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Investigating the Causes of Repeated Presidential Failure in South America

Margaret Edwards

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Margaret E. Edwards
Candidate

Political Science
Department

This dissertation is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication:

Approved by the Dissertation Committee:

______________________________
William Stanley, Co-Chairperson

______________________________
Kathryn Hochstetler, Co-Chairperson

______________________________
Wendy Hansen

______________________________
Benjamin Goldfrank
INVESTIGATING THE CAUSES OF REPEATED PRESIDENTIAL FAILURE IN SOUTH AMERICA

by

MARGARET E. EDWARDS

B.A., Political Science and History, University of Georgia, 2003
M.A., Political Science, University of New Mexico, 2006

DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the issue of presidential failure – any instance in which a president fails to complete his/her term in office without a break in the democratic regime. South America stands as an anomaly for having faced an uncommonly high rate of presidential failure, as eleven elected presidents have failed to complete their terms in office since the third wave of democratization. This phenomenon presents an interesting puzzle for scholars because it allows for inquiries into governmental stability as well as executive accountability. I evaluate the causes of presidential failure in South America through a multi-method approach that looks at the phenomenon from three different levels of analysis.

First, I examine the cross-national trends that explain why presidents are removed from office in South America. Various scholars have analyzed the reasons that presidents fail in Latin America. This assessment builds on those past arguments in order to perform a comprehensive analysis of South American presidential failure. I focus on variables that have not consistently been utilized in the past. More than that, this analysis uses a new technique, survival modeling, to identify those factors that increase or decrease the likelihood that a president will complete his or her term in office. Through this analysis, I identify the importance of minority legislative support, inflation, prolonged recession, executive wrongdoing, and protest in increasing the likelihood that a president will fall.

Second, I perform two national assessments of repeated presidential failure. The cross-national statistical analysis shows that certain factors put presidents at risk. The qualitative analyses of Argentina and Ecuador, two countries with repeated failure, allow for process-tracing in order to identify how presidents are removed. I draw from the importance of protest and legislative opposition, which are found significant in the survival model, to explain presidential failure in these two countries. I show that political actors with poder de convocatoria (power to convocate/rallying power) can use that power

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to challenge a president when he/she faces other performance-related issues, like scandal or economic problems. The study of Argentina highlights how the Peronist Party maintains this power through a variety of connections to its organized base. This relationship to base support changes over time and is visible in each instance of presidential failure. On the other hand, Ecuador demonstrates the importance of the indigenous movement in explaining mobilization against presidents. The Argentine story shows how presidential failure flows from an actor with power, a top-down process. Ecuadorian presidential failure shows the bottom-up path of failure that occurs when actors who have lacked traditional access to politics oppose presidents.

Third, I analyze survey responses from Argentine and Ecuadorian citizens in order to identify why individuals in these countries choose to protest. I assess what demographic, organizational, and attitudinal factors influence the likelihood of failure. As protest is instrumental to the process of failure, this final assessment demonstrates the importance of civil society organizations and unions in pushing individuals into the street, supporting the findings of the previous two sections. Thus, the causal mechanisms of failure can be witnessed at cross-national, national, and individual levels of analysis.

In conclusion, I discuss the important implications of this research for Latin American politics. I provide predictions for the future of presidential stability in the region, and I assess how recent protests differ from those of the past.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Democratization and democratic stability are perennial issues in the study of Latin American governance. The rise of military dictatorships in the 1960’s and 1970’s in the region provided a central topic for political science inquiry. Military dictatorships emerged in many countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, marking a period of conflict and undemocratic governance. The horrors of these regimes, matched with a global call for democracy, created a pressing need for solutions to regime instability. At the heart of this was an effort to prevent authoritarian tendencies, increase democratic stability, and improve the lives of citizens in South America. These dictatorships eventually fell in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, and the rise of newly democratic regimes, the so-called third wave of democratization, brought hope of more positive outcomes. With democracy, the horrors of the past hopefully would not be repeated. These transitions to democracy may have occurred across the region, but different governing issues have emerged for the new democracies. Instead of facing the previous dread of persistent military coups and democratic breakdown, Latin American countries have begun to experience a new type of presidential instability – presidential failure.

This issue of presidential failure emerged over the past few decades, as various presidents from different countries failed to complete their terms in office. These examples of failure cross the continent. For instance, Ecuadorian President Abdalá Bucaram faced political pressure from the legislature and mass protests from citizens in 1997. The Ecuadorian Congress eventually charged him with mental incapacity, and he
was removed from office following a majority vote in the legislature (Pérez-Liñán, 2007). In the Southern Cone, Argentina faced similar issues in 2001 when President Fernando de la Rúa resigned amid large-scale civil protest and financial crisis. Protesters dramatically chanted “Que se vayan todos,” as they called for all politicians to step down (Hochstetler, 2006). Repeating instability, Bolivia experienced its second presidential resignation in two years when Carlos Mesa Gisbert stepped down under social protest and political pressure in the summer of 2005. Mesa had replaced Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Goni), who resigned in 2003 after only one year in office. The events leading up to both resignations proved dramatic on an international scale because widespread protest and demonstrations were key features in Goni’s and Mesa’s falls (Barr, 2005; Salman, 2006).

Each of the previously mentioned examples falls under the theoretical concept of “presidential failure.” Presidential failure is defined as any instance in which a president does not complete his/her fixed term in office, without a breakdown in the democratic regime. What distinguishes presidential failure from presidential instability of earlier time periods is that the democratic regimes survived. Only the presidents fell, and even in contexts in which democratic norms were temporarily suppressed during crises, they were quickly reinstated. That is, these are not garden-variety coups d’état, but something else. Even in instances in which the military was involved in the failure, there was generally democratic adherence to order of succession. For example, in the case of Jamil Mahuad in Ecuador, a portion of the military led by Lucio Gutiérrez was a key actor in the failure by supporting protesters and working with indigenous groups (Zamosc, 2007). However, after congressional occupation and military intervention, power eventually passed to the elected vice-president, Gustavo Noboa (Zamosc, 2007). Although
legislatures and mass publics used different means across the cases to actually remove the presidents, there is sufficient conceptual common ground to justify viewing presidential failure as a general phenomenon worthy of further inquiry.\textsuperscript{1} Presidents are removed in a variety of ways, but these resignations, impeachments, and other forms of removal are all variations of the same phenomenon occurring in the region.

Presidential failure has been called a variety of terms in the literature, including interrupted presidencies, presidential falls, and presidential breakdowns. However, each term deals with the same type of event – the failure of a president to complete a fixed term in office while the democratic regime continues – and addresses its consequences for these regimes. South America is an interesting region for studying this phenomenon as presidential failure has occurred at anomalously high rates when compared to the rest of the world (Hochstetler and Edwards, 2009, p. 34). One quarter of South American presidents have not completed their terms in office between 1978 and 2005 (Hochstetler and Edwards, 2009, p. 34). The following table lists these most recent failures, and this project investigates the 11 elected South American presidents who have failed to complete their terms in office between 1978 and 2007.\textsuperscript{2} This phenomenon is a central concern for scholars interested in Latin American countries because it is key to issues of democratic governability. Although citizens seemed to have found immediate redress for their grievances in these instances, some scholars question if this newfound flexibility is, in fact, a new form of instability that may challenge democratic principles.

\textsuperscript{1}Marsteinredet and Berntzen (2008) address each type of removal and discuss the manner in which resignations, impeachments, etc. are distinct phenomena.

\textsuperscript{2}This project does not address the most recent failure of Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo in 2012.
I examine this phenomenon in South American democracies because this region has experienced disproportionately high levels of presidential failure. Previous investigations of presidential failure have analyzed Latin America as a whole, while two studies address global presidential regimes (Hochstetler and Edwards, 2009; Kim and Bahry, 2008). Instead, I focus only on South America in order to identify the reasons that presidents fail in high risk countries in a high risk region. My goal for this dissertation is to identify the causal mechanisms behind presidential failure. Investigating those countries in which presidential failure is occurring most frequently in the world allows me to trace the path of this phenomenon and isolate the causal mechanisms behind failure. I utilize a multi-method approach with three distinct levels of analysis to isolate the causal factors that explain presidential failure. I draw upon cross-national, national, and individual studies of presidential failure because this allows me to compare processes at different levels of analysis and identify what factors result in failure. Over the course of this dissertation I address a variety of questions. What factors generally increase the likelihood that presidents across the South American region will not complete their presidency?
terms? What features explain repeated presidential failure in two specific cases? Why do individuals rise up in protest against presidents?

The dissertation consists of three distinct sections to address these questions. First, I perform cross-national, statistical analysis to identify what factors increase a president’s risk of failure. Second, I examine two countries with repeated presidential failure – Ecuador and Argentina – in order to identify how the nature of certain organizing structures, political parties and civil society organizations, influence presidential failure. Third, I analyze citizens’ participation in popular mobilizations in these two countries. I identify that a driving causal factor in presidential failure is the mobilizing capacity of key political actors, and this mobilizing capacity is visible at all levels of analysis. Each chapter will demonstrate how actors’ mobilizing capacity drove presidential failure in these cases.

Cross-National Explanations of Failure

The first portion of this dissertation, a cross-national statistical analysis, uses a survival model to investigate presidential failure in South American countries from 1978 to 2007. I build upon a broad literature to explain presidential instability, and I draw from earlier arguments about democratic breakdown, and then ones about presidential failure, to develop theoretical expectations. The model then identifies the factors that increase presidential risk of failure in the present day and provides a comprehensive model of this phenomenon.

The presidential failure literature has theoretical roots in investigations of Latin American democratic instability and breakdown in the form of military coups and
authoritarian rule in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Various authors advanced theories that focused on economic and structural explanations for democratic breakdown, examining internal and external conditions that affect governmental stability (Cotler, 1978; O’Donnell, 1973; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). Eventually, a heated debate emerged as other authors began to focus on the impact of institutional variables. They identified the benefits and weaknesses of different political institutions and showed how each institutional feature proved more or less likely to support the consolidation and continuance of democracy (Cheibub, 2002, 2007; Linz, 1978, 1990; Mainwaring, 1990). This institutional approach differed from the economic arguments of earlier studies and eventually continued throughout the study of democratic transition, especially as scholars sought to explain democratic recomposition as well as breakdown.

In the first writings on the topic of presidential breakdown, scholars linked the study of failed presidencies in democracies to studies of democratic breakdown by preserving this second theoretical focus on issues of political representation and institutional stability (Negretto, 2006; Pérez-Liñán, 2005; Valenzuela 2004). These institutional explanations largely addressed how features of the presidential regime create certain inherent tensions in various political relationships. Linz’s claim that presidentialism was a zero-sum game where losing candidates and parties knew they were locked out of executive power for a rigid term was soon applied to the issues of presidential breakdown (Valenzuela, 2004, p. 14). In addition, presidentialism’s focus on the figure of the president made it so that presidents who did not receive a strong electoral mandate were especially vulnerable to challenges. For a variety of reasons, the nature of the presidential system is seen as less cooperative than parliamentary ones,
prone to deadlock and conflict that increased the likelihood of problems with presidential instability (Valenzuela, 2004, p. 16). These vulnerabilities have not proved as problematic as expected for regime stability in later studies (Cheibub, 2007), but they may still be important for explaining the instability of presidents.

Since virtually all of Latin America’s democratic regimes are presidential, they would share a set of general stressors. In addition, most institutional arguments also include the electoral/party system, which varies more and can magnify or dampen the impact of presidentialism’s hazards. In particular, presidentialism may become much more problematic when joined with the proportional representation electoral systems and resulting multiple parties that are common in Latin America (Mainwaring, 1993). For example, Linz famously pointed to the problem of dual legitimacy that exists within the presidential system because both the executive and legislative branches are independently elected (Linz, 1978). Especially if support for the president’s party in the congress dips lower and makes him/her a minority president, the un-reconciled dual legitimacy becomes much more problematic.

The role of legislative minorities has also been used to explain the occurrence of legislative-executive conflict and interrupted presidencies through examination of coalition conditions and presidential party control over the median and veto legislator (Negretto, 2006, p. 87). When comparing executive and legislative government dissolutions, presidential removal had been occurring more frequently in recent years than congressional dissolution, instances in which the president suspends congress to change its makeup (Pérez-Liñán, 2005, p. 56). Recent demilitarization, “institutional imbalances” that provided simpler legal paths for presidential removal, and constitutional
stability have created a situation of congressional supremacy that strengthened the legislature and allowed for presidential removal (Pérez-Liñán, 2005, p. 57). The institutional mechanisms of these presidential regimes, matched with their electoral systems, create weak arrangements that result in instability.

These institutional weaknesses are compounded by other factors that help drive presidential failure. Pérez-Liñán conducted a comprehensive assessment in his book *Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America*, which examines presidential impeachment as a new form of instability that results from several factors that have changed due the democratization process and the absence of military intervention (2007). He contended that when media exposed executive corruption and the president lacked congressional control, social mobilization with legislative support could drive presidential impeachment (Pérez-Liñán, 2007). Similarly, presidents were more likely to not complete their terms when they had been linked to scandal, had a perceived neoliberal policy bias, and had minority legislative support (Hochstetler, 2006, p. 409). Aside from these contributing factors, the interactions of street protest and legislatures explain how presidential failure occurs (Hochstetler, 2006). Kim and Bahry have assessed the influence of institutional, economic, and social factors on presidential stability around the globe with logit analysis (Kim and Bahry, 2008). Lastly, Álvarez and Marsteintredet perform a multinomial logit analysis, taking into account numerous variables, and identifying various factors that influence the likelihood of presidential failure, including prolonged recession, antigovernment demonstrations, and the number of political parties, among other factors (2010).
Initial institutional arguments provide a basic theoretical foundation for explaining the region’s propensity for presidential failure. Institutional arrangements serve as fault lines in Latin American governments. On top of these lines, performance-related factors such as scandal and protest, as well as economic variables, influence the likelihood of presidential failure. These other factors are the seismic waves that disrupt the weakened systems. As Przeworski and Limongi state, “What destabilizes regimes are economic crises, and democracies, particularly poor democracies, are extremely vulnerable to bad economic performance” (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997, p. 169). A country may possess underlying institutional weaknesses, but performance-related events trigger breakdown (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997, p. 169). Presidential failure is similar to democratic breakdown because the characteristics of presidential systems create fragility and the non-institutional features increase the risk that a president will fail.

In Chapter Two, I draw together this theory regarding institutional weaknesses and event-related problems to identify what factors influence presidential failure. First, I evaluate institutional claims regarding the inherent weaknesses of the presidential system by assessing if minority legislative support and initial popular vote results increase the risk of failure. Second, I assess how economic factors, in the form of neoliberal policy implementation, inflation, and prolonged recession, influence presidential failure. Finally, I examine how performance-related variables, like social unrest and executive wrongdoing, matter. In this process, I identify how social protest and minority legislative support, as well as other variables, increase the likelihood that a president will leave before the end of his/her term.
I use survival (duration) modeling to determine how the risk of failure changes over a president’s term. Differing from simple logit models, the survival analysis develops a baseline survivor function for presidents, and then I can identify how other variables influence the time until presidents fall. This model is a time-until-event analysis and allows us to see how different factors influence the likelihood that a president will fail to complete his/her term in office. In sum, this analysis provides the base, statistical assessment of why presidents fail across South America, which in turn drives the investigations of other sections of the dissertation.

**Country-Specific Presidential Failure**

The statistical analysis lays the foundation for understanding countries with repeated presidential failure. I identify quantitatively what factors place presidents at risk, but I use qualitative analysis to show how presidents fall. The importance of legislative opposition and social protest emerges from the survival model. There is no simple measurable interaction between a president’s legislative support and protest levels. Instead, I look to the repeated nature of presidential failure in certain countries in an attempt to identify the impact that legislative support and protest have. I examine presidential failure in Ecuador and Argentina, in order to understand how political actors push for the removal of unpopular presidents.

To state the obvious, it makes the most sense to trace the process of presidential failure in places where presidents have failed. Ecuador and Argentina are critical cases for this analysis because each country has faced repeated presidential failure. More than that, they are very different countries within this high-risk region. Perhaps not “most different” cases, Ecuador and Argentina still possess important distinctions that allow for
case study comparison. Historically, the two countries have uniquely different colonial experiences. Argentina avoided much of Spanish colonizers’ direct control, while Ecuador played a more instrumental role in the colonial system and witnessed many of the revolutionary efforts that ultimately resulted in independence. As a growing democracy, Argentina saw the influx of a large number of European immigrants, which created a distinctive culture and an organized working class. Ecuador grew with a different social structure, as a large indigenous population has fought for increased political inclusion. Over the past century, Argentina has emerged economically as a regional leader, despite periodic economic crises, whereas Ecuador has been less economically successful in the region and has dollarized its economy. All of these differences do not make the two countries true opposites, but they do mark extremes on the South American continent. I will be analyzing why these dissimilar nations have had the same problem of presidential instability by isolating important factors that they do both possess.

Two key similarities do exist between these countries – the declining role of the military in the public sphere and the growing adherence to democratic norms. Since the return to democracy, both countries, like many others in South America, have seen diminishing power in the hands of the military. Oppressive tendencies of the last dictatorships combined with new international norms that support democracy have all weakened the ability of the military to step into office in instances of legislative gridlock or social unrest. Changes occurred as to how democracy was perceived, especially by the military and other rightist groups (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 1995, p. 46). The military’s declining importance as an actor, along with greater global respect for
democracy, makes military intervention in the form of a coup less desirable in moments of gridlock or instability. Instead, leadership instability has been channeled through constitutional paths, like resignation and impeachment, leading to the recent trends in presidential failure. Whereas conflict in the past might have been dealt with by military intervention, the military is simply not as committed to overt acts that disrupt democratic stability. National, regional, and international pressures all oppose these types of actions. The new wave of democratization has experienced far more failure than breakdown.

The importance of both legislative minorities and social protest highlighted by quantitative analysis led me to assess how political actors influence presidential failure in these countries. A potentially key factor that exists in both countries is the presence of parties and organizations that have the capacity to mobilize support – in Spanish, poder de convocatoria (power to convoke/rallying power). Both of these groups have the capacity to rally their constituents or members against a president. In Argentina, this actor is a political party; in Ecuador it is a social movement. Despite these differences, both actors have a capacity to mobilize against presidents. Through their relationships with their base support, they are able to activate sustained opposition to presidents whose performance is lacking, either because of scandal or poor economic outcomes.

Presidential systems have fault lines created by institutional arrangements, and specific events can activate these faults, weakening government. The mobilizing actors can amplify those shock waves at times, leading to presidential failure. Drawing from classic social movement theory, these actors can be viewed as “mobilizing structures,” which are those organizations that resolve the inherent collective action problems in social mobilization (McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow, 1997). Although this is not the traditional use
of this term, this analysis will show that those actors, the Peronist Party (PJ - Partido Justicialista) and CONAIE (an Ecuadorian indigenous organization), possessed the mobilizing capacity to rally supporters against presidents, which allowed for the repeated failure of executives in these two countries.

In addition, the distinct nature of these political actors as well as the differences between the two countries provides additional insight into the process of presidential failure. Argentina, with a stable party structure and economic success, demonstrates a process of presidential failure that moved from the elites to the masses. In Ecuador, with a less stable democracy and a weaker economy, presidential failure moved from the grassroots up to political party elites, who ultimately removed multiple presidents.

**Argentine Presidential Failure**

Two elected presidents of Argentina, Alfonsín in 1989 and De la Rúa in 2001, were forced out of office before the end of their terms during the current democratic period. Both Alfonsín and De la Rúa\(^3\) were from the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), and faced similar problems with faltering legislative support, street protests, and economic policy implementation. In addition, after De la Rúa’s fall, presidential succession consisted of the entrance and exit of several presidents in a matter of weeks. I look at one of these failures in order to show how the Peronist Party mobilized against one of its own. The repeated occurrence of presidential failure in Argentina allows us to see the Peronist Party’s organizing capacity in these distinct instances, find similarities in presidents’ failures, and identify the processes of Argentine presidential failure. We can

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\(^3\) President De la Rúa was from the UCR party. However, he was elected president as part of a coalition between the UCR and the Frente País Solidario (FREPASO) known as the Alianza (Alliance).
see how this organizational capacity was instrumental in the decision making of presidential succession.

Argentina has ranked high on measures of democracy when compared to the rest of South America. It is a large country with an expansive economy, despite periodic economic crises, and has retained its standing as one of the economic leaders in the region. In addition, it has maintained a relatively stable party system with strong connections between certain parties and labor unions that transformed into clientelist linkages (Levitsky, 2003a). Argentina shares none of these characteristics with Ecuador, which is comparatively economically unsuccessful, has never had an institutionalized party system, and has had generally low levels of democracy (see Chapter Four). Despite the differences, Argentina and Ecuador share the dubious distinction of having exceptionally large numbers of presidents removed from office. The following analysis of the Argentine case shows how an opposition political party with the capacity to secure mass opposition can, through a combination of legislative challenges and popular protest, drive legitimately elected presidents from office. Later, through an examination of the Ecuadoran case, I will show that the same combination of legislative maneuver and mass protest can occur through a contrasting dynamic in which mass organizations catalyze party action rather than the other way around. Aside from its comparative value, Argentina allows me to examine variations in the Peronists’ mobilizing capacity over time, increasing since the return to democracy, and diminishing only recently during the presidency of Cristina Kirchner.

My survival analysis and the quantitative studies of other scholars support my focus on political actors’ capacity to utilize minority legislative support and popular
protest to challenge presidents. Corruption, minority legislative support, and neoliberal policy have all been found significant in explaining presidential failure, but social protest, specifically violent protest, is also an essential element in presidential failure (Hochstetler 2006). In addition, presidential scandal and popular unrest, when mixed with the absence of a “legislative shield,” creates the possibility for presidential impeachment (Peréz-Liñan, 2007).

These arguments, along with my own statistical analysis, lead me to consider that factors not previously assessed in the Argentine cases of presidential failure may be important. I theorize that the ability of political parties and civil society organizations to mobilize opposition to presidents, represented in the statistical analysis as minority legislative support and protest, is at the heart of this issue. Whereas inflation rates and personal corruption may engender opposition to a president, I argue that some actor with both legislative and mobilizing capacity is essential for a presidential failure to occur. Ongoing patterns of such dual capacity explain when countries become susceptible to repeated failure. I am unable to quantitatively evaluate this capacity, as the informal links and actions of this political actor are difficult to see consistently, much less across time and over a variety of countries. Instead, I look to qualitative analysis to map this mechanism.

This theoretical perspective is also informed by the case literature on Argentine presidential failures. Much of this literature points to singular, idiosyncratic features to explain specific instances of presidential failure, thereby ignoring the consistent non-institutional cause that exists in Argentine politics – the relationship between the Peronist Party and its base. In these instances of presidential failure, the Peronist Party wields that
power to call its base into action. The literature can be broken down into institutionalist and agency-centered approaches to Argentine presidential failure. These approaches miss the importance of the Peronists’ mobilizing capacity, even though the agency-centered approaches provide support for my larger argument.

On the institutionalist side, the “quasi-parliamentary” nature of Argentine presidential succession contributed to De la Rúa’s failure, while preventing it from leading to outright democratic breakdown (Schamis, 2002). Problems within the Alianza coalition, from which De la Rúa was elected, contributed to his presidential failure as well (Schamis, 2002, p. 87). Schamis notes that changes in the Argentine constitution, which he sees occurring in 1994 with an agreement between Alfonsín and Menem, placed greater power in the legislative branch by allowing Congress to choose the chief executive officer in the wake of resignation or impeachment and in the absence of a vice president (Schamis, 2002, p. 90). On another side of this debate, Mustapic (2005) contends that De la Rúa’s failure resulted from the problems of divided government and unilateral executive decision-making. De la Rúa faced problems in his administration, which were exacerbated when Vice President Carlos “Chacho” Álvarez resigned his position due to a coalition corruption scandal. Mustapic argues that the divided government, the absence of a vice president, and the presence of a 1975 presidential succession law (ley de acefalía) provided the Peronists with the legislative power to choose the presidential successor (2005).

Although Mustapic and Schamis disagree on the source of this constitutional element, with Mustapic correctly locating it in the 1975 (not the 1994) law, and how it affects presidentialism, the institutional change made it both attractive and safe for PJ
legislators to challenge a president because they could do so without risking a democratic breakdown, and because their legislative strength meant that they would choose the fallen president's successors in the case of De la Rúa. Lastly, Llanos argues that minority legislative support helps explain presidential failure (2010). Midterm elections accentuate presidential weakness because an opposition-controlled legislature creates an additional threat for the president (Llanos, 2010). She moves toward an agency-centered approach by acknowledging the role of presidents as well (Llanos, 2010).

The Schamis and Mustapic explanations show how institutional features increased the instability faced by the De la Rúa government. However, the Peronists did not use this avenue under the Alfonsín failure, when they were capable of achieving their goals in a different manner. Instead, they were able to push for a transition to the soon-to-be inaugurated President Menem. In all of these arguments, the institutional mechanisms are simply avenues that permit the Peronist challenge; they are tools rather than causes. As one local Socialist Party leader noted, “This [presidential failure] is the Argentine problem. No presidents complete their office unless it is permitted by Justicialismo [Justicialism – the ideology of Peronism]” (G. Traba, personal interview, 2010). Chapter Three will show that the Peronist Party acted against non-Peronist presidents to achieve party dominance, using its position of power as an opposition party and taking advantage of whatever institutional mechanisms existed. After events emerged that threatened UCR presidents, Peronists were recalcitrant in solving problems and persistent in pursuing opposition to these presidents. Moreover, they utilized their ability to foster social movement and legislative opposition to push out these presidents.
Other scholars have examined the role of specific agents in bringing De la Rúa down. For instance, Malamud argues that key mayors promoted popular unrest and provincial governors sought De la Rúa’s ousting (Malamud, Forthcoming). Additionally, provincial governments made the ultimate decision-making in the presidential succession game (Malamud, Forthcoming). My analysis supports much of Malamud’s argument, but relates the events of De la Rúa’s failure back to how the Peronist Party is able to repeatedly rally its base support. In contrast, other agency-centered approaches make De la Rúa the protagonist of his own failure, pointing to his distinctive political style as a key component of presidential crisis in 2001 (Llanos and Margheritis, 2006). They argue that De la Rúa’s weak leadership made coalition support low, while he isolated himself by making unilateral decisions (Llanos and Margheritis, 2006). In both of these accounts, the role of agency is highlighted in the decisions of key political figures, but the greater role of opposition party agency seems important as well, given the repeated challenges from the Peronist Party. For instance, Malamud (Forthcoming) shows that the Peronist Party, specifically its governors, met and strategically identified the path to Peronist power. Similarly, Llanos and Margheritis (2006) identify De la Rúa’s distinctive style, much like Mustapic, but they do not acknowledge the contrary position of the Peronist Party, refusing to assist in resolving emerging problems. All of these arguments, although different in nature, play into the theoretical argument of this dissertation by showing how the nature of the Peronist Party, as well as its ability to mobilize civil society, is the common factor that stands behind Argentine presidential failure.

