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THE RIO GRANDE TREATY OF 1933
A PRELUDE TO SETTLEMENT

THOMAS M. DAVIES, JR.

THE YEARS 1920-1940 were a tumultuous period in the history of United States-Mexican relations. Fortunately for both countries, three of the United States' ambassadors to Mexico proved to be outstanding diplomats. Dwight D. Morrow, who served from 1927 to 1930, was replaced by Joshua Reuben Clark, Jr., his right-hand man; and Josephus Daniels succeeded Clark in 1933, serving until 1941. Here we are concerned with a specific aspect of the term of J. Reuben Clark.

Of all the issues faced by Ambassador Clark, only one, that pertaining to the Rio Grande boundary and the ownership of the plot of land known as El Chamizal, between El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, did not stem from the Mexican Revolution. On the contrary, the origins of this controversy date from the years preceding Mexican independence. Boundary disputes, the majority of which concern the Rio Grande, have been prevalent throughout United States-Mexican History.¹

As early as 1804, Thomas Jefferson claimed the Rio Grande as the western boundary of the Louisiana Purchase. In 1836, the first Texas Congress set the Rio Grande as the southwestern boundary of their new nation. In the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 the Rio Grande was designated as the permanent boundary between the United States and Mexico. To insure the continued existence of this boundary, the treaty provided for a permanent Boundary Commission, to be composed of one man from each nation.

In 1853 the Gadsden Purchase rectified the boundary in the Gila River area, and the Boundary Commission sought to take advantage of this opportunity to delineate an acceptable Rio Grande boundary. The inherent problem, however, was that the Rio Grande meandered continually, never retaining a fixed channel. This was particularly true in the area around El Paso, Texas, where the soil is sandy and where torrential seasonal rains often caused the river to shift its bed. Periodic floods and resultant erosion continued throughout the nineteenth century, and the two nations tried again in 1884 to establish an acceptable line.

The Chamizal dispute dates from 1873 when the Rio Grande suddenly shifted south of the 1852-1853 channel bed. It first became a matter of international concern in 1894 when the Boundary Commission sought to establish a dividing line on the bridges between Ciudad Juárez and El Paso. Mexico protested that no one had been authorized to establish a boundary between the two nations, but only to draw a line between the two cities. Mexico further protested that Pedro I. García had filed a claim in which he alleged that he owned a plot of land called Chamizal which had been affixed to the United States by a sudden shift in the river bed.

García asserted that his grandfather had secured title to the tract in 1827 and that his family had retained possession until 1873 when the river shifted. Under Article I of the Treaty of 1884, he claimed legal possession, charging that the shift had not been erosional, but a sudden abandonment of the old bed.²

In 1897 a serious flood in the valley prompted the citizens of El Paso and Ciudad Juárez to demand action. The two governments agreed to straighten the channel and to share the cost. The work was completed in 1899, and, as a result, Córdoba Island was created and given to Mexico. The population of Chamizal had increased during the 1890's. In 1892 a church and a parochial school were built, and a second church was built in 1905.³

Two serious diplomatic incidents, one over a railroad right of way in 1907 and the other over a disposal plant in 1909, forced both governments to act. In 1910 they agreed to establish an *ad hoc*

mixed arbitration commission composed of one United States commissioner, one Mexican commissioner, and one commissioner to be appointed by the Government of Canada. The convention of 1910 clearly stated that the decision of the commission was to be final, conclusive; and binding on both nations.

The basic argument of the Mexican Government was that the shift had been sudden and avulsive; therefore, in accordance with the Treaty of 1884, the tract must remain under Mexican sovereignty. The United States, on the other hand, held that the alteration had been slow and erosive and hence that the area was no longer legally a part of Mexico. The United States further claimed the area by right of undisputed possession since 1836.

