New Mexico Historical Review

Volume 80 | Number 2 Article 3

4-1-2005

Forging Identity: Mexican Federal Frontier Schools, 1924–1935

Andrae Marak

Forging Identity

MEXICAN FEDERAL FRONTIER SCHOOLS, 1924–1935

Andrae Marak

Plutarco Elías Calles dreamed of forging a single national Mexican identity out of the many cultures that existed at the end of the Mexican Revolution. His main weapon in the battle for a united Mexico was the federal primary school, where children could be taught patriotic values and the proper use of Spanish (especially among the nation's various indigenous groups). Nowhere were federal primary schools more important than along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Taking advantage of the "voluntary" repatriation of an estimated five hundred thousand Mexicans from the United States during the Great Depression, the federal government set up a series of *escuelas fronterizas* (frontier schools) in the larger cities along the border in January 1930.[1] The mission of these schools was to take Mexicans who were considered suspicious because they had just returned from the United States or had spent their lives along the border, and mold them into patriotic citizens who would be willing to devote themselves to the economic and social advancement of their mother country.

Andrae Marak is Assistant Professor of History and Political Science at California University of Pennsylvania. His current research focuses on the assimilation campaign of the Seri and Tohono O'odham. Part of the research for this article was supported by a Garcia-Robles Fulbright Dissertation Fellowship and grants from the Latin American and Iberian Institute and the Graduate School at the University of New Mexico. In addition, suggestions by Linda B. Hall, Engracia Loyo, Ev Schlatter, Sam Truett, and the *New Mexico Historical Review*'s anonymous reviewers proved invaluable.

The schools were created to provide an alternative to better funded schools on the U.S. side of the border, where many Mexican parents sent their children. Frontier schools would teach their children Spanish, Mexican songs and hymns, and their nation's history rather than English and the Pledge of Allegiance of the United States. Although most parents were in favor of increasing funds for border schools and teaching Mexican patriotism, they also understood the necessity of learning English to get ahead in the bilingual border economy. Thus, parents pushed the Mexican government to hire native English-speaking teachers and to mimic the course offerings of American schools. By threatening to keep their children in U.S. schools unless these demands were met, Mexican parents partially undermined the original intent of the federal government and reshaped frontier school curriculum.

It is my contention that Mexican officials wanted to encourage U.S. economic involvement in the border economy but discourage its citizens from cultural and social involvement in the burgeoning economy. This article investigates this contradiction by providing an institutional sketch of the frontier schools created by the Mexican federal government. I explore the battle against U.S. cultural and economic imperialism waged by the Mexican government from 1924–1935 in Coahuila, Chihuahua, and Sonora and the resultant struggles over the cultural identity of people living along the border. First, I consider these struggles through a historical outline of the American-Mexican frontier and Calles's adoption of frontier schools as a means of resisting U.S. economic and cultural imperialism. Second, I examine how frontier schools in Coahuila, Chihuahua, and Sonora affected local communities.[2] The educational bureaucrats responsible for the schools in each state adopted specific approaches as a result of the differing cultural legacies in each region. The personal idiosyncrasies of educational inspectors in charge of overseeing the schools was a significant factor in the role that the schools played in border culture and economy.

The Creation of the Border

Much like the identities of the people who populated it, the U.S.-Mexican frontier is a historical construction. The present-day border between the two countries is the product of over a century and a half of U.S. economic, cultural, and military imperialism and the subsequent contestation and accommodation among Mexicans, Americans, and their governments.[3]

The Mexican Revolution (1910–1917) did not end the efforts of some prominent U.S. lawmakers to intervene in Mexican territory and sovereignty. Toward the end of Mexican president Victoriano Huerta's (1913–1914) term in office, Pres. Woodrow Wilson's special agent, John Lind, suggested that the United States needed to either militarily intercede in Mexican affairs or back Huerta's opponents financially. The proposed U.S. military intervention was actually supported by several prominent Mexican politicians, the most important of whom was Luis Cabrera.[4]

Wilson decided to place an embargo on Huerta's regime while lifting the embargo against his political enemies, the Constitutionalists. When the United States finally did militarily intervene in the Mexican Revolution by invading Veracruz in April 1914, the vast majority of Mexicans were understandably opposed to the U.S. interference.[5]

Despite the relatively favorable view most Mexican politicians and policymakers had toward the future role of U.S. capital in the Mexican economy, the end of the Revolution did not bring respite from those Americans who still saw Mexico as a land that belonged under the auspices of the United States. For example, American politicians like New Mexico senator Albert B. Fall advocated heavy involvement in Mexico because of his own racism. As chairman of the United States Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Mexican Affairs in 1919, Fall suggested that since Mexicans were by nature physically weak and morally base, the United States should intervene in Mexican affairs—perhaps even waging war if necessary—in order to save Mexicans from their own decrepitude.[6]

Despite the heavy-handed approach that the United States sometimes took in its dealings with Mexico—before, during, and after the Revolution—many Mexicans, including the postrevolutionary leaders from the North, were in favor of continued U.S. investment.[7] Furthermore, the overall amount of direct U.S. investment rose during the 1920s as Obregón and Calles were in the process of reconstructing their shattered nation.[8] Although Calles was interested in increasing direct U.S. investment in the Mexican economy, he was determined that incoming capital benefit Mexicans. Calles argued that he was "fighting not to destroy capital, but rather so that it might work according to our laws."[9] He and his educational ministers were concerned that the spread of U.S. capitalism would bring with it the spread of U.S. culture. Thus, they paid special attention to the forging of proper Mexican identity among borderland dwellers by inculcating patriotic values through special frontier schools.

In late 1929 the *Secretaria de Educación Pública* (SEP) approved a preliminary budget for the "creation of well organized and equipped border schools with the object of impeding Mexican children who might go to the United States to receive their primary education."[10] Originally the SEP proposed opening five schools: four along the U.S.-Mexico border in Ciudad Juárez, Piedras Negras, Nuevo Leon, and Matamoros, and one along the Mexico-Guatemala border in Motozintla.[11] Their top priority was to stem the flow of Mexican children going to the United States, consequently, the frontier school in Motozintla, Chiapas, never actually received funding.[12]

In early 1930 SEP officials acknowledged that they had bungled the job of creating frontier schools by failing to take into account the need to obtain and repair the school buildings within which the new frontier education would be offered. SEP informed educational inspectors in charge of implementing frontier school policies that they would have to obtain both the moral and material support of local and state officials for the new policies in order to be successful.[13]

The failure of SEP to secure funding for construction of the schools did not dampen the ideological importance the ministry placed on the schools. In 1930 SEP officials reiterated that the frontier schools were an important tool in constructing a "true nation" out of the heterogeneous cultural milieu of contemporary Mexico.[14] Primary schools, in general, they argued, were the key to Mexico's future prosperity:

> Schools are also necessary, many schools, but primary schools that study and understand our national life; that instill a love for our country . . . schools whose teaching principally imparts true knowledge of that which is ours and feels proud of it; [schools] in which the knowledge of geography, math, history, etc. serves to awaken a love of nation and promotes an action that benefits the land that saw us born.[15]

Despite the clear goals of the new frontier schools and the federal control over policy-making decisions, the actual implementation of frontier school policy would prove to be anything but uniform across the U.S.-Mexico border.

