10-1-1985

The Navajo at the Bosque Redondo: Cooperation, Resistance, and Initiative, 1864–1868

Katherine Marie Birmingham Osburn

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr>

Recommended Citation

Birmingham Osburn, Katherine Marie. "The Navajo at the Bosque Redondo: Cooperation, Resistance, and Initiative, 1864–1868." *New Mexico Historical Review* 60, 4 (1985). <https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr/vol60/iss4/4>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in New Mexico Historical Review by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

*THE NAVAJO AT THE BOSQUE REDONDO:
COOPERATION, RESISTANCE, AND INITIATIVE,
1864–1868*

KATHERINE MARIE BIRMINGHAM OSBURN

DESPITE THE TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE of military defeat and incarceration in a strange and hostile environment, the Navajo at the Bosque Redondo, 1864–68, did not respond passively to the reservation experience. Rather, they devised active adaptive strategies using a pattern of cooperation, resistance, and initiative. While Navajo religion furnished the Indians with a means of devising their own responses to many problems they faced, it also acted as a basis for solidarity in an experience potentially devastating to the Navajo's cultural survival. Since Indian behavior worked against the military's purposes and functioning at the Bosque Redondo, Indians were a variable in the reservation's demise, actively participating in its failure—not merely observing its collapse. Thus, while administrative and military aspects of the Bosque are important, the Navajo's behavior warrants equal consideration.

As a result of the Kit Carson campaign of 1863–64, Brig. Gen. James H. Carleton, commander of the military department of New Mexico, moved the Navajo to a plot in southeastern New Mexico known as Bosque Redondo.¹ There he had established a military post, Fort Sumner, and a reservation, where he planned to transform the Mescalero Apache and the Navajo into peaceful, Christian Americans.² The Navajo who arrived at the Bosque Redondo were starving and impoverished, and over the next four years, their miserable condition did not improve greatly. Shortages of food and fuel were continual, and the alkaline water caused dysentery. Other illnesses at the reservation included malaria, pneumonia, rheumatic fever, measles, and venereal disease. The Indians reported

that sometimes military personnel beat them and that Navajo women were raped. Further, the Navajo were raided by other Indian tribes.³

Despite this evidence, Carleton interpreted the Navajo's degraded condition as an indication that they were now passive and dependent. "It is a mockery," he wrote, "to hold councils with a people who . . . have only to await our decisions. [We should] care for them as children until they can care for themselves."⁴ In his view, the Navajo were his to transform. The Indians initially proved cooperative. As a condition of their surrender, the Indians agreed, as former Indian Superintendent James L. Collins noted in 1864, "to abandon their nomadic, marauding way of life, to settle on a reservation away from their cherished mountain homes, and to devote themselves to the pursuit of industry as their means of support."⁵

Observers at the Bosque Redondo generally commented on how industriously the Indians worked. In 1865, the Indians testified before the Doolittle Commission, a Senate investigative committee, that they were more than willing to farm despite the problems involved. In addition, Michael Steck, superintendent of Indian Affairs in 1864, commented that "the tribe has for three centuries been engaged in planting and they are also far in advance of all other wild tribes in various fabricks such as blankets, baskets, ropes, saddles and bridle bits."⁶ Thus it appeared, to individuals who visited the reservation in the early years, that the experiment had tremendous potential and that the Indians were hard-working and cooperative.

Indian cooperation was, however, more complex than it first appeared. Although the Navajo recognized that farming was a necessity—because the rations provided by the United States government were inadequate—the Indians had more choice in this area than is initially apparent. In 1868, for instance, they staunchly refused to plant any crops, explaining, "We have done all that we could possibly do, but we found it to be labor in vain and have therefore quit it; for this reason we have not planted or tried to do anything this year."⁷ Thus, cooperation, though mandated by hunger, was also a choice, for the Indians did refuse to farm. In this act they demonstrated their ability to decide for or against cooperation, regardless of the circumstances.

