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THE APACHES IN THE HISTORY
OF THE SOUTHWEST

DONALD E. WORCESTER

The Apache Indians have played a unique role in the history of North America despite the fact that they were always few in number, lived widely scattered in small nomadic groups, and rarely assembled in large numbers for any purpose. The Athapascans were apparently the last major wave into North America before the Eskimos, for most of them are still in northwestern Canada. Small bands of Athapascans, the forerunners of the Apaches and Navajos, arrived in the Southwest perhaps a century or two before the coming of the Spaniards. When Spaniards moving north from Mexico City reached the region of modern New Mexico, they met Indians whose methods of waging war were unlike those of the sedentary peoples they had encountered earlier. Spaniards were accustomed to people who lived in villages or cities, who fought as armies, and who yielded when their leaders surrendered. They conquered the Aztecs, even though badly outnumbered, but they were totally unprepared for the guerrilla tactics of the Apaches, and failed to conquer them in two centuries of warfare.

Apaches, like all Southern Athapascans, called themselves “Diné,” meaning “the people.” “Apache,” which may have been a corruption of the Zuñi word for “enemy,” was a name the Spaniards applied to them; like most American Indians the Apaches became known to Europeans through neighboring tribes, who had their own, usually unflattering, terms for them. The Apaches were, except for the Lipans, Kiowa Apaches, and one Jicarilla band, mountain people, although they were equally at
home in the southwestern deserts. Unlike most Indians who occupied marginal lands, the Apaches were not too weak to force others out of more desirable or fertile areas. They preferred their wild, free, existence and their dependence on wild game and the roots and seeds of certain plants, as well as raids on sedentary peoples, for their sustenance. Because of the constant need to search for food, they were ever on the move.

Although living for warfare, the Apaches never attacked if the outcome appeared uncertain. There were too few men to risk life needlessly, and they had no esteem for dead heroes. They were masters of stealth and surprise, and if they could not gain a decided advantage by these tactics they refrained from attacking. The Spaniards brought new sources of food, and Apaches soon developed a lingering taste for horse and mule meat, preferring it to the flesh of cattle or sheep. Because they lived scattered widely in groups of a few families, when they began raiding Spanish herds the bands were always small.

Characteristic of the Apaches were certain traits mentioned by many observers over the centuries—their hardiness and ability to endure extremes of heat and cold and hunger, their scorn for liars, the chastity of their women, their love of gambling, and their sense of humor. Their physical fortitude and endurance were legendary. Many writers have attested to their pride in truthfulness, and an equal number have commented, sometimes ruefully, on the chastity of Apache women as exceptional. Parenthetically, such chastity was greatly encouraged by the Apache practice of cutting off the fleshy part of the nose of a woman caught in adultery. One example of their sense of humor was the name they gave to bald-headed Agent John P. Clum: "Man-With-the-High-Forehead."

The Apaches' gift for survival in a harsh environment was also noted. They could find food and water where none could be expected. And although they were always on the move, with smoke signals by day and fires by night they could send and receive messages over great distances in a remarkably short time, calling others to council or warning of the approach of enemies. John C.
Cremony, who became intimately acquainted with the Mesca­leros, was astonished at their skill in concealing themselves in open country covered only with gramma grass. ¹

Beginning with Juan de Oñate, the first Spanish governor of New Mexico, who arrived with a colony shortly before 1600, Spanish officials began seizing Apaches and selling them as slaves in the mining camps to the south. This practice continued throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and Mexicans maintained it through much of the nineteenth century. The practice engendered bitter hatred for Spaniards, and as a result of Apache hostility the Spanish northward advance was permanently checked at the Pueblo region of New Mexico and the Pima and Sobaípuri villages of the Santa Cruz and San Pedro valleys of southern Arizona. Not only was the advance checked there, but Apache raids into Chihuahua and Sonora, from the late seventeenth century on, pushed back the frontier and nearly depopulated both provinces.