Frontier Education in Coahuila

In January 1930 Ramón Méndez, the head of federal education in Coahuila, responded to federal directives. He officially requested that a frontier school

be established in Piedras Negras on the other side of the border from Eagle Pass, Texas, in order to "give Mexican children the opportunity to receive a better education and thus counteract the practice of these children going to the United States's schools."[16] The municipal president of Piedras Negras immediately offered his assistance, promising to give the federal government the city's best existing school for the new project. Méndez readily accepted and also asked SEP officials in Mexico City for permission to establish a second frontier school in Villa Acuña, across the border from Del Rio, Texas. Méndez believed, however, that for the frontier schools to be successful, "it would be very necessary, for example, that the frontier school have some professors that know and teach English; since [Piedras Negras] is contiguous with Eagle Pass, many parents want their children to learn the language and for this reason they send them to the schools of the other country."[17] Early on, the original aim of policymakers to create patriotic Mexicans through the frontier schools was undermined by the need to adapt the schools to the conditions and the desires of local inhabitants.

In February, Méndez convinced (or so he thought) the governor of Coahuila, Nazario S. Ortiz, to pay the 150 pesos monthly rent for the school building that had been set aside by the municipal president of Piedras Negras. Méndez reiterated to Ortiz that the school would have to teach English classes. In addition, he argued that the school would need a kindergarten and that it would have to offer preparatory classes to prevent students in the fifth and sixth grades from abandoning "Mexico in search of a high school" in the United States.

Interestingly, Méndez informed the SEP that the school had yet to open because it lacked furniture. He did not want to take the furniture from other nearby schools, thereby crippling already existing schools for the sake of the frontier school. Ortiz had ordered the local construction of the furniture, but, in a twist of irony, Méndez noted that he could acquire the furniture more quickly and cheaply if he purchased it in the United States.[18]

It appears, however, that the municipal president of Piedras Negras and the governor of Coahuila were using the promotion of the frontier school to advance their own personal and political agendas. In January the municipal president had offered to cede ownership of the city's best existing school to the federal government for the establishment of a frontier school. Only a month later, however, the head of federal education in Coahuila was not only looking for someone to pay the rent, presumably to the municipal

president or one of his associates, but was also looking for furniture so that students could begin to attend the school.

Common sense suggests that the actual building never had been a school or, at the very least, was no longer functioning as one; otherwise it would already have had some furniture and supplies. In May, Rafael Castro, the federal inspector of schools in the border region, complained that the frontier school in Piedras Negras was located in a poor, undersized building for which the SEP had to pay the governor a monthly rent. The small size of the school was especially problematic in light of the fact that a large number of federal railroad workers, apparently recently laid off, had settled in Piedras Negras and their children would need to attend the school.[19] In any case, the municipal president and the governor rightly viewed the federal government as a positive investor in the educational advancement of local citizens and as a client to whom they could rent urban property.[20]

SEP officials agreed to offer kindergarten and English classes at the frontier school and to fund any other programs that might provide a social service to the local community.[21] In response, local educators in Piedras Negras established a sociocultural center where classes in English, dancing, and singing were offered for both primary school students and adults. Federal teachers organized a "tribu de exploradores," based on the model of boy scouts practiced in Britain and the United States.[22] Teachers were also sent on a campaign of home visits to teach locals how to live healthier lives and to convince them to cooperate with the frontier school.[23]

By June 1930 the sociocultural center was officially open.[24] The school itself had an enrollment of 113 boys and 98 girls and an actual attendance of 90 boys and 79 girls.[25] It appears, however, that the lure of U.S. schools far outweighed initial attempts of the federal government to convince Mexicans to attend Mexican schools. The federal inspector of the border region requested that the head of Piedras Negras's federal secondary school hand over all the excess school furniture and supplies that he had on hand (as a result of low enrollment and attendance rates) so that they could be used in the underfunded primary schools in the area.[26]

The next two years of the functioning of the frontier school in Piedras Negras have disappeared from the archival records. The records of educational inspectors dealing with other frontier issues along the U.S.-Coahuila border, however, are rich. Two of the most prominent border issues facing education officials during this period were relations with *colonos* (colonists) and irrigation workers. In 1931, while visiting the various schools under his

charge, Federal Inspector of Schools Castro, began exhorting Mexicans who lived along the border to protect "our nationals that are being deported from the United States."[27] Meanwhile, the *Comisión Nacional de Irrigación* (National Irrigation Commission) was in the midst of a large project called the *Sistema de Riego No. 6* (Irrigation System No. 6) along the Río Bravo.

Local residents, colonos, and irrigation officials would soon be working at cross-purposes with SEP officials. Most campesinos in the region had been granted provisional ejidos. In 1931 most of the ejidatarios were notified that they would be relocated to San Carlos, Coahuila (the previous site of a hacienda), to make room for newly arriving colonos.[28] Many of these ejidatarios understandably refused to put forth any further effort to improve the local federal schools that they would soon be forced to abandon.[29] Some schools were subsequently shut down as a result.[30]

Castro tried to get the federal government to change the status of the ejidatarios in La Bandera to that of colonos since they had been living there for their entire lives. When he was successful in doing so, he discovered that since colonos were not legally bound to cooperate with federal schools in the same ways that ejidatarios were, the locals still refused to work with him on educational matters. In response, Castro advocated the adoption of sports and other "honest diversions" and the expansion of the local anti-alcohol campaign to eradicate the prominent level of disorder and frequent orgies that he believed were practiced by both local inhabitants and federal employees working on the irrigation system.[31]

In addition to being at odds with the local colonos and the irrigation system workers, Castro had a difficult time convincing irrigation officials to donate the five hectares of land demanded by law for primary schools. The local manager of the system continually promised Castro the land, but then refused to turn it over, suggesting that he would again discuss the land with his superiors.[32] In El Tepeyac, Castro discovered that many ejidatarios who had officially been granted lands were renting them or had outright sold them and were living in nearby Jímenez to take advantage of the cash economy.[33]

In early 1932 federal inspectors tried a new approach to mold the identities of frontier Mexicans. They pushed local communities to purchase radios so that they could listen to the official broadcasts of the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* (PNR) or National Revolutionary Party.[34] Castro complained that the salary cut he (and the rest of federal employees) received as a result of the economic depression was hampering his ability to purchase radios for all of the schools under his charge.[35]

The federal government's attempts to promote patriotism along the border, however, may have been undermined by Coahuila's governor, Nazario S. Ortiz. Governor Ortiz believed that while schools should play a role in shaping people's attitudes, the state did not have enough resources to waste valuable school time on festivals, parades, and concerts. Such events, Ortiz believed, had a "marked character of exhibitionism" and took the place of real learning. Nonetheless, he was in step with the SEP in advocating sports leagues, cooperatives, and community-based *cajas de ahorro* (credit unions) to mitigate the severity of the Depression.[36]

