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TERMINATION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF  
GLENN L. EMMONS AS COMMISSIONER  
OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 1953-1961

DEBRA R. BOENDER

COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS GLENN L. EMMONS took the oath of office on August 10, 1953, in a ceremony held in the office of Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay.<sup>1</sup> Emmons was appointed to this post because President Eisenhower wished to follow the desires of Indians in selecting a new Commissioner.<sup>2</sup> Alva Simpson, Jr., the other major candidate along with Emmons, was a prominent New Mexican, but he failed to gather enough Indian backing to suit Eisenhower.<sup>3</sup> Although there was some bitter opposition to Emmons's appointment in the Senate, he was confirmed after a second set of hearings held in July 1953.<sup>4</sup> At that time Emmons was reluctant to leave his bank in Gallup but felt it was his duty to respond to the summons of the President, stating, "I . . . thought if a man was chosen for a job like this, it was a challenge and his duty, as a good American, to answer the call." Comparing the call of the President to military service or court duty he said: "It was just as much of a mandate in the same sense of the word."<sup>5</sup>

Years of association with individual New Mexico and Arizona Indians caused Emmons to enter office with a plan of action in mind. He was familiar with many of the problems which they faced, and he was aware that the needs of these Indians varied from other tribes across the nation. Emmons was able to see three major problems which most tribes faced in varying degrees and proportions: poor health conditions, poor education, and poor economic development. It was his goal to attempt their solution while in office.<sup>6</sup> During an era when Congress favored termination of Indian tribes, Emmons's programs seemed to coincide with

popular Congressional policy by preparing Indians for release from the federal trusteeship status. Actually his programs served to involve further the federal government in Indian affairs.

Emmons recognized that for most tribes a terminated status was far in the future, and immediate goals were of necessity more realistic than those that Congress set. To Emmons the word "termination" was anathema, so he called his proposed program "readjustment with security," thereby avoiding the bad connotations arising from "termination."<sup>7</sup> He did believe that at some future date Indians ought to become self-supporting.

Before initiating his three-point program, Emmons recognized that Department of Interior priorities had to be met. He conducted an intensive survey of the Bureau of Indians Affairs (BIA) in October 1953, which gave special attention to the organizational structure of the Bureau, operating policies and procedures, including fiscal matters, delegations and redelegations of authority, and legislative authority for BIA programs. Assistant Secretary of Interior Orme Lewis requested Emmons to "give special attention to the status and development of programs for the Indians to take over responsibility for their own affairs, and the relation of the Indians to state and local governments."<sup>8</sup> During 1953 the Interior Department pushed for termination in an infamous memorandum, which Emmons strongly opposed and then largely ignored.

Commissioner Emmons was directed to enact programs designed to bring tribal groups to a level whereby they would be able to support themselves with minimal federal assistance. Contrary to stated BIA policy, Emmons neither favored nor forwarded that policy. Having always maintained a dislike of the termination policy, Emmons carefully avoided facing the issue directly while Commissioner. He seldom testified before Congressional committees on the issue of termination; instead he sent his assistant, Rex Lee, to present the BIA point of view, which seems to have diverged measurably from Emmons's personal feelings. There is a noticeable absence of definite statements by Emmons about termination, and the few that do exist refer to termination at some distant time after Indians became prepared educationally and economically.

When Menominee termination plans reached fruition in 1954, Emmons did nothing to block the bill. Blocking action of any sort would most probably have failed to be effective with Congress, since Senator Arthur V. Watkins of Utah, and others, had already decided to implement a termination policy. That policy originated under Harry Truman's and former Commissioner Dillon S. Myer's administration before Emmons became Commissioner. Emmons might have been successful, however, in approaching Eisenhower and asking for a presidential veto. Perhaps because of political considerations he did not take any overt action. After the Menominee Termination Act was passed in 1954, the BIA maintained a "hands off policy" when plans were being drafted for the implementation of the act. For that reason the tribe sought aid from the state of Wisconsin.<sup>9</sup> Conspicuous uninvolvedness on behalf of the BIA certainly indicated reluctance on Emmons's part to implement actively an immediate termination policy.

