Mexican Immigration and Border Strategy During the Revolution, 1910–1920

Douglas W. Richmond

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr

Recommended Citation

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in New Mexico Historical Review by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.
After defeating a variety of rivals by 1915, Venustiano Carranza established a nationalist government that confronted Woodrow Wilson and the United States. Many of the resulting conflicts originated along the U.S.-Mexican border because life in that area became violent. The uncertain status of Mexican braceros and immigrants became important issues for both governments, especially when Carranza decided to remedy the plight of Mexican immigrants and to organize them as his allies. Political strategies and the economies of both countries depended upon successful resolution of these border disputes.

Mexico's most important political change, the Revolution of 1910 to 1920, naturally dominated these years. Beginning with the efforts of Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón to organize armed resistance and working class solidarity against the governments of Porfirio Díaz and Francisco Madero, anarchosyndicalism became one of the radical manifestations of a social revolution affecting the border after 1910. Border issues such as radical dissent were complex because, though originating within the region, they had noticeable impact on Washington, D.C. and Mexico City.

To deal with these border problems, the Mexican government requested permission from the United States to send Mexican troops across the United States side of the border to defeat radicals. Because areas such as Baja California were inaccessible and traditional regions of filibuster activity and these requests vital to the security of any regime, the United States usually cooperated because many of the Mexican anarchosyndicalists had Mexican-American adherents in Los Angeles, Texas, and throughout the Southwest.¹ Both
governments tried to keep the border free of leftist dissidents who might aid the growth of the Industrial Workers of the World or the Magonistas.

Once Woodrow Wilson and Carranza assumed power, however, national strategies along the border became warlike. Wilson sought any pretext to remove Huerta, threatening him with armed intervention if he could not control and defeat the "vandalism" caused by the Villista and Carrancista groups. After the U.S. invasion of Veracruz in 1914, Huerta tried to unify the nation behind him and put aside the differences the civil war had caused. But the Constitutionalist forces of Carranza ignored Huerta's demands that they battle together against occupation forces at Veracruz. A few months later, Huerta fled the country and within two years died in exile.

During his career as rebel and constitutional president, Carranza carefully considered the political complexities of the border. He established several sympathetic newspapers on both sides of the border with Constitutionalist propagandizers campaigning effectively in several border towns and collecting large amounts of funds. In addition, several juntas constitucionalistas recruited men and found supplies for Carranza during his various struggles. The average border inhabitant, however, suffered greatly when revolutionary forces seized food, horses, and other goods. It was not always a comfort to know that enemies of Carranza would have their land taken away. Although the seized lands were returned by 1917, the years of violence meant insecurity and fear.

Carranza's desire for a secure border often motivated his diplomacy concerning the U.S.-Mexican boundary. Obtaining de facto recognition was a major task. Some Mexican generals went to the extreme of offering to cross the border and to raise the Mexican flag in order to obtain the desired result. After Wilson relented and recognized the Carranza government, both governments avoided war but sought to protect their interests. Agreements for pursuit of bandits on both sides of the border personified this spirit, and working class organizations pressured Carranza and Wilson to settle their differences peacefully. In the meantime, Carranza decided to control his side of the border. Whenever possible, he exiled priests and other dissidents, and when Mexican authorities turned over to American officials a Mexican national accused of theft, Car-
ranza had the careless subordinate shot. Incidents involving national honor were paramount to Carranza.

Carranza's diplomatic triumphs established the precedent of a nationalist foreign policy that enabled future Mexican governments to protect Mexico's economic and political interests. Carranza was more bold than any other leader of the Mexican Revolution in resisting the intervention of the Wilson regime. For this stance, he received widespread support from all classes when he opposed U.S. imperialism. Because Wilson and Carranza were determined to implement their plans, the frontera norte became the scene of bitter conflicts.

Carranza's most dramatic innovations were his policy of protecting Mexico's natural resources and his imposing state regulations on most economic activity. As early as 1914, Carranza tripled the oil production tax. He also suspended the construction of new oil fields in January 1915 and decreed that oil companies must submit detailed plans to his officials for their approval. In addition to securing massive revenue from the oil fields, Carranza asserted Mexican ownership of subsoil wealth in other foreign-owned sectors of the economy. In September 1916, Carranza ordered foreign and national mineowners to renew full-time operations or face expropriation. Like the oil companies, mineowners such as the Guggenheims had to pay sharply increased taxes in oro nacional (gold currency).