The importance of the party’s role in challenging presidents will be further discussed in the country analysis. However, looking to Linz provides some insight into
this phenomenon. Using his language, the role of the Peronists is as a “disloyal opposition” (Linz, 1978). They stand as a consistent opposition party that prevents presidents from other parties from completing their terms. Other scholars, like Peréz-Liñan, describe the very manner in which Peronists impede opposition presidents. In his book, Peréz-Liñan acknowledges the importance of the riots and protest in creating opposition for De la Rúa, and he notes that the Peronist bloc played an obstructionist role (Peréz-Liñan, 2007). For example, Radicals worked with Peronists trying to form a coalition during the final stages of the de la Rúa’s failure. After these negotiations fell apart and civil unrest continued, the Peronists signaled that they were to begin impeachment processes against the president, prompting De la Rúa’s resignation (2007, pp. 179-180). In addition, the obstructionist nature of the Peronists is glimpsed by their congressional might as well. During every UCR presidency since the return to democracy in 1983, state governorships and senate seats were held by a Peronist plurality or, more often, majority (Treisman, 2004, p. 405). Even though the UCR held a plurality of the Chamber of Deputies during De la Ruá’s and Alfonsín’s presidency, they only held an absolute majority of the seats during the first four years of Alfonsín’s term (Treisman, 2004, p. 405). In other words, UCR, and its later coalition – the Alianza, did not hold a majority from 1987-1989 or from 1999-2001, the years in which Radical presidents were removed (Treisman, 2004, p. 405). The goal of Chapter Three is not to paint the Peronists negatively, but instead demonstrate how the nature of the party and its mobilizing capacity allows for social mobilization matched with legislative obstruction, which was wielded against presidents.
Ecuadorean Presidential Failure

More than any country in South America, Ecuador provides a compelling case for study of the repeated instances of presidential failure. Ecuador has experienced the most persistent pattern of presidential failures in the region, with the three most recently elected presidents, excluding current President Correa, failing to complete their terms in office. Whereas Argentina is exemplary in regards to party stability and economic success, Ecuador has not shown itself to be a regional leader. Ecuador features a weak party system with high volatility. Historically, the small country, largely depending on petroleum for much of its exports, has not been a regional achiever. Ecuador has experienced persistent economic uncertainty, with a severe banking crisis in 1999-2000. Whereas Argentina stands as a leader in South America, Ecuador has experienced governmental instability and lack of economic success. This comparison also allows for us to see the grassroots-based nature of presidential failure in Ecuador.

Aside from its comparative value when matched with Argentina, this study looks at presidential failure in Ecuador due to the extensive nature of the phenomenon. To be precise, Ecuador is interesting, in itself, for its presidential instability. In 1997, Ecuador faced its first instance of presidential failure in the early removal of President Abdalá Bucaram, as he was charged with being unfit to govern due to mental incapacity. The next election resulted in the presidency of Jamil Mahuad, who also failed to complete his term in office when he was forced to resign in the face of military and social movement opposition. Finally, the 2005 removal of President Lucio Gutiérrez was the third instance of failure for an elected president in Ecuador. Congress determined that he “abandoned his post” when he was forced from the presidential palace by mobs of angry protesters.
With these three instances of presidential failure, Ecuador is a critical case in the study of presidential failure due to its persistent and repeated nature. The most recent president, Correa, has successfully completed terms in office and achieved reelection. Despite achieving what the previous three presidents could not, Correa has still faced challenges. This investigation intends to trace the events leading up to the failures of Bucaram, Mahuad, and Gutiérrez, identifying the critical structural capacity of indigenous organizations. Then, I provide analysis of the most important challenge to President Correa in order to show how these social groups have reacted differently, preventing his early removal or resignation.

Unlike scholars of Argentine presidential failure, relatively few scholars have focused on Ecuadorian presidential instability in itself. In general, those scholars that have been interested in Ecuadorian political instability viewed it as a consequence of social mobilization and as a precursor to constitutional change. In the more general literature on presidential failure, scholars have used Ecuador to support their larger arguments about presidential failure in the region. These past examinations of Ecuadorian presidential instability provide insight into the various problems that have led to repeated failure. I will briefly discuss the findings of these scholars in an attempt to identify what factors have been shown to be significant in previous studies of Ecuadorian presidential failure.

Of the scholars that look at specific instances of presidential failure in Ecuador, most take a normative stance in regards to Ecuador’s political future. Shifter discusses Ecuadorian political instability and contends that Ecuador faces severe problems in regards to future stability, stemming from inherent political, geographic, and social
divisions (Shifter, 2004). Lucero (2001) expresses greater approval as he describes the importance of economic conditions and the push by indigenous organizations in the removal of President Mahuad. He notes that, despite the presence of military personnel in this removal, the indigenous organizations provide an opportunity for the deepening of democracy in Ecuador and hope for future executive leadership (Lucero, 2001). Bridging the optimism and pessimism of these earlier scholars, Zamosc makes a more nuanced argument regarding the impact of indigenous organizations’ influence on democracy. Noting their presence in the overthrow of Mahuad, Zamosc cites the negative contributions made by the movement, while acknowledging their other more positive effects (Zamosc, 2007). These scholars describe and note the importance of many actors in the failure of Ecuadorian presidents, but few make causal arguments, aside from speculation. In general, these pieces look at the larger issue of democracy, crises, and the future of Ecuadorian politics.

Whereas the previous scholars note the importance of key actors and historical elements, cross-national analysis tends to overlook the specific details of Ecuadorian cases. Scholars analyze a variety of institutional, economic, and event-related variables, from the same theoretical bases as in other countries. Despite this, they pay little attention to the conditions specific to the Ecuadorian cases. Uniquely, legislative coalition durability, impacted by institutional reforms, is identified as the factor driving presidential instability in one study (Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich, 2010, p. 74). This piece coincides with much of the cross-national analysis on this topic, pointing to the importance of institutional factors, specifically coalitions, in supporting presidential stability (Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich, 2010). Likewise, Pérez-Liñán discusses the
specific case of Bucaram’s failure, acknowledging the slight difference due to the declaration of incapacity (2007). This instance of failure is used, like other cases, to discuss Pérez-Liñán’s larger claims about impeachment in Latin America, specifically dealing with scandal, economic problems, and lack of a legislative shield (2007).

This background information shows how previous researchers have analyzed presidential failure in Ecuador. This country has been largely overlooked in the study of failure. When researched by itself, Ecuadorian presidential failure has been depicted as a perfect storm, with a variety of actors and social, economic, and political concerns creating problems for presidential stability. On the other hand, Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich (2010) support the argument of Llanos and Marsteintredet, claiming that legislative issues are paramount, while social movements are additional elements in the events of presidential breakdown (Llanos and Marsteintredet, 2010a, 2010b). Meanwhile, Pérez-Liñán uses one case of Ecuadorian presidential failure to support his arguments as well (Pérez-Liñán, 2007). Ecuadorian presidential failure still provides an avenue for investigation into this phenomenon because I contend that the likely mechanism, mobilizing capacity, is different than previously argued.

**Individual Protest Participation in Presidential Failure**

The final step will be a quantitative analysis of individual views and participation in contentious politics as measured by popular opinion surveys in Ecuador and Argentina. The qualitative case studies demonstrate the importance of mass mobilization in determining whether presidents fall; the assessment of survey data allows me to identify why citizens choose to participate in such mobilizations. Furthermore, I assess how
individuals’ participation in social protest is connected to their views of parties and presidents. If the process of presidential failure is about mobilizing capacity, is it visible from all levels of analysis? As individual acts of social protest are the foundation of the mass protests that are essential to understanding presidential failure, this component of the research will seek to identify how individuals pursue participation and how that participation drives presidential failure.

The analysis of cross-national, individual survey data is possible through recent Latinobarómetro and World Values Survey datasets. By looking at studies that occurred in the year after presidential failure in each of these countries, I assess how political actors with the capacity to serve as a rallying point (poder de convocatoria) contribute to protest participation. From Ecuadorian civil society organizations to Argentine unions, individual participation with these connections demonstrates that mobilizing structures contribute to social protest at the individual level. Moreover, I examine the potential opposition that indigenous groups in Ecuador may present to governments by evaluating if indigenous individuals display distinct patterns of participation in contentious political acts.

Although some scholars have presented arguments that rest largely on institutional explanations (Negretto, 2006; Pérez-Liñán, 2005; Valenzuela, 2004), almost all acknowledge that social protest plays a role in presidential failure (Álvarez and Marsteintredet, 2010; Hochstetler, 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards, 2009; Kim and Bahry, 2008; Pérez-Liñán, 2005, 2007; Valenzuela, 2004). Social protest is present in most, if not all, instances of presidential failure, and violent protest has an additional influence in presidential failure (Hochstetler, 2006, p. 403). Social protest contributes to the
likelihood of presidential failure for Latin American countries, but not globally (Kim and Bahry, 2008). Again, my second chapter’s survival analysis mirrors these results, showing that social protest is a significant factor in decreasing the likelihood that South American presidents will complete their terms. Along with this focus in the political science literature, common wisdom points to the importance of social protest in presidential failure, and these protests serve as a central component in the collective remembrance of presidential failure. From blocking highways in Bolivia to crowding into the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, protesters have been a repeated component of this new political phenomenon.

Protest is theoretically important in understanding presidential failure due to a variety of reasons. Public outrage creates a unique dilemma for presidential regimes:

Protests can face a president with a quandary. Unchecked demonstrations may rage beyond bounds, but the use of force against them can backfire. The personalization of authority in the figure of the president adds a particularly vexing dimension. Failures of government are viewed not as failures of a party or movement, but as failures of the chief executive himself (Valenzuela, 2004, p. 12).

When citizens focus on the president, social protest can unite with congressional pressure to incite presidential failure (Valenzuela, 2004). The president is easily targeted for failures of the administration (Valenzuela, 2004). More than that, social protest can weaken presidential support because it expresses and deepens public outrage over scandals and economic problems (Pérez-Liñán, 2007). In other words, the presidential system highlights the role of the president, and corruption or economic woes provide easy fodder for presidential street opposition. If this mobilization involves a group with organizational capacity, an even more treacherous threat emerges. Pérez-Liñán touches on this idea, noting, “Public outrage can be the product of unpopular policies or watchdog
politics, but mobilization, irrespective of its origins, is most lethal when it translates into broad social movements involving the participation of multiple political sectors” (Pérez-Liñán, 2007, p. 188).

Providing one of the few opposing perspectives on this topic, Llanos and Marsteintredet argue that protest mobilizations that challenge presidents from the streets generally occur in the final stage of presidential failure, and presidential problems with the legislature actually drive breakdown (Llanos and Marsteintredet, 2010a, p. 216). Llanos and Marsteintredet acknowledge, “Additionally, it is an open question how the extent to which street demonstrations are spontaneous or orchestrated from above, and the degree of involvement of opposition forces…makes a difference” (Llanos and Marsteintredet, 2010a, p. 216). My investigation into the causes of individual protest participation in countries with repeated presidential failure contributes to this effort because it deals with all of this literature explicitly. I assess how social protest, generated by mobilizing actors like parties, unions, and existing social movement organizations, is the key element in explaining presidential failure, which addresses the concerns of protest orchestration at the same time. From this perspective, inquiries into why citizens are protesting in countries of repeated presidential failure address the concerns of Llanos and Marsteintredet, even if they do not view street challenges as instrumental in explaining presidential failure.

Past research shows a consistent focus on the role of social protest in presidential failure. Some case studies argue for the possible relationship between economic policy or scandal with public unrest while statistical examinations show a significant relationship between protest and failure. Each of these scholars argues, in his/her own
way, that contentious politics has played a role in most, if not all, cases of presidential failure. Almost all authors focus on the consequences of protest without acknowledging the reasons for protest activity despite this general consensus that protest influences the likelihood of presidential failure. From the work of Kim and Bahry (2008) to that of Hochstetler (2006), scholars evaluate the influence of mass mobilizations on presidential stability without examining why citizens take to the streets. My study uses individual-level data to examine what factors predict whether a given individual took to the streets rather than assuming the triggers for citizen protest mobilization.

Although all of the previous literature has built on the question of presidential failure, the final portion of this dissertation asks a different question: why do individuals protest in countries with repeated histories of presidential failure? I assess the individual determinants of protest participation by looking at surveys from two countries with repeated presidential failure. Do individuals in Argentina and Ecuador possess the same attitudes and social connections? Are protest participants in these countries from similar demographic or cleavage groups? Overall, this analysis combines the presidential failure literature, which shows that protest is a key explanatory component, with the vast topic of protest participation. Then, it uses individual citizen responses from two very different cases to see if mobilizing actors are visible in protest participation.

In order to explain this phenomenon, I draw from a completely different body of literature on this topic. Providing an early comprehensive discussion of protest participation, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady created a “civic voluntarism model,” which described three categories of variables that affect the likelihood of participation: resources, recruitment networks, and political engagement (Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady, 1995, p. 471). This categorization is repeated throughout other participation literature. Various other scholars use these same general three categories, but with different titles for them (Klesner, 2007; Norris, 2002; Schussman and Soule, 2005).

“Resources” generate participation because individuals with greater time and resource accessibility – measured by variables like age, education, and income – will be more likely to participate (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). “Recruitment networks” are those linkages that assist in citizen participation by providing support, knowledge, and civic skill-building (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). “Political engagement” factors are those variables that account for an individual’s knowledge and attitudes towards politics (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). My analysis builds on this work by using the variables from previous studies and applying them to specific cases – countries with repeated presidential failure.

Based on this literature, the individual-level assessment of survey responses questions how individual demographics, organizational participation, and attitudes may explain why citizens participated in social protests. To address the issue of personal demographics, I evaluate if individual characteristics will make a person more or less likely to participate in acts of social contention. Next, I look at how organizations influence the likelihood of participation. Finally, I assess how attitudes affect participation. Presidential failure is occurring because individuals are protesting, so I examine what factors bring them into the streets.

**Dissertation Summary**

This dissertation project addresses the causes of presidential failure in a unique manner by developing a multi-level approach to understand this new phenomenon in
South America. Chapter Two presents a cross-national survival analysis of what factors foreshorten presidencies. In pursuing the national-level explanations of repeated presidential failure, Chapter Three tracks the processes behind two Argentine presidential failures, stressing the importance of the Peronist Party’s ability to both mobilize legislative and street opposition. In comparison, Chapter Four looks at the bottom-up process of repeated presidential failure in Ecuador, highlighting the role of indigenous organizations in executive removal. Chapter Five presents logit analyses of individual participation in these two countries, identifying why citizens protest in countries with repeated failure and comparing them with each other and global explanations of protest participation. Finally, Chapter Six concludes by questioning the implications presidential failure has for South American countries.

This project examines presidential failure from a unique perspective, through multiple methods and levels of analysis. One important lesson of this project is that political party and civil society organizations are a central factor in presidential failure. Moreover, these components stand out at all levels of analysis in this project. Citizens take to the streets of their own volition, but the mobilizing capacity of parties/groups and individuals contribute to the likelihood of this happening. The presence of organizations with this mobilizing capacity has created countries with a high likelihood of repeated failure, which is visible in qualitative comparative assessments as well as in cross-national statistical analyses.
CHAPTER TWO: UNIFYING MODELS OF PRESIDENTIAL FAILURE

Between 1978 and 2007, 11 elected presidents left office before the end of their terms in the 10 Spanish and Portuguese-speaking South American countries (see Table 1). Various scholars have examined the causes of presidential failure, but this chapter intends to resolve several methodological issues in these investigations. In addition, I plan to lay the foundation for the project in general by identifying the cross-national trends of presidential instability. This chapter examines presidential failure in South America, where the phenomenon appears to be occurring at a higher rate than in presidential regimes in other parts of the globe (Hochstetler and Edwards, 2009). Hochstetler and Edwards (2009) find that South American presidents exhibit more of the risk factors for presidential challenge and failure than their global counterparts, and this anomaly drives my investigation here to further understanding of presidential instability in the region. Aside from narrowing my focus to the South American region, I perform a comprehensive analysis of presidential failure that builds upon this literature theoretically and methodologically. First, this analysis focuses on the importance of economic variables in explaining presidential failure. Second, it uses a more appropriate method of analysis for looking at this issue: duration analysis.

In many case studies and popular explanations of these failed presidencies, the role of the economy is central: scholars argue that presidents become threatened due to their neoliberal policies or their inability to control inflation or generate growth (Sanín, 2005; Silva, 2009). Explanations of democratic regime breakdown, such as Guillermo O’Donnell’s iconic work on the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, pointed to the
importance of economic models and exigencies for that earlier generation of military-led presidential failures as well (O’Donnell, 1973; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). Finally, large literatures on economic voting and the importance of economic performance in popular evaluations of political leaders (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1981; Weyland, 1998) also support the idea that the early removal of presidents may also be due to economic factors. Yet economic factors appear only occasionally in existing studies of presidential failure and are inconsistently measured – sometimes as policy orientations, sometimes as various economic outcomes.

As noted in the previous literature review, the first wave of scholars to look at this research on presidential failure began by investigating the literature regarding democratic breakdown. They assessed various features of politics that arise from the presidential regime itself, as well as accompanying institutional choices. Among the most important is the choice of electoral systems, which tend to produce party systems that in turn affect a president’s level of support in the legislature. Their arguments build on previous literature, specifically the work of Juan Linz (1978, 1990), which argues that the presidential regime itself is the cause of regime instability in presidential systems (Negretto, 2006; Pérez-Liñán, 2005; Valenzuela, 2004). Despite this focus on the institutions of presidentialism, many of these scholars acknowledged various other factors that influenced presidential failure. Later scholars furthered these investigations by studying the possible importance of non-institutional variables, such as executive wrongdoing and protest, in explaining presidential failure (Hochstetler, 2006; Pérez-Liñán, 2003, 2007). A more recent book that examines a full range of presidential breakdowns is oriented around this debate from a more holistic perspective, drawing
together these previous studies to argue that legislative action is the key explanation for breakdown and street protests are merely last-stage events (Llanos and Marsteintredet, 2010b).

Potential economic causes have been considered in these past studies, including Hochstetler (2006), who includes a measure of economic policy orientation, and Pérez-Liñán (2007), who examines several economic performance variables. Finally, Álvarez and Marsteintredet evaluate economic causes in their logit model, showing that prolonged recession influences the likelihood of presidential breakdown, while inflation does not (2010). However, looking at both economic policies, specifically neoliberalism, as well as economic conditions, is not common. This chapter attempts to extend the literature and examine the crucial role of economic factors in explaining recent presidential fates in Latin America by comprehensively including these variables in a survival model. I evaluate if both 1) neoliberalism (economic liberalization) and 2) economic conditions significantly affect presidential survival in South America. By examining neoliberalism and actual economic conditions, this chapter demonstrates how these economic factors can independently prove detrimental to presidents, while still assessing complementary institutional and performance-related factors. When looking at a unified approach to this model, do economic variables matter? I intend to analyze the importance of these factors to elucidate the causes of presidential failure.

Besides examining these issues from a new explanatory framework, this chapter argues for the use of a more appropriate method of analysis for the study of presidential failure. I use a Cox proportional hazards model to examine presidencies from 1978 until
2007 in 10 South American countries.\textsuperscript{4} Survival (duration) modeling takes into account time-based phenomena by assessing how multiple variables affect the time elapsed before an event occurs. The models I use do not assume a specific baseline hazard, allowing this to vary. Survival modeling has gained acceptance in the study of cabinet survival in parliamentarism and resolves some of the problems of earlier investigations into presidential failure, which used logit models. Logit models are not fully appropriate for studying this topic because they do not take into account the importance of time-based phenomena (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez, 2002). In effect, survival modeling will enhance understanding of how these covariates influence the risk of failure, which cannot be seen with simple logistic regression.

This chapter’s analysis incorporates previously untested economic and neoliberal policy variables into a statistical model that more correctly specifies the dependent variable as the risk of failure in any one year of a president’s term. The goal is to identify what institutional factors create a weakened institutional setting and what events create risk factors for failure. In performing this testing, the importance of some variables becomes clear, as civil protest, executive wrongdoing, and specific measures of economic hardship — inflation and prolonged recession — appear to be influential risk factors for presidential failure. In addition, majority legislative support remains significant, supporting early arguments regarding the influence of presidential institutions. In sum, this investigation provides a unique perspective on presidential survival, while evaluating the importance of previously excluded variables in a comprehensive manner.

\textsuperscript{4} Countries enter the dataset in 1978 if democratic. However, if undemocratic, they enter in the year of their return to democracy. Thus, countries enter as: Argentina (1983), Bolivia (1982), Brazil (1990), Chile (1990), Columbia (1978), Ecuador (1979), Paraguay (1993), Peru (1980), Uruguay (1985), Venezuela (1979). In addition, countries drop out in specific years after a presidential failure, until another elected president comes into office.
The Need for Several Economic Variables

Other scholars have examined the importance of economic factors on democratic breakdowns (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997) as well as presidential failure (Hochstetler, 2006; Kim and Bahry, 2008; Pérez-Liñán, 2007), and this chapter continues in this evaluation of how these factors influence when presidents may be kicked out of office. In general, scholars of presidential failure have looked at economic factors in two distinct forms: 1) economic liberalization and 2) economic conditions. When looking at the role of policy, Hochstetler shows that street-based challenges emerged against ten neoliberal presidents, but only one non-neoliberal one (Hochstetler, 2006, p. 406). Moreover, scholars looking at social movements have shown how neoliberal policy implementation, in itself, may mobilize masses or create movements, contributing to failure in specific cases (Lucero, 2009; Sanín, 2005). On the other hand, Kim and Bahry argue that a declining economy places presidents at risk to not complete their terms in office (Kim and Bahry, 2008). For them, policy, in itself, is less important than actual economic conditions within a country. When applied to presidential failure, economic conditions and neoliberal policy have each been argued to independently drive citizens to participate in mass protests and oppose presidents and it seems appropriate to test their respective contributions in a single model.

Aside from the fact that they may independently drive protest, this chapter performs an assessment of both economic policy and conditions for a number of other reasons. First, the actual relationship between neoliberal policy reform and resulting economic conditions is debated within the field. For example, Brian Crisp and Michael Kelly demonstrate that the depth of market reform mildly correlates with GDP growth
and inflation control while showing some improvements in income inequality and poverty (Crisp and Kelly, 1999, p. 541). Other analyses support this argument, showing that trade liberalization can increase countries’ growth rates (Krueger, 1998). In contrast, some scholars (Huber and Solt, 2004; Korzeniewicz and Smith, 2000, Walton, 2004) have demonstrated the problems of inequality and instability created by neoliberal reform. Given this debate, a causal argument about the relationship between neoliberal policy and economic hardship cannot be taken a priori. Second, neoliberal reform may impose burdensome costs on one particular sector, and simply looking at overall poor economic performance will be unable to identify whether individuals are in opposition to the poor conditions or the policies. Third, societies may oppose neoliberal policy implementation, in itself, for fear of possible economic hardship without harsh conditions manifesting. As all of these arguments have theoretical and empirical support and initial analysis found no correlation among the variables, this investigation examines each of these variables separately rather than assuming that economic outcomes relate closely to policy choices.

Arguments and Hypotheses

This section builds on the general arguments about presidential failure to develop specific hypotheses about the causes of presidential failures. It also shows how I operationalize the variables and where I find data for the 10 Spanish and Portuguese-speaking South American countries.

First, poor economic performance obviously has material effects on citizens, and may therefore destabilize presidencies, either by triggering hostile legislative action or
mass protest activity. Linkage between economic performance and presidential survival may be particularly strong in Latin America, where the perception of a strong executive places the blame for policy outcomes on the president. In this manner, economic hardship could be a risk factor that increases the likelihood of presidential failure.

This model operationalizes economic hardship in two ways. The data for these variables are from the World Bank’s Database. The first economic variable is the inflation rate (GDP deflator). There are two ways in which inflation rates may impact the likelihood of presidential failure. First, inflation rates present an explicit hardship felt by a citizenry, as wages often do not keep up with prices and unindexed savings are wiped out. Inflation rates may create a daily reminder of economic hardship that is different from other types of economic issues. Second, inflation may have a stronger effect on poor citizens who reside on the outskirts of the formal economy, relying on a cash economy that is constantly devalued. This may drive these individuals to oppose current presidents in street-based and other informal ways. This overall disappointment, matched with targeted hardship, may lead to opposition. For these reasons, inflation presents a direct measure of a specific kind of economic hardship.

H1a: Higher levels of inflation will be associated with higher risks of presidential failure.

Using the World Bank’s data again, economic hardship is also conceptualized as prolonged recession, stemming from the work of Álvarez and Marsteintredet\(^5\) (2010). This measure is a dummy variable that is coded as a 1 if, for the two previous years, the country had negative GDP per capita growth rates (Álvarez and Marsteintredet, 2010).

\(^5\) Several other measures of GDP per capita (including GDP growth rates) were tested in this model. No other measures of GDP were ever found to be significant. This model includes this variable due to its significance in the literature on presidential failure.
As a country’s overall economic success can be assessed by change in GDP per capita, this analysis measures economic hardship by looking at prolonged decreased growth. It can be assumed that if citizens are facing poor economic conditions for several years, they may be more likely to oppose their current president.

H2a: The presence of a prolonged recession will be associated with greater risk of presidential failure.

Similarly, presidents’ policies may be another economic variable that affects the risk of an interrupted presidency. In general, a government’s implementation of neoliberal reform may result in popular expectation of hardship. Some scholars have noted that citizens oppose such reform due to its potentially harmful consequences (Hochstetler, 2006; Silva 2009; Stokes, 2001). The hardship may be imposed on specific sectors, which is difficult to identify in national economic indicators. As neither the popular expectation, nor sector-specific hardship, is easily measured, this analysis attempts to measure economic policy orientation by the openness of the economy. As mentioned previously, a causal relationship between policy and hardship may not necessarily exist, yet social and political opposition to neoliberal policy may occur anyway and drive presidents out of office for their unpopular choices. For the purposes of this model, this chapter assumes, like numerous other theorists, that citizens oppose neoliberal reform, and that this opposition creates a greater risk for presidential failure.

An index of globalization, measured by the KOF Index of Globalization’s Economic Globalization Index, is used to assess the issue of neoliberalism (Dreher, 2006).