On June 15, 1911, the commission announced it had awarded Chamizal to Mexico. The United States commissioner, Anson Mills, refused to accept the decision and President Taft backed him up. Thus the United States rejected the decision of an arbitral commission whose findings it had agreed to honor. Mexico protested, but the United States remained adamant and the controversy over Chamizal continued unabated.

There were numerous attempts made to settle the boundary disputes in the period 1912-1927 but none proved fruitful. A new ingredient had been added to the controversy; the advent of the Mexican Revolution had sorely disrupted the boundary discussions and even the arrival of Dwight Morrow failed to break the deadlock. During 1927-1930 the crucial question centered upon the problem of *bancos* which had been cut away by the shifting river.⁴ It was on questions of national territory that the nationalism which grew out of the Revolution was most evident. Neither nation would agree to proposals of extensive territorial exchange, not because the proposed exchanges were unjust, but because the diplomatic climate was unfavorable.⁵

Some progress was made in 1928 and 1929 which paved the way for the agreement of 1930. On June 19, 1928, the International Boundary Commission announced that it had unanimously agreed on forty-two decisions regarding exchange of territory arising from changes in the bed of the river.⁶ On December

21, 1928, the Commission released a report recommending the engineering feasibility of the preliminary plans for the stabilization of the boundary and the rectification of the Rio Grande.⁷

In July 1929, the United States lifted its embargo on arms and munitions to Mexico, and the Mexican Government announced that all domestic strife had ended. Thus the way was cleared for closer relations between the two countries. In August of 1929, the Boundary Commission met again to discuss the *banco* problem, which had increased in importance owing to the activities of rum-runners and smugglers along the border.⁸ The prospects of a settlement appeared so bright that Secretary of State Stimson sent J. Reuben Clark as a special representative of the United States to assist the American Commissioner Lawrence W. Lawson.⁹ The Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs Genaro Estrada invited the International Commission to meet in Mexico City to put into treaty form the plans to rectify the river and stabilize the boundary.¹⁰ The State Department approved the meeting and the conference convened on July 28, 1930. When Ambassador Morrow was not in Mexico, as was often the case during the summer of 1930, the responsibility was delegated either to Clark or to Lawson.¹¹

In addition to the easing of diplomatic and border tensions between the two countries, another factor greatly facilitated the work of the Commission. Citizens from both the United States and Mexican sides of the river sent committees to their respective governments to lobby for a prompt settlement.¹² The periodic floods in the El Paso-Juárez Valley, particularly the one-half million dollar one in 1925, had prompted demands for immediate action.

The main stumbling blocks in the negotiations of early 1930 were the question of Chamizal and the problem of private United States and Mexican land titles. Clark maintained from the beginning that Chamizal should be discussed along with the rectification treaty, but his efforts were to prove futile.¹³


By July 1930, both countries were ready for what was hoped would be profitable negotiations. Public pressure remained constant; relations between the two countries were steadily improv-



Charles Bishop Eddy and Mrs. Eddy



Dave Kemp, first sheriff of Eddy County and part owner
of one of Phenix' largest saloons



Eddy, New Mexico March 25, 1890

ing; and the two governments had tentatively agreed on basic points. In addition, both Clark and Morrow were urging the State Department to concentrate all its efforts on the boundary and claims commissions problems.¹⁴

On July 28, 1930, just three days after convening, the Commission took a major step forward by approving and signing Minute 129. This Minute, which was far-reaching in its implications, set forth the final plans for the work of rectification in the El Paso-Juárez Valley. In essence Minute 129 proposed: to cut the length of the river between El Paso and Box Canyon from 155 miles to 88 miles by straightening the channel; to construct a flood retention dam twenty-two miles below Elephant Butte Dam on the Rio Grande, creating reservoir storage of one hundred thousand acre feet; to locate the channel and to estimate the value of the acres detached from one country and attached to the other in such a manner as to insure that neither country would gain nor lose from the exchange of national territory; and to devise a payment plan which would take into account the estimated value of agricultural investments in the valley and the proportionate benefits to be derived by each country.¹⁵

