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## Franciscans Eclipsed

CHURCH AND STATE IN SPANISH NEW MEXICO, 1750–1780

Jim Norris

The Franciscan mission system, in what the Spanish called the Kingdom of New Mexico, challenged local civil government for power and influence from the time of the colony's permanent inception in 1598. At its zenith in the seventeenth century, the Order of St. Francis maintained over forty missions and as many as seventy friars labored in New Mexico. Their control over the Puebloan peoples meant that the order held significant dominion over the region's main economic asset: Indian labor. As the sole representatives of the Catholic Church in New Mexico, the Franciscan friars controlled spiritual affairs and shaped the moral behavior of all inhabitants. Using the powers of the Inquisition, the friars protected their own status and attempted, with some success, to expand their position at the expense of local government officials. The Franciscans' efforts did not go unchallenged, however, and acrimonious struggles often characterized church and state relations. Events associated with the Pueblo Revolt in 1680 and the subsequent Spanish reconquest in the 1690s altered the equation between the Franciscan friars and civil authority. Civil and military affairs now began to dominate the

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Spanish government's policy on the northern frontier of New Spain, and during the next half century, Franciscans' status and authority in New Mexico diminished in relation to those of political and military officials. The friars struggled to maintain their position and remained, at least, an influential institution up to 1750. However, by 1780, the Franciscans had permanently lost their authority and prestige in New Mexico.

In 1749 fray Andrés Varo, *custos* (prelate) of the Franciscan priests in New Mexico, finished an extensive *informe* (report) on the condition of the order's mission efforts in the region. Varo's *informe* was the first such Franciscan self-examination in over thirty years and had been specifically solicited by the viceroy of New Spain in Mexico City. Probably no one was more qualified to draft the report than fray Andrés for he had arrived in New Mexico in 1729 and had been *custos* at least three times since then.<sup>1</sup>

Varo's *informe* described a robust and vital mission operation in New Mexico. The report listed three mission districts (Santa Fe, El Paso, and Junta de los Ríos), described their physical environments, and reported their livestock and agricultural capacities. Most missions produced surplus commodities for later distribution among the region's poor, who, the *custos* regretted, were numerous. Every mission in the region had at least one friar assigned to it except for Pecos and Galisteo, which together were served by a single missionary. Eight friars labored among the Navajos. The two Navajo missions established in the 1740s represented a significant triumph for the Franciscans as the sites of their first new conversions in over a century. In addition, the friars had stepped up their evangelical efforts among the Hopis and induced over four hundred Tiwas, descendants of refugees from the 1690s reconquest era, to leave the Hopis and congregate in a new mission at Sandía. The Crown rewarded this surge in Franciscan evangelical activity with the restoration of the order's jurisdiction over the Hopis, which had been given to the Jesuits during the 1730s. Hence, at the end of the 1740s, the Franciscans had regained some of their prestige and influence lost during their dark half-century after the Pueblo Revolt in 1680.<sup>2</sup>

Such was clearly not the case a quarter century later when fray Francisco Atanasio Domínguez wrote his comprehensive assessment of the New Mexico mission field in 1776. Domínguez arrived in New Mexico with orders to inspect each mission and report on its condition. He was also to evaluate each friar's evangelical performance, adherence to the rules of St. Francis, and ability to speak Puebloan languages. He could transfer and discipline friars as needed, although he "must not be too vociferous lest the defects of his

brethren became known to the public." In short, the Franciscan leadership desired that Domínguez improve the mission operation in New Mexico.<sup>3</sup>

Domínguez found the Franciscan missions in appalling condition. That all the region's churches had earthen floors after so many years of use surprised him, and he was shocked that no church had been constructed yet at Sandía; the Puebloans there made do in the ruins of a pre-1680 mission building. At Santa Clara, fray Francisco reported the church's adornments "so soulless that I consider it unnecessary to describe anything so dead." He often described vestments and other religious articles as "very worn" or "ugly." He found the figure of Our Lady of the Rosary at San Juan decorated with "gew-gaws," her dress and mantle "tattered," and a "moth-eaten wig" upon her head. Over half the mission bells, one of the most enduring symbols of Spanish mission churches, did not function. They were broken, cracked, or missing their clappers. At Santa Ana, ironically, the neophytes were summoned to mass with a "war drum."<sup>4</sup>

