (ISI), which sought to enhance national economic independence by rapidly building and expanding national industry. In this way, Brazil (and other Latin

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American countries that turned to ISI) could diversify national production while also becoming more self-sufficient, producing their own manufactured goods rather than importing them from other countries. Although cracks emerged in ISI by the 1960s, the military governments of the 1960s-1980s continued to turn to rapid industrialization and scientific improvements as the engines of national development in the hopes of making Brazil even more “modernized” and self-sufficient. At the same time, groups like leftists, students, and scholars declared that development hinged on a greater equality between social classes, and demanded a mixture of national economic independence with social programs to reduce inequalities. Thomas Skidmore has called this blend “radical nationalism” and pointed out that it extended well beyond Communists and members of the Old Left. **53** What emerged during this period were two poles: one, representing the Brazilian government’s vision, that viewed development as economic and based on a collaboration between private enterprise and the state (laying the groundwork for the later neoliberal policies of the 1990s in Brazil), and the other drawing from leftist ideas that framed national development in terms of often-vague calls for social justice and equality alongside economic growth, best represented by students.

When analyzing students, it is important to keep in mind that, as with any set of social actors, students were a heterogeneous group, with different ideologies, goals, voices, and opinions. The scholarship on students in Brazil has tended to equate the National Student Union (UNE) to “the” student movement.

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Yet not all students who dialogued with and protested against the government were activists or connected with UNE. Sometimes students demanded issues like university reform even while allying with the military dictatorship. Additionally, issues like university reform could take on myriad meanings, ultimately leading to many student movements, rather than “a” student movement. Finally, as this dissertation will argue, UNE periodically found itself having to recalibrate its own agenda to better respond to students’ demands. While much of the scholarly focus has emphasized the radical leaders of UNE, most students were moderates who did not share radical leaders’ ideologies. This is not to say that the two groups did not have overlapping interests, however; rather, students could and did share similar goals, even if the ends differed. Where one radical student might want reform to lead to a socialist society, another might desire reform to provide better libraries or food on campus, or a simple curricular reform. Referring to “the” student movement does not do justice to the variety of motivations, beliefs, organizations, and discursive tactics students employed.

Students from diverse ideological and social backgrounds made a variety of demands regarding universities, in turn simultaneously revealing the heterogeneity of students and the power of the university as a unifying discursive field. Students came from a variety of ideological and social backgrounds, and often had competing visions of what the university’s exact role was. Similarly, their push for university reform was not a simple matter of resisting military rule. Students, along with their parents, pedagogues, white-collar professionals, military officers, politicians, and others often negotiated, collaborated, and
compromised in defining reform. Thus, while resistance and repression were a significant component of the debate over the future of Brazil’s universities and the country itself, state and society often relied upon more complex and nuanced forms of negotiation that included dialog and similar goals and interests. Nor were the “radicals” and the “moderates” clearly defined internally; numerous radical groups formed in the 1960s over what appeared superficially to be minor quibbles. Similarly, “moderate” students rarely uniformly agreed on what issues were worth fighting for and which were not. In this way, some moderates could find themselves agreeing more with radical leaders than with other moderates or conservatives, and vice versa. Thus, while a division between “moderates” and “radicals” suggests that student movements were polar rather than heterogeneous, the variety of concerns and different emphases on different issues within the “moderate” and “radical” camps belies a dualistic division within student forces.

Likewise, “the” military dictatorship was no more monolithic than the student movements. Different military presidents had alternative visions and goals for Brazil’s universities and development. Throughout the twenty-one year military regime, internal conflicts and disagreements were constant. Yet these struggles were seldom leaked to the public. In this regard, when studying Brazil’s dictatorship, it is useful to remember Derek Sayer’s idea of the “mask of state,” in which governments disagree behind closed doors even while presenting a public front of unity to the populace. Other scholars have demonstrated just how deep some of these rifts were in recent years.54 Consequently, though I refer to “the”
military dictatorship, I also make a point of referring to “military governments” and “military administrations” to remind readers that, across twenty-one years, five presidencies, and one junta, Brazil’s military dictatorship was shifting and rarely completely unified.

In order to bring together these divergent issues of class politics, state-society relations, education, development, and nation, this dissertation draws on a wide range of sources. Secret police documents from the Arquivo Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (APERJ) and the Arquivo Nacional (AN) provided excellent details regarding student demands. Jeffrey Lesser has commented on the methodological challenges scholars face when dealing with documents that involve narratives and details extracted only after the use of torture (or threat of torture).55 While this is often the case for many documents within the archives of various Brazilian security apparatuses before and during the military dictatorship, not all secret police documents were based on information extracted after the state’s use of torture. Indeed, many of the documents in archives from the Departamento de Ordem Política e Social (DOPS) at APERJ and the Divisão de Segurança e Informações (DSI) at the AN simply served as basic reports of the activities, student or otherwise, that police agents witnessed taking place on campuses. These reports did not rely on torture; additionally, they often transcribed, paraphrased, and even included in annexes the pamphlets,

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newspapers, and posters found on campuses and elsewhere, all of which were material simply taken from walls or handed out by students. In addition to simply offering insight into how Brazil’s security apparatus viewed particular “threats” from a political and ideological standpoint, these collections also offer us (via their numerous appendices and photocopies) first-hand documents from universities, factories, think tanks, and other groups that would otherwise be difficult to access.

This dissertation also draws on APERJ’s collections of underground newspapers and the private collections of radical student leaders such as Jean Marc von der Weid and Daniel Aarão Reis. The documents in these collections include many radical analyses of the political, social, and economic contexts confronting Brazil in the 1960s. However, many of these documents include nuanced analyses of student actions and the military’s responses. These documents, particularly in the Aarão Reis collection, also reveal the issues that radical leaders had in convincing their more moderate brethren to join in radical causes. Additionally, these documents often include quotations or full appendices of non-radical pamphlets, newspapers, and other student documents, making them important repositories in understanding not just the radical left itself, but the student movements more generally.

Private collections at the AN and Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas (CPDOC) in Rio de Janeiro provided invaluable resources for understanding the complex debates over higher education in Brazil. Documents in the Ernesto Geisel
collection at CPDOC and the Luís Viana Filho collection at the AN provided fascinating and rare glimpses into education and the military dictatorship behind the “masks of state.” The IPES and Paulo de Assis Ribeiro collections at the AN and documents from Anísio Teixeira, Eugênio Gûdin, and numerous other private collections at CPDOC proved invaluable in helping me incorporate pedagogues and business leaders into my narrative.

I also conducted research at the Regional Coordinator of the National Archive (COREG) in Brasília, where the Ministry of Education and Culture’s archive stores thousands of internal memos, policy drafts, reports to the president, and statistical data on education nationwide as well as at particular institutions. Thus, as with many other collections at COREG, the MEC collection offered me unprecedented access to the internal workings of a branch of the military dictatorship between 1968 and the early-1980s. At the same time, the bureaucratic nature of these documents often leaves us with faceless documents, and the stories of the individual bureaucrats remain hidden. Nonetheless, these documents do reveal the uncertainties, shifts, and debates within the bureaucratic apparatus under the Brazilian military dictatorship, providing a new way to understand the workings of the regime. The result is a much more multi-faceted analysis of the complexities of state-society relations in Brazil than scholarship that focuses simply on repression and resistance.

Finally, this dissertation draws on both personal and published interviews. On these latter sources, the Projeto Memória Estudantil (Student Memory Project) has proven invaluable. In an attempt to provide a comprehensive history of the
National Student Union (UNE) from its origins to the present, the Projeto interviewed student leaders from from the 1930s to the present, culminating in the publication of the book of the book Memórias Estudantis: Da Fundação da UNE aos Nossos Dias. Typical to narratives of the student movement, the book focuses primarily on the political aspects of students’ struggles in UNE; however, the interviews from the Projeto itself are far more extensive and complicated. With the help of private companies and public institutions, the Projeto made the full transcripts of these interviews available to researchers online.\footnote{See http://www.mme.org.br/main.asp?View={017C677B-B51B-4952-8C5E-89EC5C37A9D0}.} In the full transcripts of these interviews, student leaders acknowledge the shortcomings or flaws in their struggles in hindsight. The interviews of activists during the military regime, often exceeding thirty pages of transcription, discuss not only political ideologies or beliefs, but also the quotidian struggles that UNE confronted, conditions on campuses, the family background of activists, and many other topics. These documents are still an invaluable resource to scholars on Brazil’s student movement and national politics from 1937 onward, providing a level of detail in both political and personal matters that are difficult to find in the archival record, making student movements much more “human” than secret police documents can.

At the same time, the Projeto Memória Estudantil’s emphasis on leaders from the ME has reinforced the domination of radical students in the narrative of student movements in Brazil. As a result, I have supplemented these interviews with my own interviews with regional student leaders and with students who did
not participate in the student movements directly, self-identifying as moderates or even conservatives while they were in school. Together, these interviews have allowed me to move beyond the leftist leaders most often associated with anti-dictatorship struggles to incorporate students whose names are not a part of the main narrative. They too were active participants and witnesses to the transformations in Brazilian universities and society during the military dictatorship.

Although most of my research was based in Rio de Janeiro, my dissertation truly is national in its scope. By focusing on universities as both discursive and physical sites of resistance, I look at the student movement nationally while simultaneously demonstrating regional particularities. Governmental policies before and during the military dictatorship affected federal universities and private schools throughout the country. Previous scholarship on student movements has tended to place Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Bahia as centers of student resistance. However, the periodization of my research from 1957 to 1990 allows me to incorporate not only those major metropolitan areas, but also traditionally “peripheral” states such as Rio Grande do Sul, Maranhão, Mato Grosso do Sul, Espírito Santo, Amazonas and others. In this regard, this work is unique among the historiography on student movements and the military dictatorship.

Chapter One traces the rise of debates about the university system in Brazil in the decade leading up to the dictatorship. Between 1955 and 1964, students gradually formulated a coherent call for university reform, turning their
gaze inward towards higher education and away from the broader national political struggles for issues like the nationalization of oil in the early-1950s. Students’ voices were anything but unified. As this chapter demonstrates, while a minority of leftist leaders increasingly placed universities within a broader struggle for social equality in the Cold War context, many other students were concerned with the quotidian struggles they faced in schools, leading to a gulf between UNE’s leadership and the majority of Brazilian students. Simultaneously, the new accelerated developmentalist policies of Juscelino Kubitschek, perfectly summarized by his desire to advance “fifty years in five,” led to universities occupying new space in the national government’s vision of development. This emphasis on universities as the vanguard for social and economic transformation would continue through Jânio Quadros’s brief administration and into João Goulart’s turbulent presidency. Pedagogical experts and conservative business leaders joined in the fray, making the debate over universities part of a broader debate between multiple sectors of society and the state. These various actors laid the groundwork for subsequent struggles between the military regime and society, while also revealing early malleability of universities in discursive struggles over ideology, development, and class.

Chapter Two focuses on the military regime’s educational rhetoric and policy between 1964 and 1968. During its first four years, the military dictatorship relied more on speeches and study groups than policy implementation when it addressed the need to transform university education. Although the military sought to exert total control over the issue, it constantly found itself
butting up against and having to respond to students’ demands and protests. As a result, the military increasingly turned to repression to monopolize the discourse over university reform. In doing so, however, it inadvertently brought middle-class parents and pedagogues into the fray, with the result that universities became a central part of the public debate in the early years of the dictatorship. This led to a struggle in which many actors participated, agreeing on the need for university reform even while struggling over goals and implementation. This debate culminated in the military regime issuing the University Reform and the repressive Institutional Act No. 5 (Ato Institucional No. 5, AI-5) just two weeks apart at the end of 1968, setting the educational, social, and political context for the 1970s. Ironically, the state had finally passed a long-standing demand while simultaneously repressing its most vocal advocates.

Chapter Three moves into how society shaped and responded to the military dictatorship’s educational policies, repression, and developmentalism, focusing on students, parents, business-leaders, and pedagogues between 1964 and 1968. In these years, the arrival of the dictatorship fundamentally shifted student demands. In response, UNE leaders incorporated quotidian demands into UNE’s platform in order to gain more followers, leading to a context in which practical demands for university reform became tied to strategic anti-dictatorship sentiment. This new context helped the organization bridge that pre-1964 gap between the vanguard and the masses within the student movements. Even students who supported the military dictatorship called for university reform in these years, demonstrating that reform had become a central platform in students’
struggles in spite of competing ideologies. At the same time, parents who had supported the dictatorship entered into the debate over education and democracy as the government increasingly responded to their children’s demand for greater access to higher education with violence. At the same time, conservative business leaders concerned with the future of the country’s economy pushed the dictatorship to reform the university system with the hopes of spurring the business class. Although these groups came from diverse ideological backgrounds, they collectively placed the university system at the center of national development and pressured the government. As these demands grew, the relationship between middle class expectations and university education strengthened.

Chapter Four follows the state under military control between 1969 and 1979. It details the marked shift in the state’s approach to universities after the University Reform. After 1968, the passage of University Reform forced the government to shift from rhetoric to implementation of policies that expanded and improved university education, particularly in areas like engineering and medicine, to transform Brazil’s economy. In implementing these policies, the military governments of Emílio Garrastazu Médici and Ernesto Geisel gave the middle class a new social, economic, and political importance that it had not had before, demonstrating the ways in which external forces like state policy played a role in solidifying class identity in Brazil. Nonetheless, shortcomings in the University Reform and subsequent related policies, as well as increasing
economic, political, and social unrest constantly forced the military to re-evaluate and reform its own policies throughout the 1970s.

Chapter Five returns to students and white-collar professionals between 1969 and 1979. While UNE was all but extinct by 1972, students did not stop mobilizing. Rather, this chapter shows how students re-framed their demands to respond to both the post-Reform context and to the heightened political repression. With UNE gone and a national movement all but impossible, students focused on local struggles, turning to professional organizations and regional encounters to formulate and circulate their demands. Additionally, as the University Reform changed the structure and curricula in the Brazilian university system, the simultaneous economic turbulence of the late-1970s led to students increasingly incorporating material and economic issues into their challenges against the dictatorship. This shift marked a subtle but important transformation in student movements. Students became critical of the government not only for the failings within the university reform, but for its inability to address their needs as eventual white-collar professionals. In these years, student movements increasingly embraced the markers of middle-class identity and incorporated them into their struggle against the dictatorship rather than addressing human rights violations head on.

Chapter Six examines the final six years of the dictatorship. In this period, president João Figueiredo tried to complete the “slow and gradual” end of the dictatorship even while Brazil’s economy rapidly spiraled out of control. In terms of education policy, Figueiredo departed from his predecessors, shifting his
emphasis away from the universities and placing elementary schools and rural education at the center of his development plans. Even as Figueiredo redirected his attention elsewhere, however, universities assumed a new importance in Brazilian politics. Students continued to mobilize against the dictatorship, striking over conditions in the universities, and participating actively in movements like the fight for a direct presidential election in 1985. The return of UNE facilitated this process somewhat; yet UNE also faced its own challenges as it returned, as many students were leery or unreceptive to the radical leadership’s demands. As a result, UNE’s return was marked by both external pressures and internal divisions that gave the student movements of the 1980s a more multi-faceted nature. At the same time, as important as students were in resisting the military government, they were no longer alone. New middle class actors joined students in mobilizing heavily against the dictatorship between 1979 and 1985. University professors and staff, doctors, engineers, and bankers all turned against the dictatorship as its economic policies did not fulfill their material expectations as white-collar workers. The return of exiles following the 1979 amnesty coupled with economic instability contributed to a middle class that was both well-educated and politicized. Thus, even as the military regime de-emphasized universities and the middle class that they trained, those same middle-class workers took on an unprecedented level of political and social participation to challenge the military.

The Conclusion briefly looks at the years of 1985-1998. Although the military dictatorship came to an end in 1985, the issues that dominated discourse during the regime did not simply disappear just because the state had changed.
The economy continued to worsen through the 1980s, and students continued to demand a “true” university reform that could satisfy their varying ideological, material, and educational demands. Likewise, the civilian government of José Sarney (1985-1989) returned to an emphasis on higher education as a means to help Brazil out of its troubled times. New political actors such as the Workers’ Party (PT) and neo-liberals under the guidance of president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002) incorporated universities into their own platforms and policies. The issue of university reform would continue to be central to Brazil’s political and social discourse well after the military had exited the stage.
Chapter One – The Ivory Tower, or the Tower of Babel? The Origins of University Reform, 195-1964

The subject of university reform was a major piece of student resistance to the military dictatorship in Brazil. However, the issues behind students’ demands actually pre-dated the dictatorship by several years. Students originally focused on the generic need for pedagogical reforms, but as the 1950s and 1960s progressed, more radical student leaders increasingly outlined a vision of universities that placed them at the center of social transformations through programs such as literacy campaigns for the poor. At the same time, a more moderate majority of students focused on specific issues they confronted on a daily basis within universities: the instructional system itself, infrastructural inadequacies, even simple things like non-functioning drinking fountains. Although these strains varied, in both cases students began to define not only the role of ideal universities, but also the nature of Brazilian development and the nation. Additionally, they demanded a broader voice within university administration to effect these changes, as well as turning to strikes to make their demands heard. In doing so, universities became both discursive and physical sites of debate over the direction of national development and the role of higher education within it prior to military rule.

Although university reform played an increasingly central role within student movements in the late-1950s and early-1960s, scholarly works on student movements have overlooked the participation of other groups in debates over the role of universities in Brazilian society and development. Politicians, technocrats,
pedagogues, and private citizens were also increasingly concerned with Brazil’s economic and political development, and placed the universities at the center of debates and policies on development and growth. However, these visions often were as heterogeneous as the groups debating them. Although Brazilian universities served only a scant portion of Brazil’s overall population, the universities came to have national prominence within the discourse on the nation that politicians, business leaders, and even military leaders articulated. However, these groups varied on the particulars regarding the institutional role of universities and the social role of students. These debates would come to have increasing importance as the 1960s progressed, laying the foundation for a vision of nation and development that hinged on middle-class labor.

**Imperialism or Infrastructure?: Students and Calls for University Reform**

Although the National Students’ Union (UNE) only began to take shape in the late-1930s, Brazilian students had been active in politics since the colonial period. Students educated at individual *faculdades*, or post-secondary schools, had been the leaders of major political and social change for generations, but they had never formally organized their own political-cultural organizations. An organized student movement was born in the midst of Getúlio Vargas’s Estado Novo, just as Brazil’s university system was beginning to take shape.

In 1937, students gathered at the Brazilian Student House in Rio de Janeiro, with the intention of forming their own organization. The meeting took

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place with the government’s consent, and Minister of Education Gustavo
Capanema inaugurated the ceremonies. Some consider this meeting to be the
founding of the National Students’ Union (União Nacional dos Estudantes,
UNE). However, students did not adopt the organizational name of União
Nacional dos Estudantes until 1938, at the II National Congress of Students.
UNE’s founders had still wanted to call its 1938 meeting the “First National
Congress,” but when one of the participants from the 1910 meeting got wind of
UNE’s intentions, he allegedly threatened to sue. Thus, they settled on calling
their meeting the “Second National Congress,” which avoided offending the
participants of the 1910 meeting and even suggested a legacy of activism upon
which the founders were building upon.58 At the same time, proclaiming their
meeting the “second” after the 1910 meeting denied the legitimacy of the 1937
meeting by failing to acknowledge it as the “first” (or “second”) meeting of
students. This was important to several of the new organization’s leaders, as they
believed that the 1937 participants were too closely connected and subservient to
the Vargas administration. Instead, they hold that the Second National Congress
in 1938 marked the true beginning of the student movement, because it was there
that students staked out a position independent of Vargas or any other political
party as well as calling themselves UNE. Whatever the official founding date,
UNE quickly came to play a prominent role in national politics.

When the Second National Congress took place in 1938, representatives
from nearly eighty universities, isolated colleges, and high schools attended,

58 See Poerner, O Poder Jovem, Ch. 6; Maria Paula Araújo, Memórias Estudantis: Da
and Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Irum Sant’Anna, p. 6.
along with professors and even a representative from MEC. There, they discussed a variety of issues ranging from illiteracy to the national steel industry. UNE established its first official Directory and provided a Plan for Educational Reform. The Plan focused on both political and pedagogical problems, including modernization of the university system, promotion and development of research, a meritocratic system for student admissions, and students’ participation in the election of rectors.  

Although these demands indicated an early concern with the condition of education in Brazil, and especially university education, they remained relatively generalized. Indeed, a focus on educational reform quickly fell to the wayside as students shifted their efforts to broader political and social issues. By the 1940s, students were increasingly active and present on the national stage. They were at the front of successful efforts to pressure the Vargas administration, which had fascist sympathizers in its administration, to enter World War II on the side of the allies. In 1948, students protested the increase of public transportation rates in Rio, resulting in the official foundation of the Brazilian Union of Secondary Students (UBES) and in a police invasion of UNE’s headquarters. By the late 1940s, student leaders in UNE pushed for the “economic and territorial

59 The “Plano de sugestões para reforma educational aprovado no II Congresso nacional de estudantes” laid out UNE’s objectives, including struggles for educational reform, and was reprinted in the 1970s in student journals. Arquivo Público do estado do Rio de Janeiro (herein, APERJ), Coleção Jean Marc van der Weid, Pasta 6, “Revista do DCE Livre Alexandre Vanucci Leme,” pp. 9-11. See also Fávero, A UNE em Tempos de Autoritarismo, pp. 17-19.

60 For students and World War II, see Poerner, O Poder Jovem, Ch. 7; Araújo, Memórias Estudantis, pp. 31-46; Cunha, A Universidade Crítica, pp. 285-289. For more on fascist sympathizers in the Estado Novo, see Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964, pp. 38-39.

61 For the police invasion, see Fávero, A UNE em Tempos de Autoritarismo, p. 23, and Poerner, O Poder Jovem, pp. 188-189. For UBES, see Araújo, Memórias Estudantis, pp. 68-69.
patrimony” of Brazil, including the *O Petróleo é Nosso* (“It’s Our Oil”) campaign in the late-1940s and early-1950s that led to the formation of the state-run industry Petrobrás.62

Although the oil campaign did not focus on education, students played a notable role in the debate. The battle over oil was highly charged, and not limited to students or politicians. In the context of post-war world increasingly polarized by the onset of the Cold War, conservative members of the military viewed the push for nationalization as “radical.” When it became clear that opposing nationalization was politically costly, conservative military leaders re-directed and re-shaped the rhetoric of nationalizing oil to fit their own ideological vision of the path Brazil should take, reframing nationalization as a matter of national security.63 In so doing, they re-formulated and re-shaped students’ demands to fit their own developmentalist agendas, a strategy that they would repeat in the coming decades.64

While UNE focused on national issues in the 1940s and 1950s, students in both high schools and universities continued to address educational policy. In 1950, the leadership of UBES, claiming to represent 300,000 students throughout Brazil, demanded a National Convention of Secondary Students explicitly to resist “the increase of taxes and annual fees” in their schools. UBES also called


64  See Chapter 3.
for “more funding for education!” In the mid-1950s high school students in Brasília also called for reforms in the public schooling system at all levels.

University students at the Fluminense School of Philosophy in Rio de Janeiro state recalled fighting for improvements and for the school’s incorporation into a federally funded university. Ultimately, the Philosophy School would be a part of the newly-created Federal University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UFERJ), which would later be re-named the Fluminense Federal University (UFF).

However, these struggles remained isolated from any sustained national push for educational reform. Throughout the 1940s and early-1950s, UNE focused more on national issues and supporting student culture than on the conditions in Brazil’s universities.

By the late-1950s, UNE shifted its focus to the conditions of the universities themselves. In the late-1940s, the organization had divided between groups from the left and from the right. Between 1950 and 1956, conservative students controlled UNE. However, by the mid-1950s, the progressive wave had begun to win out among students as groups like the Catholic University Youth (JUC) and the Catholic Student Youth (JEC) emerged. As a result, leftists again returned to power in UNE in 1956. Under this new leadership, UNE sponsored

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65 Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea, Rio de Janeiro (herein CPDOC), CMa mês ce 1947.03.10, “Manifesto aos estudantes e ao povo brasileiro!”, 9 February 1950.

66 Published interview with Cláudio Fonteles, p. 3.

67 Personal Interview with AP, 26 November 2007.

68 The president of Rio’s Metropolitan Students’ Union, Paulo Egydio Martins, was a major figure behind the scenes in this period. Martins would later become General Artur Costa e Silva’s Minister of Industry and Commerce during the dictatorship. See Araujo, Memórias Estudantis, pp. 78-81.
the First National Seminar of Educational Reform in Rio de Janeiro in 1957. This seminar marked the first time that UNE explicitly declared the need for national university reform. Although the seminar still focused on basic pedagogical issues without incorporating broader social and political issues, it nonetheless marked the “student movement’s awakening” to the need for “a more systemic fight for reform.” In spite of later criticisms that the seminar was more concerned with the structural issues than with expanding university education to the poorer sectors of society, UNE still recognized the meeting as a shift towards examining the role of the university within Brazilian society. In this regard, the 1957 seminar was a watershed; for the first time since the 1938 Conference, UNE considered educational reforms on the national level. In doing so, UNE laid the groundwork for student struggles over education for the next thirty years.

Students also participated in the ongoing struggle over the Law of Directives and Basic Reforms (LDB) in Congress. Originally proposed in the 1940s, the LDB had stalled before Congress, as conservative and progressive politicians continued to fight over the exact extent of the reforms and where education fit within it. An increasingly progressive worldview on the parts of students provided them a juridical vehicle to criticize the conditions of universities and education. Students expressed the ideological preference for publicly-funded universities over private universities, which were then still a

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70  APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Polícias Política, L514, Luta Atual pela Reforma Universitária, p. 13 [original italics].
minority. Perhaps paradoxically, students who had been admitted to the universities suddenly began attacking those institutions as “fields of the Brazilian elite.” That they themselves were part of that elite did not seem to bother them. They began to demand that universities expand and become more available to poorer sectors of society, reflecting the more progressive ideology of UNE’s leadership after 1956. By the late-1950s and early-1960s, isolated student strikes took place at federal universities in Bahia, Pernambuco, Minas Gerais, and Goiás. In these strikes, university students began to demand administrative and infrastructural reforms. While these instances were not the nation-wide strikes that would occur in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, they indicated that students were already using collective action to demand reform within individual universities.

Students also protested and fought for other issues tangentially related to the university system, such as student discounts for public transportation and movie theaters and the quality of university restaurants, an issue that would explode in the 1970s. As one former student pointed out, student IDs were worthless if they did not offer benefits, and UNE derived a significant amount of its funding from students paying for IDs. Thus, transportation and movie

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71 For just a handful of examples of ex-students’ observations on the presence of elites and the middle-class in Brazilian universities, see published interview with Clemente Rosas in Túlio Velho Barreto and Laurindo Ferreira, orgs., Na trilha do golpe: 1964 revisitado (Recife: Fundação Joaquim Nabuco – Instituto de Pesquisas Sociais, 2004), pp. 180-81, and Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Arthur Poerner, p. 4; Marcelo Cerqueira, p. 17; and Marco Maciel, p. 4.

discounts were directly tied to UNE’s ability to raise money. Individual *faculdades*, or colleges, and not UNE, controlled the restaurants. Although not nearly as important to student struggles as they would be in the 1960s and 1970s, restaurants in the late-1950s nonetheless served as important physical and discursive sites where students tried to exert their own autonomy within higher education.

Students had a history of seeking dialogue with the government prior to the Kubitschek administration. The demands to join the allies in World War II, the fight against the Estado Novo in the mid-1940s, and the campaign to nationalize oil production were just a handful of examples of this “dialog.” Yet they never pressured the government on the issue of educational reform. By the late-1950s, though, university reform had come to form a major centerpiece in students’ dialogues with and addresses to the president. Several student leaders recalled meetings with presidents Juscelino Kubitschek and João Goulart, remembering formal meetings and an access to the president that students had never had before. One former student and historian even recalled Goulart visiting UNE headquarters in the early-1960s, proudly pointing to the “prestige of UNE in those days!” Student dialogues with Kubitschek and with Goulart, be they face-

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73 Projeto Memória Estudantil, published Interview with Pedro Simon, p. 4.


75 Quote from Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Arthur José Poerner, p. 2. For other recollections of UNE’s contact with Kubitschek, Goulart, and with education officials of both administrations, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Luis Raul Machado, p. 3; Marco Maciel, pp. 4-5; Pedro Simon, p. 5; Sepúlveda Pertence, p. 3. See also Araujo, *Memórias Estudantis*, pp. 85-89. One student recalled that this access was limited to
to-face meetings, strikes and issuing manifestos, marked a new phase of state-student relations, one which increasingly revolved around educational demands and sublimating national issues to the question of university reform. However, as the 1960s dawned, the national student movement identified and critiqued broader social problems alongside problems in the university system. They began to offer solutions that would both improve Brazil’s university system and lead to a more socially democratic and equal society. 

Student demands were not well received during the brief seven-month administration of President Jânio Quadros in 1961. In that year, students went on strike at the Federal Rural University in Pernambuco to protest the lack of classes in the school and to demand the removal of the university rector. Quadros’s Minister of Education met with the students, but instead of resolving the issue, he sent in the military. After the military coup, this type of dialog continued and turned increasingly confrontational and heated.

While meetings with presidents were an important means to make their voices heard, students did not wait for presidential action to call for reform. In 1961, students took the initiative and held the First National Seminar on university students, and that the Union of Brazilian Secondary Students (UBES) did not have the same access. See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Franklin Martins, p. 7.


See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Marco Maciel, pp. 4-5. For narratives of the Quadros resignation, see Skidmore, Politics in Brazil 1930-1964, Chs. 6-7, and Gomes & Ferreira, Jango: As múltiplas faces, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2007), Ch. IV, which includes transcripts of interviews from contemporaries of Quadros.

See Chapter 2.
University Reform in Bahia. The Seminar occurred in the wake of a student strike in Salvador the previous year. The semantic difference from the 1957 Seminar was subtle but significant; whereas the earlier seminar focused on “Educational Reform,” students were now solely concerned with “University Reform.” The 1960 gathering produced the “Declaration of Bahia,” which situated the university in a broader matrix of social problems facing “Brazilian reality.” The Declaration emphasized the university’s formative role in the creation of leaders and its restriction to serving the middle- and upper-classes and the broader “capitalist” developmentalist attitudes in Brazil. The Declaration suggested higher education become more available to all sectors of society. When making these demands, students claimed that the poor conditions within the university system impeded the country’s ability to expand and improve national development. In doing so, they used dominant developmentalist discourse to frame their own appeals, criticisms, and solutions.

A year later, the Second National Seminar of University Reform took place in Curitiba, Paraná, resulting in the “Letter of Paraná.” At this meeting, students further expanded the Declaration of Bahia, explicitly linking social democracy to higher education in a way that set up “the future path for the entire fight for University Reform.” They demanded more federal funding for

[79] Maria de Lourdes de A. Fávero reprinted the entire Declaration of Bahia as an annex in her work on UNE. See A UNE em Tempos de Autoritarismo, pp. I-XXVII. See also APERJ, APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Polícias Politica, L514, Luta Atual pela Reforma Universitária, pp. 13-14, and Poerner, O Poder Jovem, pp. 200-203.

[80] Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” p. 49. See, also Poerner, O Poder Jovem, p. 201; and Fávero, A UNE em Tempos de Autoritarismo, pp. I-XXVII.
education, while also criticizing the “bourgeois” development models begun in the Kubitschek era. At the Third National Seminar on University Reform in Belo Horizonte in 1963, students drafted a new LDB to send to Congress “to transform the very content of the University.”¹⁸² UNE also published books such as its *Present Fight for University Reform*, which outlined both the history of struggles dating back to the 1950s and UNE’s new educational demands. Student leadership continued to make public speeches that connected university reform to social reform, be it at a gathering commemorating Getúlio Vargas in Cinelândia, Rio de Janeiro, in 1963, or president of UNE José Serra speaking before 250,000 people at a rally in Rio’s Central Plaza in 1964.¹⁸³

In these seminars, meetings, and manifestos, students’ demands remained similar, even as the rhetoric belied a growing progressivism among UNE’s leadership that reflected broader political polarizations taking place in Brazil in the 1960s.¹⁸⁴ This growing emphasis on broad structural reforms within society rather than basic infrastructural issues revealed a disconnect between UNE’s leadership and many students who simply wanted quotidian infrastructural issues to be resolved. As one former student put it, UNE’s leadership saw a divide

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¹⁸³ See Barreto and Ferreira, *Na trilha do golpe*, pp. 177-178. The exact content of Serra’s speech is unclear; historical accounts of Central focus on Leonel Brizola’s incendiary speech and Goulart’s speech, which revealed his full commitment to leftist causes, while overlooking the content of Serra’s (and others’) speeches. Even Serra, understandably overwhelmed by the sheer spectacle below him on the stage, does not recall what he said, remembering the event as just a blur. Projeto Memória Estudantil published interview with José Serra, p. 12.

¹⁸⁴ See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Antônio Carlos Peixoto, p. 9.
between politics and universities, wondering how students could “remain worried about the drinking fountain, when you have the problem of imperialism!”85

While UNE increasingly targeted “imperialism,” students increasingly mobilized over the conditions they confronted on campuses. At the Escola de Agronomia de Areia in Paraíba, students went on strike over the terrible hygienic conditions in student housing.86 Even politically conservative critics of the student movement declared that university students “sincerely” desired infrastructural reforms in the universities; these conservatives, however, blamed UNE for turning the student masses away via its “political” stances.87 While UNE tried to bridge this gap in the wake of the Carta do Paraná, the joining of leadership and the masses would not cement itself until after 1964, when university reform became a vehicle for students and the UNE leadership to confront drinking fountains and imperialism.

Filthy student housing and poor infrastructure were not the only daily issues students confronted on campuses in this period. The pedagogical structure itself came under attack. Students demanded reform of the position of the professor catedrático, the position many full-time professors held in Brazilian universities at the time. Once a professor achieved her or his status as a catedrático, the professor had absolute job security and no longer needed to

85 Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Antônio Serra, p. 18, and Antônio Carlos Peixoto, pp. 3, 9
research or publish. The *catedráticos*’ power went almost unchecked within classes, and students complained the position resembled “feudalism” and that the *catedráticos* simply passed their positions “from father to son.” The issue of *catedráticos* cut directly to both student experience and to a demand for a general re-structuring of the university system, in this case calling for a fundamental shift in the tenuring of professors. In a list of the “principal points” that students wanted to amend the LDB, abolishing the *catedra vitalicia* was the first reform they proposed. To fill the gap the abolition of *catedráticos* would create, UNE also called for the “departmentalization” of education. This restructuring would lead to professors who continued research, in turn benefiting students, professors, and the overall quality of scientific and technological research in Brazil.

Students also began to complain about the gradual introduction of annual fees, or *anuidades*. Public universities were supposedly free of cost. Students’ push against *anuidades* was fierce enough to gain the military’s attention. In a report titled “Loyalty to the Army,” officer Ulhoa Cintra stressed the need to combat growing “subversion” in Brazil, singling out UNE specifically and students more generally. While worried about “street riots,” he also expressed consternation over students’ demands for an end to the *anuidades* and the *catedra*, saying these issues were part of the “Brazilian Revolution” that was threatening the country. Cintra declared to his colleagues that students’ activities marked

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nothing less than “communism” and an effort “to torpedo governmental measures.” Although Cintra’s report saw threats to Brazil everywhere, his characterization of students’ activities foreshadowed the ways in which the military government would characterize student leaders and their demands as “subversive.”

Another issue that would continue to play a major role in students’ demands for university reform in the 1960s was the subject of vagas, or available positions in the university system. By the 1950s, the still-consolidating middle-class had begun to expect a university degree as part of their class status. The growing middle-class expectation of a university degree led bureaucrats within the Kubitschek administration to express concern over whether Brazil’s small university system would be able to address the growing demand for university education among the middle class. These fears were not unfounded, as by the 1960s, the increasing number of students eligible to enter university began to exceed the number of openings available within the federal university system. As

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90 CPDOC, UCi g 1959.11.03, photos 79 and 168-169, “Reflexões que poderiam auxiliar a concepção estratégica de um eficiente repressão do movimento subversivo que as Correntes de Esquerda preparam no Brasil.”.

91 See Chapter 2.

92 For the rise of this expectation by the 1950s, see Owensby, Intimate Ironies. An overwhelming majority of students involved in UNE’s leadership throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were from middle-class backgrounds, with their fathers involved in white-collar work and their mothers either involved in “acceptable” work as primary school teachers, or as housewives. See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Marco Maciel, José Serra, Maria Augusta Carneiro Ribeiro, Comba Porto, and many others. Only a handful of students in this period came from the lower-middle or working classes, and their exceptional status only reinforced the general rule of middle-class backgrounds. For exceptions, see personal interview with D.N., 13 August 2007, and Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with José Dirceu and José Genoino.

93 See the following section, below.
a result, students called for government expansion of the system in order to offer openings to students who had passed their entrance exams. More radical leaders in UNE even called for an end to the exams themselves, demanding “classificatory” exams that qualified students based on their abilities, rather than the “eliminatory” entrance exams that determined university admission. They also sought increased federal funding for the university system. Both of these issues became increasingly important as the 1960s progressed.

Perhaps one of the most controversial demands student leadership made regarded university administration itself. In order to make sure the reforms and structural “modernization” of the universities took place, UNE began to push for the right to comprise “at least” one-third of university committees. The demand for “one-third” was controversial enough that leftist Darcy Ribeiro and conservative Flávio Suplicy de Lacerda could join forces in opposing the idea. Ribeiro was one of the leading progressive pedagogical theorists in Brazil, and served as Minister of Education and Culture under João Goulart. Flávio Suplicy de Lacerda would gain notoriety for a law he issued that made UNE illegal while he was Minister of Education and Culture under General Humberto Castelo Branco, the first military president of the dictatorship. Yet both of these men signed a letter condemning the demands of the “movement for 1/3,” agreeing that

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94 The vestibular was and remains a controversial topic. To prepare for it, it was likely that students would have to take preparatory classes for the exam, usually at night. These exams were doubly disadvantageous to the poor; they often could not afford an extra year of paid schooling, and night-classes eliminated many students who had to work to help support their families.

95 For example, see APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Polícias Politica, L514, *Luta Atual pela Reforma Universitária*, pp. 30-31.

96 See Chapter 2, below.
allowing students to have one-third representation was a “lamentable,”
“ingenuous,” and “inconvenient” idea. In the face of this opposition, students
went on a nation-wide strike for “one-third.” Though the strike was unsuccessful,
it did demonstrate the degree to which university reform had become a national
issue.

Through the 1960s, the student movements’ visions were ever more
“critical and creative.” In 1962, students created the mobile Centers of Popular
Culture (CPCs), which involved students traveling to remote parts of Brazil,
where they performed plays, songs, and delivered speeches to educate poor rural
people about broad basic reforms. Former students still debate how effective
the CPCs were. For example, Arnaldo Jabor, who participated in the student
movement from 1962 to 1967, said that the CPCs had a greater importance
“symbolically” to the student movements themselves than having a “real

97 CPDOC, AT c 62.00.00/2, Photo 261, Roll 40, CPDOC. For student demands on the
strike, see: APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Polícias Politica, L514, Luta Atual pela Reforma
Universitária, pp. 31-32; Projeto Memória Estudiantil, published interviews with Antônio Carlos
Peixoto, pp. 9-10; Antônio Serra, p. 6; José Serra, p. 4; and Roberto Amaral, pp. 9-10. Clemente
Rosas also deals with the strike of 1/3 in his memoirs; see Rosas, Praia do Flamengo, 132, p. 90.
Elio Gaspari also refers to the strike in his narrative of the dictatorship, pointing to the strike as a
strong example of students mobilizing for greater participation in the universities before and after
the 1964 coup. See Elio Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, p. 219.

98 See, for example, APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Polícias Politica, L514, Luta Atual
pela Reforma Universitária, pp. 15-20; Projeto Memória Estudiantil, published interviews with
Antônio Carlos Peixoto, Antônio Serra, José Serra, and Roberto Amaral; Rosas, Praia do
Flamengo, 132, p. 90; Poerner, O Jovem Poder, pp. 205-207; and Fávero, A UNE em tempos de
autoritarismo, p. 41.

99 APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Polícias Politica, L514, Luta Atual pela Reforma
Universitária, p. 15.

100 Theater continued to be a significant, if problematic, way for activists and leftists to
criticize the military regime through the 1960s. For example, see Margo Milleret’s discussion of
Consuelo de Castro’s play, A Prova de Fogo, in Margo Milleret, “Lessons from Students about
importance” to Brazilian culture, even while Arthur Poerner declared the CPCs had an “immediate repercussion on society.”101 The CPCs were not without their problems; as Christopher Dunn has pointed out, “paternalism and ethnocentric value judgments” were at the core of the students’ belief that a revolutionary vanguard would educate workers about the social problems confronting Brazil.102

Whatever the impact on Brazilians more generally, it is clear that university reform played an important part of the CPC’s message. One of the centerpieces was the play “Act of the 99 percent,” which referred to the fact that only one percent of Brazil’s population was able to attend public universities.103 In the play the students called for democratization or the university system for all Brazilians. Yet the play also targeted specific issues confronting the university system, using humor that mocked both the university system and specific professors to illustrate the need for reform, using what one anti-UNE conservative and ex-student said was little more than “cruel jokes” done in “bad taste.”104


103 An audio file of a 1963 recording of the play performed in its entirety is available at http://franklinmartins.com.br/som_na_caixa_gravação.php?titulo=auto-dos-99-de-cpc-da-une. Claiming the university students were only one percent of the country’s population was actually generous, as the actual numbers more closely approximated 0.1 percent. In 1963, for example, Brazil only had 124,214 students enrolled in universities, compared to an estimated 77,521,000 people living in Brazil at the time. For numbers, see “Matrícula geral, segundo os ramos do ensino,” and “População Estimada, Segundo as Regiões Fisiográficas e as Unidades da Federação, 1960/1970,” Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (herein, IBGE). The enrollment numbers from IBGE match up closely with those from the Ministry of Education and Culture; for these numbers, see Luis Alberto Gómez de Souza, A JUC: Os estudantes católicos e a política, (Petrópolis, RJ: Editora Vozes, 1984), p. 75.

104 Rosas, Praia do Flamengo, 132, p. 98. For the conservative student reaction, see Seganfreddo, UNE: Instrumento da Subversão, p. 126.
Whether or not the humor was offensive, or indeed whether the message of university struggles even resonated with the rural workers or not, it was clear that students expressed the need for university reforms beyond seminars and classrooms. In doing so, they attempted “to insert the fight for University reform among the fights for structural reforms” in Brazilian society more generally.105

Collectively, these meetings, speeches, strikes, manifestos, and public performances set the stage for student struggles across the next decade. As reflections of society, UNE’s leadership believed universities had to become more available to the popular classes if Brazil was to fully democratize and become more just. In this way, university students, who admitted they were a scant minority within Brazil, moved beyond a vision of university reform that merely criticized general patterns and structures or sought simple pedagogical reforms. Rather, university reform for radical students became a vital question to broad social reforms. Within this vision, the universities needed to be reformed not just to improve learning and research; they began to assume transformative power in the students’ minds, in which the fate of the universities was the fate of Brazilian society itself.

By 1964, university reform had become one of the central pillars of UNE and of student demands more broadly. In 1957, the seminar on reform called for broad pedagogical changes, but without diagnosing possible solutions. As the 1950s progressed, UNE’s leadership began to define and refine broader structural and social issues it felt were at the heart of university reform, even while students

in general focused on specific issues and challenges they were facing in the universities. By the 1960s, these macro-structural and ideological demands and visions dovetailed with specific infrastructural improvements and reforms within the universities; the ideological and the practical had begun to converge. What had begun as a meeting that tried to identify issues universities were facing had become a formidable movement that demanded not only pedagogical and infrastructural reform, but that had its own prescription for the way university reform should be effected, all while connecting the university system to overall social reform in Brazil. In these years, students sowed the seeds for future battles over development, placing universities at the physical and discursive heart over national development. Yet they were not alone in giving universities a disproportionately large role in transforming Brazil.

*The Second Republic and Universities: The Kubitschek and Goulart Administrations*

Politicians and bureaucrats within the federal government also actively debated university policy, viewing universities as central to Brazil’s national development. The administrations of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961), Jânio Quadros (1961), and João Goulart (1961-1964) acknowledged that only a tiny fraction of Brazilians attended the universities. Yet they also emphasized that universities specifically and education more generally had to become more available to Brazilian citizens if the economy were to grow and society were to progress.
The first proposal for detailed university reform originated not with students, but with the government of President Eurico Gaspar Dutra in 1948, when the debate over the LDB began. Although Dutra’s Minister of Education, Clemente Mariani, hoped the law would transform Brazilian education at all levels, it quickly stalled on the floor of Congress. In the meantime, students in the late-1950s began to adopt it as part of their platform for educational and social reforms, even while politicians continued to debate and re-shape the law.\textsuperscript{106} Dissatisfied with the LDB’s final form, the UNE leadership even printed a “substitution” to the LDB.

Juscelino Kubitschek’s administration (1955-1960) picked up on the need for reform originally expressed in the LDB, highlighting universities in particular. Kubitschek is known primarily for the creation of Brasília and for its emphasis on industrial development, and some scholars have even somewhat implausibly suggested that Kubitschek used a focus on these areas to “ignore” and to “divert attention” from university reform.\textsuperscript{107} However, the Kubitschek administration was also well aware of the importance of universities in leading Brazilian development forward “fifty years in five.”\textsuperscript{108} Kubitschek’s top advisers and

\textsuperscript{106} For the role the discussion had in the 1960s and the various permutations that the law assumed over time, see, for example, Arquivo Nacional (herein, AN), Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 46, “Esboço Inicial do Plano de Restruturacao da Universidade do Brasil,” and AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 49, “Estudo Sobre Organização Universitária.” See also AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 243, “Projeto de Lei da Camara No. 13 de 1960 – Fixa as Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional,” and APERJ, Livros Apreendidos pelas Policias Politica, L514, \textit{Luta Atual pela Reforma Universitária}, pp. 30-32.


\textsuperscript{108} For a general narrative of the Kubitschek years and the emphasis on development in that time, see Skidmore, \textit{Politics in Brazil 1930-1964}, Ch. V; for a historically critical analysis of the Kubitschek vision of development, see Lúcio Flávio de Almeida, \textit{Uma Ilusão de
cabinet members in the administration were extremely concerned with higher education, hoping the University of Brasília (UnB) would serve “as a model for educational reform throughout the country.”

Roberto Campos, who occupied various posts under Kubitschek, declared that all schools in Brazil, from primary education through the universities, were “incapable of attending to the demands” of the growing Brazilian population. While Campos believed all levels needed to be improved if Brazil was to “reach the elevated and urgent productivity” needed for the “economic emancipation of the country,” he particularly emphasized university education. In Campos’s vision, university-trained white-collar technicians and scientists would lead Brazil’s industrial development.

Even before Kubitschek had officially taken office, universities began to receive added attention. The Ministry of Education reminded university rectors, most of whom were federal employees, that increasing the university system would not only aid Brazil’s national economy and development, but would lead to “social elevation” as well.

Almost all of the universities in Brazil in the 1950s were public universities that the government ran, with the federal government often appointing or approving rectors at these schools. There were only a small number of private schools that lay outside of the federal government’s direct

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112 CPDOC, AT pi MES 1951/1955.00.00, Roll 2, Photos 215-225, “Discurso pronunciado na reunião de reitores na Universidade do Paraná com considerações gerais sobre educação, destacando-se discussão sobre o papel da universidade.”
jurisdiction, including the Catholic Universities in several states, as well as Mackenzie University in São Paulo. In a 1959 interview, M.B. Lourenço Filho called for an increase in federal spending, an expansion of the university system, and the creation of more post-graduate programs in order to provide the doctors, pharmacists, agronomists, nurses, and engineers who would lead Brazilian development. Kubitschek also appointed a group of technocrats and officials, including the Minister of Education and Culture, to study the issue of education. Their findings demonstrated the ways in which the universities were becoming increasingly important to the governmental vision of national development, declaring that the “educational ideal” would be a system that revolved around “education for development.”

Among its comments and findings, the group highlighted university education as needing to be flexible and integrated in order to meet the “demands of society.” In framing the need for educational reforms generally, the work-group directly tied national development not only to economic growth, but to humanistic improvement of the Brazilian citizenry in general. The study viewed education for development as a nearly-holistic experience. It would offer to the Brazilian citizenry the “intellectual preparation of the individual, with its moral formation, the dominion of the self, the sense of the collective well-being, the

113 CPDOC, LF pi Lourenço Filho 1959.00.00/2, Roll 3, Photos 53-57, “Entrevista sobre a situação do ensino primário, secundário e superior no Brasil.”


austerity in consumption, the formation of the range of virtues of the enterprising individual, which are no less than Christian virtues” on which modern education had “entirely turned its back.” Only by focusing on education for development could Brazil improve its economy and return to its moral roots, making individuals “protagonist[s] of [their] epoch.”

