The United States Army in Taos, 1847–1852

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THE ROLE of the military was vital in consolidating the authority of the United States government in the Southwest. As an army of occupation, troops prevented dissidents among the populace from mounting a successful revolt against the foreign intruders. For a time the military was the only operating government. Its officers promulgated the laws and selected officials. Moreover, it kept hostile Indians from overrunning the territory. Much has been written about such well-known military establishments as Fort Union and Fort Defiance. Little is known about the smaller, less famous posts. A study of the activities of the army in the northern New Mexican town of Taos may illuminate the importance of the soldier in establishing United States domination in New Mexico.

That the permanent occupation of the Southwest could not be accomplished peacefully became clear during the early months of 1847 when word reached Santa Fe of a bloody anti-American revolt in Taos. Nationalistic Mexican forces there, allied with Indians from the nearby pueblo, had marched through the streets, massacring and mutilating all who had joined sides with the United States. New Mexico Governor Charles Bent, Taos Sheriff Stephen Luis Lee, and attorney James W. Leal were among the dead. The bloodshed spread rapidly to the nearby towns of Mora, Río Colorado, and Arroyo Hondo.

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Colonel Sterling Price, who assumed command of troops in New Mexico upon the departure of General Stephen W. Kearny for California, learned of the massacre on February 20. His Missouri Volunteers plus regular dragoons and infantry totalling 353 men moved quickly north from Santa Fe. A skirmish at Cañada preceded major encounters with the rebels at La Joya (present Velarde) and Embudo along the Rio Grande. In early March Price and his men captured the village of Don Fernando de Taos and prepared to assault the nearby pueblo, where the rebels took refuge. Only after a hard fight, climaxed by the storming of the Indian church, did resistance collapse. By then some 150 Indians and Mexican loyalists were dead. Forty-five soldiers received wounds and seven died. One of the casualties, Captain John H. K. Burgwin, later came to symbolize the military presence in Taos.

Price soon departed Taos, but the army remained. Captain W. Z. Angney and Company A, Missouri Volunteers, stayed until late March when Lieutenant Colonel David Willock arrived with his cavalry company. Lewis H. Garrard, who visited northern New Mexico shortly after the revolt, recalled the presence of the army during the trials of the conspirators. Troops stood guard throughout the village. The day the guilty were to be executed more than two hundred soldiers marched in front of the jail. Their commander, Colonel Willock, observed the scene from astride a "handsome charger," while a mountain howitzer placed atop the jail stood ready in case of trouble. The troops supervised the hangings, then retired to their quarters. Most left soon for other assignments, but three companies apparently remained. By October 1847 the army had decided that permanent arrangements were needed; the "Post of Don Fernando de Taos" was officially established. Garrisoning it were Companies G, H, and K of the 3rd Regiment of Missouri Volunteers commanded by Major W. W. Reynolds.

During their stay in Taos, the Missouri Volunteers accentuated rather than alleviated anti-American sentiments. Mrs. Thomas Boggs, the stepdaughter of Governor Bent, recalled years later that soldiers punished offending Indians by harnessing them to army
ambulances and running them from the pueblo into town. "They would reach us exhausted," she remembered, "the crack of the driver's whip heralding their approach, with blood streaming from their unprotected backs and legs—one ambulance being followed by another and another, racing as they came by." Soldiers who became bored by such entertainment, she added, sometimes hanged their victims. Naturally such actions only increased the possibility of later rebellion.

Not until a year after the establishment of the post are sufficient records available to indicate the activities of the troops in Taos. By then the Missouri Volunteers had been replaced by Company I, 1st Dragoons. Major B. L. Beall commanded the unit, which included Lieutenant John Whittlesey, 3 sergeants, 4 corporals, 46 privates, and 2 buglers. Besides preventing a new uprising, the troops were now called upon to protect much of northern New Mexico from incursions by Apache, Ute, Kiowa, Comanche, and other Indian marauders.

