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# *AMERICAN WESTWARD EXPANSION AND THE BREAKDOWN OF RELATIONS BETWEEN* POBLADORES *AND* "INDIOS BÁRBAROS" *ON MEXICO'S FAR NORTHERN FRONTIER, 1821–1846*

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IN THE LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, innovative policies and mutual interest had spun a delicate web of peace between Hispanic and Indian peoples in the "land of war," as far northern New Spain was sometimes called. By the time Mexico won independence in 1821, the strains of a decade of revolution had begun to tear apart that fragile fabric, and the new nation could not mend it.[1] In many areas of Mexico's Far North, from Texas to Alta California, the decades following independence saw relations worsen with those autonomous tribes of seminomadic Indians who rejected much of Hispanic culture—Indians whom the pobladores, or frontiersmen, variously termed "*indios bárbaros*," "*salvajes*," "*gentiles*," or "*naciones errantes*." By 1846, the situation had deteriorated to the point that some areas of the Mexican frontier had less to fear from an imminent war with the United States than they had from "savage" Indians who were better armed, better mounted, and more successful than ever at defending their lands and striking offensive blows deep into Mexico.

In Mexican Texas, many observers took the view that raids by Comanches and their occasional Wichita allies, such as Tawakonis and Wacos, had hindered expansion of the tejano settlements and left people living in fear of "total extermination," notwithstanding interludes of relative peace. By the mid-1830s, as Texas stood on the brink of separation from Mexico, bands of Comanches and smaller tribes kept the province in a state of constant agitation. In what is today Arizona, then the northern edge

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of Sonora, the Mexican frontier receded in the face of an Apache onslaught, with farms and ranches reduced to ashes and considerable loss of life. New Mexicans saw themselves threatened with ruin at the hands of "thirty or more tribes of wild Indians"—allowing for hyperbole and depending on how one counted. At the outbreak of war with the United States, New Mexicans were still trying to neutralize Navajos who had raided the Rio Grande settlement for decades. "The war with the Navajos," Governor Manuel Armijo wrote in 1845, "is slowly consuming us." In addition, an ugly incident in 1844 had infuriated the traditionally friendly Utes against the nuevomexicanos. In the years just prior to the American invasion, Ute attacks forced pobladores from small communities such as El Rito and Ojo Caliente to flee their homes.[2]

Of course, not all Utes, Navajos, Apaches, or Comanches raided Mexican settlements all of the time. None of these groups possessed a central political structure or functioned as a unit or as a "nation," notwithstanding Spanish and Mexican use of the term "*nación*" to describe them. As one military veteran characterized Apaches:

> Each family forms a *ranchería* [a community] and all live independently of one another without recognizing a government. Hence, war with this horde of savages never has ceased for one day, because even when thirty rancherías are at peace, the rest are not.[3]

Thus, pobladores who enjoyed harmonious relations with one group of Apaches might have their livestock stolen by members of another band, or even by individuals from a friendly ranchería. Mexican officials struggled to sort out differences between "barbarians" and distinguish friend from foe, but usually without long-lasting results. Garbled reports, rumors, conflicting evidence, and rapidly shifting alliances in this turbulent era made the task nearly impossible.

No single Indian group in Alta California achieved the fearsome reputations of Apaches, Comanches, Navajos, or Utes, but members of smaller tribes raided California settlements with increasing intensity in the years before the war with the United States. Nonmission Indians from the interior, who enjoyed the relative security of the Sierras, the Tulare country, and the Central Valley,

together with Indians who had abandoned the newly secularized missions, took the offensive in the 1830s and raided coastal settlements regularly. Indians made life on the ranches insecure and put californios on the defensive by the 1840s. Few californios died at the hands of Indians in these years, but destruction was such that historian Hubert Howe Bancroft judged Indian raids as California's "most serious obstacle to progress and prosperity." The San Diego area was hit hardest. In the late 1830s and early 1840s, outlying ranches came under attack and had to be abandoned. The population of the town dropped from 520 in 1830 to about 150 in 1840, when one visitor described it as "almost deserted." By the time of the Mexican-American War, according to Thomas Larkin, an experienced observer, Indian attacks had become commonplace throughout California, causing some californios to desert their ranchos: "the Indians are losing all fear of the inhabitants and with their arrows have shot several of them during the years 1845 and 1846."[4]

Indian raids on more prosperous Mexican states below the present border also accelerated in the years prior to the Mexican War. In the 1840s some Comanches reportedly reached Zacatecas, nearly 500 miles south of the Rio Grande, and on one occasion a group was reported at Querétaro, some 135 miles north of Mexico's capital. The extent of Indian control over northern Mexico was described by the despairing Chihuahua legislature in 1846:

> we travel the roads . . . at their whim; we cultivate the land where they wish and in the amount that they wish; we use sparingly things they have left to us until the moment that it strikes their appetite to take them for themselves.[5]

Although the picture is far from complete, historians and contemporaries have provided vivid images of the devastating effects of Indian raids on areas of northern Mexico prior to the Mexican-American War. Explanations for the intensity and scope of those raids, however, remain murky. Part of the explanation, of course, lies within Indian communities themselves and may never be fully understood. Some historians have pointed correctly to Mexico's waning military strength as a reason for Indian military successes.