The Apaches were apparently the first of the wild Indians in the present Southwest to acquire horses and to engage in mounted combat.² Spaniards were authorized to employ Christianized Pueblo Indians as herders. Some of these sought refuge with Apaches in the 1630's and 1640's, and no doubt taught them to ride. Even after this the Apaches still ate most of the horses and mules they stole from the Spaniards, keeping only a few of the best for riding. They patterned their riding gear after that of the Spaniards.³

There were a number of sporadic Pueblo Indian uprisings, but it was only in 1680 that a coordinated movement drove the Spaniards from the Rio Grande valley, a movement in which both Apaches and Navajos took an active part. Only when they learned that Apaches were actually helping the Pueblo rebels did the Spaniards retreat.⁴

In the eighteenth century, because of their successful raids on Spanish herds in Sonora and Chihuahua, in which they drove off thousands upon thousands of horses, mules, and cattle, larger numbers of Apaches were able to congregate and to participate in
raids. Their tactics changed as a result, making their forays much more terrifying and destructive than before. They no longer relied on stealth, but in parties of several hundred boldly attacked towns, ranches, and even presidios. They killed the men whenever possible, carrying off women and children either to be ransomed in New Mexico or adopted into the tribe. Many a Mexican boy captured by Apaches grew up to become a feared warrior. In this way the Apaches kept their numbers from declining drastically despite constant punitive expeditions against them.

Faced with the probable loss of Sonora and Chihuahua, in 1776 the Spaniards created a new institution designed especially to cope with the Apaches, something they had done for no other Indians. This unique organization was the Commandancy General of the Interior Provinces, meaning all of the northern frontier provinces. It was a purely military jurisdiction, for the commander general’s duties were to wage constant warfare against the Apaches along the whole frontier, a task that left him little time for civil administration. Another innovation was the compañía volante or “flying company,” a highly mobile cavalry force organized to pursue and punish Apache raiders swiftly and effectively.

With an increased number of troops and improved firearms, the commander general launched a determined war of extermination, using the Apaches of one band to help locate and surprise the camps of other bands. In 1786, too, Viceroy Bernardo de Gálvez, who had served with the army in Apachería, issued a set of instructions to the commander general in which he introduced a new and more hopeful policy for controlling the Apaches by tempering the extermination policy with opportunities for making peace. Previously Spanish officials were not allowed to make peace treaties with Apaches; now the Indians were to be admitted to peace whenever they requested it, providing they would locate their camps at establecimientos de paz (peace establishments) in the vicinity of one of the presidios. The extermination campaigns, coupled with the opportunity to live in peace and be supplied provisions by the Spanish government, induced many hard-pressed bands to accept peace terms. Gálvez ordered
that the Apaches be given not only food but aguardiente and even Spanish firearms, to make them dependent on Spanish friendship. He hoped they would give up altogether the use of the bow and arrow. This was another new concept, for previously it had been illegal to trade guns to Indians.5

The new policy of intensified warfare using Apaches as scouts, together with offers of protection and support at establecimientos de paz, soon bore fruit, as the Chiricahuas and other bands voluntarily settled in camps near the Sonora and Chihuahua presidios. As a result, there was a period of relative peace from about 1790 to 1830, during which time mining and ranching operations spread along the northern frontier and into southern Arizona. It was, for Sonora, a prosperous era, and it appeared that the Apache problem was well on the way to solution. Even though some recalcitrant bands still remained hostile, their own people in the peace camps were willing to wage war against them.

After Mexican independence, however, the new nation entered a time of troubles; supplies for the Apaches became irregular, and military effectiveness declined noticeably. In the 1830's the Apaches returned to their old ways, and their raids became more destructive than ever, reaching their peak in the 1840's.

The dread of Apache raiders became so great in Chihuahua that the desperate officials of that state made treaties with the Gileño Apache bands, treaties that excluded Sonora. Chihuahua offered to provide food and protection for those Apaches who would return to the peace camps near the Janos presidio. The Apaches were even allowed to sell or trade livestock stolen elsewhere. This proved to be an attractive arrangement to some of the Gila bands, for they had a refuge and food supply at Janos as well as opportunities for disposing of stolen animals. But after these Apaches made several costly raids into Sonora, the Sonorans raised a force and surprised the camps at Janos, killing many and carrying off even more to be sold into slavery. Chihuahua officials were furious, but the government supported Sonora.

In 1835 Sonora introduced a new and drastic method of combating Apaches, the scalp bounty system. At first bounties were
paid only for the scalps of men, but soon payments were made for the scalps of women and children as well, and for captives, who were sold into slavery. Many Anglo-Americans entered the lucrative "hair business," among them James Johnson, who lured chief Juan José Compá and his Mimbreno band to a feast, then fired a concealed cannon into their midst. Another famous scalp hunter was James ("Don Santiago") Kirker, the self-styled "King of New Mexico." Scalp hunters killed or captured many Apache women and children as well as some men, weakening especially the Gila bands, the Mimbrenos, and the Mogollones. Bounty hunters presented hundreds of scalps for payment, but it was suspected throughout the border that many "Apache" scalps for which they were paid had once adorned the heads of luckless Mexican peons or peaceful Indians. Long black hair was an invitation to disaster.

