

10-1-1973

Senator Albert B. Fall and "The Plot Against Mexico"

Mark T. Gilderhus

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr>

Recommended Citation

Gilderhus, Mark T.. "Senator Albert B. Fall and "The Plot Against Mexico"." *New Mexico Historical Review* 48, 4 (2021). <https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr/vol48/iss4/3>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in New Mexico Historical Review by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

SENATOR ALBERT B. FALL AND
"THE PLOT AGAINST MEXICO"

MARK T. GILDERHUS

IN 1919 a curious assortment of journalists, radicals, and missionaries charged "the interests" with undertaking "a plot against Mexico." Allegedly Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico and American oil producers were seeking military intervention against the government of Venustiano Carranza. Although Fall and the oil men denied the accusation, most scholarly authorities have accepted the substance of the charge as valid. The existing literature portrays the Senator as an interventionist who sought to resolve the crisis with Mexico during the autumn of 1919 by means of force.¹ This essay seeks to suggest that his goals were in fact less direct.

Albert Fall had a reputation for toughness in Mexican affairs. After winning election to the Senate as a Republican in 1912, he embraced American businessmen as his special constituents and assailed Woodrow Wilson's Mexican policies for lacking direction and authority. As a pugnacious politico and entrepreneur with close ties to borderland enterprise, Fall identified with Americans in Mexico.² In 1919 his personal concerns complemented those of his party. Having won control of Congress in 1918, Republicans mounted an assault against the Wilson administration with a view toward forthcoming presidential elections. Although they directed much of their fire against the Treaty of Versailles, the Mexican question also figured in their calculations. Senator Fall presided over this aspect of the attack and developed an intimate association with American oil producers in Mexico. In February 1919 Harold Walker, a spokesman for Edward L. Doheny's Mexican Petroleum

Company, appealed to Fall for assistance. While attributing Mexico's "hideous" condition largely "to Mr. Wilson's able assistance," Walker urged the Senator to speak out, because only he could give to the issue the necessary "dramatic presentation."³ Subsequently, in efforts to toughen American policy, Fall collaborated with various oil men and aided the National Association for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico.

American businessmen created the National Association early in December 1918. Fronted by a twelve-member committee with offices in New York City, the organization represented a variety of concerns, including land and cattle companies, mining operations, and petroleum enterprises. It functioned primarily as a pressure group and publicity bureau which sought to discredit Venustiano Carranza with charges of negligence and malfeasance. As its principal goal, the National Association intended to arouse, organize, and lead "a public sentiment" to sustain the United States government "in taking without further delay whatever steps may be necessary to secure . . . protection for the lives and property of Americans in Mexico."⁴

Assisted by Senator Fall, the National Association singled out for special censure Carranza's inability to pacify the republic and his challenge to the sanctity of private property. Propaganda releases depicted Mexico as having regressed into a Hobbesian state of barbarity. Lawlessness and disorder threatened constantly. Bandits, marauders, and venal officials subjected United States nationals to repeated indignities, and government authorities, either indifferent or powerless, did nothing. The new Mexican Constitution of February 5, 1917, also rankled. This document, an expression of economic nationalism, was intended to provide greater control over foreign business operations in the extractive industries. Article Twenty-seven especially threatened American interests. It asserted "the right to impose on private property such limitations as the public interest may demand," and sanctioned expropriation "for reasons of public utility and by means of indemnification." It also annulled the practices of Porfirio Díaz by re-establishing the Hispanic tradition of vesting ownership of

mineral resources with the nation. Since possession of surface lands no longer would imply title to resources beneath the surface, exploitative concessions in the future could be obtained only by direct concession from the Mexican government.⁵

Article Twenty-seven did not affect that status of property rights immediately. Enacting legislation was necessary to make it effective, but Americans nevertheless objected strenuously. Oil men, especially, interpreted the provision as a confiscatory device. To constitute "a united front," they formed the Oil Producers Association with Edward L. Doheny as chairman, and urged the United States government to defend their property energetically.⁶

In 1917 and 1918 Woodrow Wilson had subordinated Mexican issues to the task of waging war against Germany. Although the State Department warned repeatedly that the United States would not acquiesce in "the direct or indirect confiscation of American-owned property," the President wished to avoid a confrontation while engaged in Europe, and American property owners tended to regard his efforts as excessively timid. Nevertheless, it was widely assumed that the United States would call Carranza to account once the European struggle ended. As a State Department memorandum observed in August 1918, "a policy of temporization" toward Mexico was necessary for the duration, but "immediately" after "the European peace," the United States should undertake "the rehabilitation of Mexico."⁷

