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Abstract:

This research re-examines the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua in 1909-10. Most literature of this period argues that the United States forced the dictator Zelaya out of office in 1909; however, I contend that the argument that U.S. intervention caused the fall of Zelaya does not clearly match up to the historical record. Instead, I argue it is much more compelling to examine U.S. policy toward José Madriz to understand the impact of the intervention. It is clear that U.S. policy was the decisive factor in the fall of Madriz, while it is less convincing in the case of Zelaya.
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From 1909 until 1933, the United States intervened in Nicaragua politically, economically, and militarily. This intervention led to the fall of two consecutive Liberal presidents, the return of the Conservative Party to power, the establishment of a U.S. protectorate over the country, the stationing of Marines in Nicaragua for over two decades, and political instability culminating in the war led by Augusto César Sandino from 1927 to 1933. State formation and economic development were seriously affected under Conservative rule until the return of the Liberals in the first Somoza regime. Despite the importance of this period in Nicaraguan history, very few scholars have taken an in-depth and critical look at how events unfolded.

The reasons for U.S. intervention in Nicaragua are numerous, with wide scholarly disagreement regarding their prioritization. Nevertheless, most researchers do not draw a distinction between the fall of José Santos Zelaya in 1909 and the fall of Dr. José Madriz in 1910. To better understand U.S. motives behind the intervention, it is crucial that one examine not only the better-known case of Zelaya but also the short-lived administration of Madriz. I contend that the argument that U.S. intervention led to the fall of Zelaya does not clearly match up to the historical record. Instead, I argue it is much more compelling to examine U.S. policy toward José Madriz to understand the impact of the U.S. intervention. It is clear that American foreign policy was the decisive factor in the fall of Madriz, while it is less convincing in the case of Zelaya. The common arguments used to explain the fall of Zelaya do not elaborate on the reasons why the U.S. so strongly resisted the Madriz government as well, nor is the causal argument that the U.S. forced Zelaya out of power all that convincing after one looks at internal
factors that weakened the Zelaya regime. U.S. aims in Nicaragua become much clearer when the desire to rid Central America of Zelaya is examined alongside U.S. policy toward Madriz.

The strategic interests of the United States in protecting its investment in the Panama Canal led the State Department to pay increasingly closer attention to events in Central America, leading to the subsequent conclusion that Zelaya did not serve U.S. interests. However, the explanation that strategic concerns led the U.S. to seek the ouster of Zelaya fails to explain the rapid collapse of his regime, especially considering the minimal military threat posed by the 1909 rebellion. A brief look at domestic factors demonstrates Zelaya’s fragile hold on power by the end of 1909, although U.S. pressure against him quickened his government’s collapse. In contrast, Madriz decided to resist U.S. pressure and the American-supported revolution led by Juan José Estrada. Madriz quickly gained control of most Nicaraguan territory, had sufficient political support to rule, and repeatedly attempted to negotiate an end to the civil war and reestablish diplomatic relations with the United States. The landing of U.S. Marines in the Caribbean coastal city of Bluefields in mid-1910 and the military support for the revolutionaries prevented Madriz from defeating the rebel forces, ending the civil war, and consolidating his political power. In contrast to Zelaya, the diplomatic and military pressure against Madriz demonstrates how far the United States was willing to go to ensure that a subservient government was installed in Managua that would serve American interests.

To be sure, the breaking of diplomatic relations in 1909 was critical; however, had Zelaya been able to gather the same national and international support that Madriz had, he likely would have attempted to fight the rebels as Madriz did. The international outcry against the U.S. actions toward Zelaya was rather widespread, yet internal support for his regime was crumbling long before the outbreak of revolution in October 1909. Nevertheless, it seems probable that, had
Zelaya maintained diplomatic relations with the U.S., his regime would have collapsed sooner rather than later. Future research might further consider the internal political dynamics of Nicaragua during the latter stages of Zelaya’s rule to better determine the relative strength of internal opposition to Zelaya’s hold on power.

Before answering these questions, it is necessary to provide some historical context leading up to 1909. I briefly discuss the Zelaya dictatorship from 1893 to 1909 and place the U.S. intervention within the context of dollar diplomacy. After providing some historical background, I examine the scholarly debates on the reasons for U.S. intervention and the fall of Zelaya, and why this period is decisive for Nicaragua. Then I take a critical look at the presidency of José Madriz (December 1909-August 1910) and up to what can be considered the beginning of the Conservative Restoration in Nicaragua, the presidential inauguration of Juan José Estrada on January 1, 1911.5

Historical background

The Liberal-Conservative divide plagued Nicaragua for most of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth, yet the divide was more related to historical divisions of power than to the economy or political ideology. The Liberals, based out of León, were commonly portrayed as being composed of urban professionals, merchants, workers, and a large peasant sector. The Conservatives stationed themselves in Granada and largely represented the oligarchs of the country. They were considered to be mostly large landowners involved in raising coffee, sugar, and cattle. The Conservatives also sided more with the church than did the Liberals.6 However, as the coffee boom enveloped Nicaragua in the late nineteenth century, both parties participated...
in the expansion of commercial agriculture and came to resemble each other more and more, both politically and economically.\textsuperscript{7}

Prior to 1893, the Conservative Party had ruled uninterrupted for thirty-six years. The ability of the Conservatives to stay in power was partially a result of the thorough discrediting of the Liberal Party after the William Walker affair of the 1850s and the Conservative push for gradual modernization. However, Conservative advances in economic modernization, largely tied to coffee, finally undermined their political power. The growth of the coffee economy created a new group of capitalists based out of Managua who desired more rapid change and who allied with a renewed Liberal Party. Starting in 1889, Conservative infighting regarding presidential succession led to an armed uprising and a splintering of the Conservative Party. While in the short term this conflict was resolved, it provided an opportunity for the Liberals to eventually stage an uprising in July 1893 that easily defeated the Conservative forces. Zelaya, a member of a Managua coffee family, led the revolt known as the July Revolution and ruled as a dictator until the end of 1909.\textsuperscript{8}

U.S. foreign policy in the Caribbean and Central America was largely based on the concept of dollar diplomacy. The specific program behind dollar diplomacy was establishing customs collectorships and providing loans to promote political stability and economic development.\textsuperscript{9} While dollar diplomacy began under the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt and his Secretary of State Elihu Root, President Taft and Secretary of State Philander Knox adopted it as well in Nicaragua. As a response to European powers sending warships to the Americas to collect on unpaid debts, Roosevelt decided the U.S. would assume the debts to eliminate any pretext for European intervention. However, regardless of any one country’s need for a loan, the U.S. used the policy to force loans on sometimes unwilling countries to exert political and
financial control in the Caribbean. The main declared objectives of U.S. policy in the region were to discourage revolutions and improve economic conditions, although U.S. policy in Nicaragua unfortunately had the opposite effect. Dana Munro, an apologist for dollar diplomacy and U.S. foreign policy in the region, said, “[W]hat the United States was trying to do…was to put an end to conditions that threatened the independence of some of the Caribbean states and were consequently a potential danger to the security of the United States.” The policy in Nicaragua was meant to bring stability, promote economic progress, and ward off European interference. However, Munro recognizes that it did not work very well as it ultimately resulted in propping up a highly unpopular government.

U.S.-Nicaraguan relations were fairly cordial for most of the Zelaya dictatorship. In fact, the United States intervened on Zelaya’s behalf in what was the most formidable challenge to his rule. In 1896, a split occurred in the Liberal Party regarding Zelaya’s continued rule, leading Vice President Anastasio Ortiz, along with Liberals from León led by Francisco Baca and José Madriz, to start a revolt that lasted two months. The U.S. blockaded the port of Corinto, cutting off arms supplies to the rebels, which quickly ended the rebellion.

