

11-18-1890

Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, 11-18-1890

New Mexican Printing Company

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Best Stock of Horses and Carriages in town.

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Healthy and Nice Rooms on the Second Floor. Nightly Band Concert in Front of the Hotel, 1st Plaza.

Rates, \$1.50 and \$2 per Day. Special Rates for Regular Board.

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Successor to CARTWRIGHT & GRISWOLD, DEALER IN

Fine Staple and Fancy Groceries

We are Manufacturers' Agents for the well known

Dew Drop brand Canned Fruit & Vegetables

Also agents in Santa Fe for Patent Imperial Flour, the

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We keep in stock the world renowned PEABODY CREAMERY

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IMPORTER AND JOHNSON OF

General Merchandise

SAN FRANCISCO STREET,

Largest and Most Complete Stock of General Merchandise Carried in the Entire Southwest

HAVE TO COUNT 'EM.

Judge Seeds Rules that the Santa Fe County Board Must Canvass All the Returns.

Must Assemble Before 2 P. M. Tomorrow and Cease to Stand Upon Filmy Technicalities.

The Stolen Ballot Box Can Not Be Taken Advantage of and the Gang Crowd Counted In.

Vaulting Ambition O'erleaps Itself—Corruption and Dishonest Methods Completely Crushed.

TAOS COUNTY LO MISMO!!!

At noon to-day Judge Seeds filed with the clerk the following opinion:

Territory of New Mexico, ex. rel. B. M. Read vs. J. H. Stann, et al. Board of County Commissioners of Santa Fe County, N. M.

This is an action by the territory upon the relation of one B. M. Read against the board of county commissioners of Santa Fe county by mandamus to compel said board, acting as a board of election canvassers to canvass the returns and count the votes from precincts Nos. 1, 2, 8 and 16, in said county, and to count for the said Read four votes alleged to have been cast for him, but not counted, in precinct No. 11. The writ further alleges that the poll books and certificates from precinct No. 8, after their return to the board and the counting had begun and been purchased and in their stead a certified copy of the certificate of the votes cast at said precinct was offered to said board by the relator, Read, as provided by section 1196 of the Compiled Laws of 1884, which he demanded should be counted.

In response to the writ the board came into court and filed their answer, alleging as reasons for not complying with the demands of said writ to count the alleged returns substantially as follows:

"That upon opening of the official ballot boxes from said precincts Nos. 1, 2, 8 and 16, your respondents found no poll books or certificates of election enclosed in said ballot boxes as is required by the provisions of section 1185, of the Compiled Laws of New Mexico, as amended by section 7, chapter 135, of the acts of the legislative assembly of 1889, that there was not in said ballot boxes any returns of election from said precincts except ballots." They further say that there were two bundles wrapped in brown paper handed to them, one of which bundles was marked No. 1, and the other No. 2, but nothing more to indicate from whence they came or what they were; that a paper purporting to be a poll book and return from said precinct No. 16, was presented instead; that therefore the respondents, sitting as a board of canvassers, were of the opinion that said purported returns were not the true and authentic returns from said precincts Nos. 1, 2 and 16, and as such board they declined to canvass the same.

