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Richard E. Greenleaf

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## THE LITTLE WAR OF GUADALAJARA—1587-1590

RICHARD E. GREENLEAF\*

ONE of the major royal concerns for the proper administration of colonial Mexico was to avoid conflict of interest when officials became socially and economically involved in local affairs. In order to insure loyal and impartial government, marriage alliances between officials and local families were discouraged; and viceroys, judges and provincial functionaries were forbidden to engage in commercial undertakings. These policies were slow to evolve during the sixteenth century, and it was common knowledge that viceroys and oidores did have an economic stake in the community. In the interior provinces of the north, the holding of political office became synonymous with economic opportunism. It was a difficult pattern to break.

In 1575 Philip II decreed that henceforth it would be illegal for officials, from the viceregal down to provincial level, to marry, or for members of their families to wed, without royal permission and deprivation of office.<sup>1</sup> For more than a decade the *cedula* caused no great inconvenience in New Spain. The king granted exemptions to officials who made the correct petitions.

During the viceregency of don Álvaro Manrique de Zúñiga, Marqués of Villamanrique, seventh viceroy of Mexico (1585-1590), however, the judges on the two Audiencias under his supervision (New Spain and Guadalajara) began to violate the law. The Viceroy's troubles began with his oidor-colleagues on

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\* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor France V. Scholes, who first suggested this topic and shared documents from his collection.

the Audiencia of Mexico, of which he was president, or chief justice. In a letter to the king, dated October 1, 1587, Villamanrique outlined the major problems. He related that for the most part the judges sent out from Spain were fresh out of law school—some had come directly from Salamanca to Mexico. They were too young and did not have the practical and legal experience required for so responsible a job in the royal hierarchy. Lacking personal and professional maturity, these appointees failed to maintain proper detachment and became too sociable with the citizenry. Being young men, they were prone to fall in love, or to marry in order to improve their financial and social positions, and so became involved in the economic life of the colony. The business interests of the families into which they married too frequently influenced the oidores' decisions in the administration of royal justice. Villamanrique counseled Philip II to send more experienced and mature judges, already married, to fill vacancies. Villamanrique also described the situation engendered by the shortage of oidores. For example, when Dr. Paredes was too ill to continue his duties, only one oidor, Dr. Francisco Sande, remained to attend to the business of the court.

As a result the king appointed three new justices: Dr. Santiago del Riego, Dr. Andrés Saldierna de Mariaca, and Licenciado Hernando Saavedra de Valderrama.<sup>2</sup> At first the new judges were very industrious and Villamanrique expressed his approval. Then Dr. Paredes died and the other two began to neglect their duties and take too much part in social activities. Both were bachelors and a bit non-conformist; both were suing for the hand of a wealthy young heiress. Dr. Saldierna de Mariaca won her, although Saavedra de Valderrama had asked formal permission to marry her. Later Saavedra tried to marry the daughter of Juan de Villaseñor Cervantes of Guanajuato, and finally wed a daughter of Juan Bautista de Lomas y Colmenares, scion of the first family of Nueva Galicia.

Saldierna's conduct scandalized Villamanrique. He informed the Crown in October 1587 that although he was the senior oidor,

Saldierna de Mariaca had contracted matrimony with doña Leonor de Solís, daughter of the wealthy encomendero of Oculma, for a dowry of forty thousand pesos. The Viceroy reprimanded Saldierna and refused to permit the marriage or payment of the dowry—even though the oidor claimed he had written to Philip II asking permission. Villamanrique said it was indecorous for the Senior Oidor to carry on as he did, going to Leonor's house to dine, staying long after the other guests had departed, hanging around her residence all the time. In his report to his successor of February 1590 the Viceroy rounded out the story.<sup>3</sup> The Viceroy charged that while Saldierna was courting Leonor Solís two important cases involving her family were dismissed in their favor. Moreover, Leonor had presented Saldierna with a daughter on San Juan Day, 1588, even though, in the eyes of the civil authorities, they had not yet received permission to marry. The Viceroy said that his senior oidor had dared to announce to him the birth of a "new subject" for the Viceroy. Villamanrique was obliged to admonish Saldierna "not to tell me such things, because I do not wish to hear them."

