Spanish-Indian Relations During the Otermin Administration, 1677-1683

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EARLY NEW MEXICO HISTORIANS correctly gave first priority to the important records left by highly placed civil, religious, and military authorities, records that generally reflected and defended official administrative policies and actions. But individuals from all socio-economic and ethnic origins shape history—and citizens’ opinions rarely coincide with those of government. So it would now seem proper to examine the tangled relationships in New Mexico history from other viewpoints as well and to begin with emphasis on the Indian at a crucial point in his history. One significant era includes the administration of Gov. Antonio de Otermín (1677–83), which encompassed the fomentation and execution of the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 and the early years of Spanish exile in El Paso.

On 10 August 1680, the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, united for the first time in recorded history, rose up and forced nearly two thousand surviving Spaniards and Christian Indians to flee south to the El Paso area, where they lived for twelve years in poverty and peril. Sadly, the Indians who remained in the newly freed province were in little better condition. The change from autocratic Spanish administration to chaotic but no less dictatorial Indian government did little to bring real freedom or prosperity.

In less than a year, the Pueblos deposed Popé (Po-pay), a medicine man from San Juan who was a prime instigator of the revolt, for his cruelty, despotism, and greed, and elected don Luis Tupatú of Picuris in his place. But don Luis was not strong enough to keep the numerous Pueblo nations secure or united. Soon the Keres, Jemez, Taos, and Pecos were at war with the Tano, Tewa, and Picuris, and all were threatened by hostile Apache and Ute.
Soon after the events of August 1680 the Spaniards began an investigation of the period leading up to and through the revolt. The first Indian witnesses called were taken prisoner during the siege of Santa Fe and the subsequent retreat toward El Paso. These captives specified two reasons for the revolt. The Indians were tired of the burdensome work they had to perform for the Spanish settlers and religious leaders, and they resented Spanish suppression of native religion. 4

The Pueblos maintained that Poshaianyi (also called Pohe-yemo), the god who had cured the Indians of intertribal fighting by having lightning kill and then revive them, 5 sent his representative from far to the north with a message that the Indians of New Mexico were to rise up, kill all Spaniards, burn their churches, wash off Christian baptism, and return to the old ways. Furthermore, Pohé-yemo’s representative warned that all the people of any pueblo who did not join in the revolt were to be massacred. 6

More significant than these early reports was that of Alonso Shimitihua, a Spanish-speaking Isleta, who probably was not one of the prisoners. Speaking before Governor Otermin at El Paso in March 1681, he testified against two other Tiwas (Baltasar and his nephew Tomás), who he claimed were fomenting rebellion against the exiled Spaniards. Shimitihua explained that he had agreed to make an entrada into New Mexico with these two men and an unnamed Jemez, to induce the rebellious Pueblos, still under Pope’s rule, to return to Christianity. 7 The group, Shimitihua continued, departed from La Salineta, a campground on the east bank of the Rio Grande, shortly after they arrived with Otermin’s retreating forces about 18 September 1680. 8 At Isleta, the first inhabited pueblo they reached, an Indian captain from Alameda “dressed in alb and surplice with a scarlet band over it, and a maniple for a crown” came in on horseback with a large retinue.

The Isletas lined up in two files and fired their weapons to demonstrate their great veneration for the captain, who immediately thereafter ordered Shimitihua and his three companions bound and taken to Alameda. From there, by way of Sandia, they were escorted to Santo Domingo, where resided Alonso Catiti, 9 mestizo leader of all the pueblos in southern New Mexico. Despite the edict of Pohé-yemo’s representative to destroy everything Spanish, Ca-
tití's house was decorated with looted treasure and carpets and cushions from the mission church. When Shimitihua arrived, Catiti was negotiating peace with a Navaho captain costumed as if he were a priest vested for Mass and seated on a church cushion, a partially filled chalice beside him.

