Salt of the Earth and Free Expression: The Mine-Mill Union and the Movies in the Rocky Mountain West

James J. Lorence
THE KEY FIGURES IN THE INDEPENDENT PRODUCTIONS CORPORATION ON LOCATION DURING FILMING OF SALT OF THE EARTH, 1953.

Extreme left, Paul Jarrico; center in front of rooftop camera, Herbert Biberman; lower right, Michael Wilson. (Collections of the Wisconsin Center for Film and Theater Research.)
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IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN WEST

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In Grant County, New Mexico, a lonely corner of a forgotten place, events of the 1950s dramatized the anticommunist hysteria of the early postwar era. In 1950 the Bayard, New Mexico, Local 890 of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers (Mine-Mill) struck against the Empire Zinc Corporation over economic, social, and safety issues. In this small worker community far from the modern industrial city, the union took steps to influence the definition of community and the pattern of gender relations in ways that would alter the social structure and challenge the distribution of power in the emergent corporate state. The union also wrote the first page in a story that ended in a sharp challenge to the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

Salt of the Earth (1954), the strikingly modern film based on the Empire Zinc strike, stands as a celluloid document of struggle on the part of courageous men and women who questioned prevailing gender and racial rela-

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tions and who built better lives for themselves and their families through the medium of socially conscious unionism. The suppression of both the motion picture that depicted the Empire Zinc strike and the left-led union that cosponsored the film reveals the intense fear generated by postwar anticom­munism and the dark side of the social settlement that by the 1950s had locked business unionists and corporate hegemons in a grim embrace.

Although scholars have investigated the story of the film's production, they have paid less attention to the comprehensive boycott against the movie. This essay explores how industry figures, patriotic organizations, and conservatives in the mainstream labor movement conspired to prevent *Salt* from achieving commercial success. This study also documents the crucial role of Mine-Mill and other sympathetic unions in promoting the film's distribution in the Rocky Mountain West.

With a focus on the film's reception in Denver and the West, it is possible to demonstrate that director Herbert Biberman, screenwriter Michael Wilson, and producer Paul Jarrico used union linkages as part of their marketing strategy. Moreover, by focusing on the conflict between the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE) and the industrial unions, this study reveals the damaging influence of militant anticommunism on a labor movement already divided by conflict between left-wing and main­stream unionists. IATSE's open warfare against the film demonstrates the complex interunion politics that constituted a serious obstacle to worker solidarity behind one of the strongest prounion films ever made.

Republican congressman Donald Jackson of California drew the outlines for the confrontation over *Salt of the Earth* in 1953. He alerted movie industry and West Coast labor leaders to the production of *Salt of the Earth* while it was under way in the New Mexico desert. Jackson denounced the work of Biberman, Wilson, Jarrico, and other blacklisted artists. Their Independent Productions Corporation (IPC), allegedly infested with communists, was producing a film that would aid the Soviet Union by damaging the image of the United States in Latin America. Jackson urged Hollywood leaders and unionists to take steps to prevent the completion and marketing of the film.

Jackson's attack struck a responsive chord with IATSE international representative Roy Brewer, a veteran of the 1945–1946 studio strikes and a staunch anticommunist. By 1954 Brewer had become a key figure in the Hollywood movie colony through his involvement in the Motion Picture Alliance for the Preservation of American Ideals (MPA), the Motion Picture Industry Council (MPIC), and the American Federation of Labor (AFL)
Film Council. Alarmed by Jackson's allegations, Brewer worked to align his union against the film. As a result, by 1954 director Biberman and producer Jarrico faced an IATSE boycott in New York, where union technicians refused to participate in the final processing of the film. IATSE had "passed the word" to its locals that "no one was to work on [the film]," which persuaded Biberman that a "knock down and drag out fight" was in the offing.2

To counter negative publicity, Biberman and the IPC followed a dual-track strategy. The union held New York previews for labor groups and progressive audiences while negotiating bookings at first-run theaters. The response from both left-wing and mainstream labor groups encouraged the IPC. At a special Carnegie Little Theater preview for three hundred representatives of twenty New York unions, audiences broke out in "spontaneous applause," which Mine-Mill president John Clark termed "stupendous." Clark reported that many unionists committed themselves "to support the showing of this picture so it will be seen all over the country." Stressing Salt's realism, Clark told Mine-Mill members that once they saw the film, they would immediately "understand the impact of this picture" as well as the "fight of reaction to bar its showing."3