Similarly, the Navajo considered the benefits of the education programs at the Bosque and chose to accept training in carpentry, leatherworking, and blacksmithing. Delgadito, the Navajo headman, realized his people's need to repair their newly acquired farm implements and also concluded that they would now have to learn how to make a living. The Navajo also perceived that the trades provided them with such an opportunity.⁸ Accommodation in this realm, then, was a strategy born of immediate needs and of an understanding of the new economic realities facing the Indians.

While the Navajo appreciated instruction in the trades, they were much more reticent about the benefits of other types of education. For example, although General Carleton established a school at the Bosque Redondo in 1865, the Indians rarely utilized it.⁹ Apparently, they were more interested in receiving the ration coupons that the school distributed than in procuring an education for their children. As post surgeon Dr. George Gwyntner noted:

I do not think that the juvenile savages shared either love of or aptitude for the alphabet, nor rightly appreciated the treasure to which it was the key; inasmuch as they often stipulated for additional bread rations as a condition of longer attendance at school.¹⁰

The Navajo's resistance to the reservation school was a serious blow to Carleton's plans for acculturation. Yet the Indians claimed they were not opposed to education; they were simply more absorbed with the immediate concerns of daily survival and considered the benefits of education to be peripheral to more urgent matters such as obtaining enough food to fend off starvation.¹¹ Their attempt to procure money and extra ration coupons for sending their children to school demonstrates the Indians' shrewd survival strategy.

The Navajo gave top priority to procuring more food. They often tried pleading for larger rations. While officers struggled to find a solution, sometimes increasing the size of the ration, other times shifting its frequency, the Indians acted to meet their needs by their own methods. They stole any available food and also produced some three thousand extra ration coupons.¹² By forging metal coupons, the Navajos were utilizing an old skill to meet a new need.

Navajos receiving ration tickets, Fort Sumner, N. Mex. Courtesy National Archives, photo no. 111-SC-87966.

In addition, since the number of forged tickets increased from January to May of 1865, the number of Indians who benefitted from this practice probably increased.¹³ Apparently, however, this strategy profited some Indians at the expense of others.

Another method of obtaining extra food was prostitution, which was not a standard practice under less stressful conditions. Navajo women were generally considered to be modest and decent, before and after the Bosque Redondo years. Indeed, the Navajo moral code discourages promiscuity, and Navajo religion had a ritual designed for "the removal of prostitution or mania," called The Prostitution Way.¹⁴ While the Navajo recognized the degradation of prostitution at Fort Sumner, they also indicated that the women were compelled to set aside their moral prescriptions because of poverty and hunger.¹⁵

Although some Navajo disregarded the moral injunctions of their culture against prostitution, the taboos governing residence were generally upheld. Carleton had originally planned to house the Navajo in neatly ordered barracks similar to the type of housing found in Pueblo villages.¹⁶ The Navajo, however, found this scheme unacceptable because their traditional housing was widely dispersed. Furthermore, they rejected the notion of permanent homes because of their beliefs about departed souls. "The custom of our tribe," the chiefs claimed, "is never to enter a house where a person has died, but abandon it." Consequently, they settled "in scattered and extended camps, unorganized by bands or otherwise."¹⁷

The Navajo's refusal to adhere to Carleton's plans for their housing represents another assertion of their autonomy. Instead of conforming to the military's plans, the Navajo forced the military to restructure their administration procedures. As Nelson H. Davis complained, the dispersed Indians were difficult to control, and his troops were severely taxed in their efforts to round up Indians for work.¹⁸ Thus, the defiance of the Indians allowed them to continue their traditional settlement patterns in spite of their captivity and to exert some control over the decisions that affected their lives.

For similar reasons, the Navajo refused medical treatment at the post hospital. The Indians explained that they shunned the hospital because "all that have reported there have died." Because of this

belief, Dr. Gwynter insisted on removing from the hospital all patients who were near death.¹⁹ Thus the Indians' behavior helped to dictate hospital policy.