In spite of such expectations, Wilson did not move to reorient United States Mexican policies drastically, and State Department officials cautioned repeatedly during the spring and summer of 1919 against a possible upsurge of interventionist sentiment. In March for example, Henry P. Fletcher, the American ambassador to Mexico, warned that the administration could "let matters drift in their present unsatisfactory condition," but to do so would risk "the ensuing clamor at home and abroad."⁸ The outcry grew steadily louder. Late in June one oil executive declared to the State Department that "the time for action has arrived." The National Association made similar demands in the *Bulletin*, a propaganda organ which asserted the need for an early remedy. On July 9

spokesmen for eighteen petroleum corporations conferred with State Department officials, and some of the oil men were favorably disposed toward intervention. In the same month Republicans in the House of Representatives took up the issue by inquiring into Mexican affairs and criticizing the administration's handling of them.⁹

In the meantime, Americans in sympathy with the Mexican Revolution mounted a counterattack. It was spearheaded by the League of Free Nations Association, an organization founded after the European armistice to promote international peace and friendship. Directed by Dr. Samuel Guy Inman, a missionary-scholar and an authority on Latin America, the group's committee on Mexico tried to defend Carranza and advised against forceful measures. In addition, radical journalists such as John Kenneth Turner, Leander J. de Bekker, and Arthur Thomson wrote treatises in which they attacked the National Association and accused the oil men of plotting military action against Mexico.¹⁰ Albert B. Fall confronted these charges directly during the autumn of 1919 when he presided over a Senate investigation of Mexican affairs.

Assisted by Frank B. Brandegee, a Republican from Connecticut, and Marcus Smith, a Democrat from Arizona, Senator Fall initiated the inquiry on September 8, 1919. During the following months, the committee summoned 257 witnesses, of whom 52 appeared in executive session, and compiled a report consisting of 3,400 pages of published testimony. Fall dominated the hearings. Although he disclaimed any personal stake in Mexico and professed friendship for the Mexican people, he conducted the investigation in a partisan fashion from the outset. His sympathies clearly resided with disgruntled Americans who were hostile toward Carranza.¹¹

When Samuel Guy Inman, Leander J. de Bekker, and Arthur Thomson appeared to defend the Mexican Revolution, Fall gave them little credence. Each maintained that the National Association in cooperation with Doheny and the oil producers was conspiring to bring about military intervention in Mexico. Moreover,

each suggested that Senator Fall had aided and abetted the scheme.¹² The Senator, in response, baited and bullied his critics, and in the end managed to undermine their credibility. He insisted upon convincing proof, not mere inference, and the witnesses could not provide it. While chiding Arthur Thomson about the dubious veracity of his sources, for example, Fall lamented: "It is a wheel within a wheel. You get something from Mr. De Bekker . . . and you swing it around, and then Mr. De Bekker gets something from you, and he swings it around, and that is the way it goes on." Condescendingly, he recommended some historical studies of Mexico to alleviate Thomson's ignorance.¹³

Fall then introduced a number of oil men, most notably Mr. Doheny, his friend and former partner, Charles H. Boynton, the executive secretary of the National Association, Frederick Kellogg, an attorney employed by Doheny, Amos L. Beatty, the general counsel for the Texas Company, and William F. Buckley, a spokesman for independent oil producers. They complained profusely about conditions in Mexico, and proposed a variety of solutions. All favored a more assertive policy, but none advocated armed intervention, except as a last resort. Most shared the view of George Agnew Chamberlain, a former American consul general in Mexico City, who advised a policy of graduated pressure. Diplomatic recognition should be withdrawn from the Carranza government. Then, if necessary, the United States should place an embargo on all loans, close all avenues of commerce, utilize naval demonstrations, and cooperate with anti-Carranza rebels who seemed likely to treat American property more generously. Finally, but only if everything else failed, Washington should consider the possibility of using force.¹⁴

Senator Fall believed in the efficacy of a similar course. Contrary to the prevailing view, his primary goal in 1919 was not military intervention. He preferred a more subtle, indirect method. By discrediting the Mexican President and withdrawing diplomatic support from him, Fall hoped to precipitate a rebellion among anti-Carranza groups and to establish a new government in power.