The Christian behavior of the Puebloans lagged far behind Domínguez's expectations as well. Instruction in matters of the faith followed a sterile formula from mission to mission. Children simply recited the catechism at church each morning and evening, while adults did the same only on Saturdays and feast days, when the Rosary was also said. Beyond mere memorization and recitation, little else was done. Only two missions—Acoma and Jémez—employed more energetic and innovative teaching methods. The central problem, fray Francisco opined, was language. Few friars were fluent in the language of their charges and Spanish fluency among the Puebloans was only somewhat better. At only five missions had native people become fairly proficient in Spanish. Hence, confession was rare, except in cases of dire illnesses or approaching death, perhaps because penitents feared what interpreters would overhear.<sup>5</sup>

His brother friars and their behaviors most disappointed Domínguez, although he circumscribed his comments in the official report. Significantly, there were only about thirty friars in New Mexico, a decline of approximately twenty-five percent since Varo's report. The strongest official criticisms he levied were that church registers were not up-to-date or that a friar's inventory of Franciscan property was inconsistent with his own findings. In private letters written to Franciscan officials, however, Domínguez was more candid and harsh in his evaluations. Many friars were too "old and ill" to be effective mission priests. One, fray Estanislai Mariano de Marulanda, had gone blind. Domínguez judged at least nine Franciscans as physically incapable

of managing their missions. Other friars were ineffective for more heinous reasons. Some were disobedient, others wanted only to obtain “temporal goods” for themselves, and several were in debt to support their extravagances. One friar had “borrowed” over seven hundred pesos from the tithe. At least two others were engaged in carnal relations with women employed in their conventos. Fray Patricio Cuéllar was “a notorious drunkard,” and still others were “depraved, disobedient, bold characters and brothers who carry knives and blunderbusses as if they were highwaymen.” Including the infirm, Domínguez concluded that over half of the Franciscans serving in the colony had no business doing so. Clearly, the Franciscans’ position had undergone a dramatic collapse since Varo’s glowing assessment nearly three decades earlier.<sup>6</sup>

In addition to questionable work ethics undermining their status, several other problems contributed to the demise of the Franciscans’ position in New Mexico during the latter half of the eighteenth century. Friars posted to New Mexico usually worked alone and continuously for an average of twenty years, a condition of service that fostered the trend of old and sick mission priests. Incessant attacks on the missions and settlements by Comanche, Apache, and other native peoples sapped morale among all the region’s inhabitants including the friars. A severe drought during the 1770s only made the conditions of life more desperate. In addition, the royal treasury only sporadically paid the missionaries their stipends, forcing the friars into commercial activities to support themselves. Once that pattern was established, the decision of some friars to gain personally involved only a short leap.

While these reasons contributed to the Franciscan breakdown, their impotence in dealing with government officials symbolized starkly their reduced circumstances. During the seventeenth century the Franciscans in New Mexico were equally powerful, if not more so, than local government officials. That several governors were hauled to Mexico City in chains to face the Inquisition attests to the clout the Franciscans held. However, the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 marked the beginning of a general decline in the friars’ hegemony. After this time, governors and other local officials steadily augmented power at the expense of the Franciscans. *Alcaldes mayores* (district officers) became influential in Puebloan politics, governors exerted more control over the region’s economic policies, and even such matters as native witchcraft practices were taken out of the friars’ hands and turned over to New Mexico’s civil authorities. These developments complemented the Bourbon imperial goal of centralizing its authority over other privileged governmental bodies like the Catholic Church. As a consequence of this aim, the Crown supported actions of civil

authorities at the expense of the Franciscans in New Mexico by routinely ruling against the friars in disputes engendered by these changes. Still, not all governors or *alcaldes mayores* exploited the new environment. Some were incompetent, some solely interested in profit, and some in office too briefly. The Franciscans were losing power, but only in fits and starts.

