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Book Reviews

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THE APACHE FRONTIER. JACOBO UGARTE AND SPANISH-INDIAN RELATIONS IN NORTHERN NEW SPAIN, 1769-1791. By Max L. Moorhead. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968. Pp. xiv, 310. Illus., maps, bibliog., index. \$6.95.

FROM THE CONQUEST of New Mexico on the Apache Indians proved a formidable obstacle to successful settlement, an obstacle ultimately removed by the U.S. Army with the aid of Apache scouts. Because of their hardiness and nomadic way of life the Apaches frustrated all attempts to conquer them completely or to induce them to live in permanent villages and to abandon their raids.

Life in the Provincias Internas, New Spain's northern provinces, was harsh and often unattractive, but the land had to be held to protect mining regions farther south. Many Spanish officers spent a large part of their careers in this thankless frontier duty. Considering the scarcity of troops and of effective weapons, the great expanse of territory, and the number and skill of the enemy the Spaniards did remarkably well in their endless struggle with the Apache.

One of those who spent many years in the Provincias Internas was Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola. When he was appointed governor of Coahuila in 1767, he had behind him thirty-five years of military service. On arriving in Monclova late in 1769 Ugarte found the government buildings in ruins. He requested funds from the viceroy, but was told to assess the local citizens. Unwilling to add to the burdens of the impoverished vecinos, Ugarte put up with the dilapidated buildings. The settlers of the province asked for weapons with which to defend themselves, and Ugarte requested the viceroy to provide three hundred muskets. Nearly three years passed before two hundred guns arrived. The viceroy insisted that the citizens pay the full cost. Ugarte spared the settlers this burden, with the result that the unpaid balance was charged to him. Such was life in the Provincias Internas.

Although the frontier presidios had only from thirty to one hundred and fifty men, even when Apache raiders struck at many places on the same day requests for additional troops were usually denied. When, in 1771, Ugarte appealed for more men to check the Apache, the viceroy remarked that the "maxim of the captains of presidios is to increase the number of men in their garrisons" and that their "respective allotments always seem small." In the whole province of Coahuila Ugarte had only 137 men at his disposal, and they were stationed in three presidios.

The morale of frontier troops was usually low, for they were generally in debt to their captains, who had a monopoly of sales. This practice was abolished in 1772, and thereafter the troops fared better. But because the officers' pay was low, Ugarte and others supported the earlier practice.

Although general and limited campaigns were launched against the Apache, the results were rarely all that was expected. The Spanish position was greatly improved by the pressures brought to bear on the Apache by the Comanche. The Spaniards therefore cultivated this rivalry, and, as elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, the Indians thus contributed to their own ruin.

In November 1777, Ugarte was transferred to the governorship of Sonora, where he served until 1782. In Sonora, Opata Indians were enlisted in presidio companies, and they made an effective fighting force under Spanish officers. At the conclusion of his term in Sonora Ugarte served briefly as governor of Puebla, then in 1786 was promoted to the position of Comandante General of the Provincias Internas. The commandancy general was designed especially for New Spain's northern frontier, where Indian warfare was the principal problem. Unlike a captain general, the commander general had no non-military functions.

There are a number of parallels between Spanish relations with the Indians and those of Anglo-Americans later. In both cases it was felt that if the Indians would become farmers and adopt a "civilized" way of life, all would be well. The difference was that the Spaniards were willing to accept such Indians among them, while the Anglo-Americans were not. And the Spaniards employed Apache to fight Apache, a practice that General George Crook "invented" in Arizona a century later.

The location of the presidios was a much discussed problem. At one time they were moved, over Ugarte's protests, some distance from the settlements, in the belief that the troops could intercept Apache raiders. They could not, and the presidios were moved back to the settlements. But, as Dr. Moorhead states, "Wherever the presidios were placed, the interior settlements . . . had always been vulnerable whenever the Apache took the offensive. The best protection, therefore, was a continuous series of offensive operations, which would carry the war into enemy territory and

keep them on the defensive. . . . Too few in numbers, poorly armed and equipped, and demoralized by high prices and low pay, the frontier soldiers performed a heroic but ineffective service. The best they could do was make the enemy pay dearly for his victories. How they held their thin line against the Apache invasions and achieved some measure of respite for the harried settlers can be better explained in diplomatic than in purely military terms. Force having failed, the Spaniards resorted to stratagem."

Dr. Moorhead has added another excellent and scholarly work to the growing list of books on the Spanish Borderlands. He avoided the conventional pitfall of biographers and did not attempt to prove Ugarte right in every instance, though a biographer of Juan de Ugalde might view relations between the two men differently. Books such as this should generate a feeling of admiration for the unheralded men who grimly maintained the frustrating struggle to hold the outposts of Spain's far-flung empire.