The estimated cost of the project was set at \$6,106,500. From this total certain items which the Commission did not consider to be proratable, but which were properly chargeable to each government, were subtracted. Among these were rights of way, purchase of private channel rights, and changes in irrigation works. These items amounted to \$1,174,200, leaving a proratable total of \$4,932,300. The United States agreed to pay \$4,340,424 or eighty-eight per cent, leaving Mexico with \$591,876 or twelve per cent.¹⁶

The prospective benefits from such a treaty were impressive. It would eliminate floods in the El Paso-Juárez Valley, shorten the boundary from 155 miles to 88 miles, increase the gradient and velocity of the river to enable silt and sediment to be carried away, and establish a definite water boundary. It would prevent future channel changes and provide for better enforcement of the national law of both countries by fixing the maps of the river.¹⁷

Both the State Department and President Hoover approved the plans, and Stimson instructed Morrow to negotiate a treaty covering the points in Minute 129. Morrow was further instructed to include, if possible, a final settlement of the Chamizal area and any other territorial differences which existed between the two countries.¹⁸

Although the two governments had tentatively agreed upon the proposed plans, the final signing of a treaty was delayed for more than two years. The stumbling block, as in the 1920's, was the disposition of Chamizal, Córdoba and Horcón tracts and of San Elisario Island. Lawson suggested initially that the United States purchase Córdoba and Chamizal for one million dollars and also perform all work on both sides of the river.¹⁹ Mexico, on the other hand, suggested that if Córdoba would revert to the United States, then by the same principle San Elisario Island should pass to Mexico. The United States rejected this offer, however, because the richest agricultural land in the valley was on San Elisario Island.²⁰ The need for a settlement can be seen in the fact that until an agreement about Chamizal was reached, the United States could not own or control its portion of the flood channel.²¹ Thus Lawson again suggested that the United States purchase Chamizal for \$1,600,000 and Córdoba for \$200,000, but the offer was flatly rejected by the Mexican Government.²²

On September 9, 1930, the Mexican Government informed the Embassy that they had approved the report of the Boundary Commission together with the engineers' report of river rectification. Mexico proposed that the Commission meet again in Ciudad Juárez to approve a new minute, and on September 18 Lawson wrote that the inclusion of Chamizal in the treaty was a definite possibility.²³ He did inform the Department, however, that there was much in the proposed Mexican minute which was objectionable to the United States.²⁴ The negotiations all but stopped in the next few months, largely owing to the ambassadorial change from Morrow to Clark.

On January 1, 1931, Clark attempted to reopen negotiations on the boundary problem. He spoke with Acting Minister of Foreign

Affairs Schiaffino who stated that he was ready to begin preliminary discussions, but that the conclusion of any agreement must await the return of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Estrada.²⁵ Before Estrada left for New York in December of 1930, he and Clark had agreed that the first step should be the settlement of Chamizal, and Clark informed the Department that he wished to continue with that plan.²⁶ Clark also urgently requested that the Department try to stop any move in Congress to pass an appropriation bill for the project until a treaty with Mexico had been signed.²⁷

On March 25, 1931, the State Department suggested three ways that the negotiations might be expedited. First, they saw a need for a definite date for the transfer of sovereignty of the affected lands. Second, they saw the need for abolishing all right of protest regarding the area transferred from one country to the other; and third, they felt that the treatment of existing titles was awkward because it involved either purchase or condemnation proceedings by both nations.²⁸ In April, Clark expressed concern over the fact that United States lands thrown south of the established border would be worth only a fraction of their previous value while the Mexican lands thrown north might conceivably treble or quadruple in value.²⁹ Clark further stated that an equitable adjustment of the Chamizal question was not only advisable, but was indispensable to a proper settlement.³⁰

Negotiations throughout 1931 remained almost at a standstill. In July Clark persuaded one of his contacts to present a rectification plan to President Ortiz Rubio and General Plutarco Elías Calles. Both men favored the plan, but neither would push for its adoption.³¹ It is not possible to document the reasons for their failure to expedite the matter, but it should be remembered that July was the month when the Mexican vice-consul at Chicago, Adolfo Domínguez, was arrested, and that in June two Mexican students, relatives of the Mexican President, had been shot to death by sheriffs in Ardmore, Oklahoma. In short, river rectification was not an immediate concern of the Mexican Government.