While the work group took a particularly spiritual path in defining the types of educational reforms necessary, other studies during the Kubitschek were more specific in their diagnoses. One study pointed to the need for universities to improve in order to supply Brazil with the “engineers (of various types), chemists, geologists, agronomists, veterinarians, doctors, [and] pharmacists” the country needed. For the first time, the federal government was explicitly relying on a new wave of university-trained white-collar professionals from the middle class, and not agricultural and industrial elites or the masses of workers, to lead the country into a golden era of prosperity. However, for this process to take place, the obstacles confronting Brazilian universities had to be overcome. The same study pointed to the “incomplete autonomy of the Universities,” the lack of organization, the inefficiency and repetition between programs, the absence of graduate programs, and the dearth of laboratories as impeding social and national progress. The report highlighted the need to increase the number of openings and of enrolled students in Brazilian universities from 13,000 in 1958 to 25,000 in


1965, as well as the need to dramatically increase federal spending on higher education. Once again, engineering schools received particular notice in the report, again tying Brazilian development to a workforce that could provide technical and scientific advancement.\textsuperscript{118}

Although Jânio Quadros, Kubitschek’s successor, was in office for only seven months before he resigned, his administration began to act on the calls for expansion that had begun under the Kubitschek government. In July 1961, Quadros’s government formed a commission to study the expansion of white-collar workers in Brazil, “having in mind the needs of [Brazil’s] social and economic development.” Once again, the president of Brazil was directly tying the stake of the nation’s future to middle-class workers. The commission called for an increase in “material and human resources” in higher education, as well as infrastructural improvement and modernization of labs and an increase in the number of courses and enrollments in Brazil’s higher education system. The commission also made clear that, given the broad changes that were required, piecemeal improvements would not suffice. What was needed was nothing less than a broad reform of the entire system, both in terms of infrastructure and personnel.\textsuperscript{119} Although Quadros did not remain in office long enough to put into effect these recommendations, it was clear that bureaucrats and officials within


\textsuperscript{119} CPDOC, AT pi Góes Fº, Joaquim Faria 51/56.00.00, Roll 1, Photos 635-637, “Trabalho sobre a Comissão encarregada de aumentar a capacidade do país para formar pessoal de nível superior.”
his administration were also concerned with the status of higher education in Brazil and its effects on national development.

The administration of João Goulart went even further in his vision of development, emphasizing the need for university reform and incorporating the advice of educational experts into his own policies. These experts also stressed the importance of improving Brazil’s university system if it was to have the “qualified professionals” needed for “the rapid progress of science and technique in the modern world.” In this vision, the humanities and social sciences fell to the wayside as the emphasis fell on “engineers, doctors, scientists, planners, administrators, and technicians.” While these positions were essential to the government’s vision of development, technocrats’ arguments were similar to students in placing blame for Brazil’s shortcomings. Like students, these officials suggested that a small and outdated university system were holding Brazil back. For example, in terms of pedagogy, officials blamed the “unnecessary and onerous duplication of professors” within the cátedra system. An anonymous writer in 1964 even commented that the confusion and disorganization of the cátedra rendered Brazilian universities “not an ivory tower, but perhaps the Tower of Babel.”

The number of openings available in universities was another issue that occupied technocrats and pedagogues during the Goulart years. Certainly,
Brazilian universities had expanded dramatically in the thirty years since Getúlio Vargas assumed the presidency. Still, this growth did not match the overall growth of the Brazilian population, and officials and students alike continued to be concerned with the issue of *vagas*. As early as 1961, the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) demanded an “immediate increase in the number of *vagas*,” as well as for “university-cities” that would concentrate all of the schools (medical, engineering, law, philosophy) in one central site, rather than spread out, as had been the model of schools like the University of Brazil in Rio de Janeiro. Governmental agencies such as the National Improvement Campaign of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) recommended the government “redouble the production of its educational preparation” and “reinforce the importance of technicians and specialists and the perfection abroad of Brazilian professionals” until the government implemented the reforms needed for Brazilian universities. Even Durmeval Trigueiro’s insistence that the issue of *vagas* was “largely artificial” rang hollow. Trigueiro, head of MEC’s Department of Higher Education (DESu) under Goulart, admitted that the number of hours professors taught was insufficient, leading to the perception that schools did not have enough openings, resulting in Brazilian universities’ “unfilled capacity.” He also pointed

122 CPDOC, AT pi Teixeira, A. 1961/1962.00.00, Roll 5, Photos 35-40, “Uma interpretação do exame vestibular.”

123 CPDOC, AT pi MEC 1961.09.23, Roll 2, Photos 196-199, “Programa educacional do governo.” Originally named the “University of Rio de Janeiro,” the school became the “University of Brazil” soon after its formation, and was re-baptized the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro in 1965 during the Castelo Branco regime.

124 CPDOC, AT pi Capes 1961.01.10, Roll 1, Photos 171-180, “Estudo sobre a ‘distribuição dos profissionais de nível superior na população ativa do país.’”
to the “disproportion” between the number of openings and the number of candidates for universities to be the “crucial problem” facing universities.\footnote{CPDOC, AT pi S. Ass. 1961/1971.00.00/4, Roll 3, Photos 18-25, “Questionário com respostas sobre o concurso vestibular.”}

In dealing with these mounting issues, the impact of broader debates and discourse in society was clear. Students and others publicly complained about not enough \textit{vagas}, abuses within the institution of the \textit{cágédra}, or basic infrastructural problems. Even university professors had begun to demand a departmental system that gave them greater access to positions and resources that only \textit{cátedraticos} previously enjoyed.\footnote{CPDOC, AT pi S. Ass. 1962/1968/00/00/1, Roll 3, Photos 10-11, “Lista de questões relativos ao ‘Estatuto do Professor Universitário’.”} These comments and complaints did not go unnoticed in the Goulart administration. The Ministry of Education and Culture not only favored of the expansion of schools at all levels, but was aware of the “new social forces” who were demanding more openings and larger schools at the primary, secondary, and higher levels.\footnote{CPDOC, AT pi MEC 1952/1964.00.00/1, Roll 2, Photo 174, “Relatório a ser apresentado pelo ministro por ocasião do término do 1º ano à frente do ministério, discorrendo sobre as obras realizadas e as dificuldades do mesmo. Rio de Janeiro,” p. 2.} As federal employees, professors’ voices and complaints penetrated the bureaucratic sphere. As for students, who “constitue[d] a politically active and volatile group,”\footnote{CPDOC, AT c 62.09.17/1, Roll 40, Photo 202, “Documento da Associação Universitária Interamericana [SP] sobre o Seminário sobre o modo de viver americano para líderes estudantis brasileiros.”} they too made their voices heard, as when they outlined to Paulo Sá the challenges they were facing in the “stupid process of admission” to universities. While it might have seemed like a typical case of student discontent, Sá commented on the students’ complaints in
a letter to Anísio Teixiera, who was then Director of the Federal Council on
Education (CFE). As Teixeira himself put it in 1964:

The University is growing agitated, the students are becoming non-conformists,
many professors are beginning to allow themselves to be moved by the new times
and the idea of the University of research and discovery, of the University more
for the future than for the past is [sic] visibly gaining force. 

While the left-leaning Teixeira was clearly pleased with an increasing activism
that displeased more conservative sectors, his comment demonstrated that the
vision of the University as leading Brazilian development was not just the domain
of politicians, but of students, professors, and at least some pedagogical experts
alike.

By tying the need for improvements and reforms in Brazilian higher
education to national development, these technocrats and experts also laid the
groundwork for debates over the role of universities in Brazil for years to come.
However, unlike their military counterparts after 1964, these officials’ visions fell
more in line with students by envisioning higher education not only as a means to
improve the national economy and production, but also as a vehicle to create a
vaguely-defined “new type of life” focused on improvement of the individual as
well. In this vision, universities not only helped science and technology, but were

129 CPDOC, AT e 1962.02.15/1, Roll 40, Photo 62, “Carta de Paulo Sá a Anísio Teixeira
enviando-lhe trabalho feito por estudantes sobre a precariedade do concurso vestibular na
admissão às universidades e sugerindo que seja publicado na ‘Revista Brasileira de Estudos
Pedagógicos’.” See also CPDOC, AT pi MEC 1952/1964.00.00/1, Roll 2, Photos 174-177,
“Relatório a ser apresentado pelo ministro por ocasião do término do 1º ano à frente do ministério,
discorrendo sobre as obras realizadas e as dificuldades do mesmo.”

130 CPDOC, AT pi S. Ass. 1964.00.00/3, Roll 3, Photos 46-48, “Comentário, sem assinatura,
sobre o artigo de Anísio Teixeira no jornal Última Hora, acerca da história da universidade.”
a means to create a culture for “the masses.” These officials and experts, like students, saw universities as being just as important to the creation of “a more inspired conscience” as they were to economic progress or scientific advancement. The focus on individualized, personal development as a defense of educational reforms faded away from official rhetoric in the wake of 1964 even while sustaining student calls for reform.

Goulart did not simply rely on these experts in the formulation of his own policy. He also gave the leading pedagogical experts an opportunity to put their ideas into practice. In the late-1950s, Darcy Ribeiro had called for the abolition of the câtedra, the creation of a department system similar to that in universities in the United States, and the “improvement of professors of higher education.” In what would be a bitter irony, Ribeiro, who would ultimately enter into exile during the dictatorship, even pointed to Brazil’s military education as “the most modern of our educational systems, offering a model for graduate and specialization courses for civil careers.” In 1961, Ribeiro finally had his chance to implement these reforms, as Goulart appointed him rector of the University of

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132 CPDOC, AT pi Teixeira, A. 1952/1964.00.00/7, Roll 3, Photos 858-859, “Texto sobre a função social da universidade na sociedade.”

133 See Chapter 2.


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Brasília (UnB). At UnB, Ribeiro had a particular advantage, for it was designed to be one of the major flagships of the new style of university education in Brazil: an isolated, concentrated campus focused on the professional development of Brazilian students and scholars.  

When Goulart appointed Ribeiro as Minister of Education and Culture in 1963, Ribeiro’s mentor, Anísio Teixeira, one of the leading reformers of Brazilian education since the 1930s and a former member of the National Confederation of Education (CFE), took over as the rector of UnB. In appointments like these, Goulart placed pedagogical experts at the vanguard of new systems of higher education in Brazil, demonstrating an even stronger commitment to university reform than Kubitschek or Quadros.

President Goulart also emphasized the importance of universities in his own rhetoric and policies in ways that Kubitschek did not, placing university reform alongside issues like agrarian reforms and workers’ rights. Despite the passage of the LDB in 1961, the idea of university reform did not disappear. When Goulart assumed the presidency in the wake of Quadros’s resignation,

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135 For UnB’s role, see AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 46, Darcy Ribeiro, *Universidade de Brasília*, and CPDOC, AT pi S.Ass. 1964.00.00/3, Roll 3, Photos 46-48, “Comentário, sem assinatura, sobre o artigo de Anísio Teixeira no jornal Última Hora, acerca da história da universidade.”

136 For more on Teixeira’s educational reforms in the 1930s, see Dávila, *Diploma of Whiteness*, Chapter 4.

137 Many of the individuals both within Goulart’s administration and in society more generally remember the furor over agrarian reform and the administration’s efforts to address workers’ rights, but few recall the fact that university reform was a part of Goulart’s agenda, as well. See, for example, interviews with Raul Ryff in Gomes and Ferreira, *Jango: As múltiplas faces*, pp. 198-199; for a study of Goulart’s policies with regard to agricultural reform within a broader historical context, and the grassroots’ relation to agrarian reform, see Cliff Welch, *The Seed Was Planted: The São Paulo Roots of Brazil’s Rural Labor Movement, 1924-1964*, (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1999), Ch. 7. For portrayals of Goulart’s push for reforms in journalism as portrayed in political cartoons, see Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta, *Jango e o golpe de 1964 na caricatura*, (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2006), Ch. 8.
students found themselves with a president sympathetic to their demands for reform, educational and otherwise. Speaking before students at the University of Brazil in 1963, he acknowledged the Brazilian university system’s need for “renovation.” He placed the fate of Brazilian development directly upon improving universities, declaring that university reform would not only help Brazil’s economy, but would allow for a “political maturation” and “democratization” of society.\(^{138}\)

Although Goulart focused on broad issues concerning development and universities, he was also aware of the more specific challenges facing Brazil’s university system. He highlighted the issue of vagas, for example, calling it “the biggest problem facing the Brazilian university.” He even went so far as to boldly claim that his administration would “immediately” double the number of enrollments in Brazilian universities. To do so, his government sought to centralize the federal university system under the Ministry of Education and Culture, which would eliminate diverse conflicting and repetitive program demands between universities and faculdades. Goulart declared these efforts would ultimately help streamline and improve university education in terms of both access and production of research while “emancipating” Brazil by improving national development and technology.\(^{139}\)

\(^{138}\) CPDOC, AT pi Goulart, J. 1963.00.00, Roll 1, Photos 638-640, “Discurso pronunciado na cerimônia de abertura dos cursos superiores da Universidade do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro.”

\(^{139}\) CPDOC, AT pi Goulart, J. 1963.00.00, Roll 1, Photos 638-640, “Discurso pronunciado na cerimônia de abertura dos cursos superiores da Universidade do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro.”
Goulart’s language was not empty rhetoric designed to satisfy the crowd of students. He had already issued decrees seeking to move the process of university reform along. The *Plano Trienal* (Three-Year Plan) under Celso Furtado, the Minister of Planning, and San Tiago Dantas, who occupied two ministries in Goulart’s administration, called for the government to “substantially intensify” its efforts in education and scientific and technological research in the interests of development while increasing the population’s access “to the fruits of cultural progress.” The policies within the *Plano Trienal* were even more ambitious than some of Goulart’s rhetoric. While the president wanted the universities to double their matriculation rates, the *Plano Trienal* said Brazil would have to quintuple those rates in order “to reach the structures that Argentina and Uruguay already enjoy.”

The central role universities would play in Brazilian development was clear. The *Plano Trienal* identified the expansion and improvement of science programs and centers of applied research as a “primordial need.”

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140 Dantas was originally Goulart’s Minister of Foreign Affairs during the first phase of the parliamentary system that the military forced in the wake of Quadros’s resignation. Dantas served in the Ministry from 1961-1962 before being elected federal deputy in Congress from 1962-1964, with a brief stint as Treasury Minister in 1963.


government also sought to improve university and high school courses that provided the training “required for the workforce.” Nonetheless, the government gave particular emphasis to universities within the Plano Trienal. Goulart ultimately abandoned the plan in the face of opposition. On the one hand, the left viewed the Plano Trienal’s orthodox economic policies and negotiation with the International Monetary Fund as evidence of Brazil bowing to “imperialism;” on the other hand, the right felt the plan’s efforts towards reform went too far. Nonetheless, the Plano Trienal made clear that Brazil’s development depended on improving the university system.

Goulart also presented the Draft of the Government’s Program to his ministers only two weeks after taking office. While the Draft dealt primarily with macroeconomic questions such as wage policies and the exploitation of natural resources, it also noted that “education demands all our special efforts for its integration into […] national development.” The Draft commented on the poor quality of both secondary and higher education, which demonstrated a “distortion between the type of education offered and the needs of development of the country.” Universities were particularly important for their role in providing technicians for the country’s industrial development. However, as Goulart would

145 Gomes Ferreira, Jango: As múltiplas faces, p. 143.
declare in his speech in 1963, the plan noted that “the gravest problem” facing universities was the small number of matriculations. In 1960, 14,000 students had competed for just 1,800 openings at medical schools while 12,000 students competed for 2,000 openings in engineering programs. The Draft also pointed out that Brazil lagged behind not only the United States but Argentina, Chile, and even India in its per capita enrollment rates.¹⁴⁷ Even worse, of those who were graduating from universities, 21 percent were graduating from law schools, and another 29 percent graduated from Arts programs. This left the sciences and fields like engineering and medicine woefully underrepresented, with devastating results on Brazil’s development, according to the report. The only solution was to increase spending and dramatically expand the number of openings in universities, especially in engineering and medical schools, and improve the use of resources and research centers in universities. Only then would Brazil be able to “accelerate the material progress of the country.”¹⁴⁸ As Goulart was preparing his list of broader administrative reforms, he asked M.B. Lourenço Filho to compile his own and others’ observations on Goulart’s plan for educational reform in 1963. The request ultimately resulted in a series of internal governmental studies that offered over seventy pages of recommendations, comments, and suggestions.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ The report pointed out that 1,773 of every 100,000 individuals in the United States was a university student. Other countries listed included: Japan (690 students per 100,000 habitants); France (410/100,000), Argentina (383/100,000), Chile (237/100,000), and India (212/100,000). By comparison, the report placed that ratio in Brazil as just 130 students per 100,000 habitants. CPDOC, RC e ag 1961.09.21, Pasta I, “Esbôço de Programa de Governo,” p. 129.

Even the watershed moment in Goulart’s administration involved university reform. Most scholars and participants in the events of 1964 in Brazil point to Goulart’s March 13 Rally in the Central Plaza as a key moment in the events leading up to the military coup. Many saw the rally as the point of no return, in which Goulart made public his “radical” policies and the military began to consider overthrowing him. At the rally, Goulart did indeed take a more explicit stand on workers’ rights, addressing Brazil’s poor and laborers directly and detailing his plans for agrarian reform. However, he also declared that he would bring before Congress “two other reforms that the Brazilian people call for, demanded by our development and our democracy. I refer to electoral reform […] and to university reform.” He outlined specifics in his plan, including promising to invest 11.3 percent of the country’s gross national product in

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150 Scholars have generally focused on two aspects of the rally: Goulart’s emphasis on agrarian reform, and the (retrospective) importance of the rally in fueling the coup. Oswaldo Munteal Filho is one of the few to mention that Goulart’s speech also included other issues besides agrarian reform, including university reform, and even he does so only in passing. See Oswaldo Munteal Filho, “Certezas e percepções da política em 1964,” in Adriano de Freixo and Oswaldo Munteal Filho, eds., A Ditadura em debate: Estado e Sociedade nos anos de autoritarismo, (Contraponto Editora Ltda, 2005), pp. 15-32.

151 A series of events in March 1964 led to the coup, including a “revolt” of sergeants in the marines, and Goulart’s presence at their rally at the Automobile Club on March 30. However, even those who feel the incident at the Club was the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back point to the Comício as a major event, ushering Goulart’s following actions. See interview with Augusto Amaral Peixoto, in Gomes and Ferreira, Jango: As múltiplas faces, pp. 205-208. For how leaders of the military who were connected to the dictatorship viewed the years of 1962-1964, including Goulart’s speeches at the rally at Central and at the Automobile club, see Maria Celina D’Araujo, Gláucio Ary Dillon Soares, and Celso Castro, eds., Visões do Golpe: A Memória Militar sobre 1964, 2nd ed., (Rio de Janeiro: Dumará Distribuidora de Publicações Ltda., 1994). See also Motta, Jango e o golpe de 1964 na caricatura, pp. 154-156.

152 Jornal do Brasil, 14 March 1964. Also available in Gomes and Ferreira, Jango: As múltiplas faces, pp. 202-204.
education. The fact that Goulart mentioned university reform in a speech directed towards workers and their rights indicates that he did not treat the issue of university reform lightly. Earlier in the day, Goulart had authorized the foundation of the Federal University of Amazonas, bringing the total number of public universities created between 1955 and 1964 to seventeen. By placing university reform alongside agrarian and electoral reform, Goulart made it quite clear that universities were going to play a central role if Brazil was to develop and become more democratic.

Goulart’s speeches, like the one he gave at the University of Brazil, also called for an expansion in the university system, an increase in the number of positions for students, and centralization of the university system, all in the name of national and technological development. In doing so, Goulart laid the groundwork for many of the arguments that the military government itself would make with regards to university reform later in the decade. While the ideologies differed between the two governments, the ends were remarkably similar.

Visions from the Right: Alternative Views of Education and Development in Brazil


154 AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 161, “Fundação da Universidade do Amazonas.” For the statistics on the number of universities formed between 1955 and 1964, see Cunha, A Universidade Crítica, p. 96. Cunha lists only 16 federal universities and 5 private universities founded in this period, but the Federal University of Amazonas remains off his list, probably due to the fact that it had not yet been constructed or organized at the time that Goulart signed the decree.
When it came to university reform and policy, educational experts and bureaucrats clearly informed the administrations of both Kubitschek and Goulart. However, conservative pedagogical experts, ex-bureaucrats, and politicians past, present, and future also actively engaged the issue of university reform, even while opposing the Goulart government’s policies. Many conservatives felt that the universities were suffering from major structural weaknesses and shortcomings. These individuals offered their own views on what universities should look like and the role they should play in national development, even while criticizing the government and progressive students.

Aliomar Baleeiro was a national representative from the National Democratic Union (UDN) in the 1950s and 1960s, a member of the Supreme Court during the military dictatorship, and a strident opponent of Goulart and his technocrats. Yet Baleeiro, too, decried the “tardy arrival” of universities in Brazil, which inhibited “the demographic, political, economic, and social progress of the country.” Baleeiro described the university system of the early 1960s as suffering from “the inanity, stagnation, inadequacy, the poverty of its ancient university institutions that still smell of the dust of Coimbra-like institutions.”

Another concern was the inability of universities to handle the growing number of students. Sociologist Arthur Hehl Neiva estimated that 19.2 percent of the Brazilian population in 1960 was between the ages of 14 and 24, and that it


156 CPDOC, AB pi Baleeiro, A. 1961.00.00, “Texto sobre a universidade, discutindo reformas modernizantes,” p. 3. Baleeiro was referring to Portugal’s University of Coimbra, originally founded in 1290 and one of the oldest universities in Europe. In this case, he was derogatorily referring to Brazilian universities as pathetically archaic.
was essential that Brazil rapidly expand its educational system at all levels.\footnote{CPDOC, AHN d 1959.10.15, “Estrutura e Dinâmica da População Brasileira,” 28 June 1960. Neiva’s politics were clearly anti-Goulart; he wrote to a friend about his “sensation of anguish” in watching the rally on March 13, and declared that Brazil’s military had saved the country from the “abyss.” See CPDOC, AHN d 1959.10.15, Pasta III, Letter to Prof. Arthur Cesar Ferreira Reis, 16 April 1964.}{157} Baleeiro also cited the inadequate number of student vacancies, commenting that universities “grew every year” at a rate for which their original designers had never planned.\footnote{CPDOC, AB pi Baleeiro, A. 1961.00.00, “Texto sobre a universidade, discutindo reformas modernizantes,” pp. 6-7.}{158} Additionally, while Baleeiro did not have a problem with the existence of a vestibular exam, he felt that the curricula were too “rigid,” focusing only on the professional career path with none of the electives common to a liberal arts program and tying a bloated bureaucracy to universities. Funding was woefully insufficient, and campus libraries were impoverished.\footnote{CPDOC, AB pi Baleeiro, A. 1961.00.00, “Texto sobre a universidade, discutindo reformas modernizantes,” pp. 5, 34-35, 38, 44, 62-64.}{159} While the structure of universities received the brunt of Baleeiro’s criticisms, students and parents did not escape his wrath. He blamed them for “wanting to ‘pass’ and not learn.” According to him, the degree was effectively being commodified, as students sought the honorific title of “doctor.” The degree allowed graduates access “to public employment, to advantageous marriage, to the galas and the shine of golden spoon of the privileged classes.” Baleeiro’s vision was elitist, yet also critical of elite excesses.\footnote{CPDOC, AB pi Baleeiro, A. 1961.00.00, “Texto sobre a universidade, discutindo reformas modernizantes,” pp. 13, 22-24, 60-61.}{160}
Baleeiro also saw a major problem with the position of the *professores catedráticos*, but in comparison to students, his complaints were radically different. Where students felt that the position led to stagnation and privilege within the universities, Baleeiro was critical of *professores cátedras* for what he perceived to be their lack of neutrality in the classroom. Baleeiro believed these professors were using their position “for ideological or doctrinal catechism or the distortion of theoretical concepts in terms of these ideological or doctrinal preferences.” He felt that “the professor should not oppose nor propose, but simply explain,” and he openly criticized professors who taught Marxism.161

Nor was he alone. Sonia Seganfreddo, a conservative journalist and former student, targeted the professors who were able to enjoy the “immunities of the *cátedra*” while “catechizing” among the students and “persecuting” conservative students like herself. As a student, she felt so ostracized in the National School of Philosophy that she transferred to another school, and upon completing, published an incendiary report that blasted university students and professors alike for their leftism.162 The differences here could not be starker; where some students felt the system of the *catedrático* had to be reformed because professors were too

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162 Seganfreddo, *UNE: Instrumento da Subversão*, p. 91. Seganfreddo does little to hide her disdain for the progressive student movement in general, but she is particularly venomous in her attacks on professor Álvaro Vieira Pinto, from the National Philosophy School (FNFi), claiming that he had ostracized her until she was forced to transfer to another school. Indeed, she spends almost two full chapters going after Pinto alone. This bias actually strengthens Seganfreddo’s book as a historical document, however; not only does she draw directly from UNE documents for her evidence, but her clear conservative ideology serves as a powerful example of how Brazil in the 1960s was becoming increasingly polarized, and provides insights into some of the rhetoric and viewpoints that those from the right were employing. For attacks on Vieira Pinto, see Chs. VI and VII of *UNE, Instrumento de Subversão*; for Seganfreddo’s negative experience at the FNFi, see her Introduction.
conservative and out of touch, individuals like Baleeiro and Seganfreddo felt that it protected leftist professors who used their authority to “indoctrinate” students. These politically conservative commentators did not cite specific examples of this “doctrinal” method; nonetheless, these complaints strengthened the political right’s call for university reform.

Baleeiro was not completely critical. He praised Brazilian federal universities for offering free tuition and affordable food, though he remained silent on the quality of the food. He claimed that lunch cost less than ten cruzeiros (three American cents), in comparison to the U.S., where it cost between seventy-five cents and a dollar (250 to 350 Cruzeiros). Still, more funding was needed. Baleeiro wrote that universities suffered in part because of the lack of “any initial support from the public coffers or from private funds.” The hiring of new professors, the creation of more unified, self-contained campuses, and support for the fine arts also could help Brazil rescue its university system from becoming “second-rate professional schools.” Perhaps most importantly, though, Baleeiro felt that adopting the U.S.’s system of a liberal arts education would solve the problem of rigidity within the system. Baleeiro also applauded universities in the U.S. for their infrastructural advancement; indeed, he felt the U.S. offered a near-utopian vision of what universities should look like, both in infrastructure and culturally:

163 CPDOC, AB pi Baleeiro, A. 1961.00.00, “Texto sobre a universidade, discutindo reformas modernizantes,” pp. 30-31. For students’ complaints about the actual quality of food in university restaurants, see above, as well as Chapters Four and Five, below.
In these [American] universities, the libraries are always populated with scholars and students. There are not, there never were, strikes…the students do not interfere in the administration, nor did the overthrow of a rector ever pass through their heads, as has just happened in one of the most venerable universities of Brazil. One does not see graffiti on the walls, nor do students protest the precocious vocations of electoral captains or of stubborn agitators. Everything is immensely diverse. Everything of a humiliating difference for those who are familiar with certain realities of Brazilian educational life.\(^{164}\)

For Baleeiro, students should study, and not become politically active or challenge authority figures of any type. His was not an isolated view. The Institute of Social Research and Study (IPÊS), a conservative organization of businessmen, pedagogues, and military leaders, produced films that emphasized the need for students to study and not become involved in “base political maneuvers.”\(^{165}\)

While Baleeiro agreed with students on many of the main issues facing the university system, it was clear that his motivation for reform was quite different. Students wanted better opportunities and better experiences, while pedagogue-technocrats like Teixeira wanted a more egalitarian system. Baleeiro wanted reforms that he felt would cut down on student activism and effectively put students in their place.

\(^{164}\) CPDOC, AB pi Baleeiro, A. 1961.00.00, “Texto sobre a universidade, discutindo reformas modernizantes,” pp 5, 40, 51-52, and 72-75.

Although all of these problems pertained to a very small part of Brazilian society, Baleeiro, like Teixeira and others, feared for the results on Brazilian society more generally. Baleeiro argued that, in terms of national development, the universities’ role was “primarily economic.”¹⁶⁶ He, too, felt that universities’ main functions were to serve as “centers of professional formation” that would create the political, professional, social, and, ironically, military leaders who would “inevitably” lead the country in its path towards development.

Clemente Mariani joined Baleeiro in these concerns.¹⁶⁷ Like Baleeiro, Mariani, in spite of his political conservatism, frequently agreed with students on the conditions of higher education in Brazil, and as Minister of Education and Health in under President Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946-1951), Mariani had been one of the original proponents of the LDB. Like Baleeiro, Anísio Teixeira, and others, Mariani held universities to be central to the formation of professionals and elites who would direct the political and intellectual development of Brazil, declaring this to be the “primary function” of higher education.¹⁶⁸ Juarez Távora, the former military leader, 1955 presidential candidate, and federal deputy for the UDN, held a top-down vision in which it was the “fundamental duty of Brazilian rulers to accelerate the national development process,” from primary schooling onward. Távora argued that university students would serve as “renovating agents


¹⁶⁷ Education and Health remained lumped together under the same ministry until 1953, when Health was give its own Ministry, and Education was re-organized and re-named the Ministry of Education and Culture.

¹⁶⁸ CPDOC, CMa pi Mariani, C. 1964.03.02, “Aula inaugural proferida na Faculdade de Direito da Universidade da Bahia,” p. 31.
in the effort of transforming the social structures that impede the development process.”\textsuperscript{169} Additionally, universities would be the centers of “formation of political, scientific, and technical leaders indispensible to the national acceleration” of Brazilian socio-economic development.\textsuperscript{170}

Clearly, students and presidential administrations were not the only ones who felt that Brazil’s future development hinged on the question of universities. Even conservatives were not immune to calls for reforms. Yet their visions differed greatly from those of students or of Goulart’s technocrats. Where the latter sought broad social leveling, individuals like Baleeiro, Neiva, Mariani, and Távora felt that students were to study, and that student activism was not to be tolerated. To them, UNE was a “subversive” instrument, one that “asphyxiated” everyday students.\textsuperscript{171} Certainly, these men and students disagreed on the particulars for reform; yet all also agreed that universities would play a central role in Brazilian development and thus required reform.

\textit{The Struggle for University Reform in an Increasingly Polarized Society: The Federal University of Bahia, March 1964}

This chapter has argued that students were far from the only participants in the debate over university reform. Presidents, technocrats, bureaucrats, pedagogical experts, and even private citizens also entered the discussion, creating new visions of national development that placed white-collar

\textsuperscript{169} CPDOC, JT pi op Távora, J. 1945.00.00, “A Mocidade e o Desenvolvimento (Algumas teses a debater, a respeito),” n. pag.

\textsuperscript{170} CPDOC, JT pi op Távora, J. 1945.00.00, “A Mocidade e o Desenvolvimento (Algumas teses a debater, a respeito),” n. pag.

\textsuperscript{171} CPDOC, CMa pi Franco, O. 1961.05.13, “Manifesto à consciência estudantil brasileiro.”
professionals at the heart of national development. As the 1960s progressed and Brazil became politically polarized, university reform, student activism, and the fear of the effects of “subversion” in Brazil only added to the struggles in the months leading up to the dictatorship. One particular protest at the Federal University of Bahia perfectly demonstrates the ways in which these many groups placed universities near the center of the political fight over Brazil’s future, bringing together students, police, politicians, pedagogues, and private civilians.

On March 2, 1964, Clemente Mariani gave the opening annual address at the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA). In his address, Mariani focused on the themes of “liberalism and democracy, the principal accomplishments in his term as Minister of Education and Health, and the directives of higher education in Brazil.” He pointed to his own efforts to improve Brazil’s system when he proposed the LDB in the 1940s. He also commented on the Brazilian universities’ importance in training political leaders. Mariani even commented on the “grand theses and problems that deeply interest national life” at that moment, and declared that nobody could pretend that young Brazilians would just withdraw from these debates and issues.  

Unfortunately for Mariani, these latter words were prophetic. During the address, a protest broke out as students who supported Goulart broke into the auditorium, shouting out to interrupt Mariani’s speech and carrying banners against Carlos Lacerda, the figurehead of the conservative UDN and the governor

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172 CPDOC, CMa pi Mariani, C. 1964.03.02, “Aula inaugural proferida na Faculdade de Direito da Universidade da Bahia, discorrendo sobre os temas liberalismo e democracia, as principais realizações de sua gestão no Ministério da Educação e Saúde e as diretrizes do ensino superior no Brasil.”
of the state of Guanabara state, which included the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro.\textsuperscript{173} They also threw eggs, tomatoes, and limes at the stage, covering several officials in culinary detritus. The incident was embarrassing enough that officials from UFBA, the state government, and the police all quickly tried to shift responsibility for the disastrous opening of the academic year.\textsuperscript{174}

The outrage was immediate. Many private citizens wrote to Mariani, expressing their concern over the act of these “communists” who were manipulating students. The emotions ranged from fatalistic humor to outrage. Alexandre Lobes Bittencourt told Mariani in a telegram that, upon hearing what had happened, he “smiled at the piety of the mediocre, unpatriotic children.” Others were not so calm about the events. One man wrote to Mariani in the wake of the failed address, expressing his concern for the health of both Mariani and Brazil itself. The attack, he wrote, demonstrated how “known agitators” and “agents of disorder” who were “masquerading as students” threatened not only the government, but democracy itself through their actions.\textsuperscript{175}

\textsuperscript{173} After the relocation of Brazil’s capital from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília in 1960, the city of Rio de Janeiro became the state of Guanabara, composed of only Rio de Janeiro as its own city-state, independent of the much-larger surrounding Rio de Janeiro state, whose capital was Niterói, opposite the city of Rio on Guanabara Bay. Only in 1975 were the two states fused into one state, the current state of Rio de Janeiro, with the city of Rio as its capital. For information on this fusion, see AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 210, “A Fusão da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro com o Estado do Rio” and “A Fusão dos Estados da Guanabara e do Rio de Janeiro,” Vols. I and III.

\textsuperscript{174} CPDOC, CMa pi Fraga, A. 64.03.04, “Entrevista concedida, enquanto reitor da Universidade da Bahia sobre a manifestação estudantil contra Carlos Lacerda, ocorrida nessa Universidade, quando da aula inaugural proferida por Clemente Mariani,” and CMa cg 1964.02.18, “Correspondência entre Clemente Mariani e diversas personalidades sobre os acontecimentos políticos de 1964 e seus desdobramentos, destacando-se a invasão da reitoria da Universidade da Bahia por estudantes na aula inaugural proferida por Clemente Mariani.

\textsuperscript{175} CPDOC, CMa cg 1964.02.18, “Correspondência entre Clemente Mariani e diversas personalidades sobre os acontecimentos políticos de 1964 e seus desdobramentos, destacando-se a
students’ outburst may have seemed like little more than a momentary ruckus, the highly-charged political climate had turned their act of protest into yet another battle between progressives dissatisfied with the right’s obstructionism and conservatives who saw a Communist threat in every public mobilization.

The event quickly took on national proportions, as representative Lourival Batista took the floor of the Congress in Brasília to speak out against the perpetrators. He refused to believe the agitators had been students, instead suggesting that the protest had been part “of the subversive plans of communists who claim to be and pass for students” and declaring that UFBA had been “occupied by professional communists.” Members of the military repeated the belief that the actions could not have been perpetrated by students. Colonel João Adolfo da Silva of the Military Police wrote that the military had filed reports on the actions of the protestors, who he insisted were not led by students but by “a communist leader – trained in Czechoslovakia.”¹⁷⁶ In the eyes of civilians and members of the military, any students who had become active were nothing less than “agitators” and “communists” who represented the broader left. There was no way “real” students could possibly participate in these mobilizations. Some even used student mobilizations, along with events like the rally on March 13 or the Sergeants’ revolt later in March 1964, to argue that Goulart was losing control of the country and that something had to be done.¹⁷⁷

These commentators clearly had a particular vision of what constituted “proper” behavior on the part of the students and the exact role of the universities should assume in educating these students. In their estimation, the protest at UFBA revealed how the universities had failed. While these letter-writers and others may not have been present at the opening class, their letters demonstrated that they too were involved in the debate over students’ and universities’ roles in Brazil. Students were to study and remain silent; they did not express themselves in public via protests, the way these “agitators” had. Like Baleeiro’s notion of good students not striking, this public blaming of “agitators” rather than “students” belied a belief that true students would not or should not participate in this type of activity while also creating a dichotomous vision of universities as home to studious youths and foreign-trained radicals.

Although private citizens, politicians, and military leaders saw the communist threat lurking everywhere and were certain that students could not have been involved with the events of March 2, some students remembered the events differently. The president of the Central Student Directory (DCE) at UFBA, Pedro Castro, recalled not only being present at the opening ceremony, but presenting “six or eight proposals for modification of the university statute,” including a better distribution of funding, an end to the cátedra, and greater student participation in the university. In this framing, the students’ protest at UFBA was not an instance of “communist” agitation, but part of a broader fight


178 Personal interview, P.C.S., 17 October 2007, and CPDOC, CMA pi Fraga, A. 64.03.04.
for university reform that had been going on for months. As UFBA’s rector, Algérico Fraga, himself admitted, student leaders had been trying to achieve reforms and to make their demands heard since November of 1963. Their measured attempts, in contrast to the violent outburst on March 2, just reinforced the belief that only “communists,” and not students, could be responsible for ruining the inaugural address. While the rector insisted in 1964 that students’ demands for university reform were completely isolated from the “agitation” of March 2, Castro’s comments demonstrated that student protests over educational conditions in Brazil still remained unresolved when Mariani spoke. Indeed, Fraga’s own apparent need to stress the difference between anti-Lacerda demands, which in his eyes were illegitimate and “subversive,” and the “legitimate” demands for university reform by students, indicates that the issue of university reform and the need for more funding remained vital.179

The incident at UFBA reminds us that universities were not simply sites of discursive struggles; they could and did often serve as spatial arenas where fights for reforms and struggles between students, police, politicians, and private citizens took place. Even if some protestors at UFBA did launch very vocal attacks against Carlos Lacerda, it did not necessarily matter that Lacerda had little to do with reforming UFBA specifically or Brazil’s universities generally. What mattered was that the university offered students the physical space in which they could publicly make their demands heard.

179 Personal interview with P.C.S., 17 October 2007, and CPDOC, CMA pi Fraga, A. 64.03.04.
While the incident at UFBA may seem isolated, it reflected the ways in which the role of the universities in Brazil had come to take on national dimensions that went well beyond student movements or state policy. The incidents at UFBA revealed the multiple ways in which universities had become a part of the discussion over the direction Brazil was heading. A small number of Brazilians may have been enrolled in the universities, but the institutions themselves had come to take on national importance, as multiple groups fought discursively and physically over the role of universities, and students, in Brazilian progress.

**Conclusion**

The events at UFBA demonstrate how the debate over university reform in Brazil grew and changed in just seven years. While students were perhaps the most-studied actors in this struggle in the late-1950s and early-1960s, university reform was not simply the concern of the student movements. Both Kubitschek and Goulart, as well as technocrats and bureaucrats within their administrations, also placed university reforms at the center of their own visions of Brazilian development. These individuals turned to models in which university-trained students would form the new professionals to lead Brazil to greater industrial, scientific, and technological productivity. Progressive pedagogues worked within these administrations to improve universities, hoping to expand the infrastructure and improve not just Brazil’s economic production, but the intellectual development of Brazilians themselves. Even conservative politicians and
business-leaders expressed the overriding need for university reforms, even if they did not necessarily agree with students or the government upon the solutions.

Certainly, university education itself only touched a tiny number of Brazilians’ lives. However, universities were important to many more than just the students attending them. Professors, politicians, and business leaders were also concerned about university reform and the role the universities and the students would play in the development of Brazil. In the process, the debate over university education had moved beyond simple calls for pedagogical improvements from students and university expansion from politicians. Students cemented the importance of both quotidian issues and demands for social justice in calls for university reform. Likewise, politicians like Kubitschek and Goulart had placed universities at the center of Brazilian development, and even conservative opponents agreed that universities had to be reformed if Brazil was to take its place as a leader within the global economy. Yet the ongoing political polarization of the 1960s made it increasingly harder for these groups to agree on the particulars of those reforms. At the end of March 1964, the military intervened, overthrowing Goulart and entering into the fray on the role of both universities and students within the nation. Democracy in Brazil might have come to an end, but the fight over universities was only beginning.
Chapter Two – Laying the Groundwork for Reform and Development:

Military Educational Visions and Policy, 1964-1968

Less than three months after taking office, president Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco gave an address at the University of Ceará. Accepting an honorary degree, he used the opportunity to outline the value of the university system to the new military government’s vision of development. He declared universities would “directly influence” the economic recovery the dictatorship hoped to accomplish.1 Under the military regime’s guiding hand, they would provide the nation with scientific and technological improvements. The universities’ contributions were not going to be one-sided, however. If the country truly was to progress, universities would have to become “modern,” and Castelo Branco emphasized that his government was placing high priority on “revising the university structure” so that Brazil could finally realize its potential of “authentic and democratic development.” He also did not miss the opportunity to extend a diplomatic hand to the students, stressing that they and the government needed to “understand each other better” and enter into “permanent and reciprocal communication” with Brazilian society and the government.2

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1 As Thomas Skidmore has demonstrated, the economic situation confronting Brazil in 1964 was bleak, with foreign governments and banks refusing to give loans to the Goulart government and with Brazil facing the real threat of defaulting on its three billion dollar foreign debt. Inflation had also hit 100 percent, furthering domestic economic instability. The causes for these issues ran deeper than Goulart’s particular policies, and included the Kubitschek’s policy of maintaining high levels of public investment even while trying to stabilize the economy. For more on economic policy during Kubitschek’s and Goulart’s administrations, see Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964, pp. 175-182, 234-248, and 267-273. For the military’s economic policy and its defense of arbitrary authority to stabilize the economy, see Thomas Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, pp. 29-39 and 55-63.

The speech was not a simple case of the president saying what he thought his audience would want to hear. As the next three years of his administration would demonstrate, he was deadly earnest about the value universities would play within the government’s vision if Brazil was going to truly gain economic stability and achieve promised levels of development. Indeed, throughout his three years of governing, Castelo Branco would repeatedly return to his speech at Ceará in outlining the military government’s developmental plans.\(^3\) Nor was Castelo Branco an exception. Throughout Brazil’s twenty-one year military dictatorship, presidents focused on the universities not just as sites of “subversion” and resistance to military rule; they were also keystones in national development and major subjects and actors in the transformation and modernization of the Brazilian economy and society. These administrations did not treat education homogeneously. Yet throughout the dictatorship and beyond, universities were constantly present in governmental and civilian rhetoric, in policy-making, and in defining what Brazilian development and democracy would look like.

For the first five years of the military dictatorship, from 1 April 1964 to the end of 1968, the administrations of Castelo Branco (1964-1967) and Artur Costa e Silva (1967-1969) tackled universities head on. Indeed, Castelo Branco’s June 1964 speech at Ceará succinctly outlined how the Castelo Branco and Costa

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e Silva governments would view and treat university education. They were determined to transform campuses that were sites of “subversion and agitation” under Goulart into vehicles for Brazilian development and modernization. Castelo Branco’s call for a “permanent and reciprocal communication” with the students would take on definitions and parameters that the military did not foresee and did not always appreciate, as students challenged and attempted to define their own vision of universities and development. However, between 1964 and 1968, the military continuously tried to unilaterally control, study, improve, and redefine the role of universities in Brazil. Yet it unwillingly found itself having to yield and respond to demands from students, parents, businessmen, diplomats, bureaucrats, technocrats, and others who had their own understanding of the function of universities in the nation.

**The Military’s Vision of Universities: State Ideology and Universities**

Upon taking office, Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco’s administration sought to undo the economic, political, and social turmoil of the previous two-and-a-half years of Goulart’s administration. Cracking down on workers, opposition politicians, and UNE, the military government promoted development to define the new Brazil. In this vision, politics would be set aside as the military guided the country to its rightful place among the “developed” world. Brazil’s inflation rate exceeded 100 percent in 1964, and stabilizing the economy was the

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4 See Chapter 3.

5 Although the coup was completed by the end of April 1, Castelo Branco was not inaugurated until 11 April 1964. In the interim, a military junta led the country, with General Arthur Costa e Silva at its head.
military’s first priority. Although inflation never “went away,” the economic policy of the Castelo Branco administration, led by Minister of Planning Roberto Campos and Economic Minister Octávio Gouvêia Bulhões, managed to rein in inflation by a third (from 61 to 41 percent) between 1965 and 1966. It did so in part by relying on foreign loans from the United States and, in a curious turn of events, the Soviet Union, the same country that the military constantly suggested was sponsoring “subversion” in the Goulart administration and UNE.6

The Castelo Branco administration emphasized universities’ role in helping Brazil to “defeat the barrier of underdevelopment” and “assuring its sovereignty, its progress, and its popular liberties.”7 These were not mere vague platitudes extolling universities’ transformative role. The Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva governments specifically emphasized the development of “human resources” in public speeches.8 Costa e Silva’s Ministry of Planning again outlined its objectives in a program that directly tied together “Education and Human Resources.” It reiterated education as a key component of national development, and specifically cited university education’s importance in “leading

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7 Castelo Branco, Discursos, Vol. 1, pp. 141, 149. This type of rhetoric dominates Castelo Branco’s public addresses. See also Castelo Branco, Discursos, Vol. 1, p. 152; Discursos, Vol. 2., p. 172; and Discursos Vol. 3, pp. 149, 152-153, and 158.

the formation of human resources.” The administrations’ definition of “human resources” did not involve all classes and jobs, though. University students in white-collar professions, particularly in private business, engineering, or medicine, were the backbone of the government’s definition of human resources.

Universities would also strengthen Brazil through the expansion of science and technology curricula. Castelo Branco extolled the role of science and technology in spurring industrial growth and development to stabilize the economy and resolve almost all of Brazil’s economic and social problems. In his vision of development, prosperity was impossible “without the foundations of science and technology.” Moreover, Castelo Branco claimed that improving Brazil’s scientific and technological capabilities in the universities would create a Brazilian “nation” and “people” whose culture and traditions could survive in the modern world. Government reports cited statistics on what they perceived to be the dearth of engineers, doctors, dentists, architects, and researchers, a concern that also pre-dated the military dictatorship.

Although Costa e Silva was not as ebullient as his predecessor in his praise for science and technology’s messianic abilities, in 1967, his new cabinet

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11 Castelo Branco, *Discursos*, vol. 1, p. 141.


also recommended boosting scientific research and production through increased federal spending.\(^{14}\) His administration also used statistics to decry the absence of scientists, engineers, dentists, veterinarians, and other white-collar professionals in the sciences, even while students in law, the social sciences, and the humanities were abundant.\(^{15}\) Perhaps not coincidentally, most student opposition came from these latter programs in the 1960s, possibly strengthening the government’s desire to focus on the sciences all the more. Indeed, in the military’s new Constitution of 1967, the section on education declared that “The Public Power will give incentive to scientific and technological research,” while saying nothing about other areas of academic study.\(^{16}\) The inclusion of science in the foundation of the country’s legal system made clear just how important improving Brazil’s scientific and technological capacity was to the new military governments.

In order for universities to be able to provide the human resources and the scientific know-how to lead Brazilian development, however, the military governments acknowledged that a major overhaul of the university system was required.\(^{17}\) Both Castelo Branco’s and Costa e Silva’s administrations regularly


\(^{16}\) Constitution of 1967, Article 171. Caixa 252, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN.

\(^{17}\) See, for example, Castelo Branco, *Discursos*, Vol. 1, p. 136-137; Vol. 2, p. 110; and Untitled Document, NT 334, Fundo Coleções Particulares – Coleção Jair Ferreira de Sá, APERJ.
called for the need to “perfect” (aperfeiçoar) the university system generally,\(^\text{18}\) language that university students also used in their own calls for reform.\(^\text{19}\) Flávio Suplicy de Lacerda, the first Minister of Education during the dictatorship,\(^\text{20}\) claimed that 11 of the 15 measures adopted by the military government to transform education in Brazil dealt directly or tangentially with the university system.\(^\text{21}\) Making claims on the value of the universities was common in this period; both Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva continuously placed universities at the center of their rhetoric on national development. However, actually transforming universities through policy proved to be more scattershot during the first years of the dictatorship.

*Visions and Praxis: Educational Policy*


\(^{19}\) See Chapter 3.