Because Dr. Saldierna had made no secret of his marriage and parenthood to his colleagues, Lic. Valderrama and others—telling them that he was married and was not sorry for it—and since his wife's family was related to most of the prominent families of the viceregal capital, Viceroy Villamanrique decided that Saldierna would not be able to administer justice impartially. In order to document the marriage, the birth of a daughter, and the Solís connections, Villamanrique took copious testimony from the midwife and other persons and sent it to the king. Although Oidor Saldierna claimed that his marriage and new family were a product of Villamanrique's imagination, the Viceroy offered proof to the contrary. After Villamanrique removed him from office, Saldierna set up his home as a gambling house frequented by the riffraff of Mexico City.

Villamanrique sent clergymen and members of the Audiencia staff to Saldierna in an effort to persuade him to change his wicked ways, but to no effect. So when Saldierna's servant clubbed a tailor

who had gossiped about doña Leonor and the child, "almost in the presence of Dr. Santiago del Riego," the Viceroy exiled the offending master from Mexico. There is no doubt that Villamanrique's vexations with his own *audiencia* in Mexico City influenced his attitudes in the struggle with the judges of the *Audiencia* of Nueva Galicia which threatened to embroil the frontier of the Viceroyalty of New Spain in civil war and forced Villamanrique from office in 1590. Although the struggle began with a controversy over the marriage of judges on the Guadalajara *Audiencia*, the Viceroy's fall resulted from deeper political and economic problems.

THE Marqués de Villamanrique was a stern viceroy of New Spain, a man determined to enforce the spirit as well as the letter of the law. Earlier viceroys had compromised in narrowing the gap between theory and practice in colonial administration, but Villamanrique delved into political and financial matters with a tenacity that often antagonized vested interests. Perhaps, with his penchant to reorganize administrative processes and to consolidate royal power, Villamanrique was stubborn and inflexible. His enemies in Guadalajara called him intemperate. But he always seemed to uphold the king's prerogatives and the public interest with an impartial mind when he enunciated policies and saw to their enforcement.

With the reduction in colonial income during the last two decades of the sixteenth century, and the decline in native population resulting in labor shortages,<sup>4</sup> Viceroy Villamanrique began many regulatory policies to promote efficient public finance and economic stability. His searching inquiry into fiscal procedures in Veracruz, Zacatecas, and Nueva Galicia aroused animosity. He recommended to Philip II the construction of an official highway between Veracruz and Mexico City, not only for the sake of better communications but for better control of distribution in the Mexican economy.<sup>5</sup> His regulations on the manufacture and sale of wine in Indian villages and the excessive number of taverns—there were more than eighty bars in Cholula alone—were designed

to increase revenue. The merchants were very surly at the prospect of regulation, saying they had licenses from Spain to sell their goods anywhere they pleased. Regulations on slaughterhouses and the issuance of licenses to weigh meats were other methods employed by the Viceroy to control the economy at the lower levels. Control over the mining and sale of salt, sericulture in the Mixteca, and stern supervision of gambling facilities resulted from Villamanrique's determination to mould the economic and moral character of New Spain.<sup>6</sup>

Villamanrique's most successful financial achievements were his tight rein on the quicksilver market, which enabled him to supervise mining activities in the north, and his establishment of an *Acuerdo de Hacienda*, or Tribunal of Accounts. In March 1587 the Viceroy got royal approval for his new *acuerdo*, and he initiated a weekly tribunal, over which he presided, to review financial matters, taxation—especially sales taxes and customs duties—and see to the regulation of quicksilver. The Viceroy, the Crown attorney, and the Senior Oidor of the Audiencia made up the *Acuerdo*.<sup>7</sup> Perhaps the very success of the new court, and Villamanrique's statements that the Audiencia of Guadalajara should be subordinate to the *acuerdo* in financial matters, stiffened the opposition to his viceregency.

Villamanrique's attitude toward royal supervision of church activities as defined in the *Patronato Real* differed considerably from that of his predecessor, Archbishop-Viceroy Pedro Moya de Contreras. The new viceroy complained to the king about the general obstreperousness of the clergy and their tendency toward autonomous action.<sup>8</sup> For example, in 1586 he related that cooperation from the clergy came only from the bishops of Oaxaca and Michoacan, who were humble friars and respected the royal patronage. The other bishops made every effort to evade viceregal enforcement of the *Patronato*.<sup>9</sup> The situation compelled the Viceroy to issue a specific instruction to the bishops on nomination of clergy, their installation with an oath to obey the *Patronato*, and other procedures. Villamanrique singled out the Bishop of Puebla

as especially defiant of political authority. The Viceroy's problems with the bishops were to have unfortunate ramifications in the little war of Guadalajara.