Resistance to the hospital can also be traced to the Navajo's preference for their native medicine men. Dr. Gwynter complained that "the relations of the sick person have [occasionally] carried the patient off clandestinely, to get such benefits as may accrue from the practice of their native medicine-men."²⁰ The Indians admitted that the medicine men were often ineffectual in combatting diseases on the reservation, but explained that they lacked the plants necessary for native cures.²¹

Army doctors viewed illness as a natural occurrence treatable with scientific methods, but the Navajo had a different interpretation. In the Navajo world view, illness is an example of disharmony in the cosmic order that the performance of a religious ceremony can correct. During the ceremony, the Navajo invoke their Holy People to rectify the disturbance of order. If the ritual is correctly carried out, the deities are obligated to grant the mortal's requests, for a principle of reciprocity governs the exchange.²² In this regard, Navajo oral tradition emphasizes the importance of healing ritual at the Bosque. Charlie Mitchell, a Navajo who had been a child at the reservation, explained that ceremonies were performed to prevent the Navajo from dying in captivity.²³

In seeking solutions to disease, the Navajo rejected Anglo cures but embraced some from other Indians. They borrowed, for instance, the Chiricahua Windway from the Apache at the fort. This ritual cures a variety of sicknesses such as: those caused by the winds—being knocked over by wind, cooking with a tree felled by wind, or sleeping in a place hollowed out by winds; those caused by snakes—eating food touched by a snake, injury to a snake, or snake bites; those from a cactus—because of cooking with tree cactus; or those by flooding. Another Navajo explanation for sickness at the Bosque Redondo was witchcraft. To help combat illness resulting from witchcraft, the Navajo also adopted the Apache's Suckingway ritual technique for curing a witchcraft victim: sucking out the witch's darts.²⁴

To bring about other cures, the Navajo also performed many of their own ceremonies. For instance, the Squaw Dance, a ritual of

the Navajo Evilway, which purifies an individual from disease-inducing contacts with foreigners, was used at the Bosque.²⁵ According to this ceremony some sicknesses are the result of the ghosts of aliens, either those whom a Navajo warrior has killed, or those who died from other causes and with whom the Navajo may have had contact, sexual or otherwise. Touching the corpse or stepping on the grave of an "outsider" may also cause alien ghosts to torment a Navajo with sickness.²⁶ Because the Navajo were in close contact with Apache and Anglos who died, they no doubt felt that at least some of their sicknesses necessitated the performance of the Squaw Dance.

Other reasons for enacting the Squaw Dance were probably connected with Navajo raids from the Bosque reservation. Since Navajo warriors were killing enemies during this time, they required a Squaw Dance to prevent or cure a retaliating illness. In March of 1866, as an example, seven Navajo went on a foray against the Utes who had killed one of their children. The Navajo pursued their enemies for approximately twelve or thirteen days and then attacked them, killing five and capturing a ten-year-old Ute boy, twenty-four horses, and saddles and guns.²⁷ Another account of a Navajo campaign from Fort Sumner does not end so happily. While on a raid in the Comanche country, the Navajo lost four of their war party. The raid had been doomed, the raiders concluded, when a coyote appeared one night in the warriors' camp. In October of 1867, a contingent of Navajo retaliated against the Comanches for a raid on 9 September. The Navajo had pursued their attackers and killed twelve.²⁸

In addition to retaliatory raids, the Indians also committed offensive raids aimed at obtaining more stock. In this regard, settlers in eastern New Mexico claimed that Navajo from Fort Sumner attacked their homes and stole their livestock. Yet while some Navajo did engage in such activities, it is important to note that a large number of the complaints were probably exaggerated and that the Navajo were often blamed for depredations that other Indians committed.²⁹ Regardless of blame, warfare conducted at the Bosque Redondo required ceremony to counteract the disturbance it wrought in the natural order.

Barboncito, Navajo leader designated head chief of the Navajos by Gen. Sherman in 1868. From *The Army and the Navajo* by Gerald Thompson.

