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## Criminal Law—Sexual Offenses—Sodomy—Cunnilingus *State v. Putnam*, 78 N.M. 552, 434 P.2d 77 (1968)

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## Criminal Law—Sexual Offenses—Sodomy— Cunnilingus\*

At common law sodomy was punishable by death.<sup>1</sup> The offense of sodomy, however, was much more circumscribed at common law than it is today under statutory definitions and judicial interpretations. Most of the writers and cases agree that the common law definition of sodomy included only acts constituting copulation per anum and copulation between humans and animals.<sup>2</sup>

A majority of courts have broadly construed statutes prohibiting sodomy and have thus spread the statutory net to include as many acts of deviant sexual behavior as possible.<sup>3</sup> Generally, sodomy statutes have been, and are, anomalously vague and indefinite<sup>4</sup> as have been the indictments charging persons with sodomy.<sup>5</sup> Many appellate opinions construing statutes proscribing sodomy have likewise been vague, perhaps in an effort to be delicate in pursuit of judicial etiquette.<sup>6</sup>

A wide gap exists between present laws proscribing "sodomy" and the state of psychological knowledge of sexual practices as well as public opinion regarding sex.<sup>7</sup> The sexual revolution<sup>8</sup> has been said to be "the most far-reaching, the most deep-going of all . . . the revolutions sweeping the world today."<sup>9</sup> Largely as a result of prodding by Kinsey,<sup>10</sup> law review writers,<sup>11</sup> and quasi-official investigative bodies,<sup>12</sup> legislatures are gradually undertaking the indelicate

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\* *State v. Putman*, 78 N.M. 552, 434 P.2d 77 (1968).

1. *Bennett v. Abram*, 57 N.M. 28, 30, 253 P.2d 316, 317 (1953); Spence, *The Law of Crime Against Nature*, 32 N.C. L. Rev. 312, 313 (1954); § 1 C.J.S. *Sodomy* (1953).

2. *Bennett v. Abram*, 57 N.M. at 29, 253 P.2d at 316; Spence, *supra* note 1, at 314.

3. Note, *The Crimes Against Nature*, 16 J. Pub. L. 159, 163 (1967) (hereinafter cited *Public Law Note*); Cantor, *Deviation and the Criminal Law*, 55 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 441, 445 (1964) (hereinafter cited *Cantor*).

4. *Public Law Note* at 179; Comment, *Deviate Sexual Behavior: The Desirability of Legislative Proscription*, 30 Alb. L. Rev. 291, 299 (1966).

5. 48 Am. Jur. *Sodomy* § 4 (1943).

6. Comment, *Deviate Sexual Behavior*, *supra* note 4, at 299.

7. See Slovenko, *Sex Mores and the Enforcement of the Law on Sex Crimes: A Study of the Status Quo*, 15 Kan. L. Rev. 265 (1967).

8. See generally Lipton, *The Erotic Revolution* (1965).

9. *Id.* at xiii.

10. Kinsey, Pomeroy & Martin, *Sexual Behavior In The Human Male* (1943); and Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin & Gebhard, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female* (1953).

11. A casual inspection of the Index of Legal Periodicals under "Sex Offenses" will confirm this assertion.

12. *The Wolfenden Report: Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution* (Stein & Day 1963), first published in 1957 in England; Model Penal Code § 207.5 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).

task of analyzing, evaluating and sometimes revising their statutes prohibiting sodomy and related sexual offenses. New York and Illinois are the most notable examples of states that have tried to reform such statutes.<sup>13</sup> Ten years after the famous Wolfenden Report,<sup>14</sup> England has finally passed a Sexual Offenses Bill<sup>15</sup> which includes reformed provisions regarding male homosexual activity. This recent concern of state legislatures and Parliament with reforming sodomy laws reflects an attempt to "close the gap." It is time the New Mexico Legislature and New Mexico courts considered the arguments espoused by the reform advocates.

*State v. Putman*<sup>16</sup> can be taken as a specific frame of reference. In that case, the defendant was accused of sodomy in an information supplemented by a bill of particulars. Sodomy is defined as a crime in § 40A-9-6, *N.M. Stat. Ann.* (Repl. 1964) :

Sodomy consists of a person intentionally taking into his or her mouth or anus the sexual organ of any other person or animal, or intentionally placing his or her sexual organ in the mouth or anus of any other person or animal, or coitus with an animal. Any penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime of sodomy. Both parties may be principals.