Few historians, however, have understood the extent to which American expansion upset the delicate balance between independent Indian peoples and pobladores in Mexico's Far North, from Texas to California.

The breakdown of relations between Mexican frontiersmen and "indios bárbaros" owed much to the activities of unscrupulous traders from the United States. Writing in 1830, the liberal savant from Coahuila, Miguel Ramos Arizpe, explained why. Prior to the coming of the Americans, he said, Indians "did not have firearms except a small number of old muskets which they received as gifts from the Spaniards, with a very small supply of powder that hardly served them because of its bad quality." Indians thus remained "rather weak" and dependent upon Spaniards alone for trade. Americans, Ramos Arizpe said, broke that dependency by furnishing Indians good guns and "very exquisite powder." Thus fortified by their new trading partners, Indians raided Mexican settlements, taking livestock and even human captives who could be traded to the Americans for more arms and munitions as well as whiskey and other goods. Some contemporaries considered it a mistake to assume that Indians did more damage with guns than with bows and arrows, but most apparently believed firearms to be more effective, including Indians themselves. Perhaps more important than the weapons Americans furnished, however, was the market they provided for stolen property, thereby encouraging Indian raids on northern Mexico. Little wonder that some of these American traders came to be charged with "land piracy," even by their countrymen.[6]

The pernicious impact of American traders on relations with neighboring Indian tribes had first troubled Spanish officials in the eighteenth century, and their concern increased after the United States acquired Louisiana in 1803. By the time of Mexican independence it was widely recognized that some Apaches and Comanches, and probably Wichita bands such as the Taovayas, stole horses and mules from tejanos and exchanged them for guns and ammunition with traders in Louisiana. Acting as middlemen, Comanches were also believed to be trading guns and ammunition with more westerly tribes. The problem became so alarming that in 1826 Mexico's secretary of state asked the United States min-

ister in Mexico City to stop the "traders of blood who put instruments of death in the hands of those barbarians." Years later, when the United States had still not stopped the traffic in armaments, one high-ranking Mexican official wondered if it was United States policy "to use savage Indians to menace defenseless Mexicans in order to force them to abandon their lands or . . . request the protection of the United States government."[7]

As Americans moved farther west into Texas in the 1820s, some of their more unscrupulous countrymen spared Comanches and other Indians the inconvenience of hauling furs and stolen Mexican property all the way to Louisiana. Texas officials, for example, had reason to believe that some residents of Stephen Austin's colony carried on a "clandestine trade" in arms and ammunition with Indians. Mexican officials could also read in the American press about itinerant peddlers from the United States, such as a group from Kaskaskia, Illinois, who entered Texas in 1826 "on a trading adventure to the Cumancha Indians." Reports that Texas officials offered a $1,000 reward for every American trading illegally with Indians apparently did not deter these merchants, and the harmful effects of their activities in Texas were no secret. One Louisiana newspaper reported in 1826 that Americans carried on "an extensive and often very lucrative trade" with the Comanches,

> one of the most hostile nations in America, who are continually at war with the Mexicans, and who will remain so long as they are supplied with goods, in return for the horses and mules, of which they rob the inhabitants of the Province [of Texas].[8]

Dealing with Indians was sufficiently lucrative in Texas that some Americans set up trading posts along the Red River where it formed the boundary with the United States. Texas officials believed that these traders not only furnished arms and ammunition to Indians, but also incited them to attack Mexican settlements. One trader, Holland Coffee, who had established a post on the upper Red River in 1833, met with some Comanches, Wacos, and Tawakonis in 1835 and "advised them to go to the interior and kill Mexicans and bring their horses and mules to him and he

would give them a fair price," according to James Bowie. By 1838, one Texas newspaper reported, American traders in Texas faced stiff competition for the "immense booty" that "the most powerful of the most savage nations of North America" brought back from Mexico. Much of the lucrative Indian trade, the paper said, was being siphoned off by merchants from Arkansas and Missouri, some of whom traded as far west as Santa Fe.[9]

The report was correct. The opening of the trail between Missouri and Santa Fe to legal trade in 1821 facilitated the importation of American guns and munitions to Taos, Santa Fe, El Paso, and more remote locations. Far from the eyes of Mexican officials, armaments could be traded to Apaches, Comanches, and other tribes in West Texas, Chihuahua, and Sonora. As early as 1823 New Mexicans learned that Americans had furnished guns and ammunition to Navajos, and by the late 1820s New Mexicans recognized that American armaments had shifted the balance of power to the Indians.[10]

