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PROHIBITION IN NEW MEXICO, 1917

JAMES A. BURRAN

THE TOWN OF EDDY, New Mexico, was established in the spring of 1889 as part of a dream empire conceived by Charles A. Eddy and J. J. Hagerman for the Pecos valley of southeastern New Mexico. The town quickly attracted settlers, largely because of several government projects which were under construction in that area. But since Charles Eddy was a strict prohibitionist, there was a unique restriction placed upon all settlers who moved to Eddy. This was the prohibition within the town limits of alcohol in any form except for medicinal usage.

Naturally this bone-dry atmosphere irritated many of the inhabitants, so in 1892 a group of pro-liquor men moved about one mile south of Eddy and founded the town of Phenix. A number of saloons, a brothel, and a few honorable businesses constituted the town. Within a few months Phenix began to enjoy a prosperous trade from Eddy and the surrounding government projects. But because of the fact that Phenix thrived on violence, alcohol, vice, and gambling, it soon became an unsavory community.

Finally, several events caused the death of Phenix, the most important of which was the retirement of Charles Eddy and the withdrawal of his personal influence. This permitted saloons and alcohol to move back into Eddy, and by about 1897 Phenix was a ghost town. In 1899 the name of Eddy was changed to Carlsbad in order to help erase the memory of its founder and the events of the 1890's.¹

The founding of Phenix as an answer to forced prohibition in Eddy is fairly characteristic of the minds of New Mexicans during the late nineteenth century and serves to explain in part the unorthodox methods which were often used on the frontier. Actions such as those just described were not revolutionary to frontier people but an accepted way of doing things. Even in 1912, the year New Mexico became a state, the frontier code was still in existence and the people had not significantly changed their way of thinking.

By 1915 New Mexico was represented in the Congress of the United States as the forty-seventh state of the Union. It had created an acceptable constitution in 1910 and 1911, and its government was functioning well. New Mexico in 1915 covered an area of 119,600 square miles and had a population somewhere around 350,000. Within this population were 255,000 native-born Anglos and persons of Hispanic descent. In addition, there were 12,000 Hispanic people of foreign birth, as well as 20,000 Indians and a handful of Negroes. The number of males eligible to vote totaled 95,000, with 73 per cent either Anglo or Hispanic. The illiteracy rate in the state was 20.2 per cent, most of this group Indian.² Although the state was young, inexperienced, and sparsely populated, with a diverse ethnic makeup, the strong forces of prohibition did not hesitate to invade New Mexico as part of their general plan for national ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment.

The Anti-Saloon League had been working in New Mexico since 1910, when the territory held its Constitutional Convention. Prohibitionist agitation at the convention was largely unsuccessful. Only nineteen of the one hundred convention delegates favored a prohibition measure. The decision that prohibition was not a proper matter for inclusion in the constitution effectively killed any anti-liquor hopes. Nevertheless the convention did call for a vote concerning liquor by the New Mexico population, and this action ultimately resulted in the prohibition vote of 1917.³

Disheartened but not defeated, in 1915 the Anti-Saloon League began another concentrated effort to establish statewide prohibition. The state was at that time under local-option liquor law, but not many areas had gone dry. Only one county, San Juan, was completely dry, and its population numbered but 8,500. The only dry cities in the state were located in the eastern and southern plains, which served as the stronghold for prohibition. These were Clovis, Portales, and Artesia, whose aggregate population totaled only 6,400. A few of the villages and smaller towns were also dry. Thus prohibition affected a minority of the population of the state—probably less than twenty-five per cent.⁴

So in 1915 the Anti-Saloon League formulated a comprehensive program which was to affect every section of New Mexico. Within five years this plan achieved success. It consisted essentially of the following points: submission of a prohibition amendment for the State Constitution, protection of dry territory from introduction of liquor, and preparation of the state for ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.⁵

As the forces of prohibition began working statewide for a cause which seems not to have caught on as a major concern in New Mexico, an important factor on the side of prohibition, ultimately helped turn the tide of the battle. This factor was New Mexico politics.