Villamanrique's Indian policy caused great consternation among the Spanish population. In 1590 he informed his successor that he had soon become aware of continuing population decline as a result of Spanish labor policies and harsh treatment of the natives. In order to remedy the deplorable situation, he had contrived a whole series of new policies on the *repartimiento*, or labor draft, and the *obrajes*, woolen and cotton textile mills using Indian labor.<sup>10</sup> By reducing the number of natives drafted from each village, prohibiting that they be sent to work far from their homes, and by assuring them at least a subsistence supply of food, the Viceroy valiantly tried to instill a spirit of conservation of labor supply and to curb excessive exploitation. Since profits from their ventures were levelling off or declining, and tribute income from *encomiendas* had shrunk, the colonists resented Villamanrique's actions. Many went to the northern frontier, hoping to evade vice-regal meddling. The clergy were especially critical of the new policies because they depended upon Indian labor and feudal dues for their economic well-being.

The Viceroy tried to administer and supervise three major frontier areas: the province of Nuevo León in the northeast, the north central Chichimec frontier of Nueva Vizcaya, and the settlements of Nueva Galicia in the northwest. Obviously, the dispersion of authority and the great distances hampered his actions. For instance, he took the famous Governor Luis de Carvajal of Nuevo León to task for slave raiding in the Rio Grande area, where he committed many atrocities among Indians who knew neither the Spaniard nor the Church, selling them as slaves at the mines or on the haciendas of the central valley of Mexico.<sup>11</sup> Carvajal was arrested by the Inquisition after appearing before Villamanrique on other counts, but the Viceroy complained that Carvajal's lieutenant governor, Gaspar Castaño, was committing these same reprehensible acts, with a group of marauding soldiers who had "no sense of justice or Christian feeling."

Perhaps it was Villamanrique's conduct of the Chichimec War which caused the initial friction with the Guadalajara Audiencia.<sup>12</sup> When the Viceroy proceeded to eliminate the communications barrier between the central valley and the rich silver mines of Zacatecas, caused by the Chichimecs, the miners and the Guadalajara judges saw an end to their autonomy. Hard feelings had arisen from a struggle between the Audiencia of Nueva Galicia and the Audiencia of Mexico over military jurisdiction. In the 1560's it had been customary for the Viceroy and Audiencia of Mexico to appoint a lieutenant captain general as field commander. The judges and president of the New Galicia Audiencia also appointed a commander—Rodrigo del Río de Loza in the 1570-1590 period—refusing to recognize the supreme command of the Viceroy. Although Villamanrique agreed to Rodrigo del Río de Loza as viceregal commander of the troops in the Chichimec campaigns, he supervised with a heavy hand, prohibited the enslavement of non-bellicose Chichimecs, and severely limited the sale of captured Indians for the mines of Zacatecas and Nueva Galicia.<sup>13</sup> It is probable that viceregal military planning in Chichimeca, around Zacatecas, and on the fringes of Nueva Galicia made the Guadalajara oidores apprehensive.

A chain of settlements in the area of modern Jalisco had been established during the first two decades of the Mexican conquest. By the 1540's the missionary clergy, miners, and cattle ranchers had populated the region to such an extent that separate political and legal jurisdiction seemed necessary. In 1548 the Audiencia of Nueva Galicia, suffragan to the Viceroy and the Audiencia of Mexico, was established at Compostela. The headquarters of the Audiencia was moved to Guadalajara in 1560, and by 1573 it was made a royal chancellery, or independent court, with a president of its own and responsible to the Council of the Indies.<sup>14</sup> Many viceroys, Villamanrique among them, doubted the efficacy of a separate frontier jurisdiction with only perfunctory supervisory control from Mexico City.

The Audiencia of Guadalajara, like its counterparts all over the Spanish empire, was far more than a judicial body. It exercised



quasi-legislative and executive functions as well, and had political and economic jurisdiction over the far northern frontier. By the last quarter of the sixteenth century influential cattle barons and mining families had come to dominate much of the economic life of New Galicia. Two of these entrepreneurs, Juan Bautista de Lomas y Colmenares and Rodrigo del Río de Loza, were related to families of Zacatecas.