Emmons did not institute programs which would lead to rapid termination. What was known as the "Emmons Plan" was a three-point program designed to improve the health, education, and economy of federally recognized tribes and groups of Indians. Indian health problems were of major importance to Emmons. On August 5, 1954, Eisenhower approved the transfer of BIA health programs to the United States Public Health Service. This action meant that fifty-five hospitals and other facilities, in addition to about one-fourth of BIA health program personnel, were involved in this transfer.<sup>10</sup> This action, completed in July 1955, caused an increase in the level and effectiveness of health services provided to Indians. BIA health programs were notoriously inadequate, and although under the Public Health Service they were still lacking in some respects, overall improvements in health care were very encouraging. Many tribes feared this move was the beginning of "piecemeal termination" but soon realized that their fears were groundless when services improved.

Under the BIA the Indian health program was subject to non-professional administration and suffered from staffing problems. Indian populations were too small to generate economically sound use of BIA facilities; whereas under the Public Health Service,

facilities would attract other groups of persons and be put to better use. More personnel, facilities, and funds were at the disposal of the Public Health Service, and as a result better service was available to Indians. Despite warnings of administrative upheavals, Indian health services were transferred to the U.S. Public Health Service with the general feeling that benefits would exceed problems.<sup>11</sup>

Through this transfer, though reservation health care began to approximate more nearly that which non-Indians received in the United States, it still lagged some twenty years behind health care of the overall population. In 1956 the National Congress of American Indians gave their approval to the Indian Health Program of the Public Health Service.<sup>12</sup> Step one of Emmons's plan was accomplished, or at least set in motion by 1955. Education and economic improvements were not accomplished as readily; they required more intensive study and organization.

Emmons accomplished much of this study himself by making his office open to Indian requests and recommendations and by traveling extensively among tribes throughout the nation. In September 1953 at Eisenhower's request, he toured major tribal groups.<sup>13</sup> Throughout his administration he consulted frequently with tribes all over the country. In addition to his tour of tribes in 1953, Emmons met with Indian leaders again in 1956 and 1958 to study their problems and to hear their ideas for improved Indian services.<sup>14</sup> Subsequent discussions with tribes confirmed Emmons's hypothesis that tribal needs were large because demands for better education and economy were numerous.

Educational problems ran rampant among almost all tribes, especially those on large or remote reservations. Emmons was familiar with the problems on the huge Navajo reservations where population was scattered and where there were not enough schools. Many Navajo children were not in school, and those that were attending schools did so at a great distance from home, thus alienating them from their tribal customs and identity. Emmons used a supplemental appropriation to place thousands of Navajo children in school. Day schools were converted to boarding schools, makeshift schools were constructed from quonset huts, trailer schools were put into use, and public school systems were requested to admit Indian children.<sup>15</sup>

TABLE 1: Distribution of Indian Children Attending School by Type of School and Percent (Excluding Alaskan Natives)

Year	Total Children Between 6-18 yrs.	Total No. in School	%	No. in Gov't Sch.	%	No. in Public Sch.	%	No. in Other Sch.	%	No. not Enrolled	% of Total	No. of Those with No Info.
1952	128,133	99,441	78	36,414	37	52,960	53	10,067	10	28,692	22	—
1953	127,213	100,883	79	36,194	36	54,417	54	10,272	10	26,330	21	(6,649)
1954	128,053	104,470	82	35,586	34	58,855	56	10,029	10	23,583	18	(4,256)
1955	132,171	115,631	87	39,862	35	65,089	56	10,680	9	16,540	13	(6,408)
1956	139,036	122,855	88	39,676	32	71,956	59	11,223	9	16,181	12	(5,870)
1957	141,572	125,555	89	38,295	30	76,250	61	11,010	9	16,017	11	(7,552)
1958	141,581	129,760	92	39,677	30	78,822	61	11,261	9	11,821	8	(3,030)
1959	144,069	131,927	92	38,911	30	81,098	61	11,918	9	12,142	8	(3,179)
1960	145,998	133,316	91	37,377	28	84,650	64	11,289	8	12,682	9	(3,801)
1961	125,450	112,746	90	38,876	34	64,987	58	8,883	8	12,704	10	(3,013)

Figures compiled from: U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Branch of Education, *Statistics Concerning Indian Education* (Lawrence, KS: Haskell Institute, Fiscal Years 1952-1961) [10 separate publications].

