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RECENT HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE ORIGINS OF THE MEXICAN WAR

THOMAS BENJAMIN

THE ORIGINS of the United States war with Mexico continue to interest students of American and Mexican history, in large part because it is a subject as controversial and perplexing today as it was for Democrats and Whigs in the spring of 1846. The recent literature on the Mexican War is not as abundant as it is in certain other areas, such as the Mexican Revolution, where there is disagreement among historians. The quality of recent Mexican War scholarship, however, far outweighs its numerical inferiority. The recent scholarship, in fact, has substantially improved the character of the traditional historiography.¹

Traditional historiographical divisions still persist, although recent interpretations are less rigidly defined and are more sophisticated and complex. Mexican scholars have begun to move from their nationalistic and defensive interpretations to examinations of domestic causes of the war. The slave-power conspiracy thesis which was used to explain expansionism in the Southwest as a southern plot to add new slave states to the union, has largely disappeared. The Whig thesis, which maintained that President James K. Polk actively plotted his way to war, as well as the Polk-Democratic thesis which placed the burden of responsibility for the war on Mexico, are alive and well in the recent historiography. A final group of studies all but defy categorization. The authors of these books grapple with the difficult issues to form new conclusions which are neither Whig nor Democratic, anti-Mexican nor unabashedly pro-United States.

Unfortunately few recent studies have been written on the subject of the essential motivations that underlay expansionism on the part of the United States in the 1840s: Beginning students of the

Mexican War should first refer to Norman A. Graebner's examination of the commercial push for a Pacific coastline and Frederick Merk's study of the crusading ideology of American expansionism, Manifest Destiny. The best recent synthesis on the subject is William Goetzmann's short monograph of the romantic impulse for expansion. To Goetzmann "the motivation for American continental expansion was more complex than simple greed." It was a compound of agrarian cupidity, mission, the desire for trade, racial prejudice, and a basic sense of insecurity.²

The intent of this article is to survey this recent historiography on both sides of the border since the mid-1960s, reporting on continuing trends and new interpretations.

The early Whig interpretation of the causes of the war focused on the ambitions, cunning, and partisanship of James K. Polk. This theme of personality responsibility was from the beginning, however, tied to the theme of a manipulative slavocracy seeking to expand the territorial base of slavery.³ Authors of the recent studies of the Whig persuasion have stopped paying serious attention to the slavocracy conspiracy interpretation and squarely lay responsibility for the war on President Polk.⁴ The more critical view which posits that Polk consciously plotted his way to war was first seriously researched in the 1930s by Richard Stenberg.⁵ Stenberg argues that Commodore Robert F. Stockton and several other American citizens in the Republic of Texas were under secret orders from Polk to persuade the Texan government to attack the Mexican forces along the Rio Grande so that the United States could "annex a war" as well as the new state to the Union.⁶ Stenberg also maintains that Polk sought to incite Americans in California to revolt against Mexican rule and then seek American protection and annexation.⁷

Glenn W. Price takes up the Stenberg thesis with new vigor and research.⁸ Price argues that when the Polk-Stockton war plan failed, Polk was forced to use the Texas-Mexican boundary confusion to provoke war. The primary question and most difficult problem of Price's book is not documenting what Stockton sought to do in Texas, which is beyond dispute, but linking his activities to Presidential authorization. Price is clearly aware of the difficulty this presents. He notes that the trail linking Stockton to Polk

“was deliberately and carefully hidden.”⁹ The fascinating problem posed by this book is that of who to believe and how to interpret the ambiguous primary sources.