In order to understand the politics of New Mexico, it is necessary to recognize that the state "may be in the United States but is not of the United States." Several conditions, generally as real today as they were in the past, present special political problems. The first is sparse population. Getting elected was not a matter of statesmanship or intellectual oratory, but rather of getting out and coming in contact with the largest possible number of people. With a population as small as it was in 1917, every vote was worth a great deal. The second was patronage. To the winning faction in politics went the right to hand out state jobs from the top to the most menial posts. Most of this patronage went to the

Hispanic⁶ people, because without their support politicians could not hope to be elected in New Mexico. And this Hispanic population was the third factor contributing to the political problems peculiar to New Mexico, giving "the state's politics a distinct Latin-American flavor, without the armed revolutions." The Hispanic citizen, unlike the Anglo, did not turn away from politics but thrived on it, even though his eagerness was not always matched by an understanding of democratic practices and systems.⁷

During the early twentieth century the Hispanic voters in New Mexico were allied almost exclusively with the Republican Party. This alliance came about after the Civil War, when the United States was under the control of the GOP. Since New Mexico was a territory, the national GOP leaders placed other GOP leaders in the high offices in New Mexico. Patronage of the Hispanic population became widespread, and so long as the Hispanic population got patronized, Republicans got elected. The alliance flourished throughout the early twentieth century.⁸

The national Republican progressive movement found its way into New Mexico in the persons of several reform-minded GOP leaders who concentrated on the political rather than the social or intellectual aspects of national progressivism. They were especially concerned with corruption and boss rule. In New Mexico, boss rule often meant Old Guard Republican rule. Oddly enough, however, they paid little attention to the political influence of big business which was of great concern to the progressives nationally. This was largely an issue of urban America, and New Mexico was hardly urban.⁹

During the era of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft there were three major progressive leaders in New Mexico: Miguel Otero, H. J. Hagerman, and George Curry. Each had served as territorial governor, and each had openly fought corruption and bossism, often challenging the all-powerful Old Guard. The resultant disunity within the Republican Party was further widened by the arrival of Bronson Cutting on the scene.¹⁰

Cutting had moved to New Mexico from New York in 1910, and in 1912 he purchased the Santa Fe *New Mexican*. Previously the organ of the Old Guard, the *New Mexican* became the progressive mouthpiece of the state and remained so for many years. It supported all kinds of reform, including prohibition. Even though Cutting did not hold public office until the late twenties, his influence as a progressive in New Mexico politics lasted from 1912 through the mid-thirties.¹¹

While Cutting and other progressive Republicans were advocating reform and generally causing trouble for the Old Guard, the Anti-Saloon League and the Women's Christian Temperance Union were working quietly but earnestly in every part of the state. They lobbied hard in the state legislature, arousing public interest. Late in 1916 the legislature began to hear proposals for an amendment to the state constitution substituting statewide prohibition for the existing local-option provision.¹²

By mid-January 1917 there were several proposals for prohibition in each house of the New Mexico Legislature. Melvin T. Dunlavy, Senator from Santa Fe, introduced a bill which was a duplicate of the Arizona prohibition law of 1914, but this proposal got no further than the senate.¹³ The McDonald and Clark bill was then introduced but was tied up in a joint committee for some time. Finally the committee substitute for the McDonald and Clark bill was introduced and was passed by a sixteen to four vote in the senate and a forty-two to five vote in the house on February 1, 1917. The press noted that opposition to prohibition was strong in the early stages of debate, but faded away later because the "wets" were unwilling to engage in open floor battle with the "drys."¹⁴

This bill was officially known as Joint Resolution Number 17, the Committee Substitute for Senate Joint Resolutions Numbers Two and Three, and was filed with Secretary of State Lucero on February 20, 1917. It was to be voted on in a general election by the people of New Mexico, and, if passed, would become Article XXIII of the Constitution of the State of New Mexico.¹⁵

The proposed amendment was divided into two sections. The first described the purpose of the bill:

From and after October 1, 1918, no person, association or corporation shall, within this state, manufacture for sale, barter or gift, any ardent spirits, ale, beer, alcohol, wine or liquor of any kind whatsoever containing alcohol . . .¹⁶

This description did not prohibit alcohol when intended and used for medicinal purposes and did not prohibit wine when intended and used for sacramental purposes.