Carranza also began attacking foreign control of the nation's land. A decree in June 1916 ruled that foreign capitalists had to renounce external citizenship, promise formally to abide by Mexican law, and recognize that the Carranza regime could intervene into any matter involving foreign-owned lands. Carranza also barred foreigners from buying land in the federal district and various states throughout the country. In addition, the government revoked many of the colonization contracts the Díaz regime had granted. Most of the land concessions involved border areas capitalized by development companies from the western United States.

Unfortunately, wartime conditions and the clash between Wilson and Carranza over the exploitation of Mexico's natural wealth slowed the revival of the border economy. North American companies generally opposed the enormous tax increases Carranza imposed.
To pressure him into retreating, they delayed renewing operation of their plants. Shortages of coal and oil also endangered the recovery of various industries, particularly in the mining sector. Another debilitating component of border economic problems was inflation. Until financial stability asserted itself in 1917, the border suffered from counterfeiters and a flood of new currency.13

Despite Carranza's new economic policies, northern Mexico continued to depend upon border trade with the United States. This relationship was not always beneficial, particularly when U.S. officials adversely affected the frontera norte's commercial traffic by suspending trade across the border.14 Another persistent border irritant was the problem of contraband. Anxious to protect her industry even during the Revolution, Mexico erected tariff walls to restrict the entry of many U.S. goods, but smuggling satisfied demands for North American products despite plans to stamp out illegal border trade. This conflict was particularly difficult for Carranza because he would not permit Mexican agricultural exports in order to feed a hungry population. Although Carranza was successful in regulating foreign economic activity, U.S. and British wealth in Mexico increased during the Revolution.15 Moreover, massive migration of Mexicans into the United States from 1916 to 1920 illustrates the economic problems that Mexico suffered during that era.

Mexican emigration to the north had begun even before the United States was a nation. First, Spanish conquistadors conquered what is now Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California, but when Mexico lost possession of Texas in 1836 and the Southwest in 1848, many Mexicans remained to become U.S. citizens. Some assumed positions of power and influence, but more were treated as a conquered group by subsequent waves of Anglos from the east and north. The first real Mexican migrations began with the building of railroads across the Southwest. The railroads provided transportation and jobs for the new Mexican immigrants, dispersing them through shanty towns in Arizona and New Mexico, to California farms, and into Texas mines. Soon they became the premier agricultural workers throughout the Southwest and spread into factories of the Midwest. By 1900, an estimated 100,000 Mexicans were living in the United States.16
The first U.S. restrictions upon Mexican immigration evolved during the early years of the Revolution. Until the creation of the Border Patrol in 1924, only about sixty mounted agents patrolled the 1900-mile border. Lax border control enabled the immigrants to cross the frontera norte with ease until anarchists caused concern. Because Mexican radicals cooperated with the Western Federation of Miners and received aid from militant labor leaders in the United States, the first U.S. restrictions placed upon Mexican immigration in 1903 were designed to check the entry of anarchists. Most of the Mexican anarchists were young, politically aware immigrants who had a profound impact upon Mexican-American communities. These activists tried to prepare the communities for revolution in Mexico and organized strikes in a number of areas.  

While keeping in mind opposition against him in the United States and socioeconomic changes in Mexico, Carranza carefully assessed the role of Mexicans along the border. Mexican immigrants were a major factor in Carranza's policy of curtailing U.S. intervention. The humanitarian impulse of the Mexican Revolution, whose egalitarianism proclaimed protection of oppressed peoples from the strong powers, was another major factor. Carranza responded to border Mexicans and their needs as if they lived in Mexico.

The immigration of Mexican laborers across the border was a painful episode in Mexican and U.S. history. Carranza had witnessed the traumatic conditions of these generally poor people when in exile in San Antonio. Bad treatment of the immigrants angered Carranza early in his career, and he was determined to improve the situation. As violence increased after 1911, whole villages fled across the border. As is the case today, the refugees were looking for work often not available in Mexico. Sleeping on the streets of Eagle Pass and other border cities, the immigrants frequently subsisted on little more than coffee and crackers. (Those not searching for jobs were usually the families of various factional groups fighting in Mexico.) Without shoes and dressed in rags, these refugees elicited sympathy from Mexican as well as North American officials.