Price, as had Stenberg thirty years earlier, relies heavily upon Anson Jones’s own account of Texan history (written five years after the Stockton affair) and accepts it as valid.¹⁰ Jones, the last president of Texas, accused Polk of “inducing me to the responsibility of provoking and bringing [war with Mexico] about.”¹¹ Price fails to question Jones’s intent in writing the book, his dislike for Polk, and his opposition to annexation. It should also be remembered that Jones’s knowledge of Stockton’s “Presidential orders” came from Stockton himself, who very likely would have invoked this higher authority for his mission whether or not it was true. Price’s thesis cannot be easily refuted and certainly should not be ignored by serious students of the war. Indeed, students must take a stand on this question, given its central implications concerning Polk’s ruthless ambition for Mexican territory, before they tackle the more outstanding incidents such as the Slidell mission and General Taylor’s march to the Rio Grande.¹²

It is not surprising that the Mexican Left has found the Stenberg interpretation congenial. Gaston García Cantu relies on Glenn Price for the actual coming of the war but he is more concerned with the underlying motivation and meaning of North American expansionism.¹³ To García Cantu, North American expansionism was an inevitable product of capitalism. President Polk completed the expansionist dream of Thomas Jefferson and expressed the nationalist arguments for aggression at the decisive stage of capitalist growth in the United States.¹⁴ The war was necessary, according to the author, for the continued growth of North American capitalism and also for Mexican conservatives who sought to preserve church domains and army privileges. In both countries it was a war against the popular classes.¹⁵

Gilberto López y Rivas considers the war one of conquest, plain and simple.¹⁶ He is critical, however, of certain Mexican “internal factors,” specifically liberals who were enthusiastic about North American institutions and who paved the way for United States encroachment through commercial and colonization schemes.¹⁷

John H. Schroeder’s monograph of anti-government criticism in the United States during the war does not bypass the tough issues

of the war's origin.¹⁸ Schroeder, like López, argues that Polk's was a militant policy. "While publicly committed to peaceful diplomacy," he contends, "Polk maneuvered to ensure war if necessary to gain his objectives." Polk used the claims dispute with Mexico to achieve his territorial objectives, whatever the cost.¹⁹ Schroeder concludes that the largely Whig, anti-war movement had little effect on the war. However, one must add that it has had considerable influence on the writing of the history of the war until this day.

Generally, the proponents of the Whig interpretation see the origins of the Mexican War as a one-sided affair. To them the United States was entirely responsible for the war while Mexico was a passive, if not willing, bystander. The Mexican role was that of victim and, to these scholars, relatively unimportant.

The Democratic thesis originated in the documents the Polk administration sent to Congress upon the declaration of war in May, 1846.²⁰ Polk noted that the peaceful efforts to reestablish good relations and adjust the border with Mexico "on liberal and honorable terms" were rebuffed again and again. Finally, the Mexican government, after menacing the territory of the United States for months and unwilling to accept the lawful annexation of Texas to the Union, invaded this country and "shed the blood of our fellow citizens on our soil."²¹

The Democratic interpretation received its most thorough treatment by Justin Harvey Smith in 1919.²² Smith conducted exhaustive research, using both North American and Mexican archives. His two-volume work won the Pulitzer prize in 1920 and as late as 1964 was considered an indispensable account by the authors of the most recent historiographical review of the war.²³ Smith's account of Mexican history and life from 1800 is insightful and interesting, although he denigrates the Mexican people. The purpose of his early chapters is to note the anarchy within the early Mexican republic and to suggest that good relations between the two countries were impossible because of internal Mexican problems.

Although the book has more than one thousand pages, Smith devotes only one hundred pages to the origins of the war. He concentrates on the peaceful intent and efforts of the Polk administration. Smith also gives considerable attention to, as he views it, the unrealistic, belligerent, and offensive claims and pronouncements of the Mexican government, army, and press. In short, says Smith,

“Polk told only the truth when he said the conflict was forced upon us. Mexico wanted it; Mexico threatened it; Mexico issued orders to wage it.”²⁴