Shimitihua announced that he had returned to persuade the Pueblos to surrender and return to Christianity, but Catiti acrimoniously rejected this idea. However, another plan, put forth by Baltasar and Tomás, pleased him, and he sent to San Juan for Popé, whom Shimitihua identified as "captain general of the kingdom . . . who governed all the rebels despotically and supremely." Three days later, Popé arrived at Santo Domingo. Furious at Shimitihua's reason for returning, Popé lunged at him with a dagger and wounded him, exclaiming, "There is no longer [a Christian] God. Will praying bring us the mantas [squares of cloth] and other things we need?" Popé would have stabbed Shimitihua to death if Catiti had not intervened. The next day Popé turned his attention to Baltasar and Tomás and questioned them with Shimitihua present.

Baltasar announced that the Tiwas and Piros who fled the province with the Spaniards had not ordered him to return to New Mexico to urge the Pueblos to surrender; rather, he had come to ask the Indians of New Mexico to join these Tiwas and Piros in another revolt against the Spaniards, "for they wanted to have done with them and all return to New Mexico." Baltasar also revealed that his brother, Joseph, had remained in El Paso to incite the Mansos to join in the uprising, but Joseph had not yet succeeded in carrying out his design because a few Indians opposed the plan. One of these, Baltasar alleged, was Francisco, current governor of the Isletas; another was a Jemez called Muza.10

Popé hated Muza because he had warned the Spaniards of the Revolt. Thus, Popé urged Baltasar, "Look, if this is so . . . you may most certainly take whatever Tiwas and Piros you wish from here, and by whatever deceit necessary, take Muza from the pueblo . . . and bring him here so we can gouge out his eyes." If Muza would not leave the pueblo, they were to murder him and his supporters there. Then, appropriating Muza's remaining forces, Baltasar and his followers could proceed south to the El Paso–San Lorenzo area, where they should attack the ranchos of Juan Domínguez de Men-
PUEBLO GROUPS OF CENTRAL NEW MEXICO

KEY
- Modern Pueblo
- Pueblo Ruin
○ City or Town

SCALE
0  5  10  20  30  40 Miles

Courtesy of Albert H. Schroeder.
doza and Alonso García, anyone else who came to aid of the Spaniards, and all the friars. Moreover, if they could enlist the Sumas, they were to kill and rob the rest of the Spaniards. Baltasar promised to follow these orders and left for Picuris with Tomás.

Popé then sent Shimitihua and the Jemez to Taos. Although they were not imprisoned, they were not permitted to leave the pueblo and remained there for some months. Eventually Shimitihua realized he could not attain his pious purpose, and on false pretenses slipped away, arriving in El Paso 6 March 1681. Baltasar and Tomás arrived a bit later. Confronted with Shimitihua’s accusations, they confessed that what he said was true, as far as it went, but that “There was no such convocation; it was an invention of Shimitihua’s to save himself.”

Although this testimony indicates that prospects for a peaceful reconquest were bleak, Governor Otermin made an attempt to regain the province between November 1681 and February 1682. This controversial military campaign was not successful; however, it afforded another opportunity to collect important testimony from Indians about the Revolt. Official records reveal that witnesses cited several reasons for the Indians’ discontent. In addition to the forced labor and religious oppression mentioned above, the witnesses also noted the cruel activities of several Spanish officers, especially those of Secretary of Government and War Francisco Xavier, who kept those records, as prime causes of the revolt.¹¹

One Indian related an example of Xavier’s cruelty. In 1675 Xavier sentenced four Tewa “sorcerers” to death and forty-three others, including Popé, to be lashed and sold into slavery for bewitching Fray Andrés Durán, minister of San Ildefonso, and his household. Only after some seventy Indian leaders came to Santa Fe, bearing gifts and threatening to kill all the citizens of Santa Fe if Gov. Francisco de Treviño failed to release the prisoners, did the governor free the medicine men still living.¹² Popé returned to San Juan a bitter man. Xavier’s persecutions continued, however, and at last Popé took refuge in the kiva at Taos, where—either alone or in cooperation with Pohé-yemo’s mysterious representative—he made final plans for the successful revolt.