By the early 1830s Apache attacks extended beyond New Mexico to Chihuahua. Officials there, too, viewed Americans as a major source of the trouble. In prohibiting all trade with Indians, Chihuahua officials specified that Anglo-Americans found trading arms, powder, or lead with Apaches would be executed. In 1835 Governor Albino Pérez of New Mexico attempted to cooperate with Chihuahua officials and ordered strict regulation of trade with "indios bárbaros." He, too, singled out norteamericanos as the chief suppliers of arms, but he also noted that some New Mexicans followed the Americans' "corrupt and noxious example." Whether or not they had been corrupted by the Americans, some pobladores continued a long tradition of trading stolen goods with the very Indians who raided their settlements. Chihuahua officials even suspected one New Mexico governor, Manuel Armijo, of furnishing guns to Apaches. New Mexicans known as *comancheros*, who traveled out to the Plains to trade with Comanches and other tribes, acquired an especially unsavory reputation following the Mexican-American War, but little is known of their activities during the Mexican era. Americans, then, had no monopoly on illicit trade, but they did possess the most desirable arms and ammunition.[11]

Repeated orders by Pérez and other officials did little to check gunrunners or curb illicit trade in New Mexico. Governor Armijo openly expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of trade embargoes without adequate troops, but even if New Mexicans had succeeded in patrolling their vast territory, Americans would have escaped the net. In the mid-1830s Americans had begun to build trading posts outside Mexican jurisdiction in present Colorado. First and foremost of these isolated emporiums was Bent's Fort, on the United States' side of the Arkansas, built in 1832 or 1833. After 1835, Forts Vásquez, Jackson, and Lupton opened for business on the South Platte—all in American territory, but close enough to Mexico that the rifles and ammunition they sold to Indians proved very troublesome.[12]

These American trading centers earned the condemnation of the dynamic cura of Taos, Antonio José Martínez. In a printed memorial to President Antonio López de Santa Anna in 1843, Martínez accused American traders of contributing to the moral decay of Indians and of encouraging Indian depredations on New Mexico. Indians stole livestock from New Mexico, Martínez charged, in order to exchange it at the American posts for liquor. Americans also led some "idle and ill-intentioned" New Mexicans astray as well as Indians, the padre asserted. Equally distressing, Indians killed buffalo in immense quantities to obtain hides that they traded with Americans. Buffalo, Martínez warned, were not only becoming scarce, but would soon become extinct as a species and the "naciones bárbaras," who depended upon buffalo for their survival, would turn more and more toward New Mexico to "rob and pillage." A few years after Martínez issued this prediction, New Mexico hunters had to travel more than 250 miles to find buffalo, but obtained so little meat that they consumed it all on the journey home.[13]

One of the most dramatic examples of the impact of American traders on traditional trading patterns and alliances is the case of the Utes. Occupying lands to the northwest of the New Mexico settlements, Utes had been rather consistent allies of New Mexicans throughout the first decades of the nineteenth century. In the late 1830s, however, Antoine Robidoux, an American of French ancestry who had become a Mexican citizen, built trading posts on the



Armed Comanche meeting U.S. Dragoons. By George Catlin.

Gunnison River, in present Colorado, and on the Uintah River, in today's Utah. At those posts Robidoux traded guns and ammunition for pelts, and from the late 1830s on, tensions between Utes and New Mexicans increased. In 1844, when they became alienated from New Mexicans, Utes no longer depended on the pobladores for trade and possessed the means to launch a devastating series of attacks. Robidoux's activities alone did not cause the Ute "war," of course, but New Mexico officials rightly suspected that Robidoux contributed substantially to their problems with Utes.[14]

By 1844 when Utes stepped up their raids on New Mexico, Robidoux was not the only American supplying them with arms and munitions. A desultory group of American traders had settled at places like Pueblo, Hardscrabble, and Greenhorn in the Upper Arkansas Valley on the eastern edge of the Front Range of the Rockies and wantonly exchanged firearms for stolen Mexican livestock. Utes maintained harmonious relations with these Americans while simultaneously raiding New Mexico. One New Mexico officer was not far off the mark in describing the American traders as "protectors" of the Utes.[15]

The Ute example is not an isolated case. Other tribes, such as the band of Apaches known today as White Mountain, also raided Mexican settlements and befriended American merchants. It is understandable, then, that by 1846, just prior to the war with the United States, one New Mexican could lament that "the lot of the Indians around New Mexico has improved at the time that ours has worsened."[16]

Indian raids on New Mexico increased not only as a result of the activities of American traders, but also due to demographic pressures from westward-moving American settlers. In a report to Congress in 1826, forty-six-year-old Juan Bautista Pino, a former alcalde of Santa Fe and one of several sons of the venerable Pedro Bautista Pino, New Mexico's delegate to the 1812 Spanish Cortes, explained the situation as many New Mexicans must have understood it. The growing population of North Americans, he said, had forced Kiowas and their allies toward the west. They in turn pushed other tribes toward New Mexico so that "in time we will probably have them on top of us." "These [Indian] Nations are like balls in a row," Pino explained. When the first received a "strong

impulse it is passed along until it reaches the last." The source of the "strong impulse" Pino identified as "the wise and practical policy adopted by the government in Washington." The "active" Americans, Pino believed, had expanded their border rapidly by purchasing land from Indians and pushing them toward northern Mexico. When he wrote in the fall of 1829, Pino had probably learned from American traders of strong sentiment in the United States for the removal of Cherokees and other "civilized tribes" from the southern states to beyond the Mississippi—sentiment that helped put Andrew Jackson in the White House in 1829 and that resulted in passage of the Indian Removal Act early in the following year.[17]