In April Mexico's president, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, decreed that the sale of liquor within one hundred kilometers of the border would henceforth be illegal. Castro worked to convince the local inhabitants to become part of vigilante groups to enforce strict compliance with the new decree. He also pushed to ensure that every school had a field for baseball so that people would have something constructive to do during their normal drinking hours. The enforcement of the anti-alcohol decree had its greatest impact in Villa Acuña, where a number of cantinas closed.[37] As late as 1934, the campaign against alcohol consumption and the move to close all cantinas near the border had still not been successful. Castro noted that there were no drinking establishments located in the vicinity of frontier schools, but that it would be impossible to close down all the local centers of vice because of their widespread prevalence.[38] In Mira Villa Castro tried to get the locals to decorate their school and its open air theater so that they would serve as "cultural propaganda for our federal education system." He also tried to convince locals to move closer to the school so that their children would find it easier to attend.[39] Another inspector, Abraham Arellano, noted that the poor construction and lack of furniture in the schools located on the shores of the Río Bravo in San Vicente and Boquillas were an embarrassment to Mexico; he asked municipal authorities to lend a helping hand to the federal government's project.[40]

By 1933 the frontier school in Piedras Negras was in deep trouble as a result of federal mismanagement. The new head of federal education in Coahuila, Maurilio P. Nañez, noted that over four days in January there had been a suspicious and sudden influx of students, likely to secure the minimum number of 288 students necessary for keeping six teachers and assistants employed. The director of the school, Carlos Morales Sánchez, was fired because he lacked the "active, social, nationalist, and democratic tendencies" necessary to advance the ideology of the Revolution. Federal

authorities also noted that Sánchez first began offering night classes for adults at the end of January, probably as a last-ditch effort to save his job.[41]

When the school first opened in 1930, the head of federal education in Coahuila, Ramón Méndez, boasted that the frontier school would offer night classes for adults focusing on English, dancing, and singing by the end of the first semester of the school's existence. It is possible that these classes only existed on paper at the time, but even if they were implemented, it is clear that they had a very short life span.

The new director of the frontier school, Eliseo Ruiz Vadillo, attempted to overcome the school's past difficulties by promoting its work on the local radio station. He asked the president of the local radio station, XETN, to regularly air educational lectures, programs, and works undertaken in school.[42] It was not long, however, before he too ran into difficulties. Two months after taking over the frontier school, it was discovered that the teacher who had been put in charge of the local cooperative, Gilberto Ceja Torres, was embezzling cooperative funds.[43] By the end of April, Vadillo had been replaced by a new director, Fabian García R.[44]

García was quick to make changes. He immediately moved to have Ceja Torres fired, and then addressed the conditions of the frontier school. He noted that the majority of the adults who had been recruited to attend night classes had already passed the sixth grade. Thus, it would be necessary to hire teachers to give instruction in typewriting, singing, and choir. Finally, García observed that the school had recently received baseball equipment from the PNR, and he promised to put the equipment to good use.[45]

In January 1933 the SEP pushed for the advancement of frontier schooling by arranging for two additional frontier schools, one in Villa Acuña and the other in Piedras Negras. The minister of education, Narciso Bassols (1931–1934), notified Coahuila's governor that he would be turning one of the federal primary schools in Villa Acuña into a frontier school.[46] The new school would be staffed by 6 federal teachers, 3 municipal assistants, and would be capable of instructing 350 primary students.[47] The SEP figured that setting up a frontier school in Villa Acuña (after having been unable to find the resources in the past) was especially important because municipal authorities in Del Río, Texas, had established several schools specifically aimed at assimilating Mexican children into U.S. culture.[48] After making the basic arrangements for the frontier school in Villa Acuña, the SEP turned over its management to the state of Coahuila.[49] By January 1934, work on the Villa Acuña school stopped due to lack of funds. School officials hoped

to secure additional funds from the state government to add fifth and sixth grade classrooms and the necessary additional teachers to staff them.[50]

At the end of 1934, the new federal inspector in the area, Micaela Zuñiga R., found it necessary to organize a fundraiser for the state-run frontier school in Villa Acuña. Even in late 1934, the school still lacked proper lighting and water, and municipal authorities had almost completely neglected the school.[51] The problem of funding was compounded by the fact that locally supported private schools lured students away from frontier schools that advanced the anti-religious tenets of socialist education promoted by the minister of education, Narciso Bassols.

Local citizens pulled their children from federal schools and placed them in clandestine private schools where they were given religious instruction. Even the closure of seven of these private schools had failed to increase attendance at federal schools. Zuñiga tried to convince the inhabitants of Villa Acuña to send their children back to federal schools (and in the process keep parents out of local cantinas) by offering increased sporting events and classes in sewing and knitting. Despite all their efforts, both the federal school and Villa Acuña itself remained in "terrible conditions."[52]

Early in 1933, the second frontier school in Piedras Negras opened its doors. The school initially lacked electricity and was thus limited to offering only day classes. The school's first director, Carlos Flores Fortis, had problems getting along with the student body. He asked for a two-month leave of absence, and was subsequently replaced.[53] By March the new director, Mario Matus Micelli, had opened a school store to sell products produced during classes. Micelli arranged for electricity at the school and night classes, which focused on sewing and small industries, were held regularly, and enrolled eighty women.[54]

When school officials tried to offer night classes in basic reading and writing in April 1933, only ten people were present. When they expanded the number of classes to include domestic economy, Spanish, math, speech, cultural aesthetics, and singing, an additional 128 people participated (88 of them women).[55] Night classes on basic reading and writing were the bread and butter of rural primary schools in Mexico during this period.

The fact that reading and writing classes proved highly unsuccessful, and that they were replaced by other classes that found a greater general interest among locals suggests two things: differing needs between rural and urban dwellers, and a willingness on the behalf of SEP officials to adjust to parental pressure and desires in order to make an impact in the local com-

munity. Nonetheless, even urban schools still advanced Calles's belief that agriculture would be the engine of future Mexican prosperity. In accordance with agricultural ideals, educational inspectors were forced to find suitable agricultural lands, often far from the actual location of urban schools, for students to learn modern farming techniques, even if they would never put them to use.[56]

At the behest of Rafael Castro, municipal officials in Piedras Negras implemented a 2 percent custom's fee to pay for the construction of a local high school to provide a Mexican alternative for city residents and as an improvement over the frontier schools. By January of 1934, however, the fee was dropped due to the dismissal of the municipal president, the administrator of customs, and the head of the local post office when President Lázaro Cárdenas assumed office in Mexico City. In place of the custom's fee, the new municipal president offered to donate ten pesos toward the purchase of cultivable land needed by the frontier schools.[57]

By late 1934, the implementation of socialist education practices that purported to counter subversive religious propaganda inhibiting Mexico's economic and social progress were in full swing.[58] In early 1935 federal teachers were active in the local community and helped local brickmakers form a union that pressed for and received a 1.5 pesos daily wage. Despite these advances, the frontier schools still did not have regular English, music, or typewriting teachers, and attendance was suffering.[59]