Lieutenant Whittlesey, who frequently commanded the post when Beall was on detached service, quickly discovered the immense practical problems of maintaining troops in a remote and often hostile community. The Missouri Volunteers, he reported, had "left such a bad reputation" that few Taos residents would rent suitable quarters to the government unless an American guaranteed payment. What houses were available frequently required extensive repair to make them habitable. Moreover, obtaining forage for the government livestock or hiring pack mules for expeditions against the Indians proved difficult and expensive. Even the army command seemed to forget about Taos. Whittlesey complained early in 1849 that his men had not been paid for five months and pleaded that the paymaster be sent soon.

Even before these logistical problems were solved, the Taos detachment set out on a series of expeditions against the Indians. During February 1849 Beall received orders to send troops east across the Sangre de Cristo range to free several Mexican-Americans held captive near Bent's Fort. Accompanied by local guides and company of Second Dragoons, Beall and Whittlesey
spent two weeks crossing the rugged mountains. Their long winter march proved futile, however. Indian Agent Thomas Fitzpatrick, fearing violence from a large band of Indians camped along the Arkansas, discouraged Beall from demanding the return of the prisoners. Thus, without even mentioning their assignment, the soldiers returned to Taos through a heavy snow storm which cost them several animals. Nothing had been accomplished. 13

No sooner had Beall completed one fruitless expedition than he sent Whittlesey on another, this time to pursue a band of Ute committing depredations north of Taos. Fifty men left on March 5 "with a well-appointed Company of Spies and Guides" and a mountain howitzer. They moved north past the settlement on the Rio Colorado and into the San Luis Valley. While one platoon stayed behind to transport the howitzer, Whittlesey led the remainder through the Rio Grande gorge to a Ute village. After exchanging words with an Indian spokesman, Whittlesey's men opened fire. Before the outnumbered dragoons could retreat into a nearby forest two soldiers died, along with six or seven Indians. The other platoon also encountered the Ute, producing another five or six casualties. The soldiers must have been somewhat consoled, spending the night in abandoned Indian lodges before their return to Taos, but they had certainly failed to strike a decisive blow. 14

The limited success of the Ute expedition was offset by a tragedy which it indirectly caused. While soldiers battled Indians, the famed mountaineer Bill Williams, botanist-physician Dr. Benjamin Kern, and several Mexican-American guides entered the area. Members of John C. Fremont's fourth western expedition, they had left the main party to recover some drawings, instruments, and other supplies cached nearby. They had reached Taos and were returning north when the Ute, angered over Whittlesey's attack, found and captured them. Eventually the Mexican-Americans were released, but Williams and Kern were killed. 15

Partly as a result of such exasperating expeditions, army officials realized by the spring of 1849 that too few troops were stationed in Taos to control the Indians over such an extensive area. Since ad-
ditional forces could not be secured from the East, Colonel J. M. Washington commanding the department authorized the enlistment of local volunteer units. Almost immediately Beall enrolled a company of Taos citizens under the command of Captain J. M. Valdez. Much of the work of defending northern New Mexico subsequently fell to them.

In order to make better use of the enlarged force now under his command, Colonel Washington also ordered the establishment of several subsidiary posts comprised of men on temporary detached service from Taos. Early in April 1849, for example, 85 volunteers left to patrol the plains around Las Vegas. A month later Beall received orders to establish a station at “Sangre de Christo” in the San Luis Valley eighty miles north of Taos. It was designed to protect the older frontier settlements and a new mining camp in the area from Ute and Apache. Beall selected a location near the junction of Trinchera and Ute Creeks and soon had men from Captain Valdez’ volunteer company at work building a stockade. But in less than a month he received new instructions to abandon the project and return the soldiers. In spite of Lieutenant Whittlesey’s protests that withdrawal of the troops would expose the “Rio Colorado frontier” to the “full fury” of the Indians, the order stood, and the post was abandoned. Once more a great deal of time and effort had been expended for naught. Thereafter, Taos resumed the responsibility for protecting the San Luis Valley.