Carranza opposed emigration because the flight of Mexican workers disrupted economic recovery when labor became scarce. In
Fred R. Wulff, U.S. mine owner, with two peons near Torreón. Courtesy of Alice W. McCart.

Mexican revolutionaries led by José Inés Salazar in action near the border. Courtesy of Alice W. McCart.
addition to the large numbers who crossed the border, many Mexican workers moved throughout northern Mexico from one area to another in search of jobs. The attitude of Mexican governors along the border matched that of the chief executive. Their apprehension about the loss of agricultural workers convinced Carranza to take action. In March 1918, he prohibited the issuing of passports to Mexican workers attempting to find employment across the border.

Carranza's nationalist border policy also included attempts to protect Mexican braceros who found work in the United States. By January 1917, the Secretaría de Gobernación informed emigration officials that no Mexican laborers could leave the nation unless they had a contract outlining hours of work and compensation. Carranza also used his consuls to intervene in the making of contracts so that Mexican workers would have decent conditions outlined and enforced. When a strike of Mexican workers in Clifton, Arizona, threatened to explode into violence, Carranza answered the Arizona governor's appeal for aid; he sent his best consul to arbitrate differences, and as a result the workers secured wage increases.

Carranza's early concern for their welfare did not go unnoticed among Mexican immigrants. By 1915, many of them continued to support Carranza, despite propaganda campaigns by conservative and Catholic refugees attacking the president.

Meanwhile, diplomatic conflict with the Wilson government provoked the first comprehensive United States restrictions against Mexican immigration. The Immigration Act of February 5, 1917 insisted that all aliens be literate and pay an eight dollar head tax. Wilson, however, overlooked the fact that the World War I created a new labor demand, which made this legislation meaningless. Under pressure from growers, Wilson lifted the restriction in May but imposed a six-month residence period for braceros, forced them to carry identification cards, and threatened deportation for those attempting to work in nonagricultural jobs. In addition, state governments were supposed to establish housing and sanitation standards. To discourage the Mexicans from becoming U.S. citizens, growers withheld the workers' wages at discounted rates of ten to twenty percent each month. These wages were deposited in the U.S. Postal Savings Bank until the braceros returned to their place of departure in Mexico.
For the first time, a Mexican government actively demanded that workers who migrated to the Southwest be treated fairly. In doing so, Carranza frustrated the work of labor recruiters searching for bracero workers in Mexico. Despite the arguments of U.S. Ambassador Henry P. Fletcher and the Labor Department, Carranza pointed out that working conditions were unsatisfactory and that southwestern growers never fulfilled their contracts. Mexico made it clear that only if the U.S. federal government would cooperate in ending bad labor conditions and heed the complaints of the braceros could they expect to receive unlimited Mexican labor. But the State Department considered "inexpedient" an agreement with Carranza on uniform regulations and reciprocal border permits.

Still unresolved, these problems continue to plague relations between both nations. But in the past, the list of complaints was much longer. The Mexican foreign relations ministry protested the conscription of Mexican citizens into the U.S. army and their use as strikebreakers. Then, as now, coyotes promised good employment to Mexican workers but often abandoned them along la frontera norte. Despite formidable objections from the Carranza government, its workers continued to toil in humiliating circumstances. Carranza, his governors, and Mexican consuls restricted immigration to protest poor living conditions and endemic racism that Mexicans often encountered in their new surroundings along the border.