TABLE 2: Navajo Children Between 6-18 Years Attending School:  
Fiscal Years 1952-1961.

Year	Total Children	Total in School	% in School	Total Not in School	% Not in School
1952	26,336	13,135	50	13,201	50
1953	27,106	14,106	52	13,000	48
1954	27,362	15,501	57	11,861	43
1955	27,752	22,741	82	5,011	18
1956	29,519	24,163	82	5,356	18
1957	29,585	25,475	86	4,110	14
1958	30,376	26,903	89	3,473	11
1959	31,151	26,859	86	4,292	14
1960	31,743	27,407	86	4,336	14
1961	34,604	28,824	83	5,780	17

In 1953 more than 26,000 Indian children of school age were not attending school. Approximately 13,000 of these were Navajos. Forty-eight percent of the 27,106 Navajo children were not attending any school.<sup>16</sup> Through programs of an experimental nature, Emmons attempted to solve this problem as rapidly as possible. Debate raged in Congress when he asked for an additional \$3 million appropriation after the regular budgeting had allowed \$11 million for Indian education. Congressman John J. Rhodes of Arizona championed this request for greater funding, citing the unique problems Navajos faced in their large reservation. Many Navajo families were nomadic, and this characteristic influenced school attendance. When Navajo children resided near a school, they attended classes. When their parents lived apart from schools, the children were frequently absent. Rhodes noted that Emmons had already begun to solve the problem by instituting a system of trailer schools which were sufficiently portable to shift location when the Indian population did. These trailers would immediately provide schools for three to four thousand Indian children. Secondly, Rhodes noted, the program which Emmons called for would place Navajo children in schools located along reservation borders. Since many of these towns and cities tended to be small, they needed federal support to provide additional space for Indian students.<sup>17</sup>

Despite provisions of the Johnson-O'Malley Act (1934), which

TABLE 3: Types of BIA Schools: Fiscal Years 1952-1961. (Excluding Alaska).

Year	Boarding Schools		Day Schools					Total
	Non-Reservation	Reservation	Regular	Trailer	Hogan	Instructional Aid	Hospital	
1952	Boarding and Day 14	17	Non-Res. 18/140	0	Navajo Community 41	0	0	230
1953	21	34	213	5	Navajo Community 36 / 2	13	0	324
1954	89 including four dorms				226 including four sanatoriums			315
1955	16	23 Nav/46	198	37	16	14	4 (san.)	11 Dorm. 365
1956	15	68	184	29	8	13	4	321
1957	15	64	182	28	3	12	4	308
1958	15	65	177	23	1	10	3	294
1959	15	64	179	18	1	5	3	285
1960	15	62	176	15	0	4	5	277
1961	15	62	170	14	0	4	5	270

Figures for Table 2 and Table 3 compiled from: U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Branch of Education, *Statistics Concerning Indian Education* (Lawrence, KS: Haskell Institute, Fiscal Years 1952-1961) [10 separate publications].

provided federal reimbursement to states for non-taxable Indian lands so that Indian children might attend school, Congress was reluctant to appropriate the requested \$3 million. Numerous representatives provided excuses that Congress had never before appropriated money to build school facilities outside of Indian territory, that other tribes might demand the same type of aid, that this program was a break from traditional Indian service budgeting procedures, and that there was no guarantee the program would work. These roadblocks eventually gave way to allow Emmons's plan for improved Indian education to go into effect.<sup>18</sup>

