AFTER a few comparatively tranquil years relations between Navaho and New Mexican deteriorated again in the summer of 1816. The settlers at Cebolleta were scared. In August Captain Bartolomé Baca, alcalde at Belén, informed the alcalde of Albuquerque that he was marching with his militia company to protect Cebolleta from the threat of Navaho attack.¹ Late in September Laguna alcalde José Vicente Ortiz reported to Governor Pedro María de Allande that fifteen Navaho had called on Fray Mariano Peñón, asking him to tell the governor that they were leaving their farms along the south side of Mt. Taylor, at Encinal, San José, and Cubero. They wanted a paper forbidding Spaniards to appropriate their land during their absence. These Indians were going to take refuge at Canyon de Chelly for fear, they said, of the Comanche.²

The trouble had begun earlier that summer. On August 4 Governor Allande wrote to Commandant General Bernardo Bonavia y Zapata about a friendly visit which Juan Lucero had made to the Comanche nation. On the sixteenth he wrote again, saying that Comanche had attacked Navaho. The New Mexico governor, Bonavia replied, should warn the militia captains and local officials to stand by to act as the movements of the Comanche or any other Indians might require.
The commandant general recognized the perils of the situation, for New Mexico lay between the two tribes. He ordered Governor Allande to summon Comanche captains and the general of the Navaho to Santa Fe and to endeavor to reconcile their differences. The Comanche must be made to realize that it was breach of their friendship with the Spaniards to go through "our own pueblos" to attack the Navaho, who were also friends of the Spaniards. On the other hand, Navaho suspicion that New Mexicans had countenanced Comanche hostility was unfounded, and there was no excuse for them to retaliate upon the people of the pueblos through which the Comanche had passed. Bonavia hoped to convince both parties of Spanish impartiality so that New Mexico could count upon Navaho aid in case the Comanche continued to misbehave. Allande was to leave no doubt that the moment either tribe broke the faith, it would be forced to respect the armed might of the King.

In case the Comanche were thinking of allying themselves with their eastern kinsmen, or with "the rebels and Americans," they should be warned that

any offers and gifts the former may make are not intended for their benefit, but to place them under obligation to be disloyal to us, thus making it possible for them to steal horses to take to the Americans. These Americans act in very bad faith, and their only aim is to take their lands and property from them and to finish them off little by little. If it were possible for these Comanche to go to the United States, they would see the proof of this truth. They would find no Indians there because the Americans have caused them to disappear, as they intend to do with them and all those whom they can win over. This has been the reason which has forced some tribes of the New Orleans territory to come to settle in ours.

In view of the Comanche's unlicensed entry into Spanish territory to attack other friends of the Spaniards, a real insult, further gifts to them, such as Lucero had taken, would be a sign of weakness. It was essential to preserve "the decorum of the armed might of the King our Lord."
Meanwhile, on August 20 a Navaho called Salvador went to Ignacio María Sánchez Vergara, alcalde at Jemez, complaining that Comanche had stolen Navaho horses. Salvador said that because the settlers of the Río Abajo had moved their animals, the Navaho suspected that something was afoot. They had sent him to find out the truth. The alcalde and Interpreter Antonio García assured Salvador that the Spaniards were in no way involved in Comanche depredations. The Indian seemed inclined to accept this, but he wanted the governor’s word as well. Sánchez Vergara promised that he and García would take the governor’s reply to the Navaho who were awaiting the results of Salvador’s mission. Allande responded that he had already sent a message for the Navaho making it clear that “I consider them my sons and friends, and that I have been distressed by the harm the Comanche have done them, but that neither I nor anyone belonging to this province was warned in time to forestall the Comanche.”

Navaho raided herds in the Río Abajo the next year, 1817, but details are lacking. Early in March 1818 Governor Allande notified the alcaldes of Cochiti, Alameda, Albuquerque, and Belén that Ute Indians accompanied by Navaho had run off horses and killed stock in the Jemez jurisdiction. The alcalde of Jemez was sending out a force, and Allande ordered the other alcaldes to keep patrols of settlers and Indians out beyond where their animals grazed. They were also to alert herders and shepherds that Navaho were on the prowl. For the time being Allande could do no more, because he was then readying a large force of soldiers and citizens from the whole Río Arriba to investigate a report by Apache Indians that a party of Americans was at the Arroyo de los Yutas.

It soon looked as if the Navaho were ready to break the peace in earnest. At Loma Parda in June a band of about seventy attacked a detachment of fourteen soldiers under Sergeant Mariano Bernal on their way to garrison Cebolleta. The troops beat them off and captured fourteen horses. A few days later Alcalde Sánchez Vergara wrote from Jemez that the Navaho were on the of-
fensive. At San Miguel on the upper Río Puerco they had killed Juan Alire of Corrales in a gaming quarrel and seriously wounded four shepherds. They were stealing stock here and there. They took the whole horse herd from don Luis María Cabeza de Baca’s Ojo del Espíritu Santo ranch. Baca and his fifteen children had received this grant in 1815; it stretched from the crest of the Sierra de Jémez on the east to the Río Puerco and the end of Mesa Prieta on the west; and from Mesa de la Ventana in the north to Cañada de la Querencia and Antonio Armenta’s ranch in the south.7 But Navaho resentment over grants in this area was nothing new.

During July 1818 New Mexicans found it difficult to appraise the significance of such episodes. Was the whole Navaho nation rising? or were a few malcontents responsible as they had been before? Jémez Indians who had been among the Navaho at the time of Alire’s murder said that the tribe as a whole was not to blame. On the basis of a scouting expedition from the Mt. Taylor area to Zuñi, José Vicente Ortiz, alcalde at Laguna, thought that the depredations were the work of the “hungry thieves who roam these parts.” He offered to go to the Navaho leaders and do all he could to persuade them to turn in the miscreants. This point of view seemed reasonable at the time. Allande had sent Interpreter García with eighteen Jémez, Zía, and Santa Ana Indians to question the Navaho leaders about the motives for the murder, and to have them bring in the culprits as they had promised to do in a similar case in April 1817 when two shepherd boys were killed.8

About the same time Governor Allande was informed of trouble to the north. Navaho Indians had killed Vicente García, a citizen of Santa Cruz, in the jurisdiction of Abiquiu. Navaho also got away with four hundred sheep, two burros, and other animals from the Río de las Gallinas, or Arroyo del Capulín.9