Recent works of the Democratic conviction by Seymour Connor and Odie B. Faulk, William H. Goetzmann, and Sanford H. Montaigne show these scholars to be the intellectual heirs to Smith's study.²⁵ Their accounts, neither collectively nor singularly, replace or supplement to any noteworthy degree Smith's monograph. Connor and Faulk allot only thirty pages to the question of war origins. They reject the claims question, boundary dispute, and American desire for California as serious causes of the war. In their analysis it was the annexation of Texas, a province long lost to Mexico as “any realistic Mexican politician knew. . .” which prompted the Mexican attack on the United States.²⁶ The Connor and Faulk book is most valuable for its ninety-one page analytical bibliography of the war which lists seven hundred and sixty-six books and pamphlets. To be of most use the analytical aspect of the bibliography needs to be approached with the knowledge of the authors' position on the coming of the war.²⁷

Goetzmann's well written history of American expansionism from 1800 to 1860 follows Smith's interpretation closely and is intended to counter the “Whig-inspired apologetics” of the war. This account, much more than the others of the Democratic conviction, examines the expansionist, even aggressive, nature of the United States during this era. Goetzmann contends that Polk mobilized United States military resources in order to negotiate with Mexico from a position of strength and exhausted the route of diplomatic negotiations. He did not, however, start the war. Far from being the aggressor, the United States, argues the author, “became the victim of Mexican internal strife.”²⁸

Montaigne's book is the least scholarly of the three discussed here and it is more chauvinistic and anti-Mexican than Smith's study. Montaigne considers his book a response “to a distortion of this country's history, which together with other misinterpretations has tarnished our image and misled millions of young Americans into believing that America is among the most venal of nations.”²⁹

The proponents of the Democratic interpretation devote considerable attention to the political and military activities of Mexico on the eve of war. Indeed, Mexican motives and actions are

more closely scrutinized than those of the Polk administration. The Democratic interpretation, in contrast to the Whig view, is that the Polk administration merely responded to Mexican initiatives.

A third and final group of studies present a more evenhanded treatment of the coming of the war. They significantly improve the quality of Mexican War historiography, primarily because they have transcended the Whig-Democratic dialectic.

Frederick Merk in three books has reexamined certain aspects of American expansionism of the 1840s.³⁰ *Fruits of Propaganda* and *Slavery and the Annexation of Texas* begin to resuscitate the old slavocracy thesis. Merk argues that southerners, in and out of government, stressed the threat of British intervention in Texas to northerners, and expansion of slavery and slave power in the national government to southerners, with regard to the proposed annexation of Texas. This intriguing interpretation raises the possibility of intelligent public relations, not conspiracy, aiding and even guiding public policy. In *The Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism*, Merk analyzes the changes in the Monroe Doctrine during the administrations of Presidents Tyler and Polk. Originally defensive, the doctrine came to be used in support of territorial expansion in the name of national security. Tyler and Polk, notes Merk, saw British attempts to encircle the United States and apparently "imperilling its vital interests and its principles of republicanism."³¹ In these three books Merk not only clarifies some of the confusion of American expansionism and its relation to the Mexican War but he also views Polk's Mexican policy as a logical and important stage in the gradual evolution of an emerging regional power.

Gene M. Brack's essay on the Mexican origins of the war fills an important gap in Mexican War historiography.³² Brack's purpose is to explain why Mexico chose to fight rather than recognize the independence of Texas or cede territory. He offers the first substantial response to Justin Smith's conclusion that Mexicans—confident, bellicose, and hostile—wanted war. For this reason this book is a most welcome addition to the literature of the Mexican War.