Public school systems soon began to admit Navajo and other Indian children after Emmons assured school systems complete federal funding for additional expenses.<sup>19</sup> Within just a few years, almost all of the 13,000 Navajo children were in school. A system of bordertown dormitories dotted areas around the Navajo reservation. Emergency quarters were set up, sometimes making dual use of gyms and dining areas and other available spaces so that they might be used as sleeping areas until regular dormitories were constructed.<sup>20</sup> Children living in these dormitories were relatively close to home, to which they returned on weekends. By use of this system, Indian students became accustomed to Anglo society and yet retained their native culture. Emmons realized the need of Navajos to learn how to live among Anglos without losing tribal identity. Many Navajos, raised on the reservations and attending all-Indian schools, were unable to face the prospect of dealing daily with non-Indian schools; Emmons hoped to solve this problem and to confront the lack of adequate educational facilities.<sup>21</sup>

A distinction was made in this plan between older and younger children. Those below third grade level attended mobile trailer schools, while older students lived in the bordertown dorms.<sup>22</sup> Emmons felt that this was a sensible decision because young children should not be separated from their families.<sup>23</sup>

A great deal of national publicity was given this program on the Navajo reservation. In some counties Indian children attended public day schools and returned home at night. Results of this program provided greater education opportunities for Indian children, as the speed with which it went into effect placed numerous

children into schools who might never have attended under the older system. In 1959 a leading national magazine termed Emmons's plan "the most ambitious program of schooling ever launched for American Indians."<sup>24</sup>

By 1955, eighty-seven percent of all Indian children were in some type of school, and of this total thirty-five percent were in federal schools. An approximate ten percent increase in enrollment over the previous year was a clear indication of the intensity of Emmons's determination.<sup>25</sup>

Recent newspaper accounts have lauded the success of the bordertown dormitory system, which Emmons began in 1954. Twenty-year dormitory contracts issued in the first year expired in 1974 but were renewed on a shorter term basis to keep Indian children in public schools. Not only have these dorms been successful in enriching Indian lives, but school directors contend that the presence of Indian children also enriches the environment of the non-Indian children.<sup>26</sup>

Although the numbers of students in school at any one time cannot determine the quality of education, these figures do indicate improved opportunities for many Indian children. At the end of the fiscal year 1952, only seventy-eight percent of all Indian children were in school. During the administration of Emmons, this figure rose considerably, reaching a high point of ninety-two percent in 1958-1959 and leveling off to about ninety percent by the end of 1961. During this same period a general reshuffling of Indian student population occurred among schools of all types. An increased use of public schools became evident, while use of federal government schools declined. Indians made less use of other schools, including all types of private and parochial schools. At the same time, additional boarding and day schools were built and used on reservations. In 1952 no trailer schools were in operation, nor were any hospital schools in use. By 1955 thirty-seven trailer schools were operating, and four hospital schools located in sanatoriums served a number of reservations. All of these improvements in the Indian educational system meant that by the time Emmons left office in 1961 a higher percentage of Indian children were attending school than ever before.

Not only were the young being salvaged, but also older tribal

members in an adult education curriculum that stressed English courses in the improved education programs. This program was launched among Florida Seminoles, Arizona Papagos, South Dakota Sioux, North Dakota Chippewas, and Idaho Shoshones. Emmons was quoted as saying, "Thousands of Indians are separated from the modern world by a language barrier. No wonder they have such a difficulty earning a living."<sup>27</sup>

Emmons encountered the problems of adult illiteracy during his tour of tribes in the autumn of 1953. When he asked an audience of Florida Seminoles deep in the Everglades to raise their hands if they would like to learn to read and write English, almost every hand was raised. Emmons promised to include the Seminoles as part of the new adult educational program he was devising.<sup>28</sup> Response to the program was overwhelming, and it became successful among those tribes where many could not communicate well in English. Leading experts in the field of Indian education suggested that the adult education program concentrate on five areas: personal progress and self-reliance; family life and home improvement; permanent gainful employment; social adjustment and mobility; broadened horizons through the perception and solution of problems of personal and public concern.<sup>29</sup>

Emmons also instituted an adult Education and Vocational Program designed to meet the needs of those Indians who wished to move off the reservations. Relocation of Indians to urban communities played a major role in his plans to create self-supporting tribes, and adult vocational training was an important segment of this program.