When the 1934–1935 school year ended, Castro informed his superiors that if Mexico really wanted to compete against the education being offered in the United States, Mexico would have to take some dramatic steps. Castro estimated that to compete with the United States, five new schools, each staffed with six regular teachers and two additional teachers to give instruction in English and other special courses, must be opened. He anticipated that these schools would cost up to 400,000 pesos to put into place and an additional 1,500 pesos per month to run effectively. Castro argued that the frontier schools located in Piedras Negras and Villa Acuña educated only 10 percent and 20 percent respectively of school-aged children in their local communities. The children not attending the frontier schools either attended private schools (where many of them were being illegally instructed on religious matters) or crossed the border to go to U.S. schools.[60] Boosting attendance numbers at the frontier schools, Castro realized, would be a difficult task. Teachers in the United States were earning about $75 per month, more

than Mexico's inspector generals. In addition, the United States was running well-funded schools specifically aimed at assimilating Mexican children into U.S. society. Finally, many of the children that did attend Mexican primary schools were forced to go to the United States if they wanted to attend secondary or high school.

Despite evidence to the contrary, Castro did not believe that rural Mexicans were going to the United States because of better schools; he did not deny, however, that many urban Mexicans were certainly drawn in by U.S. schools. Castro's final solution (in addition to the funding of the additional five border schools that he had proposed) was the "absolute suppression of all non-federal schools" to ensure that all Mexican schools were delivering high quality education that could compete with education on the U.S. side of the border.[61]

Frontier Education in Chihuahua

From the point of view of federal educators, by late 1929 the situation along the Chihuahuan section of the U.S.-Mexican border was dire. At the center of the problem was Ciudad Juárez. The border city was the most important link between the United States and Mexico and was the location of Mexico's most important customhouse.[62]

Ciudad Juárez had a darker side as well; it served as a center for smuggling, gambling, prostitution, and contraband.[63] By 1870 the region had already been the center of a "highly organized" cattle rustling business.[64] During the Mexican Revolution, Ciudad Juárez served as a center for weapons smuggling by the various military factions vying for national power. With the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment (Prohibition) in the United States on 29 January 1919, the city became the center of a newly flourishing bootlegging and contraband business.[65] By 1929 the main commerce undertaken by Ciudad Juárez's 21,000 inhabitants was distilling alcohol destined to be smuggled north across the border. The city boasted one beer factory and two whiskey distilleries. Residents also engaged in running gambling houses. While state officials gave lip service to fighting the spread of these industries, the reality was that by 1931, gambling provided the state with over 70 percent of its overall tax revenue, and taking concrete action against gambling would be political suicide.[66] A further problem, according to education officials, was that between 50,000 and 55,000 of El Paso's 108,000

inhabitants were Mexican.[67] In the eyes of SEP policymakers, this meant that 50,000 to 55,000 people were in the process of losing their culture.

The advancement of frontier schooling in Ciudad Juárez proved to be ironic in that while the federal government used education to stamp out the vices associated with the border for moral and cultural reasons, it simultaneously undermined those very policies by supporting the expansion of gambling and bootlegging for economic and political reasons. Chihuahua governor Rodrigo Quevedo (1932–1936) based his political power on his ruthlessness, his control of large revenue sources based on border gambling and bootlegging, and on support from Plutarco Elías Calles.[68] Calles used his close political ties with Quevedo to convince the governor to turn control of Chihuahua's state primary school system over to the federal government. In return, Calles did not interfere in Quevedo's illegal border activities. The state's education director, Salvador Varela, and one of the inspectors assigned to the area, Ramón Espinosa Villanueva, realized that they had nowhere to turn for help in combating contraband trade because state and local authorities were actively taking part in the illegal activities.[69]

The illicit activities of some Chihuahuans, however, benefited the frontier schools. Quevedo's chief competitor in the gambling and bootlegging industry in Ciudad Juárez, Enrique Fernández, was donating his monetary and moral support to local federal schools. Fernández was commended on several occasions for donating land, buildings, and supplies to schools located along the border and, in the process, secured the good graces of the local education inspector.[70] Many of the families (the majority, according to the local inspector) that made use of the schools donated by Fernández were probably employed in the contraband trade. Almost comically, at the same time that Fernández was cultivating his relationship with local educators, the education inspector, J. Reyes Pimentel, was waging an anti-alcohol campaign aimed at reducing the number of people involved in running alcohol across the border.

Pimentel complained to his superiors that the contraband trade made his job of improving education along the border doubly difficult. Many families involved in the business outright refused to cooperate with the schools, and even those families that were inclined to cooperate with school authorities lived scattered about the countryside surrounding Ciudad Juárez. Living outside the city facilitated Chihuahuans slipping across the border unseen at night.[71] Pimentel's hard work paid off, and by 1935 the education

inspector was convinced that the school's social campaigns and advancement of sports, especially baseball, had undermined the propensity of frontier dwellers to work in the alcohol industry.[72] The repeal of U.S. Prohibition in 1933 and the assassination of Fernández (after one earlier unsuccessful attempt), however, were probably the overriding causes of the industry's diminution.[73]

While the SEP's response to the contraband liquor business played an important role in inhibiting the advancement of frontier schooling in Ciudad Juárez, general apathy and the enticement of better schools on the U.S. side of the border were also problems. When the head of federal education in Chihuahua, Salvador Varela, first advanced the idea of increased funding for frontier schooling in November 1929, he was confronted with a situation in which about 25 percent (1,000 of an estimated 4,200) of the children of Ciudad Juárez were crossing the border to attend school in El Paso, Texas. Even the children currently attending primary school in Ciudad Juárez were likely to go to El Paso for industrial, vocational, or English classes after they had graduated.

Furthermore, when school inspector Pimentel attempted to involve Mexican parents residing in El Paso in festivities celebrating the anniversary of the Mexican Revolution, they protested vociferously and refused to take part. His attempts to promote increased respect for the Mexican flag and prohibit the use of foreign (i.e., English) words met with a tepid response. Instead, parents told him that they would consider keeping their children in Mexican schools if the Mexican government could guarantee the establishment of fourth and fifth grade classes in Ciudad Juárez.[74]

In response to the local difficulties, Varela suggested that a former convent that had just been taken over by the federal government be set aside as the future site for a frontier school.[75] In addition, he argued that the teachers hired to staff the new frontier school would have to be from the interior of Mexico because the existing teachers along the border were neither Mexican nor American.[76] In January 1930, the one existing federal primary school in Ciudad Juárez closed in order to make room for a new and improved frontier school.