Whoever commits sodomy is guilty of a third degree felony.

The statutory punishment for a third degree felony is not less than two years nor more than ten years imprisonment or a fine of not more than \$5,000 or both imprisonment and fine in the judge's discretion.<sup>17</sup>

The information in *Putman* charges "that said defendant did take into his mouth the sexual organ of another person. . . ." And the bill of particulars states: "[T]he manner in which the defendant committed the act of sodomy upon her is that he placed his tongue within her vagina." Technically, therefore, the defendant was accused of acts constituting cunnilingus. "Cunnilingus" is defined as "sexual activity in which the mouth and tongue are used to stimulate the female genitals."<sup>18</sup>

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13. *Ill. Rev. Stat.* ch. 38 §§ 11-2, 11-3, 11-4 (1963); *N.Y. Penal Law* § 690.

14. *Supra* note 12.

15. This bill was recently approved by the House of Commons on July 4, 1967. For its "primary sections," see Public Law Note at 189.

16. 78 N.M. 552, 434 P.2d 77 (1968).

17. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-29-3 (Repl. 1964).

18. 6 *Encyclopedia Of Mental Health* 2115 (Deutsch ed. 1963). See also *Black's Law Dictionary* 456 (4th ed. 1957). Cunnilingus may be, but does not have to be,

The defendant moved to quash the information on the ground that the acts alleged did not constitute the offense of sodomy. The trial court, considering only the acts alleged in the bill of particulars, sustained defendant's motion to quash. According to the Court of Appeals, the trial court did not consider the general allegation, following the statutory language, in the information. On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals, *held*, the quashing order reversed and the case remanded with instructions to reinstate the charge. Judge Spiess concurred in part and dissented in part. The appellate court limited its brief opinion to one issue: "whether the acts alleged constitute the offense of sodomy." The acts to be considered, however, were decided to be those acts alleged in *both* the bill of particulars and the information.<sup>19</sup>

The Court of Appeals in three short paragraphs held that acts constituting cunnilingus also constitute sodomy as defined in § 40A-9-6.

Our statute applies to acts per os as well as acts per anum. Compare *Bennett v. Abram*, 57 N.M. 28, 253 P.2d 316 (1953), which was decided before our statutory definition was enacted.

Our act defines sodomy to including a taking into the mouth "the sexual organ of any other person." The statute is not limited to the sexual organ of the male. "Any other person" includes male and female. Compare *Connell v. State*, 215 Ind. 318, 19 N.E.2d 267 (1939).

Reading the information and the bill of particulars together, defendant is accused of acts constituting the offense of sodomy.<sup>20</sup>

*Bennett v. Abram*<sup>21</sup> has been cited as an example of that admir-

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homosexual. "Homosexual" means "[D]irected toward a person of the same sex." Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 626 (23 ed. 1957).

19. The problem of whether a bill of particulars supplements an information is so broad that another comment could be written on it. See generally 27 Am. Jur. *Indictments and Informations* § 112 (1940).

20. The court by ignoring the allegations in the bill of particulars refuses to discuss particular physical acts. All members of the court seem to agree that some form or forms of cunnilingus are prohibited by § 40A-9-6. See text accompanying footnote 26, *infra*. Apparently, the court would not deem proof of penetration by the tongue necessary or sufficient, but instead require proof that defendant took into his mouth some tissue of the female organ. Query: Could the breast be held to be "the sexual organ" of a person, especially if it were functioning as a sexual instrument at the time? Compare the opposite approach of the military courts in ACM 7434, Brown, 13 CMR 731 (1953). Such distinctions as those suggested above combined with the generality of informations and indictments in cases like *Putman* illustrate the unfairness perpetrated by courts otherwise zealous to protect an accused's rights.

