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*AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BICENTENNIAL*

DONALD L. PARMAN

THE fate of the American Indian during the past fifteen years represents complex changes in federal policies, a continued shift of population from reservations to urban areas, and drastic alterations in how Indians perceive themselves and how the general public views them. Taken together, Indian affairs have undergone a revolution that is perhaps the most significant since the start of the reservation system in the nineteenth century.

To a large degree the Indians' changed image can be attributed to their fears of the forced termination and relocation policies of the Eisenhower administration. As D'Arcy McNickle aptly suggests, most Indians see their reservations and historic treaties as symbolic of their continuation as a distinct people. The withdrawal of federal commitments during the 1950s threatened their land base, their special legal status, and, indeed, their survival as Indians.<sup>1</sup> The disastrous results of termination among the Klamaths and Menominees, two of the wealthiest tribes, bred anxieties among unterminated tribes which still linger.

If the Kennedy administration achieved nothing else, it at least reduced the Indians' fears about termination, and it marked a shift toward a policy of self-determination and respect for the Indian heritage. Secretary of Interior Stewart L. Udall in 1961 dispatched a task force through Indian country to investigate conditions and

opinions. The group's report in July criticized termination without openly disavowing it. The members recommended that Indians use their statutory power to review Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) budgets and to assume greater control over reservation matters. The task force also advocated increased development of economic and natural resources on reservations, especially the attraction of industrial firms. A second task force sponsored by the Fund for the Republic surveyed reservations at about the same time and reached similar conclusions.<sup>2</sup>

The start of the Kennedy administration also witnessed the first evidence of a new militancy among younger Indians. At a meeting at the University of Chicago in the summer of 1961, some five hundred delegates from the West and Alaska gathered for a week of heated debate which produced a significant document, "A Declaration of Indian Purpose."<sup>3</sup> The sentiments expressed were perhaps less important than the fact that Indians of various ages, tribes, educational and economic levels, and degrees of acculturation could agree on this or any set of beliefs.

Soon after the Chicago meeting the more youthful and aggressive participants formed the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC). Obviously inspired by the civil rights movement, NIYC leaders were "of radical persuasion," and they identified with the more traditional and impoverished elements of the Indian population. Although bitterly critical of the recent termination and relocation policies of the BIA, their chief focus of discontent appeared to be on the National Congress of American Indians and on tribal leadership, particularly among the Five Civilized Tribes. The National Congress and Oklahoma leaders, according to the NIYC, did not represent "real" Indians but stood for the wealthier and more acculturated. Such leaders might have a blood claim as Indians, but they were psychologically white. Moreover, existing leadership exerted a right wing influence which negated potential cooperation between Indians and the civil rights movement. This, in turn, thwarted the activists' hopes of making Indian problems known to the general public.<sup>4</sup>

The NIYC, loosely operated through Indian clubs on western

campuses, issued a newspaper for students called *ABC: Americans before Columbus*, and tried to stimulate young Indians into taking a more activist stance. NIYC publicity concentrated on such themes as the necessity for an Indian revolution, pan-Indianism, and retention of Indian identity. A charismatic Ponca from Oklahoma named Clyde Warrior became the chief prophet of the movement. A complex personality, Warrior had once debated whether to fight in Vietnam or join the civil rights movement and had ended up spending a summer with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in Mississippi. A sarcastic humorist, Warrior spiced his speeches with the hip rhetoric of militant blacks, denouncing not only whites as racists, fascists, colonialists, and reactionaries, but also classifying some Indians as well as Uncle Tomahawks or Apples.<sup>5</sup>

Before his premature death, Warrior resigned from the governing board of the NIYC because so many young Indians were getting "sucked into the system." His complaint doubtlessly reflected NIYC members' participation in sweeping administrative changes taking place on reservations in the mid-1960s. Traditionally all federal programs for Indians, except for the Indian Health Service, had been controlled by the BIA. During the War on Poverty, however, many new agencies to combat Indian destitution began direct operations on reservations including the Job Corps, Head Start, Upward Bound, and VISTA. More importantly, the Community Action Program permitted tribal governments to obtain grants for technical services from the Office of Economic Opportunity and to administer them without BIA direction.<sup>6</sup> Even private Indian organizations received federal grants for projects.