It was becoming apparent that the situation was more serious than many had wished to believe. When Interpreter García met Joaquín near Tunicha, this Navaho captain told him that the Navaho in general were rising against the New Mexicans. Allande immediately notified Alcalde Ortiz that he was sending sixteen presidials to El Vadito pending the arrival of Captain Bartolomé
Baca and his militia company. He also told him to give the lieutenant alcalde of Zuñi an escort so that he could return there and help the alcalde take precautions against Navaho raids.10

At sunset on July 20 Sánchez Vergara saw smokes in the vicinity of Jémez. He feared surprise attack and went on the alert. Soon Captain Joaquín appeared with a brother and two nephews. Concealing his suspicions, the alcalde received his visitors with the usual courtesies and was soon convinced of this Navaho leader's loyalty and good will. Joaquín had come to report that the Navaho nation was preparing for war. He had tried to dissuade them, but in vain: Therefore he and his band had decided to withdraw and to cast their lot with the Spaniards. According to Joaquín, the hostile Navaho had gathered in force at Carrizo, where they had fortified themselves on mesas with Ute allies, and were raiding from that base. He said that five or six detachments attacking from all sides could frustrate the rebels' plans. Joaquín's followers had given him four days for his mission; he would await the governor's decision, but if he failed to return within this time, his people would assume that he had been made a prisoner.11

In late July or early August Captain Bartolomé Baca gave Antonio Chávez the aid of twenty Ácoma Indians, two militiamen, and two citizens to reconnoiter the area to which Navaho raiders had taken sheep stolen from "La Cebolla." They found no trace of these animals, but did bring in 302 head that had strayed to Ácoma. Not long after, another scouting party, operating a hundred miles to the northeast, failed to pick up the trail of Navaho reported in the Valle Grande area. Nevertheless, the pueblos of Santa Clara and San Juan were ordered to move their horse herds to the east side of the Río Grande. Matías Ortiz at Cuyamungué assembled a force of two hundred cavalry and twenty-five infantry and awaited instructions from Santa Fe.12

A new governor, don Facundo Melgares, took office during the critical summer of 1818. Despite the storm clouds gathering over New Mexico, the veteran soldier began his term with buoyant optimism. In a series of letters to Commandant General Alejo García Conde, written from Santa Fe in August, Melgares told...
what he was doing to humble the Navaho. First he had sent a couple of Ute petty captains as emissaries to let them know how distressed he was by their hostile acts. He wanted guilty Navaho brought to him at once and the spoils returned. If they obeyed, he would forget all the crimes they had committed to date. If they refused this generous offer, he would march into Navaholand in person and give them no quarter.

While he waited for a reply the governor ordered two patrols to the Navaho frontier under presidial Captain Andrés Gómez Sañudo and militia Captain Bartolomé Baca "to repel any coward among that canaille who might be intent upon continuing his rascality." On August 16 Captain Gómez Sañudo, on his way to aid Baca, wrote from the Vado de Piedra on the Río Puerco that he had word of Navaho stealing stock in that area. He immediately set out in pursuit. At the Rincón de Santa Rosa he ran into Captain Baca, who had left home for Cebolleta on August 14. After a siesta on the Río Puerco, Baca and his men rode on. They were scarcely out of sight over the next hill when a band of Navaho swooped down and ran off a bunch of horses. The Navaho prevented the herders from getting a message to Baca until the following morning, when he too went after the thieves. At the place where the captains met they noticed the trail of fifteen or twenty Navaho with horses and cattle. Since it was old, they decided to split up to continue the search. Just then two Navaho came along driving nine or ten horses. When they saw the New Mexicans they took off. Although they outdistanced the pursuers, Baca acquired the horses. The patrols remained in the field, and on September 1 four of Baca's men, killed by Navaho, were buried at Laguna. Meanwhile, news of repeated raids in the Zuñi area reached Santa Fe.14

The Ute captains came back with word that their mission had failed. The ungrateful Navaho had declared that they would continue open warfare and resist invasion. Melgares acted accordingly. He prepared to march on September 1 at the head of a thousand men. He told the commandant general that he could lose no
time in subjecting the Navaho because of rumors of foreign infiltration among the tribes north and east of New Mexico. When he was on the point of leaving the capital, news from Taos forced him to change his plans.

At five o'clock in the afternoon of August 30, 1818, Alcalde Juan de Dios Peña of Taos received Melgares' orders for the Navaho campaign. At the very same hour word reached him that "an American, formerly a soldier in our forces, called Manuel Hernández, had come from Anglo-American territory to Río Colorado, the first plaza of this jurisdiction." Hernández claimed that a multitude of "Frenchmen," allied with Kiowa and other tribes, were assembling to attack New Mexico. Peña detained the troops scheduled to leave for the Navaho expedition the next day, saying "here we are on the point of losing the province if we permit an hour's delay." He expected to hear from Melgares within twenty-four hours. In the meantime the alcalde sent for "the American" and ordered the families at Río Colorado and Arroyo Hondo to come in to Taos. He dispatched a hundred good men to reconnoiter the threatened frontier.15

The following morning Melgares commissioned Lieutenant José María de Arce to investigate. Arce set out for Taos immediately. There he questioned Hernández for twenty minutes before sending him to Santa Fe. Although the lieutenant was sceptical about Hernández' tale and believed that even if it were true the foreigners' plans would take some time to mature, he was going out at once with two hundred men to the Valle de Culebra to guard the passes. From there he would send out a party to scout the other side of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains as far as the Río Napestle. In view of the crisis in the north, he asked Melgares to relieve the citizens of the Río Arriba from Navaho campaign duty.

Indeed Arce was more than doubtful of Hernández' veracity. He pointed out that the man was an apostate who had deserted to join the foreigners who had been tried the year before, and that he had since been living with the Indians. He could well be playing a double game. If so, and if the enemy intended to attack through
other passes, Arce believed that small parties should be sent to guard the frontier at Lo de Mora and El Vado, where they could also spy on hostile Indians.\textsuperscript{16}

For the time being Melgares was obliged to cancel the Navaho campaign. He clapped Hernández in irons and had him questioned at length.\textsuperscript{17} On September 6 the governor wrote to the commandant general that in order to forestall any “insidia de los americanos o insurgentes,” without neglecting the Navaho war, he had made the following dispositions: He had mustered all the manpower of the province, posting 600 men at Taos under Arce as the vanguard, 400 men with two pieces of artillery under Gómez Sañudo at El Vado as the center, and 800 men under Bartolomé Baca on the right bank of the Río Grande as the rear guard to hold off the Navaho. He had issued the necessary arms and munitions “for the formidable task of defending this province if any kind of enemy tries to dispute our Beneficent Sovereign’s undeniable right to it.” If the foreign menace proved minimal, Melgares would make two expeditions, one to the Plains to determine the actual number of foreigners, the other to punish the Navaho. In another letter of the same date he asked for two hundred cavalrymen and infantrymen from Sonora and one hundred from Nueva Vizcaya to stiffen the defense of New Mexico and to bring the wars to a glorious conclusion.\textsuperscript{18}