Carranza also attempted to aid those whose fortunes in the United States declined. Under the pressure of living without their families, several Mexican immigrants went insane, whereupon North American officials usually jailed and deported them. When high wartime salaries in the U.S. ended, many immigrants did not find the work that they sought. From 1915 to 1919, hundreds of braceros returned to Saltillo, Piedras Negras, and Ciudad Juárez. The Carrancistas became concerned about their suffering because many lacked funds to purchase train tickets to return home. Thousands of Mexicans stranded along the border and out of work accepted Carranza's offer of free transportation. Carranza telegraphed each governor and secured work for braceros in states such as Oaxaca, Morelos, Campeche, Yucatán, and Michoacán. Carranza also sent hundreds of dollars for the relief of refugees near Eagle Pass.
Various generals and governors provided unsuccessful immigrants with land seized from Carranza's wealthy opponents and urged Carranza to expand this policy.\textsuperscript{34}

Residents of the United States never welcomed the immigrants with open arms. From 1918 to 1920, the Wilson government feared that Carranza would encourage rebellion within the United States, and many Southwesterners believed that Mexican refugees would sow revolutionary ideas among minorities and labor organizations. U.S. border patrols often had orders to stop anyone crossing the line and frequently shot Mexicans who tried to ford the rivers or boundaries. The arrival of Mexican army reinforcements in 1918 temporarily halted these flagrant abuses and death-dealing U.S. raids across the border.\textsuperscript{35}

Social conditions in various Mexican border cities were strikingly similar to problems of today. The turbulence of the Revolution forced cities such as Ciudad Juárez to request funds for public works projects such as streets and slaughterhouses.\textsuperscript{36} Because the Rio Grande cut off Mexican territory eventually claimed by the United States, a Chihuahua deputy asked Carranza for 100,000 pesos to reconstruct defensive fortifications in front of Ciudad Juárez. The dispute over this land, known as the Chamizal problem, would fester for several decades until the United States returned the land to Mexico in 1964.\textsuperscript{37}

Still, morale in the border cities remained higher than many Carrancista authorities expected. Residents of Piedras Negras appealed to Carranza when their Jefe de Armas opened up a Gran Jugada as a source of municipal revenue. They argued that this gathering place resulted in “ruin and shame” because thirsty gringo visitors showed up to drink excessively in cantinas and encourage cockfights.\textsuperscript{38} Physical security was another problem for border towns. In some areas, municipal police had to be called on to battle bandits, Villistas, and U.S. soldiers who crossed the border to hunt down Mexican raiders. During these armed conflicts many Mexican citizens in border areas lost their lives.\textsuperscript{39}

In North American cities, Mexican consuls actively protested numerous abuses that Mexican refugees suffered. Humiliated by unemployment, discrimination, unofficial segregation, Texas rangers, and vicious lynchings, immigrants on the border and most
Mexican braceros constructing the Trasquila dam in northern Mexico. Courtesy of Alice W. McCart.
Mexican-Americans found life very difficult. Living conditions were uniformly bad. In Laredo and most other Texas towns, Mexicans and their children experienced segregation in public facilities. Sympathetic to the plight of the immigrants and eager to promote their interests, Carranza ordered his consuls in border cities to demand that Mexicans receive fair treatment. For example, officials such as F. J. Stafka protested films in Tucson that depicted Mexican soldiers abusing U.S. citizens and their children. Consuls also protested the indifference of U.S. customs officials to the suffering of refugees in areas such as Douglas, Arizona.

This intervention of consuls into the lives of Mexican nationals was a historical departure from the pre-Revolution days when the plight of immigrants was not considered a serious matter. These new actions of Mexican diplomats brought mixed responses. Mexican residents in U.S. border cities often praised or condemned the efforts of these officials. Some urged armed resistance to the Wilson government or cited specific abuses needing to be corrected. Not all refugees, however, were poor. Some of them plotted against the Carranza government with the aid of North American investors who would have prospered if Carranza's economic reforms ended.

As working class life began to improve, the generally militant labor movement managed to reach some accommodation with the new regime in Mexico City. A principal cause of the Revolution was the resentment that workers harbored against foreign investors. Before Carranza came to power, mine workers demanded that the federal government no longer permit foreigners to exploit them. The proletariat emerging from the mines became so militant that they often threatened to lynch brutal foremen, even after judges absolved these supervisors of any crimes. Once Carranza became the executive, Carrancistas listened carefully to working class demands, and state governments along the border negotiated with strikers before calling in troops to restore order. In Coahuila, the governor requested more rail traffic from the federal government to mitigate the effects of local layoffs. Generally speaking, Carranza and his governors preferred a paternalistic relation with labor in which they attempted to check revolutionary protests with mild reformism or repression.
Despite continued attempts to eradicate them, vice and corruption maintained their sturdy tradition along the border. Some of Carranza's officials, often intoxicated in various bars or found guilty of fraud, left something to be desired. Many authorities could not resist the juicy bribes forthcoming from the increased traffic in drugs, alcohol, and prostitution in the frontier towns. The vice trade increased noticeably after prohibition became the law in the United States, with drugs and crime becoming a way of life. The governor of Baja California was so corrupt that he operated an opium business in conjunction with Chinese merchants. He used his hypodermic needle so often that one leg and one arm were partially black and covered with ugly perforations. 46