Vested interests were becoming increasingly hostile to economic supervision by the crown. Jurisdictional subterfuge was a frequent means of escaping royal control. Wherever the viceroy's authority was nebulous, or where he shared it with other officials, colonists relied on loose construction of the law. Whenever possible, they employed the "obedezco pero no cumplo" (I obey but I do not execute) formula and ignored higher authority. On New Spain's northern frontier monopolization of mining and ranching activities developed a wealthy class who sought to control political office as well. During the reign of Philip II (1555-1598) it became customary to sell public office for revenue.<sup>15</sup> Parry notes that "the usual purchasers of municipal offices in New Galicia were local encomenderos, ranchers and mine owners."<sup>16</sup>

If young Audiencia judges were eager to increase their incomes by marriage, the economically active families also saw advantages from marrying daughters or sisters to the oidores. The oidores of Mexico and Guadalajara were responsible for regulation of mining and codification of mining law, for authorization of repartimientos, distribution of land, military assessments, rewarding services in campaigns against barbarous Indians, sale of public office, proba-tion of wills and administration of the property of those who died intestate, supervision of provincial and local political offices, and auditing and supervision of treasury matters.<sup>17</sup> Obviously, having a relative at court could be helpful to miners and cattle ranchers.

Because of his exacting fiscal regulations and his Indian policies, Viceroy Villamanrique had a difficult job in his supervisory capacity vis-à-vis the Audiencia of Guadalajara. Inter-marriage of royal officialdom and the wealthy families in Nueva

Galicia had created a privileged oligarchy. Judicial decisions, law enforcement, and treasury matters were influenced by family connections. The processing and taxing of silver were in the hands of people whose scrupulous honesty Villamanrique questioned. Furthermore, the Guadalajara officials acted with arrogant autonomy, challenging viceregal authority and Villamanrique's desire to give meaningful direction to political and economic affairs in Nueva Galicia. He met with resistance whenever he tried to modify procedures or insure compliance with royal orders in the imperial interest. The rich silver areas of Zacatecas were so far from Mexico City and communications with Guadalajara so bad that Villamanrique felt it unwise for these settlements to be administered by the Audiencia of Guadalajara.

Like other viceroys, Villamanrique questioned the need for a separate and semi-autonomous jurisdiction in Guadalajara. He claimed that the diffusion of political power often militated against the royal interest, and that the area was too sparsely populated.<sup>18</sup> Since most people inevitably came to Mexico City on business, and the capital was just as accessible from the northern frontier as Guadalajara, which was relatively close to Mexico City, Villamanrique queried the king about the real need for a separate tribunal. Why not a small, competent, loyal, and unencumbered body of royal officials to administer justice and finance in Nueva Galicia, while the Audiencia remained where it could be adequately supervised by the Viceroy? Villamanrique thought his recommendation to the king was especially appropriate in view of the scarcity of oidores to staff audiencias.<sup>19</sup>

Villamanrique complained that finance in Nueva Galicia, including silver mining, lacked proper safeguards for the royal treasury to be able to cope with dishonesty and conflict of interest. He suggested two methods of remedying the situation. First, the viable and expanding Mexican jurisdictions might pattern themselves after the Peruvian experience. There the viceroy did have the necessary and proper controls and, in some cases, retained the title of President of outlying audiencias. Or, if the king did not

choose to remodel the Guadalajara jurisdiction, he asked for a cedula relieving him of all responsibility for Nueva Galicia, placing the province outside of the administration of New Spain proper. The viceroy wanted authority commensurate with responsibility or no authority at all.

The oidores of Guadalajara took the position that their president, not Viceroy Villamanrique, was the ranking official in Nueva Galicia. With jealous zeal they fought viceregal interference in their affairs. The issue was not unique. It was the fundamental question in top-ranking Spanish colonial administration throughout the empire: Where did primary authority of the viceroy stop? Where did the oidores' power begin in Indian affairs, economic matters, and law enforcement? This question was never answered by the king or his Council of the Indies. In Nueva Galicia the problem led to civil war in 1587 and 1588, a conflict which the Franciscan chronicler Fray Antonio Tello called "the little war of Guadalajara."<sup>20</sup> The matter of marriages by oidores and fiscales of the court was merely a symptom of the conflict between vested interests and royal controls. Obviously, the regional powers prevailed, if not with royal blessing, with the Spanish government's tolerance. Philip II had given Villamanrique responsibility without sufficient authority.