Beginning in 1750, however, local government officials gained irrevocable power and position in New Mexico, and the friars found themselves, at last, relegated permanently to second place. The Franciscans began 1750 on the defensive and the year progressively worsened. The Franciscans learned that the Jesuits had made two *entradas* into the Colorado-Gila region, raising anew the friars' concerns about jurisdiction among the Hopis.<sup>7</sup> In addition, the viceroy appointed don Tomás Vélez Cachupín as interim governor in 1750. Described by one historian as "young, full of ambition and not a little impetuous," Vélez Cachupín had only recently been assigned to New Mexico to command the Santa Fe presidio's mounted troops prior to his appointment as governor. He would prove to be, however, a very capable governor.<sup>8</sup> Rather than using supplies and soldiers earmarked for the Navajo mission field, the governor diverted these resources to combat Comanche raiders instead. As a result of this deviation, the newly congregated Navajos bolted from their missions. Although the main reason for their departure centered on the fundamental differences between Navajos and Spaniards, the Franciscans blamed Vélez Cachupín. Consequently, the new governor found his administration at odds with the Franciscans from the beginning.

Besides the Navajo incident, a conflict also arose between the Franciscans and the governor over a report drafted by don Antonio de Ornedal y Maza. Ornedal y Maza had come to New Mexico in 1749 for two official reasons: to serve as *juez de residencia* (court judge) for the outgoing governor and to inspect the presidios in New Mexico and Nueva Vizcaya for the viceroy. Nowhere in his written duties was he asked to examine the Franciscan mission operation, but either on his own initiative or at the behest of Governor Vélez Cachupín, Ornedal y Maza composed a critical report of the condition of the New Mexico missions.<sup>9</sup> His report caused problems for the Franciscans.<sup>10</sup> The substance of most charges was not new, but the timing of the report was unfortunate. It arrived in Mexico City about the same time, if not in the same pouch, as Varo's informe. Ornedal y Maza's contradiction of Varo's assessment outraged and embittered the Franciscans, and their anger placed them on a collision course with Governor Vélez Cachupín.<sup>11</sup>

Initially, several friars authored lengthy rebuttals to Ornedal y Maza's report. These categorically refuted all of his criticisms while offering counter allegations of abuse and misuse of power by the governor and *alcaldes mayores*. According to the Franciscans, Puebloans were forced to labor without pay; their woven goods and agricultural commodities were taken without fair compensation; and presidial soldiers were ill-equipped and harshly treated by the governor and their officers. Franciscan officials in Mexico City deemed a written rebuttal by fray Andrés so incendiary that they suppressed it and gave only an abridged version to another viceroy ten years later. Among other accusations, Varo described Governor Vélez Cachupín as "childish . . . without maturity, knowledge, or experience." The provincial of Santo Evangelio, who oversaw the New Mexico missions, also wrote a long protest to Ornedal y Maza's report.<sup>12</sup>

That Franciscans disputed the report came as no surprise, but to add weight to their refutations, they collected affidavits from the region's citizens attesting to the missionaries' exemplary behavior and devout attention to their duties. Thirteen Spaniards of prominence, including former *alcaldes mayores*, current presidial officers, and the assistant governor-captain general of Nueva Vizcaya, made testimonials.<sup>13</sup> Support for the friars from such individuals was potentially the most effective weapon the friars could marshal against Ornedal y Maza's report.

At this point Governor Vélez Cachupín did the unexpected and unprecedented: he derailed the entire controversy. First, he moved to unify local government, forbidding any current *alcalde mayor*, presidial soldier, or other government official in New Mexico from testifying either for or against Ornedal y Maza's report. Second, none of these officials could certify any Franciscan report. By default, only Vélez Cachupín's signature could legitimize Franciscan documents leaving New Mexico. Any violation of these orders would result in a two hundred peso fine and/or loss of position to the offender. And finally, to prevent even noncertified information by his Franciscan detractors from reaching Mexico City, the governor directed that no Franciscan mail, except for correspondence pertaining to the Inquisition, could leave New Mexico without his approval. In this manner, Vélez Cachupín silenced the friars—something no other governor had been able to do—without challenging the Inquisition. Even more astonishing was that his executive intervention worked and Franciscan correspondence from New Mexico soon slowed to a trickle.<sup>14</sup>