American perceptions of Zelaya slowly began to change after 1903 when Nicaragua was passed over in favor of Panama for the isthmian canal route. Relations with Nicaragua then drastically changed following the 1907 Central American War. Though the war was initiated by Honduran troops crossing into Nicaragua, a failed peace agreement led Zelaya to send troops into Honduras under the command of Estrada, depose President Manuel Bonilla, and take control of Tegucigalpa. In a Salvadoran-Nicaraguan dispute about who would succeed Bonilla, Nicaragua attacked El Salvador. The United States and Mexico intervened to stop the war,
blaming Zelaya for escalating the conflict.\textsuperscript{15} The U.S. then came to view Zelaya as the biggest obstacle to stability in the region.

Following the inauguration of President William Howard Taft in March 1909, and the appointment of his more interventionist Secretary of State Philander Knox, U.S. foreign policy in Central America and the Caribbean took a dramatic turn.\textsuperscript{16} Opposition to the Zelaya government grew, in part because of unfounded allegations made by U.S. representatives in Nicaragua about Zelaya’s scheming to destabilize Central America.\textsuperscript{17} Though many of the rumors were false, it provided justification for the U.S. to intervene.\textsuperscript{18} While American business interests supported the 1909 revolution, the United States government did not take an active role in Nicaragua until the execution of Americans Lee Roy Cannon and Leonard Groce.\textsuperscript{19} The murders were the final straw for the U.S. and gave Knox a sufficient pretext to break diplomatic relations in December 1909.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Why did Zelaya fall?}

Many scholars point out several factors that led to Zelaya’s downfall: Zelaya was too nationalist and had an independent foreign policy; Zelaya worked against American geopolitical interests; Zelaya was rumored to be attempting to grant a canal concession in Nicaragua to another foreign power, supposedly Japan; Zelaya’s contraction of loans through European banks challenged the Monroe Doctrine; Nicaraguan interference in Honduras and other Central American states; Zelaya cancelled several U.S. concessions in Nicaragua, such as the Emery concession; Zelaya was a threat to U.S. investment in the Panama Canal; Zelaya was hostile to U.S. business interests in Nicaragua; and the executions of Cannon and Groce.\textsuperscript{21} Other authors mention that
U.S. foreign policy was designed to expand American industrial and financial interests, as the United States needed new, stable markets for its products.\textsuperscript{22} Findling and Teplitz argue that the reasons were primarily strategic, not economic, although it is difficult to separate the two. Findling argues the U.S. was interested in Central American stability to protect its canal investments from both internal and European threats. He also points out Zelaya was becoming too independent and unpredictable for the U.S.\textsuperscript{23} According to Findling, the interests of American businessmen on the Atlantic Coast were subordinate to larger strategic concerns. Knox’s hostility to Zelaya is logical when one looks at the larger U.S. policy in the region that was aimed at protecting the canal and expanding commerce.\textsuperscript{24}

While both authors agree that strategic concerns defined American foreign policy in the area, only Teplitz provides a convincing argument for why Zelaya gave up power so quickly. The other arguments define general U.S. grievances and policy in the region, but fail to compellingly explain why Zelaya resigned when he did. Estrada’s revolution was not in itself a threat to Zelaya’s rule, and, after the government retook San Juan del Norte in November 1909, the revolt quieted down.\textsuperscript{25} The executions of the two Americans affected U.S. policy but did not affect the military situation on the ground. Teplitz argues that there was sufficient internal resistance to Zelaya by the end of 1909 that the breaking of diplomatic relations was only the last straw.\textsuperscript{26} In contrast to many revisionist historians of the Zelaya regime, Teplitz contends that the United States was not responsible for forcing out an otherwise popular leader.\textsuperscript{27}

A small but vibrant labor movement was formed in the 1890s and by 1908-09 had become increasingly militant and anti-capitalist. Zelaya was also increasingly repressive toward labor and arrested workers en masse after several anti-Zelaya demonstrations in the cities of the Pacific Coast in 1909. By the end of Zelaya’s rule, the police could no longer contain the labor
protests. The Liberals were responsible for instituting a national labor draft and also closed off opportunities to peasants to purchase land and to urban dwellers to start businesses.

Peasants and the peoples of the Caribbean Coast also opposed Zelaya. The Reincorporation of the Atlantic Coast in 1894 angered costeños and ended their de-facto self-rule. By the early 1900s, Zelaya was granting large swathes of territory to mestizo officials on the Atlantic Coast. Local residents had little recourse for reclaiming their land, leading to a futile attempt to involve the British in the land claims and to further polarize attitudes between costeños and the government in Managua.

When Zelaya finally left Nicaragua, he was forced to go through “insulting crowds to the port of Corinto.” On the day before Zelaya’s departure for exile in Mexico, a group of about 100 men organized in an attempt to assassinate him. The reaction to U.S. pressure on Madriz stands in stark contrast to that of Zelaya, as will be elaborated below.

In addition to opposition from the masses, Zelaya also lost the crucial support of the elites. The revolution meant the loss of the strategically and economically important Department of Zelaya, which lessened elite dependence on the dictator. In 1909, Zelaya’s inability to retake the Atlantic Coast, considered the territory with the most economic potential, caused the elite to jump ship and withdraw their support from the aging dictator. With this loss of elite support, Zelaya’s days were numbered. Besides losing his domestic support base, he also faced the hostility of his Central American neighbors, the Conservative Party, American businessmen, U.S. politicians, peasants, and labor.

Several reasons given for the resignation of Zelaya are not entirely convincing. Bermann points out that the evidence that Zelaya was attempting to build another canal is very weak, and in all the contemporary documents consulted for this research, the idea was never mentioned. As
shown below, the evidence of American business complaints against Zelaya following Estrada’s victory was extremely thin. The idea that Zelaya was a nationalist hardly seems plausible, as his economic policy of creating monopolies and granting concessions largely benefited U.S. companies, thus alienating a large segment of the local elite. Zelaya, for most of his dictatorship, was actually seen as more friendly to American economic interests than were the leaders of other Central American countries, and he was criticized for selling out to the Yankees. Teplitz provides the most compelling argument for the rapid collapse of the Zelaya regime, although U.S. pressure certainly hastened his fall. Clearly, the U.S.'s breaking of diplomatic relations quickened Zelaya’s decision to resign, but the actions of the U.S. do not explain why Zelaya did not resist the international pressure while Madriz did, why Zelaya was not able to muster internal support for his regime, or why he began looking for a successor before the breaking of relations, as discussed in detail below. However, the strategic and geopolitical arguments make much more sense when one looks at U.S. policy towards Madriz.