By the 1830s the influence of westward-moving American traders was felt in California, with its abundance of mules and horses. Governor Manuel Victoria reported to Mexico City in 1831 that "the interior valleys are being overrun by foreigners, who come in great numbers to corrupt the gentiles, and to steal." Horse thieves, among whom were traders from New Mexico, Victoria reported, "have begun trading with the gentiles, the fugitive Christians and the Neophytes of the missions and it results that the Indians of the mountains and the Tulares steal horses from the missions and ranchos in order to sell them." Victoria's successor, José de Figueroa, also recognized and deplored the influence of the foreigners. He prohibited foreigners from trapping in California and put a complete embargo on trade with "heathen Indians." To enforce these restrictions he ordered presidial officers at San Diego, Santa Barbara, and Monterey to patrol the coastal ranges and interior valleys. The program met modest success. Raids quieted for a few years, but resumed again in 1837, after Figueroa's death.[18]

Californios had no prior experience with foreign interlopers from the east until the first years after Mexican independence. In 1826, trapper Jedediah Smith became the first American to find his way across the continent to California, and he and the trappers who followed him found California horses as valuable a trade item as furs. Domesticated California horses, which Smith purchased at $10 a head, brought $50 at the trapper's annual mountain rendezvous in 1827. Not all American trappers demonstrated Smith's scruples about obtaining California horses legally. Some American trappers enlisted the aid of Indians to raid California

ranches, and other trappers turned to horse thieving in the late 1830s and 1840s as the fur trade fell on hard times. Among the better known mountain men-turned-horse-thieves were "Peg-leg" Smith, "Old Bill" Williams, Joseph Reddeford Walker, Jim Beckwourth, and Jean Baptiste Chalifoux. Much of the stolen California stock was driven east to New Mexico or sold at trading posts such as Bent's Fort. From there, some animals might be driven on to Missouri. By the 1840s, however, the increased traffic of Americans bound for Oregon seemed to move the market for stolen California livestock much farther west. California officials believed that American settlers in Oregon provided Indians with guns in exchange for stolen cattle and horses.[19]

Nuevomexicanos, who first brought woven goods from Santa Fe to Los Angeles beginning in 1830, also sought California horses and traded stolen stock with Indians in exchange for liquor. Merchants from New Mexico won such a bad reputation that Governor Figueroa felt obliged to ask the governor of New Mexico for help: "Every man coming from that territory is believed to be an adventurer and a thief," he wrote. California officials took stern measures to regulate the New Mexico traders, treating them as if they were foreigners.[20]

In addition to New Mexicans, Americans, and California Indians who plundered their livestock, California rancheros also found themselves victimized by Indians from outside the province. Navajos, for example, reportedly stole cattle near Los Angeles in 1834. Nez Perces, Yakimas, and Cayuses from the north raided the Sacramento Valley. Utes, associated with Anglo-Americans, apparently learned the way to California during these years and drove stolen livestock from the West Coast to New Mexico where they traded with foreigners and Mexicans. Walkara, the most notorious of the Ute leaders, is believed to have worked with Peg-leg Smith to make off with 1,200 animals at Mission San Luis Obispo in 1840. Walkara continued to lead raids into California well after the United States conquest in 1846, selling the stolen stock to Mormons in Salt Lake City.[21]

Indians who traveled farthest to raid California settlements were Delawares and Shawnees. Driven from their ancestral homes in the United States, bands of some of these displaced tribes took refuge in East Texas, along with displaced Creeks, Kickapoos,

Cherokees, and Choctaws (groups that originally lived in such states as Wisconsin, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi). Mexican officials generally welcomed these refugees from America, hoping they would form a buffer against both Anglo-Americans and the "indios bárbaros." Some of these Indians did become allies of Mexicans. Some English-speaking Shawnees and Delawares, on the other hand, teamed up with American trappers and adventurers, stealing horses in northern Mexico and as far west as California where officials corrupted the name "Shawnees" to "Chaguanosos."[22]

Thus, from Texas to California, those unscrupulous Anglo-Americans, who armed and displaced Indians, contributed enormously to Mexico's difficulties in controlling autonomous northern tribes. The difficulty was compounded because independent Mexico tried to continue the pragmatic Spanish policy of "purchasing" a peace through the use of trade and distribution of presents and did not attempt to control Indians with military force alone. Mexican officers continued the Spanish tradition of distributing gifts, such as tobacco, sugar, knives, cloth, mirrors, buttons, spoons, shirts, medals, and other manufactured items, purchased from a special "allies fund." The same fund was used to feed and entertain visiting delegations of Indians.[23]