The Senator attempted to stigmatize President Carranza in a

number of ways. For example, Fall tried to link Carranza with radical and subversive elements in the United States. In a letter to Secretary of State Robert Lansing in the middle of November, Fall alleged that the Mexican President had fostered sedition in the United States. As evidence, he disclosed that Mexican consulates were distributing Arthur Thomson's *The Conspiracy Against Mexico*, a pamphlet which Fall dubbed "A Bolshevik appeal to labor elements in the United States." In addition, Fall reported that Carranza had assisted Señora Hermila Galindo in the preparation of a book which castigated the northern colossus for its pretensions of hegemony in the hemisphere and upheld Pan-Hispanicism as an ideal. In the Senator's view, it clearly demonstrated Carranza's hostile attitude. As further proof, Fall's committee tried to implicate President Carranza in a plot reportedly calculated to provoke an uprising among Mexicans in the American Southwest.¹⁵ Such charges were especially potent during the era of the Red Scare. By insisting upon a connection between the revolution in Mexico and social unrest at home, Fall exploited America's postwar paranoia and won ever more support. Ambassador Fletcher moved closer to Fall's position. So did Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane, and Robert Lansing also became increasingly sympathetic.¹⁶

Albert Fall expected that anti-Carranza factions would coalesce into a solid bloc of opposition if the United States would withdraw recognition from Carranza. A resurgence of rebel activities in 1919 buoyed his hopes. In the north and south alike, leaders such as Francisco Villa, Emiliano Zapata, and Félix Díaz were appealing for the creation of a new revolutionary union. Fall's strategem focused especially on Félix Díaz. As a nephew of former President Porfirio Díaz and a favorite among Mexican conservatives, he had a high regard for the sanctity of private property. Moreover, as chief of the *Ejército Reorganizador Nacional* (National Army of Reorganization), he wielded considerable influence in southern Mexico, and sought to extend it by cultivating ties with rebels such as Guillermo Meixueiro, who had established an autonomous regime

in Oaxaca, and Manuel Peláez, who controlled the oil fields around Tampico and Veracruz.¹⁷

To amalgamate the anti-Carrancistas into a single force, it was necessary to overcome a multitude of differences, but gradually the movement gained headway. In 1919 Carranza's principal enemies affirmed allegiance to the Constitution of 1857. In contrast to the Constitution of 1917, this document upheld more vigorously the right to own property. By repudiating Article Twenty-seven, the anti-Carrancistas intended to court support north of the border. By recognizing their status as belligerents, they proclaimed, Washington could avoid the responsibility of intervention and facilitate "a quick and sound reconstruction of Mexico."¹⁸

Rebel groups of course viewed Albert Fall as a potential ally. At least by the late summer of 1919, intermediaries had placed him in contact with Pedro del Villar, the leader of the Díaz exiles in the United States. In August, in a memorandum addressed to the Senator, Villar requested support and recognition for Díaz. A few weeks later, in an appeal to the State Department, anti-Carrancistas promised "to unite in the formation of a provisional administration." To aid in this "great work of reconstruction," they "frankly" asked for American assistance.¹⁹ An opportunity to obtain it appeared a short while later when a crisis developed over "the Jenkins affair."

William O. Jenkins, an American consular agent in the city of Puebla, was abducted on the night of October 19, 1919, by a band of rebels, probably acting on orders from Manuel Peláez. To embarrass Mexico City and to provoke an incident with the United States, they demanded a ransom of three hundred thousand pesos, payable only by the Mexican government. The plan went awry, however, when Jenkins fell ill. Rather than risk his death, the kidnapers accepted payment from private sources, and released the victim on October 26. Officials in the state of Puebla then arrested Jenkins, charging that he had arranged his own abduction in collusion with the insurgents. Claiming innocence, Jenkins refused to post bail on grounds that it would amount to a tacit admission of

guilt.²⁰ The incident soon became a *cause célèbre* in the United States.