\(^{20}\) Because Castelo Branco was not inaugurated until April 11, Luiz Antônio da Gama e Silva served as Minister of Education from April 6 until Suplicy’s installation on April 15, at which point Gama e Silva relocated to his position as rector at the Universidade de São Paulo (USP). See “MEC – Principais Atividades e Realizações – 1930-1967,” pp. 16-17, Notação 9.56, Coleção Luís Viana Filho; and Gaspari, *A Ditadura Envergonhada*, p. 223. Gama e Silva would later become notorious as the Minister of Justice, a hardliner who according to one scholar served as supervisor to the paramilitary group Comando de Caça aos Comunistas (Communist-Hunting Command, CCC); see Gaspari, *A Ditadura Envergonhada*, p. 299. While serving as Minister of Justice in the cabinet of Costa e Silva, Gama e Silva playing a central role in the issuance of the repressive Institutional Act No. 5, which would usher in the most repressive phase of Brazil’s twenty-one year dictatorship. See Gaspari, *A Ditadura Envergonhada*, pp. 317 and 332-343, and Ronaldo Costa Couto, *História indiscreta da ditadura e da abertura – Brasil: 1964-1985*, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 2003), p. 86.

\(^{21}\) “MEC – Principais Atividades e Realizações – 1930-1967,” pp. 49-51, Caixa 9, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN.
With his focus on economic reforms, Castelo Branco attempted to increase funding and attendance in the universities, but offered little in the way of a coherent policy. Certainly, Castelo Branco attempted to expand the university system, and boasted of increasing its funding. Agreements with foreign agencies played an important part in the Castelo Branco administration’s educational policy, as well. However, these attempts at reform were piecemeal and often half-hearted, as the administration undid its previous policies and laws. Only during Costa e Silva’s administration did the military dictatorship begin to fully tackle the issue of university reform in an attempt to create a unified, coherent policy to transform Brazil’s higher education.

Foremost among the Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva administrations’ specific concerns was the issue of vagas, or positions available in the universities each year. Officials pointed towards the country’s “demographic explosion” and increasing urbanization, resulting in growing numbers of students seeking university education. Castelo Branco quickly expressed his goal of fulfilling 1961’s *Lei de Diretrizes e Bases* (LDB) and expanding the number of openings in universities. Raymundo Moniz Aragão, Castelo Branco’s third Minister of Education, placed expanding the university system as his top priority upon taking office in 1966. Even so, progress was slow, and in early-1967, Aragão was

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24 “MEC – Principais Atividades e Realizações – 1930-1967,” p. 71-72, Notação 9.56, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN. Flávio Suplicy de Lacerda stepped down in the beginning of 1966, and Minas Gerais politician Pedro Aleixo replaced him. However, Aleixo had to step down in
promising students in Rio de Janeiro that all the excedentes, or those who had passed the entrance exams but for whom there were no positions available, would be placed in universities, although perhaps in other states. Shortly after taking office, Guanabara governor Francisco Negrão de Lima commented on the public’s worry over the lack of openings at all educational levels, particularly the university level. However, he did not offer solutions, instead dodging the issue by calling it a “national problem.”

Yet the federal government under Castelo Branco was slow to solve the problem. Some statistics for 1967 put the number of students eligible for university admission at 180,000, with only 80,000 openings that year. In addition to the relative smallness of universities, the military governments also criticized lab conditions, the quality of curricula, the archaic position of the professor catedrático, and the examination system. Under Castelo Branco, CAPES spent only five million Cruzeiros (NCr$) on re-equipping universities in

October of that same year when he became Costa e Silva’s vice-presidential candidate. Raymundo Moniz de Aragão, the Director of Higher Education at the Ministry of Education and Culture, stepped in to fill Aleixo’s shoes. The fact that it was the Director of Higher Education, and not the Director of Secondary or Primary Education (both positions in MEC), who assumed the role of Minister of Education and Culture in Castelo Branco’s last year, suggests how seriously the government took university education.

25 “Cronologia do Govêrno Castelo Branco,” Notação 7.52, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN.

26 Negrão de Lima’s election as governor of Guanabara state (Rio de Janeiro city) in 1965 was one of the two factors that led to the military’s institution of AI-2, which abolished old political parties and opened a new round of stripping individuals of their political rights. See Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, pp. 60-65.

27 “Governador Negrão de Lima Preside Aula Inaugural da UEG [Universidade do Estado de Guanabara],” Govêrno da Guanabara – Assessoria de Imprensa, 11, March 1966. CPDOC, NL g 66.03.11.

1966.²⁹ The military government lamented the “scarcity of resources,” as well as poor distribution, which resulted in what one participant at a forum featuring Roberto Campos described as “the horrible quality of education offered in the majority of universities.”³⁰

To deal with outdated infrastructure, Castelo Branco’s bureaucrats urged increased spending.³¹ Fifty-eight percent of MEC’s budget in 1965 was spent on higher education, thus violating the law as outlined in the LDB, which dictated that the spending be divided equally among the three levels of education.³² Nonetheless, the federal government boasted that spending on education was at its “most intense” between 1964 and 1967, and that per capita spending on universities had jumped from 2.9 percent in 1960 to 4.5 percent in 1967, with an annual growth of 16 percent.³³

However, the government’s numbers could not be reconciled with student complaints that universities were underfunded. State governmental studies suggested that the federal government had failed to adjust their figures for

²⁹ “MEC – Principais Atividades e Realizações – 1930-1967,” pp. 72-73, Notação 9.56, Coleção Luis Viana Filho, AN. The final figure given was NCr$4,756,925.00.


inflation and that students perhaps had a legitimate complaint. The military claimed it had rapidly increased spending in 1964 alone. Yet a study in Rio de Janeiro pointed out that, while federal spending on education and culture in Rio had increased from Cr$588,404,000 in 1960 to Cr$3,292,879,000 in 1964, when inflation was taken into account, funding actually dropped by 15.3 percent between 1960 and 1964. Likewise, Governor Negrão Lima declared that nine billion cruzeiros of state and federal funding would be insufficient to attend to the University system’s needs in Rio in 1966.

The Castelo Branco administration did make attempts to legislate broader university reforms. In November 1966, it issued Decree-Law 53, followed by Decree-Law 252 in February 1967. Together, they hinted at the direction the regime would take in the 1968 University Reform. They proclaimed the need to streamline university administration and departmental organization while emphasizing the value of research. However, these reforms remained superficial, with no diagnoses on how to implement these changes. Additionally, they came after Congress had elected Costa e Silva and Castelo Branco entered the lame-duck phase of his regime, meaning little came of them. Indeed, although the two laws marked the government’s most serious efforts at university reform

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36 “Decreto Lei no. 53 de 18 de novembro de 1966,” 1.107, and “Decreto Lei no. 252 de 28 de fevereiro de 1967,” 1.108, Pasta 3, Caixa 9, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN.
yet, as one scholar put it, they were still “paper reforms” that did not offer any real transformations in Brazilian education. 37

Perhaps the most important educational legislation during Castelo Branco’s administration dealt not with issues of vagas or funding, but with the student movement itself. In November 1964, the government issued the Lei Suplicy, or Suplicy de Lacerda law, named after the Minister of Education and Culture. With labor leaders and opposition politicians removed through the First Institutional Act, the Lei Suplicy was the government’s first concentrated salvo against student movements. The law outlawed UNE, as well as the State Student Unions (UEEs) and Rio de Janeiro’s Metropolitan Student Union (União Metropolitano dos Estudantes, UME). In their stead, the government created the National Directory of Students (Diretório Nacional de Estudantes, DNE) and State Directories of Students (Diretórios Estaduais dos Estudantes, DEE). The new DNE and DEEs fell under the direct jurisdiction of the state, providing the military with a better way to control student organizations. The Lei Suplicy also sought to control on-campus organizing by establishing the Students’ Central Directories (DCEs). The intention was to strip the student movements of all “subversive” voices and relegate student organizations to the authority of the executive branch. However, the dictatorship never fully enforced the law, forcing UNE into “semi-legality,” as it continued to hold elections and congresses through 1968.

The law spurred immediate outrage among students. They bashed Suplicy de Lacerda for his incompetence and for his namesake law. One scholar called him “the most catastrophic Minister of Education in the history of national pedagogy.” A former student went so far as to say that the only good thing Suplicy had accomplished as rector of the University of Paraná (prior to becoming Minister of Education) was installing a bust of himself on the campus, one which the student bragged students later destroyed. Students also took over the DCEs on many campuses in an attempt to seize control from the government. While UNE continued to meet semi-clandestinely and students mobilized against the law, the DEEs and DNEs proved ineffectual. By 1966, the government repealed the Lei Suplicy (though UNE remained illegal); yet that did not stop the law from providing students with a powerful symbol in protesting the military regime well into the Costa e Silva administration.

Under Costa e Silva, many of the issues that plagued higher education under Castelo Branco continued to occupy the new president. Prior to taking office, the general had already decreed 1967 to be “The Year of Education,” pledging improvements and reform. A preoccupation with vagas continued in the first years of the Costa e Silva administration. Arlindo Lopes Corrêa, a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Planning and General Coordination, took

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38 Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, p. 225.
39 See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with José Dirceu, pp. 4-5.
40 See Ch. 3, below.
41 Untitled Document, NT 334, Fundo Coleções Particulares – Coleção Jair Ferreira de Sá, APERJ.
seriously a Universidade do Brasil professor’s claims that doubling the number of openings in the university system was viable, and presented a governmental report based on the professor’s argument.\textsuperscript{42} Although Castelo Branco had sought expansion, Costa e Silva’s administration went even further, acting on the professor’s study. While Costa e Silva’s administration proposed doubling the number of openings, Castelo Branco had denigrated João Goulart’s Decree 53.642 of February 1964, which doubled the number of openings in universities. It was not that Castelo Branco was opposed to the expansion of universities. However, he suggested that Goulart’s decree was “simple” and disorderly, and even blamed it for students’ “dissatisfaction.”\textsuperscript{43} Although Castelo Branco also sought to expand the university system, he deemed Goulart’s educational policies “erroneous”\textsuperscript{44} and, in a statement seemingly free of irony, even accused Goulart of using the expansion in order “to dominate the University via terror.”\textsuperscript{45} Yet four years after assuming power, the military government was exploring the exact same policy to address the issues of \textit{vagas} and \textit{excedentes}.

The entrance exams were another point of increasing concern under Costa e Silva. In the 1960s, students took different exams for different fields. Thus, students in engineering were not tested on subjects like literature or anthropology.

\textsuperscript{42} “Uso Intensivo do Espaço Escolar no Ensino Superior – Setor da Educação Mão-de-Obra do IPEA – Ministério do Planejamento e Coordenação Geral,” March 1968. CPDOC, EUG píc Corrêa, A. 1968.03.00.

\textsuperscript{43} “Notas sobre o Ministério da Educação e Cultura no Governo Castelo Branco,” Anotações 9.94-9.95, Caixa 9, Coleção Luis Viana Filho, AN.

\textsuperscript{44} Castelo Branco, \textit{Discursos}, Vol. 2, p. 172.

Consequently, students applying to more than one program had to take multiple exams, which slowed down the admissions process. The government suggested the exams could be adapted to measure “not only the basic essential knowledge needed for entrance into the university, but the potentiality of the future university students and of the adaptation of their qualities with regards to the career paths they have selected.”\textsuperscript{46} This approach would simultaneously test students on a broad range of subjects while streamlining the process by providing one unified exam for all students, regardless of their proposed field of study.

In spite of his efforts, Costa e Silva ran into some of the same problems his predecessor had. In 1967, he cut university budgets, half-heartedly defending the measure as part of “a reduction only in the spending of the [federal] Union.”\textsuperscript{47} Although this did not impact primary or secondary education as much, it hit higher education hard.\textsuperscript{48} Federal universities matriculated as much as 81 percent of Brazil’s total university population in 1964, meaning universities suffered disproportionately from these budget cuts.\textsuperscript{49} Thus, it was not so surprising when


the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF) complained of funding cuts due to inflation when on paper, their budget had actually increased. Additionally, although primary and secondary education was funded primarily by municipal and state governments, the federal government was responsible for funding universities. Consequently, while the government could point to misleading data suggesting it had improved educational spending, students and state governments could legitimately claim that the system remained woefully under-funded.

The government’s turn to foreign agencies to intervene in university reform was even more ideologically outrageous to students. Paradoxically, this strategy actually predated the military dictatorship. Prior to the coup, Goulart entered into an agreement with the Inter-American Bank of Development (Banco Interamericano do Desenvolvimento, BID). The agreement secured foreign loans to help Brazil improve the educational system. Brazil’s National Bank of Development (BNDES), which oversaw the spending of the funds, learned that the government hoped to use the money for education and attempted to block the use of the funds, claiming that education was not a “basic investment for national economic development.” The BNDES did eventually free up the money when professor and Institute of Social Research and Studies (Instituto de Pesquisa e Estudos Sociais, IPES) member Paulo de Assis Ribeiro argued that “education is a primordial investment for the economic development of any country.” When the military overthrew Goulart, the MEC-BID agreements were one of the few Goulart-era policies that the military continued, gaining Castelo Branco’s seal of

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50 “Plano de Reestruturação da Universidade Federal de Fluminense.” CPDOC, EAP erj 1945/1965.00.00 [Pasta III].
approval as long as the agreements were vaguely and reassuringly amended to “remove the wrong and continue with the right.” 

Although the Goulart administration had established the loan, Castelo Branco took credit for it, and between 1964 and 1967, BID gave US$172 million in aid to Brazil.

Only eleven days after the coup, a group of government officials, including Minister of Planning Roberto Campos, Raymundo Moniz de Aragão, Paulo Novais from the National Service of Industrial Training (SENAI), and others gathered to discuss the possibility of getting a loan from the Banco Internacional para Reconstrução e Desenvolvimento (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, BIRD) to finance “projects for secondary and higher education, associated with the economic development of the country.” The group earmarked the money for two main projects: to create a labor service to address the need for “human resources” and to complete a new building at the National Engineering School (a part of the University of Brazil), allowing for better training for engineers.

While the MEC-BID and MEC-BIRD agreements set the precedent for financial and diplomatic foreign aid in reforming Brazilian education, an agreement between MEC and the United States Agency for International Development, or USAID, was the most infamous of these foreign agreements.

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53 “Reunião para Exame da Possibilidade de Ajudo do BIRD para Educação,” n. pag., Caixa 317, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN.
Originally established in 1965 under Castelo Branco and renewed in 1967 under Costa e Silva, the MEC-USAID accords (as they came to be known) sought to research, reorganize, and reform Brazil’s universities, in what Victoria Langland calls an “economic developmentalist model.” The accords looked to the United States’ university system as a potential model. They attempted to streamline the university system, making it a key part of Brazilian development, particularly with its focus on science and technology and on professional training, especially for teachers. The agreements also pledged to investigate possible methods of university expansion and “perfection.”

In reality, the MEC-USAID accords were part of a broader aid package from USAID in areas that included “agrarian reform, fish production, malaria eradication, textbook production, training of labor union leaders, and expansion of capital markets.” Although USAID contributed US$488 million to Brazil between 1964 and 1967 (with $147 million in 1965 alone), government officials insisted that in terms of education, collaboration with USAID never went beyond


55 For example, see letter from Juracy Magalhães to Jutay Magalhães, item IV-11, Pasta IV, Coleção Juracy Magalhães, CPDOC. The MEC-USAID agreements were never fully completed, but the governments findings would ultimately form the Reforma Universitária (University Reform) of December 1968. See the Reportagem do Grupo de Trabalho sobre a Reforma Universitária, Caixa 309, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN.


“analysis” and suggestions for reforming the curricula, entrance exams, and other reforms, changes the government itself had been investigating. 59 Indeed, in terms of education, the accords were largely symbolic. While the agreements included financial aid for education, Castelo Branco used that money to pay off foreign debts, and USAID’s impact seemed to fall further on the side of “analysis” than on funding, although this distinction would make little difference to students.60 Though the United States government had expressed concern over Castelo Branco’s use of USAID funds to reduce foreign debt, that did not stop the U.S. government from renewing the agreements with Costa e Silva and USAID pledging another $100 million in 1967.61 Moreover, the government occasionally sought student participation in the committee overseeing educational reform in 1967 debates, an offer which university students turned down in protest of the agreements.62

The government also sought the outside aid of Rudolph Atcon, an American professor and ex-member of USAID who had been involved with CAPES in the 1950s. In 1966, the Department of Higher Education (DESu) in


60 For comment on the financial aid, see Ribeiro, “Educação Superior Brasileira,” pp. 22-23. For U.S. officials’ consternation, see Skidmore, *Politics of Military Rule*, p. 60. For students’ responses, see Ch. 3, below.


MEC contracted Atcon to return to Brazil in order to help transform the Brazilian university system. Ultimately, Atcon published four different studies on the issue, conveniently emphasizing the value of an apolitical campus, administrative reform, a core curriculum, and reforming professors’ pay scale. In November 1967, professor Frank Tiller, the director of the Center of Higher Education Studies of Latin America at the University of Houston, visited the Universidade de Santa Catarina in Florianópolis and recommended the adoption of an Americanized system based on credit hours, student advisors, increased “professorial remuneration,” and campus reorganization and modernization. Ten months later, professor Robert B. Howsam from the University of Houston visited UFRJ. On his visit, he submitted a report from Tiller. The report also recommended expanding the university system, emphasizing the production of “professional educators,” creating a stronger graduate school network in Brazil, and greater institutional control by both professors and students. Even private universities pursued this strategy. In December 1968, PUC-RJ received a report from Douglas G. Maclean, also from the University of Houston.

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63 Ribeiro, “Educação Superior Brasileira,” p. 21; Vieira, O (Dis)curso da (Re)forma Universitária, pp. 17 and 27.

64 Vieira, O (Dis)curso da (Re)forma Universitária, pp. 136-137.


67 It is unclear why only the University of Houston was involved, or how it became involved in reports for divergent schools. However, it is worth noting that of the visits mentioned, each gave a report from Tiller, who was an M.D. in chemical engineering, once again suggesting
recommended PUC-RJ adopt “a strong academic chain of command” and administrative reform, streamlining the financial and social administration of the campus.\(^{68}\) Foreign participation in studying university reforms in Brazil clearly went beyond the MEC-USAID agreements, and extended to sectors outside of the federal university system.

The dictatorship also established its own domestic groups to study higher education. One of these was headed by colonel Carlos Meira Matos, from the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) and counted among its members the director of the National Law School at the University of Rio de Janeiro and the general director of the National Department of Education.\(^{69}\) The formation of the Meira Matos commission suggested that students were getting under the military government’s skin. Meira Matos was an ardent anti-Communist who allegedly said that there were “three [Communist] red centers in the world: Russia, China, and the University of Brasília.”\(^{70}\) Perhaps because of this political stance, Costa e Silva appointed him to investigate student demands and complaints, and to offer solutions should they be valid. In the first months of 1968, the commission met, ultimately issuing a report which encouraged a stronger role among authorities on campuses, the president’s direct nomination of rectors, new criteria and better pay

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\(^{68}\) “Seventh Report – Visit of Douglas G. MacLean, Vice President for Staff Services, The University of Houston, to the Pontifícia Universidade Católica, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil, December 1-16.” CPDOC, JT pit t Maclean, D.G. 1968.12.01.


\(^{70}\) Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview, Cláudio Fonteles, p. 7.
for professors, increased available positions for incoming students, and the participation of students in university administration.\textsuperscript{71}

The Meira Matos report spurred the creation of another study group, the Grupo de Trabalho (Work Group, GT), assigned “to study the issue of university reform” in July 1968. The GT originally was to be composed of eight government-appointed officials and two student representatives, though no students volunteered for the GT as a sign of protest against the military’s rule.\textsuperscript{72}

Once again stressing universities’ role in leading national development through scientific production, the GT recommended the government should expand university education. This included federalizing more schools, abandoning the catedrático system, developing a strong post-graduate programs, particularly in the sciences, and creating a single entrance exam for all students regardless of academic field.\textsuperscript{73}

In proposing all of these studies and reforms, a systematic reform of the university system was not the only issue on officials’ minds. Leaders in the military government and their allies also viewed university reform as a means to control student resistance and subversion. Coup participant Antônio Carlos Muricy commented that university reform “in the shortest term possible” would help remove “‘true’ student agitators” and reorient university activity to “studious

\textsuperscript{71} Vieira, \textit{O (Dis)Curso da (Re)forma Universitária}, pp. 136-137.
\textsuperscript{72} Vieira, \textit{O (Dis)Curso da (Re)forma Universitária}, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{73} Ministério do Planejamento e Coordenação Geral, Ministério da Fazenda, and Ministério da Educação e Cultura, \textit{Reforma Universitária: Expansão do ensino superior e aumento de recursos para a educação – Relatório da Subcomissão Especial do Grupo de Trabalho da Reforma Universitária, Coordenada por João Paulo dos Reis Velloso e Fernando Ribeiro do Val}. Caixa 21, Encadernado 8, Coleção DAU-SESU, COREG.
youth.” Castelo Branco pointed to the value of reform “above all to modify the atmosphere of continued agitation” and to combat “subversion and inefficiency” on campuses. Roberto Campos commented at a roundtable that Congress was moving towards university reform rapidly due in no small part “to the extent and ferocity of student protest.”

Yet to implement change, the military governments of the 1960s found themselves in a bit of a paradox. They extolled in theory the virtues of decentralizing authority with regards to education, frequently appealing to the LDB of 1961, which had called for redistributing authority over schooling to states and municipalities. In practice, this was a far more tenuous position. While discursively proclaiming the value of decentralization, the Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva administrations were simultaneously strengthening and centralizing oversight of the educational system at all levels through MEC. The military quickly reorganized MEC in order to better control the educational institution at all levels. In practice the military made clear its preference for top-down management even while it rhetorically extolled the merits of decentralization. Certainly, the heavy hand of the military was obvious in the police invasions of campuses and increasing crackdowns on protesting students.

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74 CPDOC, ACM pm 1964.10.00, Rolo 1, photos 693-696, 734-738.
76 Roberto Campos, “Educação e Desenvolvimento Econômico,” 1968, p. 12, Caixa 319, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN.
like the MEC-USAID accords, the Plano Atcon, and the Meira Matos group emphasized the need to centralize and increase the executive’s control over the universities. Even while states and municipalities had more control over the primary and secondary schools themselves, the military government strengthened its control over the pedagogical content of schooling nationwide, and reserved and executed the right to dismiss “subversive” faculty at all levels.\(^\text{78}\) It also streamlined the administrative side of education, creating a leaner hierarchy that placed MEC at the top of the chain of command. Thus, the military discursively extolled its efforts to “decentralize,” pointing to its fulfillment of the LDB’s requirement that municipal and state governments have more control over local education, even while it increased real control over content and power in the federal government. Having condemned the Goulart administration for moving towards a dictatorship and a strong, centralized government, the military then further strengthened the executive branch’s power and the federal government’s hierarchical control over education.

In spite of their efforts to completely control the process of reform, however, the Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva educational policies were influenced by student strikes on campuses, street protests, and clashes with the police.\(^\text{79}\) Sometimes students directly confronted government officials, even the

\(^{78}\) Nor was this right an idle threat; immediately after the coup, the dictatorship fired “subversive” professors throughout the country, and many more resigned in protest or in fear of their own futures. See, for example “Do Diretor Álvaro Sardinha aos Professores, Alunos e Funcionários da Faculdade de Direito.” CPDOC: EAP 1945/1965.00.00 [Pasta II].

\(^{79}\) “Agenda com Recursos de atos, encontros, decisões, articulações entre Castelo Branco, 14.08.64 a 15.03.1967,” Notação 1.72; “Cronologia do Governo Castelo Branco,” Notação 7.52
president. When Castelo Branco attended the 1965 academic year’s inaugural class at the University of Rio de Janeiro, several students protested, jeering the president and walking out, at which point they were arrested. While one witness claimed that Castelo Branco opposed their expulsion, their conspicuous act of protest nonetheless made an impression and generated separate secret police files.80 The military government also heard complaints from students loyal to the government. Castelo Branco’s Minister of Foreign Relations, Juracy Magalhães received a letter from a pro-military student clamoring for university reform. He, in turn, forwarded the letter to the Ministry of Education.81 In a separate incident, Minister of Education Raymundo Moniz de Aragão reflected on decree-laws 53 and 252, saying they “opened the path for a full reform of the University, called for so long.”82 The former Minister of Planning, Roberto Campos, commented that Congress was certainly aware of students’ educational demands and activism, while ex-foreign minister Juracy Magalhães wrote to his son Jutahy, the vice-

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81 Letter from Paulo Nunes Alves, 1966. CPDOC, JM e mre 66.03.15. Even if the letter did not make it to the Minister of Education’s desk (the outcome of the case is unclear), Magalhães did receive the letter and respond, again indicating that government officials even outside of the direct administration of educational matters were aware of the calls for university reform.

82 “MEC – Principais Atividades e Realizações – 1930-1967,” pp. 74-75 (emphasis added), Notação 9.56, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN. Sociologist Florestan Fernandes suggested that these two decree-laws were the real university reform, rather than the 1968 Reform, because the latter was based largely on the laws established in Decree-Laws 53 and 252. Thus, he claimed, university reform in Brazil had actually begun under Castelo Branco, rather than Costa e Silva. See Florestan Fernandes, *Universidade Brasileira: reforma ou revolução?*, (São Paulo: Editora Alfa-Omega, 1975), p. 203.
governor of Bahia, describing student street protests calling for university
reform. 83 Students also made their voices heard by marching or rallying directly
in front of the MEC building in Rio de Janeiro, intentionally choosing the site to
make their demands clear to the dictatorship. 84

Moreover, the military government periodically entered into direct
dialogue with students. When the government outlawed UNE via the Lei Suplicy,
a group of students from Recife asked Castelo Branco to allow UNE’s continued
existence. Castelo Branco countered that he would only reexamine UNE’s
situation once students accepted the federally-controlled DEEs and the DNE. 85
While it is unclear whether that dialog took place face-to-face, other such
meetings did occur. In August 1965, Castelo Branco had a “long meeting” with
six university students, 86 and although details are lacking, Castelo Branco’s
official activities recorded six audiences and meetings with “student
representation” in 1964, twenty-nine in 1965, and thirty-nine in 1966. 87 It is
possible that the government initiated these meetings to try to gain student allies
in order to counteract the anti-dictatorship currents within the student movements.

One of Castelo Branco’s security advisers even suggested trying to recruit

83 Roberto Campos, “Educação e Desenvolvimento Econômico,” 1968, Caixa 319, Coleção
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN; letter from Juracy Magalhães to Jutahy Magalhães, CPDOC, JM c c
Magalhães, J.

84 See, for example, “Universidade Popular,” p. 3. Dossie 9, Fundo Coleções Particulares –
Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, APERJ.

85 CPDOC, ACM pm 1964.10.00, Rolo 1, photos 693-696, 734-738.

86 “Agenda com Registro de atos, encontros, decisões, articulações entre Castelo Branco –
14.08.1964 a 15.03.1967,” Notação 1.72, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, AN.

Filho, AN.
students into working for the National Security Institute, one of the major cogs in the state’s growing security apparatus. In a particularly high-profile instance, Costa e Silva requested to meet with student leaders in 1968. Several student leaders did meet with Costa e Silva, using the opportunity to demand more funds, vagas, and the release of arrested student leaders, among other issues. Costa e Silva delayed or refused to meet their demands, but the fact that he invited students to meet with him in the Guanabara Palace in Rio de Janeiro made clear that the relationship between students and the state was more complicated than of mere protest and repression, and that the military was actively aware of students’ demands.

Between 1964 and 1968, the Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva governments launched numerous efforts to examine the problems and potential solutions to Brazil’s university problem. Some of these programs, like the Plano Atcon and the agreements between MEC and BID, BIRD, and USAID, turned to outside agencies for help, while other studies, such as the Meira Matos report and the Grupo de Trabalho, were domestic enterprises. In each instance, the federal government assumed a central role in administering the plans and acting upon their findings. Universities and reform were a central part of the military’s developmental plan almost from the moment it overthrew Goulart, and the

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88 Who suggested this is open to debate; the document merely suggests it was “G.” This could have been Ernesto Geisel, Castelo Branco’s military chief of staff, though Golbery do Couto seems like a more likely candidate, as he was the founder and head of the SNI under Castelo Branco. See “Agenda com registro de atos, encontros, decisões, articulações entre Castelo Branco – 14.08.1964 a 15.03.1967,” Caixa 1, Coleção Luis Viana Filho, AN.

89 Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Franklin Martins, p. 17; Bernardo Joffily, pp. 4-5; and Jean Marc von der Weid, pp. 13-14. See also Chapter 2, above.
military dictatorship was determined to exercise final authority, even as students, conservative business leaders, pedagogues, and politicians also shaped the debate over the role universities would play in the Brazilian development under the new regime.  

**The Result of Years’ Worth of Efforts: 1968’s Reforma Universitária**

Towards the end of 1968, as political and social tensions reached their apex, the military government finally issued its *Reforma Universitária* (University Reform). Four years in the making, the *Reforma* marked the first major university policy in over thirty-five years, born out of more than a decade of demands from students, professors, business leaders, and politicians both before and after the military coup. The *Reforma* established the university’s role as a center of scientific research and development and gave the university greater autonomy with the federal government’s approval. It replaced the *catedrático* system with a departmental system, something students had demanded in the early 1960s. It outlined how future universities were to be formed in order to address the need for more openings. It centralized internal administration in individual universities, giving rectors greater control over the schools. It also strengthened the federal government’s control over public universities, giving the executive the right to nominate rectors and vice-rectors, who in turn nominated their administrators,

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90 See Ch. 3, below.


92 See Chapter 1.
effectively making university administration run by officials sympathetic to the military dictatorship. It was a sweeping reform that transformed not only the role of universities in Brazilian society, but their administration and organization as well.93

The Reforma Universitária was not the product of a single study, or a single group’s interest; rather, it was the synthesis of both domestic studies and international accords and funding.94 Additionally many of the military government’s concerns, be they modern facilities, more openings, or transforming the catedrático, overlapped with students’ demands, even if they did not agree ideologically. Nor could the state under military rule ignore those demands, occasionally entering into willing (or unwilling) dialog with students. Elements from each of these projects and sectors were present in the final reform. Sometimes, they coincided, as when reports suggested increasing the number of openings or reforming the pay structure and administration of universities. Other times, certain recommendations, such as the Meira Matos group’s suggestion that students participate in administration, fell in line with students’ demands even while contradicting the military government’s vision of a successful university. In these recommendations, it was clear that the state had not acted alone; business leaders, foreign diplomats, Brazilian pedagogical experts, and students had all shaped and structured the debate. Indeed, many of the recommendations addressed issues and solutions first raised in the 1940s, including the abolition of

93 Lei 5.540, 28 November 1968. For a copy of the law, see Caixa 07-4674, Coleção DSI, AN.
94 Vieira, O (Dis)Curso da Reforma Universitária, pp. 136-137.
the catedrático and the institution of departments. Nonetheless, only the military government could issue federal policy and it did. The 1968 Reforma Universitária was the result.

Yet in forming these policies and reforms, the government did not operate in a vacuum. While it bore responsibility for the decree and execution of the first major overhaul of the university system since the 1930s, it also incorporated demands from diverse sectors. Students, parents, progressive pedagogues, and conservative business leaders all actively influenced the debate over university reform in the 1960s, shaping the government’s own policies and goals. It is to their voices that we now turn.

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95 See Ch. 1. For the origins of these demands in the 1940s, see Luiz Antônio Cunha, A universidade reformada: O golpe de 1964 e a modernização do Ensino, (Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves, 1988), p. 22.
Chapter Three – Of Drinking Fountains and Imperialism: Students, Civilians, and Visions of the University in Brazil, 1964-1968

The debate over universities’ roles in development, and students’ roles in those debates, predated the dictatorship by several years. Nonetheless, the military government that emerged from the overthrow of João Goulart on 1 April 1964 changed the dynamic of those struggles. The new political context transformed the fight for university reform. By highlighting issues like infrastructural problems, a lack of funding, and broader educational policies under the new regime, students simultaneously tried to pressure the government to reform the universities while undermining the military’s authority. Additionally, student movements continued to use the universities to shape the debate over the nature of Brazilian development. As the 1960s progressed, students used both informal and formal forms of dialog with the government in order to influence this debate. Yet the struggle over educational reform was not limited to students and the military regime. Parents, conservative organizations, business leaders, and pedagogues all contributed to the discourse over the role of Brazil’s universities in national development. In this regard, universities increasingly served as physical and discursive sites in which various social sectors with widely varying ideologies resisted and reshaped the military governments’ efforts to shape universities and higher education’s role in social and economic development.

Demands Old and New: Students and Universities, 1964-1968

In the immediate wake of the coup, students’ focus on university reform temporarily faded as the country waited to see what would be the results of the
military’s seventh political intervention in 34 years.¹ Many from the middle class were originally grateful for the coup, feeling that it had prevented Brazil from further careening towards chaos.² While a small number of students protested the coup on April 1, many more supported it. Some students who would later become leaders against the dictatorship even rushed to physically defend Guanabara’s right-wing governor, Carlos Lacerda, when the military first moved on Rio.³

Even while many students supported the coup, the new regime moved quickly to immobilize UNE. On April 1, the military burned down the UNE headquarters in Rio de Janeiro. A small number of students tried to rise up against the military coup at the National Law School, but the police quickly arrested some, and the remainder dispersed as organized support of Goulart collapsed. As the military cracked down on “subversive” forces, UNE’s leadership was effectively gutted. Some pre-coup leaders voluntarily left, while the military politically persecuted others that it had identified as “communists.”⁴

¹ The military was involved in Getúlio Vargas’s successful ascension in 1930; the establishment of the Estado Novo in 1937; the overthrow of Vargas in 1945; the establishment of a parliamentary system in the wake of Jânio Quadros’s resignation in 1961; and the coup of 1964. Additionally, it had moved behind the scenes upon Vargas’s 1954 suicide, and attempted but failed to mobilize military involvement after Juscelino Kubitschek was elected in 1955, leading to no fewer than seven incidents in which the military attempted to influence national politics in Brazil since 1930.

² See Daniel Aarão Reis, Ditadura militar, esquerdas e sociedade, (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2000).

³ Personal interview with F.G., 10 September 2007; Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Jean Marc von der Weid. Some students did mobilize, most notably at the Candido Oliveira Academic Center (CACO), of the Law School at University of Brazil. However, such resistance was short-lived. See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Daniel Aarão Reis, p. 4.

groups did try to reorient themselves to the new political context. The Popular Action (Ação Popular, AP) movement, which had been born out of progressive Catholic student organizations in the late-1950s and early-1960s, sought to arrange a “counter-revolutionary” movement to combat the “revolutionary” coup. However, the AP’s leadership floundered, and its members often found themselves imprisoned and interrogated. The Communist Party was even more ineffective as the military arrested its leadership and Party members divided over strategy. Thus, student leaders in groups like UNE or AP were left to “lick their wounds” while many other students breathed a sigh of relief that Brazil had been “saved.”

While most students did not initially mobilize against the dictatorship, the regime’s obvious antipathy towards student movements, best symbolized by the burning down of UNE headquarters and the Suplicy Law of November 1964, led

addresses, many of which are in middle-class neighborhoods like Botafogo, Copacabana, Laranjeiras, and Urca. Whether or not these students were communists is unclear; what is clear is that the military quickly pursued and persecuted them for their political beliefs in an effort to remove them from the university system. Certainly, their neighborhoods reflect the middle-class status of many university students at this time. For more on students being persecuted or opting to leave universities and even enter into exile, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Daniel Aarão Reis, p. 7, and Franklin Martins, p. 13.

5 Quickly after taking over, the military leaders categorized their movement as a “revolution” that was going to transform and save Brazil, and throughout the twenty-one years of the dictatorship, military officers as well as coup supporters referred to the “Revolution of ’64.” To this day, some still call it a “revolution.” Personal Interview, F.G., 10 September 2007.


7 The quote comes from Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Franklin Martins, p. 12. For initial support for the coup, personal interviews with F.G. and D.N. See also Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Daniel Aarão Reis, p. 4, and Luis Raul Machado, p. 7.
to student organizations quickly reconstituting themselves and challenging the
dictatorship. Although technically illegal, UNE continued to meet regularly in a
state of “semi-clandestinity.” Students also used organizations like the state-
sponsored DCEs on campuses to further mobilize. By 1966, students were taking
to the streets, protesting the military’s crackdown on UNE, the conditions on
campuses, and the increasing use of repression, be it through police brutality or
the invasion of campuses in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Brasília. Where
students had been relatively disorganized in the wake of the 1964 coup, by 1966
they were again directly challenging the military government. In that year, police
invaded UFRJ’s medical school, beating any and all students they could get their
hands on while journalists and photographers recorded what came to be known as
the “Massacre at Praia Vermelha.” For the next two years, images of police
beating and arresting protesting students became increasingly common, giving
strength to students who protested a regime that was growing ever more
authoritarian.

Although the increasingly repressive atmosphere of the dictatorship fueled
student movements, it was far from the sole contributor to youthful organization.

University reform continued to play a major part in students’ rallies, marches, and

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8 Praia Vermelha was the beach area in the bairro of Urca in Rio de Janeiro, where the
medical school of Universidade do Brasil (later UFRJ) was located. Several student leaders were
present at the crackdown and the police specifically sought them out. Wladimir Palmeira joked
that while they had targeted him, he was clean-shaven, and they were looking for the stereotypical
“hippie” with a beard, and so he was able to sneak by security. See Projeto Memória Estudantil,
published interview with Wladimir Palmeira. While he may have escaped, the crackdown
effectively eliminated the medical school at the university for the next few years, as most students
decided the risks were not worth the rewards. Personal interviews with D.N., 27 August 2007, and

9 For a detailed narrative and analysis of these mobilizations, see Victoria Langland,
“Speaking of Flowers,” Ch. 1.
demands. Students increasingly mobilized over a variety of issues that generally fell into three categories: conditions students faced within the universities; the government’s educational policy more generally; and broader national and international issues, particularly the government’s openness to American “imperialism.” Yet these demands and complaints were not limited to social and educational reform. Rather, the new political context and increasing military repression led to students challenging the government’s legitimacy through the lens of university policy. In doing so, students were able to influence the national debate on both educational policy and on development more generally.

If the student masses had begun to express concern over the conditions they faced daily in the universities in the 1950s and early-1960s, such demands dramatically increased after the coup as the problems only worsened. Foremost among students’ complaints after 1964 were the “three v’s” of vagas (positions), verbas (federal educational funding), and vestibulares (entrance exams). Although the lack of positions for those who had passed their exams dated back to the previous decade, by the 1960s, the disparity between the number of eligible students and available positions only worsened. For example, in 1965, the government claimed that there were 125,406 eligible candidates who had passed the entrance exams, yet there were only 58,929 openings available throughout the country. Even non-students recognized the need for openings, and plans to

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expand universities placed the issue of *vagas* front and center.\(^\text{11}\) As the number of students who passed their entrance exams increased each year, the number of available positions at individual universities remained fairly steady, resulting in an increasing number of *excedentes*, or surplus students. These qualified *excedentes* began to turn against the military government because they were unable to attend the state-run federal universities. They declared the government was “prejudiced” against their needs, and chastised the regime for “the small number of openings and large number of applicants.”\(^\text{12}\) Eligible students who were kept out of university due to the lack of *vagas* took to the streets *en masse*, criticizing the government for failing to meet their cultural and material expectations.

While complaints about *vagas* and the *vestibular* could be traced back to the 1950s, demands for funding (*verbas*) were recent. Shortly after Castelo Branco took office, reigning in inflation became his top priority. In order to stabilize the Brazilian economy and gain economic support from the United States and others, the government had to cut federal spending. Education was one of the first areas that saw reductions, and what educational spending remained increasingly went to administrative positions rather than educational programs.\(^\text{13}\)

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\(^\text{11}\) CPDOC, EAP erj 1945/1965.00.00, Pasta III, “Plano de Reestruturação da Universidade Federal de Fluminense,” 1967.

\(^\text{12}\) See, for example, APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 30/31, “Colegas Vestibulandos,” and Informação No. 271/DPPS/RJ, 23 September 1968. See also Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with José Genoíno, p. 3, and Paulo Tarso de Venceslau, p. 7.

\(^\text{13}\) See David S. Brown, “Democracy, Authoritarianism and Education Finance in Brazil,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 34:1. Education was not the only area in which the military government sought to save money in the first years of the coup. Among other new fiscal policies,
As the military readjusted its economic and fiscal policies, federal universities increasingly felt the pinch, witnessing cuts of billions of cruzeiros from individual schools. They described the lack of funding as the “root of ills” in the schools, and repeatedly demanded more support. They even took to the streets with banners that demanded “More Funding for Universities,” belying the notion that all street protests simply called for an end to repression. The issue continued to occupy students’ rhetoric throughout the first four years of the dictatorship. Some student leaders even met with president Costa e Silva to demand more funding, placing it ahead of demands regarding vagas, the release of student prisoners, and reopening a popular student restaurant in Rio de Janeiro.

While the “three v’s” occupied an important space in student calls for university reform, they were not the sole challenges students faced. Indeed, if the lack of funding affected students through the poorer quality of education, new anuidades, or annual fees, directly hit students in their wallets. Beginning in

the government also discontinued its practice of buying surplus coffee at a profit for Brazilian coffee-growers. **See Skidmore.**


16 For examples of these images, see the online photo archive of the Projeto Memória Estudantil at http://www.mme.org.br/main.asp?Team=%7B98CBB6B3C4%2DB6BF%2D4D56%2D8B2E%2D286CD15F2893%7D. See also Aarujo, *Memória Estudantil*, pp. 160, 178, 181, and 204.

17 Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Franklin Martins, p. 17.
1965, first private and then public universities began charging fees. These fees were originally small, and most students could easily afford them. The insult was more ideological than financial. The federal university system had been completely free, and students felt that the government would continue to raise the fees yearly, until students were paying for their education. Additionally, they felt such fees would exclude the working class from the universities, making education more restricted, rather than more open. Thus, they once again called for “free education” for all Brazilians, though eliminating the fees would obviously aid those middle-class students in universities more immediately than the working class majority who did not attend university.¹⁸

The result was a broad mobilization against these fees in public and private schools alike. A general assembly of over 3,000 students in Pernambuco issued a manifesto that complained about the effect of anuidades not just on university students, but on high-school students as well.¹⁹ Some students called the fees “the first major attack of the dictatorship” in turning universities into diploma factories that would prepare technocrats.²⁰ Others in state schools declared the government used anuidades to cover the government’s spending cuts

¹⁸ For example, see APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 11, “Informe estudantil nacional de política operária,” pp. 2, 6, and Dossie 9, Guerra Popular (Órgão Nacional do Setor Estudantil do P.C. do Brasil – Ala Vermelha), No. 1, Ano 1, Oct. 1968, pp. 5-6.; and APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Mem No. 1022 – “Encaminha Exemplares de Órgãos Estudantis,” 29 November 1966. For the role of universities in creating a “democratic society” in the 1950s and 1960s, see Ch. 1.

¹⁹ AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 586-05252, Ofício No. 891-DOS/66 Reservado, Departamento de Ordem Social, 14 October 1966.

²⁰ For example, see APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Mem No. 1022 – “Encaminha Exemplares de Órgãos Estudantis,” 29 November 1966, and CPDOC, EAP erj 1945/1965.00.00, Pasta III, “Plano de Reestruturação da Universidade Federal de Fluminense,” 1967.
in education. Meanwhile, students in private schools particularly felt the pinch, as they were already paying for school; what was more, the fees at private schools were often higher, as the government had less control there. Student outrage was general, as every student had to pay these fees, whether they were politically active or not.

Improvements to university infrastructure were another demand that students had been making since the 1950s but that increased in the 1960s. Earlier demands for better labs, curricula, restaurants, and an end to the institution of the professor catedrático continued after the coup. Students continued to condemn the “archaic” and “deficient” nature of the university system, targeting the catedráticos specifically. They also directly connected poor infrastructure to a lack of funding. They bemoaned the absence of laboratories needed for professional development within the universities. They complained that universities were understaffed, and the professors were “generally terrible,” a fact that the low pay did not help. They commented on the absence of drinking fountains and declared that “the bathrooms, when they exist, are filthy and

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22 For example, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with José Dirceu, pp. 6, 15. Although the federal government could regulate the general operations of private universities and grant licenture to such institutions, it could not control internal decisions like the rate of fees in the 1960s. This would change by the 1980s, as fees became so exorbitant that the government began to crack down. For more on the 1980s, see Ch. 6. For more on the government’s relation to private universities in the 1960s, see Cunha, A Universidade Reformada.

unhygienic.”24 Likewise, by 1968 student newspapers cited the government’s inability to accommodate all students who passed their entrance exams as just one more example of the regime’s failed educational policies.25

Even quotidian issues as mundane as food became major battlefields against the dictatorship. Prior to the coup, student organizations had been responsible for the functioning of their own restaurants. After 1964, the military assumed control of the restaurants and began to crack down on them as sites of “subversion” where students gathered. In the most famous example, the government shut down the Calabouço restaurant in Rio de Janeiro, ostensibly to pave a new road. Not only had the restaurant provided cheap food for all students; it also served as a meeting place for progressives who discussed the weaknesses of the dictatorship. Thus, students perceived the military’s efforts as a double-offense against both the poorer students who ate at the restaurant as well as against the more radical students who used the restaurant as a meeting place. They protested the closing, and at one protest in early 1968, police killed a poor high school student, Edson Luís de Lima Souto, who worked at the restaurant. Edson Luís’s murder unleashed a massive wave of protests throughout the country as hundreds of thousands took to the streets to condemn the regime’s brutality. UNE was particularly effective in using Edson Luís’s murder as a rallying cry, taking his body to the Legislative Assembly in Rio de Janeiro and draping it in a flag.

24 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 30/31, DPPS Informação No. 271/DPPS/RJ, 23 September 1968. See also APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 9, Guerra Popular (Órgão Nacional do Setor Estudantil do P.C. do Brasil – Ala Vermelha), No. 1, Ano 1, Oct. 1968, pp. 5-6.

25 APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 9, Universidade Popular, p. 3.
surrounded by signs that read “Here is the body of a student, killed by the dictatorship” and “This is a corrupt democracy.” Although events quickly spun out of the regime’s control, it is worth recalling that the original issue that led to this political turmoil rested in the struggle over the government’s closing of a single restaurant. Even an issue as simple and mundane as food became a major way to challenge the military dictatorship, and reasserting control over the price and quality of food in restaurants would be one of the main issues that students would continue to raise well into the 1970s.

Students used complaints about the shortcomings of the Brazilian universities to directly challenge and undermine the dictatorship. They pointed to these multiple failures as yet “one more aspect of the Educational Policy of the Dictatorship.” Certainly, police violence and campus invasions only strengthened the anti-dictatorship sentiment. However, protests and street marches that called for an end to repressive actions against students also clamored for an end to fees, an increase in openings, and better food in university

26 For the photo of Luis’s body in repose, see Araujo, Memórias Estudantis, p. 175. See Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” Ch. 1., for a detailed analysis of the events behind Calabouço and the importance of Edson Luis’s death in constructing memories of 1968 as a watershed year.

27 See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Adriano Diogo, César Maia, Daniel Aarão Reis, José Luís Guedes, Wladimir Palmeira. See also Ch. 5, below.

28 APERJ, Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 9, Universidade Popular, p. 3.

29 From the beginning of the dictatorship, the military had not hesitated to invade campuses that it felt were causing problems or housing “subversives.” It invaded the University of Brasília (UnB) alone three times between 1964 and 1968, and also sparked outrage among the student body for invasions of campuses in Rio Grande do Sul, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais. See Pimenta, Universidade: A destruição de uma experiência democrática, Salmeron, A universidade interrompida, and Gurgel, A Rebelião dos Estudantes.
restaurants. Student opposition did not boil down to an either/or proposition between basic university problems and an end to the dictatorship’s repression; rather, quotidian demands became central to anti-dictatorship rhetoric more generally.

Who Defines Reform? Challenging Specific Educational Policies

If the immediate burning of UNE’s headquarters and the opening of criminal and political proceedings against student leaders in 1964 had not made clear the military’s antipathy towards existing student movements, new laws would soon drive home the point. The most incendiary of these acts came in November 1964, when the regime issued the Suplicy Law, which explicitly targeted the students’ representative organizations and led to widespread student indignation. One study even claimed that 98 percent of students nationwide supported the continuation of UNE. While that number seems high and may not have represented every student’s voice, it is clear that many students who had previously remained outside of UNE were outraged at the abolition of “their” organization. After all, students generally were proud of the role that UNE had played in Brazil since its founding in 1938, pointing to the demonstrations to join the Allies in World War II, the end of the Estado Novo dictatorship in 1945, and the marches to nationalize Brazil’s oil in the 1950s. Regardless of their

31 Moreira Alves, State Opposition in Military Brazil, p. 45.
32 For the history of UNE from its inception in 1937 up to 1964, see: Luiz Antonio Cunha, A Universidade Temporâ, Chapter 3; Roberto Martin da Silva, “Four Centuries of Struggle: The Idea of a Brazilian University and Its History, (Ph.D. diss.: Southern Illinois University at
involvement with UNE, a majority of students saw the new law as a major affront to their own interests.