**Why is this period significant?**

Most work that deals with the period between the Zelaya and Somoza dictatorships identifies the reestablishment of Conservative rule and the end of Liberal governance as a founding moment for Nicaragua. Some scholars go so far as to put a positive face on the Zelaya dictatorship. Karl Bermann claimed that under Zelaya public education was expanded and society was at least partially democratized. Walter LaFeber declared that the events of 1909-10 were the root cause of several decades of U.S. occupation, the Somoza family dictatorship, and the Sandinista Revolution.
James Mahoney, in a much more elaborate argument, states that the fall of Zelaya and Madriz represents a case of “aborted liberalism.”\(^{40}\) In his work, he argues Nicaragua and Honduras failed to capitalize on periods of modernization by Liberals because of foreign intervention, setting these two countries onto different developmental paths than Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. The reinstallation of the Conservative Party as the head of government signified the founding of a “neocolonial” system that affected the development of state institutions and class structures, resulting in an end to the economic-modernization policies of Zelaya, a decline in public services, and economic stagnation. Consequently, coffee exports that had risen under Zelaya stagnated under the subsequent regimes.\(^{41}\)

While the evidence is not currently available to refute or confirm these claims, there is some question about their continuing validity. Jeffrey Gould questions the historiography of the post-Zelaya, pre-Somoza period that characterizes it as one of economic backwardness.\(^{42}\) He uses the example of the San Antonio Sugar Mill in Chichigalpa, Nicaragua’s “largest manufacturing establishment,” that grew under Zelaya and flourished in the 1920s. In addition, the Liberal workers of the mill were highly politicized and challenged Conservative dominance in the government.\(^{43}\) Moreover, Bermann's unsubstantiated claims do not stand up to the available evidence. Elections had been freer during the prior Conservative period than under Zelaya, and his regime was responsible for instituting repressive labor policies that had not existed before.\(^{44}\) Liberals under Zelaya centralized political power and destroyed the municipal autonomy that had existed before 1893.\(^{45}\) Zelaya’s record on education was not much better; as Teplitz points out, his record was equal to or worse than the prior Conservative regimes.\(^{46}\) Illiteracy was at 85% in 1883 and by 1920 was at 72%, hardly a substantial improvement attributable to Zelaya.\(^{47}\)
Zelaya’s most significant change for Nicaragua was his agricultural-development policies. He put more land into production and increased the supply of both capital and labor, at the expense of the lower classes. Zelaya expanded modernization through the export of agricultural products, though this only benefited the elites. However, it is unclear how much this changed after the Liberals were ousted from power. Oscar René Vargas provides several economic statistics for the period 1890-1913, and, at least in the immediate period after 1910, there is little evidence in any of the economic indicators to suggest economic stagnation. From 1890 to 1913, total exports were relatively stable, but doubled in 1911 and 1913. Imports were also stable, though they also doubled after 1910. The volume of coffee exports was consistent for the 1903-09 period at around 8 to 9 million kilograms, but then spiked upward in 1910 to 12 million kilos, dropped below pre-1910 levels for the next two years, and then significantly rose again to 11 million kilos in 1913. Government expenditures after 1909 significantly outweighed government revenues, a drastic change from the Zelaya period where government spending and income were roughly equal. This change may be the result of Conservative incompetence or U.S. meddling in Nicaragua’s financial affairs after 1910. For at least three years after the fall of Zelaya, the economic indicators show some continuity or minimal improvement over the Zelaya era, except for a sign of increasing public debt after 1910. The long-term effects of the intervention need more research.

The rise and fall of Dr. José Madríz

Juan José Estrada, Liberal governor of the Department of Zelaya, declared himself provisional president of the department on 10 October 1909, signaling the beginning of the “revolution” that would force out of power both Zelaya and Madríz. Initially the revolution was not successful, but
following the execution of U.S. citizens Cannon and Groce on 16 November, U.S. support for the revolution strengthened. Secretary of State Knox used the pretext of the Cannon and Groce murders to break diplomatic relations with Nicaragua with a note sent to Chargé d’Affaires (needs first name, Felipe?) Rodríguez on 1 December. Prior to the ‘Knox note,’ Zelaya had already realized the mistake of executing Cannon and Groce and quickly began a process of looking for his own successor. Initially, Zelaya was going to resign in favor of Aurelio Estrada, brother of Juan J. Estrada, then an opponent of the revolution. The Liberals in León opposed this choice and instead suggested Zelaya’s General Minister Julián Irías. This debate on presidential succession lasted until early December when Irías decided to support Madríz for president as a result of U.S. opposition to his own candidacy. On 7 December Zelaya reported his intention to resign, while the U.S. suggested another Estrada brother, José Dolores Estrada. Madríz had been the Nicaraguan delegate for the Central American Court of Justice in Cartago but sailed for Nicaragua on 17 December to take over the presidency. Zelaya resigned on 21 December in favor of Madríz and left for exile in Mexico three days later.

The debate regarding Zelaya’s successor is important for two reasons. First, the State Department at the time considered Madriz Zelaya’s handpicked successor and a continuation of Zelayismo; yet that was not the case. Madriz, a dissident Liberal from León, opposed Zelaya for most of his rule. Following the end of the 1896 revolution, Madriz left for exile in El Salvador, not to return to Nicaragua until 1908. During the 1907 war, Madriz sided with Zelaya and was his delegate to the 1907 Washington Peace Conference that established the court in Cartago. However, Madriz used his position in Washington to include as part of the peace treaty that the Central American states could not allow for the re-election of presidents in their constitutions. If re-election was allowed, then a constitutional reform was required. Since the fraudulent re-
election of Zelaya was a continuing grievance of the political opposition, it is clear that Madriz was still attempting to remove Zelaya in 1907, although in a more peaceful manner. Second, Zelaya decided to look for a successor only three days after the execution of the two Americans, almost two weeks before the U.S. broke diplomatic relations.\textsuperscript{58} It is not clear what Zelaya’s decision-making rational was in taking measures toward resignation, but this fact does cast doubt on the causal explanation that the breaking of diplomatic relations forced Zelaya out of office. It seems plausible that Zelaya would have resigned anyway, even without any break in Nicaragua-U.S. relations.

Soon after taking power in December, Madriz tried to come to a peaceful solution with the Estrada-led revolution and to neutralize U.S. hostility toward his government.\textsuperscript{59} He also quickly distanced himself from Zelaya. In January 1910, Madriz unsuccessfully attempted to form a coalition government between Liberals and Conservatives and to negotiate peace with Estrada. He also took action to punish those responsible for executing Cannon and Groce.\textsuperscript{60} However, the attempt to bring to trial those involved in the execution of the Americans ended in an acquittal. This was in part because of the juridical justification that Zelaya was the one to blame, not the ones who had carried out his orders.\textsuperscript{61} Despite the acquittal, it was clear Madriz was trying to correct the errors of the Zelaya government and displayed a conciliatory attitude toward the revolutionaries. As will be further elaborated below, Madriz was committed to reestablishing diplomatic relations and dealing with U.S. complaints against the prior regime, yet the approach taken by Madriz was hopeless as he did not fit into U.S. designs for Nicaragua.

On 23 January, government forces defeated a band of revolutionaries near La Libertad, leading Madriz to issue a manifesto the following day. He declared that the conflict would be settled by arms as Estrada was not seriously willing to negotiate.\textsuperscript{62} Madriz’s conditions for peace
included free presidential elections within six months, Madriz would not put himself up as a candidate, the state would take on the debt incurred by the revolution, and any other conditions Estrada thought would be necessary for a peaceful solution. Madriz also offered to hand over the presidency to an agreed-upon third person until elections took place. The revolutionary leaders rejected the Madriz plan. They demanded Madriz recognize the provisional government set up by Estrada, something Madriz was unwilling to do as he felt it threatened Nicaraguan sovereignty.  

Despite the government victory at La Libertad, the military aspect of the conflict did not look favorable for Madriz through the end of January and into February. On 4 February Luis Mena, a revolutionary general, defeated government troops near Acoyapa in the Department of Chontales, and on 19 February Madriz forces suffered heavy losses near San Vicente. The survival of the government in Managua was in doubt as revolutionary General Emiliano Chamorro’s troops were reported to be nearing the capital as they crossed the Rio Tipitapa. Nevertheless, revolutionary forces were stretched thin, and Estrada had few options for recruiting more soldiers. The revolution soon suffered a severe setback that would have likely ended the conflict had the United States not been adamant in its support for Estrada.  