Answering as to precinct No. 8 they state: "That your respondents have no official knowledge whether or not an election was held at said precinct No. 8 on the 4th day of November, A. D. 1890; that according to the requirements of law they met as a board to canvass the returns upon November 10, 1890; that upon requiring the county clerk to bring to them the returns, he stated that: 'If I had not in his possession, he was unable to find any ballot box, poll books or returns from said precinct No. 8.' They state and deny that there ever was any return made to them, or to the clerk of the precinct, of said county of any poll books, certificates or ballot box, as the poll books, certificates and ballot box of an election held in said precinct No. 8, on the 4th day of November, 1890, and they deny that there was any poll book or certificate or ballot box purchased or taken away from before your respondents as a board of county commissioners after they had assembled as a canvassing board to canvass the returns and votes of said election or at any other time; they allege that upon November 11, 1890, Benjamin M. Read, the same person upon whose petition said writ was issued, filed with the clerk of said county a paper purporting to be a certificate of the result of an election held at said precinct No. 8; that said alleged certificate is not, nor is it alleged to be the original certificate as is required to be made by the provisions of section 1131, of the Compiled Laws of New Mexico; nor is said certificate authentic in any manner as a copy as required by section 1196 of said Compiled Laws; that not having been received or presented to said board in the manner directed by law, said alleged certificate was an absolute nullity, and as such board of canvassers they decline to accept or canvass said evidence of the result of an election held at said precinct No. 8; they further answer as to the four votes alleged to have been cast, but not counted, for B. M. Read in precinct No. 11, that 'they as such board accepted and canvassed the result of the election in precinct No. 11, according to the returns made to said board by the judges of election held in precinct No. 11; that as to the action of said judges in passing upon the qualifications of electors or their registration, or receiving of the same your respondents as such board were of the opinion that as such board they had no jurisdiction to go behind the returns made by said judges, or to review the actions of said judges, and as such board to examine the ballots and the affidavits of the person mentioned in said alternative writ of mandamus, or to change the result of the election in said precinct No. 11 as certified by the judges thereof.' It appears from the petition upon which the writ of mandamus was issued that the petitioner, Benjamin M. Read, was out of the candidates for the house of representatives of the territorial legislature voted for at the election held in Santa Fe county upon the 4th day of November, 1890.

I have thus fully set out the state of the pleadings in order that it may easily be understood what are the real issues upon which I am to pass.

As a preliminary question it may be asked, who are interested in the action of this board and especially related to this mandamus proceeding? There are, in my judgment, three classes of persons vitally interested, and their interests should be kept constantly in mind in coming to a conclusion.

First. The people whose will was asserted at the various precincts. That will should not be lightly considered. It is sovereign; and through the proper channels and according to the law it is the law of the land. The persons upon the various tickets who were voted for. It is not the party who is elected by a majority of the votes alone, who is interested in having a canvass of the votes, but all who were voted for, I may be deceived in an election, but I am entitled to 2,000 votes, and my rights are not protected if I receive only 1,500, though I am in either case defeated.

Third. The parties who are entitled to the certificates. There is a vast difference between the right to the certificate and the right to the office. The certificate is property—the party who has the majority of votes cast within the precinct is entitled to that certificate, and ministerial boards are bound to use every legal presumption to see that the certificate is given to that person. It would do to say that the party has his recourse to an action of contest. For speaking legally, a contest deals solely with the right to the office, not to the certificate.

Boards of canvassing are for the purpose of awarding certificates, not offices. If a majority of the ballots in a poll book are fraudulent that has no effect upon the certificate, that goes merely to the right of the office.

The boards protect certificates; Courts protect offices.

In argument it was argued that this was purely a legal question implying that the rights of no one was to be considered as covering the action of the board, but that the rigid interpretation of the statute alone must be considered. In other words, the rights of parties, if any were to be seen through the stern unblinking letter of the statute.

Instead, I believe that the statute should be interpreted in view of the rights of the above three classes of parties.

Addressing myself then to the question before me, the first is:

What are the powers and duties of a board of county election canvassers under the law in the territory of New Mexico?

It is quite apparent that those powers and duties grow out of their powers and duties as county commissioners.

Section 345 of the Compiled Laws of 1884, subdivision 9 says: 'said board of commissioners shall act as boards of canvassers of the elections within their respective counties, shall count the votes cast in any election within their respective counties and shall determine the result thereof from the returns of the judges of election of the various precincts; their duties in relation to the elections do not stop merely with canvassing the returns, but by the same section they are to appoint the board of registration.'

By section 113 they are to appoint the judges of each voting precinct, who are to be men of discretion and good character; by section 1181 they are to furnish poll books to the various precincts, and by section 1143 they are to furnish ballot boxes.