Since a stroke had incapacitated President Wilson early in October, Secretary Lansing took charge. He and most members of the Cabinet favored caution, although Franklin K. Lane, the Secretary of the Interior, and Albert S. Burleson, the Postmaster-General, urged "drastic measures," and Henry Fletcher advised "a strong position." Indeed, Fletcher wanted to break off relations unless Mexico released Jenkins within forty-eight hours. Initially Lansing would not go that far, but he proceeded to lay "all the cards on the table." In a note to Mexico City on November 23, he criticized Jenkins' arrest, calling it "entirely unwarranted" and "an arbitrary exercise of public authority." Failure to release the prisoner, he warned, would "have a very serious effect." Fletcher, in the meantime, reported that the Army and Navy stood ready.²¹

When Mexico refused to free Jenkins three days later, the Secretary of State furiously called the Mexican ambassador to account for the "insolence" of his government. He told Ignacio Bonillas that the United States had suffered "indignity after indignity" and would tolerate no more. An open break was possible unless Carranza abandoned his policy of "flagrant disregard for American rights." Moreover, public outrage "might overwhelm" diplomatic efforts, and that "would almost inevitably mean war." Bonillas was rendered speechless. As Lansing later recalled with satisfaction, the ambassador terminated the conversation abruptly by stalking out "white with rage."²²

In a second dispatch on the following day, the Secretary of State accused the Carranza government of "wilful indifference to the feelings of the American people," and again requested Jenkins' release. His note had the earmarks of a near ultimatum, but Lansing nevertheless seemed opposed to military action. In his diary, he explained that he wanted to resolve the crisis peacefully, but worried lest Carranza's behavior might provoke "a storm of popular indignation" in the United States. By assuming a forceful stance, Lansing hoped to deflate interventionist pressure. As he saw it, the outburst against Bonillas was "a last resort to get the

Mexicans to change their policy and prevent an explosion in Congress." Though bellicose and threatening, "it really was intended to prevent war."²³

Lansing's maneuver, whatever his intentions, provided Carranza's enemies with an opportunity to exploit. In a note to Senator Fall on November 28, a spokesman for Félix Díaz suggested an alliance with the United States. In return for aid and support, the insurgents would deed Lower California to the United States after taking power, and would allow the Americans "full control of all petroleum fields in Mexico."²⁴ In the meantime, Senator Fall hurried back to Washington from El Paso. When he arrived on December 1, the Secretary of State designated Henry Fletcher to brief him. Subsequently Fall told Fletcher of his decision to initiate congressional action. He intended to introduce a resolution in the Senate to support the State Department's handling of the Jenkins case and to urge a break in relations with Mexico.²⁵

Upon learning of the plan, Lansing in dismay ordered Fletcher to dissuade Senator Fall. The Secretary feared that such a resolution would cripple efforts to settle the crisis peacefully, especially since two days previously Ignacio Bonillas had confided his belief that Jenkins would be released. On December 4, Lansing and Fletcher appeared before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and asked it to defer action. The Secretary, however, inadvertently heightened speculation about the President's ability to perform his duties when he confessed that he had not informed Wilson of developments in Mexico. Republican members in response urged an inquiry, and arranged an audience with the President for Senator Gilbert Hitchcock, a Democrat from Nebraska, and Senator Albert B. Fall.²⁶

The details of the visitation on the afternoon of December 5 are well known. Scarcely the mindless lunatic conjured up by rumor, the President was cheerful, alert, and in control of his faculties. Moreover, the denouement of the Jenkins affair took place during the interview when news arrived that Carranza had decided to free his captive. This act relieved the immediate crisis, but Wilson nevertheless asked Fall to prepare a memorandum on Mexico. The

Senator still wanted to revoke recognition, but Wilson was unpersuaded. He would neither sanction a break nor consent to congressional action on Fall's proposal. As he phrased it, "I would be gravely concerned to see any such resolution pass the Congress."²⁷ A rebuke by the President thus frustrated Senator Fall's ambition, and the scheme to overthrow Carranza by triggering a revolution against him came to naught.

So what of "the plot against Mexico?" The evidence suggests that something resembling a plot did exist. A diffuse, loosely connected aggregation including unhappy property owners, dissident government officials, and insurgent anti-Carrancistas shared a common disdain for the Mexican President. Some hoped to force a change in his policies, others to eliminate him altogether. But beyond this vague coincidence of interest, they could agree upon little, especially upon means by which to achieve their goals. Their endeavors as a consequence lacked coherence and coordination. Only Senator Fall's presence brought a sense of unity and purpose to the efforts of otherwise disparate groups.