In addition to these problems, border clashes between the Mexican and United States military were as frequent as they were serious. Earlier, Mexican raids upon Texas ranchers provoked general tension, and the constant incursions of U.S. soldiers also contributed to a growing xenophobia along the frontera norte as Mexican citizens often fought them with the aid of federal troops. In several cases, U.S. soldiers fired upon Mexican citizens and soldiers merely for approaching the linea divisoria. These incidents often resulted from the illegal passage of contraband supplies to anti-Carranza rebels. On other occasions, many border residents drew rifle fire when they tried to avoid paying customs taxes. Carranza was particularly angry when he learned that the head of the Texas Rangers aided conservative dissidents who attacked Mexico from Texas. 47 Lengthy presidential addresses in 1918 and 1919 indicate that these animosities left a lasting rancor that still has not entirely disappeared.

The degree of support that Carranza received in opposing the Pershing expedition of 1916 illustrates the growth of Mexican nationalism along the border. Carranza protested strongly against the Pershing attack; at one point he ordered his generals to fight if Pershing advanced farther south. Wilson attempted to use the withdrawal of the Pershing column by demanding that Carranza alter his policies concerning foreign capital, but Carranza refused. 48 All classes of border people sent Carranza emotional letters of support and participated in popular demonstrations. The masses also requested weapons and military instruction. Essentially, they con-
sidered armed intervention an intolerable attack on the national sovereignty. These reactions reveal an attitude of solidarity, determination, and collective unity absent during the war of 1846 to 1848.49

Even more interesting is the backing that Carranza received from Mexicanos who resided in the Southwest. Recent immigrants were determinedly loyal to Mexico. Given the growing unrest that appeared in southwestern cities after Pershing crossed the border, many U.S. officials feared a Mexican revolt in support of Carranza.50 This factor, along with an increasingly dangerous situation in Europe, may have prevented an even larger army from being sent into northern Mexico.

Another event that strengthened the Carranza government was the victory of the army, now a totally new group of volunteers, at the battle of Carrizal. This triumph gave officers enormous prestige and confidence. According to a British journalist, the tough attitude of Gen. Jacinto B. Treviño against the arrogant Pershing and Treviño's strategy during the battle were factors in forcing the invaders to withdraw.51 Carranza himself was prepared to initiate total warfare if such a measure were necessary to oust the North American troops. Much of the tension was dissipated when Gen. Alvaro Obregón entered into negotiations with Gen. Hugh Scott in El Paso for the removal of the Pershing expedition. Since the army was the most important institution in Mexico, its increased stature was a definite factor in border diplomacy.52

Another feature of the border, the growing dissatisfaction of Mexican-American communities in the U.S., is evident in a serious Mexican revolt in Texas. The Plan de San Diego began with a call for blacks and native Americans to join Mexicans in seizing parts of the Southwest and expelling the Anglo majority. Written in jail by Huerta officers in 1914, the plan was predicated upon Mexican and immigrant needs. Huerta authorities counted on the support of blacks on the border to aid them in case Wilson decided to mount an all-out invasion of Mexico.53

In October 1915, the revolt began with the obvious support of the Carranza government. It was the most aggressive action taken by any Mexican regime since the times of Antonio López de Santa
and had to recruit volunteers, National Guardsmen, and Texas Rangers because the bloody uprising eventually claimed hundreds of lives. Carranza probably fomented the uprising to secure de facto diplomatic recognition and to use the conflict as a lever to begin negotiations for the withdrawal of the Pershing forces.55

Before it ended, the revolt became a serious affair. In June 1916, Gen. Juan Antonio Acosta boasted to Gen. Pablo González that "the revolution in Texas is assuming serious proportions and the gringos are very scared."56 Although this assertion is somewhat exaggerated, violence did shake south Texas all along the border. Many Anglos feared that a race war would soon break out if local Mexicans joined the revolt. But once Carranza received diplomatic recognition and the Pershing expedition departed, he had achieved his objectives, and he kept the leaders out of Texas, terminating support for further armed unrest until 1919.57 Not since the days of Juan Cortina had the Mexicanos decided upon a violent revolt to overturn a system that did little to satisfy their socioeconomic needs.