The second section of the proposed amendment described the consequences of violation of the first: the first violation of section one, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months, or both fine and imprisonment; a second violation, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars and a sentence to the state penitentiary not to exceed one year.¹⁷

On March 5, 1917, another bill was passed. This was the Committee Substitute for Senate Bill Number 21, and in essence set the date for the general election to decide on the prohibition amendment. The election was to take place on November 6, 1917, and if the bill passed, it would take effect on October 1, 1918.¹⁸

Many of the legislators and much of the populace were dissatisfied with the prohibition amendment passed by the legislature. Senator Issac Barth was especially critical of it and noted a gaping loophole in the wording. According to Barth, it would allow liquor to be presented to a customer free of charge as part of a meal in any restaurant. For instance, a customer could pay an exorbitant price for a sandwich and receive a beer free of charge. Barth termed this the "rubber sandwich" loophole and maintained the bill was not effective but merely changed the method of liquor distribution.¹⁹ Many New Mexico prohibitionists were equally dissatisfied, although Justice Clarence Roberts of the New Mexico Supreme Court judged their fears unfounded and stated that the wording of the bill was airtight. The prohibitionists did agree, however, that the proposal was a good deal

better than the local-option law, and they backed it vigorously.²⁰

The press also thought that the proposed law was better than nothing, as can be seen in this editorial from the *New Mexican*:

The *New Mexican* has been extremely skeptical of the possibility of submission of a prohibition amendment. That the amendment is shut off at the spigot and leaking at the bung-hole is not at all surprising. We regard it as no mean achievement for the dry forces to have secured what has been handed them.²¹

During February 1917, when the legislature was in the midst of passing the proposed amendment, Governor E. C. de Baca died. He had been elected in November of 1916 on the Republican ticket, naturally, and had just taken office when he contracted pneumonia. He was succeeded by Lieutenant Governor W. E. Lindsey, who proved a boon to the prohibition forces. Lindsey, a native of Portales, was an ardent prohibitionist and had been elected mayor of that city in 1909 on the promise of prohibition for its inhabitants. As a delegate to the Constitutional Convention in 1910 he had tried earnestly to get prohibition included in the original constitution. As governor, Lindsey took a very active part in getting prohibition passed and during the campaign made a great number of speeches in its favor.²² Lindsey may certainly be considered a progressive. When he took office in February 1917, he advocated prohibition, women's suffrage, cessation of patronage and appointment by merit, and cessation of vote buying.²³

Lindsey and his wife began campaigning for prohibition immediately after he became governor, but on April 6 the United States entered World War I and for the next several months prohibition was temporarily relegated to the background. From April until October the people and leaders of New Mexico worked as in every other state to promote enlistments and the purchase of war bonds. In anticipation of the election, however, the wets and dries soon began to crank their campaigns up to full speed.

The wets conducted largely a whispering campaign. Except for Albuquerque and Taos, where the fight was open, the proponents of liquor quietly based their arguments on two main points. The

first was that prohibition would raise taxes considerably since the revenue from alcohol would be lost. The second was that prohibition would forbid the use of wine for sacramental purposes. This was clearly false but proved effective enough to keep much of the Hispanic populace on the wet side.²⁴

The dry campaign was loud, boisterous, and widespread. Unlike the anti-prohibitionists, they made considerable use of the news media and propaganda to carry their cause to every adult and child. The prohibitionists succeeded in getting many influential leaders in the state to go on the stump for them. These included Governor and Mrs. Lindsey, Secretary of State Antonio Lucero, Chief Justice Clarence Roberts, and other members of the state government.²⁵