Brack contends that Mexicans reacted more in fear than in aggressiveness. The annexation of Texas, the ideology of Manifest Destiny, and American racism convinced many Mexicans that

their national existence was at stake in the 1840s. This fear of the United States and the hostility of the pro-war party placed the Mexican government in a dangerous situation. Negotiation and surrender of territory would insure a rebellion while refusal to negotiate would bring on a war which most high officials did not want, nor believed could be won. The Mexican government chose war in response to the fear of national and cultural extinction and political revolt.³³

The most important contribution to this historiography on the Mexican side since José C. Valdés, *Breve historia de la guerra con los Estados Unidos* written in 1947, is Jesús Velasco Márquez's study of Mexican periodical opinion during the period 1845-1848.³⁴ Velasco Márquez's investigation of newspaper opinion perfectly complements Brack's study of elites and their perceptions. Where Brack contends that Mexican leaders really did not want war, Velasco Márquez shows that Mexican public opinion as reflected in the small but influential Mexico City press, repeatedly demanded war to resolve the Texas question from early 1845 until the war began. Mexican *periodistas* rejected the alternative of recognizing a free and independent Texas republic, thus blocking the Herrera government's moderate policy toward Texas, for several reasons. War with the United States was widely held to be the "only means to preserve the Hispanic race and culture in Mexico."³⁵ It was also put forward that Mexico could not passively accept North American lawlessness without seriously compromising the existence of an international order based on law. Mexican liberals and conservatives considered war as not only indispensable internationally but also domestically useful. War would unite the country and foment true nationalism and also create the proper crisis environment for the execution of reforms. In short, war was considered a magic formula for all of Mexico's international and domestic troubles.³⁶ Although Velasco Márquez contends that the war was, in the final analysis, the product of North American expansionist zeal, he does not ignore Mexican responsibility. Pursuing his thesis that Mexican public opinion constantly demanded war, he projects an image of an assertative nation with more complex motives than simple reaction to American pressure.

The most recent and the best biography of James K. Polk is by Charles Sellers.³⁷ Sellers is supportive of Polk's motives but he is rather critical of Polk's Mexican policy. Sellers maintains that

Polk's "sword-and-olive-branch diplomacy" was primarily designed to gain everything he wanted from Mexico—California and a secure southwestern border—without war. Polk, according to Sellers, truly expected the weak Mexican government to seek peace according to these terms. However, if bullying and bribery would not convince the Mexican government to submit to his territorial demands, Polk would not "shrink from war to accomplish his purposes." When the Mexican government stubbornly refused to receive Slidell, Polk saw no other alternative but to ask for war.³⁸ Sellers devotes some attention to Polk's personality as it affected his diplomacy, a subject which has been largely neglected. He notes that Polk's obsession with the martial Jackson image, his contempt for Mexico and Mexicans, and his belief in American virtue and superiority, significantly shaped the method and the result of his foreign policy.³⁹

The books by K. Jack Bauer and David M. Pletcher are entirely devoted to the Mexican War.⁴⁰ Bauer emphasizes the military side of the conflict while Pletcher, in his diplomatic narrative, devotes much more attention to the origins of the war than has any other author. Both writers note their objectivity at the start by stating that both sides in the conflict must bear responsibility for it. Both sides made mistakes and misread the intentions of the other. Yet these two authors cannot escape the central problem of culpability, and by implication and emphasis they come down on opposite sides of the question.

Bauer leans toward the thesis of Mexican responsibility. He stresses the importance of Mexican inability to settle American claims, Polk's peaceful intentions and readiness to negotiate, and Mexico's intransigence regarding the annexation of Texas. For Bauer, Polk's well-intentioned and justified military and diplomatic pressure failed because Mexican sensibilities were too inflamed. The Polk administration, he notes however, did not handle the crisis with Mexico as well as it could have since it did not understand Mexico and the character of the Mexican people.⁴¹