While Mine-Mill progressives and mainstream unionists momentarily edged towards rapprochement, internal disagreement surfaced within IATSE over the contradiction of a labor union boycott of a prolabor film. On 17 February 1954 Biberman privately expressed optimism about the IATSE situation, which, he was convinced, had been handled well. As a result of IPC's careful diplomacy, Biberman thought it likely that any precipitous action by President Richard Walsh of the IATSE would divert antilabor sentiment towards his organization. Moreover, Variety reported that many representatives in the movie industry expressed reservations about any action that focused on the film's content. Such action, they feared, would constitute "a worrisome precedent." Based on these reported fears of censorship, Biberman speculated that IATSE might simply "ease itself out of the leading position here and try to have the good old reliable American Legion," one of the nation's most outspoken anticommunist groups, lead the fight against Salt.4

Walsh and IATSE were also increasingly concerned about the publicity and costs associated with a high-profile lawsuit. Biberman observed that IATSE leaders "know they have to tread on eggs . . . and are doing so." On 22 February, anticommunist labor columnist Victor Riesel reported a shift in IATSE's official position: the union decided to permit its projectionists to run the film for preview performances. Denouncing Mine-Mill as "notorious,"
Riesel defended Walsh’s reasoning, which justified projecting the film to avoid the greater danger of “labor censorship over a means of communication and expression.”

Despite the ongoing conflict with IATSE, Biberman and the IPC premiered the film in New York without serious incident. Walsh’s decision to authorize a union projectionist eased the tension and persuaded Biberman and Jarrico that they had won the battle over the showing of Salt. Before long, however, their failure to crack the midwestern market would demonstrate that “victory” was illusory. Political reality soon set in when an American Legion–IATSE campaign of suppression resulted in a complete blackout of the film in Detroit and Chicago markets. IPC’s failure was especially ominous in view of the Midwest’s strong union base. In a later retrospective, Biberman noted that when those two engagements were “summarily broken,” he knew IPC and Salt “were through” in midwestern markets and that only a “miracle” could reverse the “heavy, heavy damage that had been inflicted.”

By summer of 1954, Biberman was in no position to produce a miracle.

While Biberman fought a losing battle in the Midwest, the West at first glance promised a more sympathetic field of reception for the Salt story and its cinematic recreation. Not only was the subject of the film rooted in the western economic and social experience, but the Rocky Mountain West was also the home base of the militant Mine-Mill union. If the film failed in Mine-Mill country, its prospects elsewhere were dim indeed.

For months Mine-Mill’s international officers had prepared to make Salt of the Earth an organizing tool, especially in the Rocky Mountain area. A key dimension of the union’s plan was to use its annual wage policy conference in Denver to showcase the film and energize Mine-Mill locals to promote wider exhibition. Biberman recommended that Mine-Mill secretary Maurice Travis acquaint the conference delegates with the film and the union’s success in New York. He told the Mine-Mill officers that the film would go first to those communities that had organized well. By all union accounts, the conference screening was an unqualified success. The delegates responded to the preview with a resolution that embraced the film and praised its producers, screenwriter, director, actors, and technicians for a “wonderful job.” On 6 April 1954 John Clark informed Biberman that the conferees had gone on record in favor of an “all out fight for public showing in all Mine-Mill local areas.” Salt’s “best promoters,” Clark reported, would be the rank-and-file delegates, who had been “tremendously moved by the
film.” Publicity man Morris Wright characterized the screening as the “high point” of the entire conference.7

After consulting with screenwriter Michael Wilson, Travis and the Mine-Mill leadership moved quickly to implement the conference resolution. Recalling the “warmth” and “great pride” that the conference presentation stimulated, Travis informed local unions of the obstacles that the IPC had overcome in New York. He pilloried industry executives and corporate leadership for the “contemptible” methods they used to prevent production and distribution of Salt. To bring these events closer to home, Travis noted that six Denver theaters, capitulating to industry executives and corporate leaders, had refused to screen the picture for the Mine-Mill conference. And he acknowledged that “every enemy” of the union movement would continue to fight to silence “this dramatic and effective weapon of organized labor.”8