The prohibitionists, led by the Anti-Saloon League and the WCTU, bent their efforts toward the indoctrination of children concerning the evils of liquor in order to make parents conscious of the ruinous effects of their liquor habits on innocent children. An example of this kind of propaganda is a WCTU-sponsored children's parade through downtown Santa Fe on election day. About one thousand children took part and marched by all four polling places. WCTU officials termed the parade a success.²⁶ Another example was a WCTU contest in all Santa Fe County schools. A prize of ten dollars was offered for the best essay on "Why New Mexico Should Vote Out the Saloons." This contest received considerable publicity and the winning essay was published in the *New Mexican*.²⁷

A more effective kind of propaganda which was widely publicized by the leading New Mexico papers, was the economic and military benefits of prohibition to the war effort. This argument was strengthened by the Food Administration's ban on the production of grain alcohol. In a speech given on November 3, Mrs. W. E. Lindsey said:

The president through the authority of a recent war measure passed by the congress, has forbidden the manufacture of whiskey and gin for the period of the war. Aside from the long list of awful tragedies following in the wake of the liquor traffic, the economic

waste is too great to be tolerated at this time. With so many people of the allied nations near to the door of starvation, it would be criminal ingratitude for us to continue the manufacture of whiskey.²⁸

Both Mrs. Lindsey and the Governor became increasingly active promoting the patriotic cause of prohibition. Their chief argument was summed up in an editorial in the *New Mexican* of October 20 under the title "A Distinguished Example." It noted that the Lindseys were convinced that the time had come to end the useless manufacture of alcohol from valuable food products. The demands of the breweries for 110 million bushels of grain, equal to twelve million loaves of bread, were unthinkable and a crime "when the outcome of this war may depend upon food."²⁹

In the weeks before election day the *New Mexican* and the *Albuquerque Morning Journal* were full of articles and editorials favoring the passage of prohibition. Most of them went to great lengths to play on patriotic emotions. In some instances it was even implied that the wets were in sympathy with the Kaiser.³⁰ This was the most influential propaganda that the drys used and doubtless swayed many people to the side of prohibition.

New Mexico is an inseparable part of the American union. Our citizenship has always been loyal. We have met every emergency bravely, victoriously. Hundreds of our young men have been called to the colors. From time to time increasing numbers of our young men will be called for their country. New Mexico must make sure that these men go forth to battle with unimpaired vitality, and clear heads. To make this possible we must adopt every measure that will promote the efficiency and well being of every citizen.

The election of November 6th is going to be a sort of barometer by which the patriotism of New Mexico will be registered.³¹

Although the *Journal* did publish a large number of articles clearly favoring prohibition, it usually avoided outright propaganda, and simply reported the progress of the dry campaign.

Again and again the *Journal* warned that the wets had strong support and that in order to pass prohibition the drys would have to be on guard. In October it cited the prohibition vote in Iowa

where the outcome was still uncertain, although the dries had been certain of an easy victory.³² Albuquerque was a hot spot in the state campaigns. The fight between wets and dries was out in the open, and the dries were forced to urge their supporters to work more vigorously.³³ In Santa Fe and the rest of the state (except Taos) campaigning was more restrained.

The *New Mexican*, under the progressive leadership of Bronson Cutting, was more inclined to print propaganda, generally linking prohibition with patriotism:

It is said that Germany does not consider us very seriously. At the annual meeting of the American Medical Association last June, alcohol was declared to have no medicinal value and its only use in medicine is as a preservative. Now with the present rate of its consumption, Prussianism probably notes the fact that we, as a nation, use entirely too much liquor. Hence her apparent disdain for a race which might be considered in a state of half-preservation. If we are to win this war, we cannot do it if we stay 'pickled.'

. . . the responsibility comes home to every voter—he must use his vote to help weld this nation into a mighty scalpel that will carve Liberty across the marble heart of Prussianism.³⁴

Although the *New Mexican* was much more emphatic than the *Journal*, both papers were equally loyal to the dry cause. No doubt as the largest and most influential papers in the state they had a significant impact upon many voters.