21. 57 N.M. 28, 253 P.2d 316 (1953).

able minority of cases in which courts have construed sodomy statutes strictly and narrowly.<sup>22</sup> This position of New Mexico has been undermined by *State v. Putman*. *Bennett* held that at common law and under a statute which did not define the crime but only specified a penalty for it, copulation *per os* between male persons did not constitute sodomy. Justice Compton, writing for the court in *Bennett*, concluded his opinion by morally censuring<sup>23</sup> fellatio<sup>24</sup> and recommending that the New Mexico Legislature enact a sodomy statute like the one now in effect. A conclusion, however, that § 40A-9-6 proscribes fellatio, as Justice Compton obviously sought, is far from concluding that it also proscribes cunnilingus. It is submitted that "taking into his or her mouth . . . the sex organ of any other person" does not include the female sex organ because of physical impossibility.

The broad construction of § 40A-9-6 by the Court of Appeals in *Putman* was a foreseeable result of the reluctance to discuss particular physical acts. A contrary construction, however, would have been more reasonable and consistent with general principles of statutory construction. The unquestioned principle which the majority did not follow is that penal statutes must be strictly construed.<sup>25</sup> Judge Spiess, who dissented in part in *Putman*, seemingly would have preferred construing § 40A-9-6 as excluding cunnilingus if it involved nothing more than penetration by the tongue:

As I read the language of the statute, § 40A-9-6, *supra*, together with the acts specified in the bill of particulars it appears obvious to me that if the defendant did commit the act so specified the crime of sodomy as the same is defined by the statute was not committed.<sup>26</sup>

The majority cited *Connell v. State*<sup>27</sup> as a comparison for its decision that the statutory words, "the sexual organ of any other person," means both female and male sexual organs. The *Connell*

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22. Public Law Note at 163.

23. 57 N.M. at 30, 253 P.2d at 317:

While the acts admittedly committed are even more sensual and filthy than the offense charged, baser than the practices of pagans, we cannot extend the crime of sodomy so as to include acts called felatio. [sic]

24. "Fellatio" is defined: "The act of taking the penis into the mouth." Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 498 (23 ed. 1957).

25. Public Law Note at 169; *See* Anderson, 1 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 19 (1957).

26. 78 N.M. at 553, 434 P.2d at 78 (1968).

27. 216 Ind. 318, 19 N.E.2d 267 (1939).

opinion abounds with moral censure<sup>28</sup> indicating the court's attitude. The statute before the court in *Connell* was not even similar to § 40A-9-6, but instead was worded in vague language as follows: "Whoever commits the abominable crime against nature with mankind or beast. . . ."<sup>29</sup> *Connell* held that the above statute proscribed cunnilingus. Courts have not uniformly held that even a statute like that in *Connell* proscribes cunnilingus.<sup>30</sup> It suffices to say that the *Connell* court engaged in broad statutory construction and was not confronted with particular statutory language such as that confronting the *Putman* court.

All fifty states<sup>31</sup> and the District of Columbia<sup>32</sup> have statutes making sodomy a crime. Most of these statutes are vaguely worded and many are heavy with moral censure. The sodomy statute of the District of Columbia<sup>33</sup> alone is worded exactly like that of New Mexico. The District of Columbia statute has not been construed to prohibit cunnilingus; the appellate courts in the District of Columbia have not yet ruled on the question. No other state has a sodomy statute worded as specifically as that of New Mexico and the District of Columbia. None of the others are even similar. We thus have no previous judicial interpretations in point to look to for aid.

The court should note, however, *State v. Forquer*,<sup>34</sup> a decision rare like *Bennett* because the court strictly construed a sodomy statute.<sup>35</sup> The Ohio statute construed in *Forquer* reads as follows:

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No person shall have carnal copulation with a beast, or in any

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28. For example:

The indictment is in the language of the statute and charges the crime as therein defined. Sodomy is a crime the meaning of which is well known, and, as many courts have stated, its nature is too disgusting to be further defined. 215 Ind. at 319-21, 19 N.E. 2d at 267.

29. 215 Ind. at 320, 19 N.E. 2d at 268.

30. Spence, *supra* note 1; Public Law Note.

31. See Cantor, at 453 for a collection of citations to the sodomy statutes of the fifty states as of 1964. The following changes should be noted:

*Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.* §§ 13-651, 13-652 (1956), as amended, Laws 1965, ch. 20 § 1 (Supp. 1967).

*Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.* tit. 17, ch. 41, § 1001 (1964).

*Minn. Stat. Ann.* § 617, 14 (1964) amended by 1967 Regular Session Laws ch. 507.

*W. Va. Code Ann.* § 61-8-13 (1966).