The impact of self-determination and new reservation programs obviously needs additional investigation before any final assessments can be reached, but several important effects already are clear. Certainly the BIA found itself relatively weakened by the new programs, and reservation superintendents, rather than directors of federal efforts, assumed the role of ambassadors between tribal governments and outside agencies.<sup>7</sup> It would appear that existing tribal leaders sometimes found themselves undercut by

War on Poverty agencies. On larger reservations, councils usually formed tribal authorities to coordinate the new programs only to find that War on Poverty administrators sometimes operated at odds with existing tribal leadership. On the Navajo reservation, for example, a young tribal chairman named Raymond Nakai had won the election in 1962 primarily on his promise to "kick the old bastards out." The chairman later enticed Peter McDonald, a Navajo project engineer at Hughes Aircraft Company, to leave his well-paid job and to return to the reservation to head the Office of Navajo Economic Opportunity (ONEO). Once in his new post, McDonald used his endless appearances at local chapter meetings on behalf of ONEO to defeat Nakai in 1970. In the meantime, Nakai had tried to remove from the reservation a white lawyer who headed DNA, a poverty agency which offered legal services to Navajos. A federal court decision held that Nakai had no legal power to ban the lawyer from the reservation.<sup>8</sup> Even when tribal officials controlled the War on Poverty agencies, they found themselves under attack for misappropriation of funds, payoffs from white contractors, and various other charges.

Several other developments during the Johnson administration evidenced a growing public awareness of Indians' woes. In 1966 Johnson named Robert Bennett as the first undisputed Indian to head the BIA since Ely S. Parker during Grant's administration. Federal departments with responsibilities on reservations began to hire Indian administrators and to establish Indian positions in Washington. In March 1968 Johnson created the National Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIO) under supervision of the office of the Vice-President. Composed of seven important officials, eight Indian representatives, and a small professional staff, the NCIO was designed to coordinate the War on Poverty programs and to insure that Indians shared fairly in federal expenditures.<sup>9</sup> Significantly, Johnson announced formation of the NCIO in a special message to Congress. This was the first time that a special message had dealt solely with Indian affairs. These changes, however, were weakened by Johnson's announcement of his retirement three weeks later.

Richard Nixon's campaign in 1968 showed a surprising sensitivity to Indians' fears of a Republican revival of termination and relocation. In a message to the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), Nixon strongly denied any intention of overturning self-determination or reverting to Eisenhower's policies. As President-elect, he commissioned historian Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., to conduct a study of past and present policies in order to suggest new reforms.<sup>10</sup>

Once in office, the Nixon officials moved somewhat slowly in implementing the campaign promises. In the summer of 1969 the President appointed Louis R. Bruce, a Sioux-Mohawk, as Indian commissioner. Bruce's qualifications were promising although unusual. A New York advertising executive and long-standing Republican, he had been critical of forced termination and relocation. His lack of governmental background and his promise to shake up the BIA created support for his appointment. Nixon not only met his own campaign promises to retain the NCIO, but he greatly enhanced the agency's power. Previously the NCIO had operated with funds and personnel borrowed from the BIA, but the administration secured congressional authorization and separate funding by early 1970. The new NCIO executive director, Robert Robertson, enjoyed considerable access to the White House. Robertson reported to C. D. Ward, an advisor to Spiro Agnew, and Ward worked through Bradley Patterson. Patterson was an assistant to Leonard Garment, one of Nixon's advisors for domestic affairs and widely touted as the administration's "house liberal."<sup>11</sup>