After the serious trouble with the oidores of the Audiencia of Mexico concerning marriage and conflict of interest in the Saldierna de Mariaca and Saavedra Valderrama cases in 1587 and 1588, Viceroy Villamanrique was on the alert for similar problems in Guadalajara. He decided to assert his authority and force the Audiencia of Guadalajara to obey the royal cedula on marriage and conflict of interest. The fiscal of the Guadalajara audiencia, Lic. Miguel de Pinedo, provoked the first controversy by marrying his daughter to a wealthy resident of Nueva Galicia. Since Pinedo had no royal dispensation for the marriage, Viceroy Villamanrique sent an order to Guadalajara depriving him of office. Pinedo refused to acknowledge the order, and despite a second mandamus from the viceroy, the Audiencia allowed Pinedo to continue in office.<sup>21</sup>

The cause célèbre, which resulted in armed conflict between the Viceroy of New Spain and the Audiencia of Nueva Galicia in 1588, was the marriage of Oidor Licenciado Nuño Núñez de Villavicencio to doña Maria de Lomas y Colmenares, daughter of Juan Bautista de Lomas y Colmenares of Las Nieves. Presumably Villamanrique wrote Philip II for instructions on how to deal with the matter, for on June 18, 1588, the king commanded the viceroy to enforce the prohibitions against the marriage of oidores.<sup>22</sup>

The bride brought Núñez de Villavicencio a dowry of twelve thousand pesos and connection with one of the wealthiest families on the northern frontier.<sup>23</sup> Since the oidor had not received royal permission to marry, Viceroy Villamanrique proceeded to divest him of office and salary. At the time, the office of president of the Audiencia of Nueva Galicia was vacant, and no one was willing to carry out the order. Núñez de Villavicencio's colleagues refused to deprive him of his position, and the treasury officials, not being responsible to the viceroy, continued to pay his salary. When Villamanrique ordered the oidor to come to Mexico City to answer charges, the Audiencia of Guadalajara denied the Viceroy's jurisdiction in the case.<sup>24</sup> Incensed by the rebuff, Villamanrique ordered Núñez de Villavicencio's arrest.

Early in 1589 the military phase of the struggle started. Some accounts say that the Viceroy "decided to reduce the Audiencia to obedience by force" and that he assembled an army under the command of Gil Verdugo de Ávila to invade the city of Guadalajara.<sup>25</sup> Villamanrique, in his report to the second Viceroy Velasco claimed that he had sent troops to arrest Núñez de Villavicencio, who spread the word that the Viceroy was attempting to arrest the entire Audiencia.<sup>26</sup> The judges raised an army of local encomenderos and supporters, with the famous and wealthy Rodrigo del Río de Loza in command, and the forces confronted each other at Analco, a suburb of Guadalajara. Chroniclers partisan to Guadalajara maintain that a bloody battle would have followed had not Bishop Domingo de Arzola, in full pontifical garb, interposed himself between the two armies with the Holy Sacrament in his

hands. "With sermons and showers of tears"<sup>27</sup> he persuaded the viceregal forces to withdraw. Apparently the city was well fortified and ready to give combat.

Villamanrique's account is quite different.<sup>28</sup> He claimed that Núñez de Villavicencio had so misrepresented his intention that people believed the entire Audiencia was to be arrested. He reported to the king and to Viceroy Luis de Velasco II, his successor, that the Audiencia and Rodrigo del Río de Loza had gathered "all the outlaws and profligates of the kingdom" to stage an uprising and repel Verdugo. Sensing the madness of this restless and terrible mob, Verdugo demurred. In order to avoid further outrages, Villamanrique ordered his own ministers to withdraw.

While the battle of words continued and the military lines were formed, the Audiencia of Guadalajara wrote letters to the King, to the Tribunal of the Holy Office of the Inquisition in Mexico City, and to the Audiencia of Mexico to discredit Villamanrique and spread the word that the colony was on the verge of civil war.<sup>29</sup> The oidores found willing allies in the Cabildo of Guadalajara and the Nueva Galicia clergy, who gave credence to the reports.<sup>30</sup> When the reverberations reached Philip II and the Council of the Indies, Villamanrique was removed from office (December 1589) and Velasco II appointed. The judges of Guadalajara had accomplished what they set out to do.