The testimony of Indian captives also revealed that immediately after his victory over the Spaniards, Popé, accompanied by a large
retinue, made a Spanish-style tour of inspection through all his pueblos. He demanded large tributes, taught the intricate steps of the old ceremonial dances (requiring that the Indians spend unduly long hours at worship), and insisted that they treat him with the same ceremony as they had accorded former Spanish governors. These actions, the informants indicated, alienated most of the Pueblos. Therefore, by the time the Spaniards began their entrada in 1681, Popé had been deposed and don Luis elected in his place.¹³

When Otermín entered New Mexico in November 1681, he found all the pueblos south of Isleta abandoned and ordered them burned. Forging ahead, he reconquered Isleta without a battle. From there, on 8 December 1681, he sent his lieutenant general, Maestre de Campo Juan Domínguez de Mendoza (whom historian France V. Scholes called the most prominent military man of the last half of the seventeenth century)¹⁴ ahead with a squad of sixty men to reconnoiter the pueblos as far north as Cochiti. Otermín directed Domínguez to burn estufas (kivas) and sack and burn the houses of any Indians who fled because they feared Spanish reprisals. Although the governor did not order Domínguez to burn whole pueblos, he did give the lieutenant general authority “to act as if I were present.” Should the Indians surrender, however, and give up their arms,¹⁵ Otermín instructed his subordinate to accept their overtures for peace.

When Domínguez returned to Isleta, Otermín expressed his displeasure with the outcome of the campaign. With the support of the highly respected Fray Francisco de Ayeta, procurator of New Spain and commissary visitor of New Mexico, the governor brought charges against Domínguez for the failure of the entrada. Chief among the complaints was that Domínguez had not burned any pueblos nor had he arrested any of the leaders of the revolt when all were at hand.¹⁶ Defending himself, Domínguez argued that it was Otermín and Xavier who should be blamed for the fiasco. The Indians had promised to surrender until they heard about Otermín’s burnings and other reprisals; then they fled to the mountains. Domínguez insisted that Otermín’s decision of 31 December 1681 to retreat to El Paso, rather than move the troops to the Puaray area, where they could have easily and safely encamped for the winter, had led to defeat.¹⁷
Siding with Domínguez in his argument with Otermín was Fray Nicolás López, Ayeta’s secretary. A prominent religious of that period, López served as custos (head of the Franciscan custody) of New Mexico from 1670–72 and was reelected in 1674. When Fray Nicolás returned to El Paso following the 1682 entrada, he wrote a report to his superiors in Mexico City. Castigating the governor for burning the pueblos of Senecú, Socorro, Alamillo, and Sevilleta without prior admonition to the Indians, Fray Nicolás charged that such action violated several royal cédulas (decrees) promulgated for good treatment of the Indians.

In contrast to Fray Francisco de Ayeta’s opinion that the Pueblos openly abhorred Christianity, Fray Nicolás reported that the Indians at Isleta had kept Spanish lands planted in anticipation of the Spaniards’ return. When Otermín’s forces appeared, the Indians displayed such joy and Christian zeal that before the first day was over there was a large cross in the pueblo, and every Indian had a small wooden one at his neck. Their joy, however, was marred by Secretary of Government and War Francisco Xavier. Hardly had Xavier dismounted from his horse before “he grabbed an Indian called Parraga by the hair and hurled him against the ground, beating and kicking him before most of the Spaniards.” Recalling that Xavier’s cruelty had been a primary cause of the Revolt, Indian witnesses to this scene cried out, “Why has that devil come?” The Indians, “seeing that . . . [Xavier] still had a hand in governing . . . , did not care to be reduced” and lamented: “already [Xavier is] beginning to do what he did before with the protection he had from the governor, for he used to do whatever he wished, and it was he [not Otermín] who governed.”

Similar opposition occurred at Cochiti mesa, Fray Nicolás related. Indians shouted to Juan Domínguez de Mendoza, “We beg you for peace in the name of God and of the Most Holy Virgin, and of the king our lord,” and the lieutenant general granted it to them. In view of the Parraga incident, however, the Indians would not believe Domínguez’s assurances “that Xavier no longer had a hand in governing, and could do nothing.” They refused to come down as long as Xavier was in New Mexico, demanding, “Take that devil away. Then we will willingly make peace.” When Domínguez relayed the message to Otermín, the governor angrily replied that
he had not sent Domínguez “to converse with the Indians, but to fight with them and kill them.” To the governor’s terse statement, Domínguez responded: “Sir, I thought that His Majesty was sending us to reduce souls for God, and not to conquer souls for the devil,” especially “when these apostates . . . are obedient to being reduced . . . [if we remove] those individuals they request.”