Pletcher is critical of Polk's diplomacy, policies neither tactful nor adept but chauvinistic and costly to the tune of 12,800 deaths and over \$100 million in expenses. He notes that Polk "set forth on

a foreign policy of strong stands, overstated arguments, and menacing public pronouncements, not because he wanted war but because he felt that this was the only language which his foreign adversaries would understand."⁴² It became progressively more difficult for Polk to take a more conciliatory position. Therefore the Mexican government was pushed into a corner. In the end, Polk's bold and firm course toward Mexico backfired. In late April, 1846, Mexican troops crossed the Rio Grande and engaged a detachment of American soldiers in a small fight. Mexico had lashed back.⁴³ According to Pletcher, Polk did not seek war with Mexico, but he was not adverse to using the threat of war, of even a limited war itself, to accomplish his goals. He eschewed the traditional diplomatic skill of appreciating "a foreign people's hopes, fears, and driving impulses," notes Pletcher, for a policy of bluff and show of force.⁴⁴ Pletcher's international focus, impressive research, and persuasive analysis has made his book the best study of the coming of the war and the diplomacy of the peace. Smith has been replaced by Pletcher as the current last word on the coming of the United States war with Mexico.

The debate, however, is not over, as the proponents of the Whig and the Democratic interpretations will readily admit. Nor have all the research possibilities been exhausted. Mexican scholars have only opened the door to the study of the roles and opinions of various Mexican groups with regard to the coming of the war. Also, despite an increasing amount of impressive research on society and politics in pre-war Mexico and Jacksonian America, few authors of recent studies have considered the larger comparative framework of two vastly different cultures in their first years of contact. Desire for a southern transcontinental railroad route, as a motivation for American expansion, is a seriously neglected subject, as is the topic of Polk's personality.⁴⁵ The Stockton affair is by no means settled. Aside from these larger issues, the need for the investigation of limited topics, such as the Santa Anna-Atocha scheme, is nearly unlimited.

The Mexican War, the "forgotten war" in American and Mexican history, is considered important primarily for its results rather than its origins. This is not surprising since in the histories

of both countries this war was overshadowed by more momentous subsequent events. For the United States the war has become, in the words of Alfred H. Bill, a rehearsal for conflict.⁴⁶ The war added the Mexican cession which pushed the issue of slavery and its expansion onto the center stage of national politics. For Mexico, the war deprived the nation of one-half of its national territory and the rich mineral and agricultural resources of this lost land. Additionally, it provided the shock which led to the period in Mexican history called *La Reforma*.⁴⁷

The question of the origins of the war has less apparent relevance to later historical developments in the United States and Mexico. Most authors writing on this subject have usually considered the problem of war causation as an isolated question of justice: Who was the aggrieved and who was the aggressor? War origins do, however, tell the historian more than this. Karl Schmitt, for example, suggests that United States's political consensus before the war freed American energy, which gravitated outwardly. Mexican energies, on the other hand, were focused toward the center, at Mexico City, in order to protect conflicting interests and advance contending ideologies. The situation of the two countries on the eve of war, then, can be viewed not only in terms of politics but also in the perspective of two societies with very different concerns and interests.⁴⁸

Close examination of the diplomacy and politics of the origins of the Mexican War is essential to the study of American expansionism, Mexican, and even Hispanic-American politics and national character. Such examinations, following a comparative approach, could rid Americans of the notion that other peoples simply react to American words and deeds. An examination of the Mexican origins of the war uncovers fear, hatred, and admiration toward the United States, a self perception of inferiority, and an admirable stubbornness which did not disappear in 1848. In conclusion, behavior, concerns, illusions, and mistakes taken on the road to war reveal many facets of a nation's evolving character.

NOTES

1. The history of Mexican War history is surveyed in Homer C. Chaney, Jr., "The Mexican-United States War, As Seen by Mexican Intellectuals, 1856-1956" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1959); Robert Esquenazi-Mayo, "Historiografía de la guerra entre México y los EE.UU.," *Duquesne Hispanic Review* 1 (1962):33-48; Peter T. Harstad and Richard W. Resh, "The Causes of the Mexican War: A Note on Changing Interpretations," *Arizona and the West* 6 (1964):289-302; Henry Hafer Korn, *The War with Mexico, 1846-1848: A Select Bibliography on the Causes, Conduct, and Political Aspects of the War* (Washington, D.C., 1944); James Van Horn, "Trends in Historical Interpretation: James K. Polk," *North Carolina Historical Review* 42 (1965):454-64; and Silvio Zavala, "La historiografía norteamericana sobre la guerra del 47," *Cuadernos Americanos* (1948):190-206. For the range of conflicting interpretations see: Ramón Eduardo Ruíz, ed., *The Mexican War: Was It Manifest Destiny?* (New York, 1963); Archie P. McDonald, ed., *The Mexican War: Crisis for American Democracy* (Lexington, Mass., 1969); Armin Rappaport, ed., *The War with Mexico: Why Did It Happen?* (New York, 1964); and Josefina Vásquez de Knauth, ed., *Mexicanos y norteamericanos ante la guerra del 47* (México, 1972).