Various other indicators were tested in this study, and each had the same result. Analysis was also performed with the KAOPEN Index (Chinn and Ito, 2006) and the index of Morley, Machado, and Pettinato (1999), and the results are consistent between all three measures. The KOF index was included in the final analysis because it provided the greatest availability of data across time.
The index looks at actual economic flows and restrictions and creates a score for each country year, with the higher the score the greater the degree of globalization. The index permits comparison of governments across the region and operationalizes levels of economic liberalization. We should expect to see that globalization has a positive impact on the risk of presidential failure.

H₃a: The higher the globalization index, the greater the risk of presidential failure.

Citizen protest is an obvious indicator of lack of government support, and protests often accompany presidential failure. Protest will be included as a variable by itself despite apparent relationships with some of the other explanatory variables. Scandal and economic hardship, for example, may help to trigger protest, but the social movements literature is clear that protest does not emerge automatically from such triggers. Instead, mass citizen protests of the kind that challenge presidents also depend on causal mechanisms specific to the movements themselves, such as potential protesters’ resources, organizing capacity and history, and ability to frame events in a way that resonates with individuals who might join them in the streets (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996). Thus many problematic events or outcomes that might seem to be objective triggers do not result in protest. Conversely, well-organized pre-existing oppositional networks may be able to mobilize large numbers of people to the streets in ways that make presidents seem unable to govern, even when the objective triggers are slight. For this reason, each variable will be examined independently in this analysis. Moreover, protest is not highly correlated with any other variables in this model, which supports its theoretical independence.
In order to assess the impact of social protest, a count variable, tallied by Hochstetler and Palma, presents the number of reported protest events within a country per year (Hochstetler and Palma, 2007, p. 5). This event count is based on protests reported in *Latin American Weekly Report*, and so includes only major national-level protest events. The actual content of protests covers a wide range of complaints, including policing and human rights demands, anti-privatization and wage claims, anti-corruption drives, among many others. This measure captures overall civilian unrest over the course of a year, and need not be expressly directed at the president. Assuming these protests are not in support of the president, and few are, they should create pressure for the president or the legislature. Any pro-president protest would lead to measurement error, which reduces the efficiency of the resulting estimates. Therefore, if the protest variable remains significant given this possible error, I can safely claim that protest is a factor in driving presidents from office. They may push the president to resign early, or encourage the legislature to try to impeach the president. Theoretically, the pressure of protest should positively affect the likelihood of an interrupted presidency, as a president appears unable to manage or control citizen outrage.

**H₄:** The higher the number of civil protests, the greater the risk of presidential failure.

Presidential involvement in corruption scandals has been used to explain the recent occurrence of interrupted presidencies in Latin America (Hochstetler, 2006; Pérez-Liñán, 2007). Scandals may motivate public outrage and protest or formal legislative impeachment, which can force presidents from power. Even presidential allies may
pressure the president to resign quickly to avoid being removed, when faced with
evidence of his/her involvement in unlawful activities or other corrupt wrongdoing.

Executive wrongdoing has been operationalized as a dummy variable, either 0 or 1, that marks the presence of executive wrongdoing during each year of a president’s term. However, once a president has been identified as “corrupt” the coding carries through the rest of his/her term. Full-text searches in Lexis-Nexis of each president’s name were conducted to identify the presence of presidential scandal. Any incident that shows evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the president or his/her assistance or sheltering of others’ wrongdoing has been labeled a 1. Formal legal prosecution, removal or resignation is not required to show presidential wrongdoing. Instead, the variable depicts some report of concrete evidence of presidential corruption during his/her term in office, which could have been the basis for efforts to remove him/her. By using reports of wrongdoing while in presidential office, this variable evaluates the knowledge of the public and the legislature of a president’s alleged corrupt practices.

H5a: Where public information about executive wrongdoing in office is present, the risk of presidential failure is greater.

The remaining hypotheses all involve political variables that have been identified in the institutional literature as factors making executives vulnerable to premature departure from office in presidential systems. Valenzuela argues that a president needs to gain a popular mandate in the election process to possess executive authority (Valenzuela, 2004). If citizens do not perceive that a president was elected through a process that showed true national support, they are more likely to oppose the president in rough times. This lack of popular mandate is likely in Latin America because the
presidential system, mixed with proportional representation electoral system, creates a fractionalized party system in which presidents rarely receive an absolute majority in the initial popular election (Mainwaring, 1993; Valenzuela, 2004). To address this institutional feature, various countries have implemented a runoff election or second round, thereby creating the perception of a popular mandate. However, this hypothesis identifies whether the need for a ballotage exists by testing if a popular mandate is necessary to ensure completion of a president’s term in office. If fractionalized party systems lead to low initial votes, the more fractionalized a system, the greater the likelihood of failure. Thus Hypothesis Six states that the lower the percentage of the initial popular vote a president receives, the more likely that presidency is to fail. To analyze popular support, the raw vote percentages from each election have been collected from Europa World Year Book, the organization Observatorio Electoral, and Adam Carr’s website Psephos (Europa World Year Book 1975 – 2009; http://www.observatorioelectoral.org; http://psephos.adam-carr.net).

H_{6a}: The lower a president’s initial popular vote, the greater the risk of presidential failure.

A second institutional hypothesis addresses another manner in which Latin American nations are more susceptible to the problem of presidential failure. Drawing on Mainwaring (1993) and Valenzuela’s (2004) arguments again, this chapter hypothesizes that fractionalized party systems have additional effects on the likelihood of presidential failure by leading to minority legislative support. Previous work suggests that this problem results in deadlocked executive-legislative interactions that boost a president’s chance of falling (Mainwaring, 1990). The absence of majority party support in the
legislative branch should create greater likelihood of failure when the president faces governing problems. Clearly, the absence of majority legislative support provides a way for legislatures to push presidents out of office. The model captures president’s party or electoral coalition majority support (the latter only in the cases of official party coalitions), as taken from the Europa World Year Book, Observatorio Electoral, and Adam Carr’s website Psephos (Europa World Year Book 1975 – 2009; http://www.observatorioelectoral.org; http://psephos.adam-carr.net). This variable uses a dummy coding to describe whether the president holds a majority of seats within the legislature.

H_{7a}: If the president lacks majority support, the risk of presidential failure is greater.

From a theoretical perspective it may appear that some of these variables are endogenous. Surely presidential wrongdoing or poor economic conditions result in protest. Despite this possible relationship, these relationships are more complex than that. First, Appendix A presents a correlation matrix of the independent variables, showing that they are not highly related. The relationship between executive wrongdoing and protest may seem theoretically related, but does not empirically exist. Executive wrongdoing is measured by media reports, and this may actually be showing an elite opposition to a president, that is, an elite form of protest. Second, lags of GDP per capita and inflation rates were used in other models and did not have any different results. Lagging the economic variables should distort any possible correlations that they have with protest levels. Third, I have included two models in this chapter, alternately dropping economic factors due to multicollinearity concerns. Fourth, other scholars have
included these variables in similar models, and this analysis dialogues explicitly with those other scholars. Hochstetler and Edwards (2009) completed a two-stage model of presidential failure, identifying the factors that lead to challenges and then failures. They showed that corruption and deaths during protest impacted all presidential failures, and partisan support also influenced failures that sprung from street challenges (Hochstetler and Edwards, 2009, p. 49). A two-stage model is not possible using survival analysis, and it does not take into account the time-based elements of presidential failure. Including these variables in a survival model allows us to understand this phenomenon in a new way, by looking at the risk of failure. The bivariate correlations demonstrate a lack of correlation between the independent variables, which is also supported in the literature on this topic. The survival model allows us to assess presidential failure without making unsound assumptions about the risk of failure, and we begin to see how institutions, economic factors, corruption, and protest influence presidential failure.

The survival model used here differs from previous investigations that use logit or rare-events logit in their prediction of breakdowns (Hochstetler, 2006; Kim and Bahry, 2008; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2005). Those earlier studies use country-years as their unit of analysis, aggregating years across presidents and across presidential terms, implicitly claiming that all years are theoretically homogenous. Interestingly, Kim and Bahry look at the issue of failure with event history analysis as well, and they do not identify any differences between the logit or event history models when examining this phenomenon across the globe (2008). The only difference that was noted stemmed from increased significance of variables that exist in countries with multi-party, fragmented systems (2008). Multi-party, fragmented systems are frequent in Latin America, and
their findings give support to the notion that survival analysis may show different outcomes for this region.

The survival model allows us to more directly test how time-based phenomena affect presidential failure (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez, 2002, p. 24) The survival model accurately reflects how covariates affect the risk of failure (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez, 2002). With president-year as the unit of analysis, survival analysis calculates a baseline survivor function for each presidency. From this baseline, the hazard will shift in response to changes in other variables, like protest or corruption. This approach accounts better for time-based features of presidential terms than for simple logit analysis. It should be noted that a re-elected president is seen as a new president at the start of his/her next term. Presidents in South America do have different term lengths, but they generally have between four and six years. This approach does not take into account trends that cross one presidential term into the next, but it does account for the renewed support and legitimacy provided with a second election. Despite the limitations of the model used, it provides a new perspective on presidential survival and a more appropriate statistical model to identify risk of presidential failure over the course of his/her term.

Collectively, these theoretical hypotheses present a multi-faceted explanation for presidential failure, as economic, institutional, and performance-related variables place pressure on different governmental bodies to enact change, through resignation or impeachment. Obviously, presidents come into power with the expectation of completing their terms, but economic conditions may create hostile environments that

7 Other variations of this dependent variable could be used, but none allow for the analysis of risk of failure. One variation not analyzed in previous studies is percentage of term served, but this operationalization of the dependent variable does not allow us to look at annual changes in protest, economic conditions, and other variables. Instead, it presents a cumulative analysis of failure.
necessitate change. Similarly, economic liberalization may ignite the opposition of a country’s citizenry or legislature. Institutional features can affect presidential stability when presidents lack majority support or a popular mandate. Other performance-related events, like corruption and protest, may prove influential in presidential failure as they incite civil unrest, push legislatures to act against presidents, or drive presidents to resign. The combination of these variables in a survival model will identify what increases the risk to presidential failure.

**Empirical Results**

The following tables present the results of two Cox proportional hazard models. Each model, as a whole, is consistent with the assumptions of proportional hazards, as tested with Stata 11. The strength of the hazard ratio for each variable is evaluated by its distance from 1, and the level of significance is presented in each variable’s p-value, which depict the confidence in the results. If a ratio is significantly higher than 1, then the variable has a positive relationship with presidential failure. Similarly, a ratio that is significantly lower than 1 shows a negative relationship. This positive/negative relationship can also be witnessed in the direction of the variable’s z-score as well. It should be noted that dummy variables (prolonged recession, presidential scandal, and majority legislative support) may have inflated hazard ratios due to their restricted value range. These findings are robust and different specification present similar results.

---

8 Despite this, one variable, majority support, does violate the assumption of proportional hazards. It has been included in the results, and its exclusion does not change any variables’ significance in the model. However, there are obvious limitations in using this variable in the model.

9 A log likelihood test was performed to ensure that the model was consistent when excluding insignificant variables. The test showed that the model was the same, even when dropping all insignificant variables.
### Table 2.

**Presidential Failure Model: Cox Proportional Hazard Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Hazard Ratio</th>
<th>Z-score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal Reform</td>
<td>0.9952</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0481)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%) GDP Deflator</td>
<td>1.0004***</td>
<td>3.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prolonged Recession</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Protest</td>
<td>1.1420*</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0785)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Wrongdoing</td>
<td>14.7320***</td>
<td>2.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.2724)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Popular Vote</td>
<td>0.9710</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0302)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Legislative Support</td>
<td>0.0963*</td>
<td>-1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1262)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>263</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

### Table 3.

**Presidential Failure Model: Cox Proportional Hazard Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Hazard Ratio</th>
<th>Z-score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal Reform</td>
<td>0.9989</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0451)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%) GDP Deflator</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prolonged Recession</td>
<td>6.4058**</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.0073)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Protest</td>
<td>1.1601**</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0781)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Wrongdoing</td>
<td>10.8695***</td>
<td>2.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.7637)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Popular Vote</td>
<td>0.9731</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0322)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Legislative Support</td>
<td>0.0678*</td>
<td>-1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0984)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>263</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
Among the economic variables, the inflation rate is associated with greater risk of presidential failure, at the p<0.01 level. The rate of inflation is significant, with interpretation of the results as a one-point increase in the inflation rate results in a 0.04% increase in the hazard of failure. Thus, fluctuations in inflation rates may provide risk for presidents. In the second model, prolonged recession is significant in explaining presidential failure, and two years of negative growth increases the likelihood that a president will fail. The level of economic liberalization is not statistically associated with the likelihood of a president to leave office.

Civil protest levels present a highly significant and influential impact on the likelihood of presidential failures with a significance of p<0.10 or p<0.05, in the first and second models, respectively. This supports earlier arguments and historical accounts that argue for the importance of major civil protests, and it advances the literature by showing that protest is important whether or not it is specifically directed at the president. As mentioned earlier, this finding can be understood to say that a unit increase in protest (one additional reported large protest event) creates a 14% rise in the hazard of failure for a president (a 16% increase in the second model).

Executive wrongdoing is also associated with greater risk of presidential failure, as predicted. Providing the most extreme hazard ratio, this finding shows that the occurrence of presidential corruption dramatically boosts the risk of failure, more than any other variable. Although plenty of corrupt presidents do not fall, the nearly unanimous presence of corruption amongst fallen presidents may explain the extraordinarily high hazard ratio. If we assume that these media reports represent elite opinions, these findings may also show high-level opposition to executives. Due to this
measure being a dummy variable, the very presence of corruption radically amplifies the hazard of presidential failure occurring. Despite earlier focus on institutional arguments for presidential failure, both of these events – protest and scandal – are important in explaining interrupted presidencies.

Minority legislative support increases the likelihood of presidential failure, with a significance value of p<0.10. This finding reinforces Mainwaring’s (1993) arguments about the problems of Latin American multiparty presidentialism. As past models have also shown, a lack of party support in the legislature presents a key problem for presidents completing their terms. In this instance, lacking majority support significantly enhances the likelihood of failure.

Finally the results suggest that the other institutional factor of initial popular vote is unimportant. Absence of a popular mandate does not affect a president’s risk for failure. Many countries have taken up the institution of ballotage to remedy problems of presidential failure, but these empirical results dispel much of the illusion that initial mandates affect presidential ability to maintain office. Fractionalized party systems do not necessarily prevent an elected president from completing his term in office by creating a greater likelihood of a low presidential vote, even if they do affect the legislature. Second round voting may have other positive effects on politics, but it does not seem to resolve problems of presidential failure. Unlike many proponents of ballotage, Pérez-Liñán finds that the system is not conducive to democratic governability (2006), and this investigation finds no support, one way or another. With this variable, the popular votes from the last round of voting, either first or second round percentages, were used in the model. Another variable, which was a dummy for the presence of a
second round process occurring, was used as well. The results of this variable were also insignificant.

**Discussion**

The empirical results support the general findings of the literature on presidential failure, particularly those studies that have argued for the importance of presidential wrongdoing, civil protest, and legislative support. Also, this model shows the importance of the economic variables of inflation and prolonged recession.

The statistical findings here with respect to neoliberal policies call into question how neoliberalism is linked to presidential failure (Pérez-Liñán, 2003; Silva, 2009). While social protest is indeed associated with presidential failure, its occurrence is independent of neoliberal policy implementation, and economic liberalization asserts no apparent independent effect on the risk of presidential failure. This counters a common assumption about the effect of neoliberal policy implementation in South America, but the message seems to be that neoliberalism has no immediate effect on presidential stability.\(^{11}\)

Although understanding why the variable is insignificant would require additional investigation, a few potential explanations for its unimportance may shed some light on the issue. First, economic liberalization may simply be too common among Latin American countries to covary with presidential failure. Scholars have focused on the fact that many failed presidents followed neoliberal policies without noting that many other

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\(^{10}\) The inclusion or exclusion of various ballotage variables has little effect on the model and does not affect the significance or direction of any findings. In general, concerns about second round voting’s impact on presidential failure are not supported.

\(^{11}\) In addition, lagged neoliberalism measures were not significant.
presidents with similar policies completed their terms. This selection bias, created by selecting on the dependent variable, illustrates the methodological concerns of Geddes (1990). Second, neoliberal reform may not be linked to cross-sector opposition within a country, and, by targeting only specific sectors, it does not gain enough resistance to threaten presidential stability. Third, the effects of neoliberal policy implementation may drive the failure of presidents in the future, possibly after the policy has created harmful economic conditions while having no specific impact on the president at the time of implementation. For instance, the neoliberal reforms of the Menem administration did not lead to any presidential instability during his term, but may have been a contributing factor of the De la Rúa failure. Regardless of the reasons, neoliberalism, in itself, does not appear to provide any substantial risk to presidential failure.

On the other hand, higher rates of inflation are associated with presidential failure. Why is this measure of economic hardship significant in the model? First, high rates of inflation may create concrete, daily problems for citizens, as they are unable to purchase products. In this manner, inflation rates may be a more tangible measure of economic hardship for a population, thereby creating greater risk for a president. Second, inflation may target the poorest citizens most, which may permit specific opposition to presidents. Third, instances of hyperinflation may create a particular climate of popular insecurity and constitute prima facie evidence of bad governance, even if some presidents have little to no say over central bank monetary policies. The importance of inflation in explaining presidential failure may lie in the historic economic problems of the region, which frequently involved reckless monetary policies by regimes that were already in crisis. Even though citizens may assume that presidents have the quick ability to resolve
inflation, this may not be the case. As previously noted, presidents may be unduly blamed due to their positions as figure heads of governance, a weakness of the presidential systems (Valenzuela, 2004). Therefore, citizens may oppose inflation whether or not it is within a president’s control. For all these reasons, presidents’ risk dramatically increases when bouts of hyperinflation occur, as the citizenry is faced with daily buying concerns and tangible hardship.

Surprisingly, changes in levels of income as measured by GDP per capita do not, in themselves, drive citizens or legislatures to oppose presidents. Instead, prolonged recession, as discussed by Álvarez and Marsteintredet (2010), impacts presidential survival. Likewise, lagged GDP per capita growth also proved significant in other specifications of the model. In sum, current GDP shifts do not influence presidential success, but the climate preceding the instance of failure is important.

Turning from contextual factors to agency, the empirical results show that the increased risk to a presidency associated with just one large protest is phenomenal. Moreover, citizen unrest need not be necessarily directed at the president as shown by the measure used in this model, which does not specify protest against the president but includes protest events focused on other issues. Presumably, even presidents that are not the specific target of protest come under greater pressure, and lose legitimacy, in the face of mass protest. Whereas some previous studies have focused on the top-down nature of presidential failure, this chapter reasserts the importance of mass demonstrations against presidents.

The presence of executive wrongdoing also boosts failure risk for presidents to an extraordinary extent. The magnitude of this result may stem from the use of a dummy
variable. Despite this, the consistent, considerable effect of scandal is present within the model and demonstrates a measure that presidents can proactively take to diminish their risk of failure. This finding differs from that of Kim and Bahry (2008) and Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán (2008). Compared to the Kim and Bahry measure, this chapter uses a more discriminating coding for presidential wrongdoing by requiring some evidence to be present in the news reports of the president’s personal involvement in scandal\textsuperscript{12}. In other words, there must be some foundation for the press’s story of the president’s involvement. In these instances, polities take notice and the risk of presidential failure increases. Despite this variable’s importance, additional qualitative studies should be performed to identify how scandals explicitly relate to presidential failure. Although some presidents left power in the midst of a large corruption scandal, some presidents did not fall with scandals looming. Instead, the corruption was simply one of several contentious issues with an unpopular president. The wrongdoing may show how elites use the media to oppose presidents in some cases, and this may simply be another tool of mobilizing actors to drive presidents from office.

The identified unimportance of popular mandates discounts conventional wisdom about presidential failure. The ballotage system, utilized to assuage fears of executive instability, has no significant impact on it, and this common institutional change may have been misguided. This finding provides important information for practical efforts to prevent future presidential failure. Simple institutional tinkering cannot eliminate the future possibility of presidential failures for a country, and the focus on non-institutional causes of presidential failure should continue.

\textsuperscript{12} Kim and Bahry (2008) identify accusations of presidential wrongdoing, and Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán explain their coding, “LAWR reported that exposés about corruption or abuse of power had involved the president personally” (2008, p. 184).
The role of legislative minorities in driving presidential failure is clearly apparent and supports the literature on this topic. The problem of minority party support in the legislative branch persists as a risk factor in determining presidential failure. More than that, the relationship between legislative minorities and protest cannot be easily discerned. Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán (2008) acknowledge the significance of protest and legislative opposition, explaining, “This finding suggests that extra-parliamentary mobilisation and parliamentary opposition acting together constitute a serious threat for the president” (185). Further, in-depth analyses are necessary to answer these types of questions regarding presidential failure. The ability to simply interact these variables does not seem to get at the causal mechanism behind the problem, as an interaction would assume that opposition is related to protest. More than that, the interaction would be difficult in an already complex survival analysis. The following chapters attempt to get at these causal mechanisms by assessing if and how key political actors mobilize opposition.

**Conclusion**

The original use of survival model stems from health-related studies. This statistical analysis might be used to show how the high blood pressure and diabetes of a patient contributed to his early demise. This survival analysis shows executive wrongdoing, social protest, minority legislative support, and other factors contribute to presidential failure. Presidents enter office, but face different threats to their term stability. This chapter has clarified which of the threats are statistically significant.
Despite these findings, we cannot draw conclusions about a causal mechanism from this study. These presidents face risks, but we have little understanding of how and why the risk factors contribute to presidential demise. This cross-national analysis serves as the base for the following case study analyses and individual-level survey assessment. This survival analysis shows the variables that influence cross-national presidential failure. However, various questions persist as to how presidents are actually removed. The next two chapters build on this analysis, identifying how political actors contribute to social protest and legislative opposition. The qualitative analysis of the next two chapters seeks to develop the theory regarding this phenomenon. Having identified what factors are statistically significant in the South American region, I now turn my focus to understanding the tools used by actors to drive repeated failure.
CHAPTER THREE: \textit{UN TROPEZÓN NO ES CAÍDA} - \\
\textbf{A STUMBLE IS NOT A FALL}^{13}

In mid-December 2001, Argentina erupted in protest against President de la Rúa, with citizens marching in Buenos Aires and several other cities. People took to the streets and chanted “Que se vayan todos” or “Kick them all out,” in opposition to a government that was unable to address citizen demands. Supermarket looting and rioting also occurred in various cities throughout the country. In the months prior to these activities, the country had faced harsh economic conditions, which De la Rúa had failed to resolve. De la Rúa’s governing alliance (the \textit{Alianza}) between his party -- the UCR (\textit{Unión Cívica Radical} - Radical Civic Union) and \textit{Frente País Solidario} (FREPASO) was crumbling, while Peronist opposition against him hardened. Protesters congregated in the Plaza de Mayo, the main square in front of the presidential palace, over the course of several days. On December 20, President de la Rúa called for a dialogue with opposition parties and other groups. Political maneuvering behind the scenes left De la Rúa with few options as the Peronist bloc of the lower house declared intentions to impeach him (Pérez-Liñán, 2007). The president’s call for cooperation failed, and he announced his resignation. De la Rúa’s escape by helicopter from the presidential mansion is a central image of these manifestations, as the president resigned and fled while teeming protesters demanded governmental change. Although the protests had been matched with high levels of police repression (Pérez-Liñán, 2007), the deaths of protesters had only exacerbated the situation. These protest efforts and governmental instability were a shock for Argentina, as well as the world, as one of South America’s

\footnote{13 Research for this chapter was made possible through a Fulbright Student Award Grant for Argentina.}
The strongest countries faced unprecedented government upheaval and transitioned through several presidents in a few short weeks.

This specific instance of failure in Argentina, with its protest-ridden, defeated president escaping, is an archetypal image of the fallen South American president. A few of the presidential failure studies specifically address De la Rúa’s fall, but other questions surface regarding the factors that allow for presidential failure to repeatedly occur in Argentina. De la Rúa came to power through the Alianza, but, as mentioned, his political party affiliation was UCR. The Radicals are one of the oldest parties in Argentine politics, and they have been in opposition to the Peronist Party historically. Since the return to democracy, only two UCR presidents have been elected, and neither has completed a term in office. Alfonsín, the first president after the military government, faced large-scale protest activities and Peronist opposition. This opposition eventually led to Alfonsín handing over power to the Peronist president-elect before the end of his term. The similarities in these two failures raise questions about what factors allowed for repeated presidential failure in Argentina. How do presidents fall in this country? Why have UCR presidents failed to complete their terms in office? This chapter analyzes the conditions that have led to presidential failure in Argentina and describes why presidential failure has repeatedly occurred.

As the failure of Argentine presidents has largely been characterized by the inability of UCR presidents to complete their terms in office, I will show how the Partido Justicialista (the Peronist Party – PJ) has developed the ability to mobilize broad-based opposition that, in turn, drives the dynamics of presidential challenges and failures in Argentina. More than that, I argue that changes in the party itself have transformed the
exact nature of this mobilizing capacity over time, which explains the differences between each of the presidents’ falls. The capacity of the Peronist Party to mobilize its support has become far more top-down over the past decades. The Peronist Party of the 1980’s had a bottom-up, union-based system for mobilization of society, but the party of the 1990’s and 2000’s controlled a more diverse set of civil society actors from the top down. These shifts help account for the differences between the failures of Alfonsín and De la Rúa. The inability of other parties, specifically the UCR, to replicate this mobilizing capacity accounts for the partisan bias of presidential failure, as Peronist presidents have been insulated from challenges initiated by other parties. The following analysis of the Peronist Party’s role in challenging presidents shows how the presence of an actor with mobilizing power explains repeated presidential failure.

I conducted research in Argentina, looking at Peronist mobilization and structure, and this chapter integrates others’ research with my own experiences. I trace the processes of failure in the Alfonsín and De la Rúa presidencies in order to analyze the conditions that lead to failure. In addition, I discuss the failure of Peronist Rodríguez Saá, who was thrown out in the aftermath of the De la Rúa failure. I draw from published accounts of Argentine presidential failures as well as my own interview and primary document research. Much of this information comes from news reports of the time, specifically tracing Clarín articles from 2000 – 2001 and La Capital from 2000 – 2001 and 1989. Secondary sources support these news-based investigations, along with publicly available memoirs and interviews. Finally, I use personal interviews and field work observation to describe the mechanisms for Argentine presidential failure. This chapter shows two key features of the Peronist Party. First, I demonstrate the presence of
its mobilizing capacity across time, with linkages to labor unions and/or clientelist networks that allow for challenges to opposition presidents. Second, I show how this capacity has been transformed, explaining the differences in the instances of presidential failure.