In words that echoed Biberman’s 25 March letter, Travis warned that only through diligent organization could Mine-Mill ensure that the film was shown to a wider audience. He urged union locals to secure theaters and organize a “guaranteed audience.” Never underestimating the resistance the union faced, he exhorted members to use their cinematic weapon to promote the “message of democracy and unionism.” Simply stated, Travis said, “the picture is Mine-Mill and everything we stand for.”9

The union’s experience promoting the film in Denver, home of Mine-Mill, was characteristic of the struggle unionists faced in the West. From the beginning of his search for a theater, Wright encountered obstacles. The owner of the World Theater backed out of his agreement to preview the movie for the conference after he was warned that screening Salt would put him out of business. The theater owner feared red-baiting in the press, whispering campaigns, and problems with distributors. Another reluctant exhibitor told Wright that an IATSE operator had objected to running the film on instructions from his business agent. The manager of the Cameron Theater, Walter McKinney, also feared complications with IATSE. However, a telephone call from a Denver AFL official, who appealed to him on the basis of free expression, moved McKinney to relent at the last minute. The Denver conference showing went ahead.10

Encouraged by the successful screening, McKinney next consented to a commercial run starting in May, but he soon reversed himself under renewed pressure from IATSE business agent Charles Webber. If McKinney showed the film, Webber warned, there would be red-baiting in the press. Webber also promised to enforce union rules to obstruct weekend showings
at the Cameron. A citywide union committee that supported the film promised heavy attendance to counter the pressure. McKinney next consulted the Denver Post concerning its editorial position on the film. Although the Post respected freedom of expression, the editors informed him that any proceeds paid to IPC would “go to the Communist Party” and be used to “aid the enemies of our country in their effort to destroy us.” Under such “heavy pressure,” McKinney canceled showings at his theater and in mid-May Wright resumed his search for a Denver venue.11

From the Cameron negotiations emerged a novel nuance in IATSE policy. The union’s latest strategy was to harass, obstruct, persuade, and threaten exhibitors, while avoiding the outright refusal to furnish an operator. Webber told McKinney that he had nothing against Salt and that he personally opposed censorship. However, the international union ordered him to “do everything possible to prevent showing the film.” If all else failed, on the other hand, he was to “give in and handle it.”12

As the struggle wore on, Denver-area exhibitors refused to negotiate with Wright, for various reasons. Some exhibitors feared negative publicity; others feared the IATSE treatment; and still others confronted pressure from distributors who threatened to deny future bookings of any films. For example, the manager of the Welton, a downtown burlesque house, was interested in showing Salt, but knew that if he ran the film the “distributors would run [him] out of town.”13

Angered by the blackout, the Colorado state AFL spoke out in support of free expression. After seeing the film, Colorado Labor Advocate editors attacked the “anti-Red hysteria” that had produced a “black silence of fear.” Salt was “not Communist propaganda,” but simply “good social commentary and good movie-making.” Without endorsing Mine-Mill, the state AFL defended the union’s right to produce a film expressing its point of view. Moreover, the Labor Advocate insisted that the film be “judged on artistic ability and content rather than on its producer.” Some Denver exhibitor, the newspaper declared, ought to “take his courage in his hands (and in the current hysteria courage [was] needed) and show the film.”14

Other liberal organizations joined the protest. Both the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) wanted Salt of the Earth to be “widely shown.” The ACLU’s Colorado branch worried that private groups and “possibly government agencies” had exerted pressure intended to intimidate exhibitors and “suppress the movie.” Incensed over the denial of the “right to see,” the
ACLU criticized Denver theater owners for creating a new criterion for exhibition—“movie orthodoxy”—and challenged them to accept their obligation to screen controversial films. Indignant about the rising pressures to ban the film, Allie Jay, owner of the Arvada Theater in the Denver suburbs, took the chance. Although warned by her son that the distributors would cut her off, she insisted on honoring her contract because she “did not like censorship of any kind.” Besides, playing Salt was a business proposition and she needed revenues. After a successful four-day run at the Arvada, Salt closed in Denver.