Such publicity and prohibition rallies held across the state made the dry forces fairly confident of a victory. As it turned out their confidence was justified.

On November 6, 1917, over 40,000 New Mexicans went to the polls and passed prohibition by a margin of 16,000 votes.³⁵ Returns began coming in on the seventh and continued through November 26, while a jubilant governor, secretary of state, chief justice, and the prohibition forces rejoiced. Secretary of State Lucero summed up the general feeling in an emotional victory speech on November 7:

The people of New Mexico, by their action at the polls yesterday, with one blow succeeded in shattering to pieces the shackles [*sic*] which for years had been holding as slaves thousands of unfortunates who are adicted [*sic*] to drink, and the families of those emancipated victims of King Alcohol, I know, are today on their knees thanking the Almighty for the return of brighter days which they see are coming to them shortly.³⁶

All twenty-eight counties in New Mexico except Taos and Rio Arriba voted dry. Counties with two to one majorities for prohibition included Colfax, Grant, Guadalupe, Lincoln, McKinley, Sandoval, San Miguel, and Socorro. Other counties went dry by larger majorities; some even passed prohibition by five to one. These included Chaves, Curry, Quay, San Juan, Torrance, Union, and Valencia. Otero County balloted six to one for prohibition.³⁷

What happened to Taos and Rio Arriba Counties? Taos County went wet by a 4.15 per cent margin, while according to official records, Rio Arriba County went wet by a single vote.³⁸ The Reverend R. E. Farley, chairman of the Anti-Saloon League in New Mexico, explained that the loss was due to propoganda claiming that prohibition would bring higher taxes and prevent the use of wine for sacramental purposes.³⁹ This explanation may be valid but the large Hispanic population in these counties suggests that the dry forces may have failed to exercise patronage and buy sufficient Hispanic votes, a practice which obviously succeeded elsewhere.

When the returns were finally completed they showed that prohibition had passed. The total number of votes cast was 40,879. Of these 28,732, or 70.2 per cent, were in favor of prohibition and 12,147 or 29.8 per cent, against.⁴⁰

In analyzing this vote, it is necessary to look at county returns for a regional pattern, and to determine whether there may have been an ethnic struggle over prohibition. The vote for prohibition was strongest in the eastern and southern parts of the state. These counties, which voted dry by a three to one, or larger, majority,

were almost entirely situated along the eastern border with Texas, and the southern border with Mexico. This is understandable and the dry forces expected it because this was the stronghold of prohibition, especially Clovis, Portales, and Artesia.⁴¹

Although they were not in the predominantly dry areas of eastern and southern New Mexico, Torrance, Valencia, and San Juan counties voted for prohibition by a five to one majority. This can best be explained by lack of a significant Hispanic population. Most of the residents were connected with ranching or with the Navajo, Laguna, or Acoma Indian reservations. The Anglo voters were in control of the election. The Hispanic voice in both counties was simply too weak to have any effect on the voting results.⁴² In the case of San Juan County, it should be noted that before the election it had been the only completely dry county in the state.⁴³

All but two of the counties that went dry by a two to one majority or less were located in the mountain north. Colfax County voted dry by two to one as did Santa Fe, McKinley, Sandoval, San Miguel, and Guadalupe. Bernalillo and Mora Counties went dry by only a one and a half to one majority.⁴⁴ The wet counties, Taos and Rio Arriba, were also in the north.

The fact that these counties voted either for prohibition by a relatively small majority or voted wet may be explained by two facts. First, this was the area where a majority of the voting Hispanic population lived. The dry forces obviously attempted to coerce them into voting for prohibition, but there were simply too many pro-liquor Hispanic voters. Second, it was in this mountainous area, which contained from one-third to one-half of the total population of New Mexico, that the wets apparently expended the most money and energy during the campaign. It is significant that of the 12,147 votes cast against prohibition, over half (7,162) came from the northern counties.⁴⁵

It appears that on a statewide basis the fight concerning prohibition was between the Anglo and Hispanic population. It is true that propaganda and patronage turned much of the potential power of the Hispanic vote to the dry side. But the northern

section of the voting Hispanic population was so numerous that the dries were not able to condition it as thoroughly as they would have liked.