These students rallied against the Lei Suplicy and began to enter the movement in order to protest the new law. Students circulated pamphlets that called the law “cultural terrorism.” Even secondary students rallied against the law, which was extended to outlaw UBES. A minority of students did participate in and support the DNE, but an overwhelming majority of students continued to view UNE as the official student organization, even if they did not participate in it directly; as one student put it, “I wasn’t an active part of the student movement, but I ran from the police.” Without support from more students or with necessary government financing, the DNEs and DEEs were extinct by 1967, when the Lei Suplicy was also revoked. Even then, UNE remained illegal, and students used the law to continue to mobilize against the dictatorship. They marched carrying banners that read “the Lei Suplicy went away but the suffering continues.” The law became one of the first and most enduring


33 APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Caixa 10, Doc. 52, “Projeto de Programa Revolucionário para o Movimento Estudantil,” December 1967. See also Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interveiws with Antônio Serra, p. 8; Jean Marc von der Weid, pp. 5-6; José Dirceu, p. 4; José Luis Guedes, p. 14; Vladimir Palmeira, p. 5; and Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 11, p. 3

34 AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 586-05252, Oficio No. 891-DOS/66 Reservado, Secretaria de Segurança Pública de Pernambuco, 14 October 1966.

35 NA, Coleção DSI, Caixa 585-05251, CENIMAR Informação No. 309, 2 September 1966.

symbols of the new dictatorship. From the moment of its declaration in 1964, it served as a catalyst for launching other demands, and students would continue to use it to protest the government more generally throughout the 1960s.\(^38\)

In terms of actual educational policies, the initiative that prompted the greatest student ire was the MEC-USAID accords. For Brazilian students, the agreement represented the worst kind of imperialism, as the military was simply delivering the university system to American capital and control.\(^39\) Some government officials suggested students had not even read the agreements.\(^40\) A number of student leaders had read them, however, and they provided detailed critiques of them.\(^41\) Others had a vaguer notion of their content, but that did not stop them from using the agreements to more generally criticize the government. They claimed that the accords planned the “ideological domination” of students, the “elite-ization” of universities, a turn towards “neocolonialism,” and “subordination” by capital.\(^42\) Calls for the abolition of MEC-USAID prompted street protests from students throughout Brazil.\(^43\)

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37 Ministério da Guerra, Gabinete do Ministro, Informação No. 32/66, 5 April 1966. Coleção DSI, Caixa 585, AN. The original slogan was a play on words, playing off the similarities between “Suplicy,” the Minister of Education and Culture and the namesake of the law, and the word “suffering,” (suplicio).


39 For example, see APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Informe S.O., 14 October 1966.

40 Jarbas Passarinho, Um híbrido fértil, Ch. XXVIII. Passarinho was the Minister of Labor in the Costa e Silva administration, and became the Minister of Education and Culture during Emílio Garrastazu Médici’s administration (1969-1974).

Although MEC-USAID bore the brunt of protests, studies like the Meira Matos Commission were not exempt from the students’ wrath. Students felt that the Meira Matos Commission served the same function as MEC-USAID by “delivering” Brazilian universities to “foreign investment and control.”

However, agreements like the Meira Matos Commission or the Atcon study did not garner anywhere near the same amount of student outrage as MEC-USAID, which was connected to the symbol of imperialism, the United States. While students could and did declare that other domestic studies were also “imperialist,” the United States’ involvement in the MEC-USAID accords made it the most obvious target. This anti-imperialist sentiment had been growing among student leadership since the Cuban revolution in 1959. However, the military’s

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42 For example, see: APERJ, Coleção Jean Marc von der Weid, Dossie 6, “Análise do Movimento Estudantil a partir de 1964;” APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 9, Caixa 5, Guerra Popular (Orgão Nacional do Setor Estudantil do P.C. do Brasil – Ala Vermelha), No. 1, Ano 1 (Oct. 1968) and Ano 2 (Jan. 1969); APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, O Metropolitano, O Metropolitano, 19 November 1966; and Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Adriano Diogo, César Maia, José Genoíno, José Luís Guedes, Juca Ferreira, Luís Raul Machado, Maria Augusta Carneiro Ribeiro, and Paulo de Tarso Venceslau.

43 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 6, “Nota Oficial da UME.” See also Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Jean Marc von der Weid, p. 7; José Genoíno, p. 3; José Luís Guedes, p. 7; and Paulo de Tarso Venceslau, pp. 6-7; and Passarinho, Um Hibrido Fértil, p. 285.

44 Indeed, MEC-USAID was but one of several plans, studies, and agreements the military dictatorship established to explore the possibility of university reform between 1965 and the Reforma Universitária of late-1968. However, MEC-USAID dominated students’ rhetoric, from manifestos to banners protesting the agreements in street protests. The accords occupied such a major space in student rhetoric at the time that many students have forgotten about their opposition to the other plans; MEC-USAID has come to symbolize all of the military’s educational policy in the wake of 1968. For just some examples of those who focus solely on MEC-USAID, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with César Maia, José Genoíno, Juca Ferreira, Luís Raul Machado, Maria Aousta Carneiro Ribeiro, and Paulo de Tarso Venceslau. For exceptions who remember and contextualize MEC-USAID with other government programs, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Adriano Diogo and José Luís Guedes.
collaboration with USAID accelerated and heightened the issue even further, placing student struggles in the broader Cold War context.

**University Reform as Political Reform**

In the new context of a military government, students began to recast their struggle for university reform as part of a broader fight for political reform. They suggested that their own vision of university reform dating back to the 1950s was the “true” one, thereby delegitimizing the government’s own efforts for reform. In this framework, students used university reform to counter the government’s vision of development based on scientific know-how, instead promoting an inclusive educational system that focused on social problems and would benefit all of Brazil.

Paradoxically, while a majority of students came from a middle-class background defined by white-collar work, students in the 1960s criticized the government’s emphasis on white-collar professionalization in the service of Brazilian development. They worried about the alliances the government encouraged between education and private business, which they claimed only “subordinated the university to the immediate demands of capital,” particularly North American capital. They blamed MEC for the woes facing universities, declaring that the ministry prevented the “collaboration” between students and professors and, consequently, impeded their ability to combat “our educational

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46 See Owensby, *Intimate Ironies*.

problems.” Even as the dictatorship sought to use universities to increase the number of white-collar workers in Brazil, students sought “greater government resources with the goal of modernizing and expanding university education.” Additionally, as with the case with *verbas*, *anuidades*, and MEC-USAID, students placed criticisms of educational policy as “one of the aspects of the fight against the dictatorship itself.” They also blasted the government for intentionally shutting out the working class. Paradoxically, they were not opposed to professional development; far from it. They too wanted “to complete studies within the specific field of professional formation” and to attain “development of technical knowledge related to the profession.” Their desire for white-collar jobs appeared similar to the dictatorship’s goal of training more engineers, doctors, and scientists.

The difference between the students’ vision and the dictatorship’s rested not in goals, but in ideology. For this reason, students could assert that they found themselves “frontally opposed to all of the perspectives of the dictatorship.” While white-collar development was the end for military policy, it was only the

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48 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Mem. No. 1022, Ref: Encaminha Exemplares de Órgãos Estudantis, 29 November 1966.

49 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Mem. No. 1022, Ref: Encaminha Exemplares de Órgãos Estudantis, 29 November 1966.


51 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Boletim Informativo – Movimento de Agitação Estudantil, 3 December 1966.

beginning for students. They drew on the language of the Carta do Paraná and other pre-coup platforms for university reform, viewing professional development as a means to combat the “anachronistic structure of the Brazilian University.” Students had been battling for University Reform for years; as such, theirs was the authentic reform. They insisted that the military was merely “demagogically” offering its reform in order “to confuse the university students and public opinion” and “to smother the student movement.”

This subtle ideological shift made a difference. Students pushed a “humanist” vision of university reform by which universities would be the engines for social justice in Brazil. They rejected the military dictatorship’s “economic” emphasis on the universities as the sources of “human capital” that would create the doctors, economists, businessmen, and engineers who would lead Brazilian development. Where the government hoped universities would strengthen the Brazilian professional classes, students hoped the universities would offer a “critical” education that would contribute to social equality in Brazil. Thus, while the government and students could agree on the need for better professional development, the justifications were different. In this way, the military’s policy became the anti-policy of the students. They vowed “to fight

53 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Boletim Informativo – Movimento de Agitação Estudantil, 3 December 1966.
54 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, O Metropolitano, 19 November 1966, and APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 9, Caixa 5, Guerra Popular (Órgão Nacional do Setor Estudantil do P.C. do Brasil – Ala Vermelha), No. 1, Ano 1 (Oct. 1968) and Ano 2 (Jan. 1969).
for true university reform, as well as to denounce, concomitantly, the university reform of the dictatorship.”57 When they took to the streets, they carried banners that demanded not only an end to the dictatorship, but “Down with MEC-USAID.” While some officials believed the 1968 protests had “disguised themselves as subversive,” they also could not deny that the student protesters, “activists or not,” placed university reform at the top of their demands.58

While scholars have suggested that the struggles of 1968 of the dictatorship hinged on violence and resistance,59 the banners, slogans, and pamphlets demanding more funding, university reform, better infrastructure, and numerous other changes to the university system suggest otherwise. Moreover,

56 Brian Loveman has commented on the “antipolitics” of military regimes in South America in the second half of the twentieth century. According to Loveman, this “antipolitics” focused on abolishing extant political parties, imposing censorship, closing state institutions, particularly the legislative branch, and purging public officials. See Brian Loveman, *For La Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America*, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999), p. 189. My understanding of anti-policy differs slightly from Loveman’s for two reasons: first, whereas Loveman uses “antipolitics” in reference to military governments, here, I use “anti-policy” to refer to students’ politics. This student “anti-policy” was often inconsistent with pre-dictatorship goals; for example, prior to the coup, students called for the institution of a department system, yet when the military governments of the 1960s in Brazil began to investigate the use of a department system in the MEC-USAID accords, students became adamantly opposed to these changes. Thus, where Loveman’s antipolitics was a vision of political governance stripped of traditional forms of partisan politics, here “anti-policy” refers to a contrarian vision of policy that students adopted in direct resistance to military policy. While students’ “anti-policy” could be ideologically driven, it was also often subject to reactive stances against military policies.

57 See CPDOC, NL g 1968.06.23, letters from Francisco Negrão de Lima to Artur Costa e Silva (I and II – 23 June 1968 and July 1968, respectively). Negrão de Lima, the governor of Guanabara [greater Rio de Janeiro], was one of the two opposition governors (along with Israel Pinheiro in Minas Gerais) who won elections in 1965, leading to the government’s establishment of Institutional Act No. 2. Although far from radical, the hard-liners viewed Negrão Lima suspiciously, and he may have found himself under scrutiny as protests erupted in Rio in 1968. However, he remained in office for his term, and was in close contact with the federal government. For more on Negrão Lima’s 1965 election and the fallout, see Skidmore, *Military Politics in Brazil*, and Alves, *State and Opposition*, pp. 56-66.

after the coup, university reform had become the vehicle to challenge the dictatorship for many students. As one pamphlet that circulated among social service students throughout Brazil in 1965 put it, “the fight against the dictatorship is based on the fight for University Reform.”

Some of these demands, such as the issue of vagas, the opposition to the professores catedráticos, and the call for general university reform, pre-dated the dictatorship. However, the ideological undercurrent that challenged the dictatorship’s rule was a new element in many students’ rhetoric and mobilizations. Certainly, the political shift after 1964 caused a growing number of students to challenge the dictatorship and adopt increasingly ideological demands. Yet students did not limit themselves to a contrarian stance with regards to educational policy; instead, they used their own vision of university reform to shape the debate over national development and to construct their own vision of development.

The Debate over Development

Students did not raise pragmatic and ideological concerns in an “ivory tower” that isolated universities from Brazilian society more generally. They also addressed economic development but proposed a nationalist alternative to the military government’s gradualist approach, which was more open to foreign investment and the use of loans. Through policies such as the MEC-USAID accords and the issuing of fees, students viewed the military’s educational policy as just another example of the broader “selling out” of the dictatorship. Thus,

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60 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Boletim Informativo – Movimento de Agitação Estudantil, 3 December 1966.
while students called for reform, they simultaneously challenged the military’s openness to outside influences to accomplish it.

Students demonstrated some of the nationalist ideological tendencies that had been a part of their vision of development since the “O petróleo é nosso” campaign of the early-1950s. This view of development was based on the understanding that improvements in Brazilian society and technology had to come from within, and that Brazil had to break its dependency upon foreign powers like the United States. This nationalism informed their criticism of agreements like MEC-USAID as just an extension of American imperialism. They railed against the military’s development policy, which they claimed “only benefited international monopolies and privileged and retrograde” elites. Fighting against the policies like MEC-USAID meant fighting for “the people” and for Brazilian sovereignty in the face of “imperialism” and “cultural colonialism.” Students even went so far as to protest the imposition of “the ‘American way of life’” and the idea of the “self-made man” in universities within this system. Claims that

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\begin{align*}
61 & \text{ APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Informe S.O., 14 October 1966.} \\
62 & \text{ APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, “O Metropolitano,” 19 October 1966.} \\
63 & \text{ See, for example, APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 6, “Nota Oficial da UME,” and Jornal do Brasil, 25 May 1967, p. 15.} \\
64 & \text{ The document even switches to English to emphasize the foreign infiltration of the United States in the universities. The passages in their original forms comment, “no caso, o ‘american way of life,’ com seus focos na concorrência, no individualismo, no desejo de ‘vencer na vida’, no lucro a todo custo, consubstanciados no ‘self made man.’” APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Mem. No. 1022 – Ref: Encaminha Exemplares de Órgãos Estudantis, 29 November 1966.}
\end{align*}
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students would have to learn English before attending universities in Brazil pointedly mocked the pro-U.S. bias of federal development plans.\(^{65}\)

But how was development to take place? The answer was not so clear-cut in the 1960s. Certainly, students disapproved of the military’s “sell-out” policies.\(^ {66}\) They also challenged partnerships with the United States and collaborations between the military government and private enterprises.\(^ {67}\) They lamented Brazil’s “underdevelopment,” hosting conferences on the topic at schools and universities throughout the country. Students at a law school in Minas Gerais went so far as to hold a mock-trial of Castelo Branco “for ignominious crimes committed by this mediocre dictator of an underdeveloped country.”\(^ {68}\) Some supported a vaguely-defined “technical and scientific progress allied to moral evolution” and the ability “to lend any type of useful service to mankind!”\(^ {69}\) And they occasionally linked development to ideals like “liberty” and “freedom.”\(^ {70}\)

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68 See, for example, AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 5685-05250, “Informação No. 1057/SNI/ARJ,” 22 Nov 1965. For the mock-trial of Castelo Branco, see AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 586-05252, CENIMAR Informe No. 7341, 23 September 1966.

69 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 6, Unnamed document (folha 184).

70 AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 586-05252, Ofício No. 891-DOA/66, 14 October 1966.
However vaguely stated, student attitudes fit broadly within the framework of “economic nationalism” articulated by technocrats and activists alike. They strategically adapted and appropriated the government’s developmental rhetoric in their demands for university reform. Nationalism and the centrality of the universities in development often were closely linked. Brazilian development depended on technological and scientific progress that could only happen in the universities, even while offering improvements to “the people” and tackling “national problems.” Vague developmental nationalism and improvements in the universities were inextricably bound up in students’ definitions of university reform, anti-dictatorship sentiment, and Brazilian development. Students in the 1960s successfully challenged the government’s hegemonic definition of Brazilian development; they adapted messages from the 1950s to the political context of the 1960s and laid further groundwork for the debate as it would occur in the 1970s.

Clearly, students employed educational struggles in multiple ways in order to contest the regime’s authority. Some of these issue, such as the issue of vagas, the opposition to the professores catedráticos, and the call for general university reform, pre-dated the dictatorship. However, the ideological undercurrent that challenged the dictatorship’s rule was a new element in many students’ rhetoric and mobilizations. Certainly, the political shift after 1964 caused a growing number of students to challenge the dictatorship and adopt increasingly

71 See Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964, p. 30 and passim.

72 APERJ, Coleção Jean Marc von der Weid, Dossie 6, “Documento sobre as diretrizes das reformas na Universidade do Brasil,” p. 5.
ideological demands. Yet this shift also marked a closer approximation between UNE’s leadership and the student masses, one worth examining in greater detail.

“A Movement of the Students”: The approximation of UNE and Brazilian students

Prior to 1964, the student masses who rallied around quotidian demands and the progressive leadership that focused on broader ideological struggles shared little common ground. After the coup, this dynamic changed. As students increasingly mobilized for more positions in universities or against the Lei Suplicy and MEC-USAID accords, the student leadership itself moved closer to the masses’ demands. Disenchanted by students’ failure to mobilize against the coup on April 1, the new student leaders in UNE made a concerted effort to focus on quotidian demands. As Franklin Martins, who was a radical in the student movement and who was involved in the kidnapping of U.S. ambassador Charles Elbrick in 1969, retrospectively commented, “the student movement is not a movement of the left…it is a movement of the students, to defend their own interests.”

UNE’s new leadership was determined to represent those interests.

The shift began in late-1965. By that year, the students had “semi-legally” reconstituted UNE and began trying to take over the government’s new Academic Directories and Students’ Central Directories on each campus. New leaders of UNE emerged and sought to overcome a prior lack of cohesion in the student movement in the years leading up to 1964, including the near-total student apathy.

73 Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Franklin Martins, p. 14
towards the coup itself. To bridge the gap with the “masses,” student leaders addressed both “drinking fountains” and “imperialism.”

Due to these efforts, more students were increasingly turning to UNE as a useful means to create a national voice that pushed for reforms and improvements on the national level. By 1967, students had begun using UNE call for an end to fees and more federal funding for public universities. High school students joined their university counterparts, protesting the process of entrance exams for admission to universities. They demanded more openings in the university system for qualified students. The familiar refrain of infrastructural improvements returned, demanding better laboratories and libraries and classrooms large enough so students would not have to stand in the aisles or in the hallways. By 1967, all of these issues had coalesced into a call for university reform that both leadership and the masses could agree upon.

Student leaders had not abandoned ideological objections to “imperialism.” The MEC-USAID agreements provided the catalyst for student

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76 The issue of openings, or “vagas,” dated back to the late-1950s. See Ch. 1. For documents on the demand for openings in the 1960s, see CPDOC, EUG pi Corrêa, A., 1968.03.00, “Uso Intensivo do Espaço Escolar no Ensino Superior,” Setor de Educação Mão-de-Obra do IPEA, Ministério do Planejamento e Coordenação Geral, CPDOC, EAP erj 1945/1965.00.00, Pasta III, “Plano de Reestruturação da Universidade Federal de Fluminense,” EAP erj 1945/1965.00.00. See also Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Arthur José Poerner, p. 5, and Daniel Aarão Reis, pp. 14, 19.
leadership in UNE and on campuses to weld the quotidian demands for university reform with the leftist leadership’s broader Cold War ideologies. The agreements simultaneously addressed both university reform and imperialism. Students accused the Brazilian dictatorship of selling out Brazil’s interests to foreign powers, undermining and destroying the university system itself, sacrificing Brazilian development, and demonstrating a moral capitulation in the face of what student leaders perceived to be an ideologically bankrupt foreign power.\(^7^7\)

What resulted was a mutually beneficial shift in the student movement in the 1960s. Students finally had an organization that placed their quotidian and ideological demands front and center. When military police began to attack student protestors, the sentiment towards the dictatorship, which had been favorable in 1964, quickly turned. Students who were beaten and imprisoned lashed out against the violence, and even their parents began to question the nature of the regime they imagined they had “saved” Brazil in 1964.\(^7^8\) This shift fell exactly in line with what the more radical student leadership had hoped and wanted – a broader movement against the military government.\(^7^9\)

\(^7^7\) See, for example: APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Informe S.O., 14 October, 1966; APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 5, Mem. No. 1022 – Ref: Encaminha Exemplares de Órgãos Estudantes, 1966; and APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 6, “Nota Oficial da UME.” See also Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with César Maia, pp. 6-8; Jean Marc von der Weid, p. 5; José Luís Guedes, p. 25; Juca Ferreira, p. 2; and Maria Augusto Carneiro Ribeiro, p. 6.


more inclusive and representative UNE, leftist leaders and more moderate student masses were able to amalgamate their interests into one broad platform.

**More Fluid Forms of Dialog: Students’ Efforts to Shape State Policy**

Between 1964 and 1968, students increasingly gained public visibility as they held rallies and protests throughout the country. The violent “Massacre at Praia Vermelha” in Rio de Janeiro in 1966, the marches of 1966, 1967, and especially 1968, and national meetings, including the unsuccessful UNE Congress in 1968, where hundreds of student leaders were arrested, made student discontent clear to the government and the nation. By employing these methods, students were attempting to influence the dialog over education and development indirectly. The government did not respond immediately in terms of policy; rather it used police repression to exert its authority.

Yet students’ efforts to shape the state’s policy were more nuanced than a mere reliance on street protests that provoked police violence would indicate. Students were aware they were but one actor in the ongoing debate over education and development in Brazil. While they felt that the dictatorship was taking the wrong path, as their numerous demands and complaints made clear, they also tacitly acknowledged the government’s own role in shaping debate over the future of the country. For example, when the government announced the MEC-USAID accords, students did not just brand them as instruments of “imperialism” or “neo-colonialism;” they believed it was their duty to “respond” to the policy and to

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also Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Antônio Serra, p. 18; Jean Marc von der Weid, p. 8; José Dirceu, pp. 9, 12; Daniel Aarão Reis, pp. 3-5, 12-13; and Vladimir Palmeira, pp. 13-14.
shape the debate with their own counter-proposals of the function of Brazilian universities in society.  

Marches and rallies offered the most visible examples of students’ efforts to shape public dialog over education, development, and the dictatorship. Numerous demonstrations called for more openings, an end to the MEC-USAID accords, or more funding. Indeed, students sometimes refused to abandon these specific demands for more “radical” demands. One radical student recalled participating in a march where students shouted “Funding! Funding!” When he failed to get the marching students to shout “more radical slogans,” he began to shout “Shits! Shits!” Even when protesting police repression, students also carried banners condemning the MEC-USAID agreements or calling for funding. With the government increasingly calling in the police between 1966 and 1968, it was clear that, even if the government did not like the tactics the students used, it was more than aware of their demands and methods.

Students also planned these marches in order to appeal directly to the public. They often marched during rush hour in metropolitan centers like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Catching traffic, students handed out leaflets outlining

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80 See, for example, APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 11, “Informe estudantil nacional de política operária,” 5 August 1967; APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 9, Caixa 5, Guerra Popular No. 1, Ano I, Oct. 1968; and APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 6, “Nota Oficial da UME.”

81 See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Alfredo Sirkis, p. 5. In Portuguese, the words “verbas” (funding) and “merdas” (shits) sound similar, making Sirkis’s frustration at the moment humorous while also demonstrating that, while basic quotidian issues such as funding were important to them, they were not always so eager to adopt more radical political stances.
their demands. Additionally, traffic jams made it harder for police to arrive to break up the marches and easier for students to slip away when the police did arrive. Stories of marches and photos of banners plastering the front pages of newspapers throughout the country made government officials and the public in general “hear” the students’ demands, even if not at the rallies themselves. These efforts helped students gain sympathy for their movement among the Brazilian population; even Castelo Branco admitted that some of the students’ educational demands were justified.

Students frequently attempted to present their demands to any government official they could reach. Sometimes they were able to reach the highest levels of government. In 1964, Castelo Branco gave the opening address at the University of Brazil, where students interrupted his speech and made demands for university reform. Although the students were arrested, Castelo Branco could not avoid hearing their demands. And in the highest-profile meeting, student leaders met with General Costa e Silva himself after the president allegedly expressed his desire to meet and discuss conditions in the universities. Some students feared a meeting would legitimize the president in the eyes of the student body and the public, while others felt it was a good platform to make their demands. Franklin

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82 See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Alfredo Sirkis, p. 3, and Wladimir Palmeira, pp. 16-17.


Martins recalled going to the Guanabara Palace in Rio de Janeiro and demanding “more funding, more openings, the release of arrested students, and the re-opening of the Calabouço restaurant.” It is worth noting that the release of student prisoners was the third issue Martins recalled, with funding and openings being foremost, revealing just how central university reforms were to students’ demands. While Costa e Silva dodged or refused to meet their demands, the fact that students had been granted a direct audience with the president made clear that the government was paying attention to their protests and pamphlets. The dialog between students and the state over the issue of universities and educational reform went beyond protests and police repression.

When unable to meet with presidents, students attempted to dialog with other state officials. They actively tried to gain an audience with the Minister of Education. The MEC headquarters in Rio de Janeiro also became a major site of protest, as students began or ended their marches there and held rallies there. In so doing they hoped they might encounter government officials face-to-face. Students actively sought these encounters but were often disappointed, as in one

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85 Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Bernardo Joffily, pp. 4-5.


87 For a study of a similarly complex dialogue between members of the Catholic clergy and the military regime, see Serbin, *Secret Dialogues*.

meeting with the Minister of Education, who defended the unpopular entrance exam as “serving Brazilian development.”

These efforts to gain an audience were not always successful. Government officials often cancelled meetings with students at the last minute, or simply did not show up. Perhaps they feared granting students too much legitimacy or appearing weak in the public’s eye. Other times, the government was “open” to dialog, but only under extreme limitations, as when Castelo Branco’s final Minister of Education and Culture, Raimundo Moniz de Aragão, agreed to talk with students but only “without demands” on their part, a patently absurd prerequisite. Even if students did not always achieve face-to-face meetings under conditions of their own choosing, their efforts went well beyond street rallies and marches. Their relationship with the state under military rule was more complex than many scholars have allowed, as students turned to more nuanced forms of discussion and entered into dialog directly with the state. Protests and repression were a major part of this student-state relationship, but not the sole component.

By late-1968, students had become one of the most vocal and visible groups challenging the dictatorship’s rule. Certainly, events like the murder of Edson Luís and public images of police repression helped student movements

89 APERJ, Coleção Daniel Aarão Reis, Dossie 9, Caixa 5, “Universidade Popular,” p. 3.

90 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 6, “Estado de Guanabara, Secretária de Segurança Pública, Informes (S.O.-S.A.A.), 22/6/67.”

91 Jornal do Brasil 17 September 1966. See also APERJ, Coleção Jean Marc von der Weid, Dossie 6, Revista do DCE Livre Alexandre Vanucci Leme.
earn sympathy among the middle-class, artists, and others. The ongoing repression and invasion of campuses certainly strengthened students’ calls for an end to the repression and the dictatorship. However, even in what is arguably the most turbulent year of Brazil’s military dictatorship, students never lost sight of the importance of universities, not just as physical sites of resistance, but as a major discursive platform in challenging the dictatorship and defining the question of development in Brazil. Students placed chants for an end to the dictatorship alongside demands for more funding and an end to MEC-USAID in their street marches. They continued to propose their own vision of university reform while challenging the military’s rule and policy-making. Leftist leaders accommodated quotidian demands for better conditions in the universities in order to broaden support of UNE.

In short, educational reforms were not disconnected from student opposition to the government; they were a major component of it. Continuing to argue for the need for educational reform after 1964 allowed students to add to and shape broader debates over development in Brazil, much as they had in the 1950s. However, the coup of 1964 and the different political context transformed these demands into a vehicle to challenge the dictatorship itself. Although contesting the dictatorship was certainly a major component of the student movements, it was not the sole goal. Additionally, there was much more contact between students and the state than police crackdowns on campuses and marches.

Students often turned to various forms of “dialog,” formal and informal, in incidents like the interruption of Castelo Branco at UFRJ in 1965; the various efforts to meet with government officials in MEC and elsewhere; and the meeting with Costa e Silva in 1968. In doing so, students simultaneously contested the regime’s power even while trying to influence the rhetoric and policy regarding education, development, and democracy. Yet they were not alone in challenging and swaying the military regime’s educational policies. Civilian actors of a variety of ideological persuasions also participated in the debate over Brazil’s future and the role of universities in that future, and it is to their ideas and actions that we now turn.

**Conservative Views on Education – IPÊS and Brazilian Business Leaders**

Elite conservative business leaders, technocrats, and white-collar professionals were as concerned as the military government regarding the relationship of university reform to the nation’s modernization and economic progress. These sectors had joined together in 1961, forming the Institute of Social Research and Studies (*Instituto de Pesquisa e Estudos Sociais*, IPÊS), to try to co-opt issues of reform and undermine the Goulart government.\(^93\) Prior to 1964, the organization had focused more on politics than on issues like education, though the latter did appear occasionally in the group’s bulletins and internal memoranda. However, with the overthrow of Goulart, one of IPÊS’s major goals disappeared, and it was able to spend much more time focusing on social issues.

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Education and university reform were at the forefront of IPÊS’s concerns in the wake of the coup. Prior to the coup, IPÊS’s monthly bulletins had included articles on Communism, subversion, and democracy; after 1964, the bulletin emphasized education as an investment, its relationship to development and business, and the different educational and university systems throughout the world, including the Soviet Union.\footnote{See, for example, IPÊS Boletim Mensal No. 28 (Nov. 1964); No. 30/31 (Jan/Feb 1965); No. 32/33 (Mar/Apr 1965); 34/35 (May/June 1965), Caixa 138, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, AN.} It also published its own version of a University Reform in 1965. The author, A. C. Pacheco e Silva, ascribed to universities not only a “spiritual renovation through scientific and technological progress,” but a vital role in spreading a nation’s culture and improving its economic and social landscape.\footnote{AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 282, “Reforma Universitária,” 1965, pp. 1-3.} Student accusations of “elitism” in educational policy certainly applied to IPÊS. The organization promoted its own class as the most important to any type of development, going so far as to declare that the “modern world is essentially bourgeois.” The middle-class’s importance in IPÊS’s vision was far from subtle; the group sustained that the Brazilian middle class would be responsible for “extraordinary economic, scientific, and educational progress.”\footnote{AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 282, Roberto Pinto de Souza and José de Barros Pinto, “Temas de Hora Presente: A Burguesia,” pp. 11-12, Caixa 282.}

IPÊS also offered comprehensive analyses and suggestions for improvements to the university system. In 1964, it hosted a “Symposium on education reform,” which addressed national development and education.
Although the symposium also examined primary and secondary education, the emphasis fell on universities, which were to play a central role in the “scientific contribution to economic and cultural development.”

The issues that the symposium raised overlapped with student and government concerns about general conditions in the universities, and transcended ideological differences by advocating university expansion, more federal funding, better infrastructure, and improvements in faculty and curricula. Like the government, IPÊS was concerned that the lack of openings would lead to a shortage of trained professionals in the labor market. The organization also sought foreign assistance in expanding universities and improving the quality of education; it emphasized science’s centrality in national development, particularly “in the areas of medicine, engineering, architecture, exploration of natural resources, etc.” Within this vision, there was little room for lawyers, social scientists, and the humanities in Brazil’s development.

IPÊS diverged from students and the government in its openly elitist vision of university education. It chastised middle class families “with the most modest of incomes” for trying to send their children to school to attain social mobility and the prestige of a university degree rather than abstract “intellectual” motives. The white-collar professionals and business leaders of the symposium

97 AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 138, “Simpósio sôbre a reforma da educação,” p. 27.


stressed that universities were vital “not only for the satisfaction of our demand for specialized labor,” but also for the formation of leaders who would use their knowledge to lead Brazil to its unspecified destiny. The Fundação Getúlio Vargas also pointed out in 1968 that one of the main functions of the university was “to form that professional elite capable of bringing to fruition all of the innumerable conquests of science and technology that benefit the collective whole.” Nonetheless, IPÊS was motivated by class interest more than government entities or student organizations.

For many members of IPÊS, their own entrepreneurial success depended on qualified white-collar workers for their professional and financial survival. Thus, the calls for “specialized labor” at the symposium were not unselfish. IPÊS repeatedly emphasized the role of universities in providing trained professionals. The organization also moved beyond mere rhetoric, offering to its members as well as to students, businessmen, and university administrators a series of courses that linked universities and private businesses. Titled “University in Business,” IPÊS offered classes on “Capital Markets,” “Techniques for Directing a Company,” “Marketing: Essential Knowledge for your Business,” “Economy and Business Administration,” and “General Management,” among


101 CPDOC, AT pi FGV 1968.00.00, Roll 1, Photo 531, “Resultados iniciais da pesquisa ‘O Brasil e seus profissionais de nível superior,’” p. 1.

102 In addition to the “Simpósio sôbre a reforma da educação,” see also AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 317, “Incompletos,” p. 19.
others. In this vision, university-trained businessmen would use their education not only to improve private business in a capitalist society, but would also employ their degrees to lead the nation in “cultural diffusion, exchange of ideas and of knowledge, and the perfection of specialized techniques.”

These publications, conferences, and pamphlets may not have been representative of the entire organization’s attitudes. However, they regularly presented these ideas and visions to members who also likely shared their ideological sympathies. Clearly, IPÊS, like students, the government, and others, viewed the university system and its problems as essential to Brazilian development. Yet IPÊS was not operating in a bubble, preaching only to its members. The organization published numerous documents on business, development, democracy, education, and other subjects for a more general audience. It even declared that it would publish the Symposium on Education “throughout the national territory” in order to demonstrate that “education is an indispensable instrument” to Brazilian development, and to “mobilize public opinion in favor of an ample educational reform.” Additionally, as other scholars have shown, IPÊS had numerous connections to the federal government. The founder and first head of the National Service of Information (Servício Nacional de Informações, SNI), Golbery do Couto e Silva, was a dues-paying member of IPÊS.

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103 AN, Coleção IPÊS, Caixa 21, “Universidade na Emprêsa,” n. pag.
105 AN, Coleção IPÊS, Caixa 21, “Relação das publicações em estoque no almoxarifado.”
member of IPÊS at least up through 1969. IPÊS members were in contact with the government and even made up parts of the cabinet under Castelo Branco. Other members, including Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, had periodic meetings with Castelo Branco and members of his staff. It seems likely that many of the suggestions and issues IPÊS raised reached the ears of the military government, particularly during the Castelo Branco administration.

However, to suggest that IPÊS was directly responsible for the government’s formulation of university reform is an overstatement. By 1967, with the rise of Costa e Silva and the “hard-liners” within the military rule and the marginalization of the moderate “Sorbonne” school of Castelo Branco, Golbery, and Ernesto Geisel, IPÊS became isolated within the Brazilian government. Although its members continued to have the ear of the military dictatorship, their role was greatly reduced between Castelo Branco’s exit in 1967 and the inauguration of Geisel in 1974. Additionally, the university reform of 1968 was

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109 AN, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, Notação, 1.72, “Agenda com registro de atos, encontros, decisões, articulações entre Castelo Branco – 14.08.1964 a 15.03.1967.” Ribeiro also argued for the government that education was an investment in national development before the BNDES in the debate over how to spend the money from MEC-BID. See above, and AN, Coleção Luís Viana Filho, Notação 9.93, “Notas sobre o Ministério da Educação e Cultura no Governo Castelo Branco.”

110 Souza, Os empresários e a educação, p. 15.

111 Elio Gaspari does an excellent job tracing this split across his four-volume work on the dictatorship. For a succinct summary of the development of these two groups within the military, see Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, pp. 135-136. See also Costa Couto, História indiscreta, pp. 34-35, 63-73.
the product of multiple agreements, studies, and investigations, involving both
foreign and domestic agencies across the previous four years. The administrations
of Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva made it clear that they had no problem in
delegating the task of university reform to numerous individuals and groups
simultaneously. The suggestion that IPÊS was the main motivating force behind
university reform rings hollow when one considers the numerous efforts both
governments established to study reform between 1964 and 1968 and the
participation of students, professors, and others in that debate.

Likewise, it is clear that IPÊS’s work and students’ protests did not
“reinvigorate” the government’s desire for university reform in 1968. Even before
the coup, both Kubitschek and Goulart had emphasized the importance of
university reform. The military government began examining the issue of
university reform almost immediately upon overthrowing Goulart. This was a
long-term governmental goal that spanned over a decade and crossed
ideologically diverse administrations. To suggest that IPÊS influenced the
government, which in turn only acted in 1968, is to ignore a legacy of calls for
university reform in furthering Brazilian development that stretched back to at
least the mid-1950s. Although IPÊS did influence government opinion on
education, development, and reform, IPÊS was only one voice, albeit an
important one, in that choir singing out for reform. Indeed, the importance of
IPÊS’s voice is not that it was an isolated call for reform, but that business elites
were joining students and military officials in calling for reforms. While the
political backgrounds were widely varying, many students and business-leaders
shared similar social and cultural backgrounds, leading to a unified discursive field that placed universities and the middle class at the center of national development, regardless of ideology.

Other conservative voices also were involved in the debate. Juárez Távora, the former Prestes column veteran and UDN presidential candidate, declared it the government’s “fundamental duty…to accelerate the process of national development.” At the same time, he acknowledged that university students would play a key role in the development, eliminating obstacles to national development and transforming society through their labor as university-trained professionals. Relying on optimistic yet vague rhetoric, Távora argued students’ main function in this process was to provide “indispensable scientific and technical leadership in the national acceleration of the process of our economic-social development.”

Even civilians who supported the government got in on the act, with one proclaiming that, with regards to development, “education is an opportunity…today it is the only hope for mankind!”

Progressive pedagogical expert Anísio Teixeira shared Távora’s and the government’s esteem for the sciences and their role in national development. Even while opposing the military dictatorship, just after the dictatorship issued its University Reform, Teixeira lauded the new role universities had taken on as the “center of irradiation” and “scientific progress.” He even praised the government for “giving them [universities] resources and means for a gigantic advancement in human

112 CPDOC, JT pi op Távora, J. 1945.00.00, “A mocidade e o desenvolvimento (algumas teses a debater, a respeito),” pp. 1-5.
113 CPDOC, JM c mj 1965.08.27 (IV-16), Letter to Juracy Magalhães, 22 November 1965.
knowledge.” While he may not have cared for the military’s policies or ideologies, Teixeira, like students in the late-1950s and early-1960s, saw scientific knowledge as the key to intellectual and national development, and universities as the key to scientific knowledge. Perhaps more importantly, these voices were part of a growing chorus that placed middle-class white-collar professionals at the center of national development.

Obviously, the military government was not the only group interested in university reform. Many other sectors outside of the government also placed educational reform at the center of Brazil’s progress regardless of their ideological leanings or class identity. The debate over the role of universities in Brazil was much more than an oppositional dialog between the government and students; it was a debate amongst multiple sectors in Brazil, a discursive struggle to shape and determine the nation’s future.

Shifting Allegiances: Parents and the Struggle for University Reform

One group has been conspicuously absent from scholarship on the 1960s in Brazil: the parents of university students. Although many middle-class parents had openly supported the coup of 1964, by 1968 their opinions had begun to waver. Whereas in previous military interventions the armed forces promptly returned power to civilians, it seemed that the leaders of the “revolution” of 1964 had little interest in quickly relinquishing power. More importantly, students’

114 CPDOC, HL pi Teixeira, A.A. 68.12.05, “Discurso de Paraninfo da Turma de Bachareis em Direito da Universidade de Brasilia,” 5 December 1968.

115 Already in their 20s and 30s in the 1960s, many of this generation have died, making oral testimonies difficult to come by. While their children, who are in their 60s and 70s today, often recall their parents through the lens of students’ activities, they are still a useful window into the ways the dictatorship and the struggle over universities affected and involved an older generation.
ongoing protests against the dictatorship had led to increasingly violent police crackdowns, revealing the ugly side of the new military government. These incidents increased beginning in 1966, and by 1968, many parents were concerned at the regime’s bloody tactics of suppression. As a result, many middle-class parents who had initially supported the military increasingly found themselves drawn into the political struggles between students and the government.

Most university students in the 1960s came from Brazil’s middle class, and that status played a major role in the growing turbulence of the 1960s. The middle-class had decisively supported the military coup of 1964. The military based its actions on a perceived threat of a leftist dictatorship and the need to stabilize the Brazilian economy. As the 1960s progressed, it became increasingly clear that turning inflation around would take longer than the government had planned. As popular politicians like Juscelino Kubitschek and Carlos Lacerda lost their political rights, support began to falter. Lacerda, previously a leading antagonist to João Goulart, joined forces in 1966 with the deposed president and Kubitschek to form the “Ample Front” to lead Brazil back to democracy. As early as 1966, it was apparent that the dictatorship was

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moving away from democracy, not towards it, with laws like the Second Institutional Act (AI-2), which instituted indirect election of governors, outlawed previously-existing political parties, and created two new parties, the National Renovation Alliance (ARENA) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB).\footnote{Although there were technically two parties, they served no real opposition to the government. ARENA was stacked with pro-coup politicians and individuals. Although some MDB politicians, such as Márcio Moreira Alves, attempted to challenge the government, the threat of repression and the government’s ongoing policy of stripping “troublesome” politicians of their political rights made the MDB oppositional in name only. The pro-government stance, coerced or consented upon, was severe enough that for the first decade after 1966, Brazilians referred to the MDB and ARENA as “the parties of ‘Yes,’ and ‘Yes, sir!’”. For more on the parties, see Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, p. 65, and Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, pp. 46-49.} Newspapers covered heavy-handed police tactics used in invasions of campuses in Minas Gerais and Brasília in 1965 and Rio de Janeiro in 1966. Images of students handcuffed on soccer fields and of horse-mounted police attacking marching students further shook the foundations of support for the dictatorship. Many middle-class parents and their friends began to question the dictatorship’s harsh tactics. The middle class’s eroding support for the dictatorship by 1968 was similarly decisive in contributing to the increasing tensions of that turbulent year.\footnote{For example, see Gaspari, A ditadura envergonhada; Zuenir Ventura, 1968: O ano que não terminou, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira S/A, 1988); and Costa Couto, História indiscreta da ditadura e da abertura.}

Political disenchantment and direct, violent threats against their children dragged parents more closely into the struggles over university reform. Parental involvement had taken place prior to the coup; in 1962, parents and students in São Paulo demanded the federalization of the private Mackenzie University.

\footnote{See Costa Couto, História indiscreta, p. 80, and Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, pp. 279, 289.}
However, such involvement was fairly minimal. As repression intensified, though, parents (and the public more generally) became increasingly shocked at the methods the Brazilian state was employing against their children. This outrage could reach uncomfortable levels; one father went armed with a pistol to the prison where one of his sons was held. He threatened to kill whoever had arrested his son, only to find out that the arresting officer had been his other son, who had joined the military and who remained the “black sheep” of the otherwise-radical family for years. While most parents' reactions were not nearly as extreme, they gathered around prisons when their children were arrested. These visits to see their children could be humiliating as well. One former student recalled that the police strip-searched his mother before she was allowed to visit him in prison, literally exposing her to humiliation. Although the experience of an arrest could be particularly hard on the family, some student leaders were still proud of it. As one student put it, when his arrest was made public, his parents were shocked, but he gained prestige as a leader on campus.

Many parents also joined in protest marches throughout the country, such as the March of One-Hundred Thousand (Marcha dos Cem Mil) in Rio de Janeiro.

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121 CPDOC, AT c 1960.06.25, Roll 40, Photos 159-164, “Carta de Paulo de Almeida Salles a Anísio Teixeira, informando-lhe envio de cópia da moção aprovada pelo plenário da assembléia de fundação da associação de pais e alunos na Universidade Mackenzie, São Paulo.”
124 Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with César Maia, p. 17.
to protest the increasing police brutality of 1968. While the Marcha dos Cem Mil was a particularly memorable demonstration that brought students, parents, artists, singers, and politicians together against the dictatorship’s repression, parents also joined lower-profile protests, often hoping that their presence would reduce police arrests and violence. Even non-participants worried about what would happen to their children, whether they were “activists” or not.

This interest went beyond issues of personal safety. Parents whose children were facing expulsion acted on their behalf. In one particular instance, the students at UFRJ went on strike to protest the institution of fees. However, many parents paid the fees without their children’s knowledge, so that their children could remain enrolled in the public university system. One student leader who rallied against payment of fees recalled being devastated when he learned his mother had paid his fees, fearing the student body would consider him a hypocrite.

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127 Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with José Luís Guedes, p. 7.

128 Personal interview with D.N., 13 August 2007. For the stress from the viewpoint of student leader’s mother, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, Published interview with Rosa Monteiro, the mother of Ulisses Guimarães. For more on Guimarães and his fate, see Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” Chapters 1, 3, and 4.

129 Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Antônio Serra, p. 11; Daniel Aarão Reis, p. 19; and Vladimir Palmeira, p. 8.

130 Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Antônio Serra, p. 11.
Parents also had a stake in the universities and university reform because of the opportunities it provided their children. As one former student recalled, “I was not the son of a rich father, but I was the son of a father who wanted his son to become rich.” Others also remembered the liberation they and their families associated with their university education. The fact that middle-class university enrollment was increasing meant that parents had a high stake in the quality of Brazil’s university system. As one letter-writer pointed out to Costa e Silva, Brazil had “hundreds of thousands of fathers and mothers who never finished elementary school.” If Brazil’s university system improved, their children would have professional, economic, and social opportunities than they never had. On the other hand, weak curricula, poor educators, and an insufficient number of openings could further hurt the dictatorship’s support among the middle classes if their children were increasingly denied opportunities for professional development.

Students were aware of their parents’ growing concern, and appealed to their parents’ generation as the military’s antagonism to student movements increased. In their marches, they approached people of all ages with their

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132 Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with José Dirceu, p. 3, and José Genoíno, p. 1.


pamphlets and arguments in favor of university reform.\textsuperscript{135} And when police killed Edson Luís, students quickly appealed to their parents’ paternal and maternal instincts, proclaiming, “It could have been your child.”\textsuperscript{136}

Political leaders also appealed to parents to encourage tranquility. In June 1968, Guanabara governor Negrão de Lima spoke “to the students, to the parents, and to the people in general,” assuring them that the federal government was addressing their demands for university reforms, and reminding them that “it is now time to await the proposal of the competent authorities, which is impossible to formulate in an atmosphere of incomprehension and conflict.”\textsuperscript{137} Nor was Negrão Lima alone in these appeals. An internal document at MEC expressed concern over the “permanent worry” present in “a great number of homes, with their children studying at UnB.” Although MEC also blamed students’ “agitation” in preventing development from occurring “normally,” the official also proclaimed to be “conscious” of his responsibility to guarantee “the calm and tranquility that Brasília’s families are lacking.”\textsuperscript{138} In order to counterbalance student activism and restore “order,” the government had to appeal to parents.

To further complicate matters, some officials blamed parents for student mobilization. When students attacked Minister of Justice Juracy Magalhães


\textsuperscript{136} Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Vladimir Palmeira, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{137} CPDOC, NL g 1968.06.23, “Promunciamento da noite de 21 de junho de 1968,” and Letter from Francisco Negrão de Lima to Costa e Silva, 23 Jun 1968.

\textsuperscript{138} NA, Coleção DSI, Caixa 5684-05250, Ministério da Educação e Cultura, Informação Elaborada – Secreta – “A Formação da Universidade de Brasília.”
outside of the University of Bahia, he received a mountain of letters expressing support and blaming the students. Some individuals were more willing to blame “communists,” “foreigners,” and “subversives” for taking advantage of the “useful innocence” of students.139 This rhetoric was common throughout the dictatorship in an uneasy rhetorical relationship that simultaneously chastised students for their activism while at the same time insisting that they were “innocents” and were being manipulated by outside forces. Sometimes, these commentators resorted to extreme language, including accusing students of being “insane,” “maladjusted,” or “pseudo-students.” As a result, in this instance, many felt students were not responsible. Yet the burden did not fall simply on “Communists;” some also directly blamed the parents for students’ poor upbringing and activism.140

Whether they wanted to or not, parents were increasingly drawn into the battles over university reform. In so doing, they also risked exposure to violence and repression as well as emotional and professional stress. Such was the case with a father who worked for the federal government in the Attorney General's office in Brasília but who also helped his son hide Honestino Guimarães in his house for three days while police searched for him. His actions left the father torn between his duties to the state and to his son.141 While his case was extreme, many parents found they increasingly had to take a side in the battle between the

139  CPDOC, JM c mre 1966.06.05. Of course, many student activists strongly disagreed with this assessment. See, for example, Projeto Memória Estudantil, Paulo de Tarso Veceslau, p. 7.

140  CPDOC, JM c mre 1966.06.05, Letter from Paulo Santos Silva and anonymous letter. CPDOC.

141  Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Cláudio Fonteles, p. 9.
state they supported and the children they loved. In this way, many parents became engaged in the debates over the use of repression, student mobilization, and university reform.