The Navajo also performed the Fire Dance, a ritual of the nine-night Mountainway or Nightway ceremonies that restore harmony. The Fire Dance combines, in a single ceremony, the abbreviated forms of many ceremonials. Dancers representing a variety of other Holyway ceremonies, such as Beautyway, Windway, or Waterway, perform a portion of their chant. The patient receives the specific benefits of each without undergoing the entire ceremony. Thus the Fire Dance saves time and expense and would serve the Navajos by adapting their more elaborate ceremonies to the limited resources of the reservation.³⁰

The Fire Dance was also possibly connected with the food problems at the Bosque. Certainly, corn-growing rites and the ritualistic treatment of food employed in the dance were relevant to experiences of the Navajo on the reservation. According to their eschatology, an individual who has eaten another person's food without ritualistic preparation may be in danger of being transformed into that person. Therefore, the Navajo may have performed Fire Dances as protection from being "transformed" by the white person's food. The recitation of rituals concerned with agriculture suggests that, although the Navajos utilized the American's technology, they were convinced that their success in farming was contingent upon their controlling the forces of nature that were responsible for the harvest.³¹

While the Navajo employed a variety of responses in order to survive at the Bosque, their ultimate goal was to return to their homeland. From April to August of 1865, approximately 1,300 Navajo left the reservation, hoping to return to their old country where roughly 1,000 to 2,000 Navajo remained, having escaped the roundup. General Carleton dealt sternly with the runaway problem, telling his newly appointed post commander Maj. William McCleave that he would kill every Indian found off the reservation without a passport. Despite this threat, Indians continued to leave the reservation over the next several years. In 1868, for example, 250 to 300 more Navajo escaped.³²

The majority of Navajo, however, remained at the Bosque Redondo and attempted to obtain their liberty through pleading and ceremony. As early as 1865, the Indians begged for their release, warning that if they were forced to remain upon the reservation

they would "all die very soon." They explained that they had been instructed by their Holy People to remain within the boundaries of three rivers, the Rio Grande, the Rio San Juan, and the Rio Colorado, and that their violation of this restriction was responsible for their current suffering. They extolled the productivity of their old country where they had enough food and firewood and were safe from their enemies.³³

According to Navajo oral tradition, it was not pleading alone that secured the Navajo's release, but also the performance of the Coyote Way ritual. Although some informants claimed that the ritual was divinatory, indicating that the government was now ready to free the Navajo, other Navajo attributed their freedom to this ceremony. The years of pleading had been unsuccessful, they claimed, until the performance of the Coyote ritual, "during which our leader was blessed with Coyote power." Because of this ceremony, the next request to leave was approved.³⁴

Moreover, the Navajo called on their religious ritual to aid them in interaction with the reservation personnel. Recognizing that Anglos controlled the reservation, the Navajo attempted, at the same time, to circumvent government officials and to procure release by petitioning their Holy People. To this day, some Navajo believe that, ultimately, their Holy People, not the United States government, returned them to their current reservation. Whatever the cause of release, on 1 July 1868, the Navajo signed a treaty with the U.S. government allowing them to return to their traditional homeland.³⁵

An examination of the Navajo's behavior at the Bosque Redondo reveals that the Indians worked toward two primary goals, survival and release, by using a pattern of cooperation, resistance, and initiative. Cooperation meant farming and learning the trades, while resistance was manifested in refusing formal education, barracks housing, and Anglo medical treatment. In addition, prostitution, forgery, raiding, fleeing, and ceremony represented Indian initiative. These varied activities indicate that the Navajo had no single survival strategy. In fact, solutions that individuals employed sometimes clashed with the interests of the tribe as a whole. For example, when Navajo leaders promised to curtail raiding, while

other Navajo raided, the Indians were factionalized, increasing the potential for cultural disintegration.³⁶

Navajo religion, however, was an important element in avoiding this fate. Oral histories recount how special the ceremonies were to the Indians during captivity and indicate their belief that their Holy People sustained the tribe at the bosque.³⁷ In addition to providing comfort, religion was also a source of social cohesion. Navajo ceremonies require large gatherings of people, some of whom are involved with the ceremony while others come to meet friends and family.³⁸ The largest number of spectators gather during the final day and night of a sing, and the patient's kinsmen are expected to feed them. Consequently, there is social pressure on all nearby relatives to contribute time and labor to help defray the costs of a ritual. Thus, kinsmen and neighbors are bound together by reciprocal obligations governing the ceremony.³⁹

Ceremony also functions ideally as a means of reducing inter-group tensions by redistributing wealth. The singer is expected to give a large portion of his fee to friends and relatives. Navajos who stint on ceremonies risk accusations of witchcraft, and prosperous Navajos must sponsor elaborate ceremonies to avoid similar suspicions.⁴⁰ In a situation such as that at the Bosque Redondo, where resources were limited and tensions great, ceremony would have provided a means of reducing stress the uneven distribution of resources generated. Religion, then, was the key to the Navajo's survival as a cultural unit during their stay near Fort Sumner.