The climax to these promising developments occurred when the President presented his special message on Indian affairs to Congress on July 8, 1970. The message largely had been written by young Indian staffers of the NCIO and redrafted after suggestions by Bruce and various Indian employees.<sup>12</sup> Briefly, Nixon asked Congress to repeal the termination laws, requested legislation to permit tribes to act as contractors for services currently provided by the BIA and HEW, called for Indian control over reservation schools, recommended the creation of an Indian trust counsel authority to represent tribes in disputes involving natural resources,

and asked for the authorization of a new assistant secretary of interior to represent Indians at a higher level of government. Nixon also requested additional money for Indian health, education, urban centers, and the BIA revolving loan fund.<sup>13</sup> This message and the other changes elated many Indians who anticipated that they now could bypass BIA red tape and obtain sympathetic action at higher levels of government.

The widespread public enthusiasm for the message, however, might have been chastened by a more careful assessment. While Nixon promised to meet the traditional trust responsibilities imposed by treaties and statutes, he did not propose an expansion of these obligations to the growing urban Indian population, estimated at between 40 to 50 percent of all Indians. Tribesmen who left their reservations would be served by the regular federal agencies such as HEW, HUD, Labor, and Commerce.<sup>14</sup> Somewhat similarly, the administration wanted to work only through duly constituted Indian tribal leaders, and it rejected cooperation with dissident leaders and groups.<sup>15</sup> Finally, the important items in Nixon's message were dependent on congressional authorization. For example, when the BIA attempted to institute contracting, citing the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834 and other such obscure legal grounds, Wayne Aspinall of Colorado, powerful chairman of the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, rejected both contracting and the legal argument for it.<sup>16</sup> According to Nixon spokesmen, they would have encountered even stronger opposition had they tried to expand trust services to urban Indians.<sup>17</sup>

By this time the militancy of young Indians had increased immeasurably from Clyde Warrior's heyday. Their skepticism was aroused originally by Walter Hickel, the new secretary of interior, who seemed to vacillate from support for Indian reforms to criticisms that the government overprotected Native Americans. Activists appeared in force at the 1969 NCAI convention at Albuquerque to express their displeasure with Hickel who was to attend.<sup>18</sup> The following December an activist group seized Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay, claiming that the Sioux Treaty of 1868 permitted Indians to occupy unused public lands. The occupiers de-

manded that the government build centers for art, education, ecology, religion, history, and culture. Several points concerning the Alcatraz occupation are particularly significant. The public's reaction, both local and national, was overwhelmingly favorable. The public seized upon the idea that the most famous and notorious federal prison might be used to benefit this deprived minority.<sup>19</sup> Not only did the Nixon administration seem aware of this public reaction, but officials quickly agreed to negotiate with the Alcatraz group in hope that a settlement would serve as a symbol of good faith between themselves and Indians everywhere. Above all else, they wanted to avoid any public outcry against violence.

Despite the administration's willingness to negotiate, its own legalistic outlook combined with problems among the Indians themselves thwarted a solution. The early bargaining sessions headed by Robert Robertson of the NCIO revealed severe dissensions and a high turnover rate among the occupiers.<sup>20</sup> Frustrated by the Indians' insistence that agreements must meet the approval of all, Robertson encouraged the organization of the Bay Area Native American Council (BANAC), which included some representatives from Alcatraz but primarily was drawn from Indians from greater San Francisco. Robertson obviously hoped that concessions on urban services to BANAC would force the Alcatraz group to relent.<sup>21</sup> After a satisfactory arrangement with BANAC, however, Robertson learned that the Alcatraz Indians still refused to leave the island. By May 1970 both sides had developed their own nonnegotiable demands. The Indians rejected a temporary and symbolic withdrawal, and the administration refused to turn over final title to the island. The negotiations broke off by mid-1970 when the Alcatraz leaders refused the administration's final offer of an open air park operated by the National Park Service but devoted to Indian themes and staffed by Indian employees.<sup>22</sup> In June 1971 when public interest had diminished, the administration quietly removed the last Indians from Alcatraz.<sup>23</sup>