The war with Mexico brought Anglo-Americans to New Mexico in 1846, and United States troops at first found themselves even less able to cope with Apaches than the Spaniards had been. In the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo the United States promised to prevent Indians from crossing the border into Mexico on raids, a promise that could not be kept without a much more strenuous effort than the government was willing to make. In the Gadsden Purchase of 1853 the United States took advantage of Mexico's weakness by abrogating this agreement, leaving the citizens of Sonora and Chihuahua as exposed as ever to Apache depredations. A number of Apache bands lived permanently or part of each year in Mexico.

In the 1850's troops guided by Kit Carson defeated and scattered the Jicarillas of northern New Mexico, who had less than two hundred warriors, and other forces defeated the Mescaleros of central and southeastern New Mexico. Both groups agreed to keep the peace, but since the government supplied them with only partial rations, they faced a choice between starvation and thefts of livestock. Some of the Mimbrenos also settled down on tributaries of the upper Gila to plant crops under the guidance of an Indian agent, who soon considered them well on the way to becoming self-supporting. But in 1857 Colonel Bonneville's
Gila expedition against the Mogollones frightened them off, and most fled to Mexico.

The “Western Apaches,” Coyoters, Tontos, Pinaleños, and Chiricahuas of Arizona, were willing to keep peace north of the border if Anglos did not interfere with their time-honored raids into Sonora and Chihuahua. Anglos had also fought the Mexicans, and they always seemed eager to trade for the cattle and mules Apache raiders brought from Mexico, but American officials insisted that the raids must cease. To Apaches this attitude was both arrogant and incomprehensible.

It has been traditional to blame the so-called Bascom affair at Apache Pass in February 1861 for the intense Apache warfare that broke out soon after. Actually, the breaking of a local treaty in the Tubac area a few years earlier had already angered the Apaches. The hanging of the hostages at Apache Pass, incorrectly attributed to Lieutenant Bascom, was in retaliation for Cochise’s killing of Anglo captives; it certainly added fuel to the flames, but did not ignite them. The most important factor in stimulating the sharp increase in Apache depredations north of the border was the withdrawal of Union troops from the forts of southern Arizona and of New Mexico in the summer of 1861 when a Confederate invasion of New Mexico was imminent. Convinced that they had driven the troops away, the Chiricahuas, Gila Apaches, and Mescaleros launched all-out campaigns to rid their lands of Anglo intruders.

In 1862 Major James H. Carleton reached New Mexico with the California Volunteers, but the Confederates had already withdrawn. Carleton, who was promoted and named military commander of the District of New Mexico, decided to keep his troops occupied by relentless campaigns against Apaches and Navajos. He had absolutely no mercy for Apaches—his oft-repeated instructions to his troops were to kill all the men. There were no parleys with them; if they wanted to talk peace, their chiefs and headmen must come to Santa Fe to confer with Carleton in person. But when the prominent Mescalero chief Manuelito and his band were en route to Santa Fe in compliance with Carleton’s
inflexible demands, they met some of his troops. Manuelito and others tried to explain their purpose, but were shot down without warning.

As a result of Carleton’s harsh policies, the destitute and virtually decimated Mescaleros surrendered and were confined on a reservation at the desolate Bosque Redondo along the Pecos River. Carleton had promised to return them to their own lands, but decided instead to make them “happy” at the Bosque. It was difficult for sick and starving Mescaleros to exhibit the happiness Carleton demanded; his only words of consolation were that they should be “too proud” to murmur at what could not be helped. To make a bad situation impossible, he sent Kit Carson with a large force to round up more than eight thousand Navajos and add them to the Bosque Redondo reservation. The Mescaleros, numbering less than five hundred, placed thus at the mercy of their enemies, relished their happiness as long as they could stand it, then fled. For several years they roamed their customary ranges, causing no serious trouble other than occasional thefts of livestock.