Vocational job training was offered to all Indians. Skilled work training was an essential element of the Emmons plan. This training provided opportunity for off-reservation living and also expanded the reservation job market by creating attractive localities for businesses and industries. Women as well as men were educated under this program. Often untrained women were fearful of leaving the reservation and facing a world about which they knew little. Thus families were kept united during the training period, and risk of breaking up homes was greatly reduced. To Emmons this was a real and relevant concern.<sup>30</sup>

Although relocation was not a success, the concept fit Em-

mons's goal of eventually releasing Indian tribes. Later changes in the program improved it somewhat. Relocation was definitely not intended in Emmons's view to be "piecemeal termination" any more than the shift of BIA health programs was. Emmons was trying only to improve personal and tribal living conditions for Indians, to afford them an opportunity to take part in the mainstream society. Even the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) approved voluntary relocation during their convention of 1955.<sup>31</sup> Clearly, Emmons did not favor forced relocation and was a strong supporter of making the program completely voluntary. He did not initiate relocation programs; these policies began under the previous administration in 1948 and continued on into the new administration that took office in 1961. Relocation is still very much a part of current Indian policy, but it is disguised under various program names. As recently as 1972 relocation was a part of the Employment Assistance Program, which supposedly opened new avenues in the redirection of resources to improve reservation economies.<sup>32</sup> This "new" goal remains nothing more than a re-discovery of the third part of the Emmons Plan—economic development. Job skills of the adult educational and vocational training programs were an essential and primary part of this goal. Emmons was trying to provide Indians with a choice other than a meagre existence on the reservation.

If Emmons did not favor forced relocation, he did support reclamation of Indian land wherever possible, promotion of tribal industries, and production of food and livestock for sale by agrarian Indians.<sup>33</sup> Agrarian pursuits were considered part of economic development and no less an industry than mining or manufacturing. Thus, land reclamation and other economic improvements were major ingredients of the Emmons Plan.

In 1955 the BIA began studying possibilities of industrial development that would increase employment among Indians who did not wish to participate in relocation programs. Originally, considerations were directed toward an "Indians only" program, but increased study indicated that area-wide development benefitting Indians and non-Indians was necessary. In October 1957 the Branch of Industrial Development was established<sup>34</sup> and sought to achieve two major objectives: to get Indian and non-Indian groups



General Eisenhower and Glenn Emmons on the balcony at the airport in Gallup, on August 10, 1952. Courtesy of Glenn L. Emmons.

working together to create an environment as attractive as possible for future industrial development; and to help compile the necessary brochures and fact sheets industrial companies needed to decide where to locate a plant.<sup>35</sup> This program seemed to cater to Indians of the Southwest—Navajos, Pueblos, and Apaches. Three hundred thousand dollars was appropriated by the Navajo Tribal Council for use in obtaining plants and vocational training. Similar projects were also underway among the Dakota Sioux.<sup>36</sup> Across the nation tribes used tribal lands or purchased land upon which to build plants and businesses. On the Navajo reservation oil, uranium, and coal deposits were discovered and developed. In 1953 there were oil leases on only 218,660 acres of Navajo land, and after additional leasing by 1959 there were 1,594,609 acres leased, bringing fifty million dollars into the tribal treasury with two million more each year from rents and royalties.<sup>37</sup> During 1950 an additional \$800,000 from uranium and coal mining was added to the tribal treasury.<sup>38</sup> In a parallel action in the wise use of natural resources, Emmons stressed the best possible use of water resources so that agrarian Indians could remain on their homelands to produce food and livestock for consumption and sale.

During Emmons's administration a number of industries were encouraged to locate on or near the reservations, and tribes were urged to begin their own enterprises. Small industries were first attracted, but many of these tribal businesses either collapsed or changed hands or names. In the long run the Emmons Plan was quite successful, for during the 1960s numerous new industries appeared. Before 1962 the program was not large and fought continuously for acceptance.<sup>39</sup>

Economic development was also dependent upon access roads to the reservations. Aware that in many areas these roads were either non-existent or in such poor condition as to be unusable, Emmons directed part of his economic development program toward solving this problem. He linked agricultural development and road building as priorities of the BIA.<sup>40</sup> This road building project was apparently a great success, for on the day Emmons left office in 1961, he received a memorandum from Chief of the BIA Roads Division stating: "More roads and bridges were built under your term as Commissioner than under *all* other Commissioners combined."<sup>41</sup>

Thus by 1961 Emmons's three-point program had been implemented. It bore close resemblance to, and was harmonious with, the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Program of 19 April 1950.<sup>42</sup> Emmons's three-point program had a broader base, although many of his programs did cater to the Navajos and other tribes of the Southwest.