32. *D.C. Code Ann.* § 22-3502 (1967).

33. *Id.*

34. 74 Ohio App. 293, 58 N.E.2d 696 (1944).

35. *Ohio Rev. Code Ann.* § 2905.44 (Baldwin 1958). This statute, among others, is criticized in Note, Sex Laws in Ohio: A Need for Revision, 35 Cinn. L. Rev. 211 (1966).

opening of the body, except sexual parts, with another human being.

Whoever violates this section is guilty of sodomy and shall be imprisoned not less than one nor more than twenty years.<sup>36</sup>

The court in *Forquer* held that cunnilingus was not a crime in Ohio. The act had been perpetrated on a girl only nine years old, yet the court had the presence of mind to say:

The statute being criminal, must be construed strictly according to its clear import and not because of the disgusting and infamous nature of the act, as it may be thought it should be.<sup>37</sup>

The approach taken by the *Forquer* court is admittedly and unfortunately the exception. But why do courts and legislatures alike depart from orthodox principles when legislating a sodomy statute or when considering a case brought under one?<sup>38</sup> The reasons will not be found in the cases, but they may be in psychological theory which will be briefly explored.

Perhaps part of the reason lies in the sound of the word "sodomy" itself. Like "usury,"<sup>39</sup> or "adultery," "sodomy" is a harsh and uninviting word immediately connoting evil to most of us, and also connoting something that should be suppressed without need of rational argument.

The vehemence of the moralistic condemnation of deviant sex practices expressed in statutes and judicial opinions<sup>40</sup> belies another underlying unconscious reason for their seeming irrationality. In the field of abnormal psychology, there is recognized an ego defense mechanism called "reaction formation."<sup>41</sup> Reaction formation is an extension of repression by which a person protects himself from his dangerous desires. It is characterized by "its extreme intolerance, which is out of all proportion to the importance of the situation."<sup>42</sup>

The individual may think or act in ways which are directly con-

36. *Ohio Rev. Code Ann.* § 2905.44 (Baldwin 1958).

37. 74 Ohio App. at 293, 58 N.E.2d at 696.

38. Cantor at 446.

39. Jeremy Bentham thought that the moral stigma and legal prohibition attached to usury might be due largely to the sound of the word. Bentham, *Defence of Usury* (1787), found in I. Stark, *Jeremy Bentham's Economic Writings* 130 (1952).

40. Cantor at 446. A glance through the annotations to the various state sodomy statutes will show the correctness of this statement.

41. Coleman, *Abnormal Psychology and Modern Life* (3 ed. 1964) (hereinafter cited Coleman).

42. Coleman at 100.

tradictory to his dangerous thoughts or impulses. For example, . . . he may defend himself from underlying homosexual desires by developing a strong attitude of condemnation toward such behavior.<sup>43</sup>

And, of course, practically all of us are familiar with Freud's popularized notion that we all share latent tendencies toward homosexuality.

The idea that we punish people for doing what we would like to do is far from new. Professor Weihofen<sup>44</sup> has stated the idea in this way:

There is also likely to be an unconscious motivation at work on those who punish the sex offender. Ironically, while the sexual impulse is often less strong in the sex offender than we suppose, it is often much stronger in the rest of us.

The urge to punish sex offenders is strong because we know how strong the sexual impulse is in ourselves; consciously or unconsciously we fear that we might do what the sex offender has done. This disturbing thought we exorcise by publicly repudiating the wicked wretch and piously calling for his punishment.<sup>45</sup>

It may benefit all of us, including judges and legislators, to keep the above comments in mind before we morally castigate someone for deviant sex conduct.

The following arguments have been presented against overly broad sexual offense statutes, including sodomy statutes, and should be considered when legislating, construing or brief-writing.<sup>46</sup>

(1) Such statutes lack justification. They are an invasion into an area of the utmost private morality and should be left to individual choice untrammelled by legal sanctions. Sexual conduct presently proscribed should not be illegal as between consenting adults in private. As between them, no harm is done to others by the conduct itself; the harm to society, if any, is insufficient to counterbalance the harm done by depriving individual freedom.<sup>47</sup>

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43. *Id.* at 223.