In Arizona, early in 1871, some Arivaipa Apaches under chief Eskiminzin came to Camp Grant to surrender, although the army had no instructions for dealing with Apaches except as enemies. Lieutenant Royal Whitman, commander at Camp Grant, welcomed them, nevertheless, and wrote a hasty request for instructions to his superiors, pointing out that it appeared possible that many Apaches were ready to surrender. In his haste Whitman neglected to brief the letter on the outside of the envelope as required by army regulations; some months later his letter was returned to him unread, with a terse notation calling attention to his dereliction of duty in failing to brief it. Eventually, however, the Apaches were allowed to remain at Camp Grant and receive food from army stores. This was the first step away from the extermination policy in Arizona, a step the Apaches themselves initiated. It was, however, a step that the people of Tucson resented. Their anger increased when Whitman employed the Apaches in gathering hay and firewood for the military post, for this took money out of the hands of contractors.
Raids attributed to Apaches continued occasionally in southern Arizona, and some Tucson men, together with a large number of Pápagos, slipped up on the Camp Grant Apaches and killed an estimated eighty or more. All but eight of the slain were women and children, and twenty-eight children were carried off to be sold into slavery in Sonora. This attack on peaceful Apaches, coming soon after President Grant's Peace Policy had been announced, made it clear that any Apaches on reservations would require constant protection.

Lieutenant Colonel George Crook, who had gained fame in the Paiute wars, and who had perfected techniques that would be useful against the Apaches, was named commander of the Arizona military district in June 1871. He began preparing for a winter campaign, but had to delay it twice while Peace Policy emissaries Vincent Colyer and General O. O. Howard tried to settle the Apaches on reservations by persuasion. Crook resented this interference, for he was convinced that the incorrigible hostiles would never accept reservation life until they had been thoroughly beaten in their own favorite refuges. Many Apaches, including Cochise and the Chiricahuas, the Mimbreños and Mogollones, and the Coyoteros of the White mountain region, did settle down peacefully on the reservations Colyer and Howard established for them. Some, but not all, worked hard to become self-sufficient. As Crook had foreseen, however, bands of hostiles remained at large and continued raiding.

Before he was ordered to suspend operations Crook had made a rapid survey of Apachería and had sent out one military detachment employing Coyotero Apaches as scouts. This was an innovation, for the scouts employed earlier were from other tribes. The officer in command of the detachment was most enthusiastic, saying that the Apache scouts had exceeded his "most sanguine" expectations, and were eager to take part in the fighting. Here was the key to the conquest of the Apaches, and Crook was quick to grasp it—using Apaches to fight Apaches, not simply as scouts to locate hostile camps. When Colyer and Howard had settled the majority of the Arizona and Gileño Apaches on reser-
vations, Crook was authorized to proceed with his plans to subdue the hostiles.

Many of the renegades were Tontos, and Crook designed his campaign against them by sending a number of independent columns, crossing and recrossing their country, forcing them into the Tonto Basin, where the final blows were struck. He chose his officers, his Apache scouts and their white chiefs of scouts, and his pack mules with equal care and deliberation; he informed his officers of his intentions, then did not interfere with them. In a few months of the hardest campaigning through the winter of 1872-1873 his columns harassed the Tontos so severely that all but a few die-hards came to Camp Verde to surrender. In these campaigns the companies of Apache scouts took an active part in the fighting, and the rueful Tontos admitted that it was fear of Apaches, not Anglo soldiers, that had driven them to surrender.

During the next few years Crook's main concern was helping the Apaches adjust to reservation life, by keeping them busy digging irrigation ditches, farming, and raising livestock. If Crook had remained in charge of them for ten years there probably would have been no further serious Apache troubles. But in 1874 the Apaches were transferred from the War Department to the Indian Bureau, and in the following year Crook was sent to the Department of the Platte to fight the Sioux. The Apaches became pawns in unfortunate struggles between the Army and the Indian Bureau, for control, and between the contractors of Tucson and New Mexico, for profits.

What revived Apache warfare more than anything else was the Indian Bureau's fatal decision to concentrate most of the Apaches at San Carlos reservation in Arizona. This policy ignored not only all of the promises made to the various bands by Colyer and Howard, but even worse, it cast hostile bands together on a single reservation, thereby multiplying the possibilities for trouble. The San Carlos region was, furthermore, distasteful to many of the bands which had been reasonably content on reservations in their own lands. This was especially true of the Camp Verde Indians—Tontos, Apache-Yumas or Hualapais, and Apache-Mohaves or
Yavapais—the Coyoteros of the White mountains, the Chiricahuas, and the Warm Spring Mimbreños and their kinsmen, the Mogollones. Crook and other knowledgeable officers warned against the dire consequences of this policy, but the Indian Bureau blandly ignored their warnings.