**Conclusion**

While educational policy and university administration may have fallen under the purview of the state, it is clear that various social sectors had a vested interest in the future of Brazil’s higher education system and actively participated in and shaped the debate over the role of universities in national development and politics. Students pointed to the infrastructural shortcomings and pedagogical and financial inadequacies of the universities as a means to challenge the regime’s power. In doing so, the student movement finally found a way to bridge the gap between the radical leadership and the more moderate masses in the process. Even those students who supported the dictatorship clamored for improvements in the system. Collectively, these efforts shaped the regime’s policies. Likewise, business-leaders and others who had a financial interest in the nation’s economic and social development used their own institutions and their contacts with the government to try to sway the military’s educational policies. Even parents became involved in the battle over reform as the university system’s shortcomings failed to address the material hopes they held for their children, even while the regime increasingly resorted to violence to attack their children.

In spite of the differing political backgrounds of these groups and the heterogeneity within them, the universities were central to each group’s hopes for Brazil’s future, just as they were to the state’s vision of development. As
members of Brazil’s middle class (or individuals with hopes of becoming a part of the middle class), they all shared a discursive vision of development that hinged on university education and the middle class’s centrality to national growth. In this regard, they were not so different from the military regime.

At the end of November of 1968, the military issued its University Reform, transforming higher education in Brazil. However, that policy did not emerge from bureaucratic ether. Between 1964 and 1968, students, parents, pedagogues, businessmen, and others shaped the military’s policy, be it through protests, meetings, rallies, private classes, pamphlets, or other forms of dialogue with the state. Although the establishment of the repressive Institutional Act No. 5 (AI-5) just two weeks later would overshadow the University Reform, the new educational policy was a major watershed that simultaneously revealed the depth of the military’s intention to transform society while also demonstrating the complex ways in which state and society were bound together in these transformations. However, declaring reform and actually implementing it were two different issues. Throughout the 1970s, the military governments continued to try to renovate the university system even as Brazil went through periods of economic growth and decline, growing social opposition, and internal contradictions within the military regime itself. It is to those efforts to implement university reform that we now turn.
Chapter Four – “Planning Is a Continuous Process”: Military Educational Policy and the Middle Class, 1969-1979

In many ways, the Reforma Universitária, issued just two weeks prior to Institutional Act No. 5 (AI-5), marked a new period in the military government and in Brazilian education more generally. With the Reforma Universitária, the military directly staked Brazil’s future to higher education. It created a new administrative hierarchy to govern the federal university system, while also reorganizing universities’ internal structure. It consolidated and built upon the reforms established in Decree-Laws 53 and 252. It established a plan to increase the number of admissions in universities in an attempt to expand the education of the middle class and to improve Brazil’s quality of life and international standing. It brought an end to the numerous studies and scattered laws dealing with universities, establishing a detailed program designed to resolve the structural problems of universities. It outlined a specific vision for the direction of national development, one that hinged on the sciences and medicine in place of the humanities and arts. In doing so, the new decree acknowledged both the students’ demands and reiterated a vision of national development that hinged on white-collar middle-class professionals who would lead the country’s scientific and commercial progress. The Reforma’s publication immediately established a “before” and “after” divide in Brazilian higher education.

Yet the Reforma was far from the final say on the role or organization of universities in Brazil. As Edson Machado de Sousa pointed out just two weeks after the government passed the Reforma, reforming the university system would
be a “continuous process.”¹ The administrations of Costa e Silva, Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1970-1974), and Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) continued to reshape, reformulate, and redirect educational policy. In the short term, the government concentrated its efforts on preventing “another 1968” while rapidly transforming the university system. As time passed, though, unforeseen problems arose. In the ten years following the Reforma Universitária, the military government oversaw Brazil’s “economic miracle” and confronted inflation and recession as the decade progressed. Consequently, military governments found themselves forced to create new policies in response not only to the ongoing transformation of Brazilian universities and the shortcomings of educational policies, but also to social changes and responses from the Brazilian population itself.²

*Preventing Another 1968: Universities and Political Reform*

When the Costa e Silva government announced the Reforma in late November 1968, it was clear that the military government was no longer going to offer half-hearted attempts to fix the university system. Costa e Silva’s administration had incorporated numerous studies and laws from the previous four years to offer a comprehensive policy for the university system’s organization. Moreover, as the tumultuous year of 1968 came to a close, the issue of student activism on campuses was one of the most immediate concerns confronting the military dictatorship, and remained so throughout 1969. Certainly,


² These civilian responses are further detailed and analyzed in the following chapter.
the military government and its allies hoped that the *Reforma* would reduce student opposition. However, the Costa e Silva administration quickly acknowledged that neither the Reforma nor the repressive Institutional Act No. 5 (*Ato Institucional* No. 5, AI-5) would immediately eliminate student mobilization. Even Emílio Garrastazu Médici’s son Roberto, a university professor at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, recalled his father being concerned about the ongoing activism of students when he assumed office late in 1969 after a stroke left Costa e Silva incapacitated. As Victoria Langland commented, given the progress the student movements had made in the previous four years, “1969 beckoned as the future of their movement.” The military regime sought to ensure that that would not be the case.

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4 AI-5 came to be the symbol of the new repressive phase of the dictatorship, commonly referred to as the “Years of Lead” (*Anos de Chumbo*). Among other things, AI-5 gave the military the power to indefinitely close Congress and ushered in a new wave of repression that witnessed heightened use of torture and other forms of police repression to clamp down on resistance and consolidate the military’s so-called “Revolution of 1964.” See Gaspari, *A Ditadura Envergonhada*, pp. 333-343. For a good contextualization of the events leading up to and decision-making process behind AI-5, see Hélio Contreiras, *AI-5: A opressão no Brasil – Um repórter nos bastidores políticos das ditaduras do Cone Sul*, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 2005).


The Costa e Silva regime wasted no time in addressing the issue. As Carnaval came to a close and students prepared to return to school in February 1969, the administration issued several decrees designed to further clamp down on student mobilizations. The most infamous of these was Decree-Law 477, which made a concerted effort to outlaw any student political activity on campuses. Those involved in vaguely defined “political activity” faced expulsion, the revocation of any and all future scholarships for a period of five years, and the inability to enroll in any university, public or private, in Brazil for a three year period.⁷ The law seemed superfluous to some since, as one newspaper pointed out years later, there was nothing in 477 that was not also covered in the broader Law of National Security.⁸ However, by reiterating restrictions on student activism in multiple laws simultaneously, the military revealed just how serious a threat it viewed student movements, even as it perhaps unintentionally gave them even greater symbolic weight. Because it specifically singled out students for repression, 477 soon became the symbol on campuses of the military’s new repressive phase, and students quickly placed “477” side-by-side with AI-5 when pointing to the most authoritarian acts of the dictatorship.⁹


⁹  For example, see: APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Ministério do Exército – I Exército, “Relatório Especial de Informações No. 4/75 – VII ECEM [Encontro Nacional de Estudantes de Medicina do Brasil], 28 July 1975; APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 043 – 17 de Junho de 1975 – “DCE/Universidade Federal Fluminense”; and APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento
Decree-law 477 was not the only new regulation designed to deny students an oppositional voice. Throughout the 1960s, the military had been concerned with “professional students” whose extended programs of studies made them vital to a student movement that was vulnerable to quick turnover due to graduation.10 To prevent these long-term activists from remaining involved in the student movement, the Médici administration issued law 5.789/72 in 1972, establishing jubilação, or “retirement,” of students. The military mandated more regimented timelines for students to finish their studies at federal universities. Students who did not complete courses within the government’s new timeline faced expulsion. Although the law also helped to shunt students into the workforce as those ever-precious “human resources,” the law’s primary motivation was much simpler. By establishing a timeline, the military could “impede the permanency of the ‘professional student,’” thereby hopefully reducing the presence of leftist student leaders on university campuses.11 Though nowhere near as draconian as 477, it was yet another means to minimize political dissent on campus and reduce “subversion.”

Although these decrees directly targeted students and student activism, the military also repressed faculty nationwide. Throughout 1969, the military used its power as the head of the executive branch to purge all federal universities of professors whose ideas were “subversive.” One scholar has suggested that this

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10 Personal interview, F.G., 10 September 2007. See also, Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Elyseo Medeiros Pires Filho, p. 5.

11 COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU Caixa 12, M.8, “Parecer No. 36/79, Processo 228.297/78,” p. 3.
definition included those whose politics did not fit with the hard-liners’, as well as any professors who might oppose the government’s vision of reform.\textsuperscript{12} Dozens of professors were removed from campuses that were already witnessing a rapidly-growing student-professor ratio, in an effort to eliminate opposition politics and “ideology” on campuses.\textsuperscript{13} By 1971, a popular magazine was suggesting that it would not be long before Brazilians had to go to the United States to learn about Brazilian history.\textsuperscript{14} Not all of the professors who exited the workforce were forced out; some moved into the private sector.\textsuperscript{15} However, it is also highly likely that the forced removal or voluntary exile of some professors influenced the departure of others.

This immediate post-1968 attempt to purge the campuses of all political activity was a source of friction between students and the military dictatorship for the next ten years. Even in the most repressive phase of the regime, students and their supporters continued to speak out against 477 in the press, in public, and in meetings with officials from MEC and from the universities.\textsuperscript{16} Likewise,


\textsuperscript{15} The study found that 70 percent of Brazilians who had earned their degrees in the sciences in another country worked in universities, yet still expressed concern that “the fact that 30 percent of these people with the title of doctor or with graduate study are working outside of the universities.” CPDOC, LSL pi Lopes, L.S. 1971.10.00, “Objetivos de uma política científica e tecnológica – Adequação da Administração Pública à melhoria da qualidade da vida,” p. 73.

jubilação inspired student opposition, not just from open leftists, but from other students whose friends were forced out in what they viewed as an unfair process. The removal of many professors who were opposed to the military regime gave the universities a new tenor as pro-government institutions throughout the 1970s. Moreover, the military government’s declaration in 1972 that UNE was extinct did not prevent new forms of student activism from appearing on campuses. Certainly, political engagement became much more limited during the regime’s most repressive years. Yet the military’s laws, designed to make universities completely apolitical sites, actually stoked opposition and increased political engagement on campuses throughout the 1970s. In spite of its best efforts, the military’s efforts to depoliticize campuses only gave students new political causes around which they could rally.\textsuperscript{17}


While laws like Decreto-Lei 477 and the establishment of jubilação provided high-profile flashpoints that spurred protest for years, such overtly political reforms in the universities were relatively few in the wake of 1968. Together with 477 and jubilação, the rise of a broad repressive apparatus via AI-5, and the ascendance of the “hard line” within the military government, best personified in the administration of Médici, rendered superfluous any further efforts to rid campuses of political activity.\textsuperscript{18} Although Médici continuously

\textsuperscript{17} See Chapter 5 for an analysis of the shifts in issues and forms of mobilization among students.
insisted that any instances of torture, human rights violations, or repression were isolated, at best many saw him as a hands-off president who was more interested in soccer than in curbing the abuses the military committed during his administration. With a strong repressive apparatus that employed torture and “disappearances” firmly in place to curb further popular mobilizations, the military regime turned towards more mundane and quotidian reforms of the university system that consumed most of the space within educational policy in the post-1968 context. With the Reforma Universitária as its benchmark, the military set about focusing on the expansion, funding, and improvement of universities. Yet the reforms often failed to quickly address the shifting economic and political context of the 1970s. Consequently, military leaders found themselves forced to address the growing inadequacies of their educational policies while responding to increasing social pressure over the shortcomings of Brazil’s “new” university system.

The University Reform initially seemed to resolve many of the problems universities confronted in the 1960s. The military pointed to the university system’s rapid expansion, and growth rates were indeed remarkable. The number

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18 For a comprehensive narrative of this “moderate”/“hard-liner” division and its developments between 1964 and 1977, see Elio Gaspari, *A Ditadura Envergonhada, A Ditadura Escancarada, A Ditadura Derrotada* (São Paulo: Editora Schwarcz, 2003), and *A Ditadura Encurralada* (São Paulo: Editora Schwarz, 2002). For a fascinating and excellent analysis that questions the division of the military dictatorship into the “moderates” of the Castelo Branco years and the “hard-liners” of the Costa e Silva years, see João Roberto Martins Filho, *O Palácio e a Caserna: A dinâmica militar das crises políticas na ditadura (1964-1969)*, (São Carlos, SP: Editora da Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 1995).

19 For this portrayal, see Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule*, Ch. 5; Alves, *State and Opposition in Military Brazil*, Ch. 6; and Gaspari, *A ditadura escancarada*. James Green suggests that Médici knew of the systematic use of torture under his watch, and only insisted that they were isolated incidents when opposition movements in the United States began to pressure the Brazilian government over its use of torture. See Green, *We Cannot Remain Silent*. 

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of students had already grown by 135,909 between 1964 and 1968, yet between 1968 and 1972, it increased by another 409,763 students.\textsuperscript{20} Private schools in particular fueled this expansion. While in 1960 public schools educated about 55 percent of the student body, by 1973 that number had dropped to 42 percent. Indeed, as part of the regime’s transformation of higher education, the number of schools under private administration skyrocketed. Private universities were already 50.5 percent of the total number of higher education institutions in 1970, and by 1974 they had ballooned to 63.01 percent of the total.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, the military was quickly able to address the need for more positions available for students, although it did so while reducing its responsibility to provide free higher education.\textsuperscript{22} Although the number of Brazilians who attended university remained a minority,\textsuperscript{23} the number of students nonetheless increased by over 500,000 in just ten years, allowing many more from the burgeoning middle class to attend universities, even if they were private institutions. It was clear that while the dictatorship was serious about expanding the university system, it was not as serious about expanding the federal university system. Rather, it promoted private universities whose accreditation still depended upon the federal government, but whose funding did not. This shift changed the landscape of higher education,

\textsuperscript{20} In 1964, the total number of students enrolled in public and private colleges and universities was 142,386. In 1968, that number reached 278,295, and then leapt to an estimated 688,058 students in 1972. COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 5, M.3, Relatório Annual – 1972,” n. pag.

\textsuperscript{21} COREG, Coleção MEC, SEEC-MEC, M.8, “Informações Estatísticas,” n. pag.

\textsuperscript{22} Private schools were responsible for the other 58 percent. The total numbers estimated were 350,000 students in public schools and 475,000 in private schools in 1973. COREG, Coleção MEC, SEEC-MEC, M.8, “Informações Estatísticas,” n. pag.

\textsuperscript{23} COREG, Coleção MEC, SEEC-MEC, M.8, “Informações Estatísticas,” n. pag.
leading to the prevalence of private universities and colleges, a condition that continues to this day. 24

Although the military encouraged a rapid increase in the number of private universities, it did not ignore expanding the federal system. It continued to try to establish federal universities in every state in the union. Part of the 1968 Reform drew on the U.S. model of universities by constructing new centralized campuses that more closely reflected the structure of their American counterparts, rather than allowing them to be spread across a city, as was the case with older Brazilian schools. While the scientific compound on the Ilha do Governador at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro was the most notable of these campuses, centralized campuses also appeared at new federal universities throughout the country.

The military gave particular emphasis on science and technology within this expansion. Ever since the Kubitschek administration, Brazilian governments both civilian and military had rhetorically emphasized applied sciences as central to Brazilian development. 25 Beginning with the Reforma, however, the military dictatorship promoted these fields through policy. The dictatorship emphasized the need to improve courses oriented towards scientific and technological development via curricular reforms, modernization of facilities, and more training and research opportunities for professors. 26 Out of 1000 federal scholarships for graduate students in Masters and Doctoral programs, a full 644 went to basic and

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24 See Ribeiro, “Educação Superior Brasileira: Reforma e Diversificação Institucional,” Chapters 1 and 2. For criticisms of this shift, see Chauí, Escritos sobre a universidade.

25 See Chapters 1 and 3.

applied sciences, while “Literature and Linguistics” received only 69 and the Arts received none at all.27 The growth of engineering schools alone reflected this emphasis. The number of public and private engineering colleges nearly doubled between 1967 and 1974.28 Likewise, by 1972, there were 74 medical schools with nearly 43,000 students enrolled.29

The emphasis on the transformative power of university degrees in white-collar professions, particularly the exact and applied sciences, seemed to have a direct impact on middle-class career choices themselves. Between 1964 and 1979, students increasingly began to choose professions in engineering, medicine, biological sciences, physics, geology, and architecture, all fields the military presidents had promoted.30 Administrations could claim they supported the arts and culture,31 but such claims rang hollow when the military’s Ministry of Education provided over 500 post-graduate scholarships for the sciences, and

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27 COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 2, M.4, “Programas de Auxílios e Bolsas no País,” n. pag. The other fields receiving scholarships were education (56), social sciences (133), and “social professions” (such as law, business, architecture, library sciences, etc.), which received 98 scholarships.

28 There were 45 engineering schools in 1965, and only 58 in 1967, yet by 1972 that number had grown to 104. In addition to engineering departments at federal universities, these numbers also include private universities and private engineering colleges, which would have had to gain government approval to function. See COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 2, M.6, “Appendix 1 – Model for the implementation of a national postgraduate program in engineering, for Brazil,” p. I.6.

29 COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 5, M.3, “Relatório Anual – 1972,” n. pag. Not surprisingly, over half (39) of these schools were in the states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro/Guanabara, and Minas Gerais, and a full 55 of these schools were located in the geographically-small but demographically-large South and Southeast, which consisted of the states of Rio de Janeiro (and Guanabara prior to the 1975 merger between the two), Minas Gerais, São Paulo, Espírito Santo, Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul.


exactly zero for the fine arts. The popular musician Chico Buarque even raised this criticism, commenting to Minister of Education Ney Braga that universities were going through a cultural crisis. Where the previous generation of composers like Buarque, Edu Lobo, Milton Nascimento, and Caetano Veloso was “born in the universities,” such artistic and cultural creation was virtually absent from campuses in the 1970s. Certainly, many university students would have chosen their professions based on a number of factors. However, the emphasis the government gave to scientific fields, often bolstered by scholarships and even greater rates of expansion than other areas of study, probably played a role in those decisions.

The government also implemented other reforms. It regulated and approved increases in annual student fees, which became a major source of student contention by the 1970s. Decree-law 464, which followed the Reforma Universitária by just two weeks, restructured and unified the entrance exams so that all students entering university took the same exam, regardless of the profession they sought to enter. Given that students, pedagogues, and military

32 COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 1, M.4, “Distribuição de Quotas de Bolsas no País da CAPES,” n. pag.

33 CPDOC, EG 1974.04.10/1, Roll 1, Photo 1392, “Despacho com o Excelentíssimo Senhor Presidente da República em 24 de Dezembro de 1974.”

34 The fees were important enough that a list of laws and decrees regulating them took up three pages of an educational report from Rio de Janeiro, with another six pages devoted to discussion of the fees. See COREG, Coleção MEC, DEMEC Caixa 1, M.2, “Ministério da Educação e Cultura – Secretária de Apoio – Coordenação de Órgãos Regionais – Delegacia Regional do Rio de Janeiro – DR-3,” Ch. 19. For student responses to the annual fees, see Chapter 5, below.
leaders alike had complained about the structure of the exams throughout the 1960s, the fact that the Costa e Silva administration neglected to address the issue initially in the Reforma Universitária suggested immediate shortcomings and demonstrated that reforms to the Reforma were already needed. Additionally, in an effort to increase a sense of patriotism and to co-opt students into the military’s imagined community of the Brazilian nation, the government began to require university students to take courses in “Moral and Civic Education.”36 The government also published a series of decrees and laws between 1969 and 1972, establishing physical education in the universities to “stimulate students”37 and to create a more vigorous and robust student body that would better represent Brazilian development.38 Indeed, the new Federal University of Alagoas had 20,000 square meters dedicated to sporting facilities, while the philosophy department had only 15,000 square meters and the medical school, 18,000 square


meters.\footnote{39} While the connection between physical health of students and the health of the nation was nothing new among political elites in Brazil,\footnote{40} these efforts marked the first time that a Brazilian government extended such concerns into the realm of higher education.

Collectively, these policies marked a significant shift in higher education in Brazil. For the first time, the military dictatorship was implementing broad changes and transformations within the university system, increasing its size, reorganizing its structure, and shifting the emphasis away from traditional fields like law and literature towards more “modern” fields in the sciences. Instead of the piecemeal reforms and empty speeches of the 1960s, by the 1970s that the government was actually backing up rhetoric with policies that sought to improve Brazil’s economy, reduce political turmoil, further development, and even transform the physical bodies of Brazilian students.

The economic success of Brazil’s “economic miracle” of 1969-1974, when the country’s growth averaged ten percent per year, led to broad support for the regime, with Médici’s approval ratings exceeding 70 percent.\footnote{41} The 1970 World Cup victory, Brazil’s third, only solidified the sense that Brazil had finally begun to meet its full potential. However, trouble was already brewing on

\footnote{39} AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 114, “MEC – Universidade Federal de Alagoas,” p. 9.


\footnote{41} Costa Couto, História indiscreta da ditadura e da abertura, pp. 115-116 While radical efforts to overthrow the regime continued, most notably in the guerrilla war in the Araguaia river valley, most Brazilians were satisfied with the growth, and a 1970 World Cup victory only strengthened the regime’s popularity. See As eventual president Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva himself put it, had there been a democratic election, Médici would have won in a landslide. See Costa Couto, Memória Viva do Regime Militar, pp. 250-251.
multiple fronts. Although Médici publicly boasted of the universities’ expansion,\textsuperscript{42} just one year later officials in Geisel’s administration complained behind closed doors that the this expansion, particularly as it regarded private schools, had happened so quickly that the military government was rapidly losing its ability to accredit and approve private schools.\textsuperscript{43} Certainly, this concern may have stemmed in part from Geisel’s broader tendencies to micromanage.\textsuperscript{44} Unlike its predecessors, Geisel’s administration wanted to administer nearly all aspects of education, from materials available for research and scientific studies of education in Brazil to even greater control over the programs in schools, the number of scholarships available, and systematization of the Brazilian education from top to bottom.\textsuperscript{45} Yet his concerns were not without basis. The rapid expansion of private schools was further diluting the quality of professors, as many who were teaching at this time did not have a doctorate or even a graduate degree. In 1975, students at the PUC in Rio de Janeiro published an article on the problems facing Brazilian universities, highlighting the plight of Brazilian professors, of which only eight percent had a masters’ degree and nine percent a doctorate, while 61 percent only had a bachelors’ degree.\textsuperscript{46}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[{43}] CPDOC, EG 1974.04.10/1, Roll 1, Photo 1298, “Despacho com o Senhor Presidente da República em 17 de setembro de 1974.”
\item[{44}] For the portrayal of Geisel as a micro-manager, see Skidmore, \textit{Military Politics in Brazil}.
\item[{45}] II Plano Setorial, 43.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
In spite of complaints that schools were expanding too quickly, the expansion could not keep up with the demand as more people turned to private and public universities to either fulfill the material expectations of their middle-class backgrounds or, in the case of the lower-middle and working classes, to seek social mobility for their children. Unsurprisingly, the issue was particularly pressing in areas that the government had been pushing. Thus, although the military had increased the number of positions in universities significantly, in 1975 students complained that there were still 160,000 more engineering candidates than there were positions in the university system even after the government’s emphasis and expansion of engineering programs.47 In 1977, 4537 people applied for 500 positions at an isolated (and not particularly renowned) engineering college in Mauá, Rio de Janeiro. Even though roughly 1250 people did not pass the entrance exam, that still left 3286 candidates for those 500 positions.48

Moreover, near the end of the 1970s, the job market itself was becoming increasingly glutted with university graduates, and many who finished in fields like medicine or education were having a hard time finding jobs.49 As one commentator pointedly observed, “the social pressure for enrollment in the

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46 The other 22 percent had only “cursos de aperfeiçoamento,” or professional training courses that went beyond a bachelors but did not terminate with a degree. APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 051 – 27 June 1975.

47 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, “As queixas contra o ensino,” Encaminhamento No. 73/75/DPPS/INT/RJ, 22 August 1975.


49 AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 616-05282, Encaminhamento No. 088/79/DSI/MJ – “Jornal ‘Em Tempo’.”
University does not correspond [...] to the job market.”50 The military government was unquestionably a major factor in this social pressure, having called for universities to provide more “human resources” since the 1960s. Yet the system expanded beyond Brazilian society’s capacity to employ these university graduates. This led to increased social unrest and protest on the part of those whom the dictatorship had encouraged to seek higher education but who could not find jobs upon graduating.51

Professional dissatisfaction also spread among faculty. Prior to the 1970s, university professors had not been a unified group when it came to defending their interests. However, throughout that decade, they became increasingly dissatisfied with the problems that directly resulted from the dictatorship’s Reforma Universitária. The Reforma Universitária itself was near-sighted. While it focused heavily on increasing the number of students and the size of campuses in Brazil’s higher education system, it did not expand the number of faculty accordingly. In some departments, the number of professors actually declined in the immediate post-Reforma context.52 Purging the universities while expanding the number of students only aggravated what was literally a growing problem. As

51 See Chapters 5 and 6.
52 COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 2, M.6, “Appendix 1 – Model for the implementation of a national postgraduate program in engineering, for Brazil – January 1971,” p. I.7. The report tries to deflect the gross disparity between the number of professors in the 1960s and 1970s by pointing out that the counting methodology shifted in 1969, and “only the engineering professors teaching in the professional cycle are taken into account,” yet this does nothing to explain why there is such a major drop from 1969 to 1971.
a result, the quality of education declined enough that students would once again raise the banner of terrible education within the university system.\textsuperscript{53}

It did not take long for the military government to experience backlash from the unintended consequences of professorial purges and an emphasis on expanding the student body while neglecting the faculty. As early as October 1969, the director of the Faculdade de Letras at UFRJ asked the Ministry of Education for an increase in funding to pay for faculty, where the student population had jumped from 300 in January 1968 to 1200 in 1969.\textsuperscript{54} In 1973, a similar letter from the President of the Federation of Federal Isolated Schools in Guanabara asked for emergency aid to provide more lab monitors and assistants for the Biomedical Institute because the current number of faculty could not satisfy the number of classes the schools offered or the number of students enrolled.\textsuperscript{55} Throughout Brazil, the rate of growth for students between 1965 and 1970 was 173 percent, while the number of professors only increased by 63 percent in the same period. In 1964 the student-professor ratio was 4.72:1; by 1971 students’ numbers had nearly quadrupled, while professors’ numbers barely doubled, leaving a student-professor ratio of 9.19:1 (although by today’s standards, these ratios are quite low).\textsuperscript{56} Schools scrambled to employ qualified

\textsuperscript{53} See Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{54} COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 1, M.1, “Protocolo 665119, MEC-DESu-Serviço Auxiliar,” 3 October 1969.

professors. In one extreme case, one professor was teaching at seven different institutions simultaneously.  

The salaries of professors remained low enough that many who could gain better-paying work in the private sector, particularly in fields like engineering, did so. This situation left the university system even more depleted. Many faculty who remained in the schools were underprepared or under-educated. Professors’ lack of training did not escape the notice of students (or of the police apparatuses monitoring them). Overstretched and underpaid, professors became increasingly dissatisfied as a class, and by the end of the decade, they began rallying around their shared professional interests. In 1978, private college and university professors in Rio de Janeiro mobilized over the “grave” issue of salaries, “destabilizing” private education throughout the country and leading students to ask the Minister of Education, Ney Braga, to act on their behalf.  

With inflation rapidly increasing, university professors who were already stretched thin and underpaid began to organize in new ways, and their discontent would play an important role in anti-dictatorship sentiment after 1979.  

By Geisel’s inauguration in March 1974, it had become apparent that yet another major overhaul of the university system was needed in order to address

56 COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 5, M.3, “Reltório Anual – 1972,” n. pag. The total numbers were 30,162 professors and 142,386 students in 1964, and 61,111 professors and 561,397 students in 1971.


58 NL d 78.10.17, CPDOC.

59 See Chapter 6.
these problems. Hoping again to solve the universities’ problems in one comprehensive law, the Geisel administration issued its National Post-Graduate Plan (Plano Nacional de Pós-Graduação, PNPG). Proclaiming “a new phase of the university system,” the PNPG sought to increase and improve post-graduate opportunities in Brazil in order “to train […] researchers, university professors, and professionals.” However, it was also clear that the PNPG aimed to fix the problems that had arisen out of 1968’s reform. It hoped that the emphasis on professors would lead to an improvement in the quality of higher education in Brazil. Indeed, the PNPG’s “fundamental objective” was “to transform the universities into true centers of permanent, creative activities.” Although professorial salaries were not explicitly mentioned, the PNPG did seek to “stabilize” the “financial, economic, and organizational rationale of the university” in all of its functions. Building on the rhetoric of the 1960s, it again reiterated the value of the sciences to national development. Although the administration paid attention to all levels of education, from primary school through post-graduate work, the university system received particular attention.64

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61 Plano Nacional de Pós-Graduação, p. 17.

62 Plano Nacional de Pós-Graduação, p. 17.

63 Plano Nacional de Pós-Graduação, pp. 20, 26.

64 For analysis and statistical data that demonstrate how Geisel’s administration focused upon and to some degrees improved education throughout Brazil, including attendance to primary and secondary schools, adult literacy, special
Geisel placed universities, particularly those with graduate programs, at the center of Brazil’s “social and economic development.” It tried to create new incentives for professors and students finishing their Masters’ or Doctoral degrees to remain in the university system, rather than turning to the private sector. Together, these goals implicitly suggested that the Reforma Universitária of 1968 had failed.

In spite of the PNPG’s attempts to address the growing problems stemming from the 1968 Reform, unrest on campuses became increasingly present as the decade progressed. A simple look at Geisel’s weekly meetings with his Minister of Education, Ney Braga, demonstrates how quickly things had shifted within the student body. In the first few years of the Geisel administration, student movements were mentioned fleetingly; yet as the decade progressed, student discontent became an increasingly common theme in these weekly meetings. Certainly, these mobilizations increased in part due to ongoing abuses on the part of the dictatorship, beginning with the murder of journalist Vladimir Herzog while in police custody in 1975. But students also reiterated the perennial complaints about excessive fees, bad food, and poor job prospects upon education, and university infrastructure, see Instituto de Planejamento Econômico e Social – IPEA, Realizações do Governo Geisel (1974-78): II – A Concepção e Execução da Estratégia Social (Brasília: 1979), pp. 7-96.

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65 Quote from Plano Nacional de Pós-Graduação, p. 30. See also pp. 31-33.
67 For example, see CPDOC, EG 1974.04.10/1, Roll 2, Photos 001-616.
68 For a detailed account of Herzog’s background, his death, and the public’s response, see Fernando Jordão, Dossiê Herzog: prisão, tortura e morte no Brasil, (São Paulo: Global Editora, 1979). See also Gaspari, A Ditadura Encurralada, pp. 159-187.
Likewise, professors’ salaries declined in value in the face of inflation as Brazil’s “economic miracle” came to a grinding halt in the latter half of the decade. Although the PNPG was able to improve the educational levels of research and expand post-graduate research, it could not expand the number of jobs available to graduating students.

The Cornerstone of the Future: The Military’s Vision of Middle Class Labor and Development

The military’s educational policies were at best a mixed success as the 1970s came to a close. Policies focused on short-term progress proved inadequate in the face of economic decline and growing political turmoil in the armed forces and Brazilian society more generally. Yet these policies represented more than a shift from rhetoric to action. By expanding the university system in the name of

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69 Other issues included the slow implementation of the department system, as outlined in the Reforma Universitária and the increasing fees. For more on how students’ demands shifted in the 1970s, see Chapter 5.

70 Inflation between 1974-78 was 37.9 percent on average, compared to the 19.3 percent average between 1968 and 1973. What is more, inflation increased more rapidly towards the end of the Geisel administration, reaching 38.8 percent in 1977 and 40.8 percent. As Thomas Skidmore points out, inflation is not the only way to measure a country’s economy, and the GDP grew during Geisel’s administration, though it slowed down towards the end of his term. Brazil’s foreign debt also rapidly inflated to 43.5 billion in 1978, “more than double the level of only three years earlier.” Thus, while the economy seemed to be still healthy on the exterior, cracks were beginning to emerge; the inflation rate for 1979 hit 77 percent, and by 1980, inflation would hit a then-record high of 110 percent. See Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, pp. 206-207, 214, and 230. The economic troubles that began to bubble to the surface during the Geisel years would continue to destabilize Brazil’s economy throughout the 1980s and well into the 1990s. Comparing 1980 to 1995, inflation in Brazil was an astronomical 20,759,903,275,651 percent, and in cities like São Paulo, inflation rose to 2703 percent. The fifteen-year inflation rate comes from Gustavo H. B. Franco, “Auge e Declínio do Inflacionismo no Brasil,” in Fabio Giambiagi, André Villela, Lavinia Barros de Castro and Jennifer Hermann, eds., Economia Brasileira Contemporânea (1945-2004), (Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier Editora Ltda., 2005), pp. 258-283. Data on São Paulo comes from Maureen O’Dougherty, Consumption Intensified, p. 63.

71 In October 1977, Geisel had to move quickly against his Minister of the Army, Silvio Frota, a hard-liner who Geisel suspected of trying to launch another “coup within the coup” in the vein of Costa e Silva. See Gaspari, A ditadura Encurralada. For his side of the story, see Frota, Ideais Traídos.
national development, the military government played a major, if often unseen, role in shaping the still-malleable middle-class identity. Its focus on white-collar labor not only provided more opportunities for the middle class to gain a university degree, thereby strengthening the bond between identity and education; it also emphasized the centrality of the middle-class to improving all of Brazil. In this way, the dictatorship itself was strengthening the growing social, political, and economic importance of the middle class in Brazilian society.

By its very nature, university enrollment in Brazil was the domain of the middle sectors of society. Given the scant number of wealthy in Brazil, and the numerous obstacles facing the poor, middle-class students were in the majority. While statistical data directly linking income levels to university attendance is not available, the rarity with which Brazilians received university education is clear. In Brazil’s largest urban centers, only a small number of citizens completed university education, ranging in 1970 from just 2.1 percent in Belém to 4.0 percent in Curitiba, while Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, 3.8 percent and 3.0 percent of the total urban populations over the age of 25 respectively had completed university education. Students themselves admitted to their middle-class background, and structural obstacles, including the need to finish high

72 Owensby, Intimate Ironies, pp. 88-91.
74 See Projeto Memórias Estudantis, interviews with Arthur José Poerner, p. 5; Daniel Aarão Reis, p. 19; and Franklin Martins, p. 11. Very few former student leaders self-identified as coming from poorer families, and most leaders’ parents exercised roles in white-collar professions like chemical engineering, law, and politics. For two exceptions, see Projeto Memória Estudantis,
school and, increasingly, take private cursinhos to pass the entrance exams, virtually eliminated many of the still-illiterate poor from university education. The military’s desire to expand university education and bring universities into poor areas where residents were lacking education just strengthened the understanding of university education as essentially a middle-class enterprise. As Maria Fávero pointed out, in spite of their best efforts, many radical students in the 1960s could not escape their financial and cultural backgrounds, and although they rebelled against the “status quo,” they also acted as “agent[s] of their class.”

This trend continued into the 1970s. A study in São Paulo found that a majority of the state’s university students were from the middle class. Even at one of the lower-ranked federal universities, a majority of students admitted in 1975 came from families with a middle-class income. Thus, when the military government placed university-trained professionals at the center of its vision of national development, it gave the middle class a central role in this process.

Perhaps one of the best examples of how these policies directly brought middle-class labor, politics, and culture into all of Brazilian society were the Rural University Centers for Training and Community Action (CRUTACs).

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75 Fávero, A UNE em tempos de autoritarismo, pp. 16-17.


77 These numbers are for the Federal University of Ouro Preto (UFOP), in Minas Gerais, where 61 percent of the students came from the middle income brackets. See COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 1, M.15, “Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto – Vestibular, Julho 1975,” p. 13. For UFOP’s low ranking, see COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 5, M.6, “Relatório do Grupo de Trabalho DAU/PREMESU – Sept./Nov. 1974,” p. 8. Of the 29 Federal universities, UFOP finished in 25th in one ranking and 29th in the other, with the disparity due to differing parameters of evaluation.
government established eight Centers across six states, all in the poor North and Northeast. Reaching a total of over 1.2 million residents in these areas, the CRUTACS offered services that included training over 10,000 university students to go out to rural areas to administer medical and other social and cultural services to the rural poor. Through the CRUTACs, the Ministry of Education was addressing the “need for an effective position of the Universities in the process of national development,” and the rural Northeast was to be a major front in that process. Thus, the CRUTACs fulfilled the “social mission” that the government tried to instill in universities.

Although the CRUTACs were designed to uplift Brazil’s poorer regions, it was not difficult to see that the program still hinged on the white-collar professionals of the present and the future. By and large, the program trained university students and professors, not rural residents who could not attend university and who often were illiterate. This training was to provide the university students with a transformative role in Brazilian development, even while the rural poor were to passively accept these services. The military government, perhaps still fearing association with the Vargas administration, denied that its practices were paternalistic. Yet by bestowing university-trained

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78 The states were Rio Grande do Norte, Maranhão, Pernambuco, Ceará, Sergipe, and Alagoas. Rio Grande do Norte and Pernambuco had two CRUTACs each.


80 For example, see Castelo Branco, Discursos, p. 113.

81 COREG, Coleção MEC, FNDE M.1, “Programa de Ação para os CRUTACs em 1976,” p. 2.
students and professionals with the ability “to elevate the socio-economic and
cultural structures of the region,” it was clear that the government perceived the
CRUTACs and their middle-class acolytes as top-down forms of aid that left little
room for rural citizens to influence and shape the programs.

The CRUTACs may have been helpful to the military government in more
ways than one. Beginning in 1969, a handful of leftists gathered in the Araguaia
river valley, near where the states of Pará, Goiás, and Maranhão met.82 These
guerrillas, mostly members of the Maoist Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB),
tried to launch a guerrilla war, drawing on the tenets of _foquismo_, in the hopes of
fomenting rural unrest and overthrowing the dictatorship.83 In 1966, a handful of
laborers had attempted a similar war in the Minas Gerais/São Paulo border region.
Both efforts at guerrilla war failed: Araguaia, due to the military’s intense
campaign of repression and “disappearing” victims, and Caparaó, due to generally
poor organization on the part of the would-be rebels.84 In both cases, however, the
guerrillas sought to gain the support of the local population, generally poor rural
laborers, in the hopes that they could spur the people to rise up against the
military. Given that the dictatorship had viewed its educational policy as a
possible means to undermine student activism, it also seems probable here that

82 The region is now in the state of Tocantins. However, Tocantins was a part of the state of
Goiás until 1988, when Tocantins gained autonomy and became the 27th and newest state in
Brazil.

83 For more on the guerrilla war in Araguaia, see Fernando Portela, _Guerra de Guerrilhas no Brasil: A saga do Araguaia_, (São Paulo: Editora Terceiro Nome, 2002), and Gaspari, _A Ditadura Escanarada_, (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), pp. 399-464.

extending the state’s presence into rural areas by improving the infrastructure of rural areas provided rural residents with material reasons to support (or at least not oppose) the military government. Additionally, the CRUTACS provided state-led paths for students to help the poor in Brazil without resorting to leftist political movements. Indeed, when the government probed students’ responses to the program, it found that students found the CRUTACs to be “good” and that there was “great receptivity” to participation in the program. What is more, the government established all but one of the CRUTACs while the Araguaia guerrilla war was taking place. While the CRUTACs fit within the broader goal of addressing regional inequalities, it probably did not hurt to establish a stronger government presence in the regions specifically targeted by leftist guerrillas.

University students also approached the poor in favelas, or urban slums, as graduate education expanded. The proximity of many universities to favelas facilitated research about them, and the number of studies on favelas (and favelas studied) ballooned in the 1970s. These university-based studies helped Brazilians learn more about the social, cultural, and economic conditions in the favelas, and many of the university students and professors who studied the favelas joined NGOs and helped forge social policy. University reform also directly helped

85 COREG, Coleção MEC, FNDE M.1, Programa de Ação para os CRUTACs em 1976,” p. 2.

86 The exception was one of the two CRUTACs in Rio Grande do Norte.

87 See Lícia do Prado Valladares, A invenção da favela: Do mito de origem a favela.com, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2005), Ch. 3. Rather than providing an ethnography of favelas per se, Valladares’ work instead traces the ways favelas have occupied space in the intellectual and research community in Brazil throughout the twentieth century,
non-academic communities by establishing and expanding university hospitals on campuses in the 1970s and providing health care to nearby communities. When Geisel came into office, he pushed programs that focused on the “Integration of Universities into Communities” in order to bridge the gap between Brazil’s richest and poorest, a gap that had rapidly grown during the military dictatorship.

While the government focused on these efforts to address the income gap in Brazil, economic inequality in Brazil actually grew during the military dictatorship. In 1970, the richest 10 percent of the country made 18.6 times the income of the poorest 40 percent, and by 1980, that number had risen to 19.7 times.

Although the personalities, governing styles, and ideologies of the hands-off hardliner Médici and the micromanaging moderate Geisel could not have been more different, the policies that they put into effect in the 1970s were clearly designed with the intent that universities transform Brazilian society at all levels, be it through the CRUTACS, hospitals, or other programs. In each of these cases,

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88 For example, see COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 3, M.1, “Informação No. /76GSS/DAU/BSB,” 24 May 1976.

89 COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 5, M.3, “Relatório Annual – 1972,” p. 15. See also COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 4, M.1, “Estimativa de Dispendios Governamentais – Projetos Prioritários, 1974-79,” p. 1. Another way economists measure income inequality is through the Gini coefficient. Taking in a number of factors relating to income, the Gini coefficient is measured on a scale of zero to one; zero would represent a society with completely equal incomes across the board. The closer to the number one that a Gini coefficient approaches, the more inequal the income distribution. In 1960, Brazil’s Gini coefficient sat at .50; by 1970, it had risen to .57, and was .59 in 1980, indicating an exaggerated gap in income levels that only intensified during military dictatorship. See Lauro Ramos and Rosane Mendonça, “Pobreza e Desigualdade de Renda no Brasil,” in Fabio Giambiagi, André Villela, Lavínia Barros de Castro and Jennifer Hermann, eds., *Economia Brasileira Contemporânea (1945-2004)*, (Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier Editora Ltda., 2005), pp. 355-377.
the visions of development hinged upon middle-class involvement. The expansion of the university system was a part of this vision. The new policies and educational reforms of the 1970s transformed white-collar technicians and professionals into catalyzing agents who would make Brazil a more equitable and technologically capable nation.

With these reforms, the military claimed it was “democratizing” Brazil by improving the living conditions for all. Yet despite the emphasis on the poor areas, and especially the North and the Northeast, the policies of the 1970s were also contradictory. Even while promoting programs like the CRUTACS or the Educational Credit program, designed to help poor students better afford a university education, the military’s educational focus often ended up reinforcing the strength of universities in the South and Southeast, which had graduate programs in place since the 1950s. Thus, much of the funding that the government spent on improving Brazil’s university system went to the parts of the country that were already richest. This was particularly the case during Geisel’s administration, when graduate schools gained an even greater importance to visions of national development. Yet even under Médici, the imbalance was clear. In 1971, CAPES provided 27 universities and institutes with small grants exceeding Cr$50,000 for infrastructure, faculty, and books; all but four of the


91 See, for example, CPDOC, EG pr 1974.03.00, Rolls 1 and 2.

92 AN, Coleção Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 298, “Tipologia dos Estados Brasileiros – Uma análise das desigualdades (Ministério de Planejamento e Coordenação Geral, Instituto de Planejamento Econômico e Social – IPEA),” pp. 6-7.
schools that received funding were in states located in the South and Southeast. Of the five major graduate centers that Médici’s Ministry of Education planned, four were in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul; only the Federal University in Pernambuco was outside of the economic center of the country. MEC identified the Federal Universities in Bahia, Pernambuco, Espírito Santo, Pará, and Sergipe as having the “most intense” needs. And in a ranking of the 29 federal universities, six of the top ten were in four southern and southeastern states, while 7 of the bottom 10 were in the North and Northeast.

This is not to say that the military completely ignored the schools in the North and Northeast. Yet even when the Department of University Subjects (DAU) launched a program to aid federal universities in rural Minas Gerais, Bahia, Amazonas, and Mato Grosso, it used more privileged schools in Santa Catarina and São Paulo to provide the models. Institutionally, the military government was again exporting urban and middle class systems and models to the Northeast, in order to address educational and professional inequalities. The

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93 COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 1, M.7, “MEC-CAPES – Programa de Auxílios a Centros e Cursos de Pós-Graduação – Relatórios dos coordenadores de Cursos – 1972.” The four schools outside of the South/Southeast that received aid were the Federal Universities in Bahia, Pernambuco, Paraíba, and Brasília. The other 23 schools were in Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Paraná, historically the wealthiest states in Brazil.


97 COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU-MEC Caixa 3, M.6, “Programa de Assistência Inter-Universitária de Ensino de Engenharia – PRAENGE.”
military dictatorship was effectively exporting the standard of an urban middle class as the paradigm for “development” in traditionally poor, rural parts of the country.

This was not the only contradiction that arose out of the dictatorship’s claims of “democratizing” the country (to say nothing of the contradiction of a military regime that randomly stripped citizens of their political rights and closed Congress while claiming to be “democratic”). Whether it was through its expansion of the university system, increased scholarships, or programs like the CRUTACs, the military proclaimed that it was making higher education in Brazil genuinely “democratic,” rather than the playground of the wealthy and upper-middle classes. The military government defended the use of fees and the rapid expansion of the university system by saying these programs would allow for programs like the Educational Credit, ensuring that the poorer sectors of Brazil have “not only access to education, but to the benefits of it.” However, full access to the university system remained elusive. In order to enter university, candidates had to fulfill numerous requirements that included a high school diploma or its equivalent, something beyond the economic reach of most poor families.


Facing these limitations, the poorer sectors turned towards traditional patronage networks to gain favor and further their children’s social mobility. Scholars have tended to associate patronage with 19th- and early-20th century politics, while 20th-century patronage politics remain understudied among historians. Certainly, the military’s stranglehold on the institutions of political power made patronage more difficult, but that did not stop civilians from trying to seek rewards from national politicians in return for political loyalty. Both the government and opposition politicians fielded requests for patronage, requests that sometimes revolved around the universities. Thus, while members of the middle class generally prided themselves on their non-involvement with patronage, believing that they had earned their status through their own hard work, it is clear that those in the lower-middle class or working class did not make such distinctions. If political connections and patronage could help them

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102 Political sociologist Kurt von Mettenheim has provided a useful study on Brazilian electoral politics that looks in part at how patronage took on new forms in the 1970s and 1980s as Brazil returned to a democracy. See Kurt von Mettenheim, *The Brazilian Voter: Democratic Transition 1974-1986*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), pp. 137-153. Regarding the earlier twentieth century, Brian Owensby’s work is one of the few historical studies that gets into how patronage functioned. See Brian P. Owensby, *Intimate Ironies: Modernity and the Making of Middle-Class Lives in Brazil*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 82-87. However, historians have tended to overlook patronage politics in Brazil in the latter-half of the twentieth century.

103 Owensby, *Intimate Ironies*, pp. 135-137, 180. As middle-class identity formed during the first half of the twentieth century, it became clear that the idea of a meritocracy free of political connections was appealing to many white-collar professionals. Yet even with the ideal of a meritocracy, the reality of Brazilian political and social life was not so clean-cut, and these white-collar professionals still saw themselves turning to patronage when it suited their political, social, or material interests. See Owensby, *Intimate Ironies*, pp. 82-87, *passim*. 
and their children further their station in life, they were more than willing to pursue them.\textsuperscript{104}

A series of letters sent to Ernâni Amaral Peixoto, a senator from the opposition MDB during the 1970s, sheds light on how the economically disadvantaged tried to parlay patronage into access to university education, as well as revealing the material expectations and promises that came with a university education. Between 1971 and 1975, Peixoto received dozens of letters from his constituents, who sought federal scholarships for their children for primary, secondary, and university education. Usually, these pleas came from lower-middle class and working class families who could not afford their children’s education and who desperately sought aid so that they could complete their schooling and improve their social standing, particularly with regards to university education. The desperation in some of these letters was almost heart-breaking, as in the case of a widow who was trying to get her four children through school, or the small-business owner who was forced to choose between paying for his eldest son’s medical schooling or his youngest son’s epilepsy treatments.\textsuperscript{105} Many of these letters reveal people of modest means at the end of their rope, seeking aid from any political benefactor they could find in order to help their children benefit from the fruits of social mobility.

\textsuperscript{104} This is not to say that middle-class families did not also pursue these options, even if they did rhetorically condemn patronage. However, my own research did not find documents that adequately proved or disproved middle-class involvement in patronage networks during the dictatorship.