Purchasing a peace brought some positive results. In New Mexico and Texas some Apaches and Comanches apparently spared those provinces from more serious raids because they served as convenient entrepôts for goods taken from wealthier provinces to the south. On the local level, individual pobladores put self-interest first and traded with those Indians with whom the larger nation was at war. As one anthropologist has written: "Trade has facility to survive when all other means of communication cease."[24]

As trade shifted increasingly to the westward-moving Anglo-Americans, however, it became less effective as a diplomatic tool for Mexicans. Donaciano Vigil, an officer of unusual education who would become governor of New Mexico following the American conquest, summed up the situation clearly in the spring of 1846. During the Spanish period, he said, the application of the velvet glove—trade, gifts, and alliances—had made the iron fist less necessary. The coming of Anglo-Americans, however, had

lessened Indian dependency on Mexicans and made it more necessary than ever to rely on the iron fist.[25]

Historians have often noted that defensive alliances, military strategies, and distribution of presents that worked for Spain in the late eighteenth century lost their effectiveness under independent Mexico. Few historians, however, have understood the extent to which American westward expansion made Mexico's task more difficult. Indeed, the Mexican government viewed American traders as so pernicious by the time of the Mexican-American War that it pressed the United States for protection from them in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. But American traders continued to provide means and incentives for Indians, especially Apaches, to attack northern Mexico well into the 1850s.[26]

## *NOTES*

*This study would not have been possible without fellowship assistance from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the American Council of Learned Societies. Their help is gratefully acknowledged.

1. A number of specialists have described the relative success of Spanish policies in bringing about detente in the late colonial period: Joseph F. Park, "Spanish Indian Policy in Northern Mexico, 1765-1810," *Arizona and the West* 4 (Winter 1962): 325-44; Odie B. Faulk, *The Last Years of Spanish Texas, 1778-1821* (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1964), pp. 65-71; Sidney B. Brinckerhoff, "The Last Years of Spanish Arizona, 1786-1821," *Arizona and the West* 9 (Spring 1967): 5-20; Max L. Moorhead, *The Presidio: Bastion of the Spanish Borderlands* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1975), pp. 95-161.

2. Andrew Anthony Tijerina, "Tejanos and Texas" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, Austin, 1977), p. 117; Report of Ramón Músquiz, Béxar, 1 October 1831, in Ildefonso Villarello, "El Departamento de Béjar del Estado de Coahuila y Texas," *Boletín del Seminario de Cultura Mexicana* 2 (September 1945): 81; *Representación dirijida por el ilustre ayuntamiento de la ciudad de Béxar al . . . Congreso del Estado* (Brazoria, Tex.: D. W. Anthony, 1833), p. 4. Gilberto Miguel Hinojosa, "Settlers and Sojourners in the 'Chaparral': A Demographic Study of a Borderlands Town in Transition, Laredo, 1775-1870" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, Austin, 1979), pp. 37, 59-62. Official correspondence of the mid-1830s in Texas abounds in statements of concern about Indian depredations and incidents of robberies and occasional murders. See, for example, Martín Perfecto de Cos to the Minister of War, Saltillo, 29 December 1834, in Guerra y Marina, Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City (AGN), transcript, University of Texas, folder 331; John H. Jenkins, ed., *Papers of the Texas Revolution*, 10 vols. (Austin: Presidial Press, 1973), 1: 22, 36, 44, 49, 75, 78, 80, 115, 134, 152,

175-77, 264-65, 273, 311, 367; Robert C. Stevens, "The Apache Menace in Sonora, 1831-1848," *Arizona and the West* 6 (Autumn 1964): 220-22; Juan Estevan Pino, "Manifiesto," to the Congreso General, Santa Fe, 24 November 1829, Mexican Archives of New Mexico (MANM), State Records Center and Archives, Santa Fe (SRCA), reel 9, frame 1120; Report of the committee to investigate New Mexico's military situation, 30 January 1829, MANM, roll 9, frames 1082-86; Proclamation of Comandante José Caballero, Santa Fe, 9 September 1837, in Benjamin M. Read, *Illustrated History of New Mexico* (Santa Fe: New Mexican Printing Company, 1912), p. 381; Antonio Barreiro, *Ojeada sobre Nuevo-México . . .* (Puebla: Imprenta del José María Campos, 1832), in *Three New Mexico Chronicles*, ed. and trans. H. Bailey Carroll and J. Villasana Haggard (Albuquerque: Quivira Society, 1942), p. 74; Armijo quoted in Frank McNitt, *Navajo Wars: Military Campaigns, Slave Raids, and Reprisals* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico [UNM] Press, 1972), p. 90; Ward Alan Minge, "Mexican Independence Day and a Ute Tragedy in Santa Fe, 1844," in *The Changing Ways of Southwestern Indians: A Historic Perspective*, ed. Albert Schroeder (Glorieta, N.Mex.: Rio Grande Press, 1973), pp. 107-22.