2. Norman A. Graebner, *Empire and the Pacific: A Study in American Continental Expansion* (New York, 1955); Frederick Merk, with the collaboration of Louise Bannister Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation* (New York, 1963); and William H. Goetzmann, *When the Eagle Screamed: The Romantic Horizon in American Diplomacy, 1800-1860* (New York, 1966), p. 24. Also see Alexander DeConde, *This Affair of Louisiana* (New York, 1976); Norman A. Graebner, ed., *Manifest Destiny* (New York, 1968); Juan A. Ortega y Medina, *Destino Manifiesto (sus razones históricas y su raíz teológica)* (México, 1972); Robert V. Remini, *Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, 1767-1821* (New York, 1977); and Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Gloucester, Mass., 1935).

3. Harstad and Resh, "Causes of the Mexican War," pp. 292-93; William Jay, *A Review of the Causes and the Consequences of the Mexican War* (Boston, 1849).

4. The sole exception is Frederick Merk, *Slavery and the Annexation of Texas* (New York, 1972).

5. Richard Stenberg, "The Failure of Polk's Mexican War Intrigue of 1848," *Pacific Historical Review* 4 (March, 1935):39-68; "Polk and Frémont, 1845-1846," *Pacific Historical Review* 7 (1938):211-77; and "President Polk and California: Additional Document," *Pacific Historical Review* 10 (1941):217-19.

6. Stenberg, "The Failure of Polk's Mexican War Intrigue," p. 40.

7. Stenberg, "Additional Documents," pp. 217-19.

8. Glenn W. Price, *Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue* (Austin, 1967).

9. Price, *The Polk-Stockton Intrigue*, p. viii.

10. Anson Jones, *Memoranda and Official Correspondence Relating to the Republic of Texas, Its History and Annexation* (New York, 1958).

11. Price, *The Polk-Stockton Intigue*, p. 114.

12. For another critique see Charles Sellers, *James K. Polk, Continentalist, 1843-1846* (Princeton, N.J., 1966), p. 225, fn.

13. Gaston García Cantu, *Las invasiones norteamericanas en México* (México, 1971). For a North American New Left view, see Richard W. Van Alstyne, "Empire in Midpassage, 1845-1867," in William Appleman Williams, ed., *From Colony to Empire: Essays in the History of American Foreign Relations* (New York, 1972), pp. 83-134.

14. García Cantu, *Las invasiones norteamericanas*, pp. 94-96.

15. García Cantu, *Las invasiones norteamericanas*, p. 80.

16. Gilberto López y Rivas, *La guerra del 47 y la resistencia popular a la ocupación* (México, 1976).

17. López y Rivas, *La guerra del 47 y la resistencia*, p. 81.

18. John H. Schroeder, *Mr. Polk's War: American Opposition and Dissent, 1846-1848* (Madison, 1973).

19. Schroeder, *Mr. Polk's War*, p. 9. For a popular history of the war from a virulent anti-American perspective, see Orlando Martínez, *The Great Land Grab: The Mexican-American War, 1846-1848* (London, 1975).

20. Messages of the President of the United States with the Correspondence, therewith communicated, between the Secretary of War and other Officers of the Government, on the subject of the Mexican War. Thirtieth Congress, First Session. Executive Document No. 60, House of Representatives, April 28, 1848 (Executive Document No. 60).