\textsuperscript{105} CPDOC, EAP 71.03.10, documents 9 and 20, respectively.
Political patronage and networking motivated many of these requests. One letter-writer, Eduardo Ribeiro, said that his son had not won one of the admission openings at a *faculdade* in Teresópolis, and asked his “old and dear friend” Peixoto if he could help Ribeiro’s son gain entrance through some “jeitinho.”\(^{106}\) Another woman asked Peixoto for a scholarship for her daughter to attend college in biological sciences, saying her father-in-law, a vice-president of the MDB, suggested she ask Peixoto for help.\(^{107}\) Other letters also mentioned having voted for Peixoto regularly or being affiliated with the MDB when asking for financial aid, be it for colleges or high schools.\(^{108}\) While Peixoto did not help many of these people, the fact that they had turned to him for patronage nonetheless demonstrated how the government’s promise to increase access to universities had fallen well short.

When facing trouble within the university system, Brazilians also did not hesitate to turn towards the military government itself. The Ministry of Education and Culture received hundreds of requests seeking financial aid, help in navigating mundane bureaucratic roadblocks, or even the validation of their schooling or degrees.\(^{109}\) The outcome of these requests is unknown; nevertheless

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\(^{106}\) CPDOC, EAP 71.03.10, document 10. The word *jeitinho* does not have a direct English translation. It generally implies the navigation of some political, social, or economic problem via one’s personal connections to navigate the complex legal or bureaucratic obstacles one confronts, generally by exploiting legal loopholes or taking advantage of a patron’s personal connections. For a simple definition and explanation of how the jeitinho generally works in practice, see Roberto da Matta, *O que faz o brasil, Brasil?*, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Rocco Ltda, 1984), pp. 99-101.

\(^{107}\) CPDOC, EAP 71.03.10, document 12.

\(^{108}\) For example, see CPDOC, EAP 71.03.10, documents 17, 25.

\(^{109}\) COREG, Coleção MEC, DEMEC M.5, Untitled documents
everyday Brazilians continued to seek aid from agents within the government to complete their university education.

Together, these appeals to Peixoto and to MEC itself reveal yet another contradiction within the military’s educational policy. By expanding the university system, more people hoped to gain access to the schools; yet “democratization” of education did not translate into greater affordability for the mass of the population. The public federal schools, the gem of the higher education system, were a shrinking proportion of the overall university educational system, and entrance typically depended upon attending a private high school and taking expensive courses to pass the entrance exams. The expansion of private universities did make it more possible for the poorer students to still attend university, but tuition at these schools cost much more than the federal schools, where students only had to pay fees. Thus, in spite of the government’s claims that education was more available to all Brazilians, the lower-middle and working classes found themselves facing greater economic obstacles than their wealthier counterparts, particularly as the economy worsened in the latter half of the 1970s. Turning towards politicians in positions of authority, therefore, was a reasonable step for the poor. For lower-class parents who aspired to send their children to university and witness the material gains that came from such an education, patronage had not died with the Brazilian empire or the Vargas administration,110 but was still alive and well in the late-20th century. The willingness to plead with politicians and the state bureaucracy so that their

110 See Wolfe, Working Men, Working Women, and Levine, Father of the Poor?, for analyses of patronage during the Estado Novo.
children could attend school indicated just how strongly the ties between social mobility and a university education had become during the years of the military regime.

**Conclusion**

With the *Reforma Universitária*, the military regime put rhetoric into action. For the next ten years, the military governments of Costa e Silva, Médici, and Geisel launched programs that reorganized, restructured, and redesigned the university system and its role in society. They hoped for campuses that were neither hotbeds of activism nor isolated ivory towers separated from national development. These policies envisioned a new Brazil in which university education was open to all and brought national renovation. Universities would provide new engineers, doctors, scientists, and architects, and their expansion into rural and poor areas would contribute to a “democratized” system that would create more white-collar professionals.\(^{111}\) Within this vision, both the the Brazilian nation and individual citizens would benefit: the former, through technological, scientific, and infrastructural improvements; the latter, through greater material expectations that came with white-collar professions. Thus, the state’s vision made universities the catalyst for both national and personal betterment. This emphasis gave that middle class a coherent social and political importance in governmental policy that it had never had before.

As is often the case, however, the theory of how these reforms would play out diverged from the realities. Military leaders expected these reforms to solve

Brazil’s educational and developmental problems, yet the expansion of universities left the schools inadequately staffed with unqualified professors, even while private education spiraled out of the government’s control. Likewise, the failure to include the faculty in the reforms led to professors growing increasingly intransigent as they faced growing burdens in the university system and decreasing material benefits in an inflationary economy. Similarly, expanding universities opened up educational and material expectations among the lower classes, even while the government’s claims for a social “democratization” were not accompanied by funding for the very groups it was encouraging to enroll. And the government’s push for certain professions in the sciences over the humanities and arts resulted in a saturated job market, leaving university graduates in fields like engineering and medicine with high material and professional expectations that went unsatisfied. As a result, criticisms that the government “not attended to the demands of the middle classes.”112 Programs like the PNPG, itself an acknowledgment of the shortcomings of 1968’s Reforma, tried to address these issues, but by the late 1970s, the scenario was looking increasingly bleak.

Additionally, other reforms were by their very nature repressive and stifling to students. Laws like 477 and the creation of jubilação directly tried to suppress students’ voices on campuses. Although UNE had been effectively neutralized, by the mid-1970s the government was once again monitoring student

groups on campuses, constantly fearing another 1968\textsuperscript{113} and reflecting the regime’s concern that, far from having been silenced or repressed, students were once again becoming a legitimate concern for the administration.

The government’s concern with the rising voice of student movements was not unwarranted. Even while student organizations went underground or were declared “extinct,” students continued to respond to and influence state policies. Indeed, official organizations could disappear, but so long as there were students, they would continue to voice their own concerns about Brazil’s universities. Throughout the 1970s, they challenged the regime’s new reforms, adopting components of the reform while criticising it for its failures in other regards. However, in the post-AI-5 context, UNE was no longer the best option to voice their complaints and demands. As the next chapter demonstrates, students would adjust to the post-1968 context by mobilizing in new ways and along issues both old and new.

Chapter Five: “There Isn’t a Process of Terror that Quiets the Voice of the Youth”¹: New Demands, and New Visions from Students, 1972-1979

From the standpoint of policy, university reform had only begun with 1968’s *Reforma Universitária*. From 1969 to 1979, members of the Brazilian state, from the lowest levels of the educational bureaucracy to presidents Médici and Geisel, continued to refine and redefine the role of the university system in Brazil. The state under military rule continued to propagate its own visions of both development and “appropriate” student behavior in Brazil, drawing on the experiences of the 1960s to bolster a university system that addressed Brazil’s economic development as the military governments envisioned it while trying to depoliticize students.

Yet students would not be silenced. Scholars have frequently commented on the “extinction” of UNE in the wake of 1968, as government crackdowns forced many students into hiding or exile and many more left the student movement to join guerrilla movements. In some regards, this narrative is accurate. As a national movement, UNE was in shambles by 1972, and many student leaders did abandon their studies and join guerrilla movements.² However, this narrative has overlooked the ways in which students continued to be active on a


smaller, more local scale as they adjusted to the new climate of political repression. Complaints about the university system did not disappear just because UNE temporarily faded away; nor did the absence of mass protests and mobilizations mean that students quit fighting for reforms in the university system. As the national student movements broke down in the wake of 1968, students continued to struggle for reforms within the educational system, as well as within Brazilian society more generally, directly (if anonymously) contesting the educational policies of Médici and Geisel.

In their efforts, students challenged the state over issues both tactical and strategic. In the former, they sought broader political and social transformations, while the latter focused on specific needs that students confronted on campuses, such as underequipped libraries or outdated curricula. These approaches both set the stage for the issues that UNE would incorporate as it re-constituted itself at the end of the 1970s, while also struggling with the military government over the role the university should play in Brazilian development and democracy.

Students did not simply employ these tactics and strategies in a vacuum. Their complaints and protests through the 1970s continued to respond to the military’s policies in a complex nexus of discursive struggle between students and the state under military rule. As had been the case in the 1960s both the military governments and students were aware of the others’ demands, actions, and rhetoric. Just as the Brazilian military continued to use the state to mold educational policy to visions of development and to prevent “another 1968,” students continued to challenge the state’s policies and the conditions at
individual universities, federal and private, throughout the country. In this regard, students were involved in a constant dialogue with state policies, adapting to and shaping the new political and educational landscape of the decade. As students in the 1970s expressed their concern over issues as diverse as torture, amnesty, campus restaurants, and high expulsion rates, they contested the state’s definitions of the universities’ roles and how democracy and economic development in Brazil functioned. Students’ efforts in turn impacted and reshaped the military’s visions, influencing policies as much as state policies affected students’ concerns. This process could and did include coercion, in the form of arrests, torture, and even deaths of students, but it could also include limited consent, as when students framed their arguments with reference to some of the military government’s new educational policies in the 1970s while reshaping them to their own expectations and interests. In acknowledging some of the government’s reforms and rejecting others, students engaged in a “dialectic of culture”3 with technocrats, politicians, and the state under military rule in the 1970s.4

Thus, student resistance did not disappear in the wake of AI-5 only to re-emerge with UNE at the end of the decade. It continued throughout the 1970s.

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3 E.P. Thompson, “Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle Without Class?” Social History 3:2 (1978): 133-165. William Roseberry was rightly critical of the simple polarization inherent in Thompson’s original “field of force,” which, as Roseberry put it, “is bipolar, and most of the social situations with which we are familiar are infinitely more complex.” In the case of Brazil, Roseberry’s critique is accurate; students were far too heterogeneous to completely oppose the state or its policies in the bipolar manner that Thompson suggested. However, the fact that various groups were struggling with the state over the cultural, social, and political role of universities, in a complex process that continued to influence and be influenced by state policy, makes Thompson’s understanding of a cultural dialectic germane. See William Roseberry, “Hegemony and the Language of Contention,” in Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), pp. 355-366.

Students throughout Brazil employed both old and new methods and organizations in their struggles. In the process, they moved from mobilization and resistance at the local level to develop regional and even national connections that allowed for unification and helped strengthen their case against the military regime and its educational policies. In so doing, students came to adjust their own understandings of democracy and development in Brazil in the post-1968 educational landscape. In the process, they set the agenda for a re-emerging national student movement and other sectors of society for the final six years of the dictatorship and beyond.

Resisting Repression on Campuses: Students, 477, and AI-5 in the 1970s

As the 1970s dawned, students tactically combated the repressive policies of the dictatorship in the universities and in Brazilian society more generally. In the wake of the authoritarian measures the military issued in the late-1960s and early-1970s, the question of repression in the universities was one of the most obvious issues that students confronted. If the Reforma Universitária had been slow in restructuring University departments, AI-5 was remarkably quick in transforming the political atmosphere on campuses around the country, giving the military an unprecedented amount of control over defining “subversive” activity and launching arrests, many of which occurred on university campuses “in order to assure the end of mass student protest.”

In many regards, Decreto-Lei 477, issued in February 1969, was even more odious to students than AI-5. Whereas the intent of AI-5 was to combat the

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kinds of broad social and political unrest that intensified in 1968, Decreto-Lei 477 specifically and solely targeted university campuses, outlawing any kind of “politicization” or “political” activity from students or faculty. Any students expelled under 477 were unable to enroll in universities for three years, and they were ineligible for publicly-funded scholarships for five years. Decreto-lei 477 was as vital as the Reforma Universitária in the government’s efforts to redefine the role of universities as places that existed strictly for students to learn what was needed to prepare them professionally. Indeed, the Decreto-Lei was so notorious that simply mentioning the three numbers consecutively became a codeword for repressive policies at universities; when the alternative newspaper O Pasquim reached edition 477, rather than just including the edition number in the banner, it read “This is number (ARGH!) 477 – There is no way to avoid it.”

Even as the military dictatorship declared UNE extinct in 1972, students were already beginning to publicly reconstitute their opposition to the military dictatorship, and 477 was one of the major sites of tactical mobilization. One of the earlier salvos came in an Opinião article surveying the landscape of higher education in Brazil in 1973. The author, Bernardo Mendonça, discussed the difficult situations students were facing in universities as 1973 began. He singled out 477 as a major source of universities’ woes, as it marked “the end of the prerogatives conceded to universities” by involving MEC in decisions relating to individual student bodies on campuses. Mendonça also decried the abuse of 477 in universities with humor, saying that it was being applied not only “to contain

political student activities, [but] against unusual crimes such as bad behavior in the classroom or fighting at recess.”\(^7\)

If Mendonça’s article pointed to general criticisms of 477, an incident at the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) that year offered a more concrete example. In March, UFMG’s rector, Marcello de Vasconcellos Coelho, proposed to the school’s DCE that the university hold a series of debates based on the theme “The Reforma Universitária and Its Introduction.” Vasconcellos initially felt such a forum on the subject would interest not just students and the university’s administration, but the “Minister of Education himself, who wishes to better know the thinking of students.” The DCE agreed to participate based on the condition that everybody present would be free to express their opinions. Even though the students acknowledged that total freedom of opinion would be impossible due to the existence of 477, they were willing to go along with Vasconcellos’ plan. Ultimately, that plan was put to the test after Vasconcellos had two pamphlets that had been published around campus taken down, prompting students to ask whether the debates would be a “serious discussion or parody? Open discussion or [one] restricted to the rectory and the directory of the DCE? An important discussion or the most mild and convenient?”\(^8\) Despite the veiled accusations from students outside of the DCE that Vasconcellos was trying to limit the conversation to the rectory and the DCE only, even the DCE was


\(^8\) APERJ, Coleção Periódicos Alternativos, “Universidade: que é o debate proposto?” Opinião No. 23 (9-16 April 1973).
critical of 477 and the effect it might have on the debate. These criticisms were well-founded given that Vasconcellos had already taken down the pamphlets and restricted the expression of opinions among students at UFMG before the debates could even begin.

In 1975, newspaper articles and pamphlets that circulated at the Second National Seminar of Engineering Students found their way into the police files. Among the articles was one pro-government statement that tried to simultaneously placate and ridicule students who disliked 477. The author declared that 477 “reflected much more the shift in students’ behavior than the magnanimity of the Minister [of Education]. But the simple existence of the decree startles students.” The article tried to defend the government by arguing that, in each case in which 477 had been applied, it was not “authorized by MEC.” Regardless of whether or not MEC had been involved with the expulsions, students would have certainly noticed that they took place. Another justificatory article took a more sarcastic tone, saying that, if the students made a new law to replace 477, it would guarantee the rights of students, professors, and staff “to paralyze school activities; to make an attempt against people or goods or against buildings and installations, damaging them at their pleasure,” and to “organiz[e] subversive movements,” among other things. Students inverted the pro-government article’s message, circulating it with “Would you be fooled?” handwritten at the top of the article in an effort to inform their colleagues of what the government’s supporters were saying about students and 477. The circulation of these articles at the Seminar offered students plenty of ammunition against 477.
when they returned to their own schools. Whether or not universities or MEC itself were misusing 477 had little bearing on the fact that 477 existed. Articles like these could and did inflame and embolden students who read the article while at the national conference. Additionally, the national professional conference provided students with an arena outside of UNE where they could interact and discuss their issues in a national setting; that it happened at an engineering conference was all the more ironic, given the status of engineering as apolitical and vital to development in the military’s rhetoric.

There was no doubt that students nationwide were increasingly compelled to speak out against 477. That same August, engineering students at the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF) published the first issue of a new student newspaper. The opening editorial criticized “the lack of freedom of expression and association in our school” and “administrative censorship” that 477 fostered. The engineering students were not alone. That June, the campus’s DCE published its platform for 1975, blaming 477 and AI-5 not just for “impeding the political participation of students,” but for preventing the participation of “the majority of the Brazilian people, in the defense of democratic prerogatives of all citizens.” For these reasons, UFF’s student leadership announced its support “for all the sectors that fight for the extinction of measures that restrict democracy in the country and in the university, such as AI-5 and

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10 See Chapter 4.
11 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Informação No. 109375, 19 August 1975.
Indeed, the DCE went so far as to stress that 477 and its effects were “not mere isolated problems of each university or faculty,” but directly tied to the military government’s entire economic and development model, “which cannot exist without discretionary instruments like AI-5 and Decreto-Lei 477.” And in 1976, students at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-RJ) viewed 477 as a means “to understand better that the Educational Policy of the Government and the repressive policies” that tried to “silence and contain students.”

In challenging Decreto-Lei 477, students simultaneously engaged in both strategic and tactical struggles. Students originally had no direct control over the military’s proclamation of 477 in February 1969 beyond the mobilization of the 1960s that framed the military’s general concern with student activism. Throughout the 1970s, students’ discursive struggles against 477 were temporal, responding to the military’s issuance and universities’ application of the law. In their complaints and protests, students were reacting to 477 and seeking its abolition, rather than proposing new reforms or issues. At the same time, 477’s sole focus on universities meant that the policy had a physical space to which it was directly connected. The law’s physical presence was felt on campuses

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13 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 42, Departamento Geral de Investigações Gerais, DPPS, DO, Seção de Buscas Especiais.

14 For de Certeau, methods of resistance can only be either temporal or spatial; that is, they can only be either tactics or strategies. However, this separation of space and time does not allow for the possibility of complex relations that embrace both temporal and spatial struggles, as the case of 477 demonstrates.
through absence: the physical absence of students expelled under its prosecution, as well as the absence of legal political activity and organization. Efforts to combat 477 had the potential to result in both abstract discursive openings and the opening of physical sites of resistance. Tactically, the struggle for the abolition of 477 would undo one of the regime’s more repressive measures against students, opening up broader discursive space for students; strategically, it would lead to more open campuses on which students could further mobilize against the government and its policies, educational and otherwise. Decree-Law 477 shows the ways in which students’ specific, proactive strategic struggles and broader discursive, reactive tactical struggles could blur together.

As the decade progressed, non-student sectors joined the struggle against 477. As the imperative for a new constitution gained momentum in the late-1970s, the oppositional MDB sought to appeal to students by placing the “Revocation of AI-5 and Decreto-Lei 477” alongside broader political demands like “human rights,” “direct elections,” “full amnesty,” “defense of national resources,” and taking a stance “against the decentralization of the Brazilian economy.” Of all these platforms, only one, the revocation of 477, targeted a specific social group, students, leading the military’s Division of Security and Information (DSI) to declare that the MDB had become a victim of “leftist” infiltration.15 Nor was this an isolated incident. In 1978, Senator Lázaro Barbosa of Goiás equated 477 and Decree-Law 228 to “tear-gas bombs,” and said that only a national constitutional

15 AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 612-5278, Ministério da Justiça, Documento Sigiloso No. 100475.
convention would free students from those laws. At a conference focusing on a new constitution in Espírito Santo, a manual defending constitutional change that circulated among the participants included a section dealing with Brazilian universities. Among the top priorities for a new constitution was the need to fight “against the laws, acts and exceptional decrees and among these, 228, 477 and Law 5.540 [Reforma Universitária], which hinder student organization and the liberty and the participation of the student, the professor, and the functionary.”

The MDB’s repudiation of 477 made political sense. In previous years, students had mobilized heavily in favor of the “voto nulo,” or “blank vote.” In these elections, the MDB was the obvious loser, as students who cast blank votes were far more likely to vote for MDB than the government’s party, ARENA, if forced to pick between the two. The MDB needed students to vote for its candidates and not cast blank votes if it was to challenge the dictatorship’s control of Congress. As a result, it was not unreasonable for the MDB to start targeting some of the issues that directly affected students in an attempt to win support among the population. Additionally, many in the MDB had grown tired of the dictatorship and the one-sided control the military government and the pro-military ARENA exercised in Brazilian politics. In this regard, they saw the Institutional Acts and Decree-Laws, including 477, as particularly burdensome institutions that were perpetuating the military regime. Although the MDB’s discussion of the end of 477 was only a small part of the broader debate for a new

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constitution, it marked the beginning of a broad political trend of looking towards the student movements for both platforms and support as the dictatorship neared its end.18

**Resisting Repression in National Politics: Students Push for Democracy in the 1970s**

In addition to 477 and AI-5, students adopted a broad set of democratic demands and tactical struggles. They used pamphlets, student newspapers, and, as the decade progressed, marches and protests to call for an end to torture and arbitrary arrests, an end to censorship, an amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles, and a return to direct elections and civilian governments. Students and other sectors increasingly pushed for these changes after 1974, when Ernesto Geisel’s election marked a return of the moderate military leaders and the policy of a “gradual, slow, and controlled” re-opening of Brazilian politics.

Basic human rights constituted one of the major discursive arenas in which students challenged the dictatorship. A series of high-profile deaths galvanized students to contest the repressive policies of the military government. In March 1973, a geology student at the University of São Paulo (USP), Alexandre Vanucci Leme, died after several intense torture sessions, prompting outrage among students and clergy in São Paulo, an outrage that only grew as the government issued conflicting and unbelievable explanations of Leme’s death.19

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18 See Chapter 6.
In October of that same year, police arrested Honestino Guimarães, the last official president of UNE until its reemergence in 1979; Guimarães was never seen again. Guimarães became another figure around whom students rallied, together with Leme and Edson Luis, as students pushed for amnesty and a return to democracy in the mid-1970s.\(^{20}\) And in October 1975, journalist Vladimir Herzog died while in police custody. As in the case of Leme, the military’s explanation that Herzog had also committed suicide (in this case, by allegedly hanging himself) rang hollow in the face of the military’s photographic evidence and eyewitness accounts of prisoners in the jail at the time of Herzog’s death.\(^{21}\)

These deaths, together with those of men like worker Manoel Fiel Filho in 1976\(^{22}\) and politician Rubens Paiva in 1971,\(^{23}\) stirred up protests not just from students, but from journalists, lawyers, and other members of Brazilian society who had begun fighting for an end to the dictatorship’s repression.

These figures remained central in students’ demands for democracy and an end to the dictatorship throughout the decade. In 1978, Radio Jornal do Brasil reported that one thousand Bahian students had gathered publicly and peacefully to “offer tribute to Edson Luiz and Alexandre Vanucchi [Leme],”\(^{24}\) one representing the student movement of 1968 and the other representing the

\(^{20}\) For more on Guimarães and his place in student memory in the 1970s, see Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” pp. 213-220.


students’ struggles against repression in the 1970s. As Victoria Langland has demonstrated, these types of connections played a major role in students’ use of memory to re-construct the student movement in the 1970s and 1980s and to create connections between two moments of student activism that had been broken up by repression and the turn to guerrilla movements.25 These meetings not only helped students to re-constitute the memory and history of UNE; figures like Leme also helped to put a face to the broader pattern of torture and imprisonment of many of their friends and families.

Demands for political amnesty were another major tactic students and others employed to contest the dictatorship in the 1970s. Calls for “full and unrestricted amnesty,” like the one found in UFMG’s Philosophy Department newspaper in 1977,26 were not uncommon, and students were increasingly involved in private and public meetings with groups such as the Brazilian Committee for Amnesty. They also formed their own commissions on campuses to discuss how to fight for and obtain a full amnesty.27 In doing so, students were reacting to military policies (in this case, the imprisonment and/or exile of “political prisoners”), yet these issues provided a means for students to proactively challenge the government. The absence of political prisoners and exiles on university campuses was manifest both in the arrest and/or


26 For UFMG, see AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 614-05280, Documento Sigiloso No. 100714, 26 September 1977. For other examples of students demanding amnesty on campuses, see AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 610-05276, “Jornal ‘DCE’,” UFF, 4 May 1977, and APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Caixa 53, Informação No. 02403-DARQ/DGIE, 21 August 1978.

disappearance of students like Honestino Guimarães, as well as the removal of professors deemed “subversive” in the wake of 1968. From 1977 onward, the struggle for amnesty grew and took on national dimensions, and as João Figueiredo “campaigned” for president in 1978, he made amnesty a campaign promise. Students played an active role in forcing the state’s hand.

Although these issues were often rhetorically disconnected from the universities, students in the 1970s were just as likely to strategically frame these struggles in the context of their own campus experiences as they were to appeal to the broader political situation. Students at UnB went on strike at the end of 1977 to protest the potential failing of 1500 students through the rector’s application of jubilação. However, they quickly reframed their protests in terms of democracy after police invaded the campus, and blamed the poor quality of education on budget increases for military spending that came at the cost of educational spending.

Students linked the military government’s repression to an authoritarian atmosphere on university campuses, where “everything is decided from above,” creating “the greatest paradise for mediocre professors” who were protected from student criticisms. As president Ernesto Geisel was leaving

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30 AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 616-05282, Documento Sigiloso No. 100840, 16 Nov. 1977.

31 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 43, DGIE-DPPS-DO-SB-Seção de Buscas Especiais – “Relatório”, 31 March 1976. Although the 1968 University Reform made professors more accountable for their professional performance, it did not provide room for sanctioned student voices or criticisms in the process.
office in 1979, a newspaper article in *O Tempo* commented that “fifteen years of repression of the university and the schools,” coupled with rapid expansion, had left the Brazilian educational system disorganized and professionals unable to find work in their fields.\(^{32}\)

Students had a vested interest in seeing an end to the use of torture and arbitrary arrest that affected their friends and families.\(^{33}\) They reframed broader repressive measures as laws that directly affected the quality of life and education within the universities. In this way, struggles for broader political goals like amnesty and an end to repression became explicitly tied to life on campuses. However, these struggles did not replace students’ educational demands in the 1970s, as some have argued.\(^{34}\) Rather, the fight for improvements in the universities would continue to occupy a central locus in students’ discourses and mobilizations in the mid-1970s and beyond.

**The Other Side of Mobilizations: Students and Educational Demands in the 1970s**

In criticizing the military government’s policies, students embraced a broad range of issues without ever focusing on one issue over the others. They

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33  Although Leme was one of the highest-profile student deaths of the 1970s, he was far from the only one. Dozens and perhaps hundreds of former and current students were disappeared in the guerrilla movement in Araguaia between 1970 and 1974, and students from other universities died in prisons after intense torture sessions as well. For Araguaia, see Gaspari, *A Ditadura Escancarada*, pp. 399-464, and Portela, *Guerra de Guerrilhas no Brasil*. For the deaths of other students, see Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” p. 208.

34  For the argument that students shifted their focus and abandoned educational demands after the 1960s, see Maria Aparecida de Aquino, “‘Nós que amávamos tanto a revolução’,” in *Memória do Movimento Estudantil*, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Museu da República, 2005): 31-39.
were equally critical of the government’s fiscal policies for education as they were of the educational policies and reforms that had begun with the Reforma Universitária. Students employed a variety of rhetorical tacks to challenge the government, ranging from disapproval of the overall spending on the university system to specific policies designed to help fund the broad expansion of schools, in addition to broader political struggles like anti-477 or amnesty movements.

Without question, one of the biggest issues that students raised in their struggle was “the question of increasing annual fees,” (anuidades) or “paid education” (ensino pago) as it came to be called. As seen in Chapter One, students first protested the imposition of annual fees in the late-1950s. Fees once again became an issue in 1967, when President Costa e Silva’s Ministry of Planning declared that universities could charge students an “annual quota.” This fee would “represent the total value of the expenses and installments of the investments of the schools”

However, only in the 1970s did the question of “paid education” really come to the forefront of students’ mobilizations as rates dramatically increased. At UFRJ, a pamphlet reported that while the “symbolic” fee of Cr$28 had
remained steady for the first five years after Costa e Silva’s declaration, it had increased from Cr$28 to Cr$435 between 1972 and 1976.38 At UFF, another student pamphlet expressed outrage over the fact that the annual fees there had gone up by 200 percent, “aggravated by the establishment of more than thirty fees, which range from 7.5 to 1200 cruzeiros.”39 Not only did the rates go up, but at UFRJ, for example, there was an increase in the “number of fees paid for the use of services (beyond the matriculation fee, growing each year),” including fees for “the payment of study packets, student ID card, putting one’s studies on hold, etc.”40 Students at UFRJ even called these rates “illegal” for going beyond the ceiling MEC had set for annual fees.41 These complaints could and did lead to the reduction of fees at some schools, and student organizations and groups pointed to these successes as the students’ first “important victory” since 1969.42

The increase in anuidades hit students at private universities even harder. Students at the Faculdade de Engenharia Industrial e Civil of Itatiba, in São Paulo, claimed that the Educational Credit system that the government had launched to help students attend university only “masked the high rates of fees” and did nothing to actually ameliorate the high cost of education for students.43 At a rally

39 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 41, Unnamed document, p. 320.
40 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Jornal da Química No. 1, June 1975.
42 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 41, Jornal da Engenharia, Ano IV, No. 9 (November 1975).
of over 300 people protesting the merger of the independent federal schools in Rio de Janeiro into UNIRIO in April 1979, “various speakers criticized the adoption of paid education” calling it a mechanism through which “the government imposes curricula without the students having a say.”

The issues of ensino pago and anuidades continued into the 1980s, when a newly-reborn national student movement, politicians, and others would pick up the cause.

Fees were not the only fiscal issue that caused outrage among students. Although some studies suggest that military spending on education increased after 1972, that did not stop students from arguing for more budgeting for education, especially higher education. In 1975, engineering students at UFRJ complained not only about the anuidades, but also lamented “the terrible conditions of education, due principally to the lack of funding that dominates not just UFRJ, but Brazilian Education in general.”

Meanwhile, in São Paulo, students and professors at USP took to the streets in 1978 to demand more funding, along with other political demands. These complaints were not limited to the major

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45 See Chapter 6.
47 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 41, Unnamed document, p. 320.
49 CPDOC, EG pr 1974.03.00, Roll 2, Photo 0099, and AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3410-08077, Ministério da Justiça, Documento Sigiloso No. 100368 – “Jornal ‘O Trabalho’”, 10 May 1978.
university centers in Rio and São Paulo, the traditional hotbeds of student activism. In 1976, students at the Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) and Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo (UFES) both pointed to data that showed that federal funding for education had dropped from 11 percent of the total federal budget in 1965 to 4.7 percent for 1976. According to these students, the government was shifting the costs of education from the state to the students themselves, leading to a decline in the quality of education in Brazil and in turn demonstrating broader failings on the part of the government in helping Brazil to develop, a refrain that politicians also began to echo as the decade progressed.

Students’ educational concerns went beyond fiscal matters. One of their biggest targets in the 1970s was the military government’s new program of *jubilação*. Initially established in 1972, *jubilação* was “the true technique intended to impede the permanency of the ‘professional student’,” who the military felt was responsible for much of the student activism of the 1960s. By the mid-1970s, students at individual campuses protested the broad use of *jubilação*, complaining that rectors were applying the rule far too liberally for

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50 Scholars have tended to focus on USP and universities in Rio de Janeiro in studying the “revival” of the student movement in the 1970s and 1980s. It is undeniable that USP, UFRJ, and UFF witnessed a disproportionate number of high-publicity mobilizations in the Brazilian university system. However, these two cities were not the only loci of major mobilizations, as the case of UFRRJ makes clear. Another area whose importance in student mobilizations remains understudies is the role of Universidade Federal da Bahia in the 1970s and 1980s. See, for example, CPDOC, EG pr 1974.03.00, Roll 1, Photo 989, 1009, 1077, 1274, *passim*.


53 COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU Caixa 12, M.8, Parecer No. 36/79, Processo 228.297/78, p. 3.
“political” purposes, and that the system facilitated extreme cases of university crackdowns. Students at UFF claimed that “more than 50 percent” of the student body had been held back due to jubilação, and blamed this rate on the “deficient character of education,” declaring that students who were expelled should not “shoulder the onus” of the burden for poor curricula and instruction. 

Later that year, UFF’s students readjusted that number to 20 percent, but that did not diminish their sense of alarm. In 1976, the rector of UFBA expelled 900 students under the policy of jubilação, prompting a strike of UFBA’s 14,000 students. The case garnered national attention among university student bodies.

Even Minister of Education and Culture Ney Braga took notice. A student newspaper at PUC-RJ pointed out that “General Ney Braga himself recognized the elevated rates [of jubilação] when he asked the rectory for a report justifying the high indices” in Bahia and organized meetings “with all of the rectors of public and private universities of the country.” These meetings addressed all student complaints, including jubilação.

54 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 74/75/DPPS/RJ/Interior, 22 August 1975 – “Falta de Vagas na Engenharia – UFE [sic].”

55 For the figure of 20 percent, see APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 41, Encaminhamento No. 165/75/DPPS/RJ/Interior, 23 October 1975 – “Cancelamento de Matrícula na UFF.” For the figure of 50 percent, see APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 74/75/DPPS/RJ/Interior, 22 August 1975 – “Falta de Vagas na Engenharia – UFE [sic].”

56 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 42, Quilombo dos Palmares Ano II, No. 3 (March 1976).


Braga’s meeting seemed to have little effect. When students at UnB went on strike in 1977 after 1500 of their colleagues had been failed under *jubilação*, the rector called for the military police to occupy the campus, claiming students’ demands were political and not educational. Countering the rector’s comment that “the students do not complain about academic questions,” students pointed to their opposition to the rector’s initiation of more than 1500 processes of *jubilação* to argue that their concerns were indeed “academic.”¹⁵⁹ Once again, MEC and the rectory of a particular university seemed at odds. Braga sent a “questionnaire” to UnB. The message “questioned the criteria adopted by UnB for the *jubilação* of students,” implying that the university had failed to follow the letter of the law.⁶⁰ Additionally, MEC requested specific data about the percentage of students *jubilados* who had not met their degree requirements, as well as asking for further data on the rates of failure or suspension at the school.⁶¹ MEC was also concerned that such a high number of *jubilações* could send the signal of expecting “perfectionism” from the students in their courses. Finally, MEC was dissatisfied with UnB’s practice of expelling students via *jubilação* and then allowing them to re-enter the program in the following year, as it undermined MEC’s efforts to offer more openings to students after 1968. Holding back so many students for


⁶⁰ COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU Caixa 12, M.8, “MEC quer que a UnB diga porque jubila os alunos.”

⁶¹ COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU Caixa 12, M.8, “MEC quer que a UnB diga porque jubila os alunos.”
another year would negatively impact the total number of openings available the following year.

The reentry of expelled students was doubly troubling to MEC. First, it seemed to counteract the purpose of jubilação, which was designed to prevent the existence of “professional” students who became leaders in the student movements. Not only was UnB giving students the chance to return to school; it allowed them to return with the credits they had earned previously. While allowing them their credits seemed to preclude the possibility of having “professional” students, MEC expressed concern that this practice rewarded students who had been punished in accordance with national educational standards.62 Secondly, MEC seemed concerned how UnB’s readmission of jubilados might be affecting the overall admission rates at UnB. The questionnaire MEC sent to the school also asked how UnB was treating the issues of jubilações and students admitted through the vestibular. Reportedly, the ministry was concerned that students who passed their entrance exams would be denied admittance because a student that had been expelled under the law would take their place. MEC juridical consultant Alvaro Alvares da Silva Campos sent a letter to the Minister of Education in 1979, asserting that “the experience of [the University of] Brasília really punishes the student who, while approved in all of the disciplines, does not reach an overall average above 3.2.” While Campos admitted that, “within the concept of university autonomy, within the professional capacity of the professor, it is true that the methods and criteria for evaluation of

62 COREG, Coleção MEC, DAU Caixa 12, M.8, “MEC quer que a UnB diga porque jubila os alunos.”
school productivity cannot be discussed,” he felt the problems ran deeper. The nationally-decreed system of jubilação on the one hand and the “internal parameters” of coursework, timeframes, and academic work established within individual universities on the other hand led to a “contradictory system.” The only solution, according to Campos, was for MEC to “exercise Federal Public Power in educational material” and rely on the “hierarchical resources that rest on constitutional principles” to give MEC, and not individual universities like UnB, the final say on how jubilação was to be applied. Once this was done, individual schools like UnB “cannot surpass certain parameters” that MEC established.63 Although the ruling seemed to favor the students’ concern over rectories’ abuses of jubilação, it was also clear that only the government could determine what those parameters were. The decision-making process would be top-down, and students’ voices were not welcomed.

Student antagonism to jubilação was not restricted to federal university students. The case of UFBA in 1976 had captured the attention and opposition of students at the private PUC-RJ.64 A year later, students at the Faculdade de Engenharia Industrial e Civil de Itatiba/SP (Industrial and Civil Engineering School of Itatiba, São Paulo) criticized jubilação for its inherent classism and, like their colleagues at UFF, condemned the system’s failure to deal with broader teaching deficiencies, saying that jubilação was just another mechanism to keep

63  COREC, Coleção MEC, DAU Caixa 12, M.8, Parecer No. 36/79, Processo 228.297/78, p. 5.

64  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 43, “Vai Chover Canivete – Jornal do Diretório Central dos Estudantes da PUC – Ano 1, No. 1, Maio de 1976.”
poor students out of universities and did nothing to address broader structural deficiencies in the university system. Of particular concern was the fact that many students were increasingly working days and taking classes at night, while the courses they needed were only offered during the day, making it difficult to finish in the timeframe jubilação mandated. With jubilação serving as a very real threat to students who could not finish courses on a timeline imposed from above, and with even MEC wavering on the application of the federal policy, students took advantage of the strategic value jubilação offered in challenging the dictatorship.

Nor was jubilação the only policy that offered these types of strategies to challenge the military governments in the 1970s. The Reforma Universitária itself became a major target of student ire in the 1970s. Within a few years of its publication, students began questioning the Reforma Universitária in general and specific terms” and was critical of its implementation. In the play, the characters of “Fundão” (the newest campus for UFRJ, on the Ilha do Governador), “D. Historia da Silva Xavier,” and a new student discussed the opening of the new campus in 1972, which “Fundão” itself, representing the voice of the government’s policy, admitted was merely


66 For example, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Apolinário Rebelo, p. 3
“ceremonial,” declaring that there was much infrastructural work still to be done. In an interesting shift in tone, when Fundão explained that the acceleration of the university system began in 1968 as a response to the March of 100,000, the student confessed that “I don’t know what happened in previous years […] and what do I have to do with this? What interests me is that the hospital [where medical students studied] is opened and that the department improves.”

This exchange is particularly revealing into how students in the early 1970s perceived both 1968 and the expansion of universities. The fact that the student (in a play written by a student, for other students) was inattentive to and unconcerned about 1968, spoke to a shift among some students in the 1970s as they became more concerned with their education. Students were divided. Some had yet to incorporate an understanding of 1968 as a major turning point in student mobilizations. Others enshrined that year in historical memory, as Victoria Langland argues. After all, the author equated 1968 to the year of the March of 100,000, the largest mobilization of students and others under the dictatorship until the 1980s. At the same time, the student author of the play suggested that the students’ mobilizations of 1968 had led the government to remedy the university system’s problems. What emerged was a contradictory understanding of students’ historical role in society, as students acknowledged the events of 1968, even while they felt disconnected from that year, concerned less with past activism than with their own educational experiences. The efforts to

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connect individual experiences on campuses to broader processes of
democratization and development still remained tenuous in the early 1970s.

Nonetheless, an understanding of educational reform’s connection to
national politics was beginning to take hold on campuses. At UFRJ, a student
newspaper listed twenty items on the agenda for discussion at a meeting of the
Council of Representatives from the Engineering School, including the desire to
hold seminars discussing the *Reforma* itself the new post-*Reforma* curricula.69
Similarly, students in the Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Filosofia at UFF
suggested discussing the *Reforma* in small groups, particularly as it regarded the
“specific problematic of the school.” In particular, the students at UFF were
concerned that the rates of anuidades would go up each time the minimum salary
in Brazil was changed. The article rhetorically asked, “until when will we
passively accept the escalation of paid education?” a paid education that the
students tied directly to the *Reforma Universitária*.70 Meanwhile, these students’
colleagues in UFF’s engineering department criticized the *Reforma* and the
military’s educational policy since the 1960s more generally. They lambasted the
military’s economic policies and claimed the educational landscape was
completely disconnected from Brazil’s economic realities. They also suggested
that the military’s professorial purges and efforts to strip campuses of any
political activity rendered universities little more than “a prop for its [the

69 APERJ, Coleção Jean Marc von der Weid, Dossie 6, Jornal do Conselho de
Representantes da Escola de Engenharia da UFRJ (No. 1, Ano 1).

70 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 44, Encaminhamento No.
dictatorship’s] own maintenance.”

By voicing these complaints, students were able to challenge to the government, using the physical sites of universities as a vehicle for broader undermining of the military’s authority.

Even private schools that lay outside of the Reforma’s jurisdiction were critical of the government’s policy. At PUC-RJ, students complained that theirs was the “first university in Brazil to apply the Reforma Universitária,” and second only to UFRJ’s engineering and architecture school in terms of graduate theses defended. Until 1972, the article went on, PUC had “sought to apply the Reforma Universitária” by hiring more professors and directing its program towards teaching and research, in an effort “to respond to the governmental policy.” Yet by 1973, this program “revealed itself to be impractical, and […] PUC entered into great crisis,” asking for a four million dollar loan from abroad just to be able to pay its faculty. Students raised numerous criticisms of the Reforma Universitária, ranging from the failure to provide improvements to the consequences of implementing the Reforma in their own schools to challenge the dictatorship’s educational policies and its consequences.

By the early 1970s, it became clear that the Reforma Universitária had only temporarily addressed the issues of excedentes and vagas. In 1975, students again noted that there were not enough openings nationwide for the number of matriculating students. A pamphlet passed around at the Second National

71 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 49, 23 June 1975.

72 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 42, Quilombo dos Palmares, Ano II, No. 3 (March 1976).
Seminar of Engineering Students pointed out that, across the 848 universities, faculdades, and private schools in Brazil, there were only 940,000 openings for over one million students, leading to a deficit of “160,000 vagas in relation to the demand – nearly three times the capacity of the University of São Paulo, the country’s largest” university 73 and exceeding the number of students enrolled in all universities and colleges in 1964. 74 Some students pointed to the termination of the Astronomy and Architecture programs at UFF for overcrowding; the military police placed the blame elsewhere, declaring that “the greater problem is created by repeating students.” The police report cited an administrative report from within UFF that indicated a failure rate of 80 percent out of a group of 120 students; the number of students repeating the courses was thereby responsible for insufficient vagas for the next incoming class. 75 Psychology students in Belo Horizonte satirically reported on the new “novelties” students could expect in 1977: “the number of lines increased and the number of vagas decreased!!!” The results, the pamphlet went on, were that “many students cannot matriculate in obligatory disciplines, [and] a greater number did not pass classes outside of their program.” 76 Newer students were finding it harder to enroll in courses where

73 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, “As queixas contra o ensino,” Encaminhamento No. 73/75/DPPS/INT/RJ, 22 August 1975. To understand the rapid expansion of higher education in Brazil after 1968, it is worth recalling that student enrollment in all universities in 1964 was about 120,000.

74 Estimates put the 1964 enrollment at about 120,000-140,000 for the entire country. See Chapters 1-3, above.

75 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 74/75/DPPS/RJ/Interior, 22 August 1975.

76 AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 614-05280, Documento Sigiloso No. 100714, 26 September 1976.
older students were being “held back,” leading to a bottleneck effect that further
clogged the university system and left fewer openings available to incoming
university students.

Students also complained that rapid expansion led to the hiring of under-
qualified professors. The Association of Graduate Students at PUC-RJ reported
that higher education had increased by 131 percent from 1969 to 1973 by hiring
67,904 professors. Of them, “61 percent only have a Bachelors’ degree, and 22
percent of these only have technical courses, only eight percent have a Master’s
degree and nine percent a doctoral degree.”77 Although private universities lay
outside of the regulations of the Reforma Universitária, these schools still felt the
effects of the Reforma’s incomplete implementation. Due to expenses and federal
spending, the military government could not expand the federal university system
fast enough; consequently, private universities increasingly saw their schools fill
up with the students who could not be accommodated in public universities. This
in turn led to rapid growth and overcrowding in the private universities. As
overcrowding spilled into the private universities, they joined their colleagues in
the federal universities in complaining about the Reforma.

Students felt that the government, in its rush to expand the university
system, had left the faculty at federal universities woefully unprepared and
unqualified. Echoing the ideology of the 1960s, the DCE at UFMG declared that
the University today, instrumentalized to serve the dominant sectors in accord
with this phase of capitalist development, reduces higher education to fragmented,

77 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 51, 27 June
1975.
super-specialized, and non-integrating professionalization. The transmission of broad scientific knowledge and learning has been completely abandoned in favor of alienated professional training that serves the interest of business.  

Students also criticized private businesses for their failure to invest in the development of technology on campuses, accusing business elites and the government of viewing the universities only as vehicles for the “formation of cheap and technical labor with the capacity to use and adapt imported technologies.”

Students throughout Brazil lamented the complete absence of sufficient faculty, something that was in part a legacy of AI-5, which had suspended “subversive” professors. At the Second National Seminar of Engineering Students in 1975, an article that circulated at the conference condemned the “failings in the curricula, the low level of professors and students, elevated fees, deficient installations and, principally, the lack of an opportunity to participate more in the solutions of the problems of the school.” Students at UFF, UFRJ, and UFPE echoed similar sentiments, going so far as to call higher education “a public calamity.” Students not only decried the quality of education in

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79 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 43, DGIE-DPPS-DO-SB-Seção de Buscas Especiais – “Relatório.”.


81 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 73/75/DPPS/INT/RJ (22 August 1975).

universities; they used the universities to chastise the government for its failings both in improving the federal universities and for its failings in helping Brazil achieve a more general “progress.”

Students also felt that the military government’s state-led efforts to increase the number of white-collar professionals to accelerate national development was having a negative effect on their education. Their training had become too narrow for them to understand their broader place in Brazilian society as university-trained professionals. Where Aliomar Baleeiro accused students of viewing degrees as commodities in the 1960s, in the 1970s students turned the rhetoric around, saying the emphasis on technical know-how commodified and devalued university degrees to serve the narrow-minded and self-serving goals of the Brazilian state.83 One student newspaper article condemned the government for “dangerously pushing students for the exclusive search for a diploma at whatever cost.”84 A pamphlet found on UFRJ’s campus commented that, “as the number of graduates increased at an accelerated rhythm, the value of the graduation diploma fell.”85 An article in Opinião declared that the commodification of degrees expanded “the market of those who have a high

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84 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 73/75/DPPS/INT/RJ (22 August 1975).
school diploma [who] were eager to consume higher education.”86 Students at a Faculdade in São Paulo published an article bluntly titled “Faculdade or Diploma Factory?” in the student newspaper.87 At PUC-RJ, students produced a pamphlet featuring the stories of four fictional students who, “although created by us, are not imaginary people. Any similarity between them and hundreds of students at PUC/RJ, in 1975, is not a mere coincidence.” The case of “Jorge,” a banker from a poor family in the outskirts of Rio, highlighted the issue of commodification. Jorge was anxious about the value of his college education for professional mobility and economic security his family. Using Jorge’s made-up narrative, the students criticized the quality of education, with professors who saw students as “empty boxes in which they deposit all of the knowledge they should acquire” for students to regurgitate on exams. They also condemned “the preoccupation with tests and exams and the need to work.” These activities “impede[d] Jorge from participating in other activities. He only learns the techniques of work, without a general vision, without a perspective.” As a result, Jorge would become obsessed with good grades, all so he might obtain a better job.88

These examples revealed the ways students used the government’s rapid expansion and reform of the university system to undermine the effectiveness of the state under military rule. Students decried narrow professionalization that led to a degree stripped of any of their broader philosophical or social concerns, such


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as the student’s role in the University and in society, issues that would be increasingly common towards the end of the decade. What was worse, this emphasis on college degrees for professionalization led to an increasingly glutted job market as the 1970s went on. When the press commented that “today we produce medical doctors who are unable to find work as doctors, journalists who cannot be journalists, professors who do not learn,” it was simply echoing a growing frustration among many students that rapid university expansion had left university graduates under-educated and the job-market over-saturated.

Students also vociferously complained about the “physically deficient conditions” of campuses that were “inadequate” compared to the number of students entering the university system. In 1975, medical students who had come from around the country to attend the National Medical Students’ Meeting drafted a resolution that complained that universities in Brazil “did not have even the minimum number of books required for courses,” suffered from an “absence of laboratories” and “didactic books for free consultation,” and demanded “improvements in the material conditions of education.” Once again, an area that the military had praised for its apolitical nature and its importance in national development had begun turning on the regime, much as engineering students had. Although the government had focused on improving medical schools, medical

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90 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Informação No. 1093/75, 19 August 1975.

students were increasingly dissatisfied with their education, and used the regime’s failures to mobilize. At these national meetings, students from schools from throughout Brazil were able to meet and learn that these deficiencies were not isolated to certain campuses, but were a major issue confronting “Brazilian education in general.”92

Another point of contention for students in the 1970s was one of the most basic items possible: food. Complaints about the prices and quality of food at university restaurants were nothing new, dating back at least to the early dictatorship period.93 In April 1969, thousands of students at UFRJ gathered to protest the rising prices of food at the university’s restaurant in clear defiance of AI-5 and 477.94 Complaints continued to surface throughout the 1970s. One student writing for the student newspaper in UFRJ’s engineering school was memorably sarcastic in dealing with the question of food quality on campus. The student composed a mock interview with a fundâonista (a student at UFRJ’s new Fundão campus) who commented that he “received two invitations from abroad, one from North Vietnam and the other from South Vietnam, and they both said the same thing: ‘We would very much like to have you on the front lines for us.