In the meantime Nixon officials sought to utilize the return of the ownership of Blue Lake to Taos Pueblo as a symbol of their interest in reform. Although Blue Lake lacked the name identifica-

tion of Alcatraz, the issue involved was highly meaningful for Indians. The Taoseños had used the forty-eight-thousand-acre tract of lake and timberland for centuries to conduct their religious ceremonies. They had accepted incorporation of Blue Lake into Carson National Forest in 1906 as a means of protecting it from white encroachment. Later, however, the Forest Service embittered the Taoseños by opening Blue Lake to white tourists, fishermen, and hikers. Viewing the visitors and their litter as a religious desecration, Governor Severino Martínez appealed to the Kennedy administration for the return of Blue Lake, but in a nasty interdepartmental squabble the Department of Agriculture refused to release the land. Taos won a cash settlement for Blue Lake from the Indian Claims Commission in 1965, but Martínez rejected the funds and demanded a return of the land itself. The necessary legislation consistently was blocked by New Mexico politicians.<sup>24</sup>

Nixon officials unquestionably saw the Blue Lake issue as much more compatible with their philosophy than the Alcatraz situation. In this instance they were dealing with reservation Indians, legitimate tribal authorities, and a misuse of the government's trust responsibilities. After Nixon strongly urged the return of Blue Lake to the Pueblos in his special message, the administration mobilized to pass the necessary legislation. Agnew's teenage daughter visited Taos in the summer of 1970 as a gesture of support. Those aware of the informal but effective veto over Indian matters exercised by western congressmen must have been astonished when the administration overrode New Mexico Senator Clinton Anderson's opposition to returning Blue Lake. Anderson, incidentally, had allegedly threatened to work against Nixon's attempt to fund the Anti-Ballistic Missile system if the Blue Lake legislation passed. The return of Blue Lake to the Pueblos and of lands to the Yakimas, the settlement of Alaska land claims, and a doubled BIA appropriation also were endorsed willingly by the administration because these measures corresponded with its philosophy of Indian affairs.<sup>25</sup>

Unfortunately, the government's successes did not avert a serious division within the BIA which developed in 1971. Bruce's Braves,

a dozen or so young activists appointed by the commissioner to revamp the BIA, shared little of the administration's legalistic and inhibited attitudes toward trust responsibilities. Instead, they demanded that the government initiate contracting with tribes, show greater protection for Indian land and water rights, and give increased employment preference in BIA posts without worrying about legal ramifications. Their criticism was aimed at Wilma L. Victor, a Choctaw educator and special assistant on Indian Affairs to the secretary of the interior, and at John O. Crow, a quarter-blood Cherokee and career BIA administrator who served as deputy commissioner.<sup>26</sup> According to the Braves, Crow constantly obstructed their attempts to restructure the organization and functions of the BIA. For his part, Crow claimed that he was merely "trying to bring a bit of managerial order to the bureau" and to rebuild morale.<sup>27</sup> The militants retorted that Crow was one-quarter Cherokee and three-quarters bureaucrat. A third target of the Braves was Harrison Loesch, an outspoken Colorado lawyer who acted as assistant secretary of interior for public land management.<sup>28</sup> As Bruce's immediate superior, Loesch wielded a conservative veto over BIA activities.

By this time the Nixon administration's chary attitude toward extending special services to urban Indians also had provoked complaints from LaDonna Harris, a part-Comanche and wife of Senator Fred A. Harris of Oklahoma. An original appointee to the NCIO, Mrs. Harris had conducted public hearings on Indian problems in five cities in 1968 and 1969. She strongly disapproved of the administration's policy that urban Indians must rely on the same federal agencies as the general public. She contended that many Indians were being rebuffed by welfare workers and being told that they must depend on the BIA. While Mrs. Harris admitted that the administration's position on urban Indians might be logical, she maintained that "right and reality are not always compatible" and that Indians deserved special help in their difficult adjustment to urban life. To further her cause, she founded the Americans for Indian Opportunity.<sup>29</sup> As an active reformer and Indian leader, wife of an important political figure, and vocal

critic, Mrs. Harris was viewed with a mixture of fear and amusement among the Department of Interior leaders.