In his study of the Audiencia of Nueva Galicia, Parry feels that the adroit, if somewhat reprehensible tactics of the Audiencia taught future viceroys a lesson: "All was quiet by the time Velasco arrived in Mexico; but it is significant that throughout his distinguished and successful reign he used the greatest tact and forbearance in dealing with the authorities of New Galicia."<sup>31</sup> In his report to his successor in February 1590, Villamanrique claimed that the oidores of Guadalajara were flaunting the law. Not only had they gone completely free as a result of the uprising, but they had consistently refused to obey the Viceroy in his capacity as governor. Villamanrique charged that his policies and changes of procedure in fiscal and military administration were ignored in Nueva Galicia after the "revolt."<sup>32</sup>

More often than not Villamanrique's fall has been attributed to the "Little War of Guadalajara." The war was an important factor, but more of a rallying cry for his dismissal than a real issue. To be sure, Philip II was not in possession of reliable information when he removed Villamanrique. The oidores had employed a very effective kind of psychological warfare, leading the king to believe that the entire viceroyalty was engaged in civil war. Velasco II found the realm tranquil when he arrived, and Villamanrique claimed that the importance of the Nueva Galicia affair had been exaggerated and the punitive expedition against Nuño Núñez de Villavicencio misunderstood and misrepresented.<sup>33</sup> In view of Villamanrique's strained relations with the clergy, it is interesting that the Bishop of Tlaxcala was chosen to take his residencia.<sup>34</sup> The Viceroy was placed under house arrest in Texcoco. Villamanrique died before the lengthy proceedings in Mexico and Spain came to an end in the 1590's.<sup>35</sup>

Beyond a doubt the Guadalajara War was victory for the autonomy of the Audiencia of Nueva Galicia. Villamanrique's successors trod softly in their relations with the frontier oidores. The king reiterated his order forbidding oidores to wed without royal license,<sup>36</sup> but the Guadalajara judges married whom they chose and when they chose without royal approbation or viceregal interference.<sup>37</sup> The privileged oligarchy of cattle ranchers, the mining aristocracy, and royal officialdom consolidated its power. The Río de Loza and Lomas y Colmenares families continued to marry daughters to oidores in Guadalajara and in Mexico. The Oñate family in Zacatecas did likewise. The importance of influential connection with "una buena familia de Guadalajara," one of the clichés of Mexican social history, is quite evident in the early squabbles over the contract to colonize New Mexico. The Lomas y Colmenares, with the complicity of son-in-law oidor Nuño Núñez de Villavicencio, used their influence to prevent Francisco de Ur-diñola from receiving the contract, and helped to entangle him in the civil proceedings that effectively removed him from consideration as colonizer of New Mexico.<sup>38</sup> Because of family connections in Guadalajara and relatives on the Audiencia of Mexico, Juan de

Oñate became the governor and captain general of the New Mexico colony.<sup>39</sup>

### NOTES

1. *Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias* (Madrid, 1681), Lib. II, tit. 16, Ley 82. See also *Real Cédula al Presidente, oidores, alcaldes y fiscales de la Audiencia de México, que no vayan en cuerpo de Audiencia y ninguno de ellos en particular a desposorios, casamientos o entierros*, 22 mayo 1583, Archivo General de la Nación, México (cited hereinafter as AGN), Reales Cédulas, Duplicados, Tomo 2, exp. 27; *Real cédula para que el Presidente, oidores y fiscal de la Real Audiencia no visiten a personas que tengan negocios en ella*, 15 octubre 1588, *ibid.*, exp. 331.

2. *Carta del virrey marqués de Villamanrique a su Majestad*, México, 1 octubre 1587, Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla (cited hereinafter as AGI), Audiencia de México, Leg. 21; *Título de Oidor de la Real Audiencia de México para el Licenciado Andrés de Zaldiverna*, 17 julio 1586, AGN, Reales Cédulas, Duplicados, Tomo 2, exp. 207; *Títulos de Oidor de la Real Audiencia de México para el licenciado Hernando Valderrama*, 27 octubre 1586, *ibid.*, exp. 208.