Like its counterpart in Piedras Negras, the frontier school in Ciudad Juárez encountered problems. First, when the federal government adopted a socialist pedagogy, parents complained that they were not "in agreement with the new direction" that the school was taking and insisted that a number of radical teachers be dismissed. Parents threatened to pull their chil-

dren out of the frontier school and send them to school in El Paso if radical teachers were not fired.[77] Second, by 1932 the SEP was in the midst of a court battle with the ex-convent's former owner, Señorita Mariana Ochoa, over ownership of the school building.[78] Ochoa had designated the building as a school for the poor, but SEP officials were positive that she was actually using it as a clandestine "Catholic convent" for religious teaching. The Constitution of 1917 made religious teaching in schools illegal, and SEP officials began to earnestly enforce the anti-religious measures of the constitution in 1926. In early 1933, the Circuit Court in Monterrey made a finding in favor of Ochoa, forcing the SEP to appeal the decision to Mexico's Supreme Court on the basis that it had already spent twenty thousand pesos to improve the building. The SEP was finally given ownership of the former convent in August 1933.[79]

While the battle for ownership of the school raged, parents raised 5,800 pesos to buy sewing machines, a radio, a film projector, and an industrial department.[80] Despite the apparent support for the school, parents complained that the school itself was located in Ciudad Juárez's tolerance zone, near the international bridge leading to El Paso. They argued that their children were going to school in the same neighborhood where local authorities promoted prostitution and sadistic public acts—prostitutes performed sex acts with burros and had anal sex in public—in order to attract U.S. tourists.[81]

The third problem encountered by the Ciudad Juárez school was parents' complaints that many of the teachers lacked a proper education and spent their spare time getting drunk in local cantinas. Once again, parents insisted that if the SEP did not promptly address these issues, they would pull their children from the frontier school and send them to El Paso. The SEP responded with an investigation that turned up no concrete faults on the part of the teachers assigned to the school.[82]

A final issue plaguing the frontier school was that of sex education. In early 1934, a number of parents disturbed by the idea of sex education being advanced by the SEP in Ciudad Juárez voiced their concern. To overcome the parental objections, SEP officials distributed copies of the textbooks being used. They focused particular attention on the various feminine leagues that had organized against sex education near the border.[83] A number of teachers assigned to the frontier school refused to sign a written statement that acknowledged their support of socialist education. Ramón Espinosa Villanueva thought that it was due to the influence of the high number of

Catholic priests who had crossed the border into El Paso to establish private religious schools. These same priests, he believed, were behind the demonstrations against sexual (or as the priests called it, "sensual") education. Thus, he asked each of the teachers who had refused to support socialist schooling to renounce their religious beliefs. The teachers refused. The school inspector then initiated a petition campaign with the support of *La Unidad Magisterial* (The Magisterial Unity), the *Bloque Radical de Maestros Socialistas de Ciudad Juárez* (The Radical Block of Socialist Teachers of Ciudad Juárez), and the *Federación de Sociedades de Padres de Family* (The Federation of Parent Societies) to push for the dismissal of the teachers.[84]

In 1935 Espinosa Villanueva asked the SEP for the necessary funding to establish two additional schools in Ciudad Juárez so that Mexican youth would no longer cross the border and be inculcated with "sentiments contrary to the interests of Mexico."[85] A previous trip to El Paso by SEP officials had revealed that the special U.S. school established to assimilate Mexican children into American culture stressed that the United States was the greatest country in the world and had the most powerful Navy. The SEP officials noted that the Mexican children attending the school—2,024 in total, one-third of whom were from Ciudad Juárez—were losing their Spanish language skills by speaking and writing mostly English.[86]

By 1935 SEP officials were beginning to realize that the frontier schools were not doing the job that they had been created to do. In May Celso Flores Zamora, the head of the Department of Rural Schools, argued that "the rural frontier and primary schools that are presently functioning, until now have not formed the barrier that could impede the passage of our children to the neighboring country in which they look for a betterment that in their own country they can not find."[87] Espinosa Villanueva believed that the solution lay in hiring only male teachers and increasing funding to frontier schools.[88] Another inspector, Jesús Coello, thought that a pro-Spanish campaign where locals were encouraged to take part in festivals and sing songs about the evils of capitalism and religion was the answer.[89] But the problem was much deeper than that. The struggle between religious and socialist teachers was a factor that constantly undermined the delivery of education within the frontier school. Numerous unions called for the forced expulsion of all teachers who refused to denounce their religious views; some teachers feared persecution if they did not join their local socialist teacher's union.[90] While SEP officials attributed the struggle between religious and socialist education to the proximity of the border, the truth was

that the border gave religious parents the opportunity to send their children to El Paso to receive a private religious education that was much more to their liking.

Perhaps even more damaging to the frontier schools in Chihuahua than the schism between religious and socialist teachers was the discovery that Ramón Espinosa Villanueva and the director of the frontier school in Ciudad Juárez, José Medrano, had been regularly sending false and misleading reports to the SEP. The SEP dispatched its inspector general, Alfonso G. Alanis, to address parental complaints and found that Medrano attended school irregularly, made personal use of school supplies and resources, hired and fired teachers based on his personal whims (even though the majority of them were unionized), was a local politician of Communist affiliation, and did not offer night classes as legally required.[91]

Despite such misconduct, Espinosa Villanueva kept his job. He hoped to reverse the practice of hiring only teachers from Mexico's interior, a practice established by his predecessor, Salvador Varela. Espinosa Villanueva argued that teachers who were not from the border region could not adapt to frontier life and, thus, should not be hired. Neatly ignoring the major conflicts created by the advancement of the SEP's socialist and anti-religious pedagogy, he proposed to eliminate fighting among teachers by advocating equal pay for all teachers.[92] Finally, he encouraged improving Ciudad Juárez's secondary school so that Mexicans would not be forced to send their children to "gringo universities" where they only learned to think about "the land of [George] Washington."[93] In 1936 the SEP showed continued support of frontier schooling by opening a second frontier school in Ciudad Juárez and another in Ojinaga.

Frontier Schooling in Sonora

Frontier schooling was much less contentious and confrontational in Sonora than in either Coahuila or Chihuahua. Nogales, the site of Sonora's frontier school located across the border from its sister city of the same name in Arizona, had originally been a small outpost established by railroad workers.[94] The economic growth of Ambos Nogales (both Nogales) evolved in such a manner that the two cities were actually one economically interdependent town "separated only by a street."[95] Relations between Mexicans and Americans were enhanced by the fact that many U.S. residents in Nogales learned Spanish while their Mexican counterparts learned English

to enhance their business prospects. By the time of the Mexican Revolution, the inhabitants of Sonora were known as the "Yankees of Mexico" because of their close ties to the United States.[96]

In 1928 a primary school for 200 children was set up in Nogales, Mexico, in a vacant building donated (along with 108 double-sided desks) to the SEP by state authorities.[97] The school was located on Avenida Alvaro Obregón and was housed in a five-story building that was, according to the school's director, Rosalío E. Moreno, poorly ventilated and poorly lit.[98] In addition to the regular curriculum, school officials focused on teaching the children how to safely cross the city's busy streets.[99] The school's success was hampered, however, by poor attendance as a result of parents' decisions to pull their children from school on both Mexican and U.S. holidays.