To combat the advances of the revolutionaries, Madriz sent Julián Irías to Masaya, giving him civil and military control of the Departments of Masaya, Granada, and Carazo. On 22 February the tables turned on the revolutionaries as Irías dealt a resounding blow to Chamorro’s forces at Tisma, just outside Granada. The next day, Chamorro was again defeated at Tipitapa. The battle at Tisma lasted nearly an entire day until the grassy plain of the battlefield caught fire, killing many of the wounded soldiers. It was reported that the forces under Irías suffered the most casualties at Tisma, yet they forced Chamorro to retreat back across the Rio Tipitapa.
Chamorro was attacked again while crossing the river, where he lost half his remaining force, along with most of his arms, ammunition, and supplies.\textsuperscript{67} Consul Thomas Moffat reported that Chamorro’s army was virtually wiped out, losing nearly 1,000 troops. Hundreds were killed and wounded in the two battles, and many of those who remained alive deserted. According to Moffat, “the revolution has practically collapsed.”\textsuperscript{68}

Following such a severe blow, the leaders of the revolution became demoralized, as the total number of troops under their command dwindled to roughly 600-1,000 men.\textsuperscript{69} Moffat alluded to Secretary Knox the need for U.S. support for Estrada, saying that “nothing can be accomplished unless something unforseen[sic] interjects itself and materially changes the situation.”\textsuperscript{70} He was confident Estrada “will welcome the extending of a guiding hand from without that would uplift the situation and save…his beloved patria.”\textsuperscript{71}

In especially candid remarks, Moffat specified why he thought the revolution had so far failed to gain support among Nicaraguans. First, the Liberals controlled the country, and the Conservatives only represented a small minority of the population. Second, the large number of Conservatives among the revolutionary forces had pushed Liberals to side with Madriz. Finally, the ousting of Zelaya had calmed political unrest in the country since the major target of the revolution had left for exile.\textsuperscript{72} Moffat’s not-so-subtle suggestions in favor of U.S. intervention would soon become reality, yet his comments also contradicted both the claims of the revolution and the United States’ reasons for intervening on behalf of the Nicaraguan people. Moffat’s claims also support Teplitz’s argument that internal reasons were crucial in the collapse of the Zelaya regime, as Moffat points out that the Madriz government regained the support of most Liberals, had at least the tacit backing of the general population, and political unrest had waned following Zelaya’s departure.
Despite the severe setback of the battles at Tisma and Tipitapa, the U.S. State Department had already decided on its plans for Nicaragua, which were based on victory by Estrada and the Conservative Party. On 24 February Assistant Secretary of State Huntington Wilson sent a message to Thomas Dawson to “have the law officers prepare immediately a proclamation recognizing the Estrada Provisional Government of Nicaragua, undated.” Dawson was also instructed to “[d]raft a letter announcing the occupation of Managua by the Provisional Forces and formally requesting recognition of the Estrada Provisional Government….” 73 Also mentioned in Wilson’s message was the plan to force Nicaragua to acquire a loan from U.S. banks to gain financial control over the country. The letters were drafted and are included in State Department files. While it is not certain they were used, the idea was that the letters were to come from Estrada’s representative in Washington, Salvador Castrillo, as soon as Managua fell.74 Six months prior to the fall of Madriz and just after a major defeat of the revolutionaries, the State Department had decided Madriz was not acceptable and Estrada was their man. The timing of the letters also indicated that the U.S. had not fully developed its policy toward Nicaragua by the time Zelaya resigned, as it was the first mention of forcing a loan on Nicaragua.

From the end of February until the middle of May, the success of the revolutionaries was extremely doubtful. With the rebels on their knees, Madriz again attempted to negotiate a peace agreement with Estrada. In early March, Estrada indicated his willingness to end the revolution, most likely knowing it would be impossible for Madriz to accept his conditions. Estrada demanded, with U.S. mediation, that the U.S. designate a provisional president who was neither Madriz nor Estrada, that the president chosen would immediately call for new elections, that the U.S. would supervise the “free” election in which Madriz and Estrada could not be candidates,
that the government of Nicaragua would assume all debts incurred by the revolution, and that all unconstitutional monopolies would be abolished.\textsuperscript{75} Madriz accepted part of Estrada’s demands, yet considered the U.S. designation of a president and its supervision of elections unconstitutional and an affront to national honor. The government agreed to assume the debts of the revolution and to abolish the monopolies, along with granting amnesty for all political crimes. In addition, Madriz demanded that the revolution recognize his government as legitimate and that a peace commission named by both parties be established to negotiate the above terms.\textsuperscript{76} Negotiations quickly stalled, as Estrada was unwilling to compromise, while Madriz was unable to accept Estrada’s conditions.\textsuperscript{77} It is very probable that Estrada’s uncompromising stance was because he knew that the U.S. would step in if Madriz seriously threatened his provisional government at Bluefields. Madriz, on the other hand, began preparations for a move against the Caribbean Coast.\textsuperscript{78} It is not clear what position the State Department took on the various peace proposals, but it never did come out in support of a peace agreement between the two contending factions, as it would not have been in the U.S.’s interest to do so.

At the same time, the government in Managua was confident of its control of the country and requested the restoration of diplomatic relations with the United States. President Madriz sent a letter in mid-March to U.S. President Taft requesting recognition. Diplomatic recognition would go a long way toward ending the civil war, according to Madriz. Of course, Taft was unmoved, and there was no change in U.S. policy towards Nicaragua,\textsuperscript{79} despite the nearly total defeat of the rebels.

In April, Madriz sent Irías to San Juan del Norte, giving him power over the eastern half of Nicaragua and responsibility for direct military operations against the remaining rebel strongholds.\textsuperscript{80} There also were reports at this time that guerilla activity had begun between
Granada and Rivas in support of Estrada and the Conservatives. The guerilla bands were led by Calixto Talavera, and in mid-April they attacked and destroyed a government military outpost near the Rio Ochomogo. Little seems to have come of the guerilla presence on the Pacific Coast other than to provide another minor annoyance for Madriz, although it does offer vague evidence of some popular support for the revolution.

Meanwhile, government troops were amassing in the eastern half of the country, alarming the revolutionary leadership at Bluefields. The pro-Estrada Moffat stationed in Bluefields also became worried about the military buildup. Moffat reported to Knox on 12 April that Estrada was likely to be defeated if Madriz forces entered the city and that they would also pose a threat to American lives and property. He suggested that Bluefields only needed 100 men to prevent the defeat of Estrada. Estrada even modified his peace proposal in another attempt to end the civil war, yet the changes were minor and failed to address the nationalist concerns of Madriz.