92  APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Encaminhamento No. 049, 23 June 1975.
93  See, for example, APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 30/31, Informação No. 271/DPPS/RJ – Serviço de Cadastro e documentação (SCD) – 23 September 1968, and CPDOC, CMa pi Fraga, A. 64.03.04, p. 7.
94  See Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” pp. 152-153 for this specific case. Langland excels in chronicling the complexities involved in bringing an end to large student mobilizations in the wake of AI-5. As she demonstrates, the declaration of AI-5 did not lead to a sudden end to mass mobilizations; rather, such mobilizations continued throughout 1969 and early 1970 as both students and the military government adapted to a post-AI-5 context. Langland, “Speaking of Flowers,” Chapter 3.
After eating at the *bandejão* (university restaurant) for more than a year and not dying, you will be invincible on the battlefront." 95 Another pamphlet found on UFRJ’s campus called the food service on campus “one of the most explosive points of complaints,” due in no small part to “the constant worsening of the quality of the food” even as prices increased from Cr$0.05 to Cr$5.00 between 1967 and 1975. 96 Students at UFRJ also pointed to similar fights against the quality and price of food at both PUC-RJ and the Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto (UFOP) in Minas Gerais. Students at UFF were even more emphatic, insisting that the need for cheaper subsidized food was as essential to forming a “democratic university” as the rights to free education and assembly were. 97 And at PUC-RJ, the student newspaper commented on leaflets “that spoke about ‘the absurd increases in the University Restaurant’.” Lacking alternatives to the expensive campus restaurant, where lunch cost Cr$8.50, many poorer students, like “Jorge” at PUC-RJ, could not afford to eat between classes. While the fight for better quality food may seem inconsequential compared to the struggles against 477 and AI-5, or the fight for better quality education in Brazil, it was clear that the campus restaurants played an important role in student activism in the 1970s. Student willingness to make it a central part of their demands for a “democratic university” reveals that students’ quotidian experiences on campuses


97 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Informação No. 1316/D.Arq/DGIE, 10 June 1975.
played just as important a role in contesting the policies of the dictatorship as did broader political struggles for democracy.

**Reinventing Development and Democracy in the 1970s**

In 1975, Minister of Education Ney Braga commented in a letter that “the basic objective [of universities] is the promotion of the student by means of preparing him for the full and useful exercise of citizenship in the democratic society in which we live.”

Braga’s praise of the “democratic society” in Brazil was nothing new; the military had insisted that its project was “democratic” since the 1960s, defining “democracy” as the fight against “subversion” and “communism.” However, students saw things differently, and began to redefine their vision of democracy through the lens of university education in the 1970s. In all of their struggles, students challenged the dictatorship’s hegemony in defining democracy and development in Brazil. They formulated their own visions of democracy and development that were connected both to improved quality of education and broader political freedoms.

Decreto-Lei 477 and AI-5 made for easy targets. Students directly tied the repressive nature of 477 to the military’s overall repression and the lack of democracy in Brazil. They pushed for greater freedom of speech and an end to censorship, and hoped that the overturning of the regime’s decree-laws would decentralize the university administration and give students and faculty more

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98 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Informação No. 2452/75-B, 6 September 1975.

autonomy. Likewise, they gathered to commemorate the deaths of citizens killed under the military’s supervision, with the deaths of Alexandre Leme Vanucchi and Vladimir Herzog bringing thousands of students to the streets. Students simultaneously incorporated both specific educational and broader political demands, as when students in São Paulo took to the streets in 1977 to demand “more funding for Education, full Amnesty, [and] against the regime.” These demands mirrored the generalized political opposition increasingly raised in the 1970s.

However, students were just as likely to frame democracy through more specific educational demands, such as the desire to have students more actively participate in the decision-making processes of the universities, a demand they had been making since the 1960s. With greater participation, they could help bring an end to the top-down “authoritarianism” in universities. Additionally, they called for social leveling by opening admission to student applicants from

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101 See Serbin, Secret Dialogues, Chapter 10, and Gaspari, A Ditadura Escancarada, pp. 159-188.


104 For evidence on this in the pre-dictatorship period, see Chapter 1; for the 1970s, see APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Caixa 53, Informação No. 446/78-B13.

all social classes, particularly the “popular classes.” Only by extending free higher education to all would Brazil achieve “the creation of a just and democratic society.” Students also critiqued the rising income gap between rich and poor in the wake of the “economic miracle,” thereby introducing a sense of social justice into their definition of democracy that was absent in state officials’ rhetoric.  

This theme of social justice also dominated students’ discussions of development. Students accused the government of holding Brazilian development back by failing to understand the university’s role “as an efficient instrument for the country’s economic and more socially just development.” Discontent with the growing stratification of Brazilian society and the increasing difficulties the poor had in obtaining free public education, student groups called for “an end to the privatization and elitization of education” and the opening of higher education and culture for all socio-economic classes. Students insisted that “true development” would only happen in Brazil when all groups and social classes could participate “in solving socio-economic and political problems.”

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110 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 40, Relatório Especial de Informações No. 4/75 – VII ECEM, 28 July 1975.
at UFRJ perhaps put it most succinctly in their definition of a university: “the university is not a ‘social position,’ but a contract with society.”Campuses, as sites for development and social justice, demanded inclusion of other socio-economic groups.

This vision had its paradoxes. On the one hand, students insisted that the universities become more open to all socio-economic classes. On the other hand, a lack of openings in universities and the commodification of degrees were a constant flashpoint for protest against the dictatorship’s policies. Student publications never dealt with these two conflicting positions simultaneously, nor did they offer any specifics on exactly how universities were to be more inclusive and not overcrowded. Even as students were mobilizing throughout the 1970s over educational issues, there was no unified “student voice” with a cohesive message or vision for Brazilian development, and internal differences could and did emerge.

Students at different universities increasingly worked together as the 1970s progressed. At meetings like the engineering students’ and medical students’ national meetings, students exchanged experiences and ideas, leading to the development of collaborative pamphlets and agendas. Networking could be professionally or regionally based, as in 1976, when students from twenty-five departments in Rio de Janeiro’s four largest universities (UFF, UFRJ, PUC-RJ, and the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro [UERJ]), gathered at UFF to protest the repressive measures of the dictatorship, including the firing of two

professors at UFF and UFRJ.\textsuperscript{112} At these gatherings, students were better able to coordinate their tactics and strategies of resistance and articulate the issues they were facing in the university system and with respect to national political agendas. As UNE began its official (albeit still-illegal) return in the late 1970s, it would adopt many of these platforms. Clearly, student mobilization and activism continued throughout the 1970s and debates continued about the role of universities and higher education in democracy and development in Brazil. As a result, students offered alternate discursive visions about education and politics than those offered by the state. The national movement may have faded away in the wake of AI-5 and the shift towards guerrilla movements, but students at individual campuses and departments continued to press for what they considered meaningful university reform.

\textit{Conclusion}

The 1970s in Brazil were in many ways a transitional period. The country went from the “economic miracle” and intense repression of the early-1970s to increasing inflation, debt, and uncertainty at the end of the decade, even as the government gradually “opened up.” When examining state-society relations, the traditional narrative has focused on repression and resistance, emphasizing on the one hand the state’s increased use of torture after 1968 and, on the other, the virtual extinction of UNE, the rise of urban and rural guerrilla movements, and the increasingly broad opposition to the use of torture in Brazil. These narratives obscure the complexities of state-society relations in authoritarian Brazil. The

\textsuperscript{112} APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 42, DGIE/DPPS/DO, Seção de Buscas Especiais.
debate over university education and reform in the 1970s points to broader avenues that may help scholars reconsider the Brazilian dictatorship and state-society relations in modern Brazil more generally.

In spite of the atmosphere of heightened repression and the near-disappearance of UNE, students’ activism continued in the wake of AI-5. Although UNE was indeed virtually extinct by 1972 as its leaders fled the country, went underground, or joined guerrilla movements, new forms of student mobilization arose to take their place. These protests started small, were usually concentrated in individual universities or departments throughout Brazil, and focused on the particular issues confronting students on individual campuses. Yet as the 1970s progressed, these students increasingly came into contact with one another, be it through regional meetings in states like Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo, or through professional meetings like the national engineering or medical students’ conferences. In these meetings, they found students elsewhere were facing the same issues. Additionally, many of the students who led the activism of the 1970s were in the very fields that the military had promoted not only for their scientific production but for their apolitical nature. When the military could not fulfill its promises, they too became major actors in challenging the military’s policies in ways that had not taken place in the 1960s. As a result of these new forms of mobilization, students were able to establish the regional and national

113  APERJ, Coleção Jean Marc von der Weid, Dossie 6, “Transcrição dos debates sobre o Estado, sociedade, democracia, e universidade,” “Exposição sobre as tendências da democracia contemporânea,” and “Conferencia para o SBPC sobre o desenvolvimento científico-acadêmico.”
networks and consolidate the issues they faced, laying the groundwork for UNE’s eventual return at the end of the decade.

This discursive mobilization among students in the 1970s, which enabled them to reconstitute their struggle and their organizations, marks an important and understudied period of student-state relations during the dictatorship. Even more significant, students used their specific educational demands to develop their own vision of the role of universities in Brazil and what constituted democracy and development in Brazil. In forming their visions, they used the same policies and practices that the government used to come to very different conclusions. Where the government saw democracy in the reduction of subversion on campuses and students’ abilities to attend “apolitical” universities, students living and studying in these conditions saw democracy as something that allowed students to meet and discuss whatever they wanted freely. They viewed education as a source of technical knowledge, and as a platform to champion issues of social justice. By condemning the commodification of their degrees, the poor quality of education, and the restrictions facing them as they entered the job market, they articulated their own notion of Brazilian development, one that relied not only on economic and professional advancement, but also on critical analysis and a broader understanding of each profession’s role in society. Where the government wanted acquiescent white-collar workers who helped push Brazil “pra frente,” students wanted conscientious white-collar workers. Where the government defined democracy as students fulfilling their professional roles for Brazil, students defined it as greater social mobility for the lower classes and the
opportunity for graduates to use their degrees and professions to make Brazil a more equal and just society.

Students had been mobilizing around educational issues since the beginning of the decade, even as more radical student leaders who had been connected to UNE joined guerrilla groups, went underground, or were exiled. These efforts would grow and ultimately play a part in the national return to democracy in the 1980s. Beginning at the local level of the individual campus, students focused on repression via 477 and AI-5, poor university facilities, inadequate curricula, and awful food. However, as the decade progressed, students collaborated first at the regional and increasingly at the national level, with national seminars and professional meetings taking the place of the old UNE congresses. At the same time, as they redefined their struggles in response to the educational and political context of the 1970s, students implicitly adopted some of the government’s policies. In acknowledging some of the government’s reforms and rejecting others, students and the military governments engaged in a “dialectic of culture” that shaped educational policy and debates over national development and focused on issues outside of torture and repression.

At the end of Geisel’s administration in 1979, the political, economic, and social landscape of Brazil was radically different than it had been seven or even five years earlier. Geisel declared an end to AI-5, and a few months into his term, Figueiredo announced a full amnesty that not only allowed many exiles back into the country, but conveniently left torturers and other military leaders immune to prosecution or punishment. As the 1980s dawned, workers, professors, bankers,
politicians, and numerous other groups that had remained relatively quiet during the dictatorship suddenly began pushing for reforms and challenging the dictatorship as Brazil moved towards a return to democracy. The university system would continue to be a major center for dialogue, contestation, and collaboration between the students, the state, and civil sectors as the dictatorship entered its twilight.

When João Figueiredo took office in March 1979, he faced a radically different political and economic context than his predecessor, Ernesto Geisel, had confronted in 1974. Efforts to control the process of abertura, or the political opening of military rule, led to increasing criticisms from an impatient society. The economic “miracle” of 1968-1973 was clearly over. The second oil crisis ravaged Brazilian industry and transportation. More importantly, inflation had begun to spiral out of control, reducing the value of salaries and the purchasing power of Brazilians. Already in 1979, millions of workers in São Paulo had successfully gone on strike and negotiated directly with factory owners to improve their salary conditions, in turn bypassing the official state-controlled labor organizations in place since the Vargas years. Although the paulista metalworkers were the most visible group protesting against the worsening economy, doctors, engineers, architects, professors, teachers, bankers, and students also protested the worsening conditions and top-down democratization. As a result, Figueiredo spent much of his administration contending with workers, students, and opposition politicians on the one hand and intransigent military hardliners on the other. Not surprisingly, Figueiredo did not make university education his top priority in ways that his predecessors had.

The process of abertura gave various social movements new opportunities to mobilize after a decade of repression. In 1979, UNE finally began to reconstitute itself after more than ten years of persecution. Although it remained
an illegal organization, the Figueiredo administration’s approach to the student union was “more a boycott than repression,” as one student put it.¹ The scholarship on UNE’s internal operations as it returned is exhaustive, yet overly simplified, focusing only on the activists who led the reinvigorated UNE and providing triumphalist narratives that imply unity and inevitability.² My research shows that UNE’s return was bumpy, as it dealt with numerous internal struggles and external challenges. Even while UNE gradually returned, students drew on the lessons of the 1970s, employing successful alternatives to mobilization that did not depend on UNE. While student unity was far from a political reality, students from diverse ideologies continued to use the universities to discursively challenge the Figueiredo government.

Additionally, for the first time since the 1964 coup, students were not the only ones affiliated with university campuses who were directly and broadly challenging the military regime. For all the attention that emerging social groups receive in their role during the dictatorship's final phase, mobilization by white-collar workers is strangely underrepresented.³ Yet worsening economic

¹ Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Aldo Rebelo, p. 12.
² For example, see Luis Henrique Romagnoli and Tânia Gonçalves, A volta da UNE: de Ibiúna a Salvador, (São Paulo: Editora Alfa-Omega Ltda., 1979); Flamarion Maués and Zilah Wendel Abramo, organizers, Pela democracia, contra o arbítrio: A oposição democrática do golpe de 1964 à campanha de Diretas Já, (São Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2006); and Araujo, Memórias Estudantis. In general, these narratives fall into two categories, either treating students as a homogeneous group forming a small part of broader mobilizations for democracy, most notably the Diretas Já! (“Direct Elections Now!”) campaign, or else involved with insular struggles pertaining to UNE’s return. While neither of these narratives is wrong, they overlook the nuanced matrix of struggles that students in the 1980s faced, failing to explore or analyze the complexities within the student movements or their relations to other sectors of society and the ways in which their quotidian demands formed part of the broader democratization processes in the 1980s.
conditions began to directly affect the material lives of ex-students who had entered into the professional world. As the *distensão* and *abertura* continued, politicians, lawyers, journalists, doctors, workers, and others increasingly challenged the dictatorship’s power, drawing on the worsening economic conditions and blaming shortcomings in the military’s fiscal and educational policies for their woes. White-collar professionals drew on the worsening economic context to challenge a military dictatorship that had consistently told them a university education would be the key to improving Brazilians’ lives and national development.

Opposition politicians were not blind to the opportunities these political activists both old and new could provide. They saw the opportunity to finally gain control of the government for the first time in over twenty years and began to appeal to university education and material expectations to gain support among students and disenchanted white-collar professionals. Even more moderate politicians took advantage of the new political climate to appeal to students, proclaiming the vitality and importance of the university system that Figueiredo seemed to be marginalizing. As a result, even while the regime tried to reduce its emphasis on universities and control the process of democratization, new actors affiliated with the university system rose up, joining students and guiding the regime to its end.

Redirecting Attention, Reducing Responsibility: Figueiredo and the University System

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3 Alfred Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil*. This collection of essays looks at studies into the participation of workers’ unions, community-based organizations, and the Catholic Church in the democratizing process, yet not one essay focuses on university students.
When General João Baptista Figueiredo, the former head of the National Information Service (SNI) under Médici and vice-president under Geisel, took office in March 1979, economic troubles were already on the horizon. While Brazil’s GDP had continued to grow under Geisel, so had its foreign debt, which was already at $43.5 billion US dollars in 1979. Perhaps worse for many Brazilians, growing inflation had returned after the years of the economic “miracle.” By the end of 1979, inflation was at 77 percent, and by 1980, it hit 110 percent, the highest it had ever been in Brazil, surpassing the inflation rates that had helped to bring down the Goulart administration in 1964. Simultaneously, the second global petroleum crisis hit Brazil particularly hard, as it was importing 85.7 percent of its petroleum at a time when oil had jumped nearly seventeen US dollars in just one year.4 As a result, the Figueiredo administration was left scrambling to address the growing economic crisis on multiple fronts as it came into office.

Figueiredo announced new economic and social measures designed to prevent the economy from spiraling out of control and provide greater opportunities to the poor in Brazil. In the social arena, he emphasized the need to aid poor and rural workers; Figueiredo must have also known that improving the income for the poorer sectors of society could only help the Brazilian economy by providing new consumers, although he did not argue this point explicitly. In his

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efforts to reduce inequalities, Figueiredo unsurprisingly turned towards education. However, unlike his predecessors, university education would not be the vehicle for development. Where the previous four presidents of the federal government focused on university education and let states and municipalities worry more about primary and secondary education, the Figueiredo administration gave new rhetorical and financial aid to primary and secondary education. He condemned the gap between the high quality and organization of universities and public schools. The inequalities between higher education and primary education were indeed stark. Although 1.5 million Brazilians were enrolled in college in 1980, they were still a minority in a country where 80 percent of the population did not finish elementary school. Figueiredo’s Third National Development Plan (III PND) announced that the government’s focus would fall on “basic education and cultural promotion.” In discussing the problems “afflicting” Brazil, he declared children’s education to be “in first place” and deserving “special attention.”

When the Figueiredo administration published the III PND in 1979, university education was all but absent. Médici’s I PND had emphasized the importance of the alliance between universities, industries, and research institutions, while Geisel’s II PND stressed the central role of universities, and especially graduate programs, in helping Brazilian development. By contrast,

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8 Figueiredo, Discursos, Vol. IV, Tomo I, p. 46.
Figueiredo’s III Plano instead saw Brazilian “progress” as hinging on primary and secondary education. This emphasis marked a broader shift in Figueiredo’s vision of how development was to proceed in Brazil. Figueiredo placed social equality at the center of his rhetoric and his goals, and made clear through his Plano that his government would extend primary and secondary education in rural areas, especially in the Amazonian basin and the Northeast, as well as in the favelas that surrounded urban centers like Rio and São Paulo. It was his administration’s hope that this extension would lead to “the reduction of social inequalities” by aiding “the population with the lowest income.”

Universities, which had been the vehicle for development under previous plans and administrations, now saw their role restricted to one that would “strengthen and amplify the realm of scientific knowledge” via post-graduate programs and research, but little else. As the III PND made clear, Figueiredo’s government held that Brazil needed to seek “a structure of development compatible with better income distribution.” There was little room for universities within this particular vision of development.

This was not empty rhetoric. Throughout 1982, Figueiredo used radio and television in each individual state, pledging money for primary and secondary education. He transferred 2.4 billion cruzeiros to Bahia for pre-school,

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9 For Médici, see *I Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento*, pp. 58-59. For Geisel, see *II Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento*, pp. 73 and 99.

10 III PND, 48.

11 III PND, 71.

12 III PND, 12.
elementary, and high school education, while Piauí saw 1.8 billion cruzeiros pledged for primary and secondary education.\textsuperscript{13} Even smaller states like Acre received 70 million cruzeiros for secondary education alone. Additionally, this funding was directed solely towards states in the North and Northeast, where evasion rates and illiteracy were at their highest.

This is not to say that universities were left completely out in the cold when it came to federal funding or rhetoric; far from it. Figueiredo expressed concern over universities becoming “factories of frustrated professionals” who were unable to find jobs.\textsuperscript{14} Certainly, higher education in some states continued to receive the greatest amount of funding. In Ceará, he pledged one billion cruzeiros for primary education and 345 million for secondary, but he still pledged two billion cruzeiros (or roughly US$10 million) to the Federal University of Ceará.\textsuperscript{15} Still, it was clear that elementary education would receive unprecedented attention from the federal government at the expense of higher education. In 1980 alone, the National Fund for Educational Development, a branch of MEC, spent nearly 1.8 billion cruzeiros on primary education projects and only 284 million cruzeiros on higher education. Even then, the primary education spending was only 62\% of what the government budgeted for projects for elementary schools that year.\textsuperscript{16} Making matters worse for the universities, the government’s education

\textsuperscript{13} See Figueiredo, \textit{Discursos}, Vol. IV, Tomo I, pp. 46, 80, and 164, respectively.


spending on education overall had already dropped precipitously, from 11.7% of
the federal budget in 1967 to 4.28% of the budget in 1980, according to one
report.\(^{17}\) The outlook was bleaker for universities than it had been in years. The
worsening economy only guaranteed that greater cuts to educational spending
would take place. Figueiredo himself admitted as much, blaming the downturn for
the government’s need to redirect funds away from education, health, and
housing.\(^{18}\) He was not even apologetic about it, proclaiming that education “[is]
not, nor should [it] be, the responsibility of the government alone.”\(^{19}\)

Figueiredo continued to pay lip service to the importance of universities in
terms of training professionals and improving development. Yet he rarely backed
up his rhetoric with concentrated political efforts to address the challenges facing
universities. For the first time since the 1950s, the Brazilian executive was not
placing universities at the center of its educational vision of national development.
Students would not only use this shift to continue their push for university
improvements; the new political context allowed for UNE’s return for the first
time in eleven years, giving student politics a new dynamic as the 1980s dawned.

**Educational Issues and Re-Union: Student Demands and the Return of UN**

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16 COREG, Coleção MEC, FNDE M.6, Ministério da Educação e Cultura, Fundo Nacional

scholars point to Brazil having one of the lowest percentages of government educational spending
as well. The percentage of spending did not improve under the Figueiredo regime; in the mid-
1980s, education still received only 4.8% of the federal budget. See Coes, *Macroeconomic Crises,
Policies, and Growth in Brazil, 1964-90*, p. 211 (fn. 2). Even though Brazil’s budget had actually
increased during the dictatorship, education was seeing diminishing investment from the federal
government.


Many of the demands that students had adopted in the 1960s or 1970s continued into the 1980s. Yet the repressive atmosphere of the 1970s had transformed the ways in which students mobilized. The virtual extinction of UNE, the departure of many of the most radical leaders for armed guerrilla movements or exile, the increased presence of police on campuses, and the threat of the regime’s new widespread use of torture during Brazil’s “economic miracle” forced students to find new ways to voice their complaints. Even though Geisel abruptly ended AI-5 in 1979, UNE did not immediately return as the major voice in student politics. Rather, UNE’s leadership found itself in a unique position; in order to reconstitute itself, it had to simultaneously appeal to its activist past while incorporating the more quotidian demands that students had made via alternate means of mobilization in the 1970s.

UNE’s path to reconstitution was anything but smooth, as it faced internal struggles between leadership groups, the presence of many students who actively participated but who continued to operate at the margins of partisan political struggles, and external pressures from the military. The push to bring UNE back began in 1976, when students held the first National Students’ Meeting (Encontro Nacional dos Estudantes, ENE). As Geisel isolated the hardliners in the military and made clear that he intended to continue his push to the eventual democratization of political society, students began to test the limits of their abilities to organize. While the regime tried to prevent these ENEs, they were

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20 See Chapter 5, above.
21 For example, see CPDOC, EG pr 1974.03.00, Rolls I and II.
unable to do so, and students began to discuss the return of UNE. Figueiredo’s
general amnesty in 1979 allowed many activists to return to Brazil and many
others to come out from hiding.22 That year, students met and revived UNE,
electing Rui César Costa Silva as their first president since the disappeared
Honestino Guimarães. Although the regime continued to insist that UNE was
illegal, it did little to directly stop these meetings, turning solely to surveillance
instead of direct repression.

Even so, roadblocks and setbacks marked UNE’s return. In 1980, the
military regime tore down the former UNE headquarters in Rio de Janeiro.
Despite having been set on fire on April 1, 1964, the building remained standing,
vacated for many years. Eventually, the government gave the building to the
-growing Federal University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UniRio); however, the
building’s continued presence also provided an important symbol to students, one
which they quickly adopted.23 Students decided they would re-take the building in
April 1980, commemorating the date when they had been expelled from it sixteen
years earlier. In response, military police suddenly occupied the building,
evacuated UniRio students attending class, and declared the building
“condemned.” In spite of widespread opposition from students, professors,

22 The amnesty was quite controversial; rather than simply amnestying political prisoners,
workers, or exiles, Figueiredo provided a general amnesty that also pardoned those in the military
regime who were involved in torturing prisoners. The amnesty stirred deep feelings of ambiguity
and anger that continue to this day, as Brazil remains one of the few Latin American dictatorships
that has failed to hold responsible those military members who ordered or committed torture or
disappearances. For the way the amnesty affected workers (an often-overlooked subject) and how
the 1979 general amnsety fit within Brazil’s broader legacy of amnesties, see Ann M. Schneider,

architects, and others, the military police tore down the remnants of the building
in order to strip the site of its symbolic importance. Victoria Langland
convincingly argues that the move actually strengthened the student movement,
giving it a major cause as it was reforming and providing it with “a huge wave of
positive publicity and popular support.” However, the demolition also left
students without a site for the organization until Leonel Brizola, João Goulart’s
brother-in-law and the recently-elected governor of Rio de Janeiro state, gave the
students a site in the city of Rio in 1983.

The administration’s opposition to UNE became more persistent in 1981-
1982. That year, the organization elected twenty-five-year-old Francisco Javier
Alfaya as its president. Alfaya’s family had moved from Spain to Brazil when he
was just seven, and he was a naturalized citizen. However, the military regime
immediately took steps to persecute him, threatening him with deportation for
being a “foreigner” engaging in political activities. Police files outlining Alfaya’s
political activism spread across multiple security agencies. As a result, Alfaya’s
mobility was limited, and other leaders within UNE suddenly found themselves

25 Find out when they were able to re-occupy 132 Praia do Flamengo later.
26 For example, see AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3575-00045, Unidade 35, “Francisco Javier
Alfaya;” AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3575-00045, Unidade 34, “Descumprimento das Leis,” 24
March 1982; APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Caixa 69-B, “Informe No. 1271/82-
SI/01/II/SR/DPF/RJ;” APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Caixa 69-B, “Governo do Estado
da Bahia, Secretaria da Segurança Pública, Gabinete do Secretário, S.I. – Serviço de Informações
– Informação No. 0010/82-SSI/SSP/BA – Xla Reunião do Conselho Nacional de entidades
Gerais – CONEG-UNE;” APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Caixa 75, SPE-DGIE-Pedido
de Busca No. 0804 DI/DGIE – “Francisco Javier Alfaya,” 20 May 1982. For Alfaya’s account, see
thrust into leadership roles they had not expected to assume. While UNE persevered and even used Alfaya’s persecution to further unify much in the way it had during the 1980 battle over its building, it also made for a turbulent year in which UNE effectively lacked a strong leader to lead the organization.

In order to overcome these obstacles and regain its status as a “national” movement, UNE’s leadership had to find ways to incorporate a broad swath of student support. In spite of the popular successes of rallying against the demolition of the UNE headquarters in Rio de Janeiro and, to a lesser extent, the Alfaya presidency, building support was slow. Radicals’ efforts to appeal to students along partisan lines were not successful; given UNE’s absence and the crackdown on leftist political parties, an increasing number of students identified themselves as “independents,” free from particular political groups. Nor did such a position isolate individuals from leadership positions; ex-UNE president Aldo Rebelo recalled the presence of several independents on the UNE directorate and estimated that 90% of all UNE members were “independents.”

Given this new context, appealing to partisan politics or abstract ideologies would not be enough to get radicals elected or to meet their agendas, a fact the newly reconstituted UNE leadership quickly learned. A 1979 secret police

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27 Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Clara Araújo, pp. 6-7. Araújo would be elected president of UNE in 1982-83, becoming the organization’s first woman president; to this date, there have only been two other woman presidents since Araujo’s term.

28 See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Cara Araújo, p. 7

29 For example, Renildo Calheiros, who eventually represented the PCdoB as the president of UNE from 1984 to 1986, ran for UNE as an independent. See Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Renildo Calheiros, pp. 3-4.

report commented that “not even 30% of Brazilian university students” voted for the main candidates for UNE’s presidency;\textsuperscript{31} whether or not the 30% figure was accurate, the report indicated that university students were participating, even if not voting for the main candidates. Students proved this point more dramatically in 1981, when UNE’s leadership, headed by members of the left-wing Revolutionary Movement 8 of October (MR-8), decided that the time was right for a national strike. They held meetings throughout the country in order to present the argument for a strike and to let all students vote on the issue in an attempt to democratize the process. On campuses and in auditoriums throughout the country, thousands of students packed auditoriums to participate in the discussion and cast their votes. UNE’s president at the time, Aldo Rebelo, recalled the event well:

A comrade from MR-8 arrived and said: “The university assembly was a success, a major success, with eleven thousand students. It demonstrates the great mobilization of the students, their combativeness, their ability to fight.” And I said, “but what was the result of the assembly?” And he said, “Well, they voted against the strike.” \textsuperscript{32}

Students were clearly willing to mobilize, but the majority were not interested in supporting radical agendas. UNE would have to modify its program if it was going to gain long-term support from students.


\textsuperscript{32} For the anecdote, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Aldo Rebelo, p. 12. See also Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Amâncio Paulino de Carvalho, p. 20.
UNE found its answer in the educational demands that students were making throughout the country, regardless of ideological or political affiliation. Indeed, UNE’s revival depended in no small part in co-opting demands that students had been making since the 1970s. These demands accelerated in the 1980s as Figueiredo’s administration reduced funding for and emphasis on higher education. Issues like funds, fees, and infrastructure appealed to a broader number of students than did more radical stances, once again making the quality and cost of education important issues to connect UNE’s leadership and its masses.

Foremost among these demands was the ongoing issue of university fees. Students at the Federal Universities of Viçosa, Santa Catarina, and Ceará, as well as at Catholic universities in Bahia, Pernambuco, and Minas Gerais had all gone on strike in 1980 over increasing fees. Students at the Faculdade de Medicina de Barbacena also went on strike, outraged at the 68% increase in fees they had to pay, while students at PUC-RJ protested the monthly payments reaching a 63% increase, with over 1500 of the school’s 7000 students gathering at a meeting, something that had never occurred in the 1970s. In Campos, students from multiple faculdades and universities joined with a newly-reconstituted UEE/RJ to complain that their monthly fees had gone up by 100% in 1980, and that many of

34 Jornal do Brasil, 19 March 1980.
their colleagues were “quitting their studies, being unable to pay the absurd increases to which we are being submitted.”

Even schools that were not striking were outraged over rising fees as the new academic year began in March 1980. In spite of Minister of Education Eduardo Portella’s insistence that he would not allow increases to supersede 38%, “a majority of the universities in Rio are covering fees registered up to 50%.”

How were these contradictory figures possible? Students at the private Universidade Gama Filho in Rio de Janeiro insisted that their fees had gone up by 50%, while the rectory insisted it was only 33%. Both the rectory and the students were right; the students based their calculations on what they had paid in the previous academic year, while the rectory was making its calculation about the fees it could have charged in 1979 but did not. Thus, Portella’s insistence that the fees never rise by more than 38% was based upon mathematical gymnastics.

The high number of student mobilizations against fees led UNE to hold its Third National Seminar, where fees topped the agenda on student demands. UNE President Rui César defended the Seminar, saying it was necessary “for us to form unified actions for students throughout the country in order to prevent the increase in annuities.” In its plan of action for 1982, UNE even insisted on “not allowing

any increase in annuities beyond 25%.”

UNE also adopted the issue of university restaurants, incorporating students’ complaints about the increase in the price of food even as fees went up and funding for universities dropped. In spite of secret police reports’ best efforts to insist that leftist leaders in UNE had “almost completely abandoned educational struggles to dedicate themselves to political-ideological proselytization,” the opposite was taking place; leftists were once again incorporating long-standing quotidian demands into their platforms in order to gain broader support for UNE and its leaders.

Old issues also gained a new urgency in the context of the Figueiredo administration. Funding was at the top of this list. Students had lamented the decline in education’s total percentage of federal spending for years, and Figueiredo in no way hid the fact that he was reducing spending on education even further in the face of Brazil’s economic crisis. Students responded by increasing the intensity of their own demands. For example, in 1980, nearly 120,000 students in the city of Rio de Janeiro and another 10,000 from the interior part of the state, composing 90% of the student body in the entire state of Rio de Janeiro, went on a 24-hour strike to demand that 12% of the federal budget be

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spent on education.\textsuperscript{43} Students marched by Figueiredo’s dais during an Independence Day parade and unfurled a banner that read “Down with the dictatorship, funding for education!”\textsuperscript{44} showing the ways in which students continued to equate educational issues to the broader repressive context of military rule. Funding was so central to student demands that another student later felt it was important to emphasize that students did not “agitate only over funding,” a confession that reveals how dominant the issue had been in students’ struggles in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{45} Once again, in what was an effort to gain support among a wide number of students, UNE quickly adopted the 12% demand into its own platform.\textsuperscript{46} In 1981, UNE attempted to go straight to the new Minister of Education and Culture, Gen. Rubem Carlos Ludwig,\textsuperscript{47} in Brasília, to deliver a list of immediate demands from the students, including the twelve percent figure, while also calling for subsidies for private universities that the government did not control and a cap on fees.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{43} In addition to the demands for verbas, they also demanded that anuidades not increase more than 35% per year. \textit{Jornal do Brasil} 11 September 1980.

\textsuperscript{44} Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Apolinário Rebelo, pp. 12-13.

\textsuperscript{45} Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Apolinário Rebelo, p. 15.


\textsuperscript{47} Portella had stepped down in 1980, and Figueiredo appointed Ludwig as his second of what would ultimately be three Ministers of Education.

Students also expressed increasing discontent with the quality of education they were receiving, something the government itself acknowledged was a problem. Students debated these issues at the XXXII Congress of UNE in Piricicaba, São Paulo, in October, 1980. It seems unlikely that this was some disingenuous move on UNE’s part; as students themselves, the leaders and the constituents they represented had plenty to lose or gain depending on the funding higher education received. However, given the large number of moderates and “independents” that UNE’s leadership had to confront and its failure in mobilizing students around ideas like general strikes, adopting funding as a major platform also provided UNE’s leadership with practical political benefits.

Not all demands were carryovers from the 1970s. New issues arose in response to the military’s rhetoric and appropriated official terminology in order to give students’ demands legitimacy. Perhaps the best example of this is their use of “security” in their struggles. In 1981, students from nearly every federal university in Brazil gathered to discuss the issue of “security on the university campuses.” In another rally in defense of Alfaya, students declared that the naturalized Brazilian president of UNE was not a threat; rather the real threat to

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51 For example, see Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Aldo Rebelo, pp. 10, 12.

52 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 74, SSP-RJ-DGIE-DPPS-Divisão de Operações, Resenha Diária No. 083, 12 May, 1981.
“national security” was Brazil’s “monstrous foreign debt.” When military police were sent to the campus of the Rural Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRRJ) to ensure classes continued during a strike, students again turned the rhetoric of the state on its head, putting up a banner sarcastically thanking the police who had arrived “to protect us from the Rectory.” Rather than viewing the police’s arrival as another violation of campus autonomy, students co-opted the military’s own language of security to criticize both the police’s presence and the rector’s authoritarian practices. Students flipped the rhetoric of “security” that the military itself had used since the establishment of the National Security Law in order to critique the very regime designed to “secure” Brazil. And where the regime and its allies once characterized “real” students as those who only wanted to study, students also co-opted this rhetoric in the early 1980s, when they protested against annual fees by saying “We want to study, we don’t want to pay.”

At the same time, students also exploited the military’s expansion of the university to their own ends. Where past governments wanted more universities and more students to further national development, more and larger campuses

53 In a curious stream of logic, students also cited Ronald Reagan as a threat to national security, saying the American president “attacks a nation that has resolved to defend its sovereignty, as he [Reagan] has done with the Malvinas Islands in Argentina.” See APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 75, Pedido de Busca No. 0804 DI/DGIE – “Francisco Javier Alfaya,” 20 May 1982.

54 “Policia garante as aulas na Rural mas a greve continua,” Jornal do Brasil, 28 June 1980.

55 For origins of the National Security Law, see Shawn C. Smallman, Fear and Memory in the Brazilian Military, 1889-1954.

gave students more spaces where they could gather to discuss their issues and made government regulation and spying more challenging. As one student leader recalled, the regime’s emphasis on the need for centralized campuses and dormitories on new campuses provided students with a site “maintained by government funding,” yet providing students “another center for articulating” their demands.57

Radical demands were not the binding fabric of student movements in the early 1980s. Certainly, UNE’s leadership continued to affiliate with more radical politics and ideologies; various leadership factions that contended for power continued to align themselves with the PCdoB, MR-8, and AP. Yet the majority of students only mobilized over more quotidian demands. Indeed, a student strike at the Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro (Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro, UFRRJ) reveals the ways in which a small personal tragedy could turn into a major movement that revealed deep-seated discontent among students and laid bare the divisions in and weaknesses of the state under military rule.

**From an Inconspicuous Accident to a National Cause: The 1980 UFRRJ Strike**

In September 1979, George Ricardo Abdala, a student at the Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro, died when a speeding car struck the motorbike he was riding near UFRRJ’s campus. While tragic, Abdala’s death was not particularly notable in any political sense, marking yet another traffic fatality. Nonetheless, Abdala’s death sparked what some considered “the gravest impasse” to face Figueiredo’s government and Minister of Education and Culture

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57 Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Aldo Rebelo, p. 5.
Eduardo Portella during his brief tenure (1979-1981), offering a major test of the policy of abertura, demonstrating the importance of education in student demands and the new alternative ways students could and did mobilize outside of UNE’s structure.

Students at UFRRJ were “stunned by the violence of the loss of a colleague,” and held an assembly “to discuss internal problems,” including safer roads and “other improvements.” In their efforts, the students won the aid of professor Walter Motta Ferreira, who helped them schedule times and arrange locations for small meetings to discuss their relatively modest demands. These activities carried on until November, when Rector Arthur Orlando Lopes da Costa fired Mota for “irregular behavior” without initiating a formal inquiry by which Mota could defend himself. Indignant at Lopes’s arbitrary move, professors at UFRRJ voiced their solidarity with Mota and expressed their protest by turning in late their final grades. The authoritarian Lopes in turn launched a police inquiry into eighty-three professors for “crime against Public Administration” and bringing the Federal Police onto UFRRJ’s campus. Students went on strike, though it petered out quickly as they entered their three-month summer holiday.
When school began again in March 1980, however, the students at UFRRJ had not forgotten Abdala’s death or Mota’s firing. On March 19th, the students again went on strike, demanding Mota’s reinstatement and an end to the police inquiry into the eighty-three professors, and insisting they would not end the strike until their demands were met. The students’ movement at UFRRJ was far from radical. Unlike protests in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, and elsewhere, there were no calls for an end to the dictatorship. Indeed, far from expressing any antagonism towards the government, the students at UFRRJ actively sought MEC’s aid. Early in the strike, they went to Brasilia, hoping to meet with Portella and to ask him to work “together with the rector, in hopes of reestablishing a dialogue with the professors and students.”

However, their demands did not stop there. While Abdala’s death and Mota’s firing had set off the strike, the students were “already discontented” with the university over issues like the “level of teaching, inadequate curricula, [and] lack of material conditions on campus,” while other reports stated the strike derived from the students’ dissatisfaction with the lack of medical assistance at UFRRJ. Even the unsympathetic security apparatus report commented on the broader demands students raised, declaring Abdala’s death a “pretext” for

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students who were “aiming for general improvements, which ranged from roads
to teaching, fees, refreshment, jubilação, professorial salaries, etc.”

The students’ demands for infrastructural improvements were not unique,
and they were not without justification. UFRRJ had not been included in any
broad infrastructural planning at MEC for the entire 1975-1979 period, as the
nation-wide programs for development and improvements in the federal
universities excluded “isolated schools, the Rural Universities, and universities
with fewer than 2000 students.” The government did not schedule any specific
infrastructural improvements for UFRRJ in 1980, even while funding projects at
federal universities in Goiás, Maranhão, Rio de Janeiro, Piauí, Rio Grande do Sul,
Minas Gerais, and elsewhere. Even in 1981, MEC would only budget just over
1000 cruzeiros for “equipment, material, and furniture.” In this context,
students’ complaints about the lack of infrastructural improvements seemed more
than just.

For its part, the government was at least somewhat sympathetic to the
students’ complaints, particularly as they related to Mota’s firing. Media reports
declared that Portella had been against the rector’s actions “from the beginning,”

64 AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Resenha – Universidade Federal Rural
do Rio de Janeiro,” p. 1, no date.

65 COREG, Coleção MEC, SEPLAN/MEC Caixa 198, Encadernado 9, Ministério da
Educação e Cultura, Secretária de Ensino Superior, Coordenadora de Desenvolvimento das
Instalações do Ensino Superior – Execução Físico-Financeiro do Projeto Prioritário “Construção

66 COREG, Coleção MEC, SEPLAN/MEC, Caixa 132, Encadernado 2, “Síntese da

67 COREG, Coleção MEC, SEPLAN/MEC Caixa 159, M.1, “Realizações do MEC no 1º
and that the Minister himself indirectly chastised Lopes by declaring that “a university should have the autonomy to resolve internal questions without having to turn to external agencies” like the Federal Police.\(^{68}\) Backing up his stance, Portella had a legal consultant look into the matter, and determined that “the rector’s strange affirmations are in conflict with the Federal Constitution and the Administrative Laws of the Country.”\(^{69}\) Additionally, the consultant found that Mota’s firing was “unconstitutional” and “illegal,” and that he should at the minimum be restored to his position while an official inquiry was established to investigate the rector’s claims against him.\(^{70}\) Portella signed off on the findings, and the secretary of Higher Education sent the report to Lopes’s office on April 15\(^{th}\).

However, Portella did not go as far as some would have liked. Ultimately, while he could issue statements and try to pressure Lopes, Portella insisted that “MEC does not have the power to intervene in the crisis,” and that only the CFE could do so through an administrative inquiry.\(^{71}\) Some in the press were upset by this position, feeling that this was Portella’s chance to prove that Figueiredo and his administration were serious about the process of abertura. When Portella sent his April 15 message to Lopes, Lopes shut down the university for twelve days,

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immediately “ordered all of the food already prepared for the day thrown into the
garbage,” and forbade the restaurant from allowing the students to make their own
lunch.\textsuperscript{72} In the face of this open defiance, one newspaper pondered, “does the
decision of the minister hold worth or not?”\textsuperscript{73} While Portella supported the
process of \textit{abertura}, newspapers declared that his failure to take a strong stance
against Lopes and the “minority that still hopes for a return of the authoritarian
university” had put the policy of abertura “in check.” The strike at UFRRJ that
had begun with a student’s death in an auto accident had suddenly become a
referendum on whether or not the Figueiredo administration would be able to
control the \textit{abertura} in the face of an “authoritarianism that in recent times has
castrated many of our universities.”\textsuperscript{74}

While national media outlets saw the students’ strike at UFRRJ as nothing
less than a test of \textit{abertura}, there is no evidence that students themselves saw their
struggles as anything more than a peaceful effort to restore a professor they felt
had been wrongly fired for trying to help them address perfectly legitimate
complaints in the wake of the death of a colleague. As MEC became more
involved in trying to mediate between the rectory and the striking students, of all
the points and issues they raised during their strike, Mota’s firing and the inquiry
into the 83 professors continued to be the sticking point. Neither the rector nor the
students would back down on this issue. Only in June, after twenty days of

\textsuperscript{72} AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Portella: manda ou sai,” \textit{Última Hora}
25 April 1980.

\textsuperscript{73} AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Portella: manda ou sai,” \textit{Última Hora}
25 April 1980.

\textsuperscript{74} AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 40-4076, Unidade 137, “Rural x MEC,” \textit{Jornal dos Sports}, 1
May 1980.
negotiations that MEC moderated, did Lopes finally agree to rehire Mota. However, the students rejected this concession, insisting they would only end the strike when the professor returned to teaching. Upon this rejection, MEC withdrew as moderator, and the students lost “the support that they had received from the federal government since the beginning of the movement.”

Lopes and his supporters in the University’s Council tried to reframe the question as a matter of the students violating the law. The rector defended his launching of an inquiry into the eighty-three professors, saying their actions constituted a crime because they worked for a federal university, and thus under the auspices of the federal government. Even while journalists declared Lopes’s actions were putting the policy of abertura at risk, Lopes saw himself as serving on the front lines in defending political opening. He insisted that “in order to guarantee abertura, the first condition is to respect the Laws.” One of his assessors also took this viewpoint, insisting that the return of Mota and the end of the inquiry into the other eighty-three professors was “practically impossible,” as the rector and his supporters “only want to follow the law.” Lopes also tried to re-paint the picture of his relationship with MEC, insisting it was “the best possible” and that they were in “perfect harmony,” even while Portella was

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declaring his dissatisfaction with the way Lopes was acting “to resolve the crisis.”

Although high-ranking members of the federal government seemed to be against Lopes’s actions, some sections of the security apparatus sided with the rector. A report in the files of the DSI insisted that not only was Abdala’s death a mere “pretext,” but that the professors were affiliates of the “extreme left” seeking to “undo the government’s action.” According to the anonymous report-writer, the professors were the ones to blame for “putting at risk the graduation of 163 students, holiday courses, and even matriculations,” and their postponement of turning in grades left the rectory with no choice but to act against the professors. The report’s author even put a positive spin on the rector’s closing of the university for twelve days at the end of May, saying that Lopes did so only to prevent the students from exceeding the number of absences allowed before students were suspended, as outlined in law 5.540/68, the University Reform.

The strike at UFRRJ continued successfully even as strikes in São Paulo and elsewhere were short-lived. As the strike entered its fourth month, professors also adopted some of the issues students had raised in the previous months. They “pointed to the dissatisfaction of the student body over the administration of the

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university, which is well-respected throughout the world,”\textsuperscript{82} as a major cause of the strike. They reminded the public that the administration always alleges the lack of resources to purchase school materials, seeds, animals, animal feed, and to reactivate the Model Farm, for example – while the Rector and Vice-Rector abandon the official residences within UFRRJ’s campus to live in Rio de Janeiro. They go and return every day from Rio in separate official cars. […] Who is paying for the gasoline?”\textsuperscript{83} Even while students had scaled back on the general complaints of issues touching upon funding, infrastructure, and administrative abuse at UFRRJ, professors adopted many of the same issues, criticizing both the regime’s failure in providing adequate infrastructure or competent administrators in the university system.

Nor were professors alone. Parents took a very active role in the strike, understanding their children’s future and social mobility to be at stake. In June, a group of parents made an attempt “to contact the MEC commission…to establish a form of action that could bring an end to the strike.” Parents who were not originally invited to participate were offended until they were formally invited, suggesting that some parents actively sought to confront MEC over the issue.\textsuperscript{84} After a judge granted habeas corpus and ordered the police to UFRRJ’s campus to protect students who wanted to attend class, both students and parents complained about the police presence on the autonomous university campus.\textsuperscript{85} And when

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{82} “Alunos da Rural apela a Figueiredo,”\textit{Jornal do Brasil}, 24 June 1980.
  \item \textsuperscript{83} “Alunos da rural apela a Figueiredo,”\textit{Jornal do Brasil}, 24 June 1980.
  \item \textsuperscript{84} “MEC medeia na crise da Rural,”\textit{Jornal do Brasil}, 20 May 1980.
  \item \textsuperscript{85} And when
\end{itemize}
students finally decided to end the strike on July 4th, they and the professors “applauded” parents for playing “a very important role, making gestures towards the different levels of government to which they had access.”

The 1980 UFRRJ strike had been one of the longest-lasting student strikes up to that time in during the sixteen years of military rule. Although a small campus, the students at UFRRJ captured the nation’s attention; regular reports appeared in newspapers and in national magazines like *Veja*. While strikes in São Paulo and Minas Gerais petered out, the students at UFRRJ continued to mobilize, ultimately succeeding in getting Mota re-hired and revealing the cracks in MEC’s ability to control its rectors. Yet students had not mobilized around radical demands associated with leftist ideologies, in spite of what the secret police files said. Rather, the rector’s harsh response to students upset by the death of a colleague unleashed a wave of mobilizations that revealed the government’s ability to control its more authoritarian rectors on campuses and exposed the latent issues facing Brazilian universities’ infrastructure. Lopes’s crackdown on students and Mota brought professors into the fray, and even parents joined in fighting for their children’s education. The 1980 UFRRJ strike reveals the complex ways in which students mobilized without UNE and revealed the divisions behind the “masks of state” under military rule. Additionally, professors’ involvement was a new factor, but it was not an isolated event. As the military dictatorship came to an end, professors, along with other white-collar

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workers, became an increasingly powerful force in politics and society, and it is to their mobilizations and causes we now turn.