Although Fall was the central figure, it is misleading to portray him primarily as an advocate of military intervention in 1919. Such a view misses the essential subtlety of his purpose. He knew the difficulty of persuading President Wilson to send troops into Mexico. He understood also the inherent danger of military action. It could create new threats to American interests in Mexico, and might cause Carranza's rivals to rally in defense of the motherland against a foreign invader. All things considered, Fall thought it wise to pursue his goal indirectly. He correctly perceived the precarious instability of the Carranza regime, but miscalculated by counting on Félix Díaz and his allies. In May 1920 an uprising overthrew Carranza and led to his assassination. But in contrast to the Senator's expectations, it was precipitated by a factional feud from within the Carranza coalition. And the new rulers of Mexico—Álvaro Obregón, Plutarco Elías Calles, and Adolfo de la Huerta—were no more satisfactory to Albert B. Fall than Venustiano Carranza.²⁸

NOTES

1. See J. Fred Rippy, *The United States and Mexico* (New York, 1926), pp. 354-59; Howard F. Cline, *The United States and Mexico*, rev. ed. (New York, 1963), pp. 189-92; Luis G. Zorrilla, *Historia de las relaciones entre México y los Estados Unidos de América*, vol. 2 (México, 1966), pp. 344-50; Manuel A. Machado, Jr. and James T. Judge, "Tempest in a Teapot? The Mexican-United States Interventionist Crisis of 1919," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, vol. 74 (1970), pp. 1-23; David Glaser, "1919: William Jenkins, Robert Lansing, and the Mexican Interlude," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, vol. 74 (1971), pp. 337-56; and Clifford Trow, "Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Interventionist Movement of 1919," *Journal of American History*, vol. 58 (1971), pp. 46-72.

2. For Fall's background, see Clifford Trow, "Senator Albert B. Fall and Mexican Affairs: 1912-1921," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1966), *passim*; and David H. Stratton, "New Mexico Machiavellian? The Story of Albert B. Fall," *Montana, The Magazine of Western History*, vol. 7 (1957), pp. 2-14. For Fall's own recollections, see David H. Stratton, ed., *The Memoirs of Albert B. Fall* (*Southwestern Studies*, vol. 4, no. 3, monograph 13, El Paso, 1966); and United States Congress, *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*, 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1920, Senate Doc. 285, vol. 1, pp. 1130-34 (hereafter cited as IMA).

3. Walker to Fall, Feb. 14, 1919, Mexican Affairs, Senate Office Files, microfilm copy, reel 36, Albert B. Fall Papers, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska; the original manuscripts are located at the Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California.

4. IMA, vol. 1, pp. 403-23; *New York Times*, Jan. 30, 1919; *Bulletin of the National Association*, July 1, 1919, in Group N, Mexican Affairs, Senate Office Files, reel 32, Fall Papers.

5. Group N, Mexican Affairs, Senate Office Files, reel 32, Fall Papers, contains propaganda items distributed by the National Association, and indicates close cooperation with Fall; *United States Department of State*,

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917 (Washington, D.C., 1926), pp. 950-81; Felipe Tena Ramírez, ed., *Leyes fundamentales de México, 1808-1957* (México, 1957), pp. 817-81.

6. IMA, vol. 1, pp. 290-91; Harold Walker to Frank L. Polk, Feb. 11, 1917, Frank L. Polk Papers, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.; Chandler P. Anderson to Polk, March 8, 1917, 812.011/57, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 272 (hereafter cited as RDS).

7. See Mark T. Gilderhus, "The United States and Carranza, 1917: The Question of *De Jure* Recognition," *The Americas*, vol. 29 (1972), pp. 214-31; Boaz Long's Memorandum, Aug. 10, 1918, 711.12/130, RDS, Microcopy No. 314.

8. Memorandum by Fletcher, March 1, 1919, 711.12/187, RDS.

9. Frederick Watriss to Polk, June 27, 1919, Polk Papers; Group N, Mexican Affairs, Senate Office Files, reel 32, Fall Papers; Polk Diary, July 9, 1919, Polk Papers; List of persons present at an interview on July 9, 1919, box 7, Henry P. Fletcher Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; United States Congress, House of Representatives, *Appointment of a Committee for Investigation of Mexican Situation; Hearings Before the Committee on Rules*, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1919.

10. IMA, vol. 1, pp. 80, 189-91; Samuel Guy Inman, *Intervention in Mexico* (New York, 1919); John Kenneth Turner, *Hands Off Mexico* (The Rand School of Social Science, 1920); Leander J. de Bekker, *The Plot Against Mexico* (New York, 1919); and Arthur Thomson, *The Conspiracy Against Mexico* (California, The International Press, n.d.).