Even the normally conservative National Congress of American Indians had become a militant group by this time. Members at the 1971 convention elected Leon Cook as president. Cook had been one of Bruce's Braves before his resignation, and he viewed the Nixon policies as a disguised form of termination. His presidency of NCAI saw the organization attempt to form coalitions with various activist groups in order to pressure the administration.<sup>30</sup>

Faced with more vocal criticisms, the Nixon officials responded by strengthening their ties with reservation leaders. The administration virtually guided the formation of the National Tribal Chairmen's Association (NTCA) in 1971.<sup>31</sup> Quite obviously, the administration sought to tap the support of the generally conservative tribal leaders and to create the impression that they alone were valid Indian spokesmen. The facts that the NTCA shared offices with the NCIO and that the government paid members' expenses to conventions indicated that the new organization had replaced the National Congress as the group with which the administration would consult on policy matters. Predictably, the preferences shown to NTCA aroused much hostility among other Indian groups.

The Nixon officials' problems with urban Indians climaxed with the emergence of the American Indian Movement (AIM) and its dominant role in the occupation of the BIA building in November 1972. Dennis Banks and George Mitchell, two Chippewas, had founded the organization in 1968 to help Indians from upper Midwest reservations who lived in a Minneapolis ghetto nicknamed "the reservation."<sup>32</sup> The parallels between AIM and the Black Panthers were striking. Like the Panthers, AIM's original target was the indiscriminate arrests by the Minneapolis police. By instituting "red patrols" to take drunken Indians home and break up fights, AIM claimed that no police arrests had been made in "the reservation" for twenty-two consecutive weekends. Doubtless inspired by aggressive blacks' confrontation tactics, AIM leaders evidenced little patience in merely requesting help from

local federal agencies. Clyde Bellecourt, a young Chippewa who had spent nearly one-half his life in prison, appeared at the NCIO hearing in Minneapolis in 1969 and stated that Indians "have to take the same avenues in our Indian way that the black community has taken." He added that his people "should show force [and] show this to the Office of Economic Opportunity."<sup>33</sup>

Militant demonstrations by AIM had become commonplace before the "Trail of Broken Treaties." Included were the seizure of *Mayflower II* and the occupation of Mount Rushmore. Dennis Banks and several AIM leaders had attended a government conference on urban Indian problems at the Airlie House at Warrenton, Virginia, in December 1970. Not only did the militants take over the discussion sessions, but after a dispute with the management, they vandalized the plush conference center and stole cash, liquor, and food to the tune of \$25,000.<sup>34</sup> The Nixon administration played down the episode, but in September 1971 Russell Means and others AIM figures visited Washington to protest against the BIA. With television cameras preceding them, Means's group occupied the BIA information office and unsuccessfully tried to place Crow and Victor under citizen's arrests. Two months later, Means and Banks led a mass demonstration at Gordon, Nebraska, against the recent murder of a Sioux. Part of the protestors afterward stopped at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, roughed up the trading post owners, and "liberated" a valuable collection of Indian relics.<sup>35</sup>

While the episode at Gordon aroused considerable Indian support, AIM's prestige slipped soon afterward when it entered a controversy at the Cass Lake Reservation, and local leaders demanded that AIM withdraw. The organization seemed on the verge of dissolution when several representatives attended the Rosebud Sun Dance in the late summer of 1972. AIM and local Sioux figures at the dance decided to plan a protest caravan to Washington on the eve of the November elections. The final plans were set at a conference in Denver in late September and early October. Eight organizations were to participate in the "Trail of Broken Treaties." According to publicity releases, the caravan would expel all who

engaged in violence and civil disorder. The protestors wanted only to publicize Indian woes, negotiate peacefully with federal officials, and stage religious ceremonies.<sup>36</sup>