The commandant general replied on September 22. He too minimized the reports of the former Carrizal presidial Hernández. Even if there were some truth in his “farrago of unrelated and mostly exaggerated information,” his motive was to clear himself of earlier charges of suspect conduct. In view of the evidence that Hernández had been involved in the activities of “Muni y Sotó” (Auguste P. Chouteau and Jules de Mun) he was to be held in jail until further notice. The danger could not be as imminent as he claimed. How could the supposed American general have achieved the alliance with all the tribes on the Missouri River, returned to report to his government, and gone back to undertake the “imagined expedition,” all since May? Such rumors were nothing new. A letter from the Spanish consul in the United
States, a copy of which he had sent to Melgares, indicated that the Americans were not planning anything of the kind.

Certainly Melgares must not abandon the precautions upon which the security of the northern frontier had always depended. He was to continue to send out patrols in the guise of buffalo hunters and traders to the Kiowa and allied tribes, and to the Comanche on the east. But he must take advantage of this season of abundant water and pasturage to humble "the perverse Navaho" before they seized the opportunity to overrun the province. Melgares was to proceed with the Navaho campaign as planned, leaving the well-qualified Arce as comandante de armas during his absence. One hundred soldiers each from Chihuahua and Sonora were on their way to New Mexico by the shortest route.19

The viceroy, Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, Conde de Venadito, agreed that the Navaho campaign must come first. Nevertheless, while he accepted his subordinates' appraisal of the Hernández statement, from his vantage point in the capital he emphasized the need for continued vigilance. He had received other reports of foreign activity among the tribes. Meanwhile Arce's reconnaissance in force far to the north produced nothing to support Hernández' story.20

Free at last to mount his delayed Navaho expedition, Melgares took the field in late October with a sizeable force, including troops from Sonora. During the 49-day campaign that followed he chalked up a score of seven Navaho dead, two prisoners, and the capture of 20 horses, 3 mules, and 2,300 sheep. Aided by bad weather the Navaho had eluded him, "fleeing on the highest peaks." His attempts to attack them were in vain. One night the Indians threw down jarrazos (lit. "great jars"; perhaps for jarazos, "spears") wounding seven soldiers. Fortunately for them, a strong north wind and the cloudy obscurity prevented them from being seen and cut to pieces.21

According to an account of the 1818 campaign written a generation later, Melgares besieged a fortified stronghold of the
Navaho (perhaps Big Bead Mesa) for more than forty days without success. This high, almost impregnable mesa had permanent water on top and caves in which the Navaho could store their crops protected from the elements.22

At this point the Navaho sent Melgares a cross and proposed peace. He replied that they must render homage to the sovereign, settle down in the "sierra de la nombre de la tribu," and make restitution for the damage they had done, or the war would continue. For the time being, however, the governor felt that it was advisable to negotiate "because in view of the fact that they are an Apache group in language, way of life, and characteristics, their robberies and forays will continue to be a problem until their extermination." Had it not been for other circumstances Melgares believed that he could have dealt definitively with the Navaho:

The country these cowardly heathen inhabit is limited and is hemmed in by this province [N.M.] on the east, and by the Ute and Hopi on the west. And in spite of their nomadic life, without homes, or any kind of government, authority, or law, I do not believe that it would be difficult for me (with the knowledge of their country I have acquired by traveling in it with an observant eye) to destroy them or force them to withdraw via the Río Grande [San Juan-Colorado] which runs to California west of this province and of their Navaho country.23

On January 12, 1819, acting Commandant General Antonio Cordero acknowledged receipt of Melgares' account of the Navaho campaign. "Although greater success would have been desirable, I realize that the season of the year, the locality, and the circumstances regarding these Indians do not favor achieving it." He approved the governor's reply to the Navaho and said that because of conditions in the province Melgares should make every effort to secure peace, even reducing the requirements if necessary. Cordero transmitted the information to the viceroy the following day, reiterating his belief that peace with the Navaho was essential. The viceroy agreed.24
Nevertheless, according to Melgares, “after diplomatic and kindly negotiations with the perfidious Navaho” these Indians killed a Laguna and stole some horses. The governor planned to attack the tribe from all sides. “I do not believe that it is humanly possible for them to escape ruination or flight to the other side of the Río Colorado which empties into the sea at California, in which case we shall be rid of this troublesome neighbor.”

On January 29 the governor ordered the alcalde at Santa Cruz de la Cañada to assemble two hundred men. Three days later he learned that a horde of Navaho was headed for the Río Abajo. He sent an urgent warning to the alcaldes of Alameda, Albuquerque, and Belén in the hope that they, with the citizens of these districts and their militia captains, might teach the hostiles a lesson. The governor himself then marched into Navaho country for the second time.

Melgares was in the field on February 17 when the alcalde of Zuñi sent a message that five Hopi Indians had come to ask the aid of the New Mexicans against the Navaho. The governor sent a detachment, which attacked Navaho in the Hopi pueblos of Walpi and Tegua. The soldiers killed some of the intruders and put the rest to flight, thus showing the Hopi with what alacrity the Spaniards would respond when Hopi well-being and tranquility were at stake. As soon as he returned to Santa Fe in March the governor dispatched five emissaries to Hopi from Sandía, probably descendants of the Hopi or Río Grande Pueblo refugees settled there in the mid-eighteenth century. Melgares was delighted and hoped to be able to send two friars “to complete the work,” for never since the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 had the Hopi “asked for aid from New Mexico, perhaps fearful because of their crime, or of being subjugated.” He was convinced that he at long last could make them realize “how much they have lost, how many humiliations they have suffered from the Navaho and other tribes because they were not under the auspices of the one true God and the king our lord.”

During this second Navaho campaign Melgares’ troops had killed thirty-six, made twenty prisoners of both sexes, and cap-
tured considerable livestock, which was divided up and eaten. Leaving a small force in the field under Captain Gómez Sañudo, Melgares had led the rest back to Santa Fe, arriving about March 18.27

Once more the Navaho sued for peace. From the New Mexican point of view it was high time. Not only were there reports of foreign activity on the Plains and in the Rockies, but ever since 1810 the troubled state of the viceroyalty had resulted in neglect of the frontier military. Even wages for the troops in New Mexico were in arrears. The burden of supporting the presidials on campaign had to be assumed, at least in part, by voluntary subscriptions from the local citizens.28 Peace on the western front promised some hope of respite.