44. Professor of Law at the University of New Mexico Law School.

45. Weihofen, *The Urge to Punish* 28 (1957); *see also* Cantor at 453.

46. An attempt has been made to collate these arguments and present them in abbreviated form. Naturally, they are given short shrift in such a small space. The arguments have, of course, been modified by this writer's viewpoints and limitations. Full development must be sought elsewhere.

47. *See* Comment, *Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality*, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 581 (1967) (hereinafter



(2) Sexual offense statutes generally, and sodomy statutes in particular, are "almost impossible to enforce"<sup>48</sup> and, when enforced, are done so arbitrarily. In addition, they promote blackmail and the use of criminal law for private purposes and desires.<sup>49</sup>

(3) Statutes regulating sexual conduct between consenting adults in private are unconstitutional. They invade the right of privacy which is a right unspecified in the federal constitution but "within the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights."<sup>50</sup>

Even a lax reading of *Griswold v. Connecticut*<sup>51</sup> will confirm that the opinion of the court, delivered by Justice Douglas, is limited to the right of marital privacy. Likewise, the concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, boldly indicated that non-marital privacy would not be constitutionally protected.<sup>52</sup> Justice White's concurring opinion also gives little support to a right of non-marital privacy in sexual practices.<sup>53</sup> Nowhere, however, did the members of the Supreme Court explain their reasons for this limitation unless it be said that the

cited U.C.L.A. Comment); Comment, Deviate Sexual Behavior; The Desirability of Legislative Proscription, 30 Alb. L. Rev. 291 (1966); Note, Sex Laws in Ohio: A Need for Revision, 35 Cinn. L. Rev. 211 (1966); and Cantor. *Compare* Cutler, Sexual Offenses—Legal and Moral Considerations, 9 Catholic Law. 94 (1963) and Cavanagh, Sexual Anomalies and the Law, 9 Catholic Law. 4 (1963). *See also* Graham Hughes, Consent in Sexual Offences, 25 Mod. L. Rev. 672 (1962); and Donnelly, Goldstein, and Schwartz, Criminal Law 123 (1962).

48. Weihofen, The Proposed New Mexico Criminal Code, 1 Natural Resources J. 125, 140 (1961).

49. *Id.*; Public Law Note; and Note, Deviate Sexual Behavior Under the New Illinois Criminal Code, 1965 Wash. L. Q. 220 (1965).

The unenforceability of these criminal statutes and the persistence of people in violating them even though exposing themselves to blackmail and social opprobrium illustrate the similarity between sodomy statutes and other statutes prohibiting symptoms of a status, e.g., alcoholism and drug addiction. It has been suggested that punishing the confirmed homosexual for engaging in acts symptomatic of homosexuality is analogous to punishing the chronic alcoholic for engaging in acts "compulsive as symptomatic of the disease" of chronic alcoholism. Punishing the chronic alcoholic for public drunkenness has been held to be "cruel and unusual punishment" under the eighth amendment as applied to the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. *Driver v. Hinnant*, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966); *Easter v. District of Columbia*, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); *contra Powell v. Texas*, 36 L.W. 3126, No. 405, probable jurisdiction noted at 3142. *See also Robinson v. California*, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Even admitting that homosexuality is a mental illness and that the condition of homosexuality is involuntary, engaging in sodomous acts characteristic of homosexuality is not necessarily so compulsive to a homosexual as to come under the *Driver* doctrine.

50. *Griswold v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), court's headnote 1.

51. *Id.*

52. *See* 381 U.S. at 498-99.

53. *See* 381 U.S. at 505-06.

long-standing policies encouraging marriage and discouraging pre-marital and extra-marital relations are sufficient reasons. Apparently, the Court would agree that acts deemed immoral by legislators, even though not harmful to others, may be made criminal on the theory that such acts harm society in general and that the state may protect the individual from himself.<sup>54</sup>

(4) Arguably, the statutes prohibiting sodomy and related acts violate the establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment.<sup>55</sup> "Neither [a state nor the federal government] can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."<sup>56</sup>

Perhaps religion is not and has not been the sole source of morality as we know it, but certainly it has been and continues to be one of the most active of such sources. When a particular law is challenged, if the Judaeo-Christian religions could be found to be both the exclusive source of, and coincident with, the morality enforced by that law, then the state should be required to examine and show what interests are sought to be furthered. If it is only a religious interest, *e.g.*, in people being moral and not "sinning", the particular law should be held to violate the First Amendment.<sup>57</sup> For example, would we not require the state to show a secular interest in passing a law prohibiting the eating of pork?