By early May, Irías had made it to the Atlantic Coast, and the Madriz government had obtained a warship from New Orleans to use in the attack on Bluefields. The Madriz army under General (first name) Lara was waiting just outside Bluefields, and some small skirmishes were taking place between government troops and revolutionaries at Recreo and near Rama. Bluefields was put under martial law by Estrada, and all available men were forced into service. In response to these developments, Moffat cabled Secretary Knox on 8 May that, in his opinion, “the end of the revolution is very near….” It seems that either Moffat was kept in the dark about U.S. plans to land Marines at Bluefields in less than two weeks or that the decision had not yet been made to intervene militarily in the Nicaraguan conflict. Just one week before U.S. Marines landed in Bluefields, Moffat notified Knox that the revolutionary army in the city was not strong enough to repel an attack by government troops. In addition, the provisional
government did not have sufficient arms to defend the city. Apparently, Estrada had received a loan from the Bluefields Steamship Company (BSC), owned by the United Fruit Company, to purchase war materiel for the revolution. The BSC was supposed to arrange for the purchase and shipment of the arms from the United States, but, as Madriz’s army encircled the revolutionary capital, the arms had not yet arrived.\textsuperscript{87}

The Madriz government declared a blockade of all ports on the eastern coast, with the exception of San Juan del Norte. A few days later, on 19 May, U.S. Marines broke the blockade of Bluefields and stationed themselves in the city.\textsuperscript{88} Two days earlier, Estrada granted permission to the U.S. Navy to send troops, leading Commander (first name) Gilmer of the U.S.S. Paducah to land 112 Marines and seven officers under the command of H.K. Hines. At the end of May, 200 Marines from the U.S.S. Dubuque were stationed at Bluefields, while the original contingent left the first week of June.\textsuperscript{89} The additional troops seem to have been sent at the request of Moffat, as on 26 May he claimed 200 more Marines were necessary to protect the city in case Estrada was defeated.\textsuperscript{90} The landing of additional troops indicates the serious weakness of the rebel army and its inability to defend the city most supportive of the revolution. Furthermore, the strength of the government army was questionable considering the difficult environment of the Atlantic Coast, the unfamiliarity of the terrain to many of the troops, and the various obstacles to transporting supplies to the soldiers.

The U.S. military intervention effectively blocked Madriz from taking Bluefields and crushing the rebellion. Yet, despite this setback, fighting raged along the Atlantic Coast. On the same day Marines landed in Bluefields, conflict began in Rama between General Mena and government troops, and a week later, the Madriz army captured El Bluff and the customs house, just outside Bluefields.\textsuperscript{91} The Managua government managed to retake Pearl Lagoon,
Prinzapolka, Rio Grande, El Bluff, and Cabo Gracias a Dios, and was already in control of San Juan del Norte. It is clear that U.S. interference in this civil war prevented an end to the conflict, as Moffat even recognized that the departure of the Marines would mean the loss of Bluefields. Besides the problems in eastern Nicaragua, Madriz also had to deal with more attacks by Talavera in June on Nandaime and San Marcos, and a pro-Estrada uprising in Rivas.

As Madriz could do little to defeat Estrada with the Marines in country, the government resorted to an international diplomatic effort to pressure the U.S. to withdraw. Nicaraguan General Minister Francisco Baca sent a plea to President Porfirio Díaz of Mexico to put pressure on the United States. Díaz sent a letter to President Taft offering to mediate a solution to the Nicaraguan civil war. Taft responded by denying that U.S. policy in Nicaragua had prolonged the conflict. Baca’s unsuccessful attempt to have Mexico intervene on Nicaragua’s behalf was part of a larger diplomatic effort that included sending letters to various governments in Europe and Latin America asking them to pressure the United States to alter its policy toward Madriz.

While international opinion was largely on the side of Nicaragua, in seems that in the eyes of many leaders this tiny Central American country was hardly worth getting into a dispute with the United States.

There were also protests against Yankee intervention in Nicaragua and in other parts of Central America. Students in San Salvador staged two demonstrations against U.S. intervention in Nicaragua and against their own president. The protests led to the arrest of several students, the firing of all the professors at the university, and, after the second protest, the closing down of the university by the Salvadoran government. The Salvadoran protests garnered support from the Madriz government and seem to have sparked protests in other cities. On 23 June, the official paper in Managua announced an anti-intervention protest for the same day. It declared,
“The people of Managua, who have always been a discerning and dignified people, should justifiably rise up with a protest of indignation, in an explosion of their wounded patriotism to demonstrate before the world that there are traitors and adventurers who beg on their knees for slavery….”

At the same time, students and artisans in Tegucigalpa organized an anti-American protest against the military intervention, and protests also took place in Costa Rica. Newspapers in Nicaragua were also calling for a boycott of U.S. goods throughout Latin America. The foreign press lodged its protest against U.S. policy in Nicaragua as well. However, local popular opinion in Nicaragua and international opposition mattered little to the State Department and President Taft.

Local governments along the Pacific Coast organized cabildos abiertos, or town-hall meetings, followed by demonstrations in the streets in defiance of U.S. intervention. Masaya and León both held cabildos at the end of June. On 25 June, a cabildo was held in Corinto followed by a march through the town’s streets, with protestors shouting anti-American slogans. Matagalpa’s local officials held a cabildo in early July, followed by an anti-American demonstration. Many of the demonstrations seem to have been out of Madriz’s control, as he issued a decree at the end of June prohibiting anti-American demonstrations by the people and anti-Americanism in the press.

Despite the protests and the seemingly wide support for Madriz, the landing of the Marines eventually had the desired effect. By the end of June, the military situation began to turn around for the Conservative-led revolt. Revolutionary troops were able to take back Pearl Lagoon on 27 June. By July, the revolutionaries had made it to Acoyapa in the Department of Chontales. The rebels were advancing further toward the capital. On 21 July, government forces fought a contingent of revolutionaries in Comalapa, with both sides suffering heavy casualties. Fighting also erupted between Granada and Nandaime. Several days later, the
Estrada-backed army defeated Madriz’s army at Masatepe, and by 31 July it had gained control of Acoyapa.\textsuperscript{110}

The changing military situation and the presence of U.S. Marines in Bluefields put substantial pressure on the Madriz government. General Minister Baca, an ally of Madriz since the 1896 rebellion, resigned in mid-July, and Madriz was forced to reorganize his cabinet.\textsuperscript{111} In addition to the cabinet reorganization, Luis Corea, the government’s representative in Washington, returned to Nicaragua.

The changing political and military situation might have been, in part, the result of low morale among the government army and higher morale among the revolutionary forces. Typical of the time, fighters on both sides were pressed into service against their will, and troop morale may have played a large role in a soldier’s willingness to fight.\textsuperscript{112} The presence of U.S. Marines certainly must have boosted the morale of Estrada’s troops. José de Olivares reported at the end of July that Madriz was on the defensive and was losing many of his soldiers.\textsuperscript{113} Something was certainly wrong, as all of Madriz’s major generals were gathered in Managua by the first of August.\textsuperscript{114}

The morale of the rebels was most likely further enhanced by the knowledge that the United States was going to supply them with arms and ammunition. It is unclear when the U.S. made this decision, but, from consular reports of early August, it is fairly certain that Olivares and Moffat were aware that the arms were meant to bring an end to the civil war. On 1 August Olivares stated to Knox that “if I am rightly informed the beginning of the end of this contention is impending.”\textsuperscript{115} The Acting Secretary of Navy notified Knox on 5 August that Hines, commander of the Dubuque at Bluefields, had cabled that the “Hornet will arrive at Bluefields about August 6\textsuperscript{th} with cargo arms and ammunition consigned to the American house.”\textsuperscript{116} The
weapons did not arrive until 8 August. Moffat sent a message to Knox notifying him of their arrival. “Confidentially. Hornet Bluefields. Arrived yesterday. There was no interference. Chamorro will leave at once for the interior with the arms and ammunition brought.”