Chief Joaquín and his followers came into Jémez on March 31, 1819, to negotiate. Presenting Rafael Montes with a cross, they handed over four New Mexican captives, two from Cebolleta, one from Sauzal, and one from Atrisco. Joaquín had a black mule he said belonged to the governor, but he did not give it up because they had all been riding the one animal. Montes asked Melgares to give Joaquín the pinto horse and mare taken from the Indian's brother when he was captured at Zuñi. Joaquín offered to bring in the two remaining captives in return for the favor he was asking. Montes sent a soldier on to Santa Fe with the message and the cross.29

Melgares replied the following day, saying that he had decided to grant a truce. He would go or send representatives to the Cerro Cabezon to draw up terms, and would let the Navaho know the date so that all the tribe might assemble to hear them. He sent Joaquín a commission as captain so that both Spaniards and Navaho might know how his services were appreciated. The Indian was to take the news to his people and let them know that they were now free to come and go at Jémez—and that they were not to rouse Melgares' ire again.30

Ten days later five Navaho came to Jémez from the Mesas de Chaca to buy maize. Montes consulted the governor, not knowing whether he should allow these Indians to go on to trade with
other pueblos. Melgares replied that for the time being they could go only to Jémez; since there were no interpreters elsewhere, misunderstandings might arise.

When Governor Melgares conveyed the gratifying news to the commandant general on April 18; he said that the Navaho would already have been living in pueblos as vassals of the crown if the news of "the ambitious Anglo-Americans on the north at the confluence of the Rochecon [Roche Jaune], or Piedra Amarilla, had not prevented it." Now that he had harried them throughout their land they had come in "more humble than ever."

For all this, blessed be the Lord of Hosts, Who so obviously protects the arms of the king our lord." "Full of joy," he boasted that not a shot was to be heard on the entire line, nor was there a single enemy of the king. The commandant general and the viceroy commended the able interim governor of New Mexico. Both were confident that he would use excellent judgment in drawing up a treaty with the Navaho. He would, of course, remit it to Mexico City for approval, and the viceroy suggested a stipulation that the Navaho be required to give hostages as a guarantee of good faith.

During the Navaho war settlers in the more vulnerable localities had led an uneasy life. New Mexicans had been moving to the region beyond Abiquiu for more than a decade. On August 1, 1806, Governor Real Alencaster approved the San Joaquin del Cañón del Río de Chama grant, about four leagues west of Abiquiu, to Francisco Salazar, ensign in the local militia, his brothers, and twenty-eight other poor and landless petitioners.

Early in 1808 Juan Bautista Valdez and nine others received the Cañón de San Miguel (Pedemales) grant near Abiquiu. Possession was given to thirty-nine settlers on March 1 of that year. From time to time the Navaho drove the early settlers away, but they always returned. The settlers at San Joaquin abandoned their holdings during the war, and in April 1819 they appealed for military support to enable them to return and plant their crops. Governor Melgares replied that the danger was over, because the enemy had asked for peace.

The formal treaty was signed at Santa Fe on August 21, 1819,
by Melgares, with the marks of Joaquín, caudillo principal; Gorda, for the cacique; and Vicente, Salvador, and Francisco, captains. The terms were not substantially different from those of earlier treaties. As usual, there was to be a “general” of the Navaho nation, preferably Joaquín because of his character and loyalty to the Spaniards, with subordinate captains of the several “families or factions.” The Indians were to cultivate the land and provide for themselves. Known Navaho transgressors were to be taken to the governor for punishment. Complaints against New Mexicans were to be referred to the government, which would punish the delinquents and award damages if necessary. As for the lands heretofore used by the Navaho: “The boundary remains as before without change as far as Cañón Largo, the mouth of Chaco Canyon, and Agua Azul, to which the livestock of the province has ranged in past years when, happily, peace reigned, and to which it shall now go, without passing the limits specified.”

On certain points this treaty differed from earlier ones: The general of the Navaho must live as near as possible to Jémez for the prompt dispatch of business between Navaho and Spaniard. The Spanish authorities may have been thinking of closer observation and control of the Indians, even though one of the interpreters already lived at Jémez. In order to ensure the peace, “four youths shall live as hostages in this capital [Santa Fe] and shall be released each year, or after a shorter period, in exchange for an equal number, at the discretion of the Navaho general.” To show their good will, the Spaniards would hand over a number of Navaho held captive in Santa Fe once the treaty was put into effect. Another clause enjoined the Navaho to respect the persons and property of the Hopi, “in view of the fact that this government is taking them under the protection of our kind sovereign, in whose shadow they have taken refuge.”

Judging from the lack of documentation to the contrary Melgares’ 1819 peace with the Navaho lasted nearly two years. During this respite on the western front the governor of New Mexico did
what he could to improve the defense of the province and to investi·
gate rumors of American activity. New Mexican patrols ranged as far as the Yellowstone.

Melgares also kept informed about the internal unrest in New Spain. By July of 1821—the month the army deposed Viceroy Conde de Venadito—Navaho and New Mexican were at it again.

On July 6, 1821, Alcalde José Joaquín de Montoya complained to Melgares. Landholders in his jurisdiction, fearful of Navaho raiders, had moved away in violation of the commandant general's order of September 16, 1804, which forbade the abandonment of frontier points on pain of loss of property and lands. The burden of defense was too much for the few poor people who remained behind. The alcalde urged that the defectors be forced to return, even without their families. Melgares replied that the commandant general's ruling held, provided there was nothing to the contrary in the 1820 Ley Constitucional.

Late in July the governor ordered the constitutional alcalde of Santa Fe to send forty fully armed men with provisions for a month to Captain Bartolomé Baca at Cebolleta to serve as cavalry against the Navaho. At the end of a month they would be relieved by a like number so that the burden of this service would be distributed equitably. Volunteers might join if they wished, and perhaps would profit from booty. Late in July militia Captain Juan Antonio Cabeza de Vaca led an expedition of two hundred twenty-five men from Jémez, but the record of their accomplishments, if any, is missing. In late September Captain Francisco Xavier Chávez campaigned against the Navaho, killing twenty-one braves, making seven captives of both sexes, and taking four hundred horses and 2,112 sheep. Moreover, he laid waste the Navaho maize fields and drove the Indians from the Sierra Tunicha, "su iglesia, más de cien leguas de su centro."