**The Nature of Peronism**

The political success of General Juan Domingo Perón ultimately led to the birth of a mass-based, populist political party, the PJ, which was linked to working class identity (Levitsky, 2003b, p. 37-38). Despite this end result, the relationship between Perón and the working class emerged over time, and the relationship between the ensuing Peronist Party and its social base has continued to evolve up until the present day. The nature of the Peronist Party, including its structure, stems from the party’s historical roots and various transformations that have occurred over the past 70 years. The following discussion of the Peronist Party maps the changing nature of the party and identifies its linkages to labor organizations and social groups.

In 1943, the military coup that overthrew President Ramón Castillo placed Perón in a position of power when he was named labor secretary in the new government (Levitsky, 2003b, p. 38). At that time, Argentina boasted the most solidified, organized working class in South America, which provided a unique opportunity for Perón (Levitsky, 2003b, p. 38). The military government had disbanded the Confederación General de Trabajadores (General Confederation of Labor – CGT), but they were still pushing simultaneously for greater labor organization and hoped to control labor through Perón’s position (Torre, 1998, p. 127). Looking to this group, Perón expanded worker benefit and utilized deep cultural messaging to build a relationship (Levitsky, 2003b, p.
Workers had become frustrated by their lack of voice in political issues, and Perón proved to be an effective leader in pursuing their demands (Smith, 1969, p. 46-49). As an end result, Perón found himself in league with working class support when he was unable to resolve issues with fellow military officers (Torre, 1998, p. 126).

In October of 1945, Perón was arrested by military officers. Protests famously led to Perón’s release on the 17th of October (Smith, 1969, p. 45-46). The protest was coordinated by traditional union leadership and involved the mass mobilization of workers that Perón had helped in earlier negotiations (Smith, 1969, p. 46). Labor leaders were attracted to the opportunity to pursue their own goals with Perón’s aid, but working class citizens participated due to their cultural identification with a charismatic, mass-focused leader (Torre, 1998, p. 128). Immediately after this large-scale protest event, Perón declared his intent to run for president. The labor unions, which had coordinated Perón’s protest efforts, created a Labor Party that provided the initial support to help him win the presidency (Torre, 1998; Levitsky, 2003b). Upon election, the victorious President Perón forcibly replaced the Labor Party with what would become the Peronist Party, overriding the wishes of labor organizers who could not oppose his mass-based influence (Levitsky, 2003b, p. 38-39).

These events show how the roots of the Peronist movement emerged, and the subsequent Peronist Party was grounded in various aspects of Perón’s support. Perón had developed mass-based appeal by giving a voice to previously unimportant workers, as well as women. More than that, he drew upon the strength of these masses to achieve his political ends. The mass-based Peronist Party that resulted from these activities built upon the identity of working class struggle, with the image of Perón and his wife Eva.
linked to this group. To foster this mass appeal, Perón developed a diffuse party structure with responsibility in the hands of the citizens. Perón maintained a vision for diffuse unidades básicas (basic units/local branches) that recruited and organized rank-and-file Peronist supporters (Little, 1973, p. 656). Little describes these, saying, “In particular the unidades básicas (local branches) were not to be used merely as electoral committees but, more importantly, for the recruitment of local leaders, the spread of propaganda, the inculcation of doctrine, and the elevation of the culture of the people” (1973, p. 656). The populist nature of Peronism also created a personalistic air to the party, which focused on the benevolent image of Perón in power.

In addition, Perón established his dominance over the labor unions through the creation of his own political party and establishment of specific party rules that maintained his power. Structural changes for the creation of a larger Peronist “movement” occurred in 1954 and created three distinct branches: political, labor, and women’s groups, which became known as the tercio (one-third) system (Levitsky, 2003b, p. 40). This split established the CGT as the labor branch, but it also guaranteed Peron’s control as the rules for dividing power were never institutionalized (Levitsky, 2003b, p. 40). Epstein notes that, “By 1955, labor was a highly disciplined part of the Peronist movement” (1979, p. 449). Perón’s relationship with the working class created a link for the Peronist Party that has never been dissolved. Through diffuse base structures, it fostered a mass-based appeal that was built around working class identity. It formed solid relationships with organized labor, over which it maintained dominance and a top-down authority structure. These key features of the early Peronist Party have influenced its development throughout the subsequent decades.
In 1955, Argentina had a break with democracy when Perón was overthrown through a coup and fled the country in exile (Torre, 1998, p. 129 – 130). Despite various shifts in power as well as Perón’s short-lived return in 1973, democracy was largely suspended until 1983. This time period spelled a new era for Peronism. First, the link between Peronism and the working class became more solidified, while its relationship to union leadership became more conflicted. The unions that had been empowered under Perón were still left to pursue worker’s rights under the military government (Torre, 1998, p. 128-130). As a result, trade unions became the most visible arm of the Peronist movement during Perón’s exile (Torre, 1998, p. 130). Torre describes this relationship, noting, “Perón’s exile and the absence of a legal party created a situation in which union organizations, in addition to their professional functions, were transformed into the natural spokesman of the Peronist masses” (1998, p. 131). At the same time, the union leadership became more distant from their exiled leader, and different factions emerged from the syndicates (Torre, 1998, p. 131).

Second, an already diffuse party structure became even more irregular when the military government banned the Peronist Party in 1955. As a result, the Peronists developed a “semi-anarchic” nature, in which the party lost its vertical linkages (Levitsky, 2001b, p. 35-36). The connections between local groups were unsystematic, and sub-groups emerged in neighborhoods, without hierarchical oversight and without contact amongst themselves (Levitsky, 2001b, p. 36). Whereas the organization had been top-down before the exile, the new structure that resulted was more anarchic and fluid (Levitsky, 2003b, p. 42-44). In addition, the returning military dictatorship led to the Argentine Dirty War, which arguably began in 1974 and lasted until 1983 and was
characterized by extreme oppression of dissidents. During the last years of this military rule between 9,000-15,000 people were killed or disappeared, and thousands more were imprisoned or driven into exile (Pion-Berlin, 1994, p. 108). This forced Peronist activists to focus on organizations, including unions, non-governmental organizations, neighborhood associations, and church groups, as their havens (Levitsky, 2001b, p. 37). Peronism would remain in these secret organizations until the democratic transition.

This description of the history of Peronism points to several key features. Peronism, in itself, has been culturally linked to the working class, with a charismatic leader who built mass-based appeal. Early on, Perón exerted control over labor unions, but maintained close ties with a working class that identified with him. He established a party structure that was hierarchical, with diffuse, widespread base units. The combination of personalistic leadership and base support fostered the development of a fluid party built around an iconic historical figure. Upon Perón’s exile, the party persisted despite being made illegal. The ties with unions gave voice to working masses while union leaders sought greater power. Under the Dirty War, repression of unions and leftists created an even more diffuse structure for the party. These key components to the Peronist Party are instrumental to understanding its reappearance with democracy’s return.

**Peronism after 1983**

The fall of the military dictatorship was met with the reemergence of a quickly evolving Peronist Party (Levitsky, 2001b, p. 37-38). The organization re-emerged in an anarchic manner, as base units had been created without any party oversight. Moreover, the various organizations, which had been born under the military dictatorship or had
sprung forth in the moment after the democratic transition, did not become part of the formal party structure because they maintained their own operations as base units (Levitsky, 2001b, p. 38). The party had persisted due to its diffuse, clandestine networks with little hierarchy, and this left clashing labor leaders in charge. For these reasons, the party found itself unready for electoral efforts. Leaders from trade unions handled campaigning for the 1983 election, with many Peronists later calling them “marshals of defeat” (Munck, 1985, p. 89). Alfonsín, a respected human rights activist of the UCR, was able to capitalize on the idea of democracy and beat the Peronists in the election. The weakened political arm of the Peronists needed much of the time period of the Alfonsín presidency to subjugate labor interests and bring them in line politically.

At the time of the 1983 election, the CGT had been split into two Peronist camps. The PJ electoral defeat only furthered divisiveness within the trade unions, with a struggle for power that benefited the PJ in the long run. Four distinct groups of Peronist union leaders clashed during the Alfonsín administration: the Group of 25 (the 25), the 62 Organizations (the 62), the Group of 15, and the Ubaldinistas. The 62 Organizations and the Group of 25 continued to influence Peronist party politics in a more traditional manner by openly struggling for party seats and leadership positions throughout the 1980s (McGuire, 1992, p. 37-38). Lorenzo Miguel and his 62 labor organizations were the oldest, orthodox faction of union power (McGuire, 1992, p. 37-39). The anti-authoritarian, reform-minded Group of 25 merged with Peronist dissidents, including half of the Peronist deputies (diputados) and all Peronist governors and senators (Munck, 1985, p. 89). The divisiveness amongst these labor leaders provided an opportunity for the Peronist Party as an institution to exert power over the groups, while simultaneously
demonstrating the residual Peronist support within the working class itself – all sides still identified as Peronists.

Torre notes that the election of the Radical President Alfonsín was, in fact, a “godsend” for Peronist labor leaders because they were able to, once again, gain power and control by developing a bureaucratic relationship between labor and Peronism (1998, p. 134). The working class took up the Peronist banner, while struggling against the Radical government (Torre, 1998, p. 134). Whereas labor unions initially gained power against a Radical president, the Peronist Party was able to begin a renovation process, gaining control over the unions due to the divisions among the union leadership. The traditional seat of power for labor within the Peronist movement had been the 62 Organizations in the 1960’s and 1970’s, as previously noted. Due to the informal nature of the Peronist Party, this group never received formal designation in the party structure (Levitsky, 2001a, p. 42). By the mid-1980’s, the Peronist Party began to take away power from this old guard group and place that power in the reform-minded 25 (Levitsky, 2001a, p. 43). Levitsky describes how this worked, noting, “Thus, in the 1985 and 1987 midterm elections, Renovation-led party branches granted the ‘25,’ rather than the ‘62,’ the right to nominate unionists for PJ legislative lists” (Levitsky, 2001a, p. 43-44). The 62 was effectively eliminated as the voice of collective labor in the Peronist movement, and there was no replacement (Levitsky, 2001a, p. 44). By 1987, the Renovation-led group also disregarded the tercio system by using a direct election system, which essentially removed labor’s hold on power and placed it with pro-Peronist base level units (Levitsky, 2001a, p. 44). The relationship between the PJ and organized labor was
fundamentally transformed as organized labor was placed in a “subordinate position” (Epstein, 1992, p. 142).

The 1989 election of Peronist president Carlos Menem marked the greatest transformation of the Peronist Party structure, with two distinct changes. First, the party removed the most substantial vestiges of union power in the Peronist Party. Second, it developed and fostered a clientelistic relationship with supporters. Peronists effectively dominated labor unions by the end of Alfonsín’s term, and they renovated the very structure of internal party functions to reduce the union’s future power under Menem’s rule. The country itself was undergoing a process of deindustrialization and deunionization (Levitsky, 2001a, p. 45), and Menem pursued a neoliberal policy agenda in general. Torre speaks of the implications of this transition for the Peronist Party and Menem’s policy implementation in no uncertain terms:

The decentralization of collective bargaining, the privatization of those veritable trade union fiefdoms – the obras sociales – the abrogation of indemnity payments, shop floor rights, even accident insurance, and finally talk of the ending of industrial unionism altogether, mean collectively the demise of Peronist trade unionism as it has existed for half a century (Torre, 1998, p. 134).

With these changing economic and social conditions, Peronists built support from outside of their working class base, extended the party’s appeal, and drew in middle class voters (Levitsky, 2001a, p. 45). They developed a more clientelistic structure with the urban poor and utilized base units to create a patronage-based system for maintaining power (Levitsky, 2001a, p. 45). Under Menem, neoliberal policies undermined labor unions as a group and caused hardship for citizens. This hardship created an opening for Peronists to consolidate support, especially with the poor, through clientelist rewards.
President Menem’s implementation of a neoliberal framework for dealing with the country’s economic problems opposed the interests of labor organizations. Workers were forced to accept these Menemist policies, given declining working class power in the neoliberal era (Epstein, 1992, p. 142). In 1991, the president’s neoliberal policies eventually resulted in the emergence of a splinter labor organization, the *Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina* (Argentine Worker’s Central Union – CTA) breaking away from the largest labor organization, the CGT. Menem lost much of his labor support when the CTA opposed neoliberal policy implementation (Palomino, 2000, pp. 130-131). This shift can be seen as a break between some organized labor and the Peronist Party, but a simultaneous break with the party’s working class constituents never occurred, due to patronage-based rewards.

Menem’s policy may have broken some of organized labor’s support, but he made other gains that offset this action. Dense social networks in the Peronist Party had always existed, but these expanded and became more clientelistic during the Menem era, which extended the party’s capacity for base mobilization. In explaining this phenomenon, Levitsky describes this party structure in the Menem era and its ability to prevent protest:

> Not only did the PJ's vast infrastructure of UBs, unions, soup kitchens, clubs, and informal social networks yield vast human and organisational resources for campaigns, but it also provided channels for patronage distribution, policy implementation, social and cultural contact and (albeit with less frequency) political participation and demand-making. For example, during the 1989-1990 hyperinflationary crisis, tens of thousands of party activists worked to dampen working and lower class protest in response to the hyperinflationary crisis and the government's austerity measures. This was done through persuasion, the physical expulsion of leftist activists from their neighbourhoods, and a variety of neighbourhood-based emergency social welfare measures (2001b, p. 51-52).

In addition, Menem’s administration provided additional resources to Peronist-controlled municipalities, instead of UCR areas (Lodola, 2005, p. 532). In sum, Menem
implemented harsh economic policies but used machine politics and base-level support to maintain power in light of austerity efforts.

These clientelist networks began in the Menem era and continued into the opposition presidency of De la Rúa and the present day. The Peronists once again drew their support from base units, while launching opposition in the congress. Various new social actors also emerged during the Menem presidency, with more diffuse ties to Peronism. Specifically, the 1996 privatization of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), the state petroleum company, created a new repertoire of mobilization.

Roadblocks became a common form of protest, as newly unemployed individuals demanded government negotiation (Wolff, 2007, p. 6). In the face of rising unemployment and increasing austerity concerns, these roadblocks mobilized individuals, named *piqueteros* (picketers). A labor expert notes that Menem’s presidency resulted in this complex set of changes (M. Gasparri, personal interview, 2010). These policies broke organized labor by splintering CTA as a new organization and instigating anti-Menemista currents in the CGT (M. Gasparri, personal interview, 2010). In addition, Menem’s actions provoked the emergence of the *piquete* (M. Gasparri, personal interview, 2010). The *piquetero* movement gained strength in the late 1990’s and became more structured in response to De la Rúa’s administration. Whereas Menem had targeted his own base with distribution of goods, De la Rúa increased distribution to areas with protests in order to minimize *piquetero* unrest (Lodola, 2005, p. 529-530). In addition, the roots of the *piquetero* movement were solidly connected to the Peronist structure. Wolff describes a key *piquetero* group – the Corriente Clasista and Combativa (CCC), “Although its leadership is dominated by a Maoist party, the CCC
thus remains strategically pragmatic and programmatically diffuse – in accordance with its largely Peronist social base” (Wolffe, 2007, p. 16). These organizations sprang forth organically, but their members still identified with the Peronist Party.

Additionally, the Peronist Party maintained personalized ties that created clientelist networks, and they have been especially visible between *punteros* (local PJ party brokers) with local *villa* (slum) members (Auyero 2000). These linkages permeated to the lowest level as individuals contacted local Peronist *punteros* to gain medicine, goods, and information and provided repayment through political support, which reinforced solidarity and support (Auyero, 2000). The personal nature of this relationship reduced the somewhat negative aspects of clientelism, as Auyero explains, “Once the empirical focus of the analysis is not only relations but experiences, it can be seen that clientelist problem solving involves constructing personalized ties, an imagined solidaristic community, and a protective and predictable network that buffers the harsh everyday reality of the slum” (2000, p. 70). Thus, a vast personalized network was created between organizations, neighborhood associations, and church groups, which all linked to the Peronist power structure. This loose coalition eventually brought down the De la Rúa government, as discussed later in this chapter. The Peronist Party’s relationship to society continued to evolve afterwards. There have been no more presidential failures – all the presidents after 2002 have been Peronists – and these developments suggest that the new Peronist linkages may have helped the party acquire and maintain its power.

Peronist Néstor Kirchner was elected in 2003, and effectively took control of the party and its clientelist networks and cemented ties with other social movement groups.
Etchemendy and Garay explain, “Top-down, uncontested leadership of the PJ machine provided a predictable base for governing and support, while the construction of linkages with social actors – including social movements and traditional labor union – underpinned Kirchner’s left-wing policies” (2011, p. 286). Kirchner effectively courted the support of unemployed workers’ organizations, garnering rallies and support for the president (Etchemendy and Garay, 2011, p. 296-287). He also rebuilt relationships with the CGT by providing friendly officials and policies, without reestablishing a stronghold for the CGT in the Peronist Party structure (Etchemendy and Garay, 2011, p. 287). The Kirchner government saw an expansion of Peronist support as well as an increase in the network capacity of the organization. In addition, the inherent weakness of the opposition has led to continued Peronist presidential victories (Levitsky and Murillo, 2008, p. 18-19). The strength of the Peronist Party persists, and the opposition, specifically the UCR, fails to provide a true alternative for voters (Levitsky and Murillo, 2008, p. 18).

In Buenos Aires today, the Peronists have greater presence in the *comunas* of the city, while other parties rely upon strategic placement in the areas of strong support. This support has cemented power in the hands of the Peronists and true opposition, at the national level, seems unlikely from other parties. The 2007 election of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has had an impact on the Peronist Party, and the 2010 death of her husband/ex-president Néstor has increased the divisiveness within Peronism itself. The Kirchners effectively consolidated power within the Peronist Party, but the death of Néstor has decidedly weakened the president’s position. Whereas no opposition from outside the party appears likely, concerns over the future of Peronism lie within the party, as different groups vie for the control of these extensive power networks.
This evolution of Peronism over time provides a solid base for understanding the transformation of Argentine politics over the past 50 years. I will next discuss specific instances of Argentine presidential failure. While looking at the specific instances of failure, I first describe how the various factors from the previous chapter played into presidential instability. Then, I identify how the broader dynamics of party/society relations just described took shape in these particular challenges.

**Alfonsín - The Conditions for Challenge**

The 1983 return to democracy in Argentina was a heralded event as the military transitioned power to the country’s democratically elected President Alfonsín, the leader of the Unión Cívica Radical. Alfonsín garnered 51.8% of the vote (*initial popular vote*), while his party won 39.1% of the Senate and a majority of the Chamber of Deputies seat (Llanos, 2010, p. 58). During his campaign, he famously offered the slogan, “Democracy will grant us food, education, and health,” to the newly democratic country (Pucciarelli, 2001, p. 40). The success of the electoral process promised a different era for Argentina – without military dictatorship – but newly inaugurated Alfonsín faced immediate problems with issues of civilian rule, economic crisis, and democratization. As the quantitative study of Chapter 2 also suggested, even a solid majority vote did not protect him from the reality of a new democracy that was more complicated than the hopeful adages of his campaign.

The previous military government had acquired extensive debt, and Alfonsín’s administration was torn between trying to meet campaign promises, assuage social tensions, and meet international creditors’ demands. Early on, the administration attempted to resolve internal economic issues by increasing salaries and deceasing
interest rates, but these policies only exacerbated inflationary problems (Peralta Ramos, 1992, p. 101). When Alfonsín initially attempted to alleviate the country’s debt, he pursued an industrial restructuring effort that would reduce tariffs and drive exports (Peralta Ramos, 1992, p. 101). The strongest industry critics remained largely opposed to the proposed changes (Peralta Ramos, 1992, p. 101).

Despite initial efforts, the Alfonsín administration found itself in a difficult situation after two years in office (Dornbusch and de Pablo, 1990, p. 106). In 1985, the government implemented a heterodox economic program, the Austral Plan, which avoided simply accepting market-oriented reform. The plan’s goal was to address the troubling hyperinflation rates that were hurting the Argentine economy, a key concern for the administration as midterm election loomed (Dornbusch and de Pablo, 1990, p. 106). The Austral Plan took a complicated approach, including implementing “wage-price-exchange rate controls,” which are based on different aspects of economic theory (Dornbusch and de Pablo, 1990, p. 106). The plan created import duties, implemented a wage-price freeze, imposed a new currency, as well as a variety of other measures (Dornbusch and de Pablo, 1990, p. 106-107). In general, it can be viewed as a mixture, taking into account specific social measures and avoiding truly painful austerity measures (Llanos, 2010, p. 58). Alfonsín would not have been seen as a true neoliberal in his policy decisions because he attempted to find this mixed alternative (neoliberal reform).

The plan’s implementation proved to be a mild success and resulted in a brief pause in Argentina’s inflationary growth. The UCR were rewarded with success in the 1985 midterm election (Llanos, 2010, p. 59). Despite the one-year respite for the Argentine economy, inflation began to rise again by mid-1986 (Dornbusch and de Pablo,
1990, p. 107-108). Table 4 shows the inflation data during this time period (data.worldbank.org). GDP fluctuated during this time period, but the economy did not suffer from the stringent coding requirements of *prolonged recession* because there were no two years of negative growth over Alfonsín’s term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inflation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>382.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>606.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>625.80</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>74.463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>127.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>388.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>3057.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alfonsín had an absolute majority of the lower house for his party, with 51% of the seats, at the beginning of his term (http://www.observatorioelectoral.org/) (*majority legislative support*). In the Senate, the UCR had 39% of the seats (http://www.observatorioelectoral.org/). This strength would diminish near the end of his term. The UCR was punished by losses in the 1987 election, and Alfonsín began to feel the burden of diminished legislative support. Although the UCR was still the largest party in the lower house, they lost their absolute majority and held only 44% of the seats (http://www.observatorioelectoral.org/). More importantly, the UCR lost nearly all of the governorships they possessed (Llanos, 2010, p. 59).

In regards to *executive wrongdoing*, Alfonsín was not scandalous. On the contrary, Alfonsín bore the mantel of democratic renewal and openly opposed anti-democratic values. Alfonsín had fought against the military dictatorship and had trumpeted the return to democracy. If anything, it was this commitment to democratic
fair play that would diminish Alfonsín’s power over the course of his term. The president fought throughout his term to enhance institutional rules in the country, which diminished his ability to woo support from the traditional seats of power. Civil protest of various kinds persisted throughout Alfonsín’s term, but the occurrence of general strikes (discussed in detail below) played a key role in his political demise. The inability of Alfonsín to court labor power, due, in part, to his democracy-promotion efforts, resulted in extensive labor opposition.

**Alfonsín - The Fall**

Alfonsín faced many challenges in his administration that put him at risk for failure, given the results of the quantitative survival analysis of the last chapter. The country suffered from a myriad of economic issues, from low growth to hyperinflation. Alfonsín was largely unable to address these issues, despite various policy efforts. Likewise, Alfonsín experienced decreasing legislative support over the course of his term, in part because of the economic ineffectiveness of his administration. Inflation was shown to be statistically significant in explaining when presidential failure occurs. However, the combination of legislative opposition and civil protest directly influenced Alfonsín’s inability to complete his term in office. Below, I will demonstrate how the Peronist Party’s mobilizing capacity, through the party’s relationship with labor unions, was able to take advantage of these causal conditions to serve as the causal mechanism of presidential removal. The UCR Majority Leader of the lower house under Alfonsín has described the unbreakable links between the PJ and organized labor, noting that “the labor movement is the spinal column of their [PJ’s] political system” (Jaroslavsky, 1996, p. 74). The Peronist Party was able to effectively mobilize this “spinal column” in
opposition to a Radical president, given the presence of economic hardship and diminishing legislative support even though Alfonsín was not personally involved in scandals.

The Peronist Party of 1983 was weak, as evidenced by its electoral defeat and difficult relationship with organized labor. For Alfonsín, this appeared to present an opportunity for the UCR that had not previously existed: the possibility to court organized labor. Alfonsín attempted to work with trade unions and build bridges into the working class, which had previously been unachievable for his party. Despite initial goodwill, the president made key decisions in opposition to trade union leaders’ interests, which created intense hostility with these groups during his term. The Director of the Estudios Históricos del Instituto Arturo Jauretche (Historical Studies of the Arturo Jauretche Institute) of the CGT identified two specific legal projects that were instrumental in turning the CGT against Alfonsín and reinforcing its ties with the Peronists (M. Gasparri, personal interview, 2010). First, the president pursued the so-called Mucci Law (Ley Mucci) in 1984. This law possessed various components of union reorganization, such as altering representation on election boards, requiring governmental supervision of elections, and ensuring direct, secret, and compulsory voting rules. Both Peronists and labor leaders viewed the proposal as an attack on organized labor, and the Peronist Party and labor forces coalesced against it. The Peronists pieced together enough support in the Senate to vote down the effort (Epstein, 1992, pp. 128-129). Alfonsín’s actions effectively unified Peronist and union interests against the Radical government while demonstrating his party’s weaknesses (Epstein, 1992, pp. 129-130).
Second, the president implemented law 23.071 in 1984. This law created elections within trade unions. Alfonsín hoped to widen his appeal to the interests of union base support by reducing the hold of traditional union bosses, increasing the democratic nature of these institutions, and allowing for the possible rise of UCR support. The plan ultimately backfired on the president because he created enemies of old union leaders. Alfonsín’s decision was poorly calculated in another way because the union base was more tightly linked to the Peronist Party than were the leaders. The base soon elected more extreme leaders, who were voted into trade union positions in the new elections. The president’s efforts to democratize the unions actually diminished the possibility for a UCR-union alliance (Taiana, 1988, p. 17). Taiana writes of this, noting,

The result reaffirmed the hegemony of Peronism in the union organizations. Despite the defeat in the national elections, the internal crisis, the loss of membership in industrial associations, and the growth of service associations, Peronism demonstrated its validity among unionized workers, making the UCR’s efforts fail to shape their own associational base, shifting the union base from the electoral majority achieved in 1983 (1988, p. 16-17).