The motivations behind the governor's actions remain unclear. Unlike many of his predecessors, Vélez Cachupín left no written statements of a

clearly antireligious or anti-Franciscan nature. He seems to have been less generous to the Franciscans than were many eighteenth-century governors, although he did purchase new vestments, linens, and an altar screen for the mission at San Juan. Certainly, New Mexico was under dire military threat by Comanche raiders in 1750, and the governor likely viewed the Ornedal y Maza matter as a distraction, with the potential to factionalize his administration.<sup>15</sup>

In addition to external political difficulties, conditions soon worsened for the Franciscans when an internal struggle erupted. Realizing that Governor Vélez Cachupín exempted Inquisition reports from civil interference, *custos* Varo requested that fray Pedro Montañón, local commissary of the Holy Office, initiate an Inquisition investigation against the governor. The immediate consequence of such an inquiry would have been testimonials, interrogations, and related documents leaving New Mexico unimpeded. Furthermore, Inquisition involvement might have intimidated Vélez Cachupín, put him on the defensive, or even lead to his removal from office. That strategy had often worked in the seventeenth century. Montañón, though, refused to open the investigation, and the ensuing conflict between him and Varo plunged the Franciscans into turmoil for two years. At a time when they most needed to present a united front, they instead turned against each other, further weakening Franciscan power and prestige.<sup>16</sup>

The diminution of Franciscan power resulting from the Ornedal y Maza affair could be clearly seen by 1753 in Governor Vélez Cachupín's comprehensive report to the viceroy on the state of the colony. The document was highly critical of the mission operations run by the Franciscans, noting that they were little concerned about their neophytes and calling into question their "dedication and diligence." In the past such a condemnation by a civil officer would have quickly drawn a vociferous response from the friars, but none was forthcoming. Vélez Cachupín had effectively muted the Franciscans and secured clear hegemony over the friars in New Mexico.<sup>17</sup>

The appointment of a new governor in 1754, don Francisco Marín del Valle, led to no improvement in the friars' position, for he kept in place the virtual gag order against the Franciscans. Only Inquisitional documents could freely leave the region, and government officials refused to certify most other Franciscan documents. For example, when the *custos*, fray Jacobo Castro, inspected all the missions in 1755, *alcaldes mayores* from the respective districts observed him throughout; however, they refused to certify any part of the inspection and in the end Santiago Roybal, the Diocese of Durango's vicar and ecclesiastical judge, endorsed Castro's report—a humilia-



tion in itself for the Franciscans. These civil obstructions effectively reduced the volume of Franciscan documents in the 1750s to a fraction of what it had been in earlier periods. If the friars could neither present their views nor defend themselves in the higher councils of Spanish government, they were virtually impotent to influence affairs in the colony. By the conclusion of Marín del Valle's administration in 1759, the Franciscans had been relegated to virtual nonentities in New Mexico, except in spiritual matters.<sup>18</sup>

The rapid erosion of the Franciscan position with local officials during the 1750s was further evidenced by their reaction to the bishop of Durango's *visita* (inspection) in 1760. The matter of episcopal jurisdiction had been a lengthy, acrimonious affair in New Mexico's history. In fact, the Franciscans contested the authority of the Diocese of Durango since that episcopate was created by royal order in 1621. As long as the Franciscans were free of a bishop's control, they were the religious masters of the colony. In a series of confrontations between 1715 and 1737, the Diocese of Durango had gained control of New Mexico. During this time, the Franciscans still resisted diocesan authority and had made two previous episcopal *visitas* difficult for the bishops. However by 1760, Bishop don Pedro Tamarón y Romeral encountered no Franciscan snubs; the friars bent over backwards to accommodate him. The bishop wrote that they responded to him "as if they were secular priests." Primarily, the Franciscans viewed Bishop Tamarón y Romeral as a potential ally against civil authorities and made him aware of the abuses they had suffered at the hands of recent governors. The friars continued to tolerate diocesan interactions even after the *visita*. When Tamarón y Romeral asked for periodic reports, the Franciscans dutifully supplied them, and they protested no other instructions from Durango. Clearly, they no longer viewed the diocese as their main foe.<sup>19</sup>