21. Executive Document No. 60, pp. 4-5.

22. Justin Harvey Smith, *The War with Mexico*, 2 vols. (New York, 1919).

23. Harstad and Resh, "The Causes of the Mexican War," p. 302.

24. Smith, *The War with Mexico*, 1:115.

25. Seymour V. Connor and Odie B. Faulk, *North America Divided: The Mexican War, 1846-1848* (New York, 1971) and the Spanish edition entitled, *La guerra de intervención, 1846-1848: El punto de vista norteamericano* (México, 1975); Goetzmann, *When the Eagle Screamed*; and Stanford H. Montaigne, *Blood Over Texas* (New Rochelle, New York, 1976).

26. Conner and Faulk, *North America Divided*, pp. 31-32.

27. For a more extended review, see John Vishanoff, "Mexican War Scholarship: the Conner-Faulk Assessment," *Journal of Mexican American History* 5 (1975):103-24.

28. Goetzmann, *When the Eagle Screamed*, p. 57.

29. Montaigne, *Blood Over Texas*, p. 12.

30. Frederick Merk, with the collaboration of Lois Bannister Merk, *The Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism, 1843-1849* (New York, 1966); *Fruits of Propaganda in the Tyler Administration* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971); and *Slavery and the Annexation of Texas* (New York, 1972).

31. Merk, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. ix.

32. Gene M. Brack, *Mexico Views Manifest Destiny, 1821-1846: An Essay on the Origins of the Mexican War* (Albuquerque, 1975).
33. Brack, *Mexico Views Manifest Destiny*, pp. 118, 178, 181.
34. Jesús Velasco Márquez, *La guerra del 47 y la opinión pública (1845-1848)* (México, 1975). Also see his article "La guerra con los Estados Unidos," *Historia de México* 7 (1976):117-40.
35. Velasco Márquez, *La guerra del 47*, p. 77.
36. Velasco Márquez, *La guerra del 47*, pp. 83, 87.
37. Sellers, *James K. Polk, Continentalist*; Volume I of Sellers's projected three volume biography is entitled *James K. Polk, Jacksonian: 1795-1843* (Princeton, 1957).
38. Sellers, *James K. Polk, Continentalist*, p. 260.
39. Sellers, *James K. Polk, Continentalist*, pp. 230, 265, 400.
40. K. Jack Bauer, *The Mexican War: 1846-1848* (New York, 1974) and David M. Pletcher, *The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War* (Columbia, 1973).
41. Bauer, *The Mexican War*, pp. 16-29.
42. Pletcher, *The Diplomacy of Annexation*, p. 599.
43. Pletcher, *The Diplomacy of Annexation*, pp. 607-08.
44. Pletcher, *The Diplomacy of Annexation*, p. 603.
45. See Graebner, *Empire on the Pacific*, pp. 94-99; Robert W. Johannsen, *Stephen A. Douglass* (New York, 1973), pp. 164-69; and David M. Potter, *The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861* (New York, 1976), pp. 145-48.
46. Alfred H. Bill, *Rehearsal for Conflict, the War with Mexico, 1846-1848* (New York, 1947).
47. John H. Coatsworth, "Obstacles to Economic Growth in Nineteenth-Century Mexico," *American Historical Review* 83 (1978):97, fn; Charles A. Hale, "The War with the United States and the Crisis in Mexican Thought," *The Americas* 14 (1957):153-73; and Velasco Márquez, *La guerra del 47*, p. 70.
48. Karl M. Schmitt, *Mexico and the United States, 1821-1973: Conflict and Coexistence* (New York, 1974), p. 69. For their attempts to place the war in a broader perspective, see Jan Bazant, *A Concise History of Mexico, from Hidalgo to Cárdenas: 1805-1940* (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 55-61; and Howard F. Cline, *The United States and Mexico* (New York, 1963), p. 40.

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