Clearly, then, Mexican border policy represented changes the Revolution had unleashed. The decision to oppose U.S. intervention strengthened the Carranza government; nationalism arose to new heights, and confidence in the government grew despite a time of economic deprivation. Although Carranza established the precedent of state regulation of the nation's wealth, foreign ownership of wealth increased to the point that U.S. and British interests were more active in the structure of the Mexican economy by 1920 than in 1910. Carranza was probably willing to allow these foreign interests to flourish since they provided jobs in northern Mexico and stimulated commerce.

U.S. reaction to the immigrants was different from that of Mexico. As the bustling southwest economy began to need laborers, planters, miners, and railroad interests succeeded in overturning the restrictive immigrant legislation of 1917; but when the Mexican braceros were not needed or the fear took hold that they were dangerous radicals, they were deported or excluded.

On the other hand, Carranza's strategy with emigrants was pragmatic and humanitarian. The Mexican president sought allies to forestall U.S. intervention and to gain diplomatic recognition. For
forestall U.S. intervention and to gain diplomatic recognition. For this reason he backed the Plan de San Diego revolt when it suited him, but he also aided the migrants so that they would not become allied with reactionary plotters who wanted to destroy his regime and its nationalist ideology. Moreover, Carranza could not abide the harsh treatment that Mexicans normally underwent after leaving his country. To maintain economic recovery, Carranza discouraged further emigration, but he also aided those who had left the country in demanding better working and living conditions in the United States.

Within a decade, the border was transformed from an open frontier to something resembling a war zone. The relative peace that characterized the border before 1900 evaporated as civil war, ethnic revolts, and exploitation became frequent border scenes. Old prejudices and injustices fueled the conflict as both nations battled to gain economic advantages and carry out wartime strategies. Temporarily, Mexicans, immigrants, and Mexican-Americans united to defend the government in Mexico City against the status quo in the Southwest, and the gulf separating Hispanics from Anglos was probably wider than ever. Undoubtedly, during the Revolution, the border was farther from cultural pluralism and political harmony than at any other time in its modern history. Carranza’s border policy reflected his determination to improve the treatment of Mexican immigrants and to strengthen the Mexican economy within the context of his fierce nationalism. Carranza’s diplomatic and military triumphs along the northern frontier demonstrate that he was a clever strategist and an able statesman who enjoyed mass support to a greater extent than is commonly recognized.

NOTES

* Funds from the University of Texas at Arlington Organized Research Fund supported the travel and research for this study.

1. Mexican consul in Calexico, California, to Military Commander of Baja California, 6 November 1911, legajo 836, folleto R-5-122, pp. 80–83, Archivo Histórico Diplomático Mexicano de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (AREM), Mexico City. Mexican consul in Calexico to Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, 19 November 1911, legajo 863, folleto R-5-122, pp. 96–98, AREM; Mexican am-


3. General T. Quintana Villadama to Pablo González, 29 April 1914, Manuscritos de Manuel González (MMG), Mexico City, carpeta 15, no. 2190, Centro de Estudios de Historia de México (CEHM), Mexico City.

4. Complaints about requisitions and Carranza’s reaction are in governor of Nuevo León to Venustiano Carranza, 6 July 1915, Telegramas de Venustiano Carranza (TVC), Mexico City, Nuevo León, carpeta 1, CEHM, and Carranza to General Gregorio Osuna, 11 July 1916, TVC, Nuevo León, carpeta 1, CEHM. Land seizures are noted in governor of Chihuahua to Carranza, 31 December 1917, TVC, Chihuahua, carpeta 2, CEHM.