This response enraged Xavier, who made “other reports” against Juan Domínguez, hiding the truth to protect himself. And, Fray Nicolás said, the officials excused Xavier saying “the Indians do not care to see him because he used to punish their idolatries—as if others were not Catholics who would know how to punish these evils.”

In addition, López continued, Xavier had confiscated Indian property before the Revolt, not as punishment but to make the natives work without pay. It was well known that Xavier accused of being sorcerers only those who owned sheep and horses; he had not persecuted or cruelly treated those who did not own livestock. Even the religious would swear to the truth of this, López asserted. As a result, the desperate apostates had risen up in blind fury, even though they knew it was wrong to burn churches and murder missionaries.

López believed that the decision for the Spanish retreat in 1682 was made “in order that [Xavier’s] wicked deeds not be found out. . . .” Therefore, López continued, “all those apostates who could today be reduced and praising God” are instead “praising the devil.” He had seen, López went on, Spanish forces capture and burn six thousand fanegas (a fanega equals about 1.575 bushels) of grain, even though people in El Paso were perishing from hunger.

Apparently, the practices López decried continued into the following decade. Appended to López’s report in an unsigned different hand was a notation dated 1694, stating that the reason little progress had been made in the Christianization of the Indians of New Mexico was that “the iniquities to which [López’s] narrative refers continue, to the great sorrow of these poor missionaries.” Although complaints were often made to people who could have put a stop to such practices, the anonymous writer continued, “they pay no attention. Nor is there any hope they will do so. . . .”
Meanwhile, Otermin realized he would need to make a strong case to support his actions. From Estero Largo, a place forty leagues above San Lorenzo where he had halted on his return to El Paso, Otermin dispatched the campaign records to the viceroy in Mexico City. In addition to the charges already made against Juan Dominguez and other members of the Cochiti expedition, Otermin accused them of sacking the pueblos on their route, retaining all the property thus acquired, and conducting themselves “with audacious impudence and effrontery.” The governor also issued an edict that no one was to leave the El Paso area without his written permission. One guilty of such treachery to the crown would face the penalty of death. Despite Otermin's command, on 7 March 1682 a delegation headed by don Fernando Durán y Cháves departed secretly for Mexico City carrying more than a dozen serious charges against Otermin and Xavier brought by the exiled cabildo of Santa Fe.

When he learned of the departure, Otermin dispatched a letter to the viceroy to protect himself. Although he professed not to know what charges and calumnies the delegation would bring against him, these men, he said, were “out to take away the honor and estate of their governor,” as accusers had from so many of his predecessors. Because the archives had been burned, Otermin relied on his memory to recite the terrible accusations earlier New Mexicans had made against their governors. This list, although presented purely in self-defense, illustrates the century-old, often vicious power struggle between the governors and the cabildo of Santa Fe, a conflict that continued into the eighteenth century.

As was customary, the viceroy turned these documents over to his fiscal, an official appointed by the King to promote and defend the royal fisc. On 25 June 1682, Fiscal Martín de Solís Miranda submitted his respuesta (opinion) regarding Otermin’s autos (pleadings or proceedings in a lawsuit). In essence, he supported the governor’s accusations regarding the Cochiti expedition, stating that Dominguez should be severely prosecuted on those charges. However, the fiscal was also highly critical of Otermin for having abandoned New Mexico when he could have maintained a strong, well-supplied position at Puaray. The Indians, caught in the mountains in deep snow with few provisions and no shelter, would soon
have been subdued. Otermín, Solís Miranda continued, should also have been influenced to remain because "the rebels were divided in their counsels. . . . Many of the pueblos had no part in the rebellion, and . . . Captain Luis Tupatú . . . had approved their resolution to submit peacefully." This approval, the fiscal believed, revealed that the Indians were divided in opinion, and Otermín had been remiss in not sending an ambassador to such a powerful leader when Tupatú offered to surrender. 30 Eleven days later, on 6 July 1682 the fiscal commented on the cabildo’s complaint that Otermín had delegated to Xavier all authority that belonged only to the governor. Solís Miranda argued that the charge was too general and specific instances must be set forth. The official even justified Otermín’s refusal to take care of an emergency demanding immediate action when his secretary was absent. 31