On January 10, 1932, Clark secured an interview with Calles, brought to his attention the apparent stalling tactics of the Mexican

Government regarding the river rectification plan, and indicated that the United States would soon want a categorical answer. Calles replied that he was no longer giving orders, but that he would talk with President Ortiz Rubio.³²

In April of 1932, Clark approached the new Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manuel C. Téllez, and told him that the United States desired a quick settlement of the rectification project because of the imminent danger of floods.³³ Téllez replied that he did want to deal with rectification and that he did want to include Chamizal in the settlement. He offered to cede Chamizal to the United States in return for a cancellation of the Pious Fund Award.³⁴

The Pious Fund had been established in 1697 by the Spanish Government for the benefit of Jesuit missionary work in California. In 1848, the fund totaled several million dollars, and since the United States claimed the fund as a part of the acquisition of California, it became a point of contention between the two countries.³⁵ On October 14, 1902, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague handed down a decision ordering Mexico to pay the United States \$1,420,682.67 in cash and an annual sum of \$43,050.99 in perpetuity.³⁶ Mexico paid the lump sum and the annual installments until 1914 when she suspended payment. It was this aggregate of unpaid sums, plus six per cent annual interest, plus the cancellation of future payments that Téllez suggested the United States exchange for Chamizal. He felt that in this way public opinion in Mexico would be satisfied and both nations could save face in the dispute.³⁷

Clark agreed to such an arrangement and asked Téllez to draw up a draft agreement regarding the various points. The Téllez plan, however, met strong opposition in the Mexican Cabinet itself. Narciso Bassols, the Secretary of Education, and Alberto J. Pani, the Secretary of Finance, both objected to the proposed exchange and to the tying of this exchange to the rectification treaty.

Bassols' basic objections to the proposal were four: Mexico should never cede a portion of her territory, but simply exchange territory; the compensation for territory should not be just an equal

amount of surface territory, but rather territory which had as much commercial value as Chamizal; the case of Chamizal ought to be handled separately from that of the Pious Fund; and any treaty regarding boundaries ought to be divorced completely from the treaty regarding rectification.³⁸ The objections of Pani were much the same, but he added that it was unconstitutional to sell any portion of Mexican territory. He also pointed out the dangers in renouncing the private titles to land held by Mexican nationals.³⁹

In the meantime, Téllez, on August 17, 1932, had presented three draft agreements to Clark. The first was a convention covering the rectification of the river; the second was a protocol regarding the transfer of Chamizal to the United States; and the third was a protocol regarding the release by the United States of the Pious Fund and its unpaid balance.⁴⁰ Clark submitted a counter-draft which combined Chamizal and the Pious Fund and Téllez agreed to the change, stating that he would have to obtain the approval of President Ortiz Rubio and General Calles before submitting it to the entire cabinet.⁴¹ Before Téllez could do so, President Ortiz Rubio resigned on August 27 and General Abelardo L. Rodríguez was elected President by the Mexican Senate on September 3.⁴²

President Rodríguez designated José Manuel Puig Casauranc as his Minister of Foreign Relations and called a cabinet meeting to discuss the problems of river rectification and Chamizal. Some members of the cabinet felt that Clark and the United States State Department had political motives for negotiating a quick settlement in view of the fact that the United States presidential elections were to be held in November.⁴³ The cabinet also accepted, for the most part, the objections of Pani and Bassols and felt that such an agreement would violate Mexico's historical policy and would completely alienate public opinion.⁴⁴