The Camp Verde Indians were the first victims of the concentration policy, for they were forced to leave their reservation, where they had dug miles of irrigation ditches and cleared and planted extensive fields. Their irritation was such that en route a fight broke out between the Tontos and the other two groups in which a number were killed and wounded. Because of army interference at Camp Apache, the Indian Bureau ordered the Coyoteros moved from their mountain region to the semi-desert of San Carlos, where brash but able young John P. Clum had successfully resisted army interference. This move placed the Coyoteros out of range of the New Mexico contractors and within easy reach of those of Tucson. Then came the Chiricahuas from their reservation in southwestern Arizona, to be followed by the Mimbreños and Mogollones from Warm Spring reservation in New Mexico. The Camp Verde Indians were at first troublesome, but Clum, with his loyal Apache police and without help from the cavalry, induced them to settle down and surrender their weapons. Clum’s ability to control the Apaches was indeed extraordinary, but his ambition caused him to promote the policy of concentrating all Apaches at San Carlos under his own jurisdiction.

The Chiricahuas were the most dangerous of the various bands. On his visit to Cochise’s stronghold, General Howard had persuaded them to accept a reservation in their own country along the Mexican border. At Cochise’s insistence, Howard appointed his close friend Thomas Jeffords as agent, giving him sole control of the Chiricahuas, thereby removing them completely from military jurisdiction. As long as Cochise lived, he and Jeffords were able to keep the Chiricahuas in line, although they made no effort to become self-supporting, and some of them occasionally joined renegades from other bands on raids into Sonora.
After one such raid Skinyea, his brother Pionsenay, and others bought whiskey from an Indian trader, and in the drunken rioting that followed Pionsenay killed several of his people. He atoned for this a few days later by killing the trader and his assistant, then led a party of warriors on a rampage through the San Pedro valley, killing a number of ranchers.

This frightening outbreak prompted widespread demands that the Chiricahuas be moved to San Carlos or elsewhere. Because of pressure from Governor A. P. K. Safford, the Indian Bureau ordered Clum to effect the removal with his Apache police. Clum insisted that troops be stationed in the area to protect citizens in case the Chiricahuas stampeded, then marched fifty-four of his Apaches to Tucson, where they waited for the troops to get into position. The citizens of Tucson were so impressed by the discipline and general demeanor of the Apache police that they purchased uniforms of red shirts and white trousers for them. This took place, it should be remembered, only five years after the Camp Grant massacre, and one of the principal figures among the police was the Arivaipa chief, Eskiminzin, who had lost most of his family at Camp Grant.

Clum, his police, and a cavalry escort conducted most of the Chiricahuas to San Carlos, but Geronimo, Juh, Nolgee, and others of a related southern band fled into Mexico, to continue their raiding. They frequently visited the Mimbrenos and Mogollones at Warm Spring, where they rested between raids and disposed of stolen livestock. They also drew rations from the agency.

Because of the continued raids in southern Arizona, early in 1877 the territorial legislature authorized Governor Safford to enlist a company of sixty men to combat hostiles and protect ranchers and miners. Safford, who, like the Tucson citizens, had been greatly impressed by the discipline and effectiveness of the Apache police, requested Clum to delegate sixty of them to serve as the territorial militia. The Apache police under their white captain, Clay Beauford, served until Clum was obliged to recall them for another assignment of even greater importance. But the fact that after only a few years of reservation life, and within a
decade of the Camp Grant massacre, Apaches were called on to protect the citizens of Arizona from other Apaches is surely one of the most astonishing reversals of roles of the Apache wars.

Clum's assignment was to march the four hundred miles to Warm Spring with his Apache police and to seize Geronimo, Juh, and the other renegades. With one hundred of his police, Clum made the capture before any troops arrived on the scene. This was the only time in the Apache campaigns that Geronimo was actually captured, although on other occasions he was persuaded to surrender and return voluntarily to the reservation. At the time of his capture the Indian Bureau, at Clum's suggestion, ordered him to move the Warm Spring Apaches to San Carlos as well. Some of them fled, but those who made the unwelcome journey took the precaution of hiding their weapons in case of subsequent need.