The cabildo also charged that Otermín traded horses purchased with royal funds as well as his gentle riding horses to friendly Indians in exchange for boys and girls captured in intertribal wars. Many of these captives died, the cabildo continued. But Solís Miranda called for further investigations of this complaint, and reminded the cabildo that ransoming “those taken in war with other gentiles to teach them [Christian] doctrine and occupy them in hauling” was not illegal. (It was, however, in violation of the law to exchange captives “for horses belonging to His Majesty.”) Moreover, the governor was discharging his duty when he forbade settlers to trade any but worn-out useless nags and required registration of the animals prior to the exchange. 32 Apparently the fiscal did not regard Otermín’s purchase and sale of captives as slave trade. Instead, he remarked that Xavier’s confiscation of Indians whom settlers were attempting to trade might have been to keep them from enslaving the Indians, a practice forbidden by oft-repeated royal cédulas. 33

The fiscal also supported Otermín against the charge that the governor, through his agent Xavier, had attempted to monopolize trade, offering the Indians double what the settlers offered. In the fiscal’s view, Otermín’s action was not designed to be harmful, but was intended to keep the settlers from deceiving the Indians. Moreover, Solís Miranda said, the infidels were not the governor’s subjects.
Most of the other charges, the fiscal believed, were too general. For example, the cabildo alleged that under assurance of peace Otermin had nine Apache captains brought to Pecos and then had their wives and children apportioned out and sold. After imprisoning the captains for some time, the accusations continued, Otermin sent them to be sold in Parral. Two escaped and fled back to New Mexico to tell their story, which severely strained Indian-Christian relations. But the fiscal noted the cabildo had not given enough specific detail regarding this charge.

Solís Miranda added that the plaintiffs needed to substantiate the charges that Otermin forced the Indians to make large, high-quality stockings from small, inferior hanks of wool and that so fearful were the Indians that they made up the amount lacking from their own resources. Otermin was also charged with forcing Tewas to make and cultivate copious plantings of corn, of “intimidating them and calling them idolators and sorcerers, making them load piñon and corn on their beasts . . .,” and of taking away the Indians’ mules “by way of loan without payment of any kind.”

The fiscal concluded his report with a severe condemnation of the Spaniards from Isleta for failing to aid their governor when he was besieged in 1680 and for their selfish actions after reaching El Paso. He also harshly criticized Domínguez’s handling of his expedition.

After reviewing the depositions, the junta general (general council with the viceroy presiding) met on 28 July 1682. This body announced that the governor was to distribute the necessary lands, establish all Spaniards in one villa, and reestablish the cabildo as it was in Santa Fe. The Indians were to live in separate villages, where they would be at complete liberty and not subject to involuntary servitude to the Spaniards. The junta general also directed that all charges and countercharges be remitted to the governor’s residencia (the official investigation of his administration) in order that the judge might substantiate the charges set forth. During this investigation, members of the cabildo delegation were to be imprisoned, subject to charges against them for having left the El Paso area without the governor’s permission.