Throughout 1929 Moreno concerned himself with the welfare of the children in the school, trying to convince the families of older children to leave their children in school rather than send them across the border in search of work.[100] In February of that year, a child came down with meningitis and the school was subsequently closed. Those who had come into contact with the child were isolated.[101] Illness was not the school's only problem. The Depression forced the federal government to pay teachers only half of their regular salary. In March three border school teachers with newly reduced salaries crossed the border to look for work in Arizona.[102] The school's director told federal officials that the newly reduced salaries were not "sufficient for [life's] most necessary expenses. I believe that we will not continue working much longer."[103] He then quit.

The school's new director for the 1929–1930 school year, Alfonso Acosta V., was entrusted with the job of transforming the school from a regular primary into a frontier primary school. He held a meeting in May 1930 with local parents to figure out how they could compete with the "Yankee schools" in Arizona and how best to reach all of the Mexican children who were presently attending school there. Acosta V. figured that 75 percent of all the children in the Nogales, Arizona, school district were Mexican citizens.[104] There is little indication, however, that the change from a regular primary school to a frontier school was anything other than nominal.

The 1931–1932 school year brought with it another new director, Agapito Constantino, who implemented policies that likely pushed additional Mexican parents to send their children to school in Arizona. For example, Constantino believed that it was necessary to shame the students who attended his school into changing their behavior. He did so by scheduling a

public assembly at the beginning of every school day in which children were divided into different groups and forced to stand underneath banners corresponding to their perceived level of punctuality and cleanliness.[105]

Another issue that forced Mexican families to send their children to the United States for schooling was the deplorable condition of Nogales's only secondary school. In 1932 the secondary school shared a building with a local primary school. The twenty-six primary school students who graduated in 1931, many of whom would immediately enter the job market, were so few in number that attracting enough students to keep the secondary school functioning properly was nearly impossible.[106] Nonetheless, the secondary school was moved to a new location near the frontier primary school on Avenida Alvaro Obregón and placed under the authority of a new director, Angel Alfonso Andrade, who, according to SEP officials, "rescued the school from the toilet."[107] By 1933 the secondary school was deemed to be functioning perfectly, and by 1934 school officials noted that it was being actively supported by influential members of Ambos Nogales.[108]

The truth is that frontier schooling was not a high priority for Sonoran officials. First, parents in Ambos Nogales seemed inclined to continue supporting the practice of sending the majority of Mexican children across the border to Arizona for their primary and secondary schooling. Second, Plutarco Elías Calles's son and the state's governor, Rodolfo Elías Calles (1931–1934) thought that rather than expanding the school system along the border, the best way to improve the situation of Mexicans repatriated during the Depression was to place them in colonies. The colonies were set up by the state on former lands of the Mayo and Yaqui Indians in southern Sonora.[109] Third, and most importantly, Calles's main preoccupation in the educational field was his role in implementing the government's widespread defanaticization campaign, which began in 1931 and was aimed at removing, once and for all, the influence of the church in Sonora.[110]

Conclusion

Plutarco Elías Calles and his education ministers wanted somehow to encourage U.S. economic involvement in the U.S.-Mexico border region while at the same time discouraging Mexican citizens from cultural and social involvement in the burgeoning economy. Frontier schools were the means by which they hoped to stem U.S. cultural imperialism. They failed to do so. Mismanagement, better course offerings, better opportunities to learn

English, better facilities on the U.S. side of the border, and access to religious education in the United States each played a role in the failure of the Mexican frontier schools.

This article has provided a preliminary institutional history of Mexican frontier schools, highlighting the ways in which different local, political, and social environments led to very different conceptions of the roles of frontier schools. Despite a long history of hostility between Coahuila and Chihuahua and Texas, SEP officials were unable to stem the flow of Mexican children to primary schools in the United States. The frontier schools in both Mexican states were plagued by mismanagement, political struggles between different factions of teachers, and the drive to eliminate religious teaching from federal schools. Nonetheless, inspectors soon realized that they could increase enrollment by providing English and vocational classes and by lessening the emphasis on festivals, parades, and concerts meant to develop a sense of patriotism. In Sonora, where there was a spirit of cooperation between leading members of Ambos Nogales, federal education officials never officially advocated the creation of a frontier school and local officials (who decided to push the issue anyway) actually worked to gain the support of community members on both sides of the border. Thus, they never tried to stem the flow of Mexican children to U.S. schools. In order to gain a better understanding of the effects that frontier schools had on Mexican citizens living near the border in Coahuila, Chihuahua, and Sonora, future historians will need to move beyond broad comparisons at the state level and delve into the microhistories of each of the locations where frontier schools were founded.

Notes

1. Although 500,000 people of Mexican descent, both U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens, would eventually be forced across the border into Mexico, most of the early refugees to return to Mexico did so because they lost their jobs. After the initial wave of returnees slowed to a trickle, a "decentralized but vigorous campaign" forced the rest across the border (almost none were legally deported). Changes in U.S. visa policy meant that almost none of them would be able to legally return to the United States after the end of the Great Depression. See Josiah McC. Heyman, *Life and Labor on the Border: Working People of Northeastern Sonora, Mexico, 1886–1986* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1991), 33–35.
2. When discussing frontier I mean that which "describes both a zone and a process, an interaction between two or more different cultures." See Sarah Deutsch, *No*

Separate Refuge: Culture, Class, and Gender on an Anglo-Hispanic Frontier in the American Southwest, 1880–1940 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 10.

3. For example, William Walker and a number of filibusters invaded Baja California in 1853 and declared it an independent country before being overwhelmed by Mexican forces and surrendering. In 1857 Henry Crabb and one hundred men attacked Sonora in hopes that the state would later be annexed by U.S. officials as was Texas. Other lesser-known, and less successful, filibusters continued throughout the Porfiriato (1876–1911). See Oscar J. Martínez, *Troublesome Border* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), 38–47.
4. Alan Knight, *Counter-Revolution and Reconstruction*, vol. 2 of *The Mexican Revolution* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 139.
5. For an in-depth account of both U.S. and Mexican responses to the invasion, see Knight, *Counter-Revolution and Reconstruction*, 155–62.
6. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*, 66th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1920), 3327–81.
7. Miguel Tinker Salas, *In the Shadow of the Eagles: Sonora and the Transformation of the Border during the Porfiriato* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 173.
8. Alan Knight, "The United States and the Mexican Peasantry, circa 1880–1940," in *Rural Revolt in Mexico: U.S. Intervention and the Domain of Subaltern Politics*, ed. Daniel Nugent (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998), 40.
9. Cited in Engracia Loyo, *Gobiernos revolucionarios y educación popular en México* (Mexico: Centro de Estudios Históricos, 1998), 217.
10. *Boletín de la Secretaria de Educación Pública* [hereafter BSEP] (Talleres Gráficos de la Nación) 8, no. 8 (1929): 63.
11. *BSEP* 8, nos. 9–11 (1929): 49–50.
12. *BSEP* 9, no. 6 (1930): 9.
13. *BSEP* 9, nos. 1–3 (1930): 21–22.
14. *BSEP* 9, nos. 9–10 (1930): 37–38.
15. Ibid.
16. Ramón Méndez, Jefe del Departmento, to Rafael Ramírez, Coahuila, 7 January 1930, box 32, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/132, Archivo Historico de la Secretaria de Educación Pública [hereafter AHSEP], Mexico City.
17. Ramón Méndez, Jefe del Departmento, to Rafael Ramírez, Coahuila, 13 January 1930, box 32, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/132, AHSEP.
18. Ramón Méndez, Jefe del Departmento, to Rafael Ramírez, Coahuila, 10 February 1930, box 32, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/132, AHSEP.
19. Informe Mensual, May, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, box 20, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/134, AHSEP.
20. When Nazario S. Ortiz finished his term in office as governor in 1934, he went into business selling foodstuffs to the federal government. See Ortiz Garza, Nazario S., leg. 3/3, exp. 32, inv. 4220, Archivo Fideicomiso Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca [hereafter AFPEC y FT], Mexico City.
21. Rafael Ramírez to Jefe del Departmento, Coahuila, box 32, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/132, AHSEP.