5. General Fortunato Zuazua to Carranza, 15 August 1915, TVC, Nuevo León, carpeta 1, CEHM.

6. F. Zapata to Gerzayn Ugarte, 28 June 1916, TVC, Coahuila, carpeta 3, CEHM; governor of Nuevo León to Carranza, 18 March 1916, TVC, Nuevo León, carpeta 2, CEHM.


9. For nationalist sentiment against the oil companies, see Carranza decree of 23 July 1914 in Manuscritos de don Venustiano Carranza (AC), Mexico City, CEHM; Pastor Rouaix to Carranza, 31 May 1915, AC. James Bevan to Secretary


13. Governor of Coahuila to Carranza, 11 September 1915, TVC, Nuevo León, carpeta 1; Nicéforo Zambrano to Carranza, 6 June 1916, TVC, Nuevo León, carpeta 2; governor of Chihuahua to Carranza, 8 June 1916, TVC, Chihuahua, carpeta 1, CEHM.

14. Governor of Coahuila to Carranza, 7, 27 June 1916, TVC, Coahuila, carpeta 3; Customs administrator to Carranza, 31 August 1917, TVC, Coahuila, carpeta 5, CEHM.

15. For the increase in foreign operations within the Mexican economy and other broad conclusions, see John Womack, “The Mexican Economy During the Revolution,” *Marxist Perspectives* 1 (Winter 1978): 80–123.


19. Mexican consul in Eagle Pass to Inspector of Consuls in San Antonio, 2, 3 October 1913, legajo 842, folleto 113-R-13, p. 100, AREM; jefe de armas in Ciudad Porfirio Díaz to governor of Coahuila, 10 March 1914, legajo 335, expediente 48, AGEC.
20. Adolfo de la Huerta to Carranza, 10 September 1916, AC.
21. U.S. consul in Eagle Pass to Secretary of State, 18 March 1918, RDS, roll 812.11, frame 0068.
22. James Parker to Department of State, 17 January 1917, RDS, roll 812.34, frames 0860–61.
23. Governor of Arizona to Carranza, 14 December 1915, AC; Mexican consul in El Paso to Carranza, 7 February 1916, AC, CEHM.
24. Mexican immigrants to Carranza, 23 March 1916, AC; Unión Constitucionalista de Obreros Mexicanos to Carranza, 6 December 1915, AC, CEHM.
28. Mexican consul in San Francisco to Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, 27 July 1918, AC. Particularly revealing is a Mexican secret service report dated 27 July 1917, legajo 864, folleto R-123-3, p. 72, AREM.
30. Inspector de Inmigración in Ciudad Porfirio Díaz to governor of Coahuila, 28 March 1914, legajo 331, expediente 11,593, AGEC.
31. Jefe de armas in Saltillo to Carranza, 27 March 1916, TVC, Coahuila, carpeta 3, CEHM; General José Peraldi to Carranza, 18 November 1916, TVC, Coahuila, carpeta 4, CEHM; governor of Coahuila to Carranza, 3, 10 March 1919, TVC, Coahuila, carpeta 5, CEHM.
32. Carranza to governor of Coahuila, 12 March 1916, TVC, Coahuila, carpeta 3; Mexican consul in Galveston to Carranza, 23 March 1916, AC, CEHM; *Mexico City Excelsior*, 2, 5 March 1919.
33. Treasury orders dated 22 June 1915, AC, CEHM.
34. General Francisco Murguía to Carranza, 7 July 1918, TVC, Chihuahua, carpeta 2; governor of Chihuahua to Carranza, 8 August 1916, TVC, Chihuahua, carpeta 2, CEHM.
1918, p. 555; State Department to U.S. consul in Calexico, 3 March 1920, RDS, roll 812.111/118, frame 0390.

36. Carranza to General Luis Gutiérrez, 7 June 1915, TVC, Coahuila, carpeta 1; governor of Chihuahua to Carranza, 11, 17, 1919, TVC, Chihuahua, carpeta 2, CEHM.

37. Chihuahua deputy to Carranza, 15 February 1919, AC, CEHM.

38. Junta Patriótica de Piedras Negras to Carranza, 24 February 1917, AC, CEHM.

39. Bandit problems are discussed in governor of Chihuahua to Carranza, 27 January 1916, TVC, Chihuahua, carpeta 1; governor of Nuevo León to Carranza, 4 March 1918, TVC, Nuevo León, carpeta 2; governor of Chihuahua to Carranza, 8 June 1917, TVC, Chihuahua, carpeta 2. A frustrated assault by U.S. soldiers is described in Murguía to Carranza, 12 June 1918, TVC, Chihuahua, carpeta 2, CEHM.