During the second half of 1849 major attention was directed to protecting northeastern New Mexico from attacks by the Jicarilla Apache. The establishment of new ranches along the edge of the Sangre de Cristos during the previous year invited raids which eventually necessitated stationing military forces in the area. News that the Apache were “robbing everywhere throughout the mountains” reached Whittlesey in midsummer. To prevent a massacre and, hopefully, to chastise the hostiles, he ordered a sergeant with 15 dragoons and 30 volunteers to the Rayado. During the fall Major William Grier mounted a major campaign against the Apache, further depleting the Taos garrison. For a time volunteers replaced the dragoons, but after Valdez’ company was mus-
tered out of the service in December, the full responsibility for staffing the outpost fell on the much overworked detachment at Taos.26 "This command has been constantly engaged in active service against the hostile Indians in N[ew] Mexico," complained Beall at the end of the year, "and our force is weak & should be releaved."27

As if combating hostile Indians was not enough to occupy the exhausted Taos troops, increasing restlessness among the Pueblos and Mexican-Americans in northern New Mexico suggested the possibility of another revolt. James S. Calhoun, Territorial Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs, first suspected trouble when he visited Taos Pueblo in January 1850. The Indians were in a "moody and dissatisfied state" and complained to him of encroachments on their land, violations of their traditions, and arbitrary appointment of their officials by the government in Santa Fe. "The wrongs to which the Pueblo Indians are subjected," Calhoun concluded, "are inconceivable and ought to be remedied without a moment's delay."28 He promised to convey their grievances to the proper authorities in Washington. Certain, however, that mischievous Taos residents had agitated the Indians for their own political purposes, Calhoun also suggested that in the future Pueblo officials seek the counsel of Beall, Grier, Whittlesey, other army officers, or Judge Charles Beaubien. All were friends who could be trusted.29

Despite Calhoun's warnings of possible unrest, the contingent at Taos continually diminished in strength. Many soldiers remained on duty at Rayado, while others were sent to reoccupy a post at Abiquiu in northeastern New Mexico.30 Major Beall's pleas that his forces were "barely sufficient" to keep the Ute and Apache from raiding Taos, much less put down a Pueblo uprising, brought nothing more than explanations that "no disposable force" could be spared to reinforce the detachment.31 By May 27 all regular troops had withdrawn from Taos.32

Officials who had almost forgotten the bloody massacre in Taos less than three years before were suddenly reminded of it by a letter from Lieutenant Whittlesey in June. The young officer,
whose long experience qualified him to comment on conditions in the area, warned that troops were once again needed in Taos. The political controversy over whether New Mexico should be a state or a territory had aroused the “lower class” of Mexican-Americans to the extent that many “intelligent citizens” feared a violent outbreak.

Though not disposed myself to be an alarmist, yet I feel it my duty to express an opinion that it is unsafe to leave Taos any longer without at least a detachment of ten or fifteen men. Considerable public property—some arms, ammunition, & c—are now there with no other guard than some half-dozen ill-armed teamsters.

Whittlesey concluded by reminding his superiors that “the revolutionary character of the inhabitants” of Taos was “well-known and should be guarded against.”

As soon as Colonel John Munroe, now commanding the Ninth Military Department, received the warning, he wrote Major Grier, who was still at Rayado, asking him to dispatch a company of men back across the mountains. Grier indicated no surprise at hearing of the rumored unrest, commenting that he had “not the slightest confidence in the honesty, patriotism, or fidelity of the people of the Taos Valley” whom he regarded as “but slightly superior to the Apaches.” He did agree that it was probably wise to station troops in the area until the political campaign had ended and ordered Lieutenant Oliver H. P. Taylor and a company of soldiers to Taos. He also promised to return with his own men as soon as possible.

Contrary to the expectations of Whittlesey, troops stationed at Taos during the fall and winter found conditions extremely quiet. If Taylor and Grier spent any time at the post, they filed no returns, and it was not officially “re-occupied” until the arrival of Company H, 3rd Infantry, in mid-July. Soon Captain William H. Gordon assumed command. Taos residents may have feared that the soldiers would not stay for the winter, for late that same month they wrote Munroe. Pointing out that within a few days the Apache had entered the village of Rio Colorado and were approaching Taos, they asked him to send out a major expedition against
The troops stayed, but no campaigns seem to have been mounted during the months that followed. Even the Pueblos and Mexican-Americans remained unusually peaceful.