By subdivision 9 of section 345 the judges of election at the various precincts are to return their returns to this board; however, the board is not necessary in session for counting purposes until six days after the election, and hence the return is actually made to the probate clerk who is ex-officio the board's clerk. But said return to the clerk is in intention of law to the board. When they meet for the purpose of canvassing the vote do they act ministerially or judicially? The position contended for by the respondents is that they act ministerially solely or if they have any discretion, it is extremely limited.

The enumeration of the early law cases was that canvassing boards acted purely as ministerial capacity and from these decisions has arisen an impression that they were simply calculating machines, affording only gross canvasses in that they possessed eyes and hands. If, however, those cases are critically studied it will be found that the point decided was that after a return known to be a return, as such, then their duty was ministerially and that they could not inquire into irregularities occurring at any previous stage. But there was no holding that they could not determine first as to whether or not they had a return in their possession, or that they not a fact have to do that very thing. Take the case before us.

The court say they have canvassed the return from precinct 11. How do they know they have? Who told them that was the return which they canvassed? If their clerk? If so, how did he know and by what authority, if their contention is correct, did he take his testimony? They say that they opened the ballot boxes from Nos. 1, 2 and 16 and there were no poll books in them as provided by law, but the only returns therein were ballots. How do they know? Possibly these were not the ballot boxes from those precincts and if they had looked for the proper ones they would have found them; then too, how do they know that there were ballots returned in said precincts?

The statute plainly states that the ballots are not to be touched or considered unless in a case of contest. Now I presume this board has done right here; they can not know that there was anything but slips of paper resembling ballots in those boxes, and yet they state in their answer that the only returns were ballots. They have canvassed the other fourteen precincts in the county. How do they know that the books and the ballot boxes were the legal ones? They didn't see them returned; their clerk is not presumed to have any extraordinary powers of ascertaining what the returns are, for, if it is anybody's duty, it is solely the board's. It will be readily seen that, in some way, the board must first determine, at least presumptively, that they have the returns before they can proceed to canvass them. They growed out of their previous duties. They furnished the poll books; they furnished the ballot boxes; they appointed the judges of election, and, presumably, they recognize the results of their own handiwork. If they can say: 'This is the return from precinct 11,' because we presume the return has been made and we know the ballot box,' why not say: 'This is the return from precinct 11' because we presume the judges there have made the return, and we recognize the poll books as well as the ballot box?' The reply will be: 'For the reason that we must presume the return is made according to law, and in the latter case it has not been.'

However, this reply is not conclusive, for they know the poll books, they know the signatures of their appointed judges, and the question of being 'according to law' depends upon what the law is as to the legal method of returning votes or directory slips; if directory, then it applies to the judges of election only, and the board have nothing to do with it. It could only, in that case, possibly, be a circumstance to put them upon their guard as to the genuineness of the return, but would not be a reason for rejecting the return. The rejection must be based upon something appearing upon the face of the returns.

The question now presents itself, is the law of the last legislature of this territory, found in chapter 135, at section 7, which requires the poll books to be returned in the ballot box, and the ballot box locked, mandatory or directory?

The law is plain that where a statute has in it words which negative any other than the mode or method laid down in such statute, that it is mandatory, 'but those directions which are not of the essence of the thing to be done, but which are given with a view merely to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of the business, and by a failure to do which the rights of those interested will not be prejudiced, are not commonly to be regarded as mandatory; and if the act is performed but not in the time, or in the precise mode indicated, it may still be sufficient, if that which is done accomplishes the substantial purpose of the statute.'

Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 78, and McCrary, in his work on Elections, to the same effect says in section 180, 'but if, as in most cases, the statute simply provides that certain acts or things shall be done, within a particular time, or in a particular manner, and does not declare that their performance is essential to the validity of the election, then they will be regarded as mandatory, if they do, and directory if they do not, affect the actual merits of the election.' How can a failure to explicitly follow out the injunction of this statute prejudice the rights of those interested? When in this case there is no allegation that the poll books were not returned by the proper persons, and were not at all time in the proper custody? Simply because the poll books were outside the ballot boxes, raises no presumption that they were not delivered by the proper persons, and from the proper persons. An error in one thing will not overthrow the favorable presumptions which attend an officer in his duty in all that he has to do. It is to me plain that the statute under consideration is directory only.