41. Mexican consul in Tucson to Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, 28 December 1916, AC; Mexican consul in Douglas, Arizona to U.S. Inspector of Immigration, 11 October 1915, RDS, roll 812.2311/238, frames 0663–65. For other consular action against adverse living conditions in the United States, see Agent A. Landrau to Jefe del Servicio Secreto Mexicano, 24 July 1917, legajo 864, folleto R-123-3, p. 72, AREM; Mexican consul in San Francisco to Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, 27 July 1918, AC; Pascual Ortiz Rubio to Carranza, 28 February 1919, AC, CEHM.

42. Mexican residents of Texas City, Texas to Carranza, 23 October 1915, AC; Mexican residents of Los Angeles to Carranza, 23 February 1916, AC, CEHM.

43. Directiva de Clubs Obreros to governor of Coahuila, 7 November 1911, legajo 302, expediente "solicitudes," AGEC.

44. Rafael Zubarán Capmany to Carranza, 16 April 1914, TVC, Chihuahua, carpeta 1, CEHM.

45. Governor of Coahuila to Carranza, 10 April 1919, TVC, Coahuila, carpeta 5; governor of Nuevo León to Carranza, 8 and 11 July 1919, TVC, Nuevo León, carpeta 2, CEHM.

46. The governor of Baja California is discussed in Los Angeles Collector of Customs to Secretary of State, 26 December 1917, RDS, roll 812.114119, frame 0360. For dereliction of duty, see Juan Barragán Rodríguez to Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, 9 February 1918, TVC, Coahuila, carpeta 5, and General Alfredo Rícaut to Carranza, 21 October 1918, TVC, Coahuila, carpeta 5, CEHM.

47. Customs administrator in Ciudad Juárez to Carranza, 23 March 1918, TVC, Chihuahua, carpeta 2; governor of Coahuila to Carranza, 29 December 1917, TVC, Coahuila, carpeta 5; governor of Coahuila to Carranza, 11 August 1918,
TVC, Coahuila, carpeta 5, CEHM. In Ricaut to Barragán Rodríguez, 13 August 1918, TVC, Nuevo León, carpeta 2, CEHM, aid from the Texas Rangers to Carranza opponents is discussed.


49. Governor of Nuevo León to Carranza, 5 June 1916, TVC, Nuevo León, carpeta 2; Coahuilán teachers and workers to Carranza, 6 June 1916, TVC, Coahuila, carpeta 3; governor of Chihuahua to Carranza, 8 June 1916, TVC, Chihuahua, carpeta 1, CEHM.

50. *Informe* of Mexican consul in Bisbee, Arizona, 10 June 1916, legajo 798, folleto 91-R-28, p. 20, AREM; Arredondo to Cándido Aguilar, 18 March 1916, legajo 1443, folleto 74-9-157, tomo 2, pp. 44–45, AREM; Mexican consul in El Paso to Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, 12 May, 12 June 1916, legajo 800, folleto 92-R-16, pp. 56, 95, AREM; Professor Santiago Tamaz to Carranza, 8 June 1916, AC, CEHM.

51. Jacinto B. Treviño to Carranza, 24 June 1916, TVC, Chihuahua, carpeta 1; Hunter MacKay to Carranza 25 June 1916, TVC, Chihuahua, carpeta 1, CEHM.

52. Carranza to Álvaro Obregón, various dates in May 1916, legajo 1443, folleto 74-9-157, tomo 2, pp. 206–11, AREM.

53. Mexican consul in Eagle Pass to Mexican consul in El Paso, 1 May 1914, legajo 796, folleto 90-R-6, p. 1, AREM.


56. González to Carranza, 17 June 1916, TVC, Morelos, carpeta 1, CEHM.

57. Peraldi to Carranza, 18 June 1916, TVC, Coahuila, carpeta 3; González to Carranza, 24 June 1916, TVC, Morelos, carpeta 1, CEHM.