The only important development came in early September 1850, when Colonel George A. McCall arrived on an official inspection of New Mexico installations. He found only forty-four men and one officer, Lieutenant Andrew Jackson, in camp. McCall's description of supply and housing problems closely resembled Whittlesey's earlier report. For quarters, stables, and storerooms, the government had again rented a number of "the usual adobe dwellings of the country" at a total cost of $120 per month. Forage and fodder could be produced locally but only at high prices, due at least in part to the "bad management" of farmers in the area. Generally, however, McCall found the quarters clean, the books well kept, and the overall appearance of things excellent.

Having described the post and its garrison, McCall went on to evaluate its importance. He reiterated the consistent military opinion that the residents of Taos were "the most turbulent in New Mexico" and that the Pueblo Indians nearby "still entertain a smothered feeling of animosity against the Americans." As a precaution, therefore, he recommended that a half-company of infantry be stationed in Taos to enforce the laws and "keep these people quiet." On the other hand, he argued with equal firmness that Taos "had nothing to recommend it" as a base for campaigns against the Ute and Apache. He much preferred sites which were closer to Indian country and less expensive to maintain.

Not only McCall recommended a reduced role for the Taos detachment. In January 1851, when Colonel Munroe evaluated the posts in his department for the Adjutant General, he concluded that "for military purposes" no troops were needed in Taos as long as the installations were maintained at Rayado and Abiquiu. "For civil considerations," however, it might be well to keep an infantry company there "for a time."

A letter from Charles Beaubien in mid-June reinforced the many fears that another Taos uprising might yet take place. Beaubien, an
old and respected Taos resident, reported in terms remarkably similar to those Whittlesey voiced exactly a year before. He had become convinced that many “lower class” Taos residents contemplated a “rebellion against the constituted United States authorities.” Secret meetings had been held; rumors circulated in an attempt to arouse the populace. Very possibly another “massacre” of the few Americans and foreigners would be attempted. The situation was ever more critical because of the close proximity of the Jicarilla Apache, who had been buying whiskey within a few miles of town. Clandestine conferences between the Ute and the Pueblos foreshadowed trouble. Only by sending a company of artillery or more mounted troops to augment the meager force in the valley, Beaubien warned, could tragedy be averted.

Beaubien’s letter produced the kind of response which previous pleas had failed to bring. Calhoun immediately forwarded a copy to Colonel John Munroe at military headquarters with a note suggesting that the “utmost vigilance” would be necessary to “prevent the outbreak desired by the restless.” Quickly the commander moved to reinforce his troops. On June 14 Munroe ordered Major H. L. Kendrick with two companies of artillery to Taos. Although his task was to “enquire fully into all the unrest connected with the contemplated rebellion,” the sixty men and two howitzers he took suggested stronger action.

Surprisingly, not everyone agreed with Munroe’s swift action. Major Gordon, still commanding troops in Taos, took offense; his opinions had not been solicited. He argued that the whole affair (apparently including Beaubien’s letter) had “originated through political feeling.” In fact scheming Americans had informed the Mexican-Americans of a possible revolution. Gordon further argued that the sudden arrival of so many troops commanded by an officer senior to himself had “operat[ed] unfavorably upon my character with this people. They know I am being relieved of command.” Munroe and his adjutant attempted in vain to explain their action, insisting that they had intended no reflection on Gordon’s ability. Still hard feelings no doubt remained.