Jaroslavsky, the UCR Majority Leader during Alfonsín’s presidency, later concurred in the critique of his party’s efforts, describing how the government call for labor reorganization was perceived as being “in line with the Cabildo” and in opposition to the “line of the balcony of the Casa Rosada” (1996, p. 72). This classic description charges that the order was perceived as a top-down power move, not one of the people. This action pushed labor groups closer to Peronism and further from the UCR, but it comments on the larger problem of the UCR being unable to obtain labor support. The president’s efforts to pursue a relationship with the unions were thwarted by his desire for democratic institutions, including in unions. Even though this was an opportunity to gain UCR support in the unions, it failed.
While Alfonsín’s efforts distanced his party from the unions, the Peronists effectively reasserted their dominance, and the transformation of the Peronist Party effectively eliminated independent union leadership might. Alfonsín was unequivocally unable to woo organized labor during his first few years in office, while the Peronist Party spent this time consolidating and exerting its control as well as taking advantage of the Radical administration’s blunders. In the previous section, I discussed ways in which the Peronists exploited the divisions among the unions to their own benefit. The PJ was able to draw power away from the union old guard, and utilize the resulting mobilizing capacity to their benefit. Alfonsín’s administration faced 13 general strikes, as organized labor confronted the government on policy choices (M. Gasparri, personal interview, 2010). When Ubaldini became the secretary general of CGT in 1986, confrontation increased even more, with 4 general strikes in 1986, 3 in 1987 and 3 in 1988 (Epstein, 1992, p. 135-136). A UCR analyst linked the general strikes with the Peronist Party itself, citing them as a form of “systematic opposition” and noting, “The form of political debate they adopted was that of striking” (C. Canievsky, personal interview, 2010).

Alfonsín faced difficult problems over the course of his term, but PJ opposition, linked with labor mobilization, was the nail in his coffin.

The 1987 midterm election marked a critical change in power dynamics between the Peronists, Radicals, and union leaders. By this time, Alfonsín’s party had lost societal support, and the Peronists had reestablished dominance over the unions. Organized labor threw its support behind Peronist candidates and openly expressed their commitment to Peronism (Epstein, 1992, p. 140). Peronism successfully reframed itself and gained surprising electoral victories by the Renovation portion of the PJ in 1987 (Cavarozzi and
Grossi, 1992, p. 194). The election results created various consequences for the relationships between the parties and unions as well. The UCR loss of control of the Chamber of Deputies squelched the idea of compromise between the UCR and the PJ, and “this led to the end of the government’s attempt at power sharing with the more conciliatory portion of the Peronist trade unionists” (Epstein, 1992, p. 140). In addition, newly-reelected Peronist governor Carlos Menem began reinforcing his ties with the labor unions, especially the traditional seats of union power, as he prepared himself for his presidential candidacy (Cavarozzi and Grossi, 1992, p. 195-196).

The country faced a new bout of hyperinflation in 1989 as the country geared up for a presidential election. The economic minister resigned, which gained the approval of the UCR presidential candidate Angeloz (Llanos, 2010, p. 60). The unions largely supported the PJ in the campaign cycle. The CGT developed a “Proposal for a Platform of National Liberation” that outlined the union’s program in support of the Menem presidency. This proposal discussed the organization’s political platform for the upcoming years. More than that, it uniquely tied the CGT back to the Peronist Party and provided support for a change to a Peronist presidency:

> This attitude is signaling, first, the complete identification of the labor union movement with the principles of the movement founded by Gen. Juan Domingo Peron. Second, the calling of his men to assume, with the force of their presence, the responsibility that they hold in a government run by justicialismo.” (Bold in original text) (Noticias Gremiales, 1989, p. 2)

The dramatic upswing that occurred in inflation before the elections only increased the likelihood of a Peronist victory (Epstein, 1992, p. 140).

On May 14, 1989, the UCR lost the presidential election, Menem was named president elect, and Alfonsín faced an increasingly difficult political, economic, and
social predicament over the unusually long six-month period before Menem would be inaugurated in December. From the point of view of the UCR, the strikes were the result of partisan opposition, as the labor unions and the Peronists created opposition that Alfonsín could not overcome (C. Canievsky, personal interview, 2010). Looting and protests had broken out in Rosario and Buenos Aires by the end of May 1989. Various cities in the country experienced protest and collective action. Some citizens participated in peaceful *cacerolazos* and *marchas del ollazo*, in which individuals gathered together and beat pots in opposition to poverty conditions in the community. Others participated in more dramatic *saqueos* (lootings) and riots that targeted supermarkets and local stores. The Peronists were able to use their links with labor as a call for street opposition during Alfonsín’s presidency. Ultimately, these calls culminated in riots and looting by the end of his term. Describing the fall of Alfonsín, a Radical analyst noted how the Peronists headed the opposition and worked to prevent progress throughout Alfonsín’s term, and the relationship between the labor unions and the Peronists served as additional opposition to the president (C. Canievsky, personal interview, 2010).

In the final negotiations between Menem and Alfonsín, the two had already discussed moving the transition to December 10. Then, another meeting occurred in which the CGT and other labor organizations pushed Menem to seek even an earlier resignation date. Alfonsín described this in his memoir, “The Union Liaison Association (Mesa de Enlace Sindical), which Luis Barrionuevo organized, expressed its willingness that the CGT convene a general strike and a demonstration in support of this demand [an immediate advancement in the handover of power]” (p. 2004, 152). Alfonsín fell to the pressure and confirmed his early resignation by June 12, 1989 after developing a
compromise agreement between the Peronists and the Radicals. He resigned early, granting power to his Peronist successor. The Peronist Party, and its links to organized labor, created an atmosphere that left Alfonsín unable to govern. The general climate of mass, organized labor opposition to Alfonsín and the Radicals was clearly a PJ creation. Although struggles between organized labor and the Peronists existed, they jointly exerted their dominance over time and effectively obstructed a non-Peronist president. With the advent of the Menem presidency, hyperinflation was finally placed under control with the implementation of neoliberal economic policies, including the Convertibility Plan, which pegged the Argentine peso to the US dollar.

**De la Rúa - The Conditions for Challenge**

The Peronist Carlos Menem served as Argentina’s president for two terms, and a major restructuring of the Peronist Party occurred over the course of his presidency, as discussed earlier. Clientelist networks replaced the focus on organized labor, and the party transformed itself in the face of neoliberal reform. Menem had altered the constitution in 1994 to allow himself a second term, but was unable to run for a third. Menem lost popularity over his terms, and opposition cemented against him through the creation of an alliance between the UCR and the newly created party coalition *Frente País Solidario* (FREPASO). Fernando de la Rúa won the 1999 presidential election with 48.5% of the initial popular vote (http://www.observatorioelectoral.org/). De la Rúa was president on the ticket, and FREPASO leader Carlos “Chacho” Álvarez was vice-president.

Much like Alfonsín, De la Rúa began his term with economic and institutional concerns at the forefront. Menem had implemented a Convertibility Plan that pegged the
peso’s value as equal to the US dollar. That constraint on monetary policy tamed inflation, but led to increasing recession and debt. As De la Rúa entered office, inflation was low and remained that way throughout his term, as seen in Table 5 (data.worldbank.org). De la Rúa did face prolonged recession in 2001, with growth rates being negative over the first two years of his term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inflation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
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These past policies that effectively controlled inflation strongly limited the president’s policy options. In addition, economic slowness was a hurdle in the wake of the Menem presidency. In regards to neoliberal reform, De la Rúa maintained many of the neoliberal tendencies of the Menem terms. He continued the Convertibility Plan but proposed changes to some other policies that were increasingly identified as undesirable (Llanos, 2010, p. 62). Eventually, De la Rúa brought Domingo Cavallo, Menem’s economic minister, back into the Cabinet in an attempt to avert economic disaster (Malamud, Forthcoming, p. 4). Cavallo’s participation prolonged the ensuing convertibility crisis.

De la Rúa had a difficult time interacting with his allies and his opponents in the government. The president had won the coalition’s open primary by utilizing his party’s administrative capacity, which the newly-created FREPASO could not match (Schamis, 2002, p. 87). As a result, FREPASO resentment towards their coalition partner began immediately (Schamis, 2002, p. 87). Whereas the initial presidential vote had been high,
the president saw a lessening in power over time. The coalition may have succeeded in developing a winning campaign, but they were less able to share governance (Llanos, 2010, p. 62). FREPASO leaders found themselves locked out of power within their own alliance, creating resentfulness and division in the coalition (Schamis, 2002, p. 87). De la Rúa tended to isolate himself, which only worsened the situation (Llanos, 2010, p. 63).

A corruption scandal emerged in which Senators received bribes for passing an administration-friendly reform bill. De la Rúa sheltered complicit legislators, which led to his implication in executive wrongdoing. Vice President Álvarez stepped down in the wake of this scandal when “de la Rúa refused to sack officials accused of funneling cash to legislators to win support for a controversial labor reform bill approved in April” (Bloomberg BusinessWeek, October 29, 2000). The Alianza suffered a severe blow as this buttressed the divisions between the UCR and FREPASO. More than that, the Alianza had campaigned against Menemist corruption, and the coalition faced backlash in light of its own scandal (Llanos, 2010, p. 63).

Coming into office, the Alianza had 47% of the seats in the lower house (http://www.observatorioelectoral.org) (majority legislative support). The midterm elections of 2001 placed greater pressure on the faltering Alianza, when they only held 34% (http://www.observatorioelectoral.org). The coalition began to face hostile opposition from the Peronist Party and weakening support from FREPASO. With an impossible economic setting and a poorly-handled political situation, De la Rúa faced a perfect storm, which was matched consistently with Peronist obstruction. The Alianza lost support while Peronists in Congress increased their opposition. President De la Rúa’s political maneuvering proved largely ineffective, and his personal style alienated
FREPASO and UCR support because he chose to insulate himself with close friends. As
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) threatened to withhold additional loans that were
necessary to keep the convertibility policy in place, political tensions and citizen fears
grew.

De la Rúa - The Fall

As with Alfonsín, De la Rúa’s fall presents a variety of the factors that were found
to be risk factors in the survival model. Minority legislative support, executive
wrongdoing, and prolonged recession were all identified as statistically significant. Even
though he was not personally involved in the scandal, he covered for a governing
coalition that was undermined by it. This perfect storm put De la Rúa at risk for failure.
However, the more important issue of Peronist opposition with strong mobilizing
capacity explains how the president was forced from office. The following discussion
will demonstrate the role of the Peronist Party in orchestrating the widespread street
opposition to the De la Rúa administration.

The Peronists effectively obstructed the Alianza in governance. They became
increasingly “combative” after the mid-term elections (Llanos, 2010, p. 64), and by mid-
December, “…the Peronists used their majority in both congressional chambers to extend
the ordinary parliamentary sessions (in order to prevent de la Rúa from governing alone
during the summer) and to revoke the special faculties that Congress had extended to
Minister Cavallo eight months before” (Llanos, 2010, p. 65).

While the Peronists opposed the Alianza in the legislature, they mobilized base
units against De la Rúa’s government as well. All sides acknowledge the Peronists’
mobilizing capacity, but definitively identifying how the Peronists mobilized their base is
difficult. The Peronist Party has never admitted to some grand conspiratorial organization of protest activities, but a local Peronist activist acknowledged that communication between various groups, organizations and other political parties occurred. The goal of these meetings among these actors was to identify solutions to the persistent problems that De la Rúa could not address (De Sario, personal interview, 2010). Other researchers have heard similar finely parsed statements from Peronist politicians and local leaders about the party’s relationship to the looting and protests that eventually drove De la Rúa to resign (Auyero, 2000; Auyero and Moran, 2007).

Likewise, the CGT hosted its seventh strike against De la Rúa on December 13, 2001, which further threatened De la Rúa’s hold on power (Clarín, 12/13/01). This combination of diffuse street opposition and concrete labor strikes heightened the swirling chaos, although the involvement of the Peronists in organizing it is difficult to pinpoint from their statements.

In contrast, the UCR sees clear Peronist responsibility for organizing the conspiracy that forced its party leaders from office. The coordinator of the UCR’s Institute of Public Policy for the Province of Buenos Aires stated with complete certainty (“sin duda”) the presence of Peronist leaders in orchestrating the protest and looting events in December of 2001 (C. Canievsky, personal interview, 2010). When questioned, Canievsky asserts “All of it was organized.” He explains that Peronist leaders orchestrated events, beginning with the looting and protesting in Rosario, and gathered marginal sectors of society to create civil unrest that would destabilize the already precarious De la Rúa government (C. Canievsky, personal interview, 2010). Alfonsín describes these events in his book Memoria Política, and he notes the role of the Peronist
vice-governor, explaining, “The deputy governor of the province of Santa Fe, Antonio Vanrell (later indicted for corruption), knew very well what was happening, because various groups associated with him had structured a very disciplined force in the slums, through the work of *carapintadas* and provincial security” (2004, p. 147). Others agree with this Radical perspective. The Secretary General of a local *Partido Socialista* (Socialist Party) *comuna* generally agreed, saying, “When the PJ is not governing, there can be no governing” (G. Traba, personal interview, 2010). He then acknowledged the underlying assumption that the Peronists use their capacity to challenge opposition presidents by any possible means (G. Traba, personal interview, 2010). When further questioned about how to prove the Peronist’s role in driving De la Rúa from office, he admonished me as an investigator and laughingly explained that the Peronists did not leave a trail of their actions, and that this was not an episode of the television show “The X Files” (G. Traba, personal interview, 2010). Although interviews provided no confessions by PJ activists that they triggered lootings, the street-based opposition created by the Peronist Party spun into a broader mobilization, at a minimum.

Whatever political figures say, the presence of Peronist organizational capacity was visible at the base level in some ways in the 2001 collective food riots. The normal channels by which food reached clients had broken down, given the economic crisis and the non-Peronist president. Various brokers were clearly present at looting incidents and recruited participants, with authorization or “tacit approval” from their Peronist patrons (Auyero and Moran, 2007, p. 1357). The mobilizing capacity of the Peronist Party is visible in the organization of looting activities, with flyers and word of mouth. Citing a specific example, Auyero and Moran explain, “These flyers were distributed by members
of the then-oppositional Peronist Party, some of them local officials, others well-known grassroots leaders” (2007, p. 1351). Moreover, the brokers’ presence was reported in newspaper accounts of many lootings (Auyero and Moran, 2007, p. 1351). These facts support the argument that party brokers were instrumental figures in the collective violence that emerged at the end of De la Rúa’s presidency.

Through these key pieces of information a more compelling story is told. First, Peronists became obstructionist to the Alianza government and prevented it from accomplishing any goals. This antagonized the administration, but it also heightened public sentiment against the government’s lack of efficacy. This obstruction and economic crisis created an intense situation by mid-December. Second, even Peronists acknowledged the communication between the party and other civil society groups in these protest-ridden days. De Sario, a Peronist party militant during the time, described the party efforts to identify problems and work together to provide solutions for Argentine citizens, acknowledging the base level communication that occurred between local organizations (G. De Sario, personal interview, 2010). Third, other political parties viewed the Peronist role as essential in the protests and riots. Fourth, other scholars have shown the presence of Peronist organization and coordination in the looting and rioting of the worst portions of 2001. Overall, these facts, taken together provide some understanding of how the Peronists organized their base units to further oppose the De la Rúa administration.

These riots and protests shattered the country in December 2001. Citizens rejected the president, as well as all other political leaders in their chants of “Que se vayan todos” (kick them all out). Protesters crowded the streets in front of the Casa
Rosada and across the nation, banging pots in opposition. Tensions heightened when looting broke out in various cities. Clarín describes the events of that day, noting, “The resignation of Fernando de la Rúa surprised no one” (Clarín, December 21, 2001). The article continues to discuss the tragic death of 25 and the wounding of 400 citizens (Clarín, December 21, 2001). The combination of constant protest, legislative opposition, destructive looting, and working class strikes proved too much for the president. On December 20, De la Rúa announced his own resignation in response to the resignation of key ministers and dramatic scenes of street protests in the Plaza de Mayo. The Peronist mobilizing capacity succeeded in creating mass protests, and the failure of a president gained international attention.

**Rodríguez Saá – The Fall**

De la Rúa’s fall did not ensure an immediate return to presidential stability. Intraparty disputes prevailed, and the country transitioned through several presidents in the course of a month. This investigation focuses only on the failure of Adolfo Rodríguez Saá because he received a vote from the legislature to serve as president and the failure occurred in the wake of the De la Rúa debacle. Other presidents in this timespan were simply interim officeholders until the legislature could vote for a president to serve until future elections were called. The Rodríguez Saá presidency is an interesting case of failure because he was, himself, a Peronist. Despite this party affiliation, Rodríguez Saá fell to the same Peronist opposition as De la Rúa and failed to complete his term in office. As such, his experience suggests either that Peronists might have lost control of protesters or that Rodríguez Saá’s betrayal of Peronist leaders placed him at the heart of an intra-
party dispute. Support for this second argument is demonstrated in the events that led to his failure.

Rodríguez Saá became president when he was voted into office by the legislature, receiving only the votes of the Peronist bloc (Malamud, Forthcoming, p. 11). His support from the Peronist bloc was based on his commitment to handing over power promptly. Fourteen Peronist governors originally met in San Luis province to discuss the presidential succession, and they split into two factions. After key meetings, the largest faction agreed to the presidency of Rodríguez Saá (a governor and member of the smaller faction), if he committed to calling elections in 2002 (Malamud, Forthcoming, 11).

After inauguration, Rodríguez Saá committed a variety of policy errors in less than two weeks, including defaulting on the debt and appointing unpopular ministers. Hostility still raged in the street regarding these financial issues. Alone, these factors might have been enough to push him from office. However, Rodríguez Saá brought on his own quicker demise when he pursued his own interest in completing De la Rúa’s term, instead of fulfilling the promises to his party to hand over power. He created enemies of the Peronist governors and legislators who had placed him in office (Malamud, Forthcoming, 11). His financial missteps, along with Peronist hostility, led to additional street protests, riots, and his subsequent resignation. The withdrawal of Peronist governor support was matched with protest against Rodríguez Saá, resulting in his subsequent resignation (Pérez-Liñán, 2007, pp. 180-181).

With Rodríguez Saá’s departure, the presidency returned to the head of the Senate Ramon Puerta, who resigned from the Senate to avoid retaking the presidency. In order of succession, the presidency then fell to the lower house’s Majority Leader, Eduardo
Camaño. He was able to leave office when a second legislative vote chose Eduardo Duhalde. Duhalde was a Senator at the time and had been the previous governor of Buenos Aires province. This vote crossed party lines, included Peronist, FREPASO, and UCR support, and empowered Duhalde to serve out De la Rúa’s term. He received not only the presidency, but he was provided the rest of De la Rúa’s term.

Duhalde’s success at gaining the presidency is the clearest indicator of Peronist power. This is evident in the words of party outsiders, as a Socialist Party leader noted, “Rodríguez Saá fell because he was outside the liking of the others [Peronists]. The one who needed to be president was Duhalde” (G. Traba, personal interview, 2010, Italics added). The CGT had originally favored Rodríguez Saá over Duhalde, and in his fall, a CGT expert acknowledged that the regional support for Rodríguez Saá could not be matched by the support Duhalde held within Buenos Aires (M. Gasparri, personal interview, 2010). In other words, Rodríguez Saá could not oppose other Peronists’ power.

The fall of Rodríguez Saá is problematic and difficult to understand at best, as the whole episode happened so quickly. I simply address this presidency because some aspects of the case support the theory, even though a Peronist is removed from office. It appears as though the mobilizing capacity of the Peronist Party was able to take down this Peronist leader because street protest and legislative opposition coalesced when he fell out of party leaders’ good graces. In this case, protest mobilization could have been aggravated by betrayed governors. However, there are other potential hypotheses that cannot be disproven. Peronists might have lost control of the mobilization efforts and been unable to protect Rodríguez Saá. Perhaps Duhalde sought to pursue his own agenda.
and used his power with the *piqueteros* to maintain opposition to Rodríguez Saá. At the very least, Rodríguez Saá’s fall shows some support for an argument that opposition from his own party was matched with social mobilization, bringing his presidency to a quick end.

**Conclusion**

A Communist Party official provided a stylized history of Argentine presidential failure, saying, “When there is a big crisis, the UCR governs. Following the depth of the crisis, the Peronists return. This is the history of Argentina. The Radicals are always playing ‘hot potato’” (J. Kreyness, personal interview, 2010). The PJ takes advantage of the UCR’s inability to resolve enormous problems in order to return to office and increase their party’s political might. Repeatedly the UCR is caught holding the “hot potato” of economic crisis, matched with political instability. This portrayal of Argentine political history largely fits the statistical analysis of presidential failure, and is discussed extensively in this case study of Argentine presidential failures. The UCR faces conditions that are debilitating for presidents, which are exacerbated by the Peronist opposition that uses them to mobilize support among its allies in society.

Like other failed presidents in the cross-national analysis, Argentina’s Alfonsín and De la Rúa faced economic crisis and diminishing partisan support in the legislature. Alfonsín struggled with hyperinflationary conditions and lost his lower house absolute majority after midterm elections. Likewise, De la Rúa carried out untenable economic policies upon inauguration and had his coalition fall around him. However, Alfonsín is nearly unique in the cross-national dataset of fallen presidents in having no personal taint
of corruption, although De la Rúa was coded for his involvement in a bribery scandal. Both faced unusually large and persistent civil society mobilizations that – critically – were joined by partisan allies in the PJ who both supported their protests and were able to use their legislative positions to block effective governing. Strikes coordinated by the PJ and CGT against Alfonsín made him unable to maintain order. Social mobilization, with diverse citizen manifestations, drove de la Rúa from office. In both cases, the Peronists obstructed legislative activities while promoting street based opposition.

The mobilization capacity of the Peronist Party is the essential explanation of how repeated presidential failure occurs in Argentina. However, this mobilization capacity differs over time. The Peronist linkages to traditional labor explained how Alfonsín faced street opposition. Years later, the diffuse clientelist network fostered by Menem was used to challenge De la Rúa. Finally, the fall of Peronist president Rodríguez Sáa shows how a divided Peronist Party may challenge one of their own. Rodríguez Sáa lacked full support from PJ, specifically the governors, faced the same activated base as De la Rúa, and met the same demise.

In regard to future predictors of presidential failure in Argentina, the changing climate of political parties may dislodge the firm hold the PJ has on labor groups and neighborhood organizations. The fractures within the Peronist Party may allow for opposition to emerge that might challenge current President Cristina Kirchner. However, this change has yet to be fully realized. As it stands, the continued connection that the PJ creates with its grassroots supporters stands as a natural threat against any other party successfully completing a presidential mandate. This capacity to oppose presidents is a top-down method of failure, as the legislative party builds street opposition to match its
political behavior and ambitions. The deeply embedded nature of the Peronist Party explains how this process moves from positions of power into the streets.
CHAPTER FOUR: ECUADORIAN PRESIDENTIAL INSTABILITY

The large presence of indigenous peoples defines Ecuador culturally and historically. Whereas Argentine politics can be characterized by the persistent strength of the Peronist Party and its subsequent clientelist tendencies, Ecuadorian politics has maintained elitist traditions and featured historic exclusion of indigenous citizens from the political sphere. Ecuador, an Andean country, has a large indigenous population that has stood outside the traditional channels of power historically. This exclusion has made social movements instrumental to political life because they provide a voice to otherwise disregarded citizens. Social movements have increased indigenous organization and participation over the past decades, and this shift is evident in Ecuadorian politics, from political parties to institutions. Ecuador rewrote its constitution in 2008, and the preamble of the document celebrates the importance of the Pacha Mama (Mother Earth). This wording points explicitly to the inclusion of indigenous culture in creating new institutional norms. It stands as a testament to the growing influence of the indigenous movement, which was a driving force in the constitutional rewriting process.

Growth in social movement strength, specifically that of indigenous organizations, has evolved over time, and this analysis intends to track that evolution and its effect on presidential instability. Social movements, along with their capacity to mobilize opposition, allow for the repeated occurrence of presidential failure in Ecuador. Ecuadorian presidential failure moves from strong organizations towards politicians, which differs inherently from the Peronist-powered opposition in Argentina. These civil

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society organizations are organizing structures for protest and presidential opposition, pushing for legislative action in the face of widespread social unrest. First, I assess how the indigenous movement grew, transformed over time, and finally, influenced the likelihood of failure. The indigenous movement in Ecuador consists of several organizations and distinct points of view, and this analysis does not intend to reduce it to a solitary voice. While acknowledging the multifaceted nature of indigenous mobilization, this study will focus on the largest organization, as it is most important in regards to political influence. Second, I conduct process-tracing of the instances of presidential failure by drawing from news and interview sources. Specifically, I access news sources from *Diario Hoy*, *El Universo*, and *Latin American Weekly Report* and use various secondary sources to verify this information. I also draw upon fieldwork and interviews in Ecuador to explain the causes of presidential failure. I will show how the ability of indigenous actors to build street and legislative opposition is instrumental to presidential failure in two cases. Indigenous organizations do not have a monopoly on such capacity, and the most recent case of failure shows how other groups drive failure, even though indigenous groups were still involved.

**Indigenous Groups’ Historical Foundation**

Ecuador clearly has a large indigenous population, but identifying the exact proportion of Ecuadorians that are indigenous is, in itself, a difficult task. The 2001 census has a low estimate of 6.6%, whereas an indigenous organization places it at around 45% (Zamosc, 2007, p. 8; Becker, 2011b, p. 3). Most of the indigenous population is in the highland and Amazonian regions of the country, with considerably
smaller numbers in the coastal region. Additionally, many indigenous people have moved to Quito and other urban areas in recent years (Van Cott, 2005, p. 101).

The social and political exclusion of the indigenous population has been a consistent theme of Ecuadorian history, with indigenous peoples facing poverty and poor social conditions up until the present day. During various historical periods, indigenous groups formed to support specific goals or advocate for distinct policies. A rise in indigenous organizations occurred in 1979 with the return to democracy, encouraged, in some areas, by agrarian reform that was passed under the military dictatorship in the 1970’s (Zamosc, 2007, p. 9). Van Cott pointed to influence by the Catholic Church and other groups in the 1970’s that increased the presence of leaders and organizational capacity (Van Cott, 2005, p. 103-104). In 1986, various organizations finally coalesced under an overarching organization, CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities - Confederacion de nacionalidades indigenas del Ecuador), when delegates from 9 different nationalities met together (Becker, 2011b, p. 8). CONAIE was made up of several indigenous organizations, representing different groups from the highlands (Ecuarunari), the Amazon (CONFENIAE), and the coastal region (COICE) (Becker, 2011b, p. 8-9). These distinct currents influence the organization to this day. At its inception, CONAIE focused on a variety of issues, including land gains, education programs, discrimination and representation, economic development, health, as well as acknowledgment of indigenous identity concerns, like language and medicinal issues (Becker, 2011b, p. 9; Zamosc, 2007, p. 9). This umbrella organization emerged as the largest funnel for indigenous concerns and quickly began asserting its strength. Other organizations, including FENOCIN (La Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones
Campesinas, Indígenas, y Negras) and FEINE (Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas Evangélicos) exist as well (Becker, 2011b, p. 16-17). However, CONAIE stands as the central indigenous organization in Ecuador and is a key facet to understanding social mobilization in Ecuador.