The United States had broken its declared neutrality in the conflict by secretly arming the rebellious faction in Nicaragua’s civil war. Although American moral and political support for the revolutionaries was well-known, it is not commonly recognized in the literature that the U.S. also supplied arms to the rebels. It is purely speculation to state that the weapons made a crucial difference in the military situation, yet the Madriz government fell twelve days after the arrival of the arms from the Hornet. Moreover, while the U.S. was involved in providing arms for Estrada and his Conservative generals, it also intervened and blocked a shipment of arms purchased by Madriz from F. Amsinck & Co. that was supposed to have been delivered through Corinto.

The revolutionary army was making a concerted push toward Managua by early August. It managed to gain control of the Department of Chontales and started moving toward Granada. A large concentration of nearly 5,000 soldiers from both sides began to gather after the first week in August near the Panaloya Pass on the Rio Tipitapa. Crossing the Rio Tipitapa was strategically crucial for the revolutionaries, for, if they were successful, it would put them just outside Managua.

Madriz seemed to be worried about a U.S. invasion on the Pacific side of Nicaragua, as barricades were constructed and trenches dug at the major port of Corinto in an attempt to repel an attack from the sea. The Managua government also began heavy recruiting in León, a major bastion of support for Madriz, in preparation for the looming conflict. Madriz certainly had reason to be concerned about a U.S. invasion, as a plan had been developed by the State
Department for a possible invasion back in June.\textsuperscript{122} While it is implausible Madriz was aware of this plan, and it was not put into action in 1910, it does demonstrate the lengths to which the United States was willing to go to ensure its their strategic interests in Nicaragua.

President Madriz also made a last-ditch effort to reestablish diplomatic relations with the United States and formulate a peace plan. He sent Drs. Modesto Barrios and Sebastian Salinas to Washington to plead his case. While they were authorized for this mission in late June, nothing was submitted to the State Department until the second week of August. Madriz was willing to do whatever necessary to placate the U.S. He was willing to settle any claims by American interests in Nicaragua, he had repeatedly signaled his desire to pay an indemnity to the families of Cannon and Groce, and he was not especially hostile to U.S. influence in Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{123} What Madriz was unaware of, however, was the U.S. plan to force a loan onto Nicaragua that would compromise its sovereignty. And, the U.S. knew that Madriz or the dominant faction of the Liberal Party would never agree to establish a customs collectorship.

The two armies at the Rio Tipitapa had remained quiet for several days, but on 18 August they finally went to battle. The revolutionary forces defeated the army of Madriz under General (first name) Toledo and crossed the river, threatening the capital. Toledo reported that, upon attack, most of his army fled. Simultaneously, government troops lost a battle with a separate group of revolutionaries south of Granada, taking the battle into the city. Most government officials and soldiers fled Granada upon attack by the rebel army.\textsuperscript{124}

The military defeats were the last straw for Madriz, and, on 19 August, he declared that he would hand over the presidency the next day to José Dolores Estrada, who intended to step down in favor of his brother, Juan José Estrada, once he arrived in Managua. José Madriz’s family left the same day for Corinto to await his arrival the next day to flee into exile. Irías,
General Toledo, and around 70 other Liberals fled the country as well. Madriz, along with his family and the fleeing Liberals, left Corinto on 21 August on an American ship headed for Amapala, Honduras. Just before the ship left, Liberal General (first name) Román attempted to convince Madriz to stay, but to no avail. Benjamín Zeledón would leave a few days later, boarding a ship bound for Costa Rica along with many of the same people, minus Madriz, who had previously fled to Amapala. Madriz’s nine-month presidency was doomed from the start, as the United States would not budge in its decision to support Estrada and the Conservatives or in its policy to transform Nicaragua into an American protectorate.

The Conservative Restoration

Following the departure of Madriz and the Liberal government, anarchy reigned in the streets of Managua, with roaming citizens shouting anti-American slogans. Bands of Conservatives and Liberals were patrolling the streets, while 700 prisoners broke out of the main prison in Managua and armed themselves. The day following the Liberal capitulation, roughly 750 revolutionary troops entered Managua, while Dolores Estrada extended formal recognition to his brother’s provisional government at Bluefields. General Mena finally gained military control of Managua on 26 August. Government troops that had held El Bluff outside Bluefields since May abandoned the town and left for San Juan del Norte. Liberal control of the country soon collapsed, signaling the restoration of political power to the Conservative Party.

Estrada and the Conservatives quickly consolidated their control of Nicaragua, though not without some pockets of resistance. A garrison of about 600 Liberal soldiers in Granada barricaded themselves inside the San Francisco Church, but finally surrendered on 29 August after hours of bombardment. Liberals in the other strongly Conservative towns of Rivas and
San Juan del Sur also refused to surrender until early September. With the handover of San Juan del Sur on 4 September, Estrada had succeeded in pacifying the western half of the country.\textsuperscript{133} By 10 September the last of Madriz’s forces surrendered in the Rio San Juan area.\textsuperscript{134} Less than a week after Madriz stepped down, Moffat made a request for the Marines to pull out of Bluefields, and by early September they had left Nicaraguan soil.\textsuperscript{135}

The basic program of the revolution consisted of six main points. First, and most important, was restructuring the economy, i.e. obtaining a U.S. loan secured by Nicaragua’s customs receipts. This was followed by: eliminating Zelayismo, settling American claims against Nicaragua, complying with the Washington peace conventions of 1907, abolishing unconstitutional monopolies and concessions, and holding “free” elections for president within six months.\textsuperscript{136} In large part, this is exactly what Estrada and the Conservatives accomplished. While it took several years for the so-called revolutionaries to consolidate their program and to restructure economic policy, they were able to hold fraudulent elections rather quickly and purge the political system of many people who had worked in the Zelaya and Madriz governments. Even Estrada would soon be forced out of power.

The Estrada provisional government quickly went to work rounding up Liberals, arresting some and exiling others in preparation for elections in November. The proclaimed rational for the arrests was “conspiracy.” Olivares claimed Liberals in Managua and León began plotting to overthrow the Estrada government as soon as Madriz handed over power.\textsuperscript{137} As will soon become evident, this was not an outrageous claim. In late September, a group of Liberals was arrested and exiled for a period of six months,\textsuperscript{138} most likely so they would not interfere with the consolidation of the U.S.-backed Conservative regime.
Despite the roundup of prominent Liberals, various forms of protest persisted. The press continued to publish pro-Madriz, anti-Estrada, and anti-Zelaya articles. Protests erupted following the arrival of Thomas Dawson, who had come to negotiate the political transition and contract a U.S. loan. On 21 October, there was an anti-American demonstration in Managua. Liberals also registered complaints against police repression. A Liberal Club meeting in Masaya was violently repressed in late October as members were attempting to organize for the upcoming elections. According to the Liberal press, the electoral process was illegitimate and was merely a manner in which to hand the government over to the Conservatives.

The signing of the Dawson Agreements on 27 October was vigorously protested by Liberals as an affront to Nicaraguan sovereignty. The Liberal Party staged a march through Managua on 6 November, with roughly 2,500-5,000 people, in defiance of President Estrada and the agreements negotiated by Dawson. A week later, another demonstration was held in León that was violently repressed, leaving five dead and several wounded. The next day, 14 November, there was another protest against the previous day’s violent response, leaving eight more wounded.