Major Kendrick’s report filed from Taos June 22 reinforced
Gordon's view that Beaubien had grossly exaggerated the likelihood of an uprising. "After the fullest possible inquiry," he concluded that although some Mexicans might have considered violence, their plans included only robbery and plunder. He could find no evidence of insurrection. Since the Apache had now disappeared and even the local priest, apparently José Antonio Martínez, saw no need for the troops, Kendrick recommended that they be withdrawn. Munroe agreed, and by month's end the soldiers had returned to Santa Fe.47

Once fears of a rebellion subsided, military officials again considered abandoning the Taos installation. The idea received new support from Colonel E. V. Sumner, who took command of the Ninth Military Department in July. Almost immediately he began consolidating the multitude of smaller posts into a few major forts. The establishment of Fort Union as department headquarters and supply center climaxed this program. Sumner also believed that New Mexico towns provided a poor environment for American soldiers, and thus he stationed all troops in remote, rural locations.48 As a result, in August Sumner announced his intention to abandon Taos. Larger posts would be established along the lower Rio Grande at Valverde and to the north in Ute and Apache country.49

The new district commander soon discovered that withdrawing troops from Taos was more difficult than it seemed. As a first step, late in October, he ordered Gordon and his infantry company to move to La Joya (Velarde) for the winter. Before leaving they were to make "suitable arrangements" for protecting the flour stockpiled in Taos.50 No sooner had word of this action reached Taos than residents began to plead that the troops remain. Ceran St. Vrain, a well-known mountaineer and businessman, asked that at least a company of dragoons stay for the winter and offered to furnish them 2,000 sacks of corn.51 Other citizens volunteered to provide "sufficient and comfortable quarters." They also guaranteed that corn would be available at reasonable prices. As a result, just after Gordon reached his winter station he received instructions sending him back to Taos. "On your arrival," an explanatory letter in-
structed him, "you will call upon the citizens to point out the quarters intended for your command." If the accommodations proved unsuitable, he was to "require them to comply with their agreement." 52

Although Gordon and about seventy soldiers remained in Taos throughout the winter and spring of 1851-1852, they apparently did little except provide a convenient market for the supplies of local farmers and merchants. Perhaps this was their major purpose. John Greiner, an Indian agent, visited Taos in October. He reported that although the Kiowa and Arapaho had recently attacked a Ute village near the Rio Colorado (now anglicized to "Red River"), driven off fifty head of livestock, and captured several women and children, the soldiers in Taos could "afford no assistance." He pleaded that some means be devised to protect the peaceful Ute from their enemies. 53 Late in March 1852, Sumner prepared to pacify the Indians of the San Luis Valley by establishing a new post, Fort Massachusetts, eighty miles north of Taos. 54 The question of what would happen to the older installation in Taos remained to be answered.

After several years of indecision, the army finally acted during the summer of 1852. In order to provide a garrison at Fort Massachusetts, Gordon's Company H, 3rd Infantry, left Taos with Major George A. H. Blake to take up station in the San Luis Valley. 55 On June 14, 1852, the post at Fernando de Taos was officially abandoned. 56 Not for long would it lack military protection, however. Less than two months later, on August 7, Company I, 1st dragoons reached Taos under the command of Captain Robert Ransom, Jr. to establish a new post. Located ten miles southwest of Taos and fifteen miles from the Rio Grande, this became Cantonment Burgwin, 57 named in honor of Captain John H. K. Burgwin who died in the Battle of Taos Pueblo in 1847. 58 Thus began a new era in the military history of northern New Mexico.

During a half-decade of presence in Taos the army had accomplished a great deal. Despite continuing rumors of unrest, a second Taos Rebellion never occurred; slowly the Mexican-Americans and
Pueblo Indians in the region accepted the inevitability of United States occupation. They also learned to sell agricultural products to the military. Moreover, continuing though never conclusive forays against the Indians in the area assured a greater measure of security for the town of Taos and the ranches surrounding it. As a result the economy of the region prospered.
NOTES


3. For a sketch of Burgwin, described as "brave as a lion yet refined and gentle as a woman," see Walter Burgwyn-Jones, *The Jones-Burgwyn Family History* (Montgomery, Ala., 1913). A copy is in the James W. Arrott collection, New Mexico Highlands University.