After emerging in 1986, CONAIE began to channel indigenous discontent. The organization focused attention on indigenous concerns, including plurinationality, bilingual education, and agrarian land reform. Despite the growing strength of indigenous organizations in the pursuit of these policies, the government failed to adequately address indigenous issues (Becker, 2011b, p. 25). This struggle culminated in 1990 with a call for uprising, known as the levantamiento indígena de Inti Raymi – the indigenous uprising of Inti Raymi (an indigenous festival). Leaders of CONAIE initiated protests and roadblocks, which spread from the highlands in a decentralized manner (Becker, 2011b, p. 25). These protest activities established negotiations with policy makers, but they were broken off several times. Despite months of activity, the material achievements of the uprising remain questionable (Becker, 2011b, p. 34). This uprising serves two purposes for this case analysis. First, it demonstrates where the political power of CONAIE lies – in engaging in non-traditional political action by mobilizing mass protests. Second, the uprising defined the true emergence of indigenous voices in mainstream Ecuadorian political life (Becker, 2011b, p. 32). Reflecting on the events of 1990, the president of Ecuarunari, Delfín Tenesaca, notes, “Before, they did not treat us like human beings, and therefore we were struggling for the recognition of plurinationality, which had not yet been applied in the country” (Diario Hoy, June 15,
2010). This statement by an indigenous leader depicts the shift that resulted from this event, as the protest itself gave indigenous people a place in Ecuadorian politics.

Two other protest efforts exemplify indigenous social movement strength in Ecuador – The Caminata (March) and the Mobilization for Life (Movilización por la Vida). In the Caminata, an Amazonian indigenous organization pursued greater collective rights and autonomy for indigenous communities (Becker, 2011b, p. 34). The lack of response, combined with governmental hostility, resulted in a march from Puyo to Quito (Becker, 2011b), a 13-day trek from the lowlands into the Andes that was performed by 5,000 protesters (Sawyer, 1997, p. 66). The march had been coordinated by a lowland group, the Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza (Organización de Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza – OPIP), but CONAIE and CONFENIAE provided support (Sawyer, 1997, p. 68). This event captured the imagination of Ecuadorians, with urban Quiteños applauding the participants due to the hardship of the trek and the national imagery utilized by the groups (Sawyer, 1997, p. 66). Although they did not achieve all their goals, these protesters left Quito victorious, as 1,115,175 hectares received communal titling (Sawyer, 1997, p. 67). The other event, the Mobilization for Life, occurred in 1994 as indigenous groups came together to oppose a proposed law that would allow the government to sell or mortgage communal lands (Becker, 2011b, p. 36). Different groups established roadblocks for 10 days of intensive, large-scale mobilization (Becker, 2011b, p. 37). The Mobilization for Life did not alter policies, but it fostered coalitions between indigenous organizations (Becker, 2011b, p. 37). These three events, the levantamiento, the Caminata, and the Mobilization for Life, are central to scholar acknowledgement of the “strength” of Ecuadorian indigenous movements, when
compared to other South American countries (Becker, 2011b, p. 37). Despite the inability to substantially change policy, in most if not all of these cases, these three events show the roots of indigenous organizing in Ecuador (Becker, 2011b, p. 37). They depict the utilization of protest as a mechanism to garner political attention, along with the foundation for the organizational capacity that these groups have maintained over time.

The power and strength of CONAIE to use social mobilization to drive for political change is unique. As with almost any grassroots movement, the problem lies in catalyzing collective action, but CONAIE has relied heavily on indigenous communities to draw out protesters. The communal nature of decision-making among Otavalo indigenous communities is well documented (Korovkin, 2001), and it is this communal decision-making among various indigenous communities that CONAIE relies upon for its support. CONAIE calls upon communities to participate in mobilization efforts, and, after a communal decision is reached, that decision is applicable to all community members with various social enforcement mechanisms (Zamosc, 2007, p. 15). Zamosc explains how this heightens CONAIE’s mobilizing capacity: “Thus, joining in a mobilization is always the result of a decision of the community, which exerts its influence to make sure that the members join in the roadblocks and rallies. The secret of CONAIE’s power, then, lies in its ability to harness the resources for collective action that exist in the Indian communities” (Zamosc, 2007, p. 16). In other words, CONAIE’s organizational structure allows for decentralized support, but strong enforcement once decisions are made. The collective nature of indigenous community decision-making
explains why CONAIE have been so successful at protest mobilization, providing it with enviably high participation in mass events\textsuperscript{15}.

Indigenous organizations utilized these non-traditional methods of participation as a matter of course, but there was greater ambiguity as to the role that indigenous mobilization would play in political parties themselves. Through the early 1980’s, indigenous organizations allied with Democratic Left (ID), PSE, Popular Democratic Movement (MPD), and other leftist parties, as well as Democracia Popular, a center-right one (Van Cott, 2005, p. 104). Until 1996, only one party, ID, listed indigenous autonomy as a facet of its political platform (Van Cott, 2005, p. 105). Overall, relationships with political parties were not highly beneficial to the indigenous cause. Indigenous citizens oftentimes voted for leftist parties, lowering parties’ incentives to target indigenous concerns (Van Cott, 2005, p. 105). More than that, alliances did not help indigenous organizations because they felt mestizo leaders ignored them and parties used them for their own designs (Van Cott, 2005, p. 105). These relationships exemplified the classic inequality present within Ecuadorian society, as indigenous organizations, supported by membership, failed to gain influence over their numerically weaker allies.

CONAIE could easily have been an indigenous movement that lacked broader support, but other economic and social factors increased its visibility. CONAIE emerged as a viable alternative, as labor movements were disintegrating in the wake of neoliberal reform and established parties faced weakening support (Sánchez López and Freidenberg, 1998, p. 71). In 1990, CONAIE adopted a policy to refrain from electoral participation, noting systemic flaws in Ecuadorian democracy (Becker, 2011b, p. 43). Over time,

\textsuperscript{15} Survey analysis in Chapter Five identifies a significant relationship between indigenous identity and protest participation. In addition, organizational affiliation is also significant.
indigenous organizations grew divided regarding this policy, and many activists questioned the utility of these actions. This division epitomizes the continued dispute between regional subgroups of CONAIE, as CONAIE leaders opposed the viewpoints of various smaller indigenous organizations within its body (Becker, 2011b, p. 44). In 1995, the Amazonian organization, CONFENIAE, created an indigenous movement Pachakutik, in opposition to the anti-political mandate from highland-led CONAIE. They also formed a coalition with a broad-based social and labor movement, Movimiento de Ciudadanos por un Nuevo País (New Country – NP) (Van Cott, 2005, p. 121). As a consequence, CONAIE finally formed its own political movement, called Plurinational Unity (Unidad Plurinacional) (Becker, 2011b, p. 45). The two indigenous political movements merged and maintained their coalition with Nuevo País in 1996, forming the Pachakutik Movement for Plurinational Unity (MUPP-NP), which is generally referred to as Pachakutik (Becker, 2011b, p. 45; Van Cott, 2005, p. 121). Although reluctant to enter into the political arrangement, CONAIE emerged as the strongest member of this alliance. In describing this relationship, the former Vice President of CONAIE, Miguel Guatemal, explains that “Pachakutik is an arm of CONAIE. It is not another organization or other movement. It was born from CONAIE” (M. Guatemal, personal interview, 2009).

The multi-faceted alliance, the Coordinador de Movimientos Sociales (Coordinator of Social Movements), created in 1995, created a backbone of support for the Pachakutik (Becker, 2011b, p. 46). This alliance linked CONAIE, labor unions, and other social movements together with this electoral movement (Andolina, 2003, p. 730). Alliances with CONAIE are widespread, as the organization works with various
indigenous groups and social movements, including women, labor, agricultural, and other organizations (M. Guatemal, personal interview, 2009). These alliances, support, and linkages are instrumental in understanding the future of Ecuadorian politics.

Since the emergence of CONAIE and other indigenous organizations, the strength of these groups has waxed and waned, with increased strength during Bucaram and Mahuad’s administration, as they opposed neoliberal reform. These changes will be further discussed in this chapter. After Bucaram’s failure, the indigenous movement successfully achieved constitutional change that acknowledged many indigenous rights, including collective land rights (Andolina, 2003, p. 747-748). However, in the wake of the Gutiérrez failure, CONAIE and Pachakutik faced declining strength as many Pachakutik politicians were viewed skeptically for participating in the Gutiérrez administration (Zamosc, 2007, p. 22). CONAIE faced internal upheaval as opposition to Gutiérrez exacerbated the divides between the various organizations that make up the umbrella organization as well as other indigenous organizations (Zamosc, 2007, p. 15). As a result, a distancing occurred between CONAIE and Pachakutik, as the organization attempted to regain support. CONAIE reasserted its ability to coordinate social mobilization, opposing various neoliberal issues, including free trade agreements (Becker, 2011b, p. 95). This time period demonstrated that CONAIE maintained the key source of the indigenous movement’s power. Although Pachakutik struggled politically, CONAIE reestablished itself as a voice for indigenous concerns, wielding its mass-based power (Becker, 2011b, p. 95).

Despite this, indigenous organizations have achieved considerable gains since then. The Correa administration heeded the call for a constituent assembly, with many
indigenous goals being included in the constitutional rewrite. Plurinationality was acknowledged, but the social movements engaged in debates regarding what these terms meant and how the government would implement them (Becker, 2011a). More than that, many indigenous politicians joined Correa’s party, pursuing greater voice in the rewriting process while diminishing Pachakutik’s strength (Becker, 2011a, p.50). Since this rewriting, Correa has consolidated his, and his party’s, power following his re-election. Correa acknowledged the importance of indigenous rights, but may have a different perspective than CONAIE and other organizations intended (Trujillo, 2010, p. 21). This has created greater tension between the government and indigenous organizations. Pachakutik has stood against Correa’s decisions that pursue economic development over environmental protections, but they failed to provide a viable alternative to the president (Trujillo, 2010, p. 19). Pachakutik has been seeking stronger ties with other political parties, like MPD (Trujillo, 2010, p. 18), but the power that was once exerted by social movements has been overtaken to some degree by Correa’s infectious populist style.

This condensed historical account demonstrates the sources of strength indigenous of social movements in Ecuador, as these groups built strong communal support before taking on electoral participation. As we will see, this strength translated into the ability to remove presidents, repeatedly.

**Cases of Presidential Failure in Ecuador**

When asked about presidential instability in Ecuador, ex-president Lucio Gutiérrez describes the causes of presidential failure by noting non-traditional actors, saying, “There is a lack of political maturity among Ecuadorian political actors,” and as a
result mobilizations against presidents were able to take advantage of poor economic decisions by the government (L. Gutiérrez, personal interview, 2009). These statements get at the heart of presidential failure in Ecuador. For this immature democracy, the path of failure moves from strong organizations towards politicians, which will be demonstrated through the following cases of failure. The following sections depict three instances of presidential failure – the cases of Presidents Bucaram, Mahuad, and Gutiérrez. Their failures show the role of these social movements in cementing opposition, building relationships, and challenging presidents. Additionally, I look at one challenge against President Correa as an instance in which the possibility of presidential failure could have occurred but did not. Each case is unique, but all demonstrate the role of social movements in driving presidential failure.

The quantitative chapter presents various risk factors for failure, and these presidents share many of the same conditions. Their specific failures will be discussed in detail, but these similarities can be discussed briefly. Given the institutional design of Ecuadorian politics, all of the presidents are at risk from institutional factors. Presidents Bucaram, Mahuad, Gutiérrez, and Correa\textsuperscript{16} (first term) received less than a majority of the first round \textit{initial popular vote}. All of the presidents had legislative minority status for their party as well (\textit{minority legislative support}). These conditions place Ecuadorian presidents in a weakened position. To be fair, every president since the return to democracy has faced these same institutional constraints, whether failed or not.

Presidents Bucaram, Mahuad, and Gutiérrez were all identified as complicit in \textit{executive wrongdoing} and facing extensive \textit{social protest}. Although each faced economic hurdles,

\textsuperscript{16}Correa did receive a majority in the first round for his 2009 and 2013 re-elections (Psephos http://psephos.adam-carr.net/).
they did not face any of the fears identified in the quantitative analysis. *Inflation* with GDP deflator never rose over 11% for any of the years of these presidents’ terms, and no year was coded positively for *prolonged recession*. On the other hand, each did pursue some aspect of *neoliberal reform* over the course of his presidency. These risk factors appear for each of the Ecuadorian presidents, but the following discussion will show the instrumental nature of civil protest and minority legislative support in driving failure.

*A Crazy Man*

In 1996, President Abdalá Bucaram was elected with 54% of the vote. He originally only received 26% of the *initial popular vote*, losing the first round of voting to Jaime Nebot, a wealthy statesman ([http://www.observatorioelectoral.org](http://www.observatorioelectoral.org)). An outsider to the traditional Quito elite, Bucaram was from Guayaquil, the coastal economic center of the country. This distinction may appear unimportant, but the implications of this dynamic explain many of the obstacles that the president quickly faced. Initially, Bucaram received intense media scrutiny, as various outlets and elites criticized the president’s style as “flamboyant” (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 26). The president also antagonized opposition leaders instead of seeking compromise within the government, heightening discontent with his leadership style (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 26). As Peréz-Liñán notes, these critiques arguably stemmed from the class attitudes of the Quito elite (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 26). These issues became conflated to challenge presidential authority, as de la Torre describes:

> For the first time in the history of the country, the most prestigious newspapers and television news shows opposed a president. They questioned his unorthodox and flamboyant style, his authoritarian appropriation of the people’s will, and the impossibility of having dialogues in which different opinions could be voiced.
Journalists were at the forefront of a democratic opposition to Bucaram when they denounced corruption and rejected his mass entertainment-based antipolitics. Their democratic challenges coexisted with upper-class prejudices that saw Bucaram as the incarnation of mass popular culture and as a shame to the country’s civility (de la Torre 1999, p. 566).

His personal style, matched with regional divides, explains many of the complaints of Bucaram’s indecorous behavior and provides a foundation for the immediate problems the president faced.\textsuperscript{17}

In addition to the more superficial concerns about Bucaram’s style, there were more serious questions regarding his ability to govern. His administration was plagued by corruption allegations after serving less than three months in office. The administration faced repeated scandals in the forms of ministerial misconduct, opposition strong-arming, and customs and public official corruption (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 25-26). By 1997, the US Ambassador publicly criticized the nepotistic, corrupt practices of the administration (Andolina, 2003, p. 731; Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 26). Also contributing to civil and political unrest, Bucaram’s government faced problems in economic policy implementation. Although he ran on a populist, anti-oligarchy agenda (de la Torre, 1999, p. 560), Bucaram slowly moved toward neoliberal economic policies (\textit{neoliberal reform}), as well as proposing a “convertibility” plan based on Argentina’s model (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 25-27). This mixture of populist rhetoric with neoliberal concessions heightened the power of the opposition because Bucaram’s waffling between the two positions continued until his approval ratings were sufficiently low to prevent support for the subsequent harsh economic policies (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 25-27). These three features

\textsuperscript{17} Examples of Bucaram’s “flamboyant” political style include “mocking” his political opponents (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 26). He eschewed more formal apparel for jeans (de la Torre, 1999, p. 561). He used song and dance to gain public attention and support (de la Torre, 1999, p. 561). Perhaps most famously, Bucaram recorded an album, \textit{El Loco que Ama} (“the crazy one who loves”) (de la Torre, 1999, p. 565).
– personal gaffes, administrative corruption, and unpopular neoliberal policy implementation – coalesced for the Bucaram government within six months in the form of media outrage, citizen protest, and legislative opposition. It was these last two components, protest and legislative opposition, that led to his removal.

Protests were organized by various indigenous organizations and social movements by fall of 1996, and elite opposition shortly followed (Andolina, 2003, p. 731). This opposition only increased by January 1997, and US Ambassador Leslie Alexander officially criticized the government on January 29, which Peréz-Liñán suggests to be “tacit support for the antigovernment movement” (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 27). A combination of social movements, indigenous organizations, and trade unions formed the “Patriotic Front” which planned a large protest and general strike to be held on February 5, 1997 (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 27). Although the actual attendance figures are questionable, the evocative image of two million Ecuadorans filling the streets of Quito characterizes all descriptions of Bucaram’s last days in office (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 27). A news report notes that protesters chanted, “Sucre by sucre, we are saving a heap, to buy the resignation of the crazy thief” (Diario Hoy, February 6, 1997). Public outcry continued for Bucaram’s removal from office, and Congress called for an emergency session. Bucaram was charged with mental incapacity, which lacked any true diagnosis or support, and he was removed from office by a simple majority vote, instead of the supermajority needed for an impeachment (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, pp. 27-28).

Bucaram eventually fled the country to avoid corruption charges, residing in exile in Panama (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 28).

18 In Spanish this chant is more lyrical, saying: “de sucre en sucre hagamos un montón para comprar la renuncia del loco ladrón.”
The activities of indigenous organizations were crucial to Bucaram’s failure. The marching protesters were largely convened by CONAIE and labor unions (Peréz-Liñán, 2007, p. 27). CONAIE’s former Vice-President, Miguel Guatemal, describes the organization’s role, saying, “We did a national uprising, for all the country,” and then explains how the organization cut off production to the city of Quito, eliminating the food supply that came from indigenous communities, which pushed citizens to oppose the government (M. Guatemal, personal interview, 2009). He notes that this left the government with a simple decision, “The city had to support the organization, and the government had to accept the proposals. If the government did not accept the proposals, then it had to leave” (M. Guatemal, personal interview, 2009). When asked if the CONAIE were in contact with Pachakutik during these types of struggle, Guatemal notes that Pachakutik members are subject to the communal decision-making of CONAIE, and in each case of failure, they were in dialogue (M. Guatemal, personal interview, 2009).

While these protests were occurring in the streets, negotiations to remove Bucaram were occurring in the legislature. On the day of his removal, Pachakutik members were making suggestions at around 11:00 A.M. as to who should be the new president, even though the vote against Bucaram did not occur until many hours later (Diario Hoy, February 7, 1997). The Pachakutik ultimately acted strategically, and these negotiations resulted in their party exchanging support for Fabián Alarcón, the legislative leader, for the later constituent assembly (Becker, 2011b, p. 57). In addition, Diario Hoy notes the presence of the CMS (Coordinator of Social Movements), leading protest activities and occupying the Metropolitan Cathedral of Quito (Diario Hoy, February 6, 1997). The CMS can be viewed as another link between indigenous organizations,
protesters, labor unions, and political parties. When viewed through the framework of a bottom-up struggle, the linkages between these organizations define the outcome. CONAIE and CMS promoted large-scale protests, creating that mythic description of protesters in the city. Linked by organizational capacity, legislative opposition was determining the manner in which to most efficiently remove president Bucaram.

A Questionable Coup

The subsequent elected president, Jamil Mahuad, faced the same problem in completing his term in office, even though he was removed through different mechanisms. The Mahuad failure shows the most explicit presence of communication between social movements and governmental organizations, largely the military, but political parties as well. Elected and inaugurated in 1998, Mahuad stepped into office in the midst of severe economic crisis and immediately faced corruption allegations. Rapid closing of banks, high rates of unemployment, increasing recession, and IMF reform pressures characterized this time period. Zamosc explains how declining oil prices, matched with climate-related problems in shrimp and banana exportation, prevented loans from being paid, led to devastating bank closures, and created immense capital flight (Zamosc, 2007, p. 12). Although Mahuad fought to preserve support from his party, the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC), he was left in an “untenable” position, as the IMF pushed its conditions in stabilization policies (Zamosc, 2007, p. 12). In an attempt to resolve these problems, Mahuad instituted banking freezes, and, during his last days, proposed the country’s dollarization. The dollarization plan was resisted by indigenous groups, as well as urban workers, who would be hit hard by the currency change (Becker,
Mahuad’s inability to resist the pressure from various political and economic sectors, while facing an increasing hostile citizenry, created a perfect storm for his subsequent challenge.

Mahuad faced repeated protests in 1998 and 1999, but his dollarization proposal sparked intense unrest with large street protests, consisting largely of indigenous organizations and military factions, along with union and middle-class supporters. On January 21, 2000 these indigenous and military groups took over the Congress building. After extending their takeover to the Supreme Court and the Presidential Palace, Mahuad was forced to flee, and Lucio Gutiérrez, a junior-ranking military officer, and Antonio Vargas, the president of CONAIE, announced the creation of a triumvirate, called the National Salvation Front (Beck and Mijeski, 2001, pp. 1-2). Retrospectively, Gutiérrez cites the “ethical” and “political” nature of the effort and highlights the role of the military, noting, “We acted in defense of the people (pueblo)” (L. Gutiérrez, personal interview, 2009). Before assuming any responsibility, Gutiérrez was quickly replaced by a higher ranking general and defense minister (Becker, 2011b, p. 68). The junta that came into power consisted of the military’s General Mendoza, a former Supreme Court Justice, and CONAIE-president Vargas, thereby taking into account the key actors in the presidential challenge (Beck and Mijeski, 2001, pp. 1-2). Becker notes that Mendoza immediately resigned from the junta, forcing its collapse in the light of international pressure (2011b, p. 68). The time period was characterized by hectic negotiations between national and international actors, and eventually indigenous leaders called for the suspension of protest activities (Zamosc, 2007, p. 13).
The importance of indigenous organizations in Mahuad’s failure is explicit. The large protests against Mahuad that opposed dollarization were organized and carried out by CONAIE. Days before the removal, CONAIE had called for a *levantamiento* (uprising) (Lucero, 2001). Over 10,000 protesters arrived in Quito, and they were aided by military personnel, who helped make bridges to cross barbed wire (Lucero, 2001, p. 63). As with the previous presidential failure, Pachakutik acquired political might from this process. The party was victorious in gaining provincial and municipal seats in the May 2000 election (Becker, 2011b, p. 71). When questioning a Pachakutik leader about the party’s role in all of these failures, he expresses the party’s involvement in each, noting, “When we are not listened to, when we are not understood in regards to diversity...because of this, the mobilizations of the indigenous sector and the plurinacionality and the *campesinos* has lived, and we have participated actively in all [mobilizations]” (J. Guamán, personal interview, 2009). More than that, this depicts the bottom-up nature of presidential failure in Ecuador, even as CONAIE pursued linkages with other groups, in this case – the military – to achieve their goals. The linking of indigenous organizations and military personnel may appear odd, but various scholars have noted that CONAIE formed relationships with lower-level colonels, which explains why some of their interests fell in line (Lucero, 2001, p. 65-66; Becker, 2011b, p. 69). These military personnel would not have been from elite families and may have been influenced by the recent leftist victory of Chavez in Venezuela (Lucero, 2001, p. 65). In sum, the unification of these two groups was beneficial in achieving their aims.
A Deserter

The next failure is the weakest example of how civil society relationships set the stage for presidential challenge, although it does provide some support due to CONAIE’s involvement. The next elected president and previous coup participant Lucio Gutiérrez also failed to complete his term in office. Gutiérrez came to office in 2002 after founding his own political party, the *Partido Socialista Patriotica* (PSP), and forming an alliance with the Pachakutik Party. These two parties joined forces after Pachakutik decided not to run their own candidate. With Gutiérrez receiving much of the indigenous support, the Pachakutik-PSP alliance appeared logical, especially in the wake of Mahuad’s ousting (Becker, 2011b, p. 79). Pachakutik received four ministerial positions from the alliance (Becker, 2011b, p. 84). Despite his early support, Gutiérrez shortly faced problems within his administration, from corruption and embezzlement allegations to unpopular policy implementation. Whereas he had fostered the image of a populist, grassroots leader in the aftermath of Mahuad’s fall, Gutiérrez transitioned towards business-friendly, neoliberal policies and favored IMF-supportive business leaders over Pachakutik compatriots for ministerial positions (Zamosc, 2007, p. 14). As a result, he implemented unpopular economic policies in order to assuage IMF pressure, among other reasons.

Starting in April 2003, various indigenous groups, with initial defector Ecuarunari, broke their alliance with Gutiérrez (Becker, 2011b, p. 86). Gutiérrez made some concessions to other organizations, but CONAIE and Pachakutik officially broke with the administration in August 2003 (Becker, 2011b, p. 87). Gutiérrez tried to maintain power by fostering his alliances with Amazonian indigenous groups and other political parties, specifically the PSC (Zamosc, 2007, p. 14). However, these disputes
came to a head as Gutiérrez faced impeachment charges for bribing legislators and exchanging PSC party support for assurance of exiled President Bucaram’s return. Although he avoided impeachment, Gutiérrez followed this event by reorganizing the Supreme Court to eliminate charges against ex-President Bucaram (Zamosc, 2007, p. 15). This combination of weakened alliances, personal corruption, and dictatorial power grabs resulted in intense citizen outrage.

This growing discontent resulted in large-scale protests in the streets of Quito in April 2005. These protests were characterized by the appearance of what Gutiérrez called “forajidos” (outlaws) who protested in opposition of the government (Bruneau, 2006, p. 4). Gutiérrez called for a state of emergency after more than a week of protest. As protesters disobeyed the president’s order, General Aguas of the military refused to enforce the state of emergency. On April 20, 2005, a special session of Congress removed the president from office by voting that he had “abandoned his post” (Bruneau, 2006, p. 5). Immediately thereafter, Admiral Víctor Hugo Rosero, the head of the Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, withdrew all support from the president “to receive the will of the people” (El Universo, April 20, 2005). President Gutiérrez refused to resign in the midst of protest and was eventually helicoptered off of the presidential mansion while protesters swarmed outside. With a warrant issued for his arrest, Gutiérrez fled the country, and presidential power transferred to the vice president (Bruneau, 2006, p. 5).

The power of indigenous organizations was broken by this presidency because, early on, they had entered into alliance with the government. Even after CONAIE and Pachakutik withdrew their support, CONFENIAE, the Amazonian indigenous
organization, and other organizations refused to separate from the government. CONAIE called for protests in February and June of 2004, but various groups refused to answer CONAIE’s pleas. Gutiérrez had successfully built an alliance with the indigenous movement and then neutralized its ability to threaten him (Zamosc, 2007, p. 15). The protests that finally devastated Gutiérrez stemmed largely from his need to make new alliance partners, trading political favors to gain new political allies. Protesters took to the streets in opposition, but CONAIE and other indigenous organizations were late to take part in the protest activities (Zamosc, 2007, p. 15). Although many scholars see this as a sign of weakness on the part of CONAIE, the previous Vice President of CONAIE tells a different story. Guatemal still describes CONAIE as having played an instrumental role in these protests. He explains that the betrayal of Gutiérrez by Pachakutik ministers led to eventual CONAIE resistance. More than that, CONAIE acted in tandem with other social movements in Quito that would drive Gutiérrez from office. He explains, “In that case, what we did was meet with all the social sectors, giving birth to the forajidos of Quito... We met together and led a march on Quito” (M. Guatemal, personal interview, 2009). Despite this assertion, it cannot be understated that other groups and parties acted, with ID explicitly participating in the mobilizations (J. Pérez, personal interview, 2009). Likewise FENOCIN (La Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas, y Negras) participated in all the removals of presidents (P. Quimiamba, personal interview, 2009). CONAIE attempted to reframe itself in the wake of the Gutiérrez failure. CONAIE distanced itself from several Pachakutik politicians who had served under the Gutiérrez administration (Pallares, 2003, p. 25). Overall, the Gutiérrez failure shows again the importance of protest and civil
society organizations linked with political opposition, but also suggests that the indigenous organizations themselves had changed, and their role had become more complex.