But, suppose that I am wrong in this conclusion, can this fact take advantage of the fact that the law may be, or is, mandatory? This goes directly to their power. Even though the statute in question was mandatory, from its wording there is a possibility that it might be directory. If directory, then, as to the validity of the returns, a failure to comply with its terms would not affect them, but, by what authority does this board arrogate to itself the prerogatives of a court to say this statute is mandatory? And yet they must have so decided before they could plead its mandatory character for throwing out returns.

They insist they are only a ministerial body, but upon the very threshold of their labors they become a court to pass upon the character of a statute!

This error was fallen into because they have failed to discriminate as to the various duties to be performed by certain persons before the result of the vote is declared by them. There are three independent stages: First, the election at the precinct and the counting of the votes there; 2d, the transmission of the returns to the canvassing board; and 3d, the canvassing of the returns—with the first two the canvassing board have nothing whatever to do. The question is as to the last. Have they that which parts with a return? Is it upon its face sufficiently legal? Does no citizen present call their attention to any alleged illegality upon the face of the returns? Is there not more than one alleged illegality before them? Then their duty is plain, they must canvass and count the returns. This position is abundantly sustained by authority. Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 31 edition, page 733, says: 'In all this the several boards have for the most part ministerially only, and are not vested with judicial powers to correct the errors and mistakes that may have occurred with any officer who presided therein in the performance of any duty connected with the election or to pass

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But, suppose that I am wrong in this conclusion, can this fact take advantage of the fact that the law may be, or is, mandatory? This goes directly to their power. Even though the statute in question was mandatory, from its wording there is a possibility that it might be directory. If directory, then, as to the validity of the returns, a failure to comply with its terms would not affect them, but, by what authority does this board arrogate to itself the prerogatives of a court to say this statute is mandatory? And yet they must have so decided before they could plead its mandatory character for throwing out returns.

They insist they are only a ministerial body, but upon the very threshold of their labors they become a court to pass upon the character of a statute!

This error was fallen into because they have failed to discriminate as to the various duties to be performed by certain persons before the result of the vote is declared by them. There are three independent stages: First, the election at the precinct and the counting of the votes there; 2d, the transmission of the returns to the canvassing board; and 3d, the canvassing of the returns—with the first two the canvassing board have nothing whatever to do. The question is as to the last. Have they that which parts with a return? Is it upon its face sufficiently legal? Does no citizen present call their attention to any alleged illegality upon the face of the returns? Is there not more than one alleged illegality before them? Then their duty is plain, they must canvass and count the returns. This position is abundantly sustained by authority. Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 31 edition, page 733, says: 'In all this the several boards have for the most part ministerially only, and are not vested with judicial powers to correct the errors and mistakes that may have occurred with any officer who presided therein in the performance of any duty connected with the election or to pass

upon the returns. They are not to be touched or considered unless in a case of contest. Now I presume this board has done right here; they can not know that there was anything but slips of paper resembling ballots in those boxes, and yet they state in their answer that the only returns were ballots. They have canvassed the other fourteen precincts in the county. How do they know that the books and the ballot boxes were the legal ones? They didn't see them returned; their clerk is not presumed to have any extraordinary powers of ascertaining what the returns are, for, if it is anybody's duty, it is solely the board's. It will be readily seen that, in some way, the board must first determine, at least presumptively, that they have the returns before they can proceed to canvass them. They growed out of their previous duties. They furnished the poll books; they furnished the ballot boxes; they appointed the judges of election, and, presumably, they recognize the results of their own handiwork. If they can say: 'This is the return from precinct 11,' because we presume the return has been made and we know the ballot box,' why not say: 'This is the return from precinct 11' because we presume the judges there have made the return, and we recognize the poll books as well as the ballot box?' The reply will be: 'For the reason that we must presume the return is made according to law, and in the latter case it has not been.'