22. Informe Mensual, May, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, box 20, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/134, AHSEP.
23. Informe Mensual, May, Ramón Méndez, Coahuila, box 6037, exp. IV/100, AHSEP.
24. Informe Mensual, June, Inocente M. Hernández, Coahuila, box 6037, exp. IV/100, AHSEP.
25. Inspection Report, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, 24 May 1930, box 20, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/134, AHSEP.
26. Inspection Report, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, 5 December 1930, box 52, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/714, AHSEP.
27. Inspection Report, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, 24 March 1931, box 31, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/511, AHSEP.
28. According to education officials, colonists were those settlers who already had the necessary capital to settle without the support of the government, while ejidatarios were those settlers who lacked the necessary resources. See Informe Mensual, December, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, box 6039, exp. IV/100, AHSEP. On the reneging on provisional land grants in the interests of greater economic output in post-revolutionary Mexico, see Linda B. Hall, "Alvaro Obregón and the Politics of Mexican Land Reform, 1920–1924," *Hispanic American Historic Review* 60 (May 1980): 213–38.
29. Inspection Report, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, 21 May 1931, box 31, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/602; and Inspection Report, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, 8 January 1931, box 51, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/606, AHSEP.
30. Informe, Jefe del Departmento, Coahuila, 4 November 1932, box 31, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/563, AHSEP.
31. Various reports, Coahuila, 13 November 1931 and 25 November 1932, box 55, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/632, AHSEP.
32. Informe Mensual, October, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, box 6039, exp. IV/100, AHSEP.
33. Inspection Report, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, 20 June 1933, box 51, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/697, AHSEP.
34. Inspection Report, J. Alcázar Robledo, Coahuila, 26 September 1931, box 51, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/606, AHSEP.
35. Informe Mensual, January, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, box 24, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/762, AHSEP.
36. Ortiz Garza, Nazario S., leg. 2/3, fojas 93–94 and 100–101, inv. 4220, exp. 32, AFPEC Y FT.
37. Informe Bimestral, March and May, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, box 24, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/762, AHSEP.
38. Informe Mensual, January, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, box 6039, exp. IV/100, AHSEP.
39. Inspection Report, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, 25 November 1932, box 52, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/701, AHSEP.
40. Informe Mensual, December, Abraham Arellano, Coahuila, box 6039, exp. IV/100, AHSEP.
41. Maurilio P. Nañez, Director of Federal Education, to SEP, Coahuila, 16 February 1933, box 32, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/132, AHSEP.

42. Eliseo Ruiz Vadillo to the President of XETN, Coahuila, 6 March 1933, box 32, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/132, AHSEP.
43. Maurilio P. Nañez to Rafael Castro, Coahuila, 17 April 1933, box 32, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/132, AHSEP.
44. Fabian García R. to Maurilio P. Nañez, Coahuila, 20 April 1933, box 32, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/132, AHSEP.
45. Informe Mensual, April, Fabian García R., Coahuila, box 32, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/132, AHSEP.
46. Gobernador Constitucional del Estado to Narciso Bassols, 29 January 1933, box 37, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/140, AHSEP. SEP had considered but been unable to open a frontier school in Villa Acuña in 1930. See Informe Mensual, May, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, box 20, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/134, AHSEP.
47. Maurilio P. Nañez to SEP, Coahuila, 1 February 1933, box 37, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/140, AHSEP.
48. Informe Mensual, May, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, box 52, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/727, AHSEP.
49. Informe Mensual, January, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, box 6039, exp. IV/100, AHSEP.
50. Ibid.
51. Informe Bimestral, November and December, Coahuila, box 37, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/140, AHSEP.
52. Informe Anual, 1934–1935, Micaela Zuñiga R., Coahuila, box 37, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/140, AHSEP.
53. Informe Mensual, February, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, box 52, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/727, AHSEP.
54. Informe Mensual, March, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, box 52, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/727, AHSEP.
55. Informe Mensual, April, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, box 52, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/727, AHSEP.
56. Ibid.
57. Informe Mensual, January, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, box 6039, exp. IV/100, AHSEP.
58. Informe, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, 18 November 1934, box 6039, exp. IV/100, AHSEP.
59. Informe Bimestral, January and February, Rafael Castro, Coahuila, box 6039, exp. IV/100, AHSEP.
60. Rafael Castro to Maurilio P. Nañez, Coahuila, 24 June 1935, box 6034, exp. 1, AHSEP.
61. Ibid.
62. Lawrence D. Taylor, "The Battle of Ciudad Juárez: Death Knell of the Porfirian Regime in Mexico," *New Mexico Historical Review* 74 (April 1999): 181.
63. "Protestan los Padres de Familia de C. Juárez," *El Mexicano del Norte*, p. 4, Chihuahua, box 936, exp. IV [082], AHSEP.
64. Linda B. Hall and Don M. Coerver, *Revolution on the Border: The United States and Mexico, 1910–1920* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), 8.