On October 3, 1821, Juan Armijo set out from Cebolleta with an irregular force of militia and Indian auxiliaries from the Río Abajo. His account of this expedition vividly portrays the day-to-day problems that plagued such operations against the Navaho. The first night he camped at the paraje of San Lucas in prescribed
military order. Obviously the local citizens did not regard this enterprise with unqualified enthusiasm. Some of them had drawn up a statement expressing their resentment because the number of men specified by the governor had not been raised. Francisco Armijo of Belén presented this to Juan Armijo just as he was about to march on the fourth. When Juan refused to accept it, Francisco wheeled around shouting that he was not going on the campaign and that he would defend all who followed him. Although Juan Armijo now had only the Indian auxiliaries and the deserters' officers, he went on to the paraje of the Siete Ojos, where he made camp. There Francisco Armijo returned with the deserters, saying that he had taken pity on the wretched men, but had repented his error. He now volunteered to go to meet Juan Rafael Ortiz and bring up the supply train. Convinced of his change of heart, the commander gave him sixty men for this task.

When Francisco failed to return by the appointed day, October 9, Juan marched to meet him, camping at the Cañada de las Cabras "in good order." On the eleventh, when he was ready to proceed, don Francisco Pino of the alcaldia of Belén complained that although he was lieutenant of the milicia urbana, Juan Armijo had not made him his ayudante but had conferred the honor on don Manuel de Turrieta, alférez de milicias arregladas. Pino handed his force over to Armijo and departed—followed by all his men who had plotted this action the night before. Armijo stated that the reason was not so much the slight to Pino as the men's fear of entering Navaho country with a small untrained force.

Desertions and insubordination did not deter Juan Armijo. He went on to the Cañada de la Rica, where he met Francisco Armijo and the supply train handed over by Ortiz at "la Peña Blanca, farm of the Navaho Cayetano." On the same day Juan gave Francisco six men to pursue the deserters, whom they overtook at Cebolleta. Pino and his subordinates Juan and Rafael Baca were adamant, but the other deserters rejoined the expedition, which set out again on the fifteenth, with the culprits on foot, shouldering their weapons, as punishment. By forced marches lasting well into the night
they now pushed on via the Cañones de la Agua Chiquita, the
Cañon de la Mesa Quemada, and the Cañones de la Agua Salada,
reaching the edge of the Chuska Valley on October 18. Here they
found a track leading “contra la Sierra Mesas del Ojo del Joso.”
At eleven o’clock on the nineteenth they surprised the Navaho,
killing seven. The Indians fled with three of the bodies, so only
four pairs of ears served as testimony to victory. The New Mexi-
cans, who suffered no casualties, took a nursing infant, seized the
foodstuffs, captured five horses and killed two. Armijo could no
longer resist the complaints of his hungry men, “those who per-
formed this service being drawn from the poorest classes in their
districts.”

The presidial troop entered the field in December, but the
“humbled” Navaho did not want to fight. Once again they asked
for peace and agreed to go to Santa Fe to treat with the governor.
This led to a tragedy.

Representatives of the tribe, on their way to meet Governor
Melgares, received what appeared to be a friendly welcome at
Jémez. Behind the scenes, however, the people of Jémez and
Cochiti had conspired against the Navaho. Under the leadership
of Alcalde Juan Antonio Baca they fell upon the Indians and
clubbed thirteen to death. The Navaho appealed to the governor
for justice and the culprits were tried and sentenced. Although the
sentence was confirmed by the superior authorities, petitions for
pardon were forwarded to Mexico City. The case was referred to
the Mexican Congress in March 1824. The guilty men went
free.

While this doleful event ran its judicial course Mexico achieved
independence. In accordance with the Plan de Iguala, all inhabi-
tants of the former viceroyalty of New Spain, whether Europeans,
Africans, or Indians, were to enjoy full status as citizens, including
protection of their property rights. The Navaho, however, were
neither aware of nor able to grasp the significance of this guar-
antee. So, early in 1822, while New Mexicans were celebrating
the new order, Navaho tribesmen wrought havoc. According to
Thomas James, a disdainful American observer in Santa Fe:
They killed all of every age and condition, burned and destroyed all they could not take away with them, and drove away the sheep, cattle and horses. They came from the south directly towards Santa Fe, sweeping everything before them, and leaving the land desolate behind them. They recrossed the Del Norte below Santa Fe, and passed to the north, laid bare the country around the town of Toas, and then disappeared with all their booty.

Governor Melgares called out the militia. The same observer, who “preferred to be a spectator in such a war,” favors us with a typically gringo view of Melgares and his tatterdemalion company:

Most of them were armed with bows and arrows. A few had guns that looked as if they had been imported by Cortez, while others had iron hoops fastened to the ends of poles, which passed for lances.

On March 8 a pioneer American trapper recorded “that the Spanierds Have Sent 700 men against the nabeho Indeans.” On May 1 he wrote from Taos:

We Ware Informed that Spanish army Had Returned that they Had taken one old Indean and Some two or three old Horses that Ware So poor the Nabeho Cold not drive them up the mountains—for it appers the[y] Went up the Steep mountain and Role down the Rocks on their Pursurs So that the[y] Ware Complied to dis-continu the pursute.45

Under the new regime changes in civil and military functions resulted in confusion. It was difficult to know from one day to the next who held a particular office and what his authority was.
During 1822 Melgares, Francisco Xavier Chávez, and Lieutenant Colonel José Antonio Vizcarra exercised civil and/or military authority, as dictates from Mexico reached Santa Fe. Vizcarra succeeded Melgares and Chavez in the combined civil and military command on December 21, 1822. Authority was divided again by decree of July 19, 1823, and Bartolomé Baca became jefe político in September, with Vizcarra continuing as military chief.46

Soon after Vizcarra took over the united offices, the Navaho problem drew him into the field. At Laguna on February 5, 1823, he composed a four-point statement of appropriate terms for yet another treaty: 1) The Navaho should hand over all captives. 2) Navaho prisoners should be returned to the tribe unless they preferred to become Christians. 3) The Navaho must surrender every last thing they had stolen since the latest treaty. 4) The Navaho should be strongly urged to accept Christianity and to settle down in pueblos established for them in suitable places. He requested the opinion of the militia on this proposal.

Three days later at Paguate some forty New Mexican citizens replied. Captain Bartolomé Baca, who headed the list, said that he agreed with the governor, adding that any Navaho thief caught in the act after the treaty should be killed on the spot, or imprisoned if he surrendered. The rest followed Baca’s lead; all signed the statement.