Glenn L. Emmons remained in the office of Commissioner of Indian Affairs for seven and one-half years. At his retirement in January 1961, Emmons received a letter from President Dwight D. Eisenhower which accepted his resignation from office, effective January 20, 1961. Eisenhower thanked him for having "served faithfully and well" and also for doing his "honest best to help the Indians achieve a better way of life."<sup>43</sup> Hard work brought praise for Emmons from many other quarters, and, as with every public official, criticism from some. He was presented with a Distinguished Service Award from the Interior Department in 1957—the only Commissioner to receive that award while in office. This award, the highest given by the Department of the Interior, was for "outstanding achievement in materially improving the health protection, the educational facilities, and the economic prospects for Indian people."<sup>44</sup> During 1958, Emmons was again honored, this time by a *Resolution of the Navajo Tribal Council* "in support and appreciation of the services of Glenn L. Emmons, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to the American Indians."<sup>45</sup>

Neither the Kennedy, Johnson nor Nixon administrations changed the primary programs Emmons initiated; however, the names and reputations of his policies were affected. Some of Emmons's programs were successful, some were not. Congress bears the greater weight in determining what Indian policy will be through passage of resolutions, laws, and budgets; the Commissioner of Indian Affairs does not. His job is administrative, and under that classification Emmons did reasonably well. Emmons did not always agree with or understand Congressional policy, but he did his best to get Congress to finance the programs which he felt were necessary to improve Indian life.

It seems possible that Emmons never fully understood Congressional policies of termination. BIA personnel hinted that perhaps this was so and that his strong ties to his program proposals

blinded Emmons to other ideas. If this was indeed the case, then one might question the success of Emmons as Commissioner. Some scholars have denied him any credit for improving federal Indian policies. That seems to be an excessively harsh judgment of a man who devoted so much energy trying to improve the health care, schools, and economic livelihood of Indians. Despite the probability that Emmons remained unaware of the seriousness with which Congress was pursuing termination, he deserves credit for the beneficial results of his administration.

Generally two results might occur when an official is unaware of stated policy goals. Disaster is the more common result, but in this case Emmons met with general success, the other possibility. Emmons's three-point program brought about the death of termination as an official policy even if the demise was a gradual one. That Emmons himself could not predict this eventual outcome is certain. He seemed ignorant of the realities of Congressional policy, or at least he feigned a convincing ignorance. May we then criticize him for not keeping abreast of official policy? Considering his successes over a relatively short span of time, Emmons cannot be shunted off into the group of so-called "bad Commissioners." This is one of the proverbial examples when the end seems to justify the means.

Although no permanent solution to federal Indian policy emerged from Emmons's administration, at least an effective end to termination was brought about through increased federal involvement with Native Americans. In the final analysis one must agree that Emmons, despite his ineffectiveness in dealing directly with the termination issue, was a concerned and hardworking Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

#### NOTES

1. *New York Times*, 11 August 1953, p. 25.
2. On 10 August 1952 Emmons personally arranged for General Eisenhower to visit the annual Gallup Indian Ceremonial. While there Eisenhower promised, in a speech, to consult the Indian tribes before selecting a new Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Speech at Gallup, 10 August 1952, Stephen Benedict: Collection of Materials re General Eisenhower's 1952 Campaign, Box 21, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

3. Emmons received unanimous endorsement from the Navajo Tribal Council. Because the Navajo are the largest tribe in the United States, this endorsement overrode the endorsements which Simpson received, and it seems to have made a better impression on Eisenhower. *Gallup Independent*, 12 December 1952; Glenn L. Emmons Endorsements Folder and Alva A. Simpson, Jr. Endorsements Folder, Box 311, General Files 17-B-1, Eisenhower Library.