In January 1933 Puig Casauranc presented Clark with a re-drafted convention covering Chamizal and a protocol regarding the Pious Fund. The new Mexican proposal differed in many respects from the previous ones. It absolutely separated the three points; it transferred more territory from the United States than

she would receive; it allowed Mexico to retain private titles in Chamizal and provided for an international commission to adjudicate them; it allowed for the signing of a rectification treaty, based on Minute 129, omitting reference to Chamizal; and it implied that the United States owed an apology to Mexico for the lengthy litigation over Chamizal.⁴⁵

The Mexican cabinet rightly viewed this proposal as an astute diplomatic move. It was a skillful countermove to offset the United States play before the November elections, but Calles and Rodríguez both desired to maintain cordial relations with the United States. Thus Rodríguez worked to obtain a rectification treaty quickly and to put off the Chamizal settlement until later.⁴⁶ But the Mexican proposal was more than shrewd diplomacy; internal policy also made it advisable. Word had leaked out that the Mexican Government was on the verge of ceding some land to the United States and the ire of the Mexican people was up. To have traded Chamizal for the Pious Fund would have spelled political disaster for the Rodríguez government. In fact, the rumors had reached such proportions that on October 22, 1932, Rodríguez was compelled to release the following statement to the press:

My Government will never close any treaty implying loss or modification of the integrity of the national territory, for my antecedents as a revolutionary and as a Mexican and my attitude as President would not allow me to do so.⁴⁷

It is clear that the Mexican proposal was not acceptable to either Clark or the State Department, because the entire question of Chamizal was left unsettled until July 1963. The most pressing matter, a rectification treaty, however, was signed by Clark and Puig Casauranc on February 1, 1933.⁴⁸ The purpose of the treaty was clearly set forth in its preamble:

The United States of America and the United Mexican States having taken into consideration the studies and engineering plans carried on by the International Boundary Commission, and specially directed to relieve the towns and agricultural lands located within the El Paso-Juárez Valley from flood dangers, and securing at the same time the

stabilization of the international boundary line, which, owing to the present meandering nature of the river it has not been possible to hold within the mean line of its channel; and fully conscious of the great importance involved in this matter, both from a local point of view as well as from a good international understanding, have resolved to undertake, in common agreement and cooperation, the necessary works as provided in Minute 129 of the International Boundary Commission, approved by the two Governments in the manner provided by treaty. . . .⁴⁹

The treaty closely followed the conditions set forth in Minute 129 except in one respect. Minute 129 had called for the exchange of about 10,000 acres of land between the two countries beginning at the western point of Chamizal or Land Monument Number One and continuing to Box Canyon below Fort Quitman. The Treaty of 1933, however, specified that work should begin at Monument Fifteen on Córdoba Island, one mile east of Chamizal.⁵⁰ Thus the entire problem of Chamizal was deleted from the rectification treaty.

The treaty met no opposition in the United States and the Senate passed it on May 1, 1933.⁵¹ The Mexican Congress was not in session when the treaty was signed and did not convene until September 1. In the interim, the Mexican landowners in the Ciudad Juárez Valley protested that the treaty would deprive them of their water rights, and the danger that the treaty would fail in the Mexican Senate appeared very real.⁵² President Rodríguez, however, favored it and it was ratified by the Mexican Senate in secret session on September 13, 1933.⁵³

As a postscript, it should be noted that the project was a success. The length of the river between El Paso and Fort Quitman was straightened and shortened, and parallel levees approximately 590 feet apart were constructed. A total of 5,121 acres of land was cut from the United States and an equal amount was cut from Mexico. Over 17,000,000 cubic yards of earth were moved during the digging of the channel, which was completed in four years at a cost of slightly over \$6,000,000.⁵⁴

There can be little doubt that the treaty was a major step forward in the diplomatic history of the two countries. The United