_A New Social Group Enters the Fray: The Mobilization of White-Collar Professionals_

Ever since the 1930s, universities had served as important physical and discursive sites for students to shape politics and society and challenge governments. Yet university employees had been relatively inactive as a group. This situation changed as the dictatorship entered its twilight. White-collar workers who had attended universities in the 1960s and 1970s were increasingly frustrated by the economic turmoil and stagnant job market of the 1980s. Military leaders’ equating of university education to development and social mobility in the 1970s had led many students to believe that their degrees would lead to unprecedented material gains, something that the economic “miracle” of 1969-1973 seemed to support. By 1980, these former students had grown impatient; they met their end of the bargain in getting degrees in fields like medicine and engineering, and yet here the military dictatorship under Figueiredo seemed to be failing to hold up its end of the deal. As a result, the 1980s witnessed the mobilization of unprecedented numbers of white-collar professionals. University professors mobilized against the government’s salary adjustments and the infrastructural challenges they confronted. Medical residents at university hospitals and university-trained doctors also lashed out against the government, mobilizing in protests and strikes over the same issues. Engineers, bankers, and even architects criticized the administration both for the economic and political
context. Where students had once been the sole group to use the university system and the benefits it offered (or was supposed to offer) to challenge the government, a large number of middle class professionals now joined in the growing chorus criticizing the government.

In this new wave of mobilizations, university professors were at the forefront. Faculty discontent had begun simmering in 1978, when professors at private universities in Rio de Janeiro and at the University of São Paulo held a “day of protest” demanding better salaries and more government spending on education. Yet these remained isolated incidents until the general amnesty of 1979, when many professors who had been removed from their positions during the previous fifteen years were able to return to the universities to teach, bringing new critical voices back into the university system. At the same time, many other professors grew disenchanted with the ways that the university reform had translated in practice, while still others objected to the ongoing and unnecessary use of repression against movements that questioned the dictatorship. The worsening economy provided the breaking point for professional inaction. In 1979, private university professors in Rio de Janeiro launched the first professors’ strike in the country’s history. The origins were far from radical; as one participant put it, “the demands basically were about…what people generically called the [government’s] salary adjustment,” which consisted of what was effectively a “compression of our salaries” in an effort to curb inflation.

87 CPDOC, EG pr 1974.03.00, Roll 2, Photo 0099, and CPDOC, NL d 78.10.17.
Although designed to help the economy, the adjustment immediately reduced the value of middle-class incomes.

It was not long before public university professors joined their colleagues in private universities. As the government tried to cut spending, federal university professors, who were technically federal employees, found themselves increasingly under economic pressure, caught between a reduction in government spending and inflation rates with which their salaries could not keep up. In 1980, professors from nineteen federal universities and seven private universities went on strike to demand a salary readjustment every semester to dull the impact of inflation on their incomes. In Rio de Janeiro, three hundred faculty members from UFRJ gathered to insist the government invest in higher education. At the rally, engineering professor Luís Pinguelli Rosa declared that “the government has funds to address our demands. It is time MEC better distribute its resources.”

These strikes led to professors gathering and forming the first nation-wide professors’ organization, the National Association of Higher Education Docents (Associação Nacional dos Docentes de Ensino Superior, ANDES). The organization’s function was to fight for professors’ causes, as well as to “connect professors’ fights to the struggles of other workers.” Nor were these empty words; in 1982, ANDES sent a letter to the Organization of Brazilian Lawyers (Organização de Advogados do Brasil, OAB) congratulating the lawyers on the

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89 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 73, Jornal do Brasil, 10 September 1980, and APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 73, Tribuna da Imprensa, 10 September 1980.

conference and presenting the professors’ demands and ideas to the lawyers.⁹¹

Professors quickly joined ANDES, including many who had actively resisted the military government in the 1960s.⁹²

In addition to salary demands, professors also began to incorporate some of the students’ agendas into their own professional mobilizations, creating yet another group within the universities that was challenging military policy on campuses. In 1981, ANDES made the demand that 12% of the federal budget be dedicated to education a central part of their platform.⁹³ Professors also demanded “free and public education” for Brazilians. The National Union of Education Workers (União Nacional os Trabalhadores em Educação, UNATE) joined their higher-education colleagues in these demands as well.⁹⁴ Professors also called for a restructuring of the university system, even joining with UNE, the Confederation of Teachers of Brazil (Confederação dos Professores do Brasil, CPB) and UBES in launching a “National Campaign for Free Public Education.”⁹⁵ University professors also called for better infrastructure in the

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⁹⁴ AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 45-5711, Unidade 44, “SNI – Agência Central – Apreciação Sumária (Campo Interno) – 9 Jan 1982.” This seems to be one of the few instances in which schoolteachers and professors shared a platform; indeed, in the police records that I came across, schoolteachers rarely appear in political or social mobilizations. This is not to say that they were not politically engaged – indeed, the fact that they had a national union indicates a political awareness and activism via class-based interests and organizations – but rather that they simply did not appear in the documents that I came across in the archives.

university system and for the “democratization” of the university system, issues that had occupied students since the 1950s. 96 Indeed, by 1981, the professors seemed to have eclipsed students as a threat to the government. The SNI predicted “greater mobilization” of professors in 1982, building on “a campaign that has already spread throughout the majority of Brazilian universities.” 97 Another secret police report expressed concern that, “unlike the student movements, the professors’ movements seemed to worsen in 1981,” a fair assessment given that faculty at nineteen federal universities and another ten isolated colleges went on strike in November 1981 alone. 98

These protests raised a new issue for the military government. The strikes of the late-1970s and early-1980s marked the first time that the employees of the federal university system had directly challenged the state via work stoppages. The importance of these strikes and the fact that Minister Ludwig met with them was not lost on observers at the time. The Jornal do Brasil pointed out that Ludwig’s meeting with representatives from the National Strike Command marked the first time “ever” that one of the military regime’s ministers had met with a “class-based organization” to resolve a work stoppage. 99 The discontent with military politics had spread into official state positions, making this the first


time that government bureaucrats in any capacity had directly challenged the military policies as a professional collective.

Nor were professors the only threat to the Figueiredo administration’s handling of the university system. As the case of Rector Lopes at UFRRJ and the increase of annual fees that exceeded MEC’s 25 percent cap made clear, the dictatorship could and did see its authority undermined by its own employees without resorting to protests. The internal disagreements could even reach the highest level of the executive branch, as when MEC and professors collaborated on a project to address their financial issues, only to have Figueiredo refuse to send the project to Congress for a vote. These conflicts revealed the weaknesses of the state under military rule in the final years of military rule; the fact that these groups, particularly professors, were now major actors in mobilizations demonstrated yet another way that universities had come to be important to national politics in ways that the military did not anticipate. Nor were they the only group of white-collar professionals who mobilized against Figueiredo in the 1980s when their economic expectations were not met.

Doctors and medical residents in university hospitals also began striking in 1979, when their salaries, like those of their teaching colleagues, began rapidly “deteriorating.” Resident doctors at the State and Municipal Hospital of Rio de Janeiro rallied in front of the Ministry of Labor, decrying the “demeaning reality

100 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 73, Tribuna da Imprensa, 10 September 1980.

101 Personal interview with F.G., 10 September 2007.
of job and salary insecurity” and demanding an increase in their income. They blasted the administration’s “threat to end medical residency in university hospitals even without improving the chaotic conditions that one finds in education in this country.” In 1980, doctors and nurses at the university hospital at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro went on a semi-strike, attending only to “cases in which lives were at risk” or those who required treatment that “could not be completed at another hospital.” The following year, their counterparts in Belo Horizonte walked out, demanding a “national salary campaign” to improve their incomes.

Other members of the middle class who increasingly felt the pinch of inflation joined their white-collar colleagues in organizing and challenging the Figueiredo government. Engineers spoke out against the deteriorating conditions resulting from Geisel’s and Figueiredo’s policies. They demanded new categories to define skill level and pay for engineers. At the VI National Seminar of Engineering Students, students and professors alike lamented their inability to find jobs; one report claimed that ten thousand of São Paulo’s sixty thousand engineers were unemployed, while another manifesto commented on the poor education that left engineers unemployed and only equipped with the ability to

102 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 70, Untitled Document.
103 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 70, Untitled Document.
104 “Professores fazem ato para explicar greve à população,” Jornal do Brasil, 1 December 1980.
“press a button.” They insisted engineering should return to basic programs like alternative energy, land management, and cheaper construction, all in the name of “liberation of the small farmers and workers,” revealing a cross-class agenda. At the same conference, professors criticized the military’s new emphasis on creating nuclear power plants, indicating that not every Brazilian was swept up in the wave of nationalist sentiment regarding nuclear energy.

Although not as frequent, other middle-class based groups began mobilizing in their own financial and professional interests. In 1979, bankers in Rio de Janeiro began organizing, once again demanding an improvement in their salaries and rejecting their bosses’ counterproposal and threatening to strike if their demands were not met. Even architects joined in opposing the military; while they did not mobilize over salaries, they did criticize the police’s decision to tear down the UNE headquarters in 1980.

These various manifestations and strikes revealed the ways in which the military’s support among middle class sectors had eroded. Certainly, the high-

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profile deaths of individuals like Vladimir Herzog, Manoel Fiel Filho, and Rubens Paiva in the 1970s had begun that erosion. However, it was not until their fiscal and material status was threatened that white-collar professionals took to the streets to defend class interests and demand a return to democracy. Strikes that were designed to “increase public awareness” were remarkably successful in giving these white-collar workers a high profile in national politics, and opposition politicians quickly took advantage of this dissatisfaction. They adopted the banners of economic troubles and broken universities to criticize the regime and gain support among the increasingly mobilized Brazilian electorate, students and workers alike.

*Sowing the Seeds of Oppositional Politics: Politicians and Education, 1979-1985*

While formal political opposition from the MDB had accelerated since Ulysses Guimarães ran as a “counter-candidate” to Ernesto Geisel in 1974, opposition politicians finally cemented their ties to the Brazilian people in the final years of the military dictatorship. The economy, combined with the 1979 general amnesty and political opening, had left Figueiredo susceptible to attacks from opposition politicians, and they did not let the opportunity pass to criticize the regime for its failings. In attempting to seek support, politicians tried to build their base by stressing the importance of universities in national development and directly appealing to university students themselves. These politicians cited the role that university students had played in opposing the military government and

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blamed the economic turmoil on the government’s failure to fund and stimulate universities. As a result, for the first time since the beginning of the coup, universities became discursively valuable tools for the opposition to challenge the military’s authority.

The political context under Figueiredo was unlike any other during the twenty-one years of military rule. Figueiredo was determined to complete the project of *abertura*, but he was equally determined that the military government, and not civilian sectors, would control the speed and methods. In 1980, Figueiredo launched an attempt to strengthen the military’s political platform while undermining opposition. Ever since 1965’s Institutional Act No. 2 (AI-2), two parties had governed Brazil: the pro-government National Renovation Alliance (ARENA) and the oppositional Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB). In the mid-1970s, the MDB had gained increasing power, serving as an umbrella party for leftists and former communists as well as more moderate politicians who opposed the military regime. As a result, the MDB began to strengthen its presence in Congress, making legislating from the executive branch more difficult for Geisel. In response, shortly after taking office, Figueiredo attempted to weaken the opposition by fragmenting it. In 1980, he announced the dissolution of ARENA and MDB and allowed multiple political parties to form. As a result, ARENA became the Social Democratic Party (*Partido Democrático Social*, PDS), with the same membership, ideals, and platforms as ARENA.

While the PDS provided the pro-government party continuity, the MDB did indeed fracture, as Figueiredo had hoped. Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva, who
had played a major role in the São Paulo metalworkers’ strike in 1979, quickly split off and organized the Workers’ Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*, PT), based in São Paulo and organized around workers’ rights and pay. Leonel Brizola, the former governor of Rio Grande do Sul and brother-in-law of the late João Goulart (who had died in exile in 1977), tried to reassume the mantle of the Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, PTB), the party that Vargas had created and that Brizola and Goulart had represented prior to the coup. While most acknowledged that Brizola was the rightful heir to the party, the electoral courts that determined the final eligibility of political parties (and that were stuffed with military appointees) decided to give the party to Vargas’s niece, Ivete Vargas. As a result, Brizola formed the Democratic Labor Party (*Partido Democrático Trabalhista*, PDT). The People’s Party (*Partido Popular*, PP) brought together liberal members of ARENA and moderate members of the MDB, but by 1983, the PP was extinct, with its members joining the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). The PMDB, in a nifty rhetorical trick, followed the law declaring that new parties had to have “party” in their name, but by keeping the “MDB,” it was able to perpetuate its identity as the main historical opponent to the military regime, something that dissatisfied Figueiredo but that he could do little to stop. Nonetheless, it seemed that Figueiredo’s efforts to splinter the opposition had succeeded; while one pro-government party (the PDS) continued in the wake of ARENA’s dissolution, five oppositional parties broke out from the MDB’s umbrella.112
Yet fragmentation had little effect on the opposition’s ability to criticize the educational policies of the military governments past and present. In a speech on the floor of the House of Representatives in 1979, Congressman Álvaro Valle expressed his concerns over Brazil’s economy and society. Drawing on his own definition of “Christian Democracy,” Valle voiced his worry over the mounting troubles facing the middle-class, whose buying power was greatly reduced thanks to expanding inflation and debt. In order to address these social needs, Valle wanted educational reform that would “democratize” society by providing “knowledge” to all Brazilians, rather than simply increasing the number of positions available in a university system that did not serve the majority of Brazilians. Valle declared the government’s satisfaction with the expansion of educational opportunities as a “false impression” that ignored the poor quality of education and continued to shut many Brazilians out of the highest levels of learning.\footnote{AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 45-5711, Unidade 44, Dep. Álvaro Valle, “Democracia Cristã,” 1979.} Congressman Walter Silva declared that the government was run by “half a dozen fascists” who were using education to “impose” their ideas on the people.\footnote{APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 70, DGIE No. 4940 – “Debate sôbre Ensino Pago em Universidades Federais’ em Campos RJ,” 16 May 1979.} Congresswoman Heloneida Studart pointedly commented that Brazil was spending less on education than Bolivia, a “small country recently devastated
by the dictatorship of cocaine.”¹¹⁵ Even Lula, who never finished school, much
less attended a university, had begun speaking out, demanding free public
education for all Brazilian students, singling out the universities specifically,
while the PT platform criticized MEC for its “financial tightening and cultural
manipulation” of Brazil’s universities.¹¹⁶ And Aurélio Cance Júnior, a mayor and
PT member from Mato Grosso do Sul, accused Figueiredo’s second Minister of
Education, Rubem Ludwig, of turning MEC into “just another of your security
organs.”¹¹⁷ In making these observations, politicians tacitly appealed to students
by adopting some of their demands. After all, students had been protesting against
annual fees and demanding more funding for education and a more democratized
university system for well over a decade.

Another, more direct way that politicians used education to challenge
Figueiredo was by going directly to students themselves. When UNE held its
XXXIV Congress in Piracicaba, São Paulo in 1982, the PMDB mayor of the city
not only provided them with buildings to use for the Congress; he spoke to UNE,
“affirming that UNE is part of the city” and that the students’ resistance to
Figueiredo was “a victory for us Brazilians.”¹¹⁸ A year earlier, over 400 students

¹¹⁵ APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 70, DGIE No. 4940 – “Debate sôbre
Ensino Pago em Universidades Federais’ em Campos RJ,” 16 May 1979. Studart did not make
clear whether Brazil was spending less per capita or net on education.

¹¹⁶ APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 70, DGIE – “Resposta a Telex No.
1251,” 3 May 1979, and APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 75, Informe No. 328/82-

¹¹⁷ AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3576-00046, Unidade 36, “Críticas do Vereador Aurélio Cance

¹¹⁸ AN, Coleção DSI, Caixa 3576-00046, Unidade 36, “XXXIV Congresso da União
gathered at the MEC building in Rio de Janeiro in 1981 to protest the regime’s cut in funding for universities. Congressman Raymundo de Oliveira attended and received “loud applause” from students when he spoke. Similarly, representatives from the PTB, PT, and PMDB, as well as leftists from the PCdoB and MR-8, joined students at the Law School in Amazonas, where they discussed opposition to Figueiredo. Leonel Brizola, elected governor of Rio de Janeiro in 1982, joined the campaign for legalizing the still-illegal UNE. And when the military police tore down the remnants of UNE’s headquarters in 1980, politicians from the PT, PP, PMDB, PDT, and PTB all spoke out against the destruction of the headquarters and the repression of students’ “peaceful protests.” Even joined by Congresswoman Djalma Bessa, a representative from the pro-government PDS, spoke out against the act, admitting “that there were ‘excesses’ in police repression of students and politicians who protested against the demolition of UNE’s building,” although she fell short of blaming the government for such repression.

Already in 1980, the PMDB held a national seminar for those university students who had registered in the party. In a speech to the students, Ulisses Guimarães praised the students for being the “principal” actors who had

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119 APERJ, Coleção DOPS, Setor Estudantil, Pasta 74, Ministério da Educação e Cultura – Delegacia do MEC no Rio de Janeiro – DEMEC/RJ – Assessoria de Segurança e Informações – ASI – DEMEC/RJ – Mensagem Direta No. 05.31391/ASI/DEMEC/RJ/81; Assunto – Concentração de estudantes no Prédio do MEC (Rio).” The police file fails to note what exactly was the content of de Oliveira’s speech, but it does comment on the students’ overwhelmingly positive support for his address, singling it out over other speakers’ comments.


challenged the regime, and applauded their ability to complete their studies even while participating in national politics. This oppositional stance seemed to fit the PMDB’s goals perfectly, according to Guimarães; as he put it in his speech, “the PMDB needs you, students of Brazil, but you need the PMDB too.” Guimarães envisioned a partnership in which each group helped the other: students helped the party by providing their youth and their history in challenging the regime and ushering the PMDB into power, while the PMDB would help students by creating more space for them to politically engage and addressing students’ demands at the national level. ¹²²

Nor did politicians limit their support to students. When professors began demanding salary readjustments in 1980, politicians from the PDT, PT, and PMDB all supported the professors’ demands. ¹²³ They made clear to students and faculty alike that they sympathized with their educational causes. It seems likely that this was a calculated move to gain political support in a new multi-party climate, yet it was also a successful one. In 1981, students representing eleven states gathered when UNE’s Legal Subsecretariat (SEDUNE) for the inaugural seminar. At the meeting, they determined that students needed “to act together with opposition political parties” in order to combat the regime’s social policies. ¹²⁴


As 1983 dawned, it became increasingly clear that the military really would step down. As Figueiredo prepared for the transition, two candidates emerged. Paulo Maluf, the governor of São Paulo, won a fiercely contested primary that split the PDS. Those dissatisfied with Maluf’s nomination left the PDS and joined the PMDB’s coalition, throwing their support behind Tancredo Neves, the moderate *mineiro* politician who had served as prime minister for a year during the Goulart administration and who had been the head of the failed PP. While Congress, and not the Brazilian people, would determine the president in 1985, both Maluf and Neves began to campaign, hoping that popular support would influence senators to represent the will of their constituents. As a result, both Neves and Congressman Ulysses Guimarães, the president of the PMDB (and the failed “anti-candidate” against Geisel in the 1974 election) traveled around the country drumming up support for the Neves candidacy. In doing so, universities played an important part in their rhetoric, providing them with a means to criticize the government while offering their own development plans and simultaneously attempting to gain the support of students, professors, and white-collar professionals.

Given Figueiredo’s retreat from universities in his vision of development, Guimarães and Neves quickly emphasized universities’ ability to transform society. Where universities had once been a central part of the national development plan of military leaders, they now became key to the opposition movement’s developmentalist rhetoric. As Figueiredo emphasized primary

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education and admitted he would have to make cuts to educational spending, the PMDB called for greater investment in education at all levels, demanded free education for all levels of schooling, including universities, and emphasized the need for universities to provide scientific and technological research and output for national development.125

Tancredo Neves was even more blatant in his appeals to universities. By 1984, he had emerged as the PMDB’s presidential candidate and the best bet to defeat Maluf and end all vestiges of pro-military politics. A consummate politician, Neves proclaimed just a month before the election that he had “always emphasized the university as a priority” in a democratic and developed Brazil.126 He acknowledged that university students and faculty were central to his campaign and would continue to be central to his government if he were elected, a message he reiterated a few months previously in a meeting with ANDES.127 Nor did he limit himself to public universities, pledging that even private universities would have the state’s support.128 He criticized the military governments of the


127 For his meeting with professors, see CPDOC, TN pi Neves, T. 1984.10.22/3, Roll 17, Photo 84, “Discurso proferido no encontro com a Associação Nacional de Docentes de Ensino Superior sobre a educação brasileira.” For students, see CPDOC, TN pi Neves, T. 1984.12.10/2, Roll 17, Photo 338, “Discurso de Tancredo Neves em agradecimento pelo título de Professor Honoris Causa,’ conferido pelo Conjunto Universitário Cândido Mendes.”

128 CPDOC, TN pi Neves, T. 1984.12.10/2, Roll 17, Photo 341, “Discurso proferido no encontro com a Associação ‘Discurso de Tancredo Neves em agradecimento pelo título de Professor Honoris Causa,’ conferido pelo Conjunto Universitário Cândido Mendes.”
past, less than subtly declaring that spending cuts for the Brazilian university system had created “the gravest crisis in [the university system’s] history.”129 He called for higher education to “return to the majority interests of the country” and for the “reconstruction of higher education in the country, correcting its distortions and stimulating its advancement.”130 He pledged better salaries to professors who had been hit hard by inflation, and he criticized the 1968 University Reform for emphasizing private education over free public education. He adopted demands like free education, more positions, and better infrastructure in his own vision of a “new university,” a vision that simultaneously ran counter to Figueiredo’s retreat on higher education while adopting demands that students had been making since the 1950s. At a time when UNE was returning and Brazil was facing the real possibility of a civil democratic society for the first time in twenty-one years, Neves adopted the positions of students, professors, and white-collar professionals alike to criticize the regime and build support for the PMDB generally and his own presidential campaign specifically. In just twenty years, students had gone from being one of the first targets of a military regime to one of the key pieces to the opposition’s attempts to lead Brazil’s return to democracy.

Neves’ efforts were successful; on January 15, he was elected Brazil’s first civilian president in twenty-one years, defeating Paulo Maluf by 441-179 in “an

129 CPDOC, TN pi Neves, T. 1984.10.22/3, Roll 17, Photo 85, “Discurso proferido no encontro com a Associação Nacional de Docentes de Ensino Superior sobre a educação brasileira.”

Yet society had fundamentally shifted during the dictatorship. Students, military leaders, parents, conservative business leaders, progressive pedagogical experts, professors, and white-collar workers had all emphasized the importance of universities to national development. The ideologies varied, but the rhetorical and policy emphasis led the middle class to have an increasingly important role in the country’s political, social, and economic life. Where students had been one of the few voices protesting military rule in 1964, by 1985, broad swaths of society had mobilized against the regime over a variety of issues – poor funding for schools, failed material expectations, a youthful tradition of activism – that led directly back to the university system.

José Sarney’s assumption of the presidency may have marked the end of the military dictatorship, but the battles over universities’ infrastructure and their role in society did not fade away just because a new era in Brazilian politics had begun. Demands for university reform continued into the 1990s, as students, politicians, and others struggled to define exactly how the university system

should be reformed in the wake of military rule. At the same time, the debate
came to include more and more people, as Brazil’s university student population
continued to rise and people continued to turn to higher education for social
mobility. While a new generation of students continued to make their voices
heard through UNE and other student movements, former students who had
entered white-collar professions had become major political, social, and economic
actors, pushing social change and transforming Brazilian politics at the end of the
twentieth century. Although still a minority, the middle class was continuing to
grow, and its material expectations and political power could no longer be
ignored.
Conclusion

Although Tancredo Neves’ death raised questions about Brazil’s return to democracy, the nation continued to gradually emerge from twenty-one years of military rule. When a journalist asked Figueiredo in early 1985 how he wanted to be remembered by the Brazilian people, the last military president famously and pointedly responded, “Forget me.” Many Brazilians seemed willing to do just that, letting the memory of repression fade away in the face of the return to civilian rule.

Although inauguration of José Sarney in March of 1985 marked the end of the military regime, processes of educational reform, white-collar mobilization, student activism, and complex state-society relations did not simply end with


133  Unlike Argentina and Chile, Brazil did not initiate a public truth commission in the wake of the military regime’s fall. Cardinal Arns and protestant minister Jaime Wright did successfully gather thousands of military documents chronicling the use of torture and repression, republishing them in an edited volume in 1985, but the government was uninvolved. See Arquidiocese de São Paulo, Brasil: Nunca Mais, (Petrópolis, RJ: Editora Vozes Ltda, 1985). For the account of how Arns and Wright were able to gather the documents and publish them, see Lawrence Weschler, A Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers (New York: Viking Penguin 1991).

The reasons for Brazil’s divergence from its neighbors are varying and complex, and include the military’s gradual, top-down effort to return to democracy, as well as the fact that while human rights abuses were widespread in Brazil, the numbers were nowhere near the 3,000 dead during the Pinochet regime in Chile (1973-1990) or the disappeared and killed during Argentina’s “Dirty War” (1976-1983), which may have reached as many as 30,000 dead in just seven years. Additionally, the general amnesty had already pardoned all torturers and those who committed murder or “disappearances” in the military, and the gradual transition to democracy made civilian politicians much more wary of and susceptible to ongoing military intervention in Brazil than in Argentina, where the spectacular failure of the Malvinas/Falklands war against England led to the military’s complete collapse. Brazil did strip some doctors who oversaw torture sessions of their medical license, but failed to even investigate, much less prosecute, the military’s use of torture in Brazil. Only in 2010 did President Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva finally begin proceedings to establish a truth commission, and even then, he faced opposition from his own party, some military leaders, and those who just felt Brazil should leave its past exactly there – in the past. Even with Lula’s decision, nothing concrete has been done to establish a commission in early 2011. For the ongoing presence and pressure of the military in Brazilian politics after 1985, see Jorge Zaverucha, Frágil democracia: Collor, Itamar, FHC e os militares (1990-1998), (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 2000).
Figueiredo’s departure. Universities continued to be a major focus in defining the future of the now-democratic nation. As Brazil returned to democracy, students continued to question the role of universities in Brazil. Between 1985 and 1990, students criticized the University Reform and the universities’ emphasis on technical know-how over a richer, more humanistic education. In the context of a more open and democratic society, they began to suggest that the military’s reform was not a real reform. They protested the rapid shift to private universities and isolated colleges, which by 1990 reached 696, compared to only 55 federal schools and another 164 state and municipal schools. Likewise, issues like fees and inadequate curricula continued to dominate students’ agendas during the administration of José Sarney (1985-1990). In these demands and struggles, students once again sought “to put the student in closer contact with reality.” In this period, UNE sponsored a handful of national conferences that specifically dealt with the issue of university reform, including hosting the 5th National Seminar on University Reform. As Brazilian politicians sat down to debate a new constitution after 1985, students once again used the debate to push their agenda, demanding that 18 percent of the federal budget and 25 percent of state and municipal budgets be dedicated to education, figures the 1988 Constitution ultimately codified.

135 Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interview with Gisela Mendonça, p. 3.
136 Projeto Memória Estudantil, published interviews with Cláudio Langone, p. 4; Gisela Mendonça, pp. 3-5.
The particularities of these issues may have changed since 1985, but their roots are traceable back to the 1950s. As this dissertation has demonstrated, universities and the issue of university reform were at center of debates regarding national development and middle-class politics even before the dictatorship. These debates were not simple struggles between students and political leaders; rather, they included parents, pedagogues, professionals, business leaders, and bureaucrats. Following the military coup of 1964, universities gained a new importance for these actors. They provided students with new means to challenge political authority of military. At the same time, military governments gave increasing importance to university-education and middle-class professionals in spurring national development, providing students and white-collar workers with a space to challenge some of the governments’ policies even while accepting others. Consequently, the struggle over educational reform and development revealed much more complicated and nuanced interactions between the state and society that moved well beyond confrontations with police or the use of torture.

Yet the complexities were not limited to interactions between the state and society between 1955 and 1990. As this dissertation has demonstrated, the idea of “a” student movement in Brazil does not hold; students had widely varying ideologies, visions, and concerns that did not always fit neatly together into a single platform. While much scholarly attention has focused on the importance of UNE, it is clear that the national organization was not the sole actor or force

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dictating the demands of student movements. Indeed UNE periodically lacked the
dictating the demands of student movements. Indeed UNE periodically lacked the
authority to define the issues during Brazil’s military regime, and radical leaders
authority to define the issues during Brazil’s military regime, and radical leaders
found themselves having to readjust UNE’s platforms to address more quotidian
found themselves having to readjust UNE’s platforms to address more quotidian
issues that a majority of students supported in order to gain broader support for
issues that a majority of students supported in order to gain broader support for
the organization. And as UNE virtually disappeared in the 1970s, students found
the organization. And as UNE virtually disappeared in the 1970s, students found
new ways to mobilize, simultaneously helping lay the groundwork for UNE’s
new ways to mobilize, simultaneously helping lay the groundwork for UNE’s
return in 1979 even while making it clear that UNE was not the only legitimate
return in 1979 even while making it clear that UNE was not the only legitimate
option for student mobilization. These complexities force us to revise our
option for student mobilization. These complexities force us to revise our
understanding of student political participation in Brazil.

Students were clearly major actors in challenging governments throughout
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the twenty-one years of military rule. Yet they were not the sole actors. As the
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military continued to remain in power, economic shortcomings and a general
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universities to mobilize. Ever since 1964, military presidents had proclaimed that
universities to mobilize. Ever since 1964, military presidents had proclaimed that
university reform would not only lead Brazil to a new era of national prosperity,
university reform would not only lead Brazil to a new era of national prosperity,
but would also lead to an improvement in life for a growing middle class. When
but would also lead to an improvement in life for a growing middle class. When
the economic context worsened in the 1970s even while democracy in Brazil
the economic context worsened in the 1970s even while democracy in Brazil
continued to be little more than a charade, middle-class workers began to turn on
continued to be little more than a charade, middle-class workers began to turn on
the regime. After years of being told that they would be central to national
the regime. After years of being told that they would be central to national
development, but with few of their material or cultural expectations met, white-
development, but with few of their material or cultural expectations met, white-
collar professionals used the new spaces that the government opened for them to
collar professionals used the new spaces that the government opened for them to
criticize same government. By the 1980s, professors, doctors, engineers,
criticize same government. By the 1980s, professors, doctors, engineers,
scientists, and architects, those same professions that the military had said would
transform Brazil, called for the end of military rule, helping weaken the regime and setting the stage for the indirect election of Tancredo Neves in 1985. Nor was this a temporary victory; by the 1980s, the middle-class, both students and ex-students, had become a political force that would determine national politics.

Twenty-one years of military rule had transformed Brazilian politics, society, and culture. The extension of torture to members of the middle class was certainly part of that shift. While the history of torture and corporal violence in Brazil extended back to slavery, this type of violence tended to be limited to Afro-descendants and the socio-economically marginalized; rarely had it afflicted the middle class. In this regard, while the 1968 murder of Edson Luís, a poor high school student from the impoverished Northeast, was notable but not unique to Brazilian history. The torture and disappearance of “whiter” and wealthier students like Honestino Guimarães and Manoel Fiel Filho and the torture of thousands of middle-class students marked the true shift in tactics as state-sponsored violence began to affect socioeconomic groups that it had previously excluded. In this way, torture and state-sponsored violence as a means of retaliation against resistance during the military regime marked a new phase in Brazilian history, and one that has understandably occupied a major space in the historiography of Brazil’s dictatorship.

Students’ relationships with the state in this period went well beyond resistance and subjection to torture and repression. Before, during, and after military rule, students and the state were involved in a complex dialectic over issues such as education, democracy, social justice, and what development.
Certainly, conflicts with police were the most visible examples of this discursive struggle, but they were not the only ones. Be it through newspapers, meetings with government officials, professional meetings, or other methods, students constantly interacted with the government in more subtle forms of negotiation regarding not just education but the broader path required for Brazil to finally reach its full potential on the global stage. In the process, students were able to wed strictly political demands such as an end to repression to more quotidian demands such as greater infrastructure on campuses, a greater say in the administration of universities, or even better food in restaurants. While they were not always successful in transforming the universities or society, the continuously forced the government to reconsider, rephrase, and readjust its own efforts towards education and national development.

In these discursive struggles, students and the state were not the only actors. Parents, business elites, professors, white-collar professionals, political exiles, and bureaucrats all informed these debates, leading to a far more complicated landscape in which various actors entered and exited alliances in the struggle for Brazil’s social and political future. The involvement of these different groups and widely divergent ideologies led to a far more complicated interaction between the state and society than the focus on student resistance and state repression allows for. Indeed, even treating student movements or the state as unified sectors belies the complexity of Brazilian politics and society during military rule. As we have seen, unity rarely existed between students, between technocrats and government officials, or between one administration and another.
This complexity is due in no small part to the ways in which Brazil’s political and social landscapes transformed in the late-twentieth century. As Brazil’s population became increasingly urbanized and a nascent middle class began to grow, it became increasingly important to national politics, both through its own efforts and from the attention of political elites. Even before military rule, presidents Kubitschek and Goulart emphatically placed university-trained professionals at the center of national development, and sought to expand the middle class both in terms of size and political relevance. These efforts only accelerated under the military regime, as the university system rapidly grew, particularly after the 1968 University Reform. Engineers, teachers, doctors, physicists, and other white-collar professionals would finally lead Brazil to its rightful place in the world economy, according to military presidents’ policies and speeches.

Despite their efforts to control education and development, time and again military governments ran into obstacles, be it students taking to the streets to proclaim their own views on the relationship between development and education in the 1960s or white-collar professionals who turned against the regime as it failed to provide the material quality of life that the university-trained middle-class had come to expect in the 1970s and 1980s. In these processes, torture, arrest, and resistance to authoritarian rule were not uncommon, yet state and society interacted in far more complex ways. The university system is central to understanding these dynamics and complexities. Universities were not just hotbeds of activism; they were physical and discursive sites of resistance and
negotiation where complex and shifting debates over ideas of development, democracy, and nation in Brazil took place. Universities provided a unified discursive field that brought together diverse actors with widely varying ideologies, groups who constantly reacted to and shaped each others’ rhetoric, ideals, and policies. Ultimately, Brazil’s higher education system, barely extant in the early-1930s, had rapidly increased between 1955 and 1990. Where there were fewer than 100,000 students in all of Brazil in the middle of the century, the number was nearly six million in 2010. This expansion took part through the initiative of government reforms and private investment, but throughout, students, parents, business elites, white-collar professionals, and others shaped these processes in subtle and nuanced ways. In this way, universities provide an important window through which to understand state-society relations in Brazil in the latter half of the twentieth century.

The university system in Brazil was not alone in witnessing significant expansion and transformation between 1955 and 1985. Middle class politics in Brazil radically transformed as well. While the middle class was just coming into its own as a cultural and political entity in the early-1950s, the thirty years between Kubitschek’s election and Figueiredo’s exit saw the Brazilian middle class become a small-but-vital group in determining social, cultural, and political policies. Students were at the vanguard of this shift in the 1950s, increasingly


139 Owensby, *Intimate Ironies*. 
becoming major voices in the national stage in determining both the paths Brazil should take towards development, and their roles in it. By the late-1970s, however, students were no longer alone, as professors, doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers, and other white-collar professionals joined students in making similar material, economic, and political demands. In this way, my dissertation reveals how the middle class became a major actor in national social and political life, a role that it continues to have today, even while it does not represent a majority of Brazilians.

By looking at these social transformations, it becomes clear that the era of military rule was not an isolated period. Universities were central to student movements, politicians, business leaders, and others before, during, and after the military regime. Many of the policies that the dictatorship adopted actually resembled many of the more progressive, democratically-elected leaders that preceded the 1964 coup. These long-term social and political processes show new ways to move beyond a strict political periodization when considering Brazil in the latter half of the 20th century. Neither 1964 nor 1985 marked a sudden social rupture, and focusing on education reminds us to consider the dictatorship as but one part of twentieth-century Brazilian history, disconnected neither from what preceded or what followed.

Although Brazil was but one right-wing authoritarian regime in South America in the late-20th century, in many ways, it departed from neighboring regimes in Argentina and Chile. While Pinochet was the face of Chile’s dictatorship and a series of military juntas headed Argentina’s dictatorship,
Brazil’s military relied on a greater façade of democracy, as evidenced by the fact there were five presidents who were indirectly “elected” between 1964 and 1985. In order to maintain legitimacy, these presidents repeatedly contorted and manipulated legal statutes to increase executive authority, especially when they ran into roadblocks to their own exercise of power. Thus it was that the Institutional Act No. 1 gave the military the power to strip politicians and others of political rights for ten years; the 1967 constitution (and the 1969 amendments) were specifically designed to legalize the authoritarian rule of the military; and Geisel’s “April Package” of 1977 dissolved Congress and created so-called “bionic senators” whom the president appointed with the strict intent that he could pass legislation. Each of these measures clearly bent the laws of Brazil to legitimize military authority. Yet some semblance of electoral processes did continue in Brazil throughout the military dictatorship, albeit in the context of repression, censorship, and other restrictions. This is not to say that other regimes were bereft of any symbolic gestures towards democracy. Notably, Pinochet relied on a plebiscite in 1980 to maintain power, and the 1988 plebiscite, in which Chileans voted “no” on another eight-year referendum on Pinochet’s rule, setting the stage for the 1990 elections that ultimately brought the dictator down. Yet neither Chile, Argentina, nor the other South American dictatorships worked as hard to maintain the appearance of legality as Brazil’s military leaders.

Another way in which Brazil offers important comparisons and contrasts to its neighbors is in the ways education played a role in nation-building projects in authoritarian regimes. Both Brazil and Chile emphasized education as central to
creating a strong nation. Yet the paths they took diverged greatly. As this
dissertation demonstrates, the Brazilian military regime increasingly emphasized
the sciences in its vision of national development. While focusing on engineers,
doctors, veterinarians, architects, and similar white-collar professions
theoretically offered tangible improvements in the quality of living in Brazil, the
regime also attempted to marginalize the humanities and law schools, the very
programs that were the major sources of student opposition to military rule in the
1960s. In complete contrast, after the coup of September 1973, the Pinochet
regime began emphasizing the humanities in schools at all levels. In the Chilean
regime, the humanities provided the mechanisms to create a new narrative of
nation that celebrated Chile’s past glories and the promise of its future. Thus, while
both Brazil and Chile turned to education to advance the idea of nation, each took
radically different tacts. Where Brazil’s military turned to the sciences to achieve
national glory, Chile’s became preoccupied with the humanities.140

In spite of these differences, the case of Brazil does point towards
important ways to understand authoritarian regimes elsewhere in Latin America.
Many works have looked at the ways in which the Pinochet regime in Chile
(1973-1990) and the military juntas in Argentina (1976-1983) successfully used
repression and terror to combat “subversion.”141 More recently, some scholars


141 For Argentina, see Diana Taylor, Disappearing Acts: Spectacles of Gender and Nationalism in Argentina’s “Dirty War”, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997). For Chile, see
have begun looking at the more complicated ways in which civilians responded to military rule by examining the ways military regimes are remembered.  

Certainly, the use of repression in Brazil and the historiographical emphasis on repression, memory, and identity reveals similarities between authoritarian regimes’ methods. Indeed, collaboration between regimes even took place regularly, as each country’s repressive apparatus helped others in rooting out “subversives.” However, as the case of educational policy in Brazil demonstrates, by moving beyond an emphasis on terror and memory and looking at social policy, cultural politics, we can begin to understand not only the more nuanced and subtle ways in which regimes tried to exert control and transform their societies and nations, but the ways in which different social and political groups shaped those processes, be it through direct resistance, collaboration, or more subtle forms of negotiation. Additionally, incorporating groups beyond radical opposition leaders and repressive military rulers, including moderate students, parents, business leaders, white-collar professionals, and others provides fertile ground to understand the nuances and complexities of how different people

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143 For an example of Brazilian scholarship that focuses on repression and identity, see Carlos Fico, Reinvestando o Otimismo: Ditadura, propaganda e imaginário social no Brasil, (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1997).

interacted with states under military rule, and how those states’ policies impacted civilians.

When Brazilian students took to the streets en masse to protest Edson Luís’s murder in 1968, they joined other student uprisings throughout the world that year. Students in France, Italy, Spain, Mexico, Japan, Egypt, India, and the United States also took to the streets, combining general complaints about the structure in their university system while seeking broader political changes just as their Brazilian counterparts did. However, the particular national and international context in Brazil had different consequences. While students in France and West Germany condemned American imperialism for the Vietnam War, anti-imperialist stances increasingly turned to the MEC-USAID accords in Brazil. Likewise, internal divisions over how radical the demands should be also characterized these movements; for example, the student protests at Columbia University ultimately split into two groups: the radical Strike Coordinating

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Committee, which placed American imperialism, racism, and war-mongering at the center of its demands, and the Students for a Restructured University, who emphasized internal reforms to administration and student participation on campus. However, Brazil’s student movement remained unique. Anti-imperialism had been a part of radicals’ demands since the late-1950s, well before students in other countries expressed serious opposition to the power of the United States.

When compared to other countries and regions, Brazilian society and politics on the surface did not look so different. Brazil, like other countries in South America and elsewhere witnessed the presence of a vibrant student movement that demanded both general political transformation and specific educational reforms; 1968 as a landmark year that witnessed unprecedented levels of activism and mobilization; and a repressive military apparatus that sought to use all available means to clamp down on “subversion” within a Cold War framework. Yet once we look at the particularities of state and society in Brazil in this period, clear divergences emerge, including students responding to Brazilian particularities in higher education and a military government that went out of its way to try to appeal to legal process even as it increased the use of repression. Collectively, these differences provide important points of comparison and

contrast to other countries, even while helping to reveal “what makes Brazil, Brazil.”

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By the mid-1990s, the tenor of the debate over university reform had shifted dramatically. Brazil elected Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the presidency in 1994, due largely to his success in finally reigning in Brazil’s rampant inflation as the Minister of Finance under Itamar Franco (1992-1994). Upon assuming the presidency, Cardoso took the controversial step of abandoning his more progressive economic theories (including dependency theory) from the 1970s and embracing neoliberal economic policies. During his administration, Brazil witnessed the privatization of state-owned manufacturing, telephone, and electric companies, among others. In his quest for privatization, Cardoso proposed reforming the university system to make it more closely resemble the United States, where students paid for at least part of their education regardless of whether it was a public or private university. Cardoso also instituted affirmative action in an attempt to have more minorities in the universities. Having already mobilized against increasing fees in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, students quickly mobilized against Cardoso’s attempt to privatize universities further, and, as had been the case in the 1980s, professors, functionaries, and staff at the universities joined them. Cardoso ultimately retreated on the issue, revealing the ways that

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147 For the original use of this phrase, see Roberto da Matta, *O que Faz o Brasil, Brasil?*, (Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 1984).

148 For more on inflation in the late-1980s and early-1990s and its effect on the Brazilian people, see O’Dougherty, *Consumption Intensified*. 
students and university employees continued to shape national policy. Simultaneously, many scholars and students protested against affirmative action, feeling that quotas for non-whites were an assault on admission based on “merit.”\textsuperscript{150} The remnants of their protests \textit{against} these university reforms remained visible on campuses into the 2000s, where graffiti proclaimed “No to University Reform!,” marking a significant change from students’ rhetoric between the 1950s and 1980s.\textsuperscript{151} With the Workers’ Party’s ascension to the presidency in 2002, Lula attempted to change the course, increasing educational funding. Yet he could not reverse the transformations in the landscape of higher education over the previous forty years. Even while Lula celebrated the fact that every state now had a federal university in 2006, people continued to criticize the proliferation of private schools that seemed to admit anybody, including an eight-year-old boy in São Paulo who was admitted to a law school.\textsuperscript{152} The legacy of these battles over education and development continue to this day. Those white-collar professionals who used an expanded university system, state rhetoric, and social mobilization to form their own political voice during the military dictatorship continue to shape politics in Brazil. It was their support for Fernando Collor and his anti-corruption campaign that helped him

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{149} See Ribeiro, “Educação Superior Brasileira,” pp. 81-100.
\item \textsuperscript{150} For example, see Peter Fry and Yvonne Maggie, “Cotas Raciais: Construindo um país dividido?”, \textit{Económica} 6:1 (2004): 153-161. For a scholarly argument in favor of Brazil’s affirmative action, see Kabengele Munanga, “Políticas de Ação Aframativa em Benefício da População Negra no Brasil – Um Ponto de Vista em Defesa de Cotas,” \textit{Sociedade e Cultura} 4:2 (Jul/Dez 2001): 31-43.
\item \textsuperscript{151} The graffiti could be found on the Fluminense Federal University as late as 2008, having never been washed from when it was originally painted. Photograph in the author’s collection.
\item \textsuperscript{152} “Brazilian boy, 8, passes law school entrance exam,” \textit{The Guardian}, 7 March 2008. Available at \url{http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/07/brazil}. Accessed 4 January 2011.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
become Brazil’s first popularly-elected president in nearly thirty years, and it was their disillusionment, made evident through massive street marches and the university students’ *caras pintadas* (“painted faces”) movements that led to his resignation. When Lula finally won election on his fourth try, many suggested that it was due in no small part to his ability to finally gain the support of the middle-class, perhaps best exemplified by traditional middle-class conservative news source *O Globo* providing positive or neutral coverage of the Workers’ Party candidate on Lula’s fourth attempt.153

Student activists from the dictatorship period also continue to shape modern Brazilian politics. Numerous student leaders who had opposed the government in the 1960s had found their way into the highest levels of government by the 2000s. Franklin Martins, Wladimir Palmeira, and José Dirceu all served in Lula’s cabinet. Others, like Daniel Aarão Reis and Clara Araújo, had become professors in the same federal university system that they had fought to reform as students. Even those who did not participate in the higher levels of the student movement in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s continued to actively follow politics, be they from the left or the right.154 The middle class continues to be a vital part of social and political life in Brazil, a fact made possible by the growing

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importance of students, the military government, business-leaders, and university-trained white-collar professionals in the latter half of the twentieth century.

At the beginning of the second decade of the 2000s, students continue to push for university reform, using educational issues to express their own political voice and to question democratic governments they support. In late 2010, thousands of students who were taking the vestibular exam discovered that there was a printing error in the exam book, and many of the questions were out of order. The Ministry of Education\textsuperscript{155} responded by tossing out the exams, telling students they would have to re-take them at a later date. Instead of rallying in the streets, marching and carrying banners, students got on the internet and using social networking sites like Twitter to criticize MEC in 140 characters or less. This move is not so surprising; not only has technology become increasingly available to all Brazilians but, according to one report, Brazilians participate on Twitter more than any other country in the world.\textsuperscript{156} When students criticized MEC on Twitter and other social networking sites, the ministry suggested that those who criticized the Ministry online could face arrest (on what charges, the Ministry was unclear), leading to more indignation from students who pointedly countered that, instead of spending its time seeing how students were criticizing the Ministry online, perhaps it could focus on how to help students make up the faulty exam MEC issued.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{155} Culture gained its own Ministry in 1985, though Education continues to go by the acronym MEC.

Much like their counterparts across the previous fifty years, students once again mobilized over the administration, quality, and structure of university entrance exams, while trying to get the government to address their educational needs. This brief eruption on Twitter was not an isolated instance of students turning to the Internet to express their discontent. Google’s social networking site “Orkut” boasts groups that proclaim “I hate Fernando Haddad! [the Minister of Education under presidents Lula and Dilma Rousseff]” and “Exam preparation courses made me fat!”158 More seriously, UNE’s website continues to demand university reform and the regulation of fees, among other issues.159 While perhaps not as strong as UNE in the 1960s, student movements continue to rally around educational demands, attempting to shape discourse and policy. Social networking and media are new avenues in which students complain about the ways in which modern higher education is playing out in Brazil. These media outlets do have their flaws; while allowing hundreds or even thousands of individual students to make their voices heard, logging on at home does not facilitate organizational efforts or a broad, mass movement in the ways that UNE and other student movements had operated in the past. Where the future of student movements and their relation with MEC is headed is unclear, but the processes of


resistance and complaint did not disappear with the dictatorship. Although the forms of protest have transformed with the rise of social networking and Internet access, the demands remain strikingly similar. Even in 2011, university education continues to be a major discursive battleground for national development and social life in Brazil.
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