The Bosque Redondo experiment failed for a number of reasons, most of which historians have discussed. The reservation was not economically feasible because of environmental and administrative problems, yet the failure of the Bosque Redondo cannot be understood without discussing Navajo activities. Clearly, their behavior taxed the labors of the military in administering them—because of their dispersed settlement pattern—and in containing them—because they left the post without the proper papers. Their refusal to accept the Bosque Redondo, seen in their nearly constant begging to go home, also contributed to the realization that Carleton's plan was not workable. The Navajo at the Bosque Redondo were not passive observers of the reservation's rise and fall, but were, instead, active participants in the successes and failures of the experiment.

NOTES

For help in locating sources, I would like to thank Orlando Romero, Don Padilla, and Gerald Thompson. For critical readings of this manuscript, I thank Donna Martin, Thomas Altherr, George Phillips, Richard Clemmer-Smith, John Chance, and especially David Brugge.

1. Lawrence C. Kelly, *Navajo Roundup* (Boulder, Colo.: Pruett Publishing Company, 1970).

2. Gen. James H. Carleton to Adj. Gen. Lorenzo Thomas, Santa Fe, 6 September 1863, Letters Received by the Adjutant General's Office (LRAGO), Albert H. Schroeder Collection, State Records Center and Archives (SRCA), Santa Fe.

3. George Gwynter, "An Indian Reservation," *Overland Monthly* 10 (February 1873): 126; Theodore H. Dodd to A. Baldwin Norton, 7 December 1867, 29 September 1867, Letters Received by the New Mexico Superintendency (LRNMS), Microcopy 234, rolls (R) 554, 555, box 13, National Archives (NA), 1956; Charles L. Werner, testimony before the Doolittle Commission, U.S. Congress, Joint Special Committee on Indian Affairs, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, S. Doc. 148 (Serial 1279), 39th Cong., 2d sess., 1867; Testimony of the Navajo Chiefs before the Doolittle Commission, in *Condition*, pp. 307-11, 353.

4. Carleton to Thomas, Santa Fe, 12, 19 March 1864, LRAGO, Schroeder Collection, SRCA.

5. James L. Collins to Carleton, 18 July 1864, LRNMS, roll 552.

6. Annual Report of Michael Steck, Territorial Indian Superintendent, 10 October 1864, Papers of Michael Steck, folder number 2, Schroeder Collection, SRCA.

7. "A Council with the Navajos," *Window Rock Navajo Times*, 28 May 1868, Navajo Tourist Guide, July 1966.

8. Capt. Henry Bristol, testimony, *Condition*, p. 344; Delgadito, testimony, *Condition*, p. 335.

9. Carleton to Secretary of the Interior John P. Usher, *Condition*, pp. 310-11.

10. Gwynter, "An Indian Reservation," pp. 127-28.

11. Testimony of the Navajo chiefs, *Condition*, p. 335.

12. Carleton to Capt. William H. Bell, chief commissary, Santa Fe, 10 December 1864, *Condition*, p. 312; Nelson H. Davis to Ben Cutler, 25 March 1865, LRAGO, Schroeder Collection, SRCA.

13. Arthur Woodward, *A Brief History of Navajo Silversmithing* (Flagstaff: Northern Arizona Society of Science and Art, 1938), 14-15, 60; 2d Lt. George W. Arnold to Brig. Gen. Marcellus M. Crocker, 1 January 1865, Abstract, Fort Sumner: Rations, Bosque Redondo File, box 3, Frank McNitt Collection, SRCA, Santa Fe.