3. Ignacio Zúñiga, *Rápida ojeada al estado de Sonora* (Mexico: Juan Ojeda, 1835), p. 7, facsimile in *Northern Mexico on the Eve of the United States Invasion: Rare Imprints . . .* , ed. David J. Weber (New York: Arno Press, 1976).

4. Hubert Howe Bancroft, *History of California*, 7 vols. (San Francisco: The History Company, 1884-90), 3: 361; Jessie Davies Francis, "An Economic and Social History of Mexican California, 1821-1846" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1935), concluded that "never a year went by without its raids and depredations" (p. 420); Alfred Robinson, *Life in California* (1846; reprint ed., Santa Barbara, Calif.: Peregrine Publishers, 1970), p. 12; Lucy Lytle Killea, "The Political History of a Mexican Pueblo: San Diego from 1825 to 1845," *Journal of San Diego History* 12 (July 1966): 24-32; Bancroft, *History of California*, 3: 611. Bancroft suggested that San Diego "more than any other part of California resembled . . . the Apache frontier, though the loss of life was much less" (4: 70); Thomas O. Larkin's Description of California, Monterey, 20 April 1846, in *The Larkin Papers: Personal, Business, and Official Correspondence . . .* , ed. George P. Hammond, 10 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), 4: 306.

5. Quoted in Ralph A. Smith, "Indians in Mexican-American Relations Before the War of 1846," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 43 (February 1963): 35-36, 62. Smith has described Indian raids on northern Mexico in a number of articles: see especially "Apache 'Ranching' Below the Gila, 1841-1845," *Arizoniana* 3 (Winter 1962): 1-17, and "Apache Plunder Trails Southward, 1831-1840," *New Mexico Historical Review* (NMHR) 37 (January 1962): 20-42. Other sources include David M. Vigness, "Indian Raids on the Lower Rio Grande, 1836-1837," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 59 (July 1955): 14-23; the excellent collection of documents and commentary by Isidro Vizcaya Canales, ed., *La invasión de los indios bárbaros al noreste de Mexico en los años de 1840 y*

*1841* (Monterrey: Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores, 1968); and Zúñiga, *Rápida ojeada al estado de Sonora.*

6. Ramos Arizpe to Lucas Alamán, Puebla; 1 August 1830, Archivo de la Secretaría de Fomento y Colonización (ASFC), AGN, legajo 6, pt. 2 (1828-1831), expediente 43, West transcripts, University of Texas; Joseph Carl McElhannon, "Imperial Mexico and Texas, 1821-1823," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 53 (October 1949): 126. For the merits of bows and arrows over firearms, see José Agustín Escudero, *Noticias estadísticas del Estado de Chihuahua* (México: Juan Ojeda, 1834), p. 247.

7. For the late colonial period see Rupert N. Richardson, *The Comanche Barrier to South Plains Settlement* (Glendale, Calif.: Arthur H. Clark, 1933), pp. 58-59, 67-73, and Abraham P. Nasatir, *Borderland in Retreat: From Spanish Louisiana to the Far Southwest* (Albuquerque: UNM Press, 1976), pp. 57, 98; Sebastián Camacho, Secretary of State, to Joel R. Poinsett, 15 June 1826, Relaciones Exteriores, AGN, Mexico, transcript, Texas State Archives, Austin (TSA) (2-22/618); Lester G. Bugbee, "The Texas Frontier, 1820-1825," *Publications of the Southern History Association* 4 (March 1900): 109; Eugene C. Barker, *The Life of Stephen F. Austin: Founder of Texas, 1793-1836* (1926; reprint ed., Austin: University of Texas, 1969), pp. 48-49; Jean Louis Berlandier, *The Indians of Texas in 1830*, ed. John C. Ewers (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1969), p. 48; José Francisco Ruiz, *Report on the Indian Tribes of Texas in 1828*, ed. John C. Ewers, trans. Georgette Dorn (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Library, 1972), pp. 14, 16; Elizabeth Ann Harper [John], "The Taovayas Indians in Frontier Trade and Diplomacy, 1779-1835," *Panhandle-Plains Historical Review* 26 (1953): 58-69, and correspondence with the author; Juan N. Almonte to the Secretary of State, 10 December 1830, ASFC, legajo 8, expediente 65, transcript, TSA (2-22/640).

8. Francisco Ruiz to Antonio Elosúa, 1 August 1830, translated in *Papers Concerning Robertson's Colony in Texas*, ed. Malcolm D. McLean, 7 vols. to date (Fort Worth and Arlington: Texas Christian University Press and the University of Texas at Arlington, 1974–), 4: 335; Stephen Austin to Ramón Músquiz, Austin, 24 August 1829, in *The Austin Papers*, ed. Eugene C. Barker, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C., and Austin: U.S. Government Printing Office and University of Texas Press, 1924-28), 2: 250; *Little Rock Arkansas Gazette*, 21 November 1826, reporting on a party apparently led by Pierre Menard; see, too, *Little Rock Arkansas Gazette*, 16 January 1827 and 27 January 1829; *Natchitoches Courier*, 15 May 1826, quoted in the *Little Rock Arkansas Gazette*, 25 July 1826.