Texas Christian University

DONALD E. WORCESTER

THE CONQUEST OF APACHERIA. By Dan L. Thrapp. Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1967. Pp. xvi, 408. Illus., maps, bibliog., index. \$6.95.

As **THE** Civil War drew to a close, Southwesterners began focusing their attention inward toward the development of the resources of their region, toward building on a permanent basis, much as had the eastern portion of the United States in the decades after the War of 1812. But just as frontiersmen in the East had discovered half a century earlier, Southwesterners soon found that the native inhabitants had to be confronted before the mines, ranches, and farms could be worked in safety. Foremost among these tribes in New Mexico and Arizona were the Western Apache—the Chiricahua, Warm Springs, Gileño, Mogollon, Mimbrenño, Aravaipa, Pinaleno, Coyotero, White Mountain, Mescalero, and Lipan. Their name itself—Apache—had come from a Zuñi word meaning "enemy," and so indeed they were considered by almost all white settlers, both in the Southwest and in Sonora and Chihuahua. So fierce were these loosely related groups that the Spaniards had given the name *Apachería* to the area, although it contained dozens of other tribes.

When Southwesterners turned to coping with the Apache, many problems manifested themselves. The Indian Bureau by 1865 had developed no long-range philosophy for coping with the Apache or other Southwestern tribes. And during the four years of civil conflict to the east, the Apache had taken advantage of the absence of troops to increase the intensity of their looting and killing—not without ample provocation, however. Such incidents as the Bascom Affair and the murder of Mangas

Coloradas left a lingering legacy of hatred. The return of federal troops to the region presaged a confrontation of life-and-death proportions. Yet, hampering the work of the Army was the attitude of many Easterners who believed that the Indians were Rousseau's "Noble Savages," that the Indians would best respond to kindness, religious instruction, and training in agrarian methods. These idealists, whose concepts were largely shaped by their distance from the atrocities being committed and by two hundred years of forgetfulness about their own forefathers' troubles with the eastern tribes, as well as the methods those forefathers had employed to solve the problem, began demanding a "peace policy" toward the natives. Moreover, they wanted Army officers deprived of the right to act as Indian agents, such positions going instead to men nominated by the various religious denominations. When Ulysses S. Grant became president in 1869, these "experts" in Western Indian warfare got their wishes.

Also in transition at the end of the Civil War was the federal policy of reservations for the Indians. By 1865 the government was committing itself to the creation of many small reservations, as needed, for particular tribes, restricting the Indians to as little land as they would settle for peacefully. Instrumental in persuading the Indians to sign treaties accepting these small reservations was the government's promise of an annual distribution of presents and a regular ration of food. To distribute the rations and presents, the Indian Bureau placed agents at each reservation, agents who sometimes caused more problems than they solved. Opportunities for graft were ever at hand, at the expense of the Indians, and corruption was rife. Perhaps even harder for the Indians to take was the ignorance of such men, for most agents neither knew nor cared about the Indians' customs, laws, and civilization. Then, after Grant's peace policy was instituted, the agents provided by the religious denominations frequently were so idealistic that they took no heed of the fact that some Indians were using the reservations as convenient and safe resting places between raids. When white settlers complained about raids, the agents swore that none of their Indians had been involved.

Also complicating the situation in the Southwest was the Indian trader. Such individuals all too frequently were shiftless characters who disregarded the government's injunction against the sale of liquor to the natives. Even worse, the traders often supplied the Indians with arms and ammunition, then purchased from them the fruits of their raids, thereby supplying the natives with both the means and the motive to jump the reservation to loot and kill.

Despite such abuses, apologists for the Indians most often claimed that white encroachment on reservation lands was the reason for unrest among the natives. This argument had some validity in Oklahoma and the

Dakotas, but not in the Southwest. In this region the population density of Indians was so small and the whites who came so few in number that only rarely did a settler covet reservation land or attempt to move onto acres guaranteed to the Indians. The truth is that most Southwestern tribes, especially the Apache, needed no excuse for making war on the whites. These tribes had lived for centuries by murder and theft, riding down their war trails as far south as Sinaloa and Durango in search of booty and captives. The livestock a brave owned was the index for measuring his wealth, and usually his horses and mules were obtained in raids. A warrior gained not only wealth but also social standing by his success as a thief. In addition, the Apache had adopted the Spanish-Mexican custom of scalping, making it an important part of their warfare in order to judge a warrior's courage. A brave thus became a war chief of stature only by gaining a reputation as a thief and a killer. That the whites were not to blame for this social and economic structure can be seen from the fact that the Indians not only fought Americans and Mexicans but also stole from and warred upon other tribes. The whites who came to the Southwest found such beliefs contrary to their own laws and customs—in short, barbaric—and concluded that “the only good Indian is a dead Indian.” The native, on the one hand, was living as he had always lived and on his own land; the whites posed for him a real physical and psychological threat. The whites, on the other hand, believed that they owned the land by right of conquest and that the Indians were not making productive use of it. Might made right in that age, and the two races simply appealed to the final arbiter of their era. It was a tragic clash of civilizations.