Confronted by formidable odds, Mine-Mill proceeded with its promotional effort. On 18 April, Wright and Biberman met to discuss strategies for a sweeping public information campaign to boost the film. At this point they

PUBLICITY STILL, SALT OF THE EARTH, CA. 1954. Juan Chacón as Ramón Quintero threatens violence against Esperanza (Rosaura Revueltas). (Collections of the Wisconsin Center for Film and Theater Research.)
still hoped for substantial commercial exposure in the Denver area. Biberman advised _Salt_’s promoters to rely on personal contacts with opinion leaders and major organizations. Responding to the IPC legal counsel’s suggestion, Biberman also recommended greater emphasis on _Salt_’s entertainment value at the expense of the narrower focus on labor and suggested that promoters stress the film’s attempt to grapple with the problems of Mexican Americans and women. In the Southwest, he argued, stressing the film’s positive reception in Mexico was especially important. The successful previews in Mexico, according to Biberman, indicated the film’s potential contribution to “the understanding of our country” as well as “our own understanding of the Mexican people.” Finally, the film would require union support, and Biberman was sure that _Salt_ could “do more to win friends and community support than anything else ever put in Mine-Mill’s hands.” What Biberman could not control was the ongoing collusion between the IATSE and distributors to close off access to theater space. In the face of such intimidation, no public relations program was likely to succeed.

In contrast to the sputtering Denver campaign, Mine-Mill mounted an impressive publicity effort in Silver City, New Mexico, where local reaction was likely to be volatile. While Local 890 union leader Juan Chacón’s role in the film had been exploited elsewhere, Silver City was his home territory and he worked hard to promote the showing. Chacón’s description of the production process was widely disseminated throughout Mine-Mill. Focusing on the role of Mexican Americans in Local 890’s filmmaking venture, the actor emphasized their activism in artistic decision-making and the importance of the union community’s capacity for accurately portraying its members’ lives. Eventually, some unionists in Local 890 grumbled that Chacón had “been called out too often” to promote the film, often at the local’s expense. Mine-Mill later defended its use of Chacón, a “valuable asset to the film company and the promotion of the film,” as worth the sacrifice.

Local 890’s internal disagreement was insignificant, however, compared to the community disruption occasioned by _Salt_’s Silver City premiere. Mine-Mill organizer Arturo Flores later asserted that the film raised issues that some local citizens preferred not to discuss, including the Mexican American drive for equality and the women’s struggle for respect within the union family and the larger community. Local critics attempted to divert public attention away from the film’s critique of these social conditions, alleging that there was communist influence within Mine-Mill and in the film. One important adversary was Reverend Sidney M. Metzger, the Roman
"AMERICANS FOR AMERICANISM DAY," SILVER CITY, N.MEX., 3 JULY 1954. Second from left, Archbishop E.V. Byrne; at microphone, Pedro Gonzales-Gonzales; right, Harold Welch of Silver City Chamber of Commerce. (Courtesy of Silver City Museum.)

Catholic bishop of El Paso, who bitterly attacked communist leadership in the union: he denounced Chacón and Local 890 on many occasions. It was not surprising, therefore, that Metzger opposed the film or that priests in nearby Santa Rita and Hurley urged parishioners to boycott Salt when it played in Silver City. Although one priest in Bayard bucked the trend, recalled Virginia Chacón, most church officials opposed Local 890 and its efforts for political reasons: "We were Communists. How were they going to support us?" Similar concerns about communists persuaded local theater owners E. W. Ward and Tom Wallace not to book Salt when it became available. Ward's own local poll convinced him that "the best interests of the community would be served by not exhibiting [the film]." But H. D. McCloughan, owner of the Silver Sky Vue Drive-In theater, read the numbers another way. Despite pressure from the local Chamber of Commerce,
American Legion, Cattlemen’s Association, and Silver City officials, McCloughan concluded that 90 percent of Grant County residents wanted to see the film. His decision to show *Salt* reflected both a perception of widespread local interest and personal friendship with the Chacóns and other Local 890 members. No blackout fell over Silver City.

Although the self-styled Hollywood “cultural workers” chose not to attend the 5 May opening in Silver City, they sent a telegram commending the local people who had “inspired the film and worked so hard to make it.” The whole world, the filmmakers reminded the union community, now knew that they were indeed the “salt of the earth.” From the Hollywood Hills, they “embraced [them] all.” Perhaps the message from Rosaura Revueltas, *Salt*’s female lead, was more meaningful to the people of Silver City. Although unable to secure a visa for the Silver City premiere because of Immigration and Naturalization Service obstructionism, the deported star of the film expressed “joy in knowing that this motion picture will bring us together” and declared that the future belonged to “the kind of people depicted in this film.” She lauded *Salt* as a “flag of friendship above the confusions that surround us.” A disconsolate Virginia Jencks, Anglo organizer and wife of Mine-Mill International representative Clinton Jencks, saw IPC’s failure to send a delegation to Silver City as a “bad mistake of appreciation and evaluation,” that communicated a lack of enthusiasm for the entire project. She observed that there was “bitter feeling against Paul and Herbert,” who had gone to showings in other cities, but “nobody came here.”