A brief period of gubernatorial instability may have given the Franciscans hope of regaining some lost influence, but whatever opening they saw soon closed when Vélez Cachupín returned to Santa Fe in 1762 to begin a second term as governor. At the time Spain was faring poorly in the Seven Years' War, and once again Puebloans and Spaniards in New Mexico suffered from destructive Comanche, Apache, and Ute raids. The Crown ordered Vélez Cachupín to stabilize and defend Spain's northern colony, and he succeeded. By 1767 the native people along New Mexico's frontiers had been reasonably pacified.<sup>20</sup>

Vélez Cachupín renewed his executive pressure on the friars as well. He reported to the viceroy that the Franciscans collected funds for far too many missionaries. No friars had filled the two empty positions at Zuñi during the

past year, and two of the missions in the Junta de los Ríos district were without friars. In addition, six other friars, because “of their advanced age and habitual indisposition,” were unfit to serve as Christian evangelicals. The governor wanted these Franciscan deficiencies corrected or government stipends permanently revoked for ten posts. Incredibly, the Franciscans in New Mexico made no response to these charges but left their defense to the provincial of Santo Evangelio. The government, however, maintained the number of Franciscan posts in New Mexico at this time. Significantly, in 1763, the Spanish Crown allocated to New Mexico only 11,450 pesos for the mission program in contrast to approximately 32,000 pesos that went to the presidial garrison in Santa Fe. From an accounting perspective alone, the importance of the evangelical work had been eclipsed by political and military agendas.<sup>21</sup>

Indeed, His Majesty’s government remained concerned about defending New Spain’s northern frontier and, in 1766, the Marqués de Rubí visited New Mexico to assess its defenses as part of an inspection of the military security and presidial system across the northern frontier. In previous inspections, the mission operations had always factored into considerations of frontier policy, but the marqués’s report, failing to mention the friars at all, reflected their decreased importance. In fact, the marqués’s inspection gave rise to the *Reglamento de 1772* (Regulation of 1772), which, among other policies, further increased presidial salaries. In the new pay scale, a priest serving as presidial chaplain received 480 pesos per year while a Franciscan missionary’s alms remained fixed at 330 pesos. The difference further attested to the reduced status of evangelicals.<sup>22</sup> Governor Vélez Cachupín’s second administration ended in 1767. He had dispatched other reports critical of the Franciscan mission program to Mexico City, but the friars mustered no defense against his negative assessments. Perhaps his restoration of some peace and security to the region had engendered gratitude among some friars. Still, the Franciscans’ position had further eroded.

The installation of a new governor, don Pedro Fermín de Mendinueta, offered little hope for the Franciscans. Appointed in 1767, he was an experienced military man with an administrative background. Two ominous events for the New Mexico friars transpired early in Fermín de Mendinueta’s tenure. First, Charles III ordered the expulsion of the Jesuits from the New World. For New Mexico’s friars, the expulsion of the Society of Jesus removed a long-time Franciscan rival from the mission field. No longer would the Franciscans have to worry about or contest their jurisdictional boundary with Jesuits to the west. However, the Crown’s aggressive act must have also re-

mind some friars that Bourbon policy continued to weaken Catholic authority and subordinate the church to the Spanish secular government. If the monarchy could arbitrarily expel the Jesuits, the king could deal the same treatment to the Order of St. Francis. As the Society of Jesus vacated the frontier, the Franciscans took over its missions in northern New Spain, stretching Franciscan resources even thinner.

The second grave development involved a viceregal plan to secularize Spanish villas—specifically El Paso, Albuquerque, Santa Fe, and Santa Cruz de la Cañada—in New Mexico. In 1765 Bishop Tamarón y Romeral offered three reasons why these sites should be taken from the Franciscans. First, he noted the Franciscans' historical reluctance to cooperate with diocesan officials; second, he described the friars' many failures with the Puebloan people and the order's inability to improve its evangelical performance; and third, the region's inhabitants continued to practice witchcraft and other idolatries. Tamarón y Romeral submitted this petition during the second administration of Vélez Cachupín, and the friars in New Mexico did not defend themselves, leaving Santo Evangelio officials to argue against the bishop's proposal.<sup>23</sup>