9. James Bowie to Henry Rueg, Natches, 3 August 1835, in Jenkins, *Papers of the Texas Revolution*, 1: 301-2; similar complaints about an American trader appear in Peter Ellis Bean to Domingo de Ugartechea, Béxar, 21 April 1835, and Rueg to the jefe político of Béxar, 18 May 1835, in Jenkins, *Papers of the Texas Revolution*, 1: 80, 115-16; *The Telegraph and Texas Register*, quoted in the *Arkansas Gazette*, 28 February 1838, in Ralph A. Smith, "Mexican and Anglo-

Saxon Traffic in Scalps, Slaves, and Livestock, 1835-1841," *West Texas Historical Association Year Book* 36 (October 1960): 102-13. For an interesting glimpse at Torrey's Post, near present Waco in 1838, see Howard R. Lamar, *The Trader on the American Frontier: Myth's Victim* (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1977), pp. 13-16.

10. Santiago Monroy to Governor Bartolomé Baca, Xemes, 20 February 1823, in Lourdes Lascuraín Orive, "Reflexiones sobre Nuevo México y su integración a los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica," in *El Destino Manifesto en la historia de la nación norteamericana, 6 ensayos* (México: Editorial Jus, 1977), p. 49. Pino, "Manifiesto," 24 November 1829; Manuel de Jesús Rada, *Proposición hecha al Soberano Congreso General de la Nación por el diputado del territorio de Nuevo México* (México: Imprenta de C. Alejandro Valdés, 1829), p. 3, facsimile in Weber, *Northern Mexico.*

11. Decree of 16 October 1835, Santa Fe, Ritch Papers, no. 153, Huntington Library, San Marino, California (HEH); Circular from the Palacio del Gobierno del Estado, Chihuahua, February 1835, cited in David J. Weber, *The Taos Trappers: The Fur Trade in the Far Southwest, 1540-1846* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), p. 222; Escudero, *Noticias estadísticas del Estado de Chihuahua*, pp. 245-46; Ward Alan Minge, "Frontier Problems in New Mexico Preceding the Mexican War, 1840-1846" (Ph.D. diss., UNM, 1965), p. 62; Josiah Gregg, *Commerce of the Prairies*, ed. Max L. Moorhead (1844; reprint ed., Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954), p. 203; Charles L. Kenner, *A History of New Mexican-Plains Indian Relations* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), pp. 78-97; Vizcaya Canales, *La invasión*, pp. 55-59.

12. Printed circular, Juan Andrés Archuleta, Santa Fe, 21 February 1843, in the María G. Durán Collection (SRCA); Minge, "Frontier Problems," pp. 55-58, 60-62; Weber, *The Taos Trappers*, pp. 210-11. According to tradition, the Bents furnished weapons to their Indian customers. George Bird Grinnell, *By Cheyenne Campfires* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), pp. 34-35, reference courtesy of George Phillips, University of Colorado.

13. *Esposicion* [sic] *que el Presbitero Antonio José Martínez, Cura de Taos en Nuevo México, Dirije al Gobierno del Exmo. Sor. General D. Antonio López de Santa-Anna. Proponiendo la civilisación de las naciones barbaras . . .* (Taos, N.Mex.: J.M.B., 1843), p. 4, facsimile in Weber, *Northern Mexico.* Donaciano Vigil to the Assembly, Santa Fe, 18 June 1846, MANM, roll 41, frames 330-39.

14. Weber, *The Taos Trappers*, pp. 213-17.

15. José María Chaves to Juan Andrés Archuleta, Campo de operaciones, Taos, 18 June 1845, MANM, roll 39, frames 626-27; Janet Lecompte, *Pueblo, Hardscrabble, Greenhorn: The Upper Arkansas, 1832-1856* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), pp. 163-65; 74-75, 146; and George P. Hammond, ed., *The Adventures of Alexander Barclay, Mountain Man* (Denver: Old West Publishing Company, 1976), p. 71.

16. Grenville Goodwin, *The Social Organization of the Western Apache* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 94. Vigil to the Assembly, Santa Fe, 8 June 1846.

17. Pino, "Manifiesto," 24 November 1829; Ronald N. Satz, *American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975), pp. 11-31.

18. Manuel Victoria, quoted in Sardis W. Templeton, *The Lame Captain: The Life and Adventures of Pegleg Smith* (Los Angeles: Westernlore Press, 1965), p. 101; see, too, Narciso Durán, 3 October 1833, quoted in Zephyrin Engelhardt, *The Missions and Missionaries of California*, 4 vols. (San Francisco: James H. Barry Co., 1908-15), 3: 494. Figueroa to the Minister of War and Navy, Monterey, 12 April 1833, and Figueroa, decree concerning robbers of horses and other livestock, 18 November 1833, quoted in Sherburne F. Cook, "Expeditions to the Interior of California's Central Valley, 1820-1840," *Anthropological Records* 20 (February 1962): 188; Bancroft, *History of California*, 3: 197, n. 25; Eleanor Lawrence, "Horse Thieves on the Spanish Trail," *Touring Topics* 23 (January 1931): 23; LeRoy R. and Ann W. Hafen, *Old Spanish Trail* (Glendale, Calif.: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1954), pp. 227-58; Mariano Guadalupe Vallejo to the governor, Sonoma, 20 July 1838, in *Comunicaciones del Gen. M. G. Vallejo* (Sonoma: n.p., 1837-39), a volume of imprints in the Bancroft Library (BL).