In addition to civilian protests, Liberals also began planning a military uprising against the Estrada government. José María Valladares organized a group of men in Honduras to invade Nicaragua. The plan was to first move on Tegucigalpa to overthrow President Miguel Dávila, then enter Nicaragua and stage a coup against Estrada. The U.S. successfully intervened in Honduras to suppress this movement, and Valladares quickly left Honduras for Costa Rica. New plans for an invasion began developing in San José among a group of Liberal exiles, including Valladares and Irías. The contents of the Dawson Agreements had put the Liberals into action.
Thomas Dawson had been the foreign minister to Panama prior to being sent to Managua in October. Before arriving in Nicaragua, Dawson conducted some preliminary research about U.S. claims against Nicaragua. He found that the large majority of unliquidated claims were from the period 1855-60, and, in addition, Nicaragua had several claims against the United States from the same period regarding the Walker episode and other filibustering expeditions. The existence of outstanding American claims against the Nicaraguan government was one of the publicly stated reasons for U.S. intervention; however, the evidence Dawson found revealed little factual evidence to back up the claim. Moreover, the U.S. had no intention of dealing with Nicaragua’s claims.

Dawson’s mission consisted of four tasks. First, he was to work toward establishing a constitutional government and holding elections as soon as possible. Second, he was to “rehabilitate” the state’s finances by contracting a U.S. loan. Third, Dawson was supposed to pressure Nicaragua into paying liquidated claims and to submit unliquidated claims arising from the Zelaya and Madriz periods to “impartial” examination. Last, he was to make sure those responsible for the deaths of Cannon and Groce were prosecuted and punished.

Dawson arrived in Managua on 18 October and a little more than a week later had accomplished most of his mission. The Dawson Agreements consisted of four agreements signed by Juan José Estrada, Adolfo Díaz, Luis Mena, and Emiliano Chamorro. The fourth agreement was also signed by Fernando Solórzano. The first agreement called for the election of a Constituent Assembly that would then elect Estrada president and Diaz vice president. The second agreement dealt with the settlement of claims and the deaths of Cannon and Groce. The third, and arguably most important, agreement stated that Nicaragua would contract a loan with the help of the United States, guaranteed by a portion of Nicaragua’s customs receipts. The last
agreement declared that the president after Estrada must adhere to the program of the revolution and represent the Conservative Party. Plus, the government of Nicaragua “must not permit, under any pretext, the Zelayista element in its administration.”

In fact, the mixed-claims commission that was established as a result of the second agreement had very little evidence to prove Liberal abuses of foreign business interests under Zelaya. It is also not clear if any action was taken regarding the Cannon and Groce affair. More plausibly, this agreement was not made to punish the actual officials involved in the trial and execution but to leave open the possibility of punishing Zelaya or seeking his extradition. Yet, it is clear the U.S. was not serious about capturing Zelaya, as he traveled to New York twice, spending the last years of his life there until his death in 1919.

The plan for Nicaragua to obtain a foreign loan seems not to have been public knowledge prior to Dawson’s arrival. But the information was leaked before the agreements were signed, leading to public outcry by the Liberals. One critic from Managua’s Diario de Nicaragua pointed out that the loan would compromise Nicaraguan economic and administrative sovereignty. Furthermore, this newspaper editorial argued, it made little sense to contract an estimated $20 million loan when the public debt only amounted to $6 million. This claim was backed up by previously cited statistics; Nicaragua generally had a balanced budget throughout the Zelaya period.

An unintended aspect of Dawson’s mission was to mediate between the contending factions now controlling the government. Soon after Dawson’s arrival, he discovered that Granada Conservatives wanted to force Estrada out of power to engage in full-scale repression of Liberals. Prior to 18 October a coup had been planned by Mena but was called off after the plotters were informed of Dawson’s impending arrival. Dawson was worried the conflict would
lead to another civil war. Chamorro had to be pressured into signing the agreements, since he opposed Estrada as the presidential candidate for the upcoming elections; hence, the fourth agreement allowing the Conservatives to choose Estrada’s successor. Dawson complained that “[t]he present situation is virtually anarchy.” The root of the conflict was summed up well in the paper *Gil Blas*, which said, “The revolution of the Coast was clearly Conservative with a Liberal chief at its head, a Liberal for whom the Liberal Party does not exist. The revolution is not the caudillo, the revolution is the combined whole, and the combined whole of the revolution of the Coast is Conservative.” For the Conservatives, the Liberals in the revolution were essentially pawns in their struggle to regain power.

The elections for the Constituent Assembly were held on November 27 and 28. A Liberal Club convention was held on 24 November where they decided that they would not participate in the upcoming elections. For the most part, the Liberal boycott held, though it had little effect on the outcome. Not surprisingly, no Liberals were elected to the Constituent Assembly. In the Department of Chinandega where it was reported that a few Liberals had voted, Estrada declared the elections void and held new elections on December 11 and 12. In November, 113 votes were cast, while in December, only five were cast.

On the final day of 1910, Estrada and Diaz were chosen as president and vice president, respectively, by the Conservative-controlled Constituent Assembly. On 1 January 1911, Estrada and Diaz officially took power as the constitutionally elected executive, completing the political transition supported by the United States government.

**Conclusions**

The U.S. intransigence towards Madriz and the lengths to which it was willing to go to ensure Estrada’s military and political victory suggest that having political and economic control were
important for larger U.S. strategic concerns. The concept of dollar diplomacy and the desire to protect American investment in the Panama Canal led the U.S. to engage in overt military, financial, and political intervention. There was little Madriz could have done to change the outcome, as he repeatedly attempted to negotiate an end to the civil war on reasonable terms and to reestablish diplomatic relations with the United States. Madriz also had political and military control over much of the country, yet this was undermined, principally as a result of the Marine presence in Bluefields. However, a Madriz presidency was not convenient for the strategic interests of the United States. This meant that the U.S. ended up supporting an unpopular revolt backed by the Conservative Party which, some have argued, was damaging to the future political and economic development of Nicaragua.

U.S. policy in Nicaragua also contradicted the stated goals of dollar diplomacy; suppressing revolutions and ensuring economic stability. The United States directly supported a revolution to gain control of a strategically important country, while its economic policies did little to ensure stability but instead increased Nicaragua’s debt and created financial chaos. Moreover, U.S. actions increased political instability in the region by encouraging Liberal revolts in Nicaragua. These revolts forced the U.S. to station Marines in Nicaragua for decades to prop-up Conservative governments.

Most scholarly work on this period gives little mention to the presidency of José Madriz and instead attempts to provide various reasons for why the U.S. wanted to force Zelaya from power. While the reasons are for the most part correct, they are misdirected and fail to explain why Zelaya abandoned the presidency almost immediately, while Madriz stayed to fight. By the end of 1909 Zelaya’s grip on power was slipping and the international pressure was too much to handle. Madriz was much more capable of exerting his control over the country and might have
been able to consolidate power, if the U.S. had not forcibly prevented him from defeating the revolution.

In addition to the omission of Madriz from the historical narrative, much of the scholarship from this period has relied more on assumptions rather than concrete evidence to describe the return of Conservative rule. It is not disputed that the U.S. exerted overt control over Nicaragua for the period from 1910 to 1933, but it is less clear how this control affected Nicaraguans in general. While the common assumptions may in fact be correct, they at least deserved to be questioned until more compelling evidence is provided.