The viceregal ruling on Tamarón y Romeral's petition did not come until near the end of Fermín de Mendinueta's first year as governor. Based on the advice of his *fiscal* (royal attorney), the viceroy (the marqués de Croix) rejected Tamarón y Romeral's request. The *fiscal* noted that the bishop of Durango had not fulfilled all proper legal requirements. His Majesty's law expected him to offer the viceroy at least two secular priests as candidates for each parish position. Tamarón y Romeral had recommended only one priest in all, for the post in El Paso. Furthermore, the *fiscal* noted, the bishop of Durango's main reason to secularize these villas originated in his displeasure with the friars' work among the Puebloan people, not the Spanish parishioners in the villas.<sup>24</sup> Despite the victory, the Franciscans still had little reason to celebrate the viceroy's ruling. The *fiscal*'s opinion did not rule out secularizing these communities, but declared only that Tamarón y Romeral had not followed proper procedures. The bishop died before he could respond to this rejection. Although his successor did not pursue the matter, the threat continued to hang over the Franciscans. Indeed, secularization of these villas would take place near the end of the century.

Throughout most of Fermín de Mendinueta's administration, lasting until 1778, the governor avoided major clashes with the Franciscans. These were some of the most difficult years for the inhabitants of New Mexico. The peace

hammered out with the Comanche people by Governor Vélez Cachupín broke down in 1768, and Comanche raiders, soon joined by other nomadic tribes, made life miserable for Spaniards and Puebloans alike. Between 1768 and 1778 virtually every Spanish villa (including Santa Fe) and Franciscan mission experienced the terror of an attack. This situation was made more pernicious by a severe drought that began in the early 1770s and lasted about ten years. Crops failed and livestock died en masse. Comanche assaults made unsafe laboring in the fields. As food production declined, the threat of famine stalked New Mexico. Indian thefts of livestock became so enormous that the Spanish government sent 1,500 horses to New Mexico in 1775. Spaniards crowded into larger communities for safety, while others joined the exodus to El Paso.<sup>25</sup>

Amid such unrelenting crises, Fermín de Mendinueta devoted his attention primarily to the defense of New Mexico, and the friars just tried to stay alive, performing little evangelical work in the process. Several times, the governor complained to Mexico City that the friars failed to provide regular religious services, that many friars were incompetent, and that some missions remained without staff. The Franciscans' response to Fermín de Mendinueta's negative reports was silence, although the Franciscan hierarchy acted by sending Domínguez to New Mexico in 1776.<sup>26</sup>

Domínguez, too, failed to right the Franciscan cart. In response to his report, some friars were replaced and fresh missionaries, posted to New Mexico. However, any positive developments soon vanished in the great smallpox epidemic of 1780–1781. Approximately one-quarter of New Mexico's population succumbed, a decline sufficient enough for the new governor, don Juan Bautista de Anza, to request successfully the number of Franciscan billets be lowered from thirty-four to twenty. This loss represented the first official reduction in the number of Franciscan personnel in New Mexico. From this time forward, the Franciscans' presence further dwindled and the position of the friars, once the rival of local officers, had been eclipsed.<sup>27</sup>

Numerous historical forces contributed to the collapse of Franciscan power in New Mexico during the eighteenth century. Due to the legacy of *el año ochenta* — “the year eighty,” as Franciscan documents sometimes referred to the Pueblo Revolt — and the turbulent reconquest period, friars sought a more accommodating relationship with the Puebloans than they had observed in the seventeenth century. Although this new posture created a more pacific mission climate throughout New Mexico, it opened the friars

to civil charges of evangelical incompetence. In addition, the Franciscan hierarchy in Mexico City maintained an inflexible mission program that hurt the friars. Priests were sent to New Mexico ill prepared to serve among the Natives, especially in regard to language, and then left in the mission field far too long. Their position eroded further when the Bishopric of Durango established jurisdiction over New Mexico during the 1730s. No longer did friars hold absolute sway over matters of faith. And finally, the growing strength of local government during the 1700s, culminating in the critical 1750–1780 period, played a crucial part in the Franciscan demise. Bolstering the power of local civil officials at the expense of the church hallmarked Bourbon policy during this period. The Crown sought to centralize power and make the empire efficient, profitable, and secure. The king broke the back of any institutions opposed to these goals. Franciscan missions in New Mexico fell into that category, and consequently the hegemony of the state over the Catholic Church became one of the primary causes in the breakdown of Franciscan power in New Mexico.