### *Recommendations*

(1) Sodomy statutes should be construed strictly and narrowly according to accepted principles of statutory construction. In case of doubt as to the scope of such statutes, a particular offense alleged should be held to be outside the statutory coverage. Cunnilingus would thus be held to be outside the prohibition of § 40A-9-6, contrary to *State v. Putman*.

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54. Compare Devlin, *The Enforcement of Morals* (1965) with H. L. A. Hart, *Law, Liberty and Morals* (1963) with Dworkin, *Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals*, 75 *Yale L.J.* 986 (1966) with U.C.L.A. Comment.

For the application of *Griswold v. Connecticut* to sex crimes, see U.C.L.A. Comment at 602 and Public Law Note. See also Recent Case, *Constitutional Law—Right To Marital Privacy—Anti-Contraceptive Statute Held Unconstitutional*, 35 *Cinn. L. Rev.* 134 (1966); and Note, *Sex Laws in Ohio: A Need for Revision*, 35 *Cinn. L. Rev.* 211 (1966) at 227.

55. See U.C.L.A. Comment at 600; and Comment, *Deviate Sexual Behavior: The Desirability of Legislative Proscription*, 30 *Alb. L. Rev.* 291, 293-4 (1966).

56. *Everson v. Board of Educ.*, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1946) quoted in U.C.L.A. Comment at 600.

57. See *McGowan v. Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).

(2) New Mexico should revise its present sodomy statute, § 40A-9-6, to accord with the views of the reform advocates as expressed above. As a beginning, such a statute might read:

#### DEVIATE SEXUAL PRACTICES.

A. It shall be a crime to engage in acts defined herein as (1) sodomy per anum, (2) fellatio, (3) cunnilingus, and (4) buggery if, but only if, one of the following two conditions is satisfied:

1. any one of the enumerated acts is performed in public, including restrooms open to the general public, in the presence of others who should be expected to be offended by such acts. Persons who attend places of amusement and entertainment whether public or private for the purpose of viewing such acts are presumed not to be offended by them.<sup>58</sup> All other persons are presumed to be offended by such acts. This latter presumption is rebuttable;
2. any one of the enumerated acts is performed without the legal consent of one of the participants either because of force, duress, alcohol, drugs, mental incompetency, or nonage. For the purposes of this statute a person is underage if he or she is not sixteen [16] years of age or older,<sup>59</sup> and the accused has actual knowledge of this fact or should know the participant is underage.<sup>60</sup>

B. For the purpose of this act, the following definitions shall control:

1. "sodomy per anum" is the insertion or taking into the anus, of the male sexual organ, the penis. Any penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime of sodomy per anum;
2. "fellatio" is the insertion, or taking into the mouth, of the penis. Any penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime of fellatio;
3. "cunnilingus" is the manipulation of the female sexual organ, the vagina, or portions thereof, by the mouth and tongue. Both parties may be principals. No penetration is required;
4. "buggery" is sexual intercourse including the three acts defined above between a human being and an animal, *i.e.*, a fowl or mammal of another species.

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58. See U.C.L.A. Comment, at 589. Adequate notice by the proprietors would be one of the main factors in proving the purpose referred to in the statute. This provision would probably be held constitutional. See *Redrup v. New York*, — U.S. —, 87 Sup. Ct. 1414 (1967).

59. Sixteen is an arbitrary age but is consistent with the age for statutory rape. *N.M. Stat. Ann.* § 40A-9-3 (Repl. 1964).

60. Compare the revised statutes of Illinois, New York, and England cited *supra*, notes 13 and 15.

*Conclusion*

We must face a value judgment: How necessary is the creation and protection of a uniform morality to the well-being and existence of society? Shall we punish individuals for its breach even though no other person, capable of giving a reasoned consent, has been harmed? Past attempts at such punishment have been futile and possibly even harmful, in creating disrespect for the law and law-makers. We should carve this limited area of morality from the criminal law and leave its promulgation and enforcement to parents, religious institutions, social pressures toward conformity, and the individual's pride in and concern with himself as a person. Our repression of nonconformity and dissent reflects our insecurity as persons and as a society.

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