Dan Thrapp, who four years ago demonstrated his scholarship in *Al Sieber, Chief of Scouts*, has traced the course of this confrontation with sympathetic understanding for both Apache and white man. Combing sources from New York to California, and most points in between, he has produced a summary of the Apache wars that should stand the test of historical judgment. His background as a journalist gives him a feeling for words that makes the narrative flow smoothly, while his documentation speaks for itself in footnotes and bibliography. Occasionally there is a lack of balance when incidents, such as the Camp Grant Massacre, receive more attention than they deserve—one suspects they were so dramatic. In total the book is excellent. The University of Oklahoma Press has maintained its usual high standard of bookmaking, producing a worthy addition to every library of Western Americana.

Oklahoma State University

ODIE B. FAULK

THE COURT-MARTIAL OF GENERAL GEORGE ARMSTRONG CUSTER. By Lawrence A. Frost. Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1968. Pp: xvi, 280. Illus., maps, bibliog., index. \$5.95.

DESPITE the title, this is really two books in one. The first, a detailed, comprehensive, and well-written account of the 7th Cavalry's participation in General W. S. Hancock's 1867 Kansas Campaign, is complete in itself, yet it also provides the background essential to the second, a verbatim record of the court martial of Brevet Major General Custer in the late summer of 1867.

With the exception of Lonnie White's article in the July 1966 issue of the *Journal of the West*, the 1867 campaign has received scant attention in most narratives of the Indian Wars. It is mentioned, if at all, only briefly and rather inaccurately in histories of the Indian Wars, the Cavalry Arm, and the 7th Regiment. By generous reference to the observations and impressions recorded by Henry M. Stanley, a *New York Tribune* correspondent (of later Africa fame) and Theodore R. Davis of *Harper's Weekly*, both of whom accompanied the expedition, Doctor Frost has brought a broader perspective to the incidents of the campaign than is usually found in narratives of this type, which so often depend almost exclusively on military records and reports. Although unsuccessful in accomplishing its main objectives, the 1867 venture deserves its niche in history as the first of the post-Civil War campaigns against the Plains Indians. Had military and political leaders better appreciated and profited by its lessons—to be oft repeated—the story of our Indian Wars might have been somewhat different.

The verbatim record of Custer's court-martial, to the knowledge of this reviewer hitherto unpublished, is a worthy addition to Custeriana if for no other reason than clarification of the misconceptions and inaccuracies, generally accepted and frequently reiterated in print, concerning this trial. Custer was accused of a variety of military derelictions in eight specifications, of which three were in effect dismissed, and the weight of substantive evidence is questionable in three others. Found guilty of the charges preferred, he was sentenced to a year's suspension from command with loss of pay, exclusive of allowances, which amounted to \$90 a month. Contrary to oft repeated assertions, he was *not* found guilty of disobeying orders by making an unauthorized trip to Fort Riley to see his wife. More serious, but apparently not so considered by the court, were the substantiated charges that he ordered fleeing deserters to be pursued and shot, resulting in the wounding of two and subsequent death of one of his soldiers, although the Judge Advocate General in his review of the case pointed out that in view of the mass desertions which were decimating Custer's

command he may have considered this the only recourse left to insure its future safety. When Custer was subsequently brought to trial before a civil court charged with murder in connection with the soldier's death, the case was dismissed. Some of the procedural actions of the court-martial and several of its findings, even under the regulations of the time, seemed to this long time veteran of courts-martial to be quite dubious.

A conscientious reader of the trial record may become confused when comparing the wording of the specifications preferred against Custer with the court's findings. Since Custer was found guilty of travel to Fort Harker rather than to Fort Riley as initially charged, corresponding pen-and-ink corrections were made in the original record of trial, but as this is not explained in Dr. Frost's account, testimony during the trial referring to Fort Riley tends to appear irrelevant. Regrettable, owing to a copying oversight, is the omission of part of the verbatim record of the court's findings. This makes it difficult to correlate them with the specifications to which they refer. The inclusion of portions of the Judge Advocate General's review of the trial—despite its rather revealing bias—would have contributed a good discussion of the salient issues and considerations on which General Grant's final approval of the sentence was based.