On his triumphal arrival at San Carlos, Clum, who had been enraged at the slightest army interference with reservation activities, found that in his absence the Indian Bureau had agreed to allow the army to station troops at San Carlos to oversee his administration. He issued an ultimatum to the Indian Bureau, demanding a salary commensurate with his increased responsibilities and authorization to enlist more Apache police, offering at the same time to take full responsibility for controlling all Apaches in Arizona without any support by the army. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs did not reply to these demands, so Clum resigned and left the Indian service. No other Arizona Indian agent but Jeffords had Clum's gift for managing Apaches, and within a few years all of the progress made had been jeopardized by costly outbreaks from San Carlos.

When Juh and other renegades slipped into San Carlos to remove their families, the Warm Spring Apaches made a dash for their homeland in New Mexico. Some surrendered and were taken to Warm Spring, then to Mescalero. There Victorio joined them, apparently satisfied to remain there, but a combination of unexpected circumstances changed his outlook. He was informed that he was under indictment for murder in Grant County, and
that officials would probably come to arrest him. A few days later Judge Warren Bristol, Albert J. Fountain, and another man crossed the Mescalero reservation on a hunting and fishing trip. Victorio was convinced they were coming to arrest him, and fled with his people and some Mescalero warriors. They ran off the entire herd of cavalry horses from the Ninth Cavalry post at Ojo Caliente.

Troops converged on southwestern New Mexico, but those detachments that confronted Victorio’s warriors did so to their sorrow, for most were soundly thrashed. The Apaches’ movements were incredibly swift, for when they wore out their horses they quickly acquired fresh ones from ranches, and on foot in the mountains they were as fleet and elusive as deer. On one occasion a company of Apache scouts caught up with Victorio and part of his force, fighting an all-day battle and killing some of his ablest warriors. Until this time he had not been pinned down or defeated, but he could not replace his lost men, and his fortunes suffered a steady decline thereafter. Between 1879, when he fled Mescalero, and 1881, when Mexican troops killed him (or he took his own life) at Tres Castillos, he eluded or fought off thousands of troops and civilian parties on both sides of the border in one of the most extraordinary guerrilla campaigns in the history of warfare. After his death old Nana continued to lead the survivors, until he, too, was run to earth.

Meanwhile, Geronimo, Juh, Chato, Nolgee and other southern Chiricahuas carried on raids on both sides of the border, escaping, when hard-pressed, into the impenetrable refuges of the Sierra Madre of Sonora.

When General Crook returned to take charge of the Apache campaigns in Arizona in 1882, he negotiated with Mexican officials for permission to pursue Apache renegades into the Sierra Madre. By sending a large force of Apache scouts under able officers accompanied by a few troops, he was able to induce the Chiricahuas and their allies to surrender, but Geronimo and a few irreconcilables slipped away at the last minute and returned to the mountains. At this time General Nelson A. Miles replaced
Crook as departmental commander. Miles, like many high-ranking army officers who were unfamiliar with conditions in Arizona, had resented Crook's reliance on Apaches for fighting men, considering it a reflection on the army's ability to defeat the Apaches. But even though Miles was more liberally supplied with troops than Crook had been, he soon found that without Apache scouts he could accomplish little. He relied on them as much as necessary, but de-emphasized that fact.

Miles made himself a hero to Arizona citizens by rounding up the peaceable reservation Chiricahuas and shipping them off to Fort Marion in Florida. When Geronimo and those with him finally surrendered, they were also sent to Florida, but not to rejoin their families, as Miles had promised. As soon as Geronimo's band was on board the train, Miles, who claimed credit for the surrender, disarmed the Apache scouts and loaded them uncERemoniously on the same train to accompany the renegades into Florida exile. This act of treachery was widely denounced, but the Apache prisoners of war languished in Florida and Alabama for years. Ultimately they were sent to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and in 1913 some were allowed to move to the Mescalero reservation in New Mexico. They were never allowed to return to their former homelands in Arizona and the Mimbres valley of New Mexico.

Writings on the Apaches began as early as 1630, when Spanish priests such as Alonso de Benavides described them with considerable respect. As the hatred between Spaniards and Apaches grew intense, however, Spanish accounts generally denounced the Apaches as cruel and treacherous, although they occasionally reflected grudging admiration. After Mexican independence, Mexican accounts usually emphasized the continuous destruction of ranches and towns, and the capture of women and children.