## Notes

1. A copy of Varo's informe is in the Biblioteca Nacional de México (hereafter BNM), Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, leg. 8, Part 2, no. 57.
2. Henry W. Kelly, "Franciscan Missions of New Mexico 1740–1760," *New Mexico Historical Review* 16 (January 1941): 41–69; and Charles W. Hackett, ed., *Historical Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1773*, collected by Adolph F. A. Bandelier and Fanny R. Bandelier (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1923–1937), 388–90, 414–20.
3. Eleanor Adams and Fray Angélico Chávez, trans., *The Missions of New Mexico, 1776: A Description by Fray Francisco Atanasio Domínguez with Other Contemporary Documents* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975), xvi–xxi. Quote from xx (Introduction) regarding Domínguez's instructions from his superiors in the Mexican Province of the Holy Gospel.
4. *Ibid.*, 75, 86, 115, 138, 167, 215, and 270–73.
5. *Ibid.*, 88, 98, 179, 193, and 207.
6. *Ibid.*, 80–82, 96–97, 123–25, 151, 158, 169, 174, 180–81, 289–96, and 300.
7. Kelly, "Franciscan Missions," 61–67; and Hackett, *Historical Documents*, 432–38.
8. John L. Kessell, *Kiva, Cross, and Crown: The Pecos Indians and New Mexico, 1540–1840* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1979), 344, 378–85; and Alfred Barnaby Thomas, *The Plains Indians and New Mexico, 1751–1778: A Collection of Documents Illustrative of the History of the Eastern*

*Frontier of New Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1940), 63. Quote from Kessell, 378.

9. Henry W. Kelly, "Franciscan Missions of New Mexico 1740-60," *New Mexico Historical Review* 16 (April 1941): 149-54. A copy of Ornedal's report is in BNM, leg. 8, Part 2, no. 56. Related material on Ornedal's background and the dates he was in New Mexico are in BNM, leg. 8, Part 2, no. 62. Ornedal's official instructions from the viceroy are in Archivo Hidalgo del Parral, Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, r. 1749, frs. 13-14.
10. The contents of the Ornedal report need not concern us here and have been ably rendered elsewhere.
11. Kelly, "Franciscan Missions," 149-54.
12. BNM, leg. 8, Part 3, nos. 67, 74-75; and Hackett, *Historical Documents*, 425-30, 479-501.
13. BNM, leg. 8, Part 3, no. 76 and leg. 9, Part 1, no. 12; and Hackett, *Historical Documents*, 438-57.
14. BNM, leg. 8, Part 3, no. 76.
15. Adams and Chávez, *The Missions of New Mexico*, 85-87; and Hackett, *Historical Documents*, 479-501.
16. Richard E. Greenleaf, "The Inquisition in Eighteenth-Century New Mexico," *New Mexico Historical Review* 60 (January 1985): 43-45.
17. Thomas, *The Plains Indians*, 65-67.
18. Robert Ryal Miller, trans. and ed., "New Mexico in Mid-Eighteenth Century: A Report Based on Governor Vélez Capuchín's [sic] Inspection," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 79 (October 1975): 169-81. Castro's 1755 visita documents are in BNM, leg. 9, Part 2, no. 31.
19. Eleanor B. Adams, ed., *Bishop Tamarón's Visitation of New Mexico, 1760*, *Publications in History*, vol. 15 (Albuquerque: Historical Society of New Mexico, 1954), 25-26, 78, 81-85; Hackett, *Historical Documents*, 468-79; Archives of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe (hereafter AASF), Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, r. 52, 1762 no. 1, 1765 no. 2, and 1767 nos. 1-3; and Jim Norris, "The Struggle Over Diocesan Control in New Mexico, 1715-37," *New Mexico Historical Review* 70 (April 1995): 114-24.
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