3. France V. Scholes and Eleanor B. Adams, *Advertimientos generales que los virreyes dejaron a sus sucesores para el gobierno de Nueva España 1590-1604* (México, 1956), pp. 37-38.

4. More and more reports to the Crown mentioned decline in population as a result of epidemics and harsh treatment of the Indians.

5. *Copia de la carta que el virrey marqués de Villamanrique escribió a vuestra Majestad en doce de mayo de 1586 sobre lo mucho que importa abrir el camino de la Vera Cruz a México y hacer la descarga en San Juan de Ulúa*, México, 12 mayo 1586, AGI, Audiencia de México, Leg. 21. Villamanrique firmly believed that royal revenues would increase if this were the only access to the capital. Many ships landed up coast from Veracruz to avoid paying duties.

6. Two documents in particular illuminate these facets of colonial administration: *Carta del marqués de Villamanrique a su Majestad*, México, 20 octubre 1587; *Licencia del excelentísimo señor marqués de Villamanrique para pesar carne en la ciudad de Texcoco por un año*, México, 28 febrero 1587. *Ibid.*

7. Villamanrique describes the new court in *Carta del virrey marqués de Villamanrique a su Majestad*, México, 28 abril 1587, *ibid.*; and com-

ments on its great success in his 1590 memorial to his successor, Scholes and Adams, pp. 13-27.

8. *Carta del virrey marqués de Villamanrique a su Majestad, México, 30 junio 1588*, AGI, Audiencia de México, Leg. 21.

9. Scholes and Adams, pp. 38-39.

10. In a letter to the king, November 30, 1588, Villamanrique recommended that negro slaves replace Indians in the mines. AGI, Audiencia de México, Leg. 21. He reviewed the labor situation in his remarks to his successor. Scholes and Adams, pp. 24-26. For the Villamanrique obraje ordinances, see "Mandamientos sobre indios en obrajes, 1579-1633," *Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación* (México), vol. 11 (1940), pp. 9-32.

11. Scholes and Adams, pp. 29-31. See also *Real cédula a la Audiencia de México para que castigue a los culpables de haber dado por esclavos a los indios que fue a reducir el capitán Luis de Carvajal a la sierra de Jalapa, 8 agosto 1587*, AGN, Reales Cédulas, Duplicados, Tomo 2, exp. 338.

12. For the Chichimec wars, see Philip W. Powell, *Soldiers, Indians and Silver: The Northward Advance of New Spain, 1550-1600* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1952); Stafford Poole, "War by Fire and Blood: The Church and the Chichimecas, 1585," *The Americas*, vol. 22 (1965), pp. 115-37. Powell (pp. 183-86) considers that Villamanrique was very competent in carrying on the war after October 1585, and says: "To this great Viceroy must go the major share of credit for planning and largely effecting . . . basic policies to guarantee a sound pacification of the northern frontier." The Cabildo of Guadalajara was very critical of his strategy. Powell, p. 190.

13. See *Copia de la nueva orden que el virrey marqués de Villamanrique dio en las cosas de la guerra contra los indios chichimecas, México, 10 agosto 1586*, AGI, Audiencia de México, Leg. 20; Scholes and Adams, pp. 27-29.

14. The best account of the conquest of New Galicia is José López Portillo y Weber, *La conquista de la Nueva Galicia* (México, 1935); the authoritative history of the Audiencia, J. H. Parry, *The Audiencia of New Galicia in the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge, Eng., 1948).

15. J. H. Parry, *The Sale of Public Office in the Spanish Indies under the Hapsburgs* (Berkeley, 1953), pp. 33-47 *passim*.

16. Parry, *Audiencia of New Galicia*, p. 145.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 135-45.

18. *Carta del virrey marqués de Villamanrique a su Majestad, 1 octubre 1587*, AGI, Audiencia de México, Leg. 21. Parry (*Audiencia of New Galicia*, pp. 185, 121) bears out Villamanrique's charge that the population did not justify a separate jurisdiction: ". . . an elaborate administrative, judicial and ecclesiastical organization was superimposed upon a relatively



sparse population." ". . . there were in 1570 about fifteen hundred Spanish householders in New Galicia, distributed among two cities, six towns, and fifteen established mining settlements."