11. IMA, *passim*; see vol. 1, pp. 1131-33 for Fall's comments.

12. IMA, vol. 1, pp. 4-141, 331-70, vol. 2, pp. 2093-2123.

13. IMA, vol. 2, p. 2110. Fall suggested especially Henry G. Ward, *Mexico in 1827*, 2 vols. (London, 1828), and Vicente Riva Palacio, *México á través de los siglos*, 5 vols. (Barcelona, 1887-1889).

14. IMA, vol 1, pp. 290, 408-16, 543, 592, 841, vol. 2, 2394, 2873.

15. Fall to Lansing, Nov. 13, 1919, Papers on Mexican Affairs, reel 40; Thomson to Gus Klumpner, Nov. 15, 1919, Mexican Affairs, Senate Office Files, reel 35, Fall Papers; Hermila Galindo, *La Doctrina Carranza y el Acercamiento Indo-Latino* (México, 1919); Memorandum from the Fall Committee to Henry Fletcher, Dec. 4, 1919, box 4, Fletcher Papers.

16. Fletcher to Lansing, Aug. 20, 1919, box 8, Fletcher Papers; Lane to Lansing, n.d., 711.12/224½, RDS; Lansing Diary, July 26, Sept. 1, 1919, Lansing Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

17. Federico Cervantes M., *Francisco Villa y la Revolución* (México,

1960), pp. 586-92; John Womack, Jr., *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York, 1969), pp. 316-17; Luis Liceaga, *Félix Díaz* (México, 1958), pp. 529-601; Weekly Report on Conditions along the Mexican Border, Feb. 21, 1919, 812.00/22535, RDS.

18. H. N. Branch, "The Mexican Constitution of 1917 Compared with the Constitution of 1857," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 71 (1917), pp. 15-25; Pedro del Villar to Lansing and others, Feb. 5, 1919, 812.00/22520, RDS.

19. W. H. Field to Fall, July 28, 1919, Sept. 8, 1919, Mexican Affairs, Senate Office Files, reel 31, Fall Papers; Liceaga, pp. 579-85; Manifesto to the President and People of the United States, Sept. 13, 1919, 812.00/23060, RDS.

20. Charles C. Cumberland, "The Jenkins Case and Mexican-American Relations," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 31 (1951), pp. 586-607.

21. E. David Cronon, ed., *The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-1921* (Lincoln, 1963), p. 461; Fletcher to Lansing, Nov. 21, 1919, box 7, Fletcher Papers; Lansing Diary, Nov. 17, 1919, Lansing Desk Diary, Nov. 13-24, 1919, Lansing Papers; *Foreign Relations, 1919*, vol. 2, p. 583.

22. *Foreign Relations, 1919*, vol. 2, pp. 584-86; Lansing Memorandum, Nov. 28, 1919, 711.12/229³/₄, RDS; Lansing Diary, Nov. 28, 1919, Lansing Papers.

23. *Foreign Relations, 1919*, vol. 2, pp. 586-89; Lansing Diary, Nov. 28, 1919, Lansing Desk Diary, Dec. 1, 4, 1919, Lansing Papers. For an intelligent appraisal of Lansing's ambivalence, see Robert Freeman Smith, *The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-1932* (Chicago, 1972), pp. 155-75.

24. W. E. D. Stokes to Fall, Nov. 28, 1919, Mexican Affairs, Senate Office Files, reel 34, Fall Papers.

25. Lansing Desk Diary, Dec. 1, 1919, Lansing Papers; IMA, vol. 1, 843A-843C.

26. Lansing Desk Diary, Dec. 3, 4, 1919, Lansing Papers; Fletcher to Lansing, Dec. 2, 1919, Fletcher Memorandum, Dec. 9, 1919, box 7, Fletcher Papers; IMA, vol. 1, 843C.

27. Edith Bolling Wilson, *My Memoir* (New York, 1938), pp. 298-99; David H. Stratton, "President Wilson's Smelling Committee," *The Colorado Quarterly*, vol. 5 (1956), pp. 164-84; IMA, vol. 1, 843C-843J; Wilson to Fall, Dec. 8, 1919, Series 3, vol. 58, Wilson Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

28. IMA, vol. 2, pp. 3368-73.