It is not apparent, as is sometimes alleged, that this trial was an attempt to make Custer the scapegoat for Hancock's unproductive Indian hunt, although it appears probable that the latter was mainly responsible for the preferring of charges against Custer by that forgotten man of the 7th Cavalry, Colonel A. J. Smith, its first commander. A more likely motivation may lie in the attitude of some older officers as expressed by Colonel Davidson (initially a member of the court) that Custer was a young man—"a newcomer in the service—only graduated in '61—never commanded a company—who must be taught he cannot come out here and do as he pleases."

Doctor Frost has done a worthy service in filling a gap in western military-Indian history and in presenting an item, not otherwise easily available, of particular interest to Custer buffs. By forgoing any personal defense of Custer or justification for his acts and permitting the trial record to speak for itself, rather than summarizing it as others have done, he has generously allowed his readers to form their own conclusions as to Custer's guilt and the punishment merited.

An appropriate selection of well reproduced photographs and four easily readable maps complement the high quality of typography and binding typical of the standards of the University of Oklahoma Press.

Alexandria, Va.

GEORGE RUHLEN
MAJOR GENERAL, USA

LIFE OF GEORGE BENT, WRITTEN FROM HIS LETTERS. By George E. Hyde. Ed. by Savoie Lottinville. Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1968. Pp. xxvi, 390. Illus., maps, bibliog., index. \$5.95.

WITH THE publication of this volume, scholars and general readers alike have access to very important source material on the Great Plains frontier, especially the closing years. And a very readable presentation it is, due to the skill and knowledge of George E. Hyde and the editorial acumen of Savoie Lottinville. The blending of Mr. Hyde's chronologically longer working copy and the shorter but finished manuscript in the Western History Department, Denver Public Library, results in a noteworthy addition to historical material on the American West. For all that, the real laurels must go to the late George Bent himself, who died in 1918. This son of famed frontiersman William Bent and Owl Woman, a Cheyenne Indian, was a rare and felicitous combination—an alert and literate man with a foot in each camp, so to speak. He was born in 1843.

Apparently always with a strong predilection for the ways of his mother's people, George Bent, however, never became so irreconcilably anti-white as did his half-brother, Charles, the son of William Bent and Yellow Woman, Owl Woman's sister. William Bent married the younger sister after Owl Woman's death in childbirth. As a boy growing up at Bent's Old Fort on the Arkansas River, George received impressions of life at the trading emporium of Bent, St. Vrain and Company during the period when the river ceased to be an international boundary line and after. Then came residence and schooling at Westport, Missouri (1853-1857), and St. Louis in 1860. In the next year the Civil War attracted George into the Confederate forces, but his military experiences ended with his capture by Union troops after the siege of Corinth, Mississippi, in 1862. Release came through the influence of his elder brother, Robert, and the young veteran returned to the country of the Upper Arkansas.

The changes there, with the promise of more to come, were the central impression made upon George Bent. All the differences and newness wrought by the gold rush to Colorado and the greatly expanded commerce, both civilian and military, on the Santa Fe Trail added up to a grim future for the Cheyennes and other Plains tribes. From the spring of 1863 his life was spent with his mother's people, a decision that was confirmed by the traumatic experience of the Sand Creek Massacre on November 29, 1864.

From that point on, it may be argued, Bent's prejudices enter in and impair his reliability. Savoie Lottinville's annotations show, however, that Bent's version and appraisal of numerous incidents are rarely very wide of the mark. Furthermore, a strong case emerges for using official army re-

ports with circumspection, although the reader also becomes aware of xenophobic distortions in some of the Indian accounts as well.

This volume is important because it makes available many descriptions of a vanished culture by a knowledgeable and sympathetic participant, who ranged the plains from Montana to Texas. Bent's comments have influenced other writings by George Hyde and, of course, George Bird Grinnell's works on the Cheyennes, as well as more recent scholarship such as Donald J. Berthrong's *The Southern Cheyennes*. In short, George Bent was an Indian spokesman, a much needed article. We may look forward to Hyde and Lottinville's edition of the George Bent letters.

Trinidad State Junior College

MORRIS F. TAYLOR

THE ENTERPRISING SCOT: INVESTORS IN THE AMERICAN WEST AFTER 1873.

By W. Turrentine Jackson. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 1968. (N.A. Agent—Chicago: Alden Publishing Company.) Pp. xvi, 416. Illus., notes, tables, bibliog., index. \$12.50.