While the cabildo delegation languished in prison, Otermin awaited the arrival of his successor, don Domingo Jironza Petriz de Cruzate.
The new governor and *juez de residencia* cleared Otermín of all charges. He also suspended proceedings against Juan Domínguez de Mendoza and don Pedro de Chávez in order to avoid greater unrest since both men were influential and had many relatives in the camp.\(^{36}\)

Still, unrest continued not only in the Spanish camp, but also among the Indians. On 30 July 1683, shortly before the new governor arrived, Otermín went to San Antonio de Isleta\(^{37}\) to investigate rumors of a conspiracy among the Christian Indians, who had been brought from New Mexico against their will. He had just returned to San Lorenzo when he received an urgent letter from Sebastián de Herrera informing him that a battle between a large number of New Mexican Indians and a band of Mansos, led by El Chiquito, had occurred near Alonso García’s abandoned house. Herrera went on to say that there had been many fatalities (which turned out to be a gross exaggeration),\(^{38}\) and that the Mansos had captured one of the New Mexicans, Juan Punnisili, a Picuri. Next morning, the prisoner was brought before Otermín for questioning. The governor ordered the Indian’s fingers placed in the lock of a blunderbuss, and commanded that the screw be turned to squeeze the digits one by one, even if they broke, to better ascertain the truth.\(^{39}\)

The unfortunate witness, Juan Punnisili, was a twenty-eight-year-old widower from Picuris who had served the friars and Spaniards in New Mexico since boyhood. Punnisili related that don Luis Tupatú had selected him, along with twenty-two other Picuris, to treat with Otermín. Tupatú had secretly told his representatives how destitute the Pueblos were without the Spaniards; there was no longer any livestock or hardware, nor clothing nor medicine, for the Spaniards had taken these items out of the province with them. Tupatú sent five deerskins as gifts to the governor and Secretary Francisco Xavier and admonished the messengers to speak only with these officials. The messengers were to tell the Spaniards “that they came to ask for peace . . . because if his excellency and the Spaniards wished to enter, they would be very well received, and [the Pueblos] would come to their aid.”

If the Spaniards agreed, but could not return immediately, Punnisili was to promise that don Luis would try to find Fray Joseph de
Espeleta (who was rumored to be alive in the hands of the Apache friends of the Moquinos [Hopi]), and bring him to El Paso. Or, if neither of these options were possible, don Luis himself would come “to see his excellency and communicate what is in his heart.”

In further defense of the Indian leader, Punssili testified that when don Luis returned from the plains, “where he was when all the people of the kingdom rebelled,” he protected the church and secreted church silver and clothing in a hollow in the high altar to await the return of the Spaniards. Don Luis, Punssili went on, still wore a cross and his rosary and continually admonished the people of his pueblo not to forget Christianity or cast aside holy matrimony as the rest of the apostates had done.

Asked about current conditions in New Mexico, Punssili replied that the Pueblos on the northern frontier were trading only with the Apaches de los Llanos, who had always been peaceful. Other Apaches, however, had now carried off all the horses and mares. The Pueblos had divided up all the stock remaining in the Taos area after the Revolt. They sent the sheep, goats, and pigs to Alonso Catiti, and one half the large number of cows and horses to Picuris. Meanwhile, the San Juan Indians, the witness continued, had consumed all the livestock in Rio Arriba. “In short, in all the kingdom there is not a head of beef cattle, nor of sheep, goats or pigs. The apostates have eaten all.” Moreover, few provisions remained for the cultivation of their fields. Pneumonia and fevers had killed many people, and many others had died of privation or in Ute raids.

All the pueblos except Sandia, Alameda, Puaray, Isleta, Sevilleta, Alamillo, and Senecú were still inhabited, and Tewas occupied the Spanish estancias in the jurisdiction of Santa Cruz de la Cañada. The Indians fled to the mountains only when the Spaniards came and returned to their pueblos when the troops retreated.

When Otermin inquired who the present Indian leaders were, Punssili responded that don Luis Tupatú governed the nations from La Cienega to Taos, and Alonso Catiti the rest of the kingdom. All, however, recognized don Luis as high chief, and it was he who designated Catiti to govern the southern nations. The Taos and Picuris had been at odds because the Taos had not wanted to obey
another nation, but since their governor, El Chato, had died, they had obeyed don Luis.

Punssili went on to say that at Santa Fe there were two broken field pieces, and only a few of the many harquebuses functioned. There was such a shortage of powder and balls that they had had to send to Pecos for the two charges of powder his delegation had brought with them.