States had been the chief initiator in the negotiations since 1900, but the failure to include Córdoba and Chamizal must be viewed as a diplomatic triumph for Mexico. Nevertheless, the United States did derive important benefits from the treaty, for it lessened the possibility of costly floods in the valley, enabled the United States to enforce its laws better, and solved many disrupting disputes over territorial sovereignty.⁵⁵ Mexico's fear that the United States would gain control of some Mexican territory prevented the signing of any treaty until 1933, but she also derived many benefits from the treaty. Not only had she won a diplomatic victory on the questions of Chamizal and Córdoba, but protected her half of the valley from destructive floods.⁵⁶

It is doubtful whether the treaty would have been as easily obtained if it had not been for the work of the Boundary Commission. The Commission was and is a unique institution. It is not an arbitral commission in the true sense of the word, but it does render decisions and these decisions are rarely disapproved by the two governments. In addition, the work of the Commission has always been relatively successful even during those periods of turmoil which have marred the relations of the two countries. Thus much of the credit for any boundary settlements, including the Treaty of 1933, must go to the Commission.⁵⁷

The Treaty of 1933 was good evidence of a new diplomatic climate between the United States and Mexico. Both countries peaceably agreed to alter their common boundary and to exchange territory. Such an agreement would hardly have been possible in the period 1910-1930. Despite its historical antecedents, the boundary dispute became involved in the conflicts which arose between Mexico and the United States during the Mexican Revolution. Mexican fear of Yankee imperialism had to be dispelled, as did the United States' fear that Mexico would not fulfill her obligations. The final adjustment of the boundary was a credit to the diplomatic efforts of Ambassadors Morrow and Clark, and particularly to the growing realization on the part of both governments that issues could be settled only through peaceful negotiation and compromise.

Nevertheless, although the Chamizal problem was almost solved in 1932, the new climate of negotiation and compromise had not yet reached the point where a final settlement could be made. Ambassador Daniels continued to press the matter, but he was far more concerned with the urgent problems of the claims commissions and the oil expropriation of 1938. Throughout the Truman and Eisenhower administrations Chamizal remained a point of contention.

In 1961 President John F. Kennedy initiated proceedings which culminated in the Treaty of 1963. This treaty transferred to Mexico a net amount of 437 acres of United States territory, including 366 acres from the Chamizal zone and 71 acres from an area east of Córdoba Island. In addition, Córdoba Island was divided equally between both nations. The irony of this settlement is that it almost exactly followed the arbitral award of 1911.

It is difficult for citizens of the United States to understand the deep emotion and nationalism which Mexicans felt and feel on the question of Chamizal. It had become a symbol of Mexican resistance to United States encroachment, and the 1963 settlement contributed immeasurably to the betterment of relations between the two nations. In retrospect, it seems unfortunate and a bit absurd that the entire question was not settled in 1932, along the same lines as the 1963 decision. The thirty-year delay served no useful purpose, but only intensified a sense of frustration. Such are the foibles of international diplomacy.

NOTES

1. It is not the purpose of this paper to rehash all the old boundary disputes, or to discuss in detail the changing character of the Rio Grande, but to place in perspective the treaty negotiations of 1930-1933 and to demonstrate their importance in the final settlement of the boundary.

2. The importance of this article for future negotiations demands its inclusion at this point: "The dividing line shall forever be that described in the aforesaid treaty and follow the center of the normal channel of the rivers named, notwithstanding any alterations in the banks or in the course of those rivers, provided that such alterations be effected by natural causes through the slow and gradual erosion and deposit of alluvium and not by the abandonment of an existing river bed and the opening of a new one." Gordon Ireland, *Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in Central and North America and the Caribbean* (Cambridge, Mass., 1941), p. 303.

3. Gladys Gregory, "The Chamizal Settlement, A View From El Paso," *Southwestern Studies*, vol. I (1963), pp. 14-15.

4. *Bancos* were tracts of land transplanted from one country to the other when the Rio Grande shifted its bed. The existence of these severely impeded rectification negotiations.

5. For examples of correspondence on the *banco* problem, see *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol 3, pp. 473-79.