Despite local disappointment in the IPC, the Silver City opening was a smashing success. In the community that had reviled the production company a year earlier, cars were lined up for blocks, their owners waiting for an opportunity to see the results of the IPC–Mine-Mill collaboration. The local press underplayed the film’s appeal. The *Silver City Daily Press* attributed large crowds to “local curiosity” while the *El Paso Herald Post* insisted that audiences were “not inspired” by a picture that presented a “false” impression of mining conditions in New Mexico. To counteract these assertions, Local 890 took to the airwaves, using its regular radio broadcast to underscore the impressive turnout for *Salt* and to cite favorable reviews from the national press. The reality was that *Salt* played to capacity crowds at the Silver Sky Vue Drive-In. An audience of 5,000 people—a remarkable turnout for a county of 15,000—watched the film during six days of exhibition, which eventually returned more than one thousand dollars to IPC.
A Picture 90 Per Cent of the People Of Grant County Want To See

Come Early and Let The Children Enjoy Our SLIDES AND SWINGS
Try Our Snack Bar — All Kinds of Refreshments at Reasonable Prices.
This success led IPC to seek Local 890's assistance in promoting the film's exhibition elsewhere in New Mexico and the Southwest. In a report to Chacon and the local executive board, the filmmakers emphasized their progress against great odds, which had enabled one hundred thousand people to see the picture. The filmmakers claimed, somewhat disingenuously, that union pressure on behalf of *Salt* had broken the IATSE boycott and begun to open the market. With Mine-Mill backing, they argued, the "same thing [could] be done in New Mexico." To achieve this goal, IPC persuaded the reliable liberal activists Craig and Jenny Wells Vincent to handle distribution in the state, assuming Local 890 approval. Within ten days the local union consented to the arrangement and the Vincents were on board as coordinators of New Mexico distribution. Although Local 890 was prepared to work with the Vincents to bring "more power to *Salt of the Earth*," they never implemented the distribution plan.  

The IPC made other plans to screen the picture in New Mexico, Texas, Arizona, and elsewhere in the Southwest. The company advanced ambitious publicity programs, often in connection with Mine-Mill organizing drives or representation elections. In most instances such plans failed as the conspiracy of suppression spread throughout the region. For example, from El Paso, Mine-Mill international representative Alfredo Montoya reported that exhibitors were intimidated into "refusing to discuss the matter." At least one theater owner reported that his chain office in Mexico City had advised him not to handle the film. Instead of commercial exhibition, Montoya showed the film to several union audiences, and he launched plans for screenings in Ciudad Juárez. Meanwhile, in Denver, Walter McKinney, who had originally proposed booking *Salt* throughout Colorado and New Mexico, reneged on his agreement. As an alternative, the film was shown to Mine-Mill audiences in Clifton, Morenci, Bisbee, Miami-Globe, Ray, and Hayden-Winkelmann, Arizona; Bayard, Minburn, and Carlsbad, New Mexico; and Laredo, Texas. Despite demonstrable enthusiasm in these mining towns, heavy pressure from the major distributors and intimidation by community organizations such as the American Legion effectively contained commercial distribution in the Southwest. Union stewards promoted *Salt* among workers, ad hoc worker committees "interviewed" exhibitors, and Mine-Mill officers sponsored public screenings, but in the words of Mine-Mill activist Lorenzo Torres, "even sympathetic theater owners could not withstand" threats, harassment, and intimidation from civic organizations and public institutions.  

Beyond Colorado and the Southwest, the story was depressingly similar in the northern Rocky Mountain area, Mine-Mill's other major field of activity.
The International’s assigned coordinator, William Gately, reported broken commitments in Helena, Butte, and Anaconda, Montana. Theater owners in some of these places cancelled showings after a distributor in Salt Lake City warned of possible future discrimination against them. In Helena, Gately observed, one prospective distributor “completely reversed himself” when he was told that *Salt* was controversial and “dangerous.” Although IPC’s Sonja Dahl wondered “who belong[ed] to that long arm” from Salt Lake, Jarrico knew the force behind the ban: major studios had told distributors, “If you play that film, you’ll never get another.” By June, Gately was convinced that IPC faced a “tough fight to get the picture shown in these communities.” The Northwest was no different. No Seattle theater owner would “take a chance on booking *Salt of the Earth*.” When one theater manager dared to express interest in showing the film, he was deluged with ominous phone calls urging that he “stay away from it.” These developments persuaded him that it would be “dangerous for him to show this picture.” Gately concluded that “they’ve put a hammer on him”; in his view Seattle was the “worst town we’ve hit.” The Northwest was a closed market by late summer. The IPC showed the film in noncommercial settings, but the company’s prospects for a wider audience quickly diminished.