1 Thanks to Judy Bieber, Les Field, Mark Peceny, and Amanda Wolfe for comments on earlier drafts.
2 An important and recent exception is Michel Gobat’s fascinating study, Confronting the American Dream. However, Gobat is not concerned with this particular episode and only spends a few paragraphs on the fall of Zelaya and the resistance of Madriz. Although he does agree that Madriz had wide support among Nicaraguans after Zelaya resigned, there is little evidence to back up this claim. This research provides a convincing argument to back up Gobat’s assertion. See Michel Gobat, Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 69-71.
4 See Gregorio Selser, La restauración conservadora y la gesta de Benjamín Zeledón, Nicaragua-USA,1909/1916 (Managua: Aldilá Editor, 2001), 77-95, for international reaction against the Knox Note and support for Zelaya.
6 Selser, 53.
7 Gobat, 57.
10 Selser, 30-34.
11 Munro, 534-35.
12 Munro, 531.
13 Munro, 161-163, 538-541.
15 Findling, 139-143. Also see Bermann, 138-40.
16 Findling, 152.
17 José de Olivares, Consul at Managua, a Nicaraguan, married into a prominent family that was very supportive of the revolution. DeSavigny, Consul at Matagalpa, and Moffat, Consul at Bluefields, were also considered open supporters of the revolution. See Barrios and Salinas to S.O.S. 8/15/10, FN 817.00/1297. Roll 7. “El Cónsul Olivares.” El Cometa, Managua, 26 June 1910. Roll 6.
18 Findling, 154-57, 160.
Bermann, 145-146. Cannon and Groce, both American citizens, had enlisted as colonels in Estrada’s army. They were captured in early November after attempting to blow up a ship carrying government soldiers. After their arrest, both men admitted to their crime and were sentenced to death by a military tribunal.


Charles R. Hale, *Resistance and Contradiction: Miskitu Indians and the Nicaraguan State, 1894-1987* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 47-48. Hale also argues that the 1894 Reincorporation was a crucial event in understanding contemporary relations between Miskitus and the state, as it signaled the loss of autonomy for the coast which coastal residents have been trying to regain ever since, and also the importance of the coast in mestizo national identity and state building. See Hale, 45.


Findling, 139-144.

57 Selser, 42.


59 Munro, 179.

60 José de Olivares, American Consul at Managua, to Secretary of State, 1/17/10; Olivares to S.O.S. 1/19/10, Roll 4


62 Olivares to S.O.S. 1/24/10, Roll 4.


64 Moffat to S.O.S. 2/9/10, FN 817.00/768; Olivares to S.O.S. 2/19/10, FN 817.00/769; Olivares to S.O.S. 2/20/10, FN 817.00/771; Moffat to S.O.S. 2/21/10, FN 817.00/773. Roll 4.

65 Moffat to S.O.S. 2/9/10, FN 817.00/767, Roll 4.

66 Olivares to S.O.S. 2/22/10, FN 817.00/780; Olivares to S.O.S. 2/24/10, FN 817.00/782. Roll 4.

67 Olivares to S.O.S. 3/3/10, FN 817.00/823. Roll 4

68 Moffat to S.O.S. 3/1/10, FN 817.00/808. Roll 4.

69 Olivares to S.O.S. 3/3/10, FN 817.00/823. Olivares reports only 600 troops. Moffat to S.O.S. 3/1/10, FN 817.00/808. Moffat reports 1000 troops. Roll 4

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Wilson to Dawson 2/24/10, FN 817.00/1373, Roll 7.

74 Ibid. A similar plan was reiterated in an unauthored “Plan” from 6/23/10. According to this plan, Madriz would hand over the presidency, new elections would be called, and a loan would be contracted to U.S. banks. This is exactly what happened following the fall of Madriz. See 817.00/1374. Roll 7.

75 Moffat to S.O.S. 3/3/10, FN 817.00/797. Roll 4.

76 Madriz to Estrada 3/14/10, taken from F.W. Kellog to Secretary of Navy 3/14/10. Roll 4. Most correspondence between the opposing factions went through either consuls or the commanding generals of the many U.S. Navy ships stationed off both coasts of Nicaragua throughout the conflict.

77 Estrada to Madriz 3/17/10, FN 817.00/817; Madriz to Estrada 3/17/10. Roll 4.

78 Olivares to S.O.S. 3/9/10, FN 817.00/831. Roll 4.

79 Madriz to Taft, 3/13/10 or 3/14/10 (?); Huntington Wilson, Assistant Secretary of State to American Consulate at Managua, 3/14/10, FN 817.00/810a. Roll 4.

80 Olivares to S.O.S. 4/29/10, FN 817.00/911. Roll 4.

81 Olivares to S.O.S 4/6/10, FN 817.00/905. Roll 4.

82 Olivares to S.O.S. 4/13/10, FN 817.00/914, Roll 4.

83 Moffat to S.O.S. 4/12/10, FN 817.00/925, Roll 5.

84 Moffat to S.O.S. 4/25/10, FN 817.00/933, Roll 5.

85 Olivares to S.O.S. 5/4/10, FN 817.00/955, Roll 5.

86 Moffat to S.O.S. 5/8/10, FN 817.00/931, Roll 5.

87 Moffat to S.O.S. 5/12/10, FN 817.00/947, Roll 5.

88 Olivares to S.O.S. 5/17/10, FN 817.00/995; Moffat to S.O.S. 5/19/10, FN 817.00/950; Luis Corea, Madriz Representative in Washington, to S.O.S. 5/25/10, FN 817.00/968. Roll 5.


90 Moffat to S.O.S. 5/26/10, FN 817.00/967. Roll 5.

91 Moffat to S.O.S. 5/20/10; Moffat to S.O.S. 5/27/10, FN 817.00/975. Roll 5.

92 Moffat to S.O.S. 6/11/10, FN 817.00/1050; Moffat to S.O.S. 6/19/10, FN 817.00/1055. Roll 5.

93 Moffat to S.O.S. 6/11/10, FN 817.00/1050. Roll 5.


95 Porfirio Diaz to Taft, 6/16/10; Taft to Diaz, 6/19/10, FN 817.00/1059. Roll 5.


97 Heimke, American Consul at San Salvador, to S.O.S. 6/23/10, FN 817.00/1074. Roll 5.

98 “El pueblo de Managua. La manifestación de hoy.” Diario de Nicaragua, Managua, 23 June 1910. Roll 6. “El pueblo de Managua, que ha sido siempre, también, pueblo consciente y digno, debe levantarse alto y justiciero con
la protesta indignada, en la explosión de su patriotismo herido, para hacer ver ante el mundo que si hay traidores y aventureros que piden de rodillas la esclavitud.....


“¿Qué debemos hacer contra la injusta intervención de Norte América?” El Cometa, Managua, 26 June 1910; Johnson, American Consul at Corinto, to S.O.S. 6/28/10, FN 817.00/1163. Roll 6.

See for example, L. “La intervención yanqui en Bluefields.” El Diario Ilustrado, Santiago, 11 July 1910, taken from American Legation at Santiago to S.O.S. 7/12/10, FN 817.00/1249. Roll 6.


For more in Nicaraguan military practices of the time, see Teplitz, 122-134.

Ibid.

Acting Secretary of Navy to S.O.S. 8/5/10, FN 817.00/1243. Roll 6.

Moffat to S.O.S. 8/9/10, FN 817.00/1265. Roll 6.

Alvey A. Adee, Acting Secretary of State, to Secretary of War 8/2/10, FN 817.00/1284. Roll 7.

Olivares to S.O.S. 8/3/10, FN 817.00/1306. Roll 7.

McCreery, American Consul at Tegucigalpa, to S.O.S. 8/2/10, FN 817.00/1238. Roll 6. Transmitting a message from Olivares from 8/1.

Ibid.

Halstead, of U.S.S. Vicksburg at Corinto, to Secretary of Navy, 9/1/10. Roll 7.

McCreery to S.O.S. 8/20/10, FN 817.00/1365. Transmitting 9/2 from Olivares; Johnson to S.O.S. 9/4/10, FN 817.00/1368; Johnson to S.O.S. 9/7/10, FN 817.00/1412. Roll 7.
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