The first American accounts of the Apaches were reserved and descriptive, such as Governor Charles Bent's report of 1846, but when warfare broke out there were many recommendations for a policy of removal or extermination. In the 1850's a few men,
such as Kit Carson, Dr. Michael Steck, and other Indian agents, defended the Apaches and expressed confidence in their ability to adapt and to support themselves if given the opportunity. Some army officers in their reminiscences referred to the Apaches in pejorative terms, but John C. Cremony also described their abilities with unconcealed admiration. Among the men engaged in mining and other activities in southern Arizona were both exponents of extermination, such as Sylvester Mowry and William S. Oury, and men who believed that the Apaches were as wronged as wrongful, such as Charles D. Poston and Raphael Pumpelly.

After the Civil War the extermination policy continued. The attitude of General Halleck, Commander of the Division of the Pacific, was typical: "It is useless to negotiate with these Apache Indians... With them there is no alternative but active and vigorous war, till they are completely destroyed, or forced to surrender as prisoners of war." But Lieutenant Colonel George Crook wrote in 1871, "I think that the Apache is painted in darker colors than he deserves, and that his villainies arise more from a misconception of facts than from his being worse than other Indians."

After the Apaches were all settled on reservations they made a genuine effort to support themselves by farming and stock-raising, showing early successes in both. There was, among the former Apache warriors, much less resistance to labor than there was among other warlike Indians, such as the Teton Sioux, when they were reduced to reservation life and forced to give up the bow for the hoe. If the Indian Bureau had not introduced the unfortunate concentration policy, and if the Apaches had remained under the guidance of men like either Crook or Clum, it seems likely that their adjustment to reservation life would have been rapid and complete.

The earliest studies of an ethnographic nature made of the Apaches were mostly by well-educated army officers such as Captain John Bourke, Crook's aide. Bourke's classic, On The Border with Crook, contains a vast store of ethnological data as well as a historical narrative of the 1870's and 1880's. These were
followed, in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, by scientific works of professional anthropologists such as Albert R. Reagan, the late Grenville Goodwin, Morris E. Opler, and many others.

The Apaches have attracted a great many writers using a variety of approaches, and an Apache bibliography would make a substantial volume. Articles number in the hundreds; in the first twenty-five volumes of the New Mexico Historical Review, for example, there are twenty-nine articles with “Apache” or the name of some Apache in the title, and these are only a part of those that mention or deal with the Apaches. The Journal of Arizona History and Arizona and the West also contain many articles on Apaches. The studies of Morris E. Opler on Apaches, books and articles, number upwards of forty.

Two of the early American histories containing chapters on Apaches are J. P. Dunn, Jr., Massacres of the Mountains (1886) and H. H. Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico (1889). Dunn, although he stated that “They are entitled to no compassion on the ground of treachery used against them. The Apache makes war by treachery,” admitted that there were wrongs on both sides. “It must be remembered . . . that a large portion of the white population were as barbarous in their modes of warfare as the Apaches themselves; that Arizona was still a refuge for the criminal and lawless men of other states and territories; that war and pillage had been bred into the Apaches, until they were the most savage and intractable Indians in the country . . . that Mexico pursued war in the old way, and still paid bounty for Apache scalps, no matter where procured; that slavery still existed in Mexico, and it was next to impossible to recover Indians once carried across the line.”

Bancroft, writing in the same period, generally regarded the Apaches as obstacles in the way of inevitable American progress. But in a footnote in his History of Arizona and New Mexico he tempered his scorn of the Peace Policy advocates: “Notwithstanding my slighting allusions to Colyer’s mission, it must be understood that I do not deny the truth of his allegations that the
Apaches had been grossly wronged. . . . A white man's reservation, under Apache control, would be somewhat more in accordance with the eternal principles of justice than the present state of affairs. I do not blame the Apaches for defending their homes and liberties in their own way." He added, however, that there was no reason that the Arizona settlers should submit to plunder and murder. "There was," he wryly remarked, "ample room for the application of our limited benevolence and fair treatment after forcing the Indians to submission."15


This is, of course, only a partial list, but these works are representative of the studies being made of the Apaches and their history. Unique, and in many ways one of the most valuable, is Eve Ball's account based on her contacts with survivors of the Apache wars and their willingness to share with her information and memories usually concealed from whites. Too seldom has it been possible to obtain and present much in the way of authentic information on the Apache side of the conflict.
NOTES