The Opposite of Failure?

In spite of these most recently elected presidents that failed to complete their terms in office, the current Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa successfully completed a first term and was re-elected in 2009 (and again in 2013). Emerging as a candidate in the 2006 election, Correa founded the Alianza País political party, which espoused a leftist political agenda. During the election, Correa proposed a constituent assembly to rewrite the country’s constitution, and he followed through with that proposition after winning the election and stepping into office, despite the fact that he had to engage in a protracted conflict with Congress to achieve the reform. The newly written constitution required an additional election for the presidency and legislature, and, in 2009, Correa was re-elected in the first round of voting.

Despite his success in completing one term and winning re-election, Correa has faced numerous problems within his presidency. First, he has repeatedly encountered conflict and filed lawsuits against Ecuadorian media, claiming libelous actions by journalists and news sources. Second, he has faced declining support from indigenous organizations. These organizations had originally supported his presidency, with many Pachakutik party members running for office as members of Alianza País. However, increased criticism of his land and water policies has resulted in protest activities from these groups (LAWR, 29 March 2012, WR-12-13). Third, Correa has already proposed and passed 10 changes to the newly-created constitution in a 2011 referendum vote.
Although these alterations received citizen support, questions have arisen as to whether these changes increase presidential power for the worse. In sum, Correa has achieved success in a manner that recent Ecuadorian presidents have not – in the form of continued popular support and winning re-election.

Despite his ability to navigate around the issue of presidential failure, Correa did face a presidential challenge on September 30, 2010. After the proposal of a new public service law that arguably reduced bonuses and altered promotion guidelines, approximately 800 police occupied their Quito headquarters, Regimiento Quito 1, while 100 police and air force personnel blocked the Quito airport (*Latin American Weekly Report* (*LAWR*), 14 October 2010, WR-10-41). President Correa attempted to negotiate with Quito police at their main barracks, but, after hours of discussion, the dispute led to tear gas explosions (*LAWR, 07 October 2010, WR-10-40). Correa was removed to a nearby hospital by his security personnel, due to concerns of asphyxiation and damage to the president’s knee (*Diario Hoy*, October 3, 2010). Rebellious police factions refused to allow him to leave (*LAWR, 07 October 2010, WR-10-40).

From this position, he declared a state of emergency, claimed an attempted coup d’état was in process, and affirmed that he would leave “either as a president or a corpse” (*LAWR, 07 October 2010, WR-10-40). In support of Correa, General Ernesto González, head of the *Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas*, declared that the military was still subordinate to the president and called on rebellious police, as well as civil society and military factions, to subside (*Latin American Security & Strategic Review* (*LASSR*), September 2010). Loyal military and police forces engaged with rebels in front of the hospital, and supporters gathered behind a wall of tear gas. The OAS made a statement
in opposition to “any attempt to alter democratic institutionality in Ecuador” (LASSR, September 2010). The United Nations and Unasur (Union of South American Nations) also denounced the event (LAWR, 07 October 2010, WR-10-40). Correa was eventually extracted by an elite army and police force and immediately replaced all high-ranking police personnel. During this event, civilian support lay largely with the president, and the president later blamed opposition forces’ role, specifically that of Lucio Gutiérrez, in the aftermath of the conflict.

Correa’s situation is different from the other presidents on several fronts. First, Correa engaged with the police, moving to their headquarters when he addressed the issue of dissension. Second, military, legislative, and popular support remained with him, even though some police and military factions opposed him. This presidential challenge lacks most, if not all, of the facets of previous instances of presidential failure, as mass outpouring of support welcomed Correa. The president has also used this event as a celebration, creating national unity around his success at thwarting coup-like intentions.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has demonstrated the influence of social movements on presidential failure. Indigenous organizations have led challenges to presidents. More than that, other social movements emulated the efforts of indigenous groups and pushed for Gutiérrez’s ouster when indigenous groups lacked sufficient organizational capacity. Unlike the Argentine case, this is a story about bottom-up presidential opposition, as leaders are challenged from below, for good cause. CONAIE views its power as residing in the community, which even a Pachakutik leader acknowledges, “We believe that the
construction of power is from below, not from above” (J. Guamán, personal interview, 2009).
CHAPTER FIVE: INDIVIDUAL DETERMINANTS OF PROTEST PARTICIPATION

As demonstrated in earlier chapters, social protest has been instrumental for understanding the early removal and resignation of South American presidents in the years after transitions to democratic politics. News reports describe citizens taking to the streets in opposition to elected presidents, from Ecuador to Bolivia to Argentina. In Ecuador, reporters describe the 2005 removal of President Lucio Gutiérrez, the third elected president to be removed from office consecutively:

Hours after the president said he would not resign, at least 30,000 people tried to march to the presidential palace in the capital's largest demonstration yet against the country's leadership, demanding that Gutiérrez leave office….The military, which under the state of emergency was charged with maintaining public order, was not visible on the streets as thousands of people disobeyed the decree and staged a peaceful demonstration, punctuated by honking horns and shouts of “Lucio Out!” and “Democracy yes, dictatorship no!” (NotiSur, Ecuador: Congress Removes President Lucio Gutiérrez, 4/22/2005).

Moreover, citizens have staged massive social protests when they demanded the removal of Argentine President Fernando de la Rúa and Bolivian President Gonzalo (Goní) Sánchez de Lozada, among others.

With the previous analyses of presidential failure assessing the cross-national and country-level causes, this turns to the question of individual-level determinants of protest participation: why do individual citizens take to the streets as a unified front? I analyze results from two surveys in countries with repeated instances of presidential failure to identify whether individual demographics, organizational linkages, or political attitudes increase the likelihood of protest involvement. One survey was administered shortly after the 2005 failure of Ecuadorian President Gutiérrez, the last of three elected
presidents to be forced out of office before the end of their terms (excluding current President Correa). The second survey asked Argentines about their protest activities around the 1989 failure of Argentine President Alfonsín, the first Argentine president to suffer from this phenomenon. I evaluate whether existing explanations of contentious behavior, focused on social linkages and individual characteristics, can explain protest in these contexts. Following a hunch inspired by the Argentine and Ecuadorian cases, I ask whether participation in civil society organizations increases the likelihood that individuals will participate in protest, and if so, which kinds of organizations are associated with greater protest. I also test whether political attitudes and beliefs promote individual participation in mass protests. Finally, I control for whether demographic factors contribute to protest, including indigenous identification. Using multivariate logit analysis, this chapter identifies what factors contribute to individual protest participation in countries with repeated presidential failure19.

This study adapts other scholars’ measures, mostly used to analyze developed countries, to understand protest in Argentina and Ecuador. Many scholars have looked only at mass mobilization in the United States (Schussman and Soule, 2005; Somma, 2009; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995) or other advanced industrial democracies (Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst, 2005) to assess reasons for protest participation. Scholars who have investigated this phenomenon in countries with varying levels of democracy find that protesting citizens have different demographics and attitudes depending on whether they live in high and low level democracies. Norris finds that

19 This chapter looks specifically at the causes of protest in Ecuador and Argentina, due to their repeated presidential failures. These restrictions in the analysis limit the empirical conclusions that can be drawn by this study, and additional investigation is needed to include other years and countries.
protest is most common in consolidated democracies and wealthier countries (Norris, 2002, p. 198). Klesner looks at four Latin American countries and finds that individuals in Chile and Argentina met the participation expectations of other consolidated democracies while Mexico and Peru did not (Klesner, 2007, p. 29). By comparing the reasons that Argentine and Ecuadorian citizens protest, I hope to identify the commonalities in citizen protest participation between these two countries with repeated presidential failure. This chapter will attempt to mirror previous studies to achieve some degree of external validity, but I recognize (and expect) that Argentina and Ecuador may be different. Protest participation will be assessed through analysis of different types of variables, lying within the following three standard categories: 1) demographic availability, 2) organizational linkages, and 3) political attitudes.

**Demographic Availability**

Biographical features, from race and age to income and education, influence the probability of protest participation. These are the personal characteristics of individuals that increase or decrease the likelihood that a person will brave the risk of participating in protest activities. Norris emphasizes “that social and demographic inequalities – based on educational qualifications, socioeconomic status, gender, and age – lead to inequalities in other civic assets, such as skills, knowledge, experience, time, and money” (Norris, 2002, p. 88). I incorporate these common demographic variables, as well as some others that have proven significant in the literature, including age, gender, education, and

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20 Although this study draws from other scholars on protest in various countries, I only compare the countries of Ecuador and Argentina. I am asking specifically, what drives protest in countries with repeated presidential failure. I examine years directly after failure to try to capture this effectively. Future study may involve analysis of more countries in the wake of failure.
income, and ethnicity (specifically indigenous background). In sum, demographic availability assesses which personal characteristics reduce constraints on individual participation, allowing individuals to commit time and assume risk.

Existing literature has produced contradictory findings even on these simple demographic variables. For instance, Norris finds the relationship between protest participation and age to be curvilinear, with the young and the old being less likely to have participated in a single protest act in their lifetime (Norris, 2002, p. 202). When looking at protest in the past 12 months, Schussman and Soule find that younger individuals are more likely to report protest (Schussman and Soule, 2006, p. 1089), which is supported by McAdam (1992). These differences may result from the wording of the question because, over their lifetime, older citizens simply face more opportunity to participate. However, if the question is looking at participation in the past year, older citizens may be less willing to take to the streets than younger citizens. The questions in my surveys ask respondents if they have ever protested, making older citizens more likely to respond affirmatively. For this reason, I argue that, given the wording of the question, the older an individual, the greater the likelihood that they have participated in protest.

**H1b**: The older an individual, the higher the likelihood that the individual participated in acts of social contention (authorized demonstrations, unauthorized demonstrations, blocking traffic, participating in looting, or occupying land, buildings or factories).

In some works, scholars have argued that male citizens are more likely to take risks in protest activities, and that, although women do participate politically, protests in the streets are generally perceived as a more male-dominated forum for political expression. From an American perspective, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady find that even though men participate more than women in a variety of ways, there is no statistical
difference in protest participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995, p. 256).

Similarly, Klesner finds that gender is not significant in explaining participation in boycotts, demonstrations, strikes, or occupations in four Latin American countries or in Argentina specifically (Klesner, 2007, p. 24). On the other hand, Norris notes that there is a slight gender gap across 80 countries, with men more likely to acknowledge that they had protested at some point in their lives (Norris, 2002, p. 201).

With these findings in mind, I still expect that male citizens may participate at higher rates in Ecuador and Argentina. Even through Klesner (2007) finds that Argentine women are protesting at statistically the same rate as men in 2001, my investigation looks at 1991 in this country, immediately after the return to democracy. For that reason, I expect that women will still be at a statistically lower rate of protest participation, which supports Klesner’s findings for Peru and Mexico (2007). Moreover, I expect that women in Ecuador should also have this lower rate due to the lower levels of democracy and the historic exclusion of women in that country. For Ecuador, women’s movements mobilized and emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Lind, 2005, p. 4). Nonetheless, I expect that there will still be a slight gender gap by 2002 when asking women about their protest participation throughout their lives.

\( H_{2b} \): Males are more likely to have participated in social contention.

I expect to find a relationship between protest participation and the demographic characteristics of income and education. First, the greater an individual’s education level, the more likely he or she may be to protest. While demographic characteristics can constrain an individual’s behavior, increased education is a resource that contributes to participation, as seen in Brady, Schlozman, and Verba (1999, p. 158). Aside from being a simple resource, education also provides valuable civic skills and affects views of civic

Regardless of reason, I assume that increased education will be matched with protest participation. Much of the literature links socioeconomic status with this idea as well. Not only should richer people be less constrained in their participation, but they should have more resources and civic skills needed to participate (Klesner, 2007, p. 10; Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie, 1993, pp. 466-467). Traditionally, the literature has shown this relationship over and over again. Based on these arguments, this study will also investigate if richer citizens are more likely to protest due to civic skills and resource availability.

\[ H_{3b}: \text{The higher an individual’s education level, the higher the likelihood that the individual participated in acts of social contention.} \]

\[ H_{4b}: \text{The better an individual’s personal economic situation, the greater the likelihood that the individual participated in acts of social contention.} \]

Like other arguments about protest participation, the role of race/ethnicity must be accounted for in the model because group exclusion can drive individuals to seek improved conditions, especially through contentious political acts. In the literature on American protest, scholars have analyzed protest participation between different race/ethnic groups, specifically Anglo-Americans, African Americans, and Latinos. For example, Verba, Scholzman, and Brady show that African Americans have higher rates of protest participation, stemming from the historical importance of protest in the American civil rights movement (1995, p. 235). This differentiation within American protest participation between a privileged majority group and an underprivileged minority group is not mirrored globally, but an examination of race/ethnicity in this analysis is still necessary.
Indigenous citizens, as part of a previously underrepresented group, may also be more prone to act contentiously, especially since protest has been one of the tools for previously excluded groups. However, demographics alone may not explain indigenous participation. Ecuador’s large umbrella indigenous group, CONAIE, is able to mobilize its own members as well as other indigenous individuals, due to the unique nature of social capital in the indigenous community, as described in the previous chapter. Zamosc explains, “The general point is that the Ecuadorian Indian Movement operates as a network of networks, whose activities can be analyzed as a process of accumulation, concentration, and deployment of the social capital embedded in its grassroots community structures” (Zamosc, 2007, p. 17). More than that, it allows for collective decision-making that influences its members. The Ecuadorian Indian Movement is able to push its members into the street, and may gain support from some non-members through its distinctive coalition-building ability. For this reason, indigenous identification, in itself, may lead individuals to protest against a president. In addition, an organizational membership variable will also be included to catch citizens who participate in indigenous organization. The following hypothesis takes into account the role that ethnicity may play in explaining individual participation in collective action, regardless of indigenous organization membership.

H5b: Individuals who self-identify as indigenous are more likely to have participated in acts of social contention.

Organizational Linkages

Organizational linkages have been seen as supporting political participation and contentious politics in particular because they influence the likelihood of individual
involvement. Putnam has argued that dense networks increase citizen participation by building social capital through heightened interpersonal trust, making organizations a key component for democracy (2000). Applying these arguments about social capital to protest participation, Brady, Schlozman, and Verba argue that individuals will gain the necessary civic skills from these organizations to participate in politics (1995, p. 273). Similarly, Klesner takes into account nonpolitical voluntarism in explaining protest participation as well (Klesner, 2007, p. 15). Moreover, relationships increase trust, especially when faced with risky behavior, like protesting. Mara Loveman argues that individuals who were linked with the Catholic Church were more likely to participate in collective actions against military dictatorships in the Southern Cone because those individuals had already developed networks of trust with others (Loveman, 1998, pp. 516-517). Although Loveman describes collective action under extreme high-risk situations, we should see a similar occurrence in protest against presidents. Specifically, Almeida contends that unions and indigenous organizations were instrumental to protest against neoliberalism, which may support the arguments of this dissertation (Almeida, 2007). As the previous chapter noted the importance of organizations in mobilizing civilians against presidents, this is a key variable in this analysis. In addition, voluntary organizations create an opportunity for recruitment, provide civic skills, increase interpersonal trust, and decrease individual risks. The following hypothesis addresses this relationship and will be evaluated with information about three kinds of organizational participation.

H_0b: If an individual participates in a voluntary organization, such as a union, political party or civil society organization, the individual will be more likely to have participated in acts of social contention.
Although I will be evaluating if political party participation in general influences protest involvement, I expect that individuals specifically linked to opposition parties may be even more prone to protest against a sitting president. For example, Pérez-Liñán and Pallares note the combined problems that Gutiérrez faced, with both social protests and congressional actions simultaneously against him (Pallares, 2006; Pérez-Liñán, 2007). Moreover, opposition party members are more likely to be in disagreement with the actual policies undertaken by an opposition party president, making them more likely to participate in any anti-government activity. For these various reasons, I expect to see that individuals who are linked to opposition political parties will be more likely to take to the streets.

**H7b:** Individual identification with an opposition party increases the likelihood that the individual participated in acts of social contention.

**Political Attitudes**

Finally, all scholars note that some individuals have an inclination for political participation, which extends to protest involvement. They acknowledge that some individuals may be more interested and more receptive to political involvement (e.g., Norris, 2002). This should also occur in these specific instances of protest activity, and I evaluate if these political attitudes matter in order to effectively assess what other factors determine participation in social protests. Individuals with greater interest in politics may be more likely to participate because they have more information about changing policy. They may be more knowledgeable about the location and timing of protest activities, which will increase the likelihood of their participation.
The greater the interest an individual has in politics, the greater the likelihood that the individual participated in acts of social contention.

The issue of trust in the government is a slightly more complicated variable, but I choose to place it under the category of political attitudes as well. Greater cynicism and governmental distrust should push individuals into the street. In instances of scandal and corruption, distrustful citizens will be more inclined to believe the criticism of the media. Although some scholars have combined analysis of social trust with organizational affiliations, based on the concept of social capital, I will be dividing the two variables for this study. Letki finds that the concepts of social capital and trust are not necessarily linked (Letki, 2004, p. 666), despite the arguments of scholars like Putnam (2000). For this reason, I consider political trust to be a personal attribute for an individual.

The less confidence an individual has in the government, the greater the likelihood that the individual participated in acts of social contention.

Finally, individuals who feel that they can understand politics and that the government will respond to their demands have been labeled by previous scholars as politically efficacious (Balch, 1974; Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990). A citizen is internally efficacious if the person believes that he/she can understand politics enough to participate (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990, p. 190). External efficacy is witnessed through the belief that government will respond to citizens (Craig, Neimi, and Silver, 1990, p. 190). Due to the questions asked by the surveys, the Ecuadorian analysis measures internal political efficacy while the Argentine one looks at external. For Ecuador, a question asked if citizens felt that politics were too difficult for them to understand. The analysis for Ecuador assumes that those citizens with less internal efficacy would be less likely to participate. A question in the Argentine survey asked if
individuals felt that the government was responsive to citizen demands. Citizens who felt higher external efficacy would be more likely to participate. Therefore, this necessarily analysis uses different measures for efficacy, internal or external, respectively, due to data limitations. The same relationship should exist because less (internally or externally) efficacious citizens should be less involved in general and less likely to take to the streets. I have included the following hypothesis to account for political efficacy of individual citizens.

\[ H_{10k}: \text{If an individual feels incapable of understanding politics or affecting political change, the lower the likelihood that the individual participated in acts of social contention} \]

**Empirical Analysis**

To recap, I examine the individual determinants of social protest by assessing three families of explanations, the demographic, organizational, and attitudinal factors that drive individuals to protest. The analysis utilizes two data sources, the Latinobarómetro (2005) dataset and the World Values Survey (1990) dataset, during a year after a presidential failure to assess how individuals responded to questions about protest activities. Latinobarómetro conducted interviews during August of 2005 in Ecuador, directly after the fall of Lucio Gutiérrez in April 2005. A dichotomous variable has been created for whether or not respondents claimed to have ever participated in some form of contentious politics. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if participants have blocked roads, participated in authorized or unauthorized protest activities, occupied lands or buildings, or participated in looting. The World Values Survey was conducted from February to April 1991 in Argentina, after the July 1989 fall of President Raúl
Alfonsín. This variable was coded as 1 if an individual participated in boycotts, authorized protest, illegal strikes, or building occupations.

It should be noted that these variables, in both surveys, do not take into account whether protests were directly targeted at driving presidents from office. Instead, this analysis uses respondents’ answers to questions about protest participation in general, attempting to catch individuals who participated. Given the timing of the surveys, we can assume that individuals would be more likely to respond positively if they had participated in the recent anti-presidential demonstrations because they would have been closer in memory. However, I cannot guarantee that the response is specifically referring to protest in the previous year or against the president. Despite this limitation, previous quantitative analysis, like in my earlier survival analysis, has shown that protest, even when not directed at the president’s removal, places pressure on the president to leave office, and so any protest is relevant to failed presidencies. In addition individual-level logit analysis allows us to learn whether citizens protest in Ecuador and Argentina for reasons that are somehow different from those we expect to motivate citizens to protest in other countries, as well as whether Ecuador and Argentina differ from each other.

I have selected these instances of presidential failure in Ecuador and Argentina for specific reasons. Both countries have faced repeated presidential failure since the return to democracy. Moreover, they present an interesting analysis because they differ from each other on an array of features, from economic to political conditions. Finally, these surveys occur directly after two instances of presidential failure that differ from each other in a theoretically interesting manner. Gutiérrez was the third consecutively elected president removed from office before the end of his term in Ecuador. Mass street protests
pushed him from office, as he was forced to leave the presidential mansion by helicopter after facing increasing claims of corruption and overreach of presidential authority. On the other hand, Alfonsín was the first Argentine president since the return to democracy and the first to be removed from office. As discussed earlier, he handed over power near the end of his term to president-elect Menem when rioting and looting broke out. In this manner, the two countries present varying backdrops for presidential failure, and these two instances present unique situations. Gutiérrez is one in a long line of presidents plagued by corruption and incompetence in Ecuador. He faced a street challenge that forced him to flee the country. Meanwhile, Alfonsín stood as the hopeful return to democracy for Argentines but was unable to solve its economic woes and the social problems that resulted. By comparing these two very different instances of failure, this analysis will identify the commonalities that potentially exist between protest participants.

The surveys in both cases provided sufficient information on the demographic variables that are likely to be associated with propensity to protest. Age was coded as a continuous variable. A dummy variable for gender was created, which coded female respondents as a 1. Education levels were listed as continuous variables, with each increase in the score corresponding to a single year increase in school attendance. Respondents were coded as 1 for indigenous background if their mother tongue was listed as “indigenous.” This variable is only present in the Ecuadorian analysis. Individuals were listed as poor economic status if they responded to a question about their actual family economic situation as “bad” or “very bad” for Ecuador. For

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21 The log of age was also used, with no different outcomes.
Argentina, it was based on their placement in an unskilled labor class, as compared to high, middle, and skilled labor.

In regard to organizational linkages, respondents were coded 1 for three different organizational memberships: labor union, political party, and civil society organizations. Civil society organizations coding accounts for participation in any organization from religious to human rights groups. Union and political party memberships were coded 1 if the respondent claimed membership in these groups. For Argentina, political party membership was not included in the survey, but a variable was included for membership in local political groups, and this was utilized in its place for that analysis. To assess opposition party affiliation in Ecuador (data was not available for Argentina), survey participants are asked for which party they would vote in upcoming elections. If participants responded Partido Social Cristiano, Izquierda Democrática, Democracia Popular, or Pachakutik, they were coded as a 1 for challenging party identification because these were the parties that originally opposed to, or that subsequently abandoned, President Lucio Gutiérrez. It can be assumed that respondents who favored these parties would also have been more prone to criticize Gutiérrez’s government.

Finally, I used three different questions in the survey to assess individual attitudes and values towards politics. For Ecuador, respondents were coded as a 1 for “high trust” if they claimed to have “much” or “some” trust in the government. For Argentina, a proxy was used by looking at their trust in the parliament. For both countries, political interest was coded as 1 if a respondent answered they had “much” or “some” interest in politics. If respondents claimed that politics were not complicated for them to understand, they were coded as 1 for high internal efficacy for Ecuador. For Argentina, it
was coded as 1 if they felt that they were able to effect political change, a measure of external efficacy.

**Ecuador 2005**

The 2005 Ecuadorian survey analysis suggests the importance of several demographic features and many organizational variables. The model is significant, but it has limited explanatory power as indicated by its low pseudo R-squared figure of 0.10. In looking at how demographic features affect protest participation, male respondents were more likely to participate in protest activities. Also, more educated respondents were more likely to take to the streets in protest activities, as we would expect based on the protest literature. Finally, indigenous identification increased the likelihood that individuals had protested at some point in their life. Conversely, age and socioeconomic status had no impact on protest involvement.
Table 6.

Determinants of Ecuadorian Protest Participation: Logistic Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic Availability</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.009 (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female = 1)</td>
<td>0.63**</td>
<td>-0.455 (0.183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Socioeconomic Status</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0.305 (0.209)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.09***</td>
<td>0.085 (0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Mother Tongue</td>
<td>3.39**</td>
<td>1.220 (0.523)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Linkages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Membership</td>
<td>3.64**</td>
<td>1.292 (0.514)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party Membership</td>
<td>5.70**</td>
<td>1.741 (0.829)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Organization Membership</td>
<td>2.74***</td>
<td>1.008 (0.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenging Party Identification</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.260 (0.259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Attitudes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Governmental Trust</td>
<td>0.61*</td>
<td>-0.502 (0.278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Political Interest</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>-0.020 (0.231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Political Efficacy (Internal)</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.062 (0.181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-3.160 (0.427)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1078</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR Chi²</td>
<td>91.01***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, and ***p<.01

I find that organizational linkages effect protest involvement; political party, union, and civil society organization membership all increase the likelihood that an individual will protest, at a p<0.05 or p<0.01 level (civil society organization membership). Surprisingly, linkage to an opposition party (controlling for party membership in general) is not significant. This finding does support the arguments regarding the importance of social capital in protest involvement, showing, once again, that organizational activity is a vehicle for participation in other forms. Of the personal attribute variables, only governmental trust shows to be significant. Political interest and efficacy are not significant.
The Argentine results present a more limited understanding of protest, as some data simply was not available from this time period and this model shows a similarly low pseudo R-squared figure of 0.11. For demographic availability, only female and social-economic status is significant, with women and lower class individuals being less likely to protest. Age is insignificant in this analysis. Organizational connections appear to be important in understanding presidential failure once again, as civil society organization and union membership are both significant. This is exactly the result that I expect, given the importance of union opposition to Alfonsín. Participation in a local political group was not significant in explaining protest participation. Finally, political attitudes that affected protest involvement differed from the Ecuadorian study as well, with political interest and efficacy being significant. Political trust was not significant.
Table 7.