Questions about failure to provide adequate living accommodations for the caravan and about the occupation of the BIA building on November 2 as a premeditated or a spur-of-the-moment affair became secondary. The conflict now centered round a list of twenty demands which AIM leaders presented to the administration; they refused to leave the bureau until Nixon officials agreed to negotiate. The list of demands, which ran thirteen pages of single-spaced type, called for a thorough restructuring of federal trust responsibilities. Some items, such as the abolition of the BIA and the establishment of an Indian agency in the Office of the President, were fairly commonplace and moderate. The creation of an inalienable Indian land base of 110 million acres and the full restoration of treaties as a means of conducting Indian affairs, however, must have proved mind-boggling even to Nixon subordinates with elevated notions about executive privilege.<sup>37</sup> None of the demands could have been met without congressional approval. In short, the administration faced a situation that violated its central philosophy regarding trust obligations and legitimate tribal leaders, but the Indians refused to leave until their demands were met. Loesch and Interior Department conservatives clearly wanted the occupation ended immediately and by force if necessary. They solicited numerous statements from the NTCA and tribal leaders denouncing the BIA takeover.<sup>38</sup> But John Ehrlichman and his staff feared a public reaction against a blood bath with the election impending on November 9.<sup>39</sup>

On November 6 the White House dispatched Leonard Garment and Frank Carlucci to take over negotiations. Garment and Carlucci primarily dealt with Hank Adams whom they considered one of the more responsible caravan leaders. A set of agreements was reached by the evening of November 8 which promised that the administration would recommend nonprosecution of those involved in the occupation and would review the twenty demands and other grievances.<sup>40</sup> Most intriguing was the distribution of \$66,600 to the

Indians in the BIA building to defray their travel expenses home. According to some spokesmen, the rank and file received little of the money, and AIM used the bulk of it to buy weapons for the outbreak at Wounded Knee in February 1973.<sup>41</sup>

Although the documentation for Wounded Knee is less abundant, the main issue is altogether clear. Full-blooded Sioux had complained since the 1930s that the tribal council on Pine Ridge was dominated by corrupt mixed-bloods who obtained the majority of the federal jobs and benefits and grossly discriminated against the traditionalists.<sup>42</sup> Chairman Dick Wilson incensed both the traditionalists and AIM members by using Indian police to harass them, and he especially offended the militants by labeling them a bunch of misfits, renegades, and bums who sponged off the poorer tribesmen.<sup>43</sup> An unsuccessful recent attempt to impeach Wilson produced an alliance between the full-bloods and AIM. The main demand of the Wounded Knee protestors was that the government overturn Wilson and the existing tribal constitution and replace both with a traditional tribal government based on bands and local communities. The official response to this, both before and during Wounded Knee, was that such interference would violate the government's trust responsibilities and self-determination, and the full-bloods' only recourse was to replace Wilson by electing someone else. In other words, Wilson might be a corrupt chairman, but he was a legitimate chairman:

Rather obviously, the protestors at Wounded Knee experienced difficulty in conveying their position to the public. Most non-Indians simply did not understand the intricacies of the central issue, and reporters afforded little help. Most newsmen questioned whether AIM leaders were serious or merely seeking publicity. Many reporters doubted that the federal government should interfere in a tribal matter. The protestors were further angered by stories based on briefings by federal officials and Wilson's colorful denunciations of AIM leaders. Women reporters were especially irritated by Russell Means's antifeminist pronouncements. By the end of the first month, the Wounded Knee leaders no longer were pictured as doomed heroes fighting oppression but as urban toughs

out for power and ego gratification. Far less than Alcatraz or even the BIA building occupation, Wounded Knee aroused little public sympathy and resulted in virtually no real gains.<sup>44</sup>

In the meantime, the Nixon administration overturned much of the machinery it had established to effect its policies. The factional deadlock within the BIA was broken by firing Bruce and his remaining Braves, as well as Crow, Victor, and Loesch. When the Wounded Knee occupation erupted, neither the BIA, the NCIO, nor White House officials entered into the negotiations, and the Justice Department managed the affair much like a military operation. In the period afterward, AIM spokesmen have found themselves under a series of federal suits which have preoccupied their time or have driven them underground. Racked by Agnew's resignation and the Watergate scandal, the Nixon administration withdrew from Indian reforms.