The IPC experience in the Rocky Mountain West matched the difficulties *Salt* had encountered throughout the United States as the conspiracy against the film expanded. The pressures that the movie’s foes exerted in Detroit and Chicago reappeared in altered form in the mountain West and on the Pacific Coast with similar consequences. Confronted by such insurmountable obstacles, Hollywood’s “cultural workers” and Mine-Mill unionists failed to forge a cross-class link in promoting a film that told a workers’ story and challenged the prevailing consensus behind corporate values and business unionism. From the beginning the filmmakers relied upon Mine-Mill and other unionists to publicize and promote the free exhibition of *Salt.* Like its adherence to progressive unionism, Mine-Mill’s endorsement of an important revolutionary film was unwelcome in Cold War America.

Despite IPC’s losing struggle in both the West and the national market, *Salt of the Earth* remains a landmark cinematic portrayal of American labor and worker culture. The film broke the Hollywood mold by presenting the struggle and the perspectives of militant Mexican American unionists. Moreover, the movie effectively depicted the pivotal role of women in the worker community, as well as the ambivalent male response to these assertive women who established their claim to parity. Equally significant was the film’s depiction of working men and women as active agents liberated by democratic unionism.
For unionists, Mexican Americans, Hollywood leftists, and mainstream liberals, the Salt controversy was a call to conscience in the battle for civil liberties. The Salt group stood firmly against thought control and censorship in a period of grave constitutional peril, and its members courageously advocated freedom of expression and challenged the forces of political conformity. Moreover, their attempt to create a labor-based cross-class alliance in defense of artistic freedom holds meaning for modern activists who seek to build a bridge between the wider liberal community and the labor movement. The 1950s were years of conservative hegemony, and unionists and other progressives could ill afford the luxury of internal division. Salt’s supporters articulated a sweeping conception of community and solidarity that, though unattainable in the context of Cold War culture, provided a model for advocates of social and economic justice in subsequent years. The Salt of the Earth proponents’ goal of progressive unity has yet to be realized as a new generation faces an assault on workers in downsized America, but their vision survives in a cinematic work of enduring value.

Notes


4. Biberman to My Dears, 17 February 1954, Biberman-Sondergaard Papers, Box 4; Biberman, *Diary*, 10 and 17 February 1954, Michael Wilson Papers (hereafter Wilson Papers), Special Collections, University of California Los Angeles Arts Library, Los Angeles, Box 51; and Variety, 17 February 1954.


6. “What Kind of Film Was This?” Biberman-Sondergaard Papers, Boxes 51, 5.


8. Maurice Travis to All Local Unions, 20 April 1954; Maurice Travis to Wilson, 15 April 1954, IUMMSW Papers, Box 129; and “An Account of Unsuccessful Efforts to Arrange for Commercial Showing of ‘Salt of the Earth’ in Denver in 1954,” 12 October 1956, Biberman-Sondergaard Papers, Box 28.

9. Maurice Travis to All Local Unions, 20 April 1954, IUMMSW Papers, Box 129.


15. “Statement,” American Civil Liberties Union, Colorado Branch, ca. May 1954, IUMMSW Papers, Box 129; and “Dear Member of the Arvada Community,” ca. May 1954, Biberman-Sondergaard Papers, Box 28.


17. “Notes on Meeting with Herbert Biberman,” 18 April 1954, IUMMSW Papers, Box 129.

19. Unidentified clipping, 1 April 1954, Juan Chacón Papers, Salt of the Earth Clippings File, Western New Mexico State University, Silver City; Virginia Chacón, interview by author, Faywood, New Mexico, 27 March 1997; Silver City Press and Daily Independent, 6, 11, and 13 February 1954; and Arturo and Joscina Flores, interview by author, Rio Rancho, New Mexico, 28 March 1997.