On February 12 an agreement with the Navaho was signed at the campo de Paguate by Vizcarra and by Captains Bartolomé Baca and Juan Antonio Sandoval in behalf of General Juanico and his tribe. The Indians handed over the captives they had with them. They protested the clause allowing the New Mexicans to keep Navaho allegedly ready for conversion, but Governor Vizcarra refused to cede this point. As for reparations, the Navaho claimed that they were dying of hunger and could not possibly repay what they were accused of stealing, although they did promise not to offend again. As for the final clause, they had to consult the entire nation and would reply within the four months dating from March 1.47

The New Mexicans were not optimistic about the outcome,
and drew up a plan for large-scale action against the Navaho: 1) The governor would lead a thousand men into Navaholand; two hundred would be stationed within the province to guard the home front. 2) Local alcaldes were to provide replacements for the whole force every two months. 3) The booty would be divided pro rata among the men actually engaged in the fighting; as the only permanent force, the *compañía veterana* would be entitled to receive the best horses and mules, since to be properly mounted they needed a horse and a mule per man. 4) Even if there were no booty for distribution at the time of the bimonthly replacement, those who had not actually fought were entitled to none. 5) One-fourth of the spoils would be reserved for repairing arms and other necessary military expenses. 6) Rightful owners of stock recovered from the Navaho could claim animals bearing a known brand. 7) Officers and unit commanders would receive double booty.48

Since, as Vizcarra had anticipated, the February agreement did not bring peace and the Navaho were soon on the prowl again, he wrote to the commandant general that he had resolved to march on June 18 with fifteen hundred men for a four- or five-month campaign. During his absence don Francisco Xavier Chávez, *primer vocal* of the provincial assembly and colonel of the militia, was to act as jefe político.49

For ten weeks, from June 18 to August 31, Vizcarra hunted the Navaho. Following every trace of the elusive enemy, he carried the war west across the vast Black Mesa of present-day northeastern Arizona, and north into Utah. After various minor encounters the expedition reached First Mesa on July 17. As the governor had heard, Navaho Indians, including Delgadito, had taken refuge in the Hopi country with their livestock. Enlisting the aid of the Hopi, he spent the next two weeks in a determined effort to clean out all the Navaho in the area. In view of the Hopi appeal to Governor Melgares in 1819, they must have been glad to be rid of the Navaho. On the other hand, the presence of such a large Mexican force in their territory was a mixed blessing. Limited aid against the Navaho was one thing, but the risk of being subjected themselves was the last thing they ever wanted.
On August 8 Vizcarra attacked a ranchería of Paiute, mistaking them for Navaho. Afterwards one of these Indians guided the New Mexicans to the hiding place of Juanico, whose tracks they found the same afternoon. They overtook him the next day. Certainly, after the abortive agreement, Vizcarra had no reason to trust Juanico, and when the Indian shouted from above that he was ready to talk, the commander retorted that he had come to fight. In the skirmishes that followed the Navaho tactics were designed to frustrate Vizcarra. Alternately attacking and retreating they took advantage of their superior horses and their adversaries’ preoccupation with rounding up stock, engaging in hand-to-hand combat with the small parties detached for this purpose. Finally, when two officers and two soldiers were wounded, Vizcarra began his withdrawal, still rounding up livestock.  

Navaho spokesmen now approached the alcaldes at Laguna and Jémez. They wanted peace. Under the newly divided authority at Santa Fe this raised the question of the treaty-making power and the return of Christian Navaho captives. Jefe Político Bartolomé Baca took the initiative by summoning representatives of the village ayuntamientos to the capital, and on October 21 the majority voted for peace. Notes to the alcaldes instructed them to bring together the Navaho made captive during the Vizcarra expedition. The jefe político set up a meeting with the Navaho for December 2 to negotiate a treaty.

Colonel Vizcarra took exception to Baca’s actions, claiming that declaring war and making peace were prerogatives of the military. The call for captives to exchange with the Navaho was wrong, for they had been taken in legitimate war while the Indians had stolen their New Mexican prisoners. Furthermore, “it is my belief,” said the commander, “that if a liberal government like the one we have adopted were to hand over to infidels individuals who have entered our society, all or most of whom have received the health-giving waters of holy baptism, we might as well go on supporting the despotic government of which we are now free.” If Baca persisted in holding the December 2 meeting at Isleta, Vizcarra would leave the capital November 25 and conduct it himself.
If Baca wished to be present, he would meet him at Isleta. In the meantime Vizcarra was reporting to the commandant general; Baca could do likewise.52

Baca responded from Tomé on November 21. Vizcarra was sadly mistaken if he considered that Baca had arbitrarily deprived him of authority. The jefe político was simply carrying out the mandate of the province as a whole. “I am very far from being electrified by the heated expressions you have hurled at me in your letter.” He too was writing to the commandant general.53

The commandant general forwarded the conflicting opinions to Mexico City. In the meantime Vizcarra twice addressed himself directly to the ministro de guerra y marina. On December 17 he said that the Navaho who had come to him asking for peace requested the return of those taken captive. Because most of these were Christians, his conscience demanded that he refuse, but he asked for instructions. A month later he wrote that he and Baca had worked out a compromise. Nevertheless, in order to maintain harmony, he needed a document defining in detail the authority of his office. He believed that making war and peace fell within his jurisdiction, but this was the chief point in dispute.54

On January 20, 1824, fourteen articles of peace resulting from the December meeting at Isleta were signed at Jémez by Vizcarra, Baca, and Antonio “El Pinto,” general of the Navaho nation:

1) The Navaho shall surrender all New Mexican captives and any apostates living with the tribe. 2) The New Mexicans shall return Navaho captives, provided they wish to go, since to send back those who had received baptism or intended to was un-Christian. 3) The point raised in article 2 has been referred to the government in Mexico City. 4) Claims may be made against the Navaho for robberies committed in violation of the truce they themselves asked for at Isleta to give them time to consult their nation. 5) The Navaho shall avoid any abuse with regard to the horses stolen in time of war. The jefe político has acknowledged their ownership of said horses. The New Mexicans shall be bound by this. 6) The jefe político shall order the alcaldes to pursue Navaho marauders and recover property; in case
the Indians rejoin their rancherías, the petty captains shall force them to give satisfaction. 7) If any New Mexicans rob Navaho, the Indians shall ask for the aid of the local authorities; the jefe político shall order these officials to grant it, seizing the culprits, making them return the stolen goods, and punishing them accordingly. 8) Since these negotiations are undertaken in good faith, the Navaho may propose all those stipulations consistent with their way of life acknowledged on previous occasions. 9) In accordance with the preceding article the Navaho are free to appoint petty captains in their customary manner so that the latter may exact fulfillment of these treaties. 10) These petty captains shall be responsible for making the Navaho ranchos said to be on the other side of the Sierra Dátil rejoin the tribe, lest all Navaho commit robberies, putting the blame on them. They shall report the result of this effort so that the necessary measures may be taken. 11) Since the known chiefs of the tribe, such as Juanico, El Chato, and Facundo, have conspicuously absented themselves from the preliminary discussions, the petty captains appointed shall urge them to join in as proof of their peaceful intentions. 12) Once the Navaho ratify the peace they shall treat well any New Mexican traveling through their country and shall put aside all ill feelings towards their kinsmen who choose to remain with the New Mexicans. 13) Since the nature of peace is to quiet old grievances originating in time of war, both parties shall be obliged to behave accordingly because of the New Mexicans' generosity in not charging the Navaho with the innumerable robberies they have committed. 14) In accordance with the New Mexicans' Christian duty they urge the pagan nation to embrace the Holy Faith of their own free will.

The Navaho accepted the articles with little comment. As for Article 1, they said they had only one captive, held by La Gorda; he would be returned. With regard to Article 13, the Navaho did not want the individuals who killed the thirteen Navaho at Jémez subjected to further punishment after their long imprisonment. They had suffered enough.
NOTES

1. José Mariano de la Peña to Gov. Pedro María de Allande (1816-1818 ad interim), Pajarito, Aug. 20, 1816; SANM, no. 2668.
2. Ortiz to Allande, Laguna, Sept. 26, 1816; SANM-BLM, no. 668.
5. Allande to alcaldes of Cochiti, Alameda, Albuquerque, Belén, Santa Fe, March 2, 1818; SANM, no. 2714. A Navaho was held prisoner at Santa Fe at a cost of one real per day, which amounted to ten pesos, two reales for the period Aug. 11 to Oct. 31, 1817. SANM, no. 2699. In 1882 seventy-five-year-old Juan López of Peña Blanca, who had attended school there in 1817 at the house of Juan Antonio Cabeza de Baca, recalled that Navaho had attacked in the Cañada de Cochiti sometime between 1817 and 1821. Cañada de Cochiti Grant; S-G, BLM, no. 135.
6. Service record of Bernal, Santa Fe, Dec. 31, 1821; MANM.
7. Sánchez Vergara to Allande, Jémez, June 24, 1818; SANM, no. 2726. Allande to Sánchez Vergara, Santa Fe, June 25, 1818; SANM, no. 2727. Sánchez Vergara to Allande, Jémez, June 29, 1818; SANM, no. 2728. [Allande] to Sánchez Vergara, Santa Fe, July 1, 1818; ibid. Tomás Cabeza de Baca, Ojo del Espíritu Santo Grant; S-G, BLM, no. 44. Manuel Hurtado testified in 1860 that the Navaho had driven Baca away temporarily in 1816 or 1817. Cf. Part I, note 25.
8. Allande to Sánchez Vergara, June 25, 1818. Sánchez Vergara to Allande, June 29, 1818. Ortiz to Allande, Laguna, July 7, 1818; SANM, 2732. Allande to Ortiz, Santa Fe, July 10, 1818; SANM, no. 2733.
9. [Allande] to Sánchez Vergara, Santa Fe, July 1, 1818; SANM, no. 2728.
10. [Allande] to Ortiz, July 10, 1818. [Allande] to Miguel Ortiz, Santa Fe, July 10, 1818; SANM, no. 2731.
11. Sánchez Vergara to Allande, Jémez, July 21, 1818; SANM, no. 2736. Joaquín was evidently somewhat acculturated. He had accompanied the annual trade caravan to Nueva Vizcaya to sell skins and blankets. Unsigned letter to com. gen., n.d.; SANM, Misc. docs., vol. 1.


14. Gómez Sanudo to Melgares, Vado de Piedra del Río Puerco, Aug. 16, 1818; ibid. Baca to Melgares, Cebolleta, Aug. 16, 1818; ibid. Salvador García to Melgares, Zúñi, Aug. 21, 27, 1818; ibid. Fr. Mariano Peñón at Laguna complained on Jan. 31, 1819, that he had not been paid for the burials of José Antonio Valverde of Tomé, Pablo Ulibarri of Sabinal, Justo Chávez of Belén, and Juan Trujillo of La Jolla. Neither the time nor place of their deaths is given. SANM, no. 2790.


16. Arce to Melgares, Taos, Aug. 31, 1818; ibid.


18. Melgares to García Conde, Santa Fe, Sept. 6, 1818; AGN, Notas Diplomáticas, tomo 4.


23. Melgares to García Conde, Dec. 18, 1818.


25. [Melgares] to Cordero (place and date omitted by copyist); AGI, Estado 33, Méx., leg. 14. Cordero to Venadito, Durango, March 1819; *ibid.* Venadito to Cordero, México, April 10, 1819.


27. Letters of Melgares to Cordero, Santa Fe, March 18, 1819; AGI, Estado 33, Méx., leg. 14; printed in the *Gaceta del Gobierno de México*, tom. X, núm. 73 (June 10, 1819). Letters of Cordero to Melgares, Durango, April 13, 1819; *ibid.* Cordero to Venadito, Durango, April 14, 1819; *ibid.* Venadito to Cordero, México, May 25, 1819; *ibid.* Fray Angelico Chavez summarizes an 1819 document as follows: “No. 2 Vadito. Melgares to Custos Hozio, Feb. 20. Cacique and others of Moqui tribe hard-pressed at Ojo de la Vaca by Navajos; seek help from Spaniards, and so there is hope of founding a Moqui Mission; sending a division against Navajos and asks prayers for success.” *Archives of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe* (Washington, 1957), p. 82.

28. As of Dec. 31, 1820, the government owed Andrés Ortega of the Santa Fe garrison 1,039 pesos in back pay. The will of Corporal Roman Sánchez, June 28, 1825, listed 2,598 pesos, 4 reales due from the National Treasury. SANM-BLM, nos. 1212, 1200. One subscription list of May 1819 credited citizens with supplying 1,011 sheep, 94 head of cattle, 59 almudes of beans, and 130 strings of chile. SANM, nos. 2812, 2821.