19. *Villamanrique a su Majestad, 1 octubre 1587.*

20. Chronicles give a lamentably cryptic treatment to the "Little War." Fray Antonio Tello, O.F.M., coined the phrase in his *Crónica miscelánea de la Santa Provincia de Jalisco*, 1643 (México, 1898) but had little to say about the conflict (cap. ccxxviii). Matías de la Mota y Padilla, *Historia de la Conquista del Reino de la Nueva Galicia*, 1742 (Guadalajara, 1920), pp. 315-16, gives considerable data. *Memoria histórica de los sucesos más notables de la conquista particular de Jalisco por los españoles* (Guadalajara, 1879), p. 128, has some interpretive data. See also Parry, *Audiencia of New Galicia*, pp. 170-72, and Vicente Riva Palacio, *México a través de los siglos*, vol. 2 (México, 1954), pp. 439-40.

21. See Scholes and Adams, p. 37.

22. *Copia de la real cédula al virrey marqués de Villamanrique dándole la orden que había de tener en la provisión de los oficios del Nuevo Reino de Galicia, San Lorenzo, 18 junio 1588.* AGI, Audiencia de México, Leg. 21.

23. Scholes and Adams, p. 37.

24. *Copia de la carta que la Audiencia de Guadalajara escribió al virrey marqués de Villamanrique obedeciendo la cédula acerca del gobierno de aquel reino, Guadalajara, 4 noviembre 1588.* AGI, Audiencia de México, Leg. 21.

25. Parry, *Audiencia of New Galicia*, p. 170.

26. Scholes and Adams, p. 37.

27. Tello, cap. ccxxviii; Parry, *Audiencia of New Galicia*, p. 171. Cf. Mota Padilla, p. 315, and *Memoria histórica de Jalisco*, p. 128.

28. Scholes and Adams, pp. 37-38.

29. AGN, Inquisición, Tomo 104; Parry, *Audiencia of New Galicia*, p. 171.

30. *Noveno Libro de las Actas de Cabildo de la Ciudad de México* (México, 1889), p. 330.

31. Parry, *Audiencia of New Galicia*, p. 171.

32. Scholes and Adams, p. 38.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

34. *Comisión al obispo de Tlaxcala para visitar al marqués de Villamanrique, virrey de la Nueva España, 31 agosto 1589*, AGN, Reales Cédulas, Duplicados, Tomo 2, exp. 375. For the Bishop's proceedings in Villamanrique's residencia, August 1589 to December 1590, see exps. 403-406. The animosity of the clergy toward Villamanrique is well documented in Fray Alonso Ponce's relation of 1586 and 1587, reproduced in part in Manuel

Romero de Terreros, *Bocetos de la vida social en la Nueva España* (México, 1944), pp. 19-21.

35. The residencia is in AGI, Audiencia de Guadalajara, Leg. 47.

36. *Real cédula para que en adelante no se casen en las Indias los Virreyes, Presidentes, Oidores, Alcaldes de Crimen y Fiscales de la Real Audiencia, así como sus hijos, sin la licencia de su Majestad*, AGN, Reales Cédulas, Duplicados, Tomo 2, exp. 358. See also the comments on problems arising from marriages of judges in Gonzalo Gómez de Cervantes, *La vida económica y social de Nueva España al finalizar el siglo XVI* (México, 1944), p. 125.

37. See Mota Padilla, pp. 315-16, for notes on the marriages of Guadalajara oidores from 1588 to 1604. See also *Carta de la hija de Juan de Lomas, México, 11 junio 1592*, AGI, Audiencia de México, Leg. 71, and AGN, Reales Cédulas, Duplicados, Tomos 2, 3.

38. See AGN, Inquisición, Tomo 214, exp. 20, Tomo 215, exp. 14, and Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Inquisición de México, Legs. 1064-67, *passim*, for the Urdiñola fracas. Cf. Vito Alessio Robles, *Francisco de Urdiñola y el Norte de la Nueva España* (México, 1931), pp. 217-75; Parry, *Audiencia of Nueva Galicia*, pp. 177-84.

39. For the Oñate family connections and their influential friends, see George P. Hammond, *Don Juan de Oñate and the Founding of New Mexico* (Santa Fe, 1927), pp. 15-18 (also in NMHR, vol. 1, 1926, pp. 56-58).