When asked whether any Spaniards or religious remained alive, Punssili mentioned Fray Joseph de Espeleta, who had been seen in very bad condition at Xongopavi in the province of Moqui. The Picuri added that he had seen Ana María, Francisco Gómez Robledo’s daughter, at El Chato’s house in Taos the previous year. Bartolomé Romero’s daughter was also in Taos at another house. Punssili said that he had also heard that the daughter of Maestre de Campo Pedro de Leiva was alive, and there were other mixed-bloods, but he did not know their names. (Unfortunately, none of these women was on Vargas’s list of survivors.)41

Punssili testified that he knew of no communication between the apostates of New Mexico and the Christian Indians of El Paso except for a group of twelve Piros; they had come to Picuris to say that the Spaniards wanted peace with the New Mexican Indians. “By letter [—an unusual occurrence—] they had found out that a [new] governor and people were coming from Mexico . . . and that the Spaniards had not mistreated [these Piros] in any way.”42

Regarding religion, Punssili, perhaps giving his opinion rather than that of don Luis, said that the Indians made use of the kachina and many other idolatries and lived “very happily because there were no religious, nor a single person to take away these things.” Even at Picuris these practices persisted until don Luis came in from the plains. These actions, he argued, were the reason “their cornfields dried up and all was perishing because there were nothing but violent winds.” The other pueblos, however, had not obeyed don Luis. At Santo Domingo, Catiti’s home, the people continued all of these idolatries with great ferocity; as a result, Punssili said, the natives had been suffering greatly, and many were perishing.

The chief instigators of the rebellion, Punssili declared, had been Popé, Chaca (or Xaca) of Taos, Catiti, and Francisco Tanjetete. The cause of the rebellion was the great amount of forced labor, which
included “cultivating cornfields, tending cattle and horses, chopping firewood,” even on cold or snowy days. “Weary of it all, [the Indians] rose up and went crazy and did what they did. . . .” Since that time, “they have lived and are living happily.”

Unfortunately only the first line of the outcome of the case remains. Thus, it is unclear whether the Spanish regarded Punssili as don Luis’s ambassador. Obviously the Picuri was fighting for his life, trying to accomplish his mission, or both. He was probably testifying under the torture that Otermin had ordered and was certainly trying to tell the Spanish authorities what he thought they wanted to hear. Many of his statements agree with and expand upon other contemporary testimonies. How much credence the authorities placed on Punssili’s testimony is uncertain. It is clear, however, that the Spaniards at El Paso were too short of supplies and troops to have attempted another entrada into New Mexico at that time. They were starving, torn by internal dissension, and had more than they could handle controlling Apaches and other Indians in the El Paso area.

Although a few quick punitive raids into New Mexico occurred in the late eighties, nearly a decade elapsed before don Diego de Vargas’s reconquest and resettlement of New Mexico. Don Luis received Vargas with great, if dubious, protestations of peace and loyalty, but soon all of the Indians of New Mexico were chafing under Spanish rule.43

Although these conflicting testimonies may not have determined subsequent Spanish policy toward the Indians, they indicate a great deal about the complexities of the era. For example, it must be remembered that Punssili and Shimitihu were Indians testifying under pressure. Also, Fray Nicolás López was a firm supporter of Juan Domínguez de Mendoza, but his narrative was written to his religious superiors; had he been writing for purely political purposes he would have addressed his report to the viceregal authorities. Further, Otermin and the cabildo wrote their complaints in the heat of emotion, each side pressing a case against the other, defending respective viewpoints and actions.

Still, these documents paint a revealing picture of a cruel age in which leaders—Spaniard, Indian, or religious—expected unswerving obedience. In this era, poverty and danger plagued everyone,
no doubt inflaming factional infighting prevalent among Europeans and Indians. In addition, these materials provide a glimpse of the attitudes and problems of the Spaniard and Indian and insights into characters of the leaders of both groups. Finally, these findings enlarge the understanding of a crucial epoch in New Mexico's history and its impact on her unique modern culture.

NOTES

Citations to the documentary collections used for this article follow the form suggested in The Chicago Manual of Style, in which the division of material precedes the name of the archive.