30. Melgares to Montes, Santa Fe, April 1, 1819; *ibid.*

31. Montes to Melgares, Jémez, April 10, 1819; *ibid.* Melgares to Montes, Santa Fe, April 13, 1819; *ibid.*

32. Melgares to Cordero, Santa Fe, April 18, 1819; *ibid.* García Conde to Melgares, Durango, May 11, 1819; *ibid.* García Conde to Venadito,
Durango, May 15, 1819; ibid. Venadito to García Conde, México, June 23, 1819, ibid.

33. Cañón de Chama Grant; S-G, BLM, no. 71. The Salazar brothers had been living at their mother's rancho. When she died it was divided among nine heirs living in other districts, and they had nowhere to plant their crops. Cañón de Pedernales Grant; ibid., no. 113. Pedro Ignacio Gallegos to Melgares, Abiquiu, April 10, 1819, and reply, April 11, 1819; SANM-BLM, no. 1282.

34. García Conde to Venadito, Durango, Sept. 20, 1819, and Tratado de Paz, Santa Fe, Aug. 21, 1819; AGI, Estado 33, Méx., leg. 14; printed in the Gaceta del Gobierno de México, tom. X, núm. 144 (Oct. 27, 1819). The viceroy had approved the treaty Oct. 26. Ten copies were sent to the commandant general, who was to file two in Durango and send the rest to Santa Fe, two to be filed and the remaining six dispatched to the Navaho chiefs.

35. See Thomas, "The Yellowstone River." In October 1820 Alférez Felipe Griego had taken part in an expedition "a los paises del Norte en reconocimiento del derrotero que traia una division de los Estados Unidos que mandaba el caudillo Benjamín Offalen [O'Fallon]. Service record of Griego, Santa Fe, Dec. 1821; MANM.

36. Montoya to Melgares, Jémez, July 6, 1821, and reply; SANM-BLM, no. 1213.

37. Melgares to alcalde of Santa Fe, Santa Fe, July 16, 1821; MANM.

38. Estado general que manifiesta el número de hombres reunidos en este pueblo de Jémez para operar en la expedición a Nabajo, Jémez, July 25, 1821; MANM. This troop was equipped with 136 escopetas, 3,500 cartridges, 150 lances, 155 bows, 3,625 arrows, 141 horses, and 126 mules.


40. Diario of Juan Armijo, Oct. 23, 1821; MANM.

41. Service record of Pedro Sandoval, Santa Fe, Dec. 31, 1844; MANM.

42. W. W. H. Davis, El Gringo; or, New Mexico and Her People (New York, 1857), p. 83, says that Baca was the ringleader, Jémez the place, and the year 1820. Josiah Gregg, Commerce of the Prairies, ed. by Max L. Moorhead (Norman, 1954), p. 199, places the crime at Cochiti. An inaccurate German translation of Gregg's account of the massacre appeared in A. R. Thümmel, Mexiko und die Mexikaner (Erlanger, 1848). This unhappy event may also account for the following curious news item: "The [Navaho] were not long since at war with the intendency of Santa Fe, on account of the perfidy of the commander under whom they served in an expedition against the royalists, near Durango. Fifteen of their
chiefs had been murdered, and they abandoned the republican cause for a time." The Natchitoches Courier quoted in Niles' Weekly Register, vol. 28 (July 9, 1825). The Courier's reporter had left Santa Fe in August 1824.

43. José Antonio Vizcarra to the ministro de guerra y marina, Santa Fe, Feb. 18, 1824, and reply, March 27, 1824; Archivo Histórico Militar Mexicano, México (AHMM), Secretaría de Guerra y Marina, D4813/271. Ministro de guerra y marina to the Mexican Congress, México, March 27, 1824; ibid.

44. James, Three Years Among the Indians and Mexicans (Philadelphia and New York, 1962), pp. 95-96.


48. Plan . . . con que debe formarse la guerra a la tribu Navajo [Feb., 1823]; MANM.

49. Vizcarra to the ayuntamiento of Santa Fe, Santa Fe, June 17, 1823; MANM.

50. Vizcarra, Diario, June 18-Aug. 31, 1823; MANM; trans. and ed. by David M. Brugge as "Vizcarra's Navajo Campaign of 1823," Arizona and the West, vol. 6 (1964), pp. 223-44. The service record of Tomás Martínez (and others) stated that Vizcarra's men killed 50 Navaho and made 36 prisoners. Santa Fe, Dec. 1840; MANM. The death of Vizcarra's soldiers in the unfortunate battle with Paiutes, Aug. 8, 1823, was certified the following year. Chavez, Archives, p. 92. In 1875 Salvador Martín, referring to points in the Tecolote area of San Miguel County, testified that the "El Pueblo" ruin lay "near the place where one Colonel Vizcarra in about 1818 had a blacksmith shop, he being then a Colonel of Sonora or old Mexican troops." Town of Tecolote Grant, S-G, BLM, no. 7. For a favorable characterization of Vizcarra, see Fidelia Miller Puckett, "Ramón Ortiz: Priest and Patriot," NMHR, vol. 25 (1950), pp. 269-71.

52. Vizcarra to Baca, Santa Fe, Nov. 17, 1823; AHMM, Guerra y Marina, D481.3/271.

53. Baca to Vizcarra, Tomé, Nov. 21, 1823; ibid. Baca to com. gen., Tomé, Nov. 21, 1823; ibid.

54. [Com. gen.] to Baca, Durango, Dec. 17, 1823; ibid. Vizcarra to ministro de guerra y marina, Santa Fe, Dec. 17, 1823, and Jan. 15, 1824; ibid.

55. Tratados de paz, Jemez, Jan. 20, 1824; ibid. The plural “treaties” was used presumably to demonstrate that both the military and civil chiefs of New Mexico, Vizcarra and Baca, concurred. This Antonio el Pinto was probably the son of the earlier one who during the 1780’s was won over to a pro-Spanish position under the pressure of Anza’s diplomacy and the enmity that developed with the Gila Apache. Antonio el Pinto the elder was killed by Apache in 1793. See Reeve, “Navaho-Spanish Diplomacy,” pp. 224-34.

56. Contestación a los artículos; ibid. According to W. W. H. Davis, “the case [against the thirteen alleged murderers] was kept in court until 1824 without any decision being made upon it, when the parties were set at liberty. Ten years after, in 1834, these same men fell by the hands of the Nabajos, by which it almost appears that Divine Providence inflicted upon these murderers the punishment the authorities of the country had failed to mete out to them.” El Gringo, p. 84.