A good example of the voting pattern of the Hispanic and Anglo populations is Bernalillo County in general and Albuquerque in particular. The county went dry by a vote of 1,883 to 1,288, a margin of only 595, or 15.6 per cent of the total vote cast. Five of the twenty-one precincts in the county went wet, but this is not significant since the votes cast in all five precincts totaled only 397. These five precincts were almost exclusively inhabited by persons of Hispanic descent.⁴⁶

Two precincts in Bernalillo County included the City of Albuquerque, and they were divided into four districts.⁴⁷ The two districts on the Rio Grande, the western and older half of the city, had a much larger Hispanic population than the two eastern districts.⁴⁸ There is, however, an apparent contradiction. The two predominantly Anglo districts voted dry by a sizeable majority, as expected, but so did the second district of the twelfth precinct, which was predominantly Hispanic. Why did it not vote in the same way as the predominantly Hispanic second district of the twenty-sixth precinct?⁴⁹

The answer to this question is unknown but one may speculate: The fact that the second district of the twelfth precinct contained a larger population than the other Hispanic district may have inspired the dry forces to greater effort because they considered it more important than the other. Moreover, there are indications that there was a larger Anglo population in the second district of the twelfth precinct than in the second district of the twenty-sixth precinct. Anglo influence and possible patronage of their Hispanic neighbors may have affected the vote.⁵⁰

There does indeed appear to be an ethnic pattern of voting in Albuquerque. The southwestern district, with its large Hispanic concentration, voted for prohibition by only a 7.3 per cent margin. The northwestern district also with large Hispanic and small but apparently influential Anglo populations, voted dry by a 29.3 per cent margin. The northeastern and southeastern districts, which

included the newer part of the city and thus the predominantly Anglo region, voted for prohibition by margins of 18.3 per cent and 37.6 per cent respectively.⁵¹

As for voting patterns throughout the state one general question remains. Why did the state turn from decidedly wet in 1915 to decidedly dry in 1917? In 1915 less than twenty-five per cent of the population of New Mexico was completely dry.⁵² In the election of November 6, 1917 over seventy per cent of the votes supported prohibition.⁵³ Why this complete change of attitude? The answer is twofold. In the first place, the war produced a demand for men and food which greatly taxed the resources of the nation. So, with the help of prohibition propaganda the people of New Mexico became convinced that in order to win there must not be any hindrance of the war effort. Although arguments of the dry forces did overemphasize this, it was true that a ban on liquor was directly related to wartime economy.

The second reason for the switch in New Mexico was that the state leaders who came into office in 1916 favored prohibition. Among the more important were Governor Lindsey, Secretary of State Lucero and Chief Justice Roberts. R. E. Farley of the Anti-Saloon League correctly noted that it was they who got the dry cause rolling in the state. Along with many others of considerable power, they began to push for a state organization to get a prohibition amendment passed,⁵⁴ and their influence was a major factor in the election of 1917.

After these hectic weeks prohibition became of little concern during 1918 when the Allies continued to batter Germany, who was now at war against half the world. As the end of the war drew near, the State of New Mexico and the country at large began screaming for vengeance and unconditional surrender. The day for prohibition to take effect in New Mexico came and went practically unnoticed. Prohibition began at midnight on October 1, 1918. The newspapers, whose columns were filled with news about the war, only briefly mentioned the passage of liquor from the scene. The *Journal*, the *New Mexican* and other newspapers

published articles in the form of obituaries. The sarcastic editors of the *New Mexican* said:

Old King Alcohol died at midnight Monday. It was thought by a number of his friends that he would live throughout yesterday, but his breathing grew rather slow and difficult by 6 o'clock Monday evening, and shortly after supper it was announced in the lobbies of the hotels that there positively was no hope to pull the patient through the night.⁵⁵

This effusion was representative of the quiet resignation of the saloon owners and the equally quiet jubilation of the prohibitionists. Evidently the dry forces thought the battle was over. They wallowed in self-esteem, and apparently found no reason to make public threats of dire consequences if the law was broken. As events were to prove, however, the battle for effective prohibition had just begun.