65. Daniel Boorstin, *The Americans: The Democratic Experience* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 81; and Martinez, *Troublesome Border*, 114.
66. Salvador Varela, Jefe del Educación Federal, to Rafael Ramírez, Jefe del Departmento de Escuelas Rurales, Chihuahua, 26 November 1929, box 57, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/221, AHSEP; and Mark Wasserman, *Persistent Oligarchs: Elites and Politics in Chihuahua, Mexico, 1910–1940* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993), 57.
67. Informe General del Instituto Extraordinario de Ciudad Juárez, Alfredo G. Basurto, Chihuahua, 4 August 1934, box 1079, exp. IV/203.7, AHSEP.
68. Wasserman, *Persistent Oligarchs*, 56–60.
69. Informe, Salvador Varela, Chihuahua, 29 November 1929, box 1653, exp. IV/000 (II-5)(721.5); and Informe Mensual, March, Ramón Espinosa Villanueva, Chihuahua, box 860, exp. IV/100 (04)(IV-4)(721.4), AHSEP.
70. Various letters and inspection reports, J. Reyes Pimentel, Chihuahua, 4 April 1930, 26 February 1930, 15 March 1930, and 23 July 1930, box 19, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/2576, AHSEP.
71. Various inspection reports, J. Reyes Pimentel, Chihuahua, 4 April 1930, 26 February 1930, 15 March 1930, and 23 July 1930, box 19, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/2576, AHSEP.
72. Inspection Report, Ramón Espinosa Villanueva, Chihuahua, 19 May 1931 and 30 April 1932, box 19, exp. IV/161 (IV-14)/2576, AHSEP.
73. Wasserman, *Persistent Oligarchs*, 58.
74. Informe Mensual, October, J. Reyes Pimentel, Chihuahua, box 1213, exp. IV/100 (IV-4)(721.4), AHSEP.
75. Salvador Varela to Rafael Ramírez, Chihuahua, 26 November 1929, box 57, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/221, AHSEP.
76. Informe, Salvador Varela, Chihuahua, 22 November 1929, box 1653, exp. IV/000 (II-5)(721.5), AHSEP.
77. Various parents to Rafael Ramírez, Chihuahua, 24 January 1930, box 57, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/215, AHSEP.
78. Rafael Ramírez to Jefe del Departmento de Administrativo Edificio, Chihuahua, 19 January 1932, box 57, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/215, AHSEP.
79. Ramón Espinosa Villanueva to the SEP, Chihuahua, 22 August 1933, box 57, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/215, AHSEP.
80. Various inspection reports, Ramón Espinosa Villanueva, Chihuahua, 26 January 1932, 14 November 1932, 16 January 1933, 20 June 1933, and 17 April 1934, box 57, exp. IV/161 (IV-12)/215, AHSEP. The radio proved to be less than useful for educational purposes as the SEP's radio signal was overpowered by U.S. signals from across the border, see Eduardo Zarza to Rafael Ramírez, Chihuahua, box 1079, exp. IV/354.2, AHSEP.
81. Daniel M. Perea, President of the Confederation of Parents and Teachers, to the SEP, Chihuahua, 28 June 1933, box 936, exp. IV (082) 1561/7, AHSEP.
82. Parents of Ciudad Juárez to Rafael Ramírez, Chihuahua, 24 August 1933, box 936, exp. IV (082) 1561/7, AHSEP.
83. Ramón Espinosa Villanueva to D. Eduardo Azarza, Chihuahua, 8 February 1934, box 1057, exp. IV/100, AHSEP.

84. Informe Bimestral, November and December, Professor D. Pedro Moreno, Chihuahua, box 1057, exp. IV/100; and Informe General del Instituto Extraordinario de Ciudad Juárez, Alfredo G. Basurto, Chihuahua, 4 August 1934, box 1079, exp. IV/203.7, AHSEP.
85. Ramón Espinosa Villanueva to the SEP, Chihuahua, 9 January 1935, box 5736, exp. 328/11, AHSEP.
86. Informe de la Visita Practicada a la "AOY School" de El Paso, Texas, Alfredo G. Basurto, Chihuahua, 5 June 1934, box 1079, exp. IV/203.7, AHSEP.
87. Celso Flores Zamora to the Director de Educación Federal, Chihuahua, 16 May 1935, box 1360, exp. IV/161 (IV-2)(721.4), AHSEP.
88. Ramón Espinosa Villanueva to the Director de Educación Federal, Chihuahua, 27 July 1935, box 1360, exp. IV/161 (IV-2)(721.4), AHSEP.
89. Jesús Coello to the Departmento de Escuelas Rurales, Chihuahua, 31 October 1935, box 1333, exp. IV/100 (04)(IV-4)(721.4), AHSEP.
90. Sindical de Obreros Industriales de C. Juárez to SEP, Chihuahua, 14 February 1935, box 5736, exp. 328/11; Gran Liga Textil Socialista to SEP, Chihuahua, 19 February 1935, box 5736, exp. 328/11; Bloque de Estudiantes Socialistre, Escuela de Agricultura, C. Juárez to Licenciado Ignacio García Tellez, Chihuahua, 12 April 1935, box 867, exp. IV/161 (IV-4)(721.4); and Informe Bimestral, November and December, Ramón Espinosa Villanueva, Chihuahua, box 867, exp. IV/100 (04)(IV-4)(721.4), AHSEP.
91. Sintesis de Carta de Inspector Alfonso G. Alanis, Chihuahua, 11 September 1935, box 6041, exp. IV/166 (IV-6)(721.3), AHSEP.
92. Informe Bimestral, January and February, Ramón Espinosa Villanueva, Chihuahua, box 867, exp. IV/100 (04)(IV-4)(721.4), AHSEP.
93. Ramón Espinosa Villanueva to Jacinto Maldonado, Chihuahua, 20 July 1935, box 867, exp. IV/100 (04)(IV-4)(721.4), AHSEP.
94. Tinker Salas, *In the Shadow of the Eagles*, 152.
95. Hall and Coerver, *Revolution on the Border*, 31–32; and Tinker Salas, *In the Shadow of the Eagles*, 6.
96. Tinker Salas, *In the Shadow of the Eagles*, 6, 202–3.
97. F.F. Dworak to the Jefe del Departmento de Escuelas Rurales, Sonora, box 8420, exp. 12, AHSEP.
98. Informe Mensual, September, Rosalío E. Moreno, Sonora, box 8420, exp. 12, AHSEP.
99. Informe Mensual, October, Rosalío E. Moreno, Sonora, box 8420, exp. 12, AHSEP.
100. Informe Mensual, January, Rosalío E. Moreno, Sonora, box 8420, exp. 12, AHSEP.
101. Informe Mensual, February, Rosalío E. Moreno, Sonora, box 8420, exp. 12, AHSEP.
102. Informe Mensual, March, F. F. Dworak, Sonora, box 8420, exp. 12, AHSEP.
103. Informe Mensual, March, Rosalío E. Moreno, Sonora, box 8420, exp. 12, AHSEP.
104. Informe Mensual, May, Alfonso Acosta V., Sonora, box 8420, exp. 12, AHSEP.
105. Informe Mensual, October, Agapito Constantino, Sonora, box 8420, exp. 12, AHSEP.
106. Memorandum, Ramón G. Bonfil, Sonora, box 8446, exp. 20, AHSEP.
107. Informe Anual, Elpidio López, Sonora, box 8446, exp. 20, AHSEP.

108. Informe Mensual, Elpidio López, Sonora, box 8446, exp. 21; and Informe Anual, 1933–1934, Elpidio López, Sonora, box 8420, exp. 12, AHSEP.
109. Elías Calles Chacon, Rodolfo, leg. 13/24, fojas 663–706, inv. 1733, exp. 4; and Espinosa, Juventino (Gral.), leg. 1, fojas 4–7, inv. 1898, exp. 67, AFPEC Y FT.
110. Adrian A. Bantjes, *As if Jesus Walked on Earth: Cardenismo, Sonora, and the Mexican Revolution* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1998), 10–15.