4. U.S., Congress, *Congressional Record*, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 1953, 99, pt. 7: 9148, 9475-9477, 10041-10044; U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Hearings on the Nomination of Glenn L. Emmons to be Commissioner of Indian Affairs*, 83rd Congress, 1st sess., 15, 28 July 1953.

5. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Hearings on the Nomination of Glenn L. Emmons*, 83rd Congress, 1st sess., 28 July 1953, p. 85; interview with Glenn L. Emmons, Former Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Albuquerque, New Mexico (Interview), 22 March 1976, 19 April 1976, 26 April 1976.

6. Interview, 22 March 1976; 10 May 1976.

7. Interview, 22 March 1976.

8. Orme Lewis to John Gates, Sr., 30 April 1953, Indian Office Administrative File No. 5-11 (10A 5-11), General Files 1937-1957, Part 18, Temp. File No. 2, Record Group 48 (RG), National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C. (NARS); memorandum from Orme Lewis to Survey Team Members, 5 October 1953, 10A 5-11, General Files 1937-1957, Part 19, RG 48, NARS.

9. A letter from W. J. Dougherty to O. M. Yeager, 29 May 1953, 10A 5-11, General Files 1937-1957, Part 18, Temp. File No. 2, RG 48, NARS, includes the memorandum to which Emmons vigorously objected; U.S., Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), *The General Economic Situation of the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin*, submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations, and the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 6 April 1973.

10. S. Lyman Tyler, *A History of Indian Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 181-82.

11. U.S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), Public Health Services, Office of the Surgeon General, Division of Public Health Methods, *Health Services for American Indians* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 95-96.

12. "Convention Records," 1953-1960, Records of the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), Boxes 5, 7, 8, 9, 13 and 14, Smithsonian Institution, National Anthropological Archives, Washington, D.C. (Smithsonian Anthropological Archives).

13. Unfinished manuscript, copy of letter, Eisenhower to Emmons, 2 September 1953, Glenn L. Emmons Papers, Box 5, fol. 15, Zimmerman Library, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque (Emmons Papers); *New York Times*, 6 September 1953, Scrapbook C, Emmons Papers.

14. General Sessions Conference, 11, 12, 13 December 1956, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland; BIA Tri-Area Resources Conference, 27, 28, 29 January 1958, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland. (Both are part of BIA-held records).

15. *Washington Star*, "The Sunday Magazine," 5 May 1957, p. 8.

16. U.S., Department of Interior, BIA, Branch of Education, *Statistics Concerning Indian Education*, Fiscal Year 1953 (Lawrence, KA: Haskell Institute, [1954]).

17. U.S., Congress, *Congressional Record*, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1954, 100, pt. 9: 11452.

18. *Congressional Record*, 100: 11453.

19. *Washington Star*, "The Sunday Magazine," 5 May 1957, p. 8.

20. *Santa Fe New Mexican*, 28 March 1954, p. 1.

21. Interview, 10 May 1976.

22. *Gallup Independent*, Ceremonial Edition, 10 August 1954, p. 1.

23. Interview, 10 May 1976.

24. "The Navajos Feel the Wind of Progress," *Reader's Digest*, March 1959, p. 206, Emmons Papers.

25. U.S., Department of the Interior, BIA, Branch of Education, *Statistics Concerning Indian Education*, Fiscal Years 1952-1961 (Lawrence, KA: Haskell Institute, [1953-1962]); "A New Era For Indian Americans," *Facts Forum News*, November 1956, pp. 6-7, Emmons Papers.

26. " 'Bordertown Dorms' For Navajo Called Success," 12 October 1974, newspaper unknown, Personal Papers of Glenn L. Emmons, Albuquerque, New Mexico (Emmons Personal Papers).

27. "He's Giving the Indians a Chance," *Reader's Digest*, March 1957, p. 167, Emmons Papers.

28. Interview, 22 March 1976; 10 May 1976.

29. "Suggested Learnings for Adult Indians: A Beginning Program in Adult Education," 1956, NCAI Records, Box 73, Smithsonian Anthropological Archives.

30. Interview, 10 May 1976.

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