As the United States enters its third century, Indians have forged a new image both for themselves and for the public. Whether reservation types or urbanites, traditionalists or acculturated, Native Americans no longer are patient, humble, or silent. On the surface the new image of the Indian may seem like a direct product of such general trends of the 1960s as the antiwar protests, the ecology drive, disdain for authority, and—most clearly—the civil rights movement. Yet to explain the "New Indian" solely by recent social trends is fearfully erroneous. The contemporary Indian has been affected by these general phenomena but only because they presented him with new tools of protest. They did not destroy his desire to remain an Indian nor his hope that he could somehow remind a government and a society that they have seldom understood or fulfilled their special obligations to the original Americans.

#### NOTES

1. D'Arcy McNickle, *Native American Tribalism, Indian Survivals and Renewals* (New York, 1973), pp. 105-6.
2. S. Lyman Tyler, *A History of Indian Policy* (Washington, 1973), pp. 197-98.

3. "Declaration of Indian Purpose," in Francis Paul Prucha, ed., *Documents of United States Indian Policy* (Lincoln, 1975), pp. 244-46.

4. Murray L. Wax, *Indian Americans, Unity and Diversity* (Englewood Cliffs, 1971), pp. 146-47.

5. Stan Steiner, *The New Indians* (New York, 1968), pp. 66-72.

6. McNickle, *Native American Tribalism*, pp. 118-19.

7. Warren H. Cohen and Philip J. Mause, "The Indian: The Forgotten Minority," *Harvard Law Review* 81 (June 1968): 1824-25.

8. Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The Indian in America* (New York, 1975), pp. 269-70.

9. The Vice-President served as chairman of the NCIO. The other government representatives included the secretaries of the Interior; Agriculture; Commerce; Labor; Health, Education, and Welfare; Housing and Urban Development as well as the director of the Office of Economic Opportunity. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 4 (Mar. 11, 1968): 438-48.

10. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., ed., *Red Power, The American Indians' Fight for Freedom* (New York, 1972), pp. 93-127.

11. Robert Robertson (former executive director of the National Council for Indian Opportunity), interview, Washington, Jan. 9, 1976.

12. *Ibid.*; Leonard Garment to John Ehrlichman, April 8, 1970, Record Group (RG) 220, Records of the National Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIOR), General Subject Files, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) III, National Archives (NA).

13. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 6 (July 13, 1970): 894-905. See also James R. Wagner and Richard Corrigan, "Minorities Report/BIA brings Indians to Cities, but has few urban services," *National Journal* 2 (July 11, 1970): 1493-1502.

14. An especially revealing early insight into the Nixon administration's unwillingness to extend the BIA into urban problems is found in Agnew to Daniel Moynihan, June 30, 1969, RG 220, NCIOR, Agnew letters, NA.

15. Robertson, interview, Jan. 9, 1976.

16. Robertson to Agnew, Jan. 12, 1972, RG 220, NCIOR, NCIO Budget, 1974, NA.

17. Robertson, interview, Jan. 9, 1976.

18. *Ibid.*

19. See the file of constituents' letters to the Nixon administration, RG 220, NCIOR, Alcatraz, NA.

20. The original landing party was composed largely of college students who drifted away soon afterward. By the end of two months, only

one of the first group still remained on Alcatraz. Richard Oakes, the group's leader, soon fell victim to factionalism over the control of the operation and the funds that were raised for the cause. Further dissension developed later between a group of young militants who acted as a security force and other Indians. See *San Francisco Chronicle*, Jan. 8, 1970 (clipping), RG 220, NCIOR, Alcatraz, NA.