NOTES

1. Lee Myers, "An Experiment in Prohibition," NMHR, vol. 40 (1965), pp. 293-97, 304-06.
2. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Population*, vol. 3, pp. 159-70.
3. Robert W. Larson, *New Mexico's Quest for Statehood* (Albuquerque, 1968), pp. 275-80.
4. Ernest Hurst Cherrington, ed., *Anti-Saloon League Year Book, 1916* (Westerville, Ohio: annual publication), p. 112.
5. Cherrington, *Anti-Saloon League Year Book, 1915*, pp. 176-77.
6. For lack of a better word, the term "Hispanic" has been used in reference to those citizens of New Mexico who have Spanish surnames.
7. Warren A. Beck, *New Mexico, A History of Four Centuries* (Norman, 1962), pp. 296-97.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 299-303.

9. Robert W. Larson, "Profile of a New Mexico Progressive," NMHR, vol. 45 (1970), pp. 240-41.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 236-38.
11. Patricia Cadigan Armstrong, *A Portrait of Bronson Cutting Through His Papers, 1910-1927* (Albuquerque, 1959), pp. 8-11.
12. Santa Fe *New Mexican*, Jan. 16, 1917, p. 1.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1917, p. 3.
15. *Ibid.*, Feb. 23, 1917, p. 3.
16. New Mexico, *Laws of the State of New Mexico Passed by the Third Regular Session of the Legislature of the State of New Mexico* (Albuquerque, 1917), p. 352.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
19. Santa Fe *New Mexican*, Feb. 7, 1917, p. 3.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Editorial, *ibid.*, p. 4.
22. Ira C. Idhe, "Washington Ellsworth Lindsey, Third Governor of New Mexico" (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of New Mexico, 1950), pp. 138-40.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 257-80.
24. Santa Fe *New Mexican*, Nov. 9, 1917, p. 5.
25. Albuquerque *Morning Journal*, Oct. 25, 1917, p. 5.
26. Santa Fe *New Mexican*, Nov. 6, 1917, p. 3.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
28. Albuquerque *Morning Journal*, Nov. 3, 1917, p. 3.
29. Editorial, Santa Fe *New Mexican*, Oct. 20, 1917, p. 4.
30. Albuquerque *Morning Journal*, Nov. 5, 1917, p. 2.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*, Oct. 18, 1917, p. 2.
33. Editorial, *ibid.*, Nov. 3, 1917, p. 6.
34. Editorial, Santa Fe *New Mexican*, Nov. 5, 1917, p. 4.
35. Ernestine D. Evans, compiler, *New Mexico Election Returns, 1911-69* (Santa Fe, n.d.), no pagination, Prohibition election returns.
36. Santa Fe *New Mexican*, Nov. 7, 1917, p. 5.
37. Prohibition election returns.
38. *Ibid.*
39. Santa Fe *New Mexican*, Nov. 9, 1917, p. 5.
40. Prohibition election returns.
41. Cherrington, *Anti-Saloon League Year Book, 1916*, p. 112.
42. Prohibition election returns.

43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Albuquerque Morning Journal*, Nov. 8, 1917, p. 8.
47. *Ibid.*, Nov. 5, 1917, p. 8.
48. This information was obtained by taking a random sampling of names from the *Albuquerque City Directory, 1917* (Dallas, 1917) and relating them to a map of Albuquerque in order to determine the Hispanic concentration in the voting districts of the city.
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Albuquerque Morning Journal*, Nov. 8, 1917.
52. Cherrington, *Anti-Saloon League Year Book, 1916*, p. 112.
53. Prohibition election returns.
54. *Santa Fe New Mexican*, Nov. 9, 1917, p. 5.
55. *Ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1918, p. 6.