However, this reply is not conclusive, for they know the poll books, they know the signatures of their appointed judges, and the question of being 'according to law' depends upon what the law is as to the legal method of returning votes or directory slips; if directory, then it

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1 inch	1.00	.75	.50	.25	.10	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
2 inch	2.00	1.50	1.00	.50	.20	.10	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
3 inch	3.00	2.25	1.50	.75	.30	.15	.07	.03	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
4 inch	4.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	.40	.20	.10	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
5 inch	5.00	3.75	2.50	1.25	.50	.25	.12	.06	.03	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
6 inch	6.00	4.50	3.00	1.50	.60	.30	.15	.07	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
7 inch	7.00	5.25	3.50	1.75	.70	.35	.17	.08	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
8 inch	8.00	6.00	4.00	2.00	.80	.40	.20	.10	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
9 inch	9.00	6.75	4.50	2.25	.90	.45	.22	.11	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
10 inch	10.00	7.50	5.00	2.50	1.00	.50	.25	.12	.06	.03	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
11 inch	11.00	8.25	5.50	2.75	1.10	.55	.27	.13	.06	.03	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
12 inch	12.00	9.00	6.00	3.00	1.20	.60	.30	.15	.07	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
13 inch	13.00	9.75	6.50	3.25	1.30	.65	.32	.16	.08	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
14 inch	14.00	10.50	7.00	3.50	1.40	.70	.35	.17	.09	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
15 inch	15.00	11.25	7.50	3.75	1.50	.75	.37	.18	.09	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
16 inch	16.00	12.00	8.00	4.00	1.60	.80	.40	.20	.10	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
17 inch	17.00	12.75	8.50	4.25	1.70	.85	.42	.21	.11	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
18 inch	18.00	13.50	9.00	4.50	1.80	.90	.45	.22	.12	.06	.03	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
19 inch	19.00	14.25	9.50	4.75	1.90	.95	.47	.23	.13	.06	.03	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
20 inch	20.00	15.00	10.00	5.00	2.00	1.00	.50	.25	.14	.07	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
21 inch	21.00	15.75	10.50	5.25	2.10	1.05	.52	.26	.15	.07	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
22 inch	22.00	16.50	11.00	5.50	2.20	1.10	.54	.27	.16	.08	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
23 inch	23.00	17.25	11.50	5.75	2.30	1.15	.56	.28	.17	.08	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
24 inch	24.00	18.00	12.00	6.00	2.40	1.20	.58	.29	.18	.09	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
25 inch	25.00	18.75	12.50	6.25	2.50	1.25	.60	.30	.19	.10	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
26 inch	26.00	19.50	13.00	6.50	2.60	1.30	.62	.31	.20	.11	.06	.03	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
27 inch	27.00	20.25	13.50	6.75	2.70	1.35	.64	.32	.21	.12	.06	.03	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
28 inch	28.00	21.00	14.00	7.00	2.80	1.40	.66	.33	.22	.13	.07	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
29 inch	29.00	21.75	14.50	7.25	2.90	1.45	.68	.34	.23	.14	.07	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
30 inch	30.00	22.50	15.00	7.50	3.00	1.50	.70	.35	.24	.15	.08	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
31 inch	31.00	23.25	15.50	7.75	3.10	1.55	.72	.36	.25	.16	.08	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
32 inch	32.00	24.00	16.00	8.00	3.20	1.60	.74	.37	.26	.17	.09	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
33 inch	33.00	24.75	16.50	8.25	3.30	1.65	.76	.38	.27	.18	.09	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
34 inch	34.00	25.50	17.00	8.50	3.40	1.70	.78	.39	.28	.19	.10	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
35 inch	35.00	26.25	17.50	8.75	3.50	1.75	.80	.40	.29	.20	.11	.06	.03	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
36 inch	36.00	27.00	18.00	9.00	3.60	1.80	.82	.41	.30	.21	.12	.06	.03	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
37 inch	37.00	27.75	18.50	9.25	3.70	1.85	.84	.42	.31	.22	.13	.07	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
38 inch	38.00	28.50	19.00	9.50	3.80	1.90	.86	.43	.32	.23	.14	.07	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
39 inch	39.00	29.25	19.50	9.75	3.90	1.95	.88	.44	.33	.24	.15	.08	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
40 inch	40.00	30.00	20.00	10.00	4.00	2.00	.90	.45	.34	.25	.16	.08	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
41 inch	41.00	30.75	20.50	10.25	4.10	2.05	.92	.46	.35	.26	.17	.09	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
42 inch	42.00	31.50	21.00	10.50	4.20	2.10	.94	.47	.36	.27	.18	.09	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
43 inch	43.00	32.25	21.50	10.75	4.30	2.15	.96	.48	.37	.28	.19	.10	.06	.03	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
44 inch	44.00	33.00	22.00	11.00	4.40	2.20	.98	.49	.38	.29	.20	.11	.06	.03	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
45 inch	45.00	33.75	22.50	11.25	4.50	2.25	1.00	.50	.39	.30	.21	.12	.07	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
46 inch	46.00	34.50	23.00	11.50	4.60	2.30	1.02	.51	.40	.31	.22	.13	.07	.04	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
47 inch	47.00	35.25	23.50	11.75	4.70	2.35	1.04	.52	.41	.32	.23	.14	.08	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
48 inch	48.00	36.00	24.00	12.00	4.80	2.40	1.06	.53	.42	.33	.24	.15	.08	.05	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
49 inch	49.00	36.75	24.50	12.25	4.90	2.45	1.08	.54	.43	.34	.25	.16	.09	.06	.03	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	
50 inch	50.00	37.50	25.00	12.50	5.00	2.50	1.10	.55	.44	.35	.26	.17	.10	.06	.03	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	