19. Hafen and Hafen, *Old Spanish Trail*, pp. 228, 236; John C. Ewers, ed., *Adventures of Zenas Leonard, Fur Trader* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), p. 113; Francisco Catillo Negrete, *Informe y propuestas que hace al Supremo Gobierno para la prosperidad y seguridad de la Alta California, su Comisionado . . .* [1836] (México: Vargas Rea, 1944), p. 10; Janet Lecompte, "Jean Baptiste Chalifoux," in *The Mountain Men and the Fur Trade of the Far West*, ed. LeRoy R. Hafen, 10 vols. (Glendale, Calif.: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1965-72), 7: 65-70; Templeton, *The Lame Captain*, pp. 103-58; Alpheus H. Favour, *Old Bill Williams: Mountain Man* (1936; reprint ed., Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962), pp. 100-117; Lecompte, *Pueblo, Hardscrabble, Greenhorn*, pp. 150-54; George Verne Blue, ed. and trans., "The Report of Captain La Place on His Voyage to the Northwest Coast and California in 1839," *California Historical Society Quarterly* 18 (December 1939): 320; Manuel Castañares, "Exposición," 1 September 1844, in Castañares, *Colección de documentos relativos al departamento de Californias* (México: Imprenta de la Voz del Pueblo, 1845), p. 31, facsimile in Weber, *Northern Mexico*; Juan Bautista Alvarado also recalled that Indians received weapons from Russians at Fort Ross, "Historia de California," 1876, 5 vols. (Manuscript, BL), 3: 33.

20. Quoted in Bancroft, *History of California*, 3: 396; Eleanor Lawrence, "Mexican Trade Between Santa Fe and Los Angeles, 1830-1848," *California Historical Society Quarterly* 10 (March 1931): 30, and Hafen and Hafen, *Old Spanish Trail*, pp. 155-94.

21. Bancroft, *History of California*, 3: 359, n. 22; Favour, *Old Bill Williams*, p. 104; Minge, "Frontier Problems," p. 65; Hafen and Hafen, *Old Spanish Trail*, pp. 237, 248, 251-57.

22. Ernest W. Winkler, "The Cherokee Indians in Texas," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 7 (October 1903): 95-165, treats one of the groups in depth; Weber, *The Taos Trappers*, p. 224; Bancroft, *History of California*, 4: 76-77.

23. Many sources refer to the continued use of this fund. See, for example, Minge, "Frontier Problems," pp. 51, 199; Tijerina, "Tejanos and Texas," p. 78. Continuity from the Spanish period is a theme in Daniel Tyler's "Mexican Indian Policy in New Mexico," NMHR 55 (April 1980): 101-20.

24. Shirley Hill Witt, "Migration into San Juan Pueblo, 1726-1968" (Ph.D. diss., UNM, 1969), p. 44. For examples of informal trade, see Vizcaya Canales, *La invasión*, p. 45; Kenner, *New Mexico-Plains Indian Relations*, p. 73. Frances León Swadesh, *Los Primeros Pobladores: Hispanic Americans of the Ute Frontier* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), pp. 20, 24-25; Berlandier, *Indians of Texas*, p. 31, n. 3, pp. 47-48; Benjamin Lundy, *The Life, Travels and Opinions . . .* (Philadelphia: William D. Parrish, 1847), p. 53; Papers relating to illegal trade with Apaches, 1846, MANM, roll 41, frames 548-60.

25. Vigil to the Assembly, 18 June 1846.

26. See, for example, Stevens, "The Apache Menace in Sonora," pp. 211-22; Edward H. Spicer, *Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533-1960* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1962), p. 240; Walter Prescott Webb, *The Great Plains* (Boston: Ginn, 1931), p. 137; J. Fred Rippy, "The Indians of the Southwest in the Diplomacy of the United States and Mexico, 1848-1853," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 2 (August 1919): 364; Joseph F. Park, "The Apaches in Mexican-American Relations, 1848-1861, A Footnote to the Gadsden Treaty," *Arizona and the West* 3 (Summer 1961): 129. A study by a Mexican historian, which appeared while this article was in press, contains conclusions similar to mine; "the guides or pioneers of the so-called American West were spies in our territory and dealers in furs and arms—many were constant instigators of attacks on Mexican towns and villages. . . ." (Carlos J. Sierra, *Los indios de la frontera* [México: Ediciones de la Muralla, 1980], p. 40).