14. Donald E. Worcester, "The Navaho during the Spanish Regime in New Mexico," *New Mexico Historical Review* 26 (April 1951): 101-18; Aleš Hrdlička, *Physiological and Medical Observations Among the Indians of the Southwestern United States and Northern Mexico*, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 34

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1908), 33; John Ladd, *The Structure of a Moral Code, a Philosophical Analysis of Ethical Discourse Applied to the Ethics of the Navaho Indians* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957): 243–44; Leland C. Wyman and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Navajo Classification of Their Song Ceremonials* (Menasha, Wis.: American Anthropological Association, 1938), Memoir 53, 25–27.

15. Delgadito, testimony, *Condition*, p. 357.

16. Carleton to Maj. Henry D. Wallen, Santa Fe, 28 February 1863, *Condition*, p. 161.

17. "Report of a Council with the Navajos," Indian Agent A. Baldwin Norton to Nathaniel G. Taylor, 15 September 1867, LRNMS, roll 554; Delgadito, in *Condition*, p. 356. See Gladys Reichard, *Navajo Religion: A Study of Symbolism*, 2 vols. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1950): 40–45, for an explanation of Navajo beliefs concerning departed souls. Leland C. Wyman also notes that homes in which an individual died of old age need not, because of the prayers of Blessingway, be destroyed upon the elderly person's death (Leland C. Wyman, *Blessingway* [Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970], p. 10); Davis to Cutler, 25 March 1865, LLAGO, Schroeder Collection, SRCA.

18. Davis to Cutler, 25 March 1865, LLAGO, Schroeder Collection, SRCA.

19. John Brooke to Mason Howard, 19 December 1867, LRNMS, roll 554; Testimony of the Indian chiefs, in *Condition*, p. 334; Gwynther, testimony, *Condition*, p. 334.

20. Gwynther, testimony, *Condition*, 334.

21. Testimony of the Navajo chiefs, *Condition*, p. 356; testimony of John Bowman before the Indian Claims Commission, 16, 17 January 1951, Window Rock, Ariz., Schroeder Collection, SRCA; *Navajo Stories of the Long Walk Period*, Ruth Roessel, ed. (Tsaile, Ariz.: Navajo Community College Press, 1973), 260.

22. Leland C. Wyman, in *The Mountainway of the Navajo* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970), 4, calls Navajo religion "medical theory and practice," but Reichard, *Navajo Religion*, 1:11, argues that the curing of disease is not the sole purpose of a chant, and "affinity with our medical terms, if there is any, is fortuitous." Thus, while Navajo religious rites may be performed for a number of reasons, the curing of disease is usually central to their performances.

23. Wyman, *The Windways of the Navajo* (Colorado Springs: The Taylor Museum, 1962), 20–21, 214; Karl W. Luckert, "Toward a Historical Perspective on Navajo Religion," in *Navajo Religion and Culture: Selected Views*, eds. David M. Brugge and Charlotte Frisbee (Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 1982), 190; Jesus Arvisio, a Mexican interpreter, told Captain Bristol that witchcraft was a common explanation for illness and had a host of "charms" and ceremonies to combat it (Bristol, testimony, *Condition*, p. 358).

24. David Aberle, *Peyote Religion Among the Navajo* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966), 49–50.

25. *Navajo Stories*, pp. 215, 227, 264; Gladys Reichard, *Navajo Medicine Man: Sandpaintings and Legends of Miguelito* (New York: Dover Publications, 1939),

19; Bernard Haile, *The Navajo War Dance* (Saint Michaels, Ariz.: Saint Michaels Press, 1946), 4.

26. W. W. Hill, "Navajo Warfare," in *Yale University Publications in Anthropology*, no. 5 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1936), 14-18; Haile, *War Dance*, pp. 4-6.

27. David M. Brugge, "A Navajo Campaign from Fort Sumner," *Window Rock, Ariz.*, *Navajo Times*, Centennial Edition, 14 July 1968.