6. Fray Angelico Chavez, “Pohé-yemo’s Representative and the Pueblo Revolt of 1680,” NMHR 42 (April 1967): 87–88. Among other names and descriptions, Chavez defines Pohé-yemo as the god who made the sun shine on the people when they emerged from the center of the earth. He theorizes that Pohé-yemo’s representative might in actuality have been Domingo Naranjo, a Santa Clara
mulatto, and the tactical genius behind the Pueblo Revolt (Chavez, "Pohé-yemo's Representative," pp. 91–92).


10. Jack Douglas Forbes, "The Janos, Jocomes, Mansos and Sumas Indians," NMHR 32 (October 1957): 325, states that the word Manso was never a tribal name, but apparently referred to a few rancherías of Indians in the El Paso area whose exact ethnic affinity is not known, but who were closely allied both culturally and militarily with the Athabascans. Hackett, Revolt, 1: xlix and 2: 159, states that the population of Isleta in 1680 was 2,000. When the Spanish fled the province, Hackett continues, 317 Christian Indians from Isleta, Sevilleta, Alamillo, and Senecú accompanied them. A large number of Isletas must have left the pueblo before Otermín's attempted reconquest in 1681. At that time he encountered only 500, 385 of whom he took with him on his return to El Paso. See also Walz,"History," p. 8.


12. Hackett and Shelby, Revolt, 2: 289–90.


16. For the charges and counter-charges regarding the Domínguez expedition, see Hackett and Shelby, Revolt, 2: 255–303; Walz, "History," p. 217; Forbes, Apache, Navaho and Spaniard (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960), p. 188; Hackett, ed., Historical Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Viz-

17. Memorial of Juan Domínguez de Mendoza, 18 November 1685, in Hackett, Historical Documents, 3: 354–56.


19. “True narrative of what happened on the entrada into New Mexico, of some singular things that took place . . .” legajo 4, no. 9: 843–46, BNM. Filed with a group of Franciscan papers from just prior to the Revolt of 1696, this narrative is not dated within the body of the text.


22. Legajo 4, no. 9: 843–44, BNM.


24. Hackett and Shelby, Revolt, 1: cvi–vii, 2: 357, 395, and 398–401. Other sources vary in placing the location, since no scientific measurement of distances existed at that time. Thus, estimates were probably no more than educated guesses.

25. Complaint of the Cabildo of Santa Fe, Mexico 53:297–311v, AGI. Copy in 2, no. 5, BNM.


31. "Respuesta del señor Oidor fiscal," 6 July 1682, Mexico 53: 280v–296, AGI. In contrast, Vélez de Escalante ("Noticias," p. 28) believed the cabildo had proved the charge.
32. Mexico, 53: 282, 283v, 284, AGI.
36. Walz, "History," pp. 115–17. Sonnichsen, Pass of the North, pp. 58, 61, states that Jironza reopened the case 27 September 1685, after Domínguez left for Mexico City without permission, for which he was to pay the costs of litigation.
37. Otermin settled the Isletas he brought from New Mexico after the 1681–82 entrada at San Antonio de Isleta, later known as Isleta del Sur. The village was located on the west bank of the Rio Grande a few leagues south of San Lorenzo.
38. "Depositions of several Tiwa, Tano, and Piro Indians before Otermin, El Paso, re: suspected revolt against the Spanish," 19 July–1 August 1683, Spanish Archives of New Mexico (SANM), State Records Center and Archives (SRCA), Santa Fe, roll 21 (Misc. SANM, frames 68–122), fr. 104. Forbes, "The Janos, Jocomes, Mansos and Sumas," p. 325, identifies El Chiquito as captain of a ranchería of Mansos, who, along with the Gila Apaches, was the greatest troublemaker from 1691 to 1692.
39. Roll 21, fr. 115, SANM.
40. Hackett and Shelby, Revolt, 1: 111, and Vélez de Escalante, "Noticias," ph. 106, list Espeleta as killed in or immediately after the Revolt of 1680.
42. Walz, "History," p. 114, states that Jironza took office 29 August 1683.