6. Col. E. W. Newby wrote Adjutant General R. Jones, Santa Fe, March 20, 1848, that "three mounted companies were kept to garrison Taos, the entree point on the northern frontier...." They were not omnipresent, however, and could not even adequately protect the town. "Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1849," *Senate Executive Doc. No. 1, 31st Cong., 1 sess.*, pp. 104-05.


9. The first available monthly return for Fernando de Taos was filed in Sept. 1848. It is included in Microcopy 617, "Returns from U.S. Military Posts, 1800-1916," Roll 1254, Taos, New Mexico, NA, hereinafter referred to as Taos Post Returns.
10. Taos Post Returns, Sept.-Nov. 1848.
12. Whittlesey to Beall, Taos, Feb. 4, 1849, Ninth Military Department, Letters Received, NA, RG 98. Copy Arrott Collection. Hereinafter referred to as NMDLR.
15. Santa Fe Weekly Gazette, March 12, 1853, p. 3; Beall to Dickerson, Taos, March 26, 1849, NMDLR; Favour, Old Bill Williams, pp. 178-79.
17. Taos Post Returns, April 1849.
18. H. B. Judd to Dickerson, Taos, April 4, 1849, NMDLR.
19. Pleasanton to Beall, Santa Fe, May 1, 1849; and Beall to Dickerson, Taos, May 18, 1849, NMDLR. Department of New Mexico, Orders No. 16, Santa Fe, June 12, 1849, in Ninth Military Department Orders, NA, RG 98. Copy Arrott Collection. This series is hereinafter referred to as NMDO.
20. Beall to Dickerson, Taos, May 8, 1849, NMDLR.
21. Ninth Military Department, Orders No. 116, Santa Fe, June 12, 1849, NMDO.
22. Whittlesey to Beall, Taos, June 18, 1849, NMDLR.
25. Beall complained to McLaws, Taos, Nov. 9, 1849, that "every able-bodied man" had gone with Grier and requested that a company of infantry be stationed at Taos for the winter. NMDLR.

27. Ibid.


30. Taos Post Returns, March, April, 1850; also Prucha, *Guide to the Military Posts*, p. 55; and Murphy, "Rayado," p. 42.


32. Taos Post Returns, April 1850.


34. Grier to McLaws, Rayado, June 18, 1850, *ibid.*

35. Taos Post Returns, July 1850.


40. Munroe to Jones, Santa Fe, March 30, 1851, NMDLR.


42. Beaubien to Calhoun, Taos, June 11, 1851, in Abel, *Official Correspondence*, pp. 357-58.

43. Calhoun to Munroe, Santa Fe, June 14, 1851, *ibid.*, p. 361.

44. Munroe to Kendrick, Santa Fe, June 14, 1851, *ibid.*, pp. 361-62.

45. Gordon to McLaws, Taos, June 21, 1851, NMDLR.

46. McLaws to Gordon, Santa Fe, June 24, 1851, in Abel, *Official Correspondence*, pp. 360-61.

47. Kendrick to McLaws, Taos, June 22, 1851, NMDLR. Munroe to Jones, Santa Fe, June 30, 1851, in Abel, *Official Correspondence*, pp. 348-59.


50. Ninth Military Department, Orders No. 39, Fort Union, Oct. 31, 1851, NMDO.

51. St. Vrain to Sumner, Taos, Oct. 14, 1851, NMDLR.

52. McFerran to Gordon, Fort Union, Nov. 9, 1851, NMDO. Taos Post Returns, Nov. 1851.

53. Greiner to Calhoun, Taos, Oct. 20, 1851, in Abel, _Official Correspondence_, p. 438. Taos Post Returns, Nov. 1851 to April 1852 show no activity whatever.

54. General Orders No. 24, near Albuquerque, March 30, 1852, in Records of the War Department, General Orders of The Department of New Mexico, 1851-1861, NA, RG 98. Microfilm copy Fort Burgwin Research Center. Also see Morris F. Taylor, "Fort Massachusetts," _Colorado Magazine_, vol. 45 (1968), pp. 121-22.


56. Taos Post Returns, April 1852.