28. Hill, "Navajo Warfare," p. 18; Dodd to Norton, 11 September 1867, LRNMS, roll 554.

29. The National Archive records contain innumerable references to Navajo depredations during the Fort Sumner years. For examples of such complaints, see Cutler to Crocker, 9 November 1864; Lorenzo Labadie to Steck, 22 October 1864, 3 November 1865; Steck Papers; and LRNMS, roll 555, especially, settlement of claims against Navajo raiders, 20 February 1867. At one point, Carleton himself encouraged the Navajo to raid the Comanches to supplement their herds; see Carleton to Crocker, 31 October 1864, in *Condition*, p. 211. Upon several occasions, however, Navajo were falsely blamed for raids. See Carleton to Usher, 27 August 1864, in *Condition*, pp. 192-93; and Brugge, "A Navajo Campaign."

30. *Navajo Stories*, pp. 215, 264; Wyman, *Mountainway*, p. 28.

31. Reichard, *Navajo Religion*, pp. 114-15, 265. For a comprehensive discussion of the role of religion in Navajo agriculture, see W. W. Hill, *The Agricultural and Hunting Methods of the Navajo Indians* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1938).

32. The exact number of Navajo who escaped the roundup is not known. Robert A. Roessel, Jr., in "Navajo History, 1850-1923," pp. 513-14, sets the estimate at around 1-2,000. A fascinating account of a family of Navajos who hid for four years before finally going to the Bosque is found in *Museum Notes of The Museum of Northern Arizona*, 9 (May 1937). See Abstract no. 6, "Exodus: 1865," Frank McNitt's personal notes, McNitt Collection, SRCA, Santa Fe, for a summary of Navajos' escape activity. Carleton's threat is found in his letter of 9 August 1865, Carleton to Maj. William McCleave, in "Exodus: 1865." Dodd to Norton, 7 December 1867, LRNMS, roll 555; A. Rosenthal to Davis, 1 February 1868, LRNMS, roll 555.

33. "A Council with the Navajo," 28 May 1868, *Navajo Times*; Report of Indian Agent Edmund A. Graves, December 1865; Navajo Chief Manuelito in *Condition*, p. 222. For a comprehensive discussion of the geographical elements in Navajo religion, see Richard V. VanValkenburgh and Clyde Kluckhohn, "Navajo Sacred Places" in *Navajo Indians III*, David Agee Horr, ed. (New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1974).

34. Testimony of informants who claimed that the Coyote Way was divinatory is found in *Navajo Stories*, pp. 85, 136-37, 224, while reports of persons believing that the Coyote Way was compulsory are found on pp. 179, 212, 238, 270.

35. U.S., Cong., Senate, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, "A Treaty with the

Navajo Indians," S. Doc. 452 (Serial 4254), 57th Cong., 1st sess., 1901-2, pp. 782-85.

36. The factionalization of the Navajo over raiding practices is well documented. For example, in the period following the relocation at Fort Sumner, the Navajo chief Manuelito executed forty Indians as witches. These men were raiders and warriors who advocated armed resistance against the Anglos. See Kluckhohn, *Navajo Witchcraft* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, 1944, Paper 22, No. 2, pp. 63-64. Evon Vogt describes the tension between rich Navajo who opposed raiding and poor Navajo who wanted to continue the practice in "The Navajos," in *Perspectives in Indian Culture Change*, Edward H. Spicer, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 306. Many Navajo also discuss the problem of raiding in *Navajo Stories*.

37. *Navajo Stories*, pp. xi, 264; Robert J. Roessel, *Pictorial History of the Navajo from 1860-1910* (Rough Rock, Ariz.: Navajo Curriculum Center of the Rough Rock Demonstration School, 1980), 20.

38. Reichard, *Navajo Religion*, xxxiii; Wyman, *Mountainway*, pp. 6-7.

39. Clyde Kluckhohn, "Some Personal and Social Aspects of Navajo Ceremonial Practice," *Harvard Theological Review* 32 (January 1939): 78-79.

40. Kluckhohn, "Personal Aspects," pp. 80-81.

41. The importance of religion in sustaining other relocated peoples is examined in Elizabeth Colson, *The Social Consequences of Resettlement: The Impact of the Kariba Resettlement Upon the Gwembe Tonga* (Manchester, Eng.: University of Manchester Press, 1971).

Navajo hogan and sheep. Milton Snow, photographer. Courtesy U.S. Indian Service.