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OPEN DAY OR NIGHT

METEOROLOGICAL.
OFFICE OF OBSERVER,
Santa Fe, N. M., November 18, 1900.

TIME OF DAY	TEMPERATURE	WIND	RELATIVE HUMIDITY	STATE OF SKY	PRECIPITATION
6 A. M.	56.0	W. 10	75	Cloudy	0.00
9 A. M.	58.0	W. 10	75	Cloudy	0.00
12 M.	60.0	W. 10	75	Cloudy	0.00
3 P. M.	62.0	W. 10	75	Cloudy	0.00
6 P. M.	60.0	W. 10	75	Cloudy	0.00
9 P. M.	58.0	W. 10	75	Cloudy	0.00
12 M.	56.0	W. 10	75	Cloudy	0.00
3 A. M.	54.0	W. 10	75	Cloudy	0.00
6 A. M.	52.0	W. 10	75	Cloudy	0.00

W. L. WOODRUFF, observer, special correspondence.

Atlantic & Pacific RAILROAD.
Western Division.

TIME TABLE NO. 29.

WESTWARD		STATIONS		EASTWARD	
No. 3, No. 1.				No. 2, No. 4.	
7:20	7:00	Albuquerque	At	11:15	8:20
12:30	12:10	Los Alamos	At	7:00	8:00
12:40	12:52	Wingate	At	7:05	9:45
7:50	1:05	Holbrook	At	7:10	9:45
8:50	2:45	Navajo Spring	At	7:15	9:45
11:22	4:47	Brookbrook	At	7:20	6:50
12:55	5:20	Winslow	At	7:25	6:50
1:35	6:40	Flagstaff	At	7:30	6:50
8:00	1:10	Williams	At	7:35	7:20
9:50	2:50	Prescott Junction	At	7:40	8:40
10:00	3:00	French Springs	At	7:45	8:40
10:10	3:10	Chino	At	7:50	8:40
11:10	6:40	The Needles	At	12:20	1:35
4:11	8:25	Fenner	At	10:42	4:27
9:25	1:53	Page	At	7:55	8:40
9:45	2:40	Kingman	At	8:00	8:40
	4:40	Las Vegas	At	8:05	8:40