A LONG HELD, even cherished, image of the thrifty, wary, frugal, and canny Scotsman needs modification, as Turrentine Jackson clearly demonstrates in this scholarly, well-balanced, and thoroughly documented study. Though they perhaps did not plunge to the level of other investors, the Scots still invested too rapidly, demanded quick and large dividends, and often, at the earliest appearance of adversity, too hastily liquidated before carefully analyzing the possible long-range economic possibilities of their holdings.

Professor Jackson covers a wide range of Scottish investments, from the better-known cattle and mining companies to land mortgage companies. While the 1870's were the biggest decade in mining, cattle, and land promotion, the Scots continued investing down to the mid-twentieth century. The entire story is drawn against the rapidly changing economic and world situation of the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Reflecting the investment pattern of the Scots, this work places its major emphasis on ranching and mining. An excellent chapter on the Arizona Copper Company serves, in a sense, as a case study of the methods, problems, and results of a foreign-based concern trying to operate in the United States. Particularly revealing is the American reaction to Scottish investment.

Naturally focusing attention on the American situation, Jackson does not, however, ignore the situation at home. The structure of the companies, leadership, stockholders' problems, and the gradual shift of the investment center from Edinburgh to Glasgow, which had interesting ramifications on the pattern of investments, are thoughtfully examined. It would seem that very little has been slighted. This book, coupled with Clark Spence's earlier study

of British investors, gives to the general picture of foreign investment in the western United States the scholarly attention it has so long needed.

In his preface Jackson states that he wrote this as a survey, "primarily to introduce a field of research of sufficient magnitude to justify further inquiry." He has done this and more. The extensive use of American and Scottish primary material, the grasp of the subject and conclusions will make this an essential monograph for students and scholars of not only investments and economy, but mining, ranching, and the host of subjects discussed by the author. It is not an easily read book, but then the subject does not lend itself to sparkling prose. One complaint of this reviewer was the smallness of the type, which tended to make the book more difficult reading. *The Enterprising Scot* should deservedly take its place on the bookshelves or reading lists of all students of the Trans-Mississippi Frontier.

Fort Lewis College, Durango, Colorado

DUANE A. SMITH

MEXICO: THE STRUGGLE FOR MODERNITY. By Charles C. Cumberland. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Pp. xii, 394. Illus., maps, tables, bibliog., index. \$7.50, cloth; \$2.50, paper.

THIS IS the best single volume covering the entire history of Mexico which has yet appeared, despite the fact that the author accords this distinction to Henry B. Parkes' *A History of Mexico*. Professor Cumberland did not set out to write a general history for he states in the Preface: "This book is an attempt to clarify and to explain the social and economic issues which gave the Mexican Revolution such a distinctive stamp, and to account for the direction and the nature of the change." Nevertheless, slightly more than a third of the text and half of the chapters are devoted to the colonial period. Cumberland recognizes that to understand the Mexican Revolution one must take into account the social, economic, and political forces that shape "attitudes [which] are the key to economic development and social change." And that "revolutions of such ferocity are spawned by deep-seated ills, not passing fancies." In so doing, the author has struck a blow for colonial history which warms the heart of this reviewer.

The opening chapter is an excellent condensation of geographical influences which have shaped and influenced the history of Mexico. Additional chapters dealing with native population, colonial society, labor, and economics are fundamentally sound. The few errors are minor: e.g., attributing the architectural marvels of Teotihuacan to the Toltec (p. 19) and rebellion among the Huastec to the slaving policies of Nuño de Guzmán (p. 45).

Cumberland avoids the amusing stories and vignettes that surround Santa Anna, Porfirio Díaz, and Pancho Villa. One *Many Mexicos* is enough. In the period from Independence to the Revolution, the author gives a balanced

treatment to both Juárez and Díaz, and he presents the most impressive array of statistics I have seen. Indeed, the statistical data constitute one of the most valuable aspects of the book.

The Revolution and its aftermath are the best chapters in the volume. Cumberland's sympathies with the Revolution are apparent, but he presents a careful analysis of the controversial issues between Church and State, foreign capital and the Mexican government, the *ejidal* program versus ownership of land in fee simple, etc. What at first appears to be an overly optimistic treatment of post-Calles Mexico is tempered by the sober admission that since 1950 the impressive economic gains scored by Mexico "have been funneled into a small segment of the population, with the vast majority benefiting only slightly."

Political chronology, a welcome supplement in recent books, and a selective section on literature complete the book. The text is remarkably free of misprints.

Cumberland has an easy style; his book may well replace Parkes as the standard textbook for Mexican history.

North Texas State University

DONALD E. CHIPMAN