21. [Minutes of] Meeting with Federal Officials on the Island of Alcatraz, Feb. 23, 1970, RG 220, NCIOR, Alcatraz, NA.

22. Robertson to C. D. Ward and Leonard Garment, May 26, 1970, RG 220, NCIOR, Alcatraz, NA.

23. Indians of All Tribes, "Alcatraz, Indians of All Tribes to the Citizens of the United States," Summer, 1971, RG 220, NCIOR, Alcatraz, NA.

24. Angie Debo, *A History of the Indians of the United States* (Norman, 1970), pp. 354-55.

25. Robertson, interview, Jan. 9, 1976; Robertson to Ward, July 19, 1972, RG 220, NCIOR, NCIO Budget, 1974, NA.

26. Robertson to Agnew, Jan. 12, 1972, RG 220, NCIOR, NCIO Budget, 1974, NA.

27. *The Daily Oklahoman* (Oklahoma City), Nov. 1, 1971 (clipping), RG 220, NCIOR, NCIO Budget, 1974, NA.

28. For a sketch on Loesch see *The Washington Post*, Nov. 22, 1972 (clipping), RG 220, NCIOR, Caravan, 1974, NA.

29. LaDonna Harris, "Americans for Indian Opportunity," *Civil Rights Digest* 4 (Spring 1971): 14-17.

30. Robertson to Agnew, Jan. 12, 1972, RG 220, NCIOR, NCIO Budget, 1974, and unidentified clipping from Bismarck, North Dakota, Jan. 22, 1972, RG 220, NCIOR, BIA III, NA.

Nixon subordinates were especially irritated when Cook selected the theme, "Self Determination or Disguised Termination: Let's Be Certain," for the 1972 NCAI convention. See Ward to Robertson, Aug. 30, 1972, National Congress of American Indians, RG 220, NCIOR, BIA III, NA.

31. Robertson to Ward, n.d. [April, 1971?], RG 220, NCIOR, BIA III, NA.

32. Ronald Dean Johnson, *Faces of Minnesota* (Minneapolis, n.d.), pp. 2-4.

33. Testimony of Clyde Bellecourt, 1969, Published Proceedings of NCIO Hearing at Minneapolis-St. Paul, RG 220, NCIOR, NA.

34. Richard H. Ross, Statement for the Record on Vandalism, Burglary, and Unlawful Restraint (Airlie House Personnel Held Hostage), Jan. 12, 1971, Airlie House Meeting, RG 220, NCIOR, NA.

35. Robert Burnette and John Koster, *Road to Wounded Knee* (New York, 1974), pp. 193-94.
36. *Trail of Broken Treaties: B.I.A. I'm Not Your Indian Anymore* (Mohawk Nation via Roosevelttown, New York, n.d.), pp. 2-3.
37. "Trail of Broken Treaties: For Renewal of Contracts—Reconstruction of Indian Communities & Securing an Indian Future in America," 1972, RG 220, NCIOR, Caravan, NA.
38. "Position Paper of the Board of Directors of the National Tribal Chairman's Association," Nov. 10, 1972, RG 220, NCIOR, Caravan, NA.
39. *The Washington Post*, Nov. 27, 1972 (clipping), RG 220, NCIOR, Caravan, NA.
40. Six agreements were signed by Garment, Carlucci, and Adams between November 6-8. In January 1973 Carlucci, and Garment replied to Adams with a lengthy rejection of the twenty demands. See Garment and Carlucci to Adams, Jan. 9, 1973, RG 220, NCIOR, Caravan, NA.
41. Robertson, interview, Jan. 9, 1976.
42. McNickle, *Native American Tribalism*, pp. x-xi.
43. *Minneapolis Tribune*, Nov. 26, 1972 (clipping), RG 220, NCIOR, Caravan, NA.
44. Burnette and Koster, *Road to Wounded Knee*, pp. 228-31.