6. James Morton Callahan, *American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations* (New York, 1932), p. 621.

7. Donald W. Peters, "The Rio Grande Boundary Dispute in American Diplomacy," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, vol. 54 (1951), p. 423.

8. Callahan, p. 621.

9. *Foreign Relations*, 1930, vol. 3, p. 537.

10. Peters, p. 424.

11. *Foreign Relations*, 1930, vol. 3, pp. 536-37.

12. L. M. Lawson, 14 January 1930, to Stimson, Department of State Serial Files, National Archives (cited hereinafter as DS), 711.12155/390.

13. Clark, 20 March 1930, to Stimson, DS, 711.12155/417.

14. Morrow, 16 July 1930, to Stimson, DS, 711.12155/437.

15. *Foreign Relations*, 1930, vol. 3, pp. 545-50.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Morrow, 11 August 1930, to Stimson, DS, 711.12155/445.

18. *Foreign Relations*, 1930, vol. 3, pp. 551-52.

19. Lawson, 22 August 1930, to Stimson, DS, 711.12155/451.

20. Morrow, 25 August 1930, to Stimson, DS, 711.12155/457.

21. Memorandum by Lawson, 3 August 1930, DS, 711.12155/459.

22. *Ibid.*

23. Memorandum by the Chargé in Mexico, Herschel V. Johnson, 18 September 1930, DS, 711.12155/460.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Foreign Relations*, 1930, vol. 3, p. 559.

26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.* The department took such action. See DS, 711.12155/496.
28. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State, 25 March 1931, DS, 711.12155/510. One explanation for concern about the last point could be the Department's fear that the Mexican Government might not completely fulfill its obligations.
29. Clark, 17 April 1931, to Stimson, DS, 711.12155/522.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Clark, 21 July 1931, to Stimson, DS, 711.12155/522.
32. Clark, 10 January 1932, to Stimson, DS, 711.12155/551. Calles' position is open to strong question. It is generally agreed among scholars from both Mexico and the United States that President Ortiz Rubio was merely a puppet of General Calles and that in reality Calles made the important governmental decisions.
33. Clark, 8 April 1932, to Stimson, DS, 711.12155/563.
34. *Ibid.* See also Francisco Javier Gaxiola, *El Presidente Rodríguez* (México, D. F., 1938), 211. Gregory, p. 36, implies that the United States State Department initiated the suggestion. All available evidence, however, tends to prove that Mexico was actually the initiator.
35. Gregory, p. 37.
36. Gaxiola, p. 214.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 213; Clark, 14 September 1932, to Stimson, DS, 711.12155/568.
38. Gaxiola, p. 219.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 219-20.
40. Gregory, p. 37.
41. *Ibid.*
42. Most Mexican and United States scholars assert that General Calles was instrumental in the removal of President Ortiz Rubio and the subsequent election of Rodríguez.
43. Gaxiola, p. 220.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 220-21.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 221-22. See also, Clark, 16 January 1933, to H. V. Johnson, DS, 711.12155/634.
46. Gaxiola, p. 222.
47. *The New York Times*, 22 October 1932, 6:6.
48. Clark, 1 February 1933, to Stimson, DS, 711.12155/645.
49. *Foreign Relations*, 1933, vol. 5, pp. 824-25.
50. Charles A. Timm, *The International Boundary Commission, United States and Mexico* (Austin, Texas, 1941), p. 174.
51. Senator Tom Connally, 1 May 1933, to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, DS, 711.12155/734.

52. Ambassador Josephus Daniels, 25 August 1933, to Hull, DS, 711.12155/810.
53. Daniels, 14 September 1933, to Hull, DS, 711.12155/835.
54. Peters, p. 427.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 428.
56. *Ibid.*
57. For an excellent discussion of the Boundary Commission see Charles A. Timm, "Some Observations on the Nature and Work of the International Boundary Commission, United States and Mexico," *The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 15 (1935), pp. 271-97.