Determinants of Argentinean Protest Participation: Logistic Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic Availability</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female = 1)</td>
<td>0.48***</td>
<td>-0.725 (0.192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Economic Status</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td>-2.114 (0.725)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Linkages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Membership</td>
<td>5.48**</td>
<td>1.703 (0.639)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Political Group Membership</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>-1.487 (1.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Organization Membership</td>
<td>1.47*</td>
<td>0.383 (0.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Attitudes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Parliamentary Trust</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>0.231 (0.238)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Political Interest</td>
<td>2.42***</td>
<td>0.885 (0.188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Political Efficacy (External)</td>
<td>1.46**</td>
<td>0.383 (0.188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-1.777 (0.297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>911</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR Chi²</td>
<td>87.45***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, and ***p<.01

Discussion

The findings of this study further previous understandings of presidential failure by identifying some of the factors that move individuals to protest in Argentina and Ecuador. While survey respondents were not asked about their protests against presidents in particular, the fact that the surveys were held shortly after large protests contributed to presidential failure suggests that the responses offer insights into the origins of those protest movements. In both countries, organizational links were most important in moving people to the street, supporting findings from other surveys in Latin America and beyond the region. The demographic and attitudinal variables show much
more mixed results. Many of these were not statistically significant, and those that were, were different for the two cases. They also often contradicted global patterns.

The most compelling findings for this study lie in the social network variables, with almost all organizational variables significant in explaining protest activism. Memberships in unions and political parties increase the likelihood that a citizen will protest. Moreover, participation in religious, arts, sports, and other organizations also correlate with contentious political activities. Many of these relationships lie in the idea that participation in any organization provides a venue for involvement, supporting inclusion in other political activities. More than that, it supports the arguments of previous chapters that mobilizing structures build opposition from their base to challenge presidents. For Argentina, the importance of union linkages is most important, which supports earlier arguments regarding union influence in Alfonsín’s failure. Overall, these organizational variables demonstrate how mobilizing actors can be witnessed at the individual level. Membership with civil society organizations were instrumental in building protest against presidents in Ecuador and Argentina, and this individual level analysis shows how mobilizing structures extend their power to push citizens into the street.

In addition, other authors have presented accounts that suggest that organizations can also influence participation through the development of civil skills and increase in interpersonal trust. Putnam has made strong arguments about the importance of civil society organizations for politics, and this study demonstrates that dense networks increase political participation (2000). Moreover, this study supports the work of
scholars, like Mara Loveman, by showing that individuals are more likely to engage in contentious politics when they are connected to organizations (1998).

The only network variables that were not significant were that of challenging party identification in Ecuador and local party participation in Argentina. Although these findings are not significant, the problem may lie in other issues. Party identification is not strong in Ecuador in general. Moreover, this may not be a good indicator in this situation because Gutiérrez was abandoned by his original supporters, so there may have been little variance between members from various parties. Additionally, local party participation may not work in Argentina because it is simply a poor indicator. All in all, organizational participation appears to be quite important for explaining protest participation.

In comparing Ecuador and Argentina to each other, I have identified some demographic availability variables that increase the likelihood that individuals will protest. Men are more likely to protest than female citizens in both countries; women are correspondingly less likely to engage in contentious politics. While this result holds in both, global studies have found that gender does not play a significant role in explaining protest participation. This difference between my finding and global studies is probably explained by country-specific features of these time periods. Argentina had recently returned to democracy during the time of the survey there, and, as supported by Klesner (2007), this might explain the gender gap. Ecuador has shown early exclusion of women in political participation, which may explain why women protest at lower rates.

On other demographic variables, there are interesting differences between these two cases. In Ecuador, the more educated a citizen, the more likely he/she is to protest.
This finding seems consistent with what we should expect to find, given the literature on the topic. Without the presence of an education variable in the Argentina dataset, we cannot say if education has an effect on protest in that country. However, in Argentina, if a person is from the upper class, likelihood of protest involvement increases. These two demographic variables, which are interrelated, demonstrate how important resources can be in protest participation. Individuals who have education and wealth are more likely to be aware of political issues. Also, they may feel the need to engage with government when economic and political conditions are not to their liking. Moreover, they will have the resources and availability to join in mass mobilization.

Finally, the importance of indigenous politics in Ecuador stands out in this analysis, as indigenous background is significant in explaining protest participation. Not only does linkage to an organization affect involvement, but indigenous identification, in itself, increases the likelihood of participation. This finding may result, as in American studies, from protest being used as a tool by a historically underrepresented minority group (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). It also appears that the Ecuadorian indigenous movement does, as Zamosc (2007) and I argue, have the capacity to mobilize the indigenous community beyond its membership. This combination of minority group behavior and the mobilizing ability of CONAIE creates an important component in explaining indigenous protest participation in Ecuador. Argentina does not have substantial ethnic variation of a kind usually linked to the prevalence of protest and other political participation, and questions about ethnic identity were not included in the survey.
Finally, the importance of political attitudes differs between Argentina and Ecuador in explaining presidential failure. In Ecuador, the only variable that was significant was governmental trust. This could show how, by 2005, problems with repeated governmental corruption had influenced the manner in which people thought about the government. People who were less trusting would have been more likely to protest. In contrast, in 1991 Argentina, political interest was a significant variable. Individuals who were interested in politics, who were more aware of what was going on with the Alfonsín government, were more likely to take to the streets. Moreover, those who felt that they could effect change were more likely to contribute in Argentina.

Perhaps the difference in looking at external and internal efficacy explains the difference in the findings for these countries, as a feeling that a government will not respond to a citizen’s demands may push citizens into the street more effectively. Comparatively, these findings reflect strongly on the experience of the two countries and the specific circumstances of these time periods. Individuals in Ecuador, plagued by corruption, had less governmental trust, while political interest and empowerment drove Argentines into the streets.

It should be noted that the Ecuadorian and Argentinian models only show a pseudo R-squared value of 0.10 and 0.11, respectively. In other words, the variables are explaining roughly 10% or 11% of protest participation in these models. The inclusion of other variables may benefit this investigation and account for additional protest, but both models are statistically significant, which allows us to be confident that I am explaining some individual determinants of protest participation in these instances of presidential failure. Despite these low R-squared values, the models tell us how different factors
influence citizens. Therefore, I can say that these variables are significant in explaining protest participation in these countries, but there are additional explanatory variables that need to be taken into account in future analyses.

Table 8.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Predicted Probabilities</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variable</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic Availability</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female = 1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Socioeconomic Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Mother Tongue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Linkages</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Union Membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party Membership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Society Organization Membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenging Party Identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Attitudes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Governmental Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Political Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Political Efficacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bolded figures are statistically significant.

In looking at these variables, we can examine the predicted probabilities to identify what variables are the most influential in explaining protest participation. The predicted probabilities show the influence of a variable as it moves from 0 to 1 (absence versus presence, for dichotomous variables), while all other variables are held at their means. This allows comparison of the importance of variables in determining protest participation for this logit analysis. For example, the Ecuadorian case shows that the importance of organizational linkages is large. As all organizational variables are
dummies, being a member of a political party increases the likelihood of protest participation by 33%, all other variables being held at their mean. Similarly, union membership and civil society membership boosts the likelihood of protesting by 23% and 14%, respectively. This demonstrates the immense role of mobilizing linkages in determining protest participation in the Ecuadorian case. In regards to the other significant variables, identification as indigenous has the next strongest influence and raises the chance of protest participation by 20%. Being a man augments the likelihood of participation by 5%, and as education moves from 0 to 1 (one additional year of schooling), there is less than a 1% increase in protesting. Finally, people who are distrustful of the government have a 5% greater likelihood of protesting, when holding all other variables at their mean.

In the Argentinean case, we see that union membership is the most influential variable, and that membership in a union increases the chance of protesting by 32%. Given the history of the CGT and other unions in the history of Argentina and specifically in opposing Alfonsín, this finding confirms the impact of this specific mobilizing structure. Unlike in Ecuador, civil society organizational membership only leads to a 5% increase in protest participation, which although important, shows a marked difference between the two countries. Moreover, political interest is more important in determining participation in Argentina, with interested individuals having an 11% increase in the likelihood of protest. With efficacy, there is only a 5% increase. Women were 8% less likely to protest, with all variables being held at their means. Finally, lower class individuals were 13% less likely to protest, which supports arguments that resources matter in participation.
In looking at these predicted probabilities, the greatest impact again stems from organizational linkages. Ecuador shows the importance of a variety of different links while Argentina highlights the role of union membership in protest activities. Even though organizational linkages are important in explaining Ecuadorian participation, indigenous identification, in itself, dramatically affects the likelihood of protest. Gender is important, showing that a discrepancy still exists in the ways that men and women choose to participate politically in these countries. The limited scope of the Argentinean case presents some problems for interpretation and comparison, but these significant variables still provide us with some understanding of protest in Argentina.

**Conclusion**

This chapter examines the individual factors that push individuals into the street – a key contribution to the work on social protest and to the literature on presidential failure. It allows us to see what features characterize protest participants in Ecuador and Argentina. By and large, I find that the most typical protester is male. In Argentina, he is educated, wealthy, or both. In Ecuador, he is indigenous. Moreover, he has some personal political attitudes that prompt him to choose protest as a manner to participate in the political process, although they differ between the two countries. Finally, he is connected to his society. He is not a solitary angry citizen. Instead, he participates in his community in a variety of organizations, be they civil society groups, unions, or political parties. These features, arguably, explain what type of person is taking to the street in Ecuador and Argentina. Most protesters probably do not display all of these
characteristics, but this analysis gives us some insight into the driving features of protest participation.

The most interesting characteristic of the protesters in both country samples is that they were more often connected to some mobilizing structure. Union, political party, and civil society organization memberships were influential. Although we cannot say that opposition party membership affects protest participation, in general, organizational membership is important across the board. These findings parallel the arguments by Hochstetler that organizations and political parties led street mobilizations against presidents (2006). They also support the causal story of this dissertation. Citizens are not rising up against presidents because of individual grievances; they are moving into the streets collectively. As noted in other chapters of this dissertation, the importance of mobilizing actors becomes clear in this individual-level analysis. Citizens are members of these organizations, and political actors foster mobilization against presidents.

When presidents fall, citizens must oppose them. There is a transition from a large portion of the citizenry voting affirmatively for the candidate to a large portion of the citizenry accepting his/her resignation or removal. This analysis looks at the individual determinants of protest participation in order to identify what drives some citizens, often the leading edge of more widespread political opposition, to go into the streets. In other words, the mobilizing capacity of other groups explains why some citizens participate in challenging presidents, helping to explain presidential failure. Future analysis may be performed that relates the studies of this chapter with other countries to improve our understanding of protest participation.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

The goal of this dissertation has been to explain what causes presidential failure in South America. I examined this issue from a multi-level approach in order to identify the importance of various factors at different levels of analysis. From a cross-national perspective, I have shown what puts presidents at risk of failure through statistical analysis. Then, I have demonstrated how mobilizing structures like political parties and civil society organizations impact presidential stability, explaining why some countries have faced repeated failure. Through case history analyses, I showed the consistent importance of how these parties’ and organizations’ ability to challenge a president, from both the street and the legislature, influenced the likelihood of presidential failure. Finally, I noted how the relationships between citizens and these organizations support this argument at the individual level.

I identified those factors that increase the risk of failure for presidents across the South American regime with a cross-national statistical analysis. This assessment expanded on previous research by focusing on economic variables and utilizing duration analysis. The analysis identified the significance of minority legislative support, social protest, inflation, prolonged recession, and presidential wrongdoing in explaining South American presidential failure. It highlighted those factors that explain regional trends in presidential failure, providing support for the later chapters by noting the importance of social protest and legislative opposition in the model.

An analysis of repeated presidential failure in Argentina revealed the importance of the existence of a political actor with the ability to call for social and legislative opposition. The linkages between the Peronist Party and other social groups made it
possible for challenges to opposition presidents to occur. In the case of Alfonsín, the party mobilized opposition through its labor organization. Likewise, De la Rúa’s fall was matched by protest mobilized by diverse social groups. The clientelistic networks of the Peronist Party made this possible. Finally, the fall of Rodríguez Sáa demonstrated the power of Peronist elites to take down one of their own when he sought to extend his mandate. In sum, the Peronist Party showed how a political actor with mobilizing power has the ability to lead challenges against presidents, accounting for the repeated presidential failures in Argentina.

Whereas Argentina paints a picture of top-down mobilization to remove presidents, Ecuador showed how social movements are capable of challenging presidents from the bottom up. The ability of indigenous organizations, specifically CONAIE, to build social and legislative opposition explained the issue of repeated presidential failure there. In the failure of Bucaram, the ability of CONAIE to mobilize opposition was clear. Mahuad’s failure showed an even greater role for this organization, extending into the overthrow of the president. The failure of Gutiérrez showed a smaller role for these groups, although the indigenous movements did carry out some mobilization. Moreover, statistical analysis shows the significance of indigenous participation in survey responses taken directly after this failure.

Finally, individual protest participation showed how these relationships exist at the citizen level. Demographic factors and attitudes showed why some people are more likely to participate in protest. More than that, individuals’ relationships to civil society organizations were highlighted, demonstrating the importance of these political actors in pushing for protest activities. For Ecuador, the importance of civil society organizations
and indigenous identity emerged, supporting the other evidence of the role of indigenous organizations in mobilizing opposition. During Alfonsín’s failure, Argentina showed the importance of labor unions in mobilizing opposition, which reappeared in the individual surveys. These two findings affirmed the role of organizational capacity in mobilizing base level opposition, supporting the arguments of the previous chapters regarding the capacity of certain political actors to oppose presidents.

In conclusion, I will draw parallels to larger questions regarding the issue of presidential failure. I begin by addressing a few scope conditions in this argument. The importance of key actors with mobilizing capacity has been demonstrated, and this feature suggests that while presidents may fall in other countries, presidential failures may be less likely in countries that lack such mobilizing capacity.

Whereas this mobilizing capacity may be a requirement for presidential failure, the declining influence of the military may as well. Scope conditions for this argument require the absence of military intervention, as well as some adherence to democratic norms. If countries still face pressure from the military, then those forces may be the first to step in during moments of crisis. This may reduce presidential failure and increase the likelihood of presidential coups. Various scholars note the role of the military in explaining democratic breakdowns, and Cheibub (2007) explicitly points to the relationships between the military and presidential regimes. Although Cheibub notes that this relationship has changed for Latin America as a whole, it does not mean that other countries might not face military intervention. Breakdown may continue in countries that do not face Western hemisphere pressure for democratic norm adherence.
The Future of Failure

The story of presidential failure is one of linked social protest and legislative opposition, and the mobilizing capacity of key actors drives its occurrence. This relationship and these mobilizing structures appear to be on the decline. Protest in Latin America, and the world, has begun to change. Civil society, and the linkages it creates in society, is changing due to economic, social, and technological factors. Protests stemming from partisan and organizational bases appear to be diminishing. Instead, new protests emerge from social media, have few organizational bases, and have a diffuse support structure. If social protest is a key component to presidential failure, what does this mean for the future of presidential instability in South America? Are they likely to continue to be an important part of South American politics?

The prevalence of presidential failure in the past has been noted, with nearly a quarter of elected presidents failing to complete their terms in office from 1978 and 2005 (Hochstetler and Edwards, 2009). Despite this past frequency, the occurrence of presidential failure appears to be trailing off, including in Ecuador and Argentina. Ecuador, the unlucky repeat offender of this study, has seen its most recent president complete his term in office and receive subsequent reelection. Likewise, Argentina has demonstrated presidential stability with the repeated elections of the Kirchners. This may seem unsurprising given the importance of the Peronist Party in explaining Argentine failure, but it coincides with a regional trend towards executive stability. These and other presidents’ ability to complete their terms in office bodes well for South American governance in general. The most recent instance of failure – President Lugo – occurred in Paraguay, the last country to return to democracy in the third wave. Perhaps the issue
of presidential failure is merely a hiccup in the process of democratization for these countries because the phenomenon is a diminishing threat to democratic governance and South America seems to face a lower risk of failure.

This lowered risk, visible in the completion of presidential terms, counters observable ongoing protest challenges to presidents across the region. Take, for instance, the opposition to President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. In April 2013, thousands of Argentineans took to the streets to protest the president, citing various acts of corruption and economic transgressions committed by the administration. Fernández had engaged in a struggle with Clarín, a media conglomerate that loudly opposed the president. The Clarín dispute, along with mounting inflation and serious concerns about crime, drove citizens into the street to oppose the president. The protest plans were largely coordinated through Facebook, Twitter, and other social networking sites (The Guardian, April 19, 2013). The peaceful resolution of this large-scale protest event flies in the face of what one might expect, especially given the findings of this study’s quantitative analysis. Fernández faced many of the factors identified in survival modeling as explanatory for presidential failure, and yet she did not fall. In fact, her response to teeming protesters in April was to send various contemptuous tweets while she continued her travels to Venezuela for a presidential inauguration (The Guardian, April 19, 2013).

Other South American countries have faced this type of continued opposition to presidents. The president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, countered intense protests in 2013 as tens of thousands of citizens demanded changes in education, transportation, and other social services, especially in light of the upcoming World Cup and Olympic Games (BBCNews, June 18, 2013). Even journalists noted the impressive nature of these
protests, comparing them to previous instances of presidential failure, noting, “The demonstrations are Brazil's largest since 1992, when people took to the streets to demand the impeachment of President Fernando Collor de Mello” (*BBCNews*, June 18, 2013). Protests were held and yet the president remained in office without a serious challenge to her authority. In fact, she noted that the protests were signs of the strength of Brazilian democracy, as youthful exuberance and mobilization were important for a responsive citizenry (*BBCNews*, June 18, 2013).

Does this mean that the era of presidential failure is over? Are presidents now facing opposition but not falling? This dissertation has argued that the key to presidential failure truly lies in the mobilizing capacity of organizations. These political parties and indigenous groups have the organizing skill to get citizens into the streets, but they also have a structural component that directs sentiment and focuses pressure. The current presidential opposition appears to be essentially different from the past. Whether the bottom-up story of Ecuadorian protest or the top-down coordination of Argentine Peronists, the structural capacity of key actors allowed for pressure to be placed on presidents, from the street *and matched with elite involvement*. The more spontaneous, mass-based appeals of recent protest have lacked this key feature. Protesters in Brazil made partisan actors leave their demonstrations, in fact, although civil society organizations were allowed to stay and wave their organizational banners.

The importance of social networking websites and other technology in coordinating recent challenges to presidents is clear. The ongoing instability in the Middle East, beginning with the “Arab Spring,” demonstrates the ability of “successful” protests to emerge from social networking websites. Likewise, the use of text messages
allowed for the coordination of intense protest, which led to the eventual impeachment of President Estrada in the Philippines (Shirky, 2011). Initially, congressional allies were reluctant to follow through with impeachment, but were convinced by the impromptu protest of a million citizens in Manila (Shirky, 2011). These successful stories of leadership transition are generally promoted in discussions of social media and protest.

Despite these “success stories,” other tales narrate how protest fails to remove leaders, with specific instances in Belarus, Iran, and Thailand (Shirky, 2011). Shirky even acknowledges that social media amplifies other civil society support, making it possible for change to occur (Shirky, 2011). There are a few positive cases of mass protest driving leadership transition. Most stories of unorganized protest do not lead to dramatic change, but instead enhance ongoing relationships in the public sphere. These stories appear to be more similar to the events occurring in South America, where protesters use social networking websites and other technologies to organize an event, but ultimately fail to achieve any true challenge to governments. The long-term effects of these protests are still unknown.

Although individuals are obviously coordinating the efforts, there is no structural foundation behind the efforts, no linkages between individuals and pressure groups, and no elite involvement that relays messages between the base and the president. In other words, the extemporaneous nature of these more recent protests highlights protest capacity, while neglecting the importance of organizing structure. Protest, by itself, does not drive presidential failure. Instead, the mobilizing capacity created by linked actors pushes presidents from office. As seen in the Argentine case, the Peronist links to civil society drive non-Peronist presidents from office. These new cases of opposition present
protest capacity without organization structure due to the role of social networking websites and other technology. They allow for organization in opposition to presidents, without ensuring that focused structural foundations exist. The inability of these recent protests to substantially challenge South American presidents clearly shows the importance of the mobilizing actor in driving presidents from office. Could these protests result in presidential failure? Decidedly so. However, it seems more evident that a shift has occurred in South America. Opposition to presidents has risen largely from less structured sectors, through for example, electronic social networking systems. The new organizing of social movements, with its dispersed nature, has altered the way in which presidents are challenged. These protests have been largely unable to disrupt presidential power in any country.

This focus on dispersed mass based protests is not the only reason for declining presidential failure. Presidents have becoming more effective at coopting base support. As previously mentioned, President Correa of Ecuador has faced various disputes over the course of his term. His relationship with indigenous organizations has diminished over time, and various protest efforts have been unable to substantially influence his policy choices. For instance, hundreds of protesters in March of 2012 opposed copper mining contracts that were granted to Chinese companies (BBCNews, March 8, 2012). The leaders of the march, largely from CONAIE, noted various goals, including greater adherence to the Ecuadorian Constitution in regards to environmental concerns (El Comercio, March 14, 2012). President Correa has expanded controversial economic plans and met environmental and/or indigenous opposition. Even with protests against him, Correa has faced no substantial challenge from the streets.
In this case, President Correa has effectively coopted the sources of earlier organizational capacity. Correa removed much of CONAIE’s base of power by building support amongst the indigenous population of the country. In the recent protests against him, Correa’s administration sent extensive resources to the communities with protests, as well as other rural areas, to thwart opposition (*El Comercio*, March 16, 2012). Indigenous protest participation is rooted in collective choice, and Correa’s actions were designed to eliminate his opposition. Correa’s ability to coopt this organization’s base has allowed for his continued power.

These two features, extemporaneous rather than organized social protest and cooptation of the social bases of opposition groups, have resulted in the decline of presidential failure. Extemporaneous social protest creates less effective opposition to presidents. Likewise, the cooptation of groups’ social bases reduces the likelihood of true challenges to their remaining in office. If these trends continue, which is likely, presidents in South America should face a brighter future for term completion. Additionally, we should (and do) see this occurring in other countries. The Arab Spring resulted in executive transition, but the lack of formally organized actors may be one of the keys as to why the grievances of countries have not been effectively channeled or resolved. Recent protest has been ineffective in targeting presidents in South America, but future mobilization may result in executive transition if it is overwhelmingly intense, as in the Arab Spring. However, in the absence of a mobilizing actor – that is an organization or party able to direct the scope, intensity, and nature of protest activity – even widespread protest may not interfere with presidential term completion.
South American democracy may have greater term completion in the future because new technologies and shifts in power may allow presidents to overcome challenges. Term completion does not equate to stability, and this outcome may be detrimental to South American governance. In fact, these results do not depict an example of the type of “democracy” one would like to see. If taken at its worse, South American citizens may be more active and less acknowledged in their demands. Presidents may complete their terms in office (except for extreme cases), but they may be less responsive to what citizens want. Dishearteningly, South Americans will not be alone, as citizens in other countries appear to share the same (or even worse) fate.

Whereas mobilizing capacity was one scope condition for this analysis, the decline of military power was another. South America may face a future of uncoordinated protest, unresponsive presidents, and disregarded citizens, but the alternative may be worse. A variety of reasons may explain the shift away from democratic breakdown in South America, including Western hemispheric norm adherence and post-authoritarian civil-military power changes. Although outside the scope of this project, the likelihood of military intervention appears lower for South American countries than in previous decades, especially given the rise in presidential failure. This cannot be said for the rest of the world. Recent conflicts in Egypt and Syria have demonstrated a greater reliance on military might to ensure executive stability. South America may face a decline in democratic responsiveness, but, as long as the military does not step in, democracy will be maintained. Cases from other regions demonstrate greater fears for the future of democracy. If military power is used to quash protest activities and reduce leadership accountability, then democracy will be even more limited.
Research Conclusions

The advent of this dissertation project was one of hope. The story of presidential failure appeared to resolve many of the traditional issues of presidential democracy in South America. Presidential failure reduced the rigidity of presidential regimes, while simultaneously eliminating the fear of military coups. It allowed for transition in moments of extreme presidential unpopularity, while guaranteeing that democracy prevailed. Presidential failure appears, on its face, to be a story about victories by the underdog. The political elite’s hands had been wrenched free of power by social groups and opposition parties. South American democracy appeared to be responding to citizen demands, in a dramatic manner that had not been seen before.

Yet, all of these expectations have culminated in a milieu of doubt. Many cases of presidential failure stem from traditional sources of power – like the Peronist Party – attempting to thwart opposition groups. Other cases – like that of Mahuad – show a president being removed for sound reasons, and yet the subsequent failure of Gutiérrez demonstrates that long term change has not been achieved. The future appears even darker for government responsiveness. Shifts in technology and society have reduced the ability of citizens to pressure governmental change. Presidents have learned to insulate themselves more effectively from opposition demands. This diminishes the likelihood that presidential failure will continue in the future. More than that, countries that have not seen a reduction in military influence in politics may face greater oppression, as uncoordinated protests meet military might.

Overall, this project has demonstrated the path by which presidential failure has evolved. The causes of presidential failure are clear, and undoubtedly, some presidents
will be removed from office in the future. The trend of presidential failure appears to be changing. This phenomenon, brought about by the third wave of democratization, occurred when military strength had been diminished by changing global norms. New voices were heard, but long term changes in government responsiveness to citizens appear unlikely.

This multi-method analysis identifies the causes of presidential failure, carrying the importance of specific factors through cross-national, national, and individual assessments. This investigation has elucidated the manner in which repeated presidential failure occurs, assessing countries with persistent presidential instability to trace the process of failure and enhance knowledge about this phenomenon. Overall, this dissertation has attempted to resolve previous limitations in previous studies of presidential failure. By looking at this issue from multiple levels of analysis, this project demonstrated the importance of key political actors using their mobilization skills to oppose presidents.

 Presidential failure still may serve as a cautionary tale for South American governmental stability. The declining nature of the phenomenon may be positive, assuming the goal of governance is term completion. However, if South American countries are pursuing stronger democracy, the larger worry is that a disheartening transition may be emerging in the region, as individuals lack relationships to key organizing structures. The historic conditions that have formulated political life have been declining over the past few decades. Additional investigations that analyze civil society and the changing nature of modern organization are needed. Presidential failure appears to be a time limited phenomenon, but the problem appears to be a symptom of
unresponsive governance. That disease does not appear to have been resolved. Future analysis is needed to identify how to ensure citizen voices are heard in this new era of South American democracy.
REFERENCES


Appendix A

Correlation Matrix

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<th>Neoliberal</th>
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<th>Recession</th>
<th>Scandal</th>
<th>Protest</th>
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