

4-1-1961

## Pascual Orozco: Chihuahua Rebel

Paige W. Christiansen

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr>

---

### Recommended Citation

Christiansen, Paige W.. "Pascual Orozco: Chihuahua Rebel." *New Mexico Historical Review* 36, 2 (1961).  
<https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr/vol36/iss2/3>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in New Mexico Historical Review by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [amywinter@unm.edu](mailto:amywinter@unm.edu), [lsloane@salud.unm.edu](mailto:lsloane@salud.unm.edu), [sarahrk@unm.edu](mailto:sarahrk@unm.edu).

## PASCUAL OROZCO: CHIHUAHUA REBEL

Episodes in the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1915

By PAIGE W. CHRISTIANSEN\*

Before the nature and character of the Mexican Revolution can be fully understood, the men, their motives, their actions, and their characters must be sorted out, understood, and then fitted back into their historical context. To know only the major leaders, presidents or presidential candidates, or only the major revolutionary plans, is to ignore the very essence of the Revolution. This movement, which began in 1910, is too important to Mexico and all of Latin America to rest upon inadequate historical knowledge. The story of Pascual Orozco, Jr., storekeeper, mule skinner, freighter, general, and bandit, is an example of one man of the Revolution who is known and yet unknown. Deeply influenced by regional factors and by his environment, Orozco became the symbol of revolution to many of the people of Chihuahua.

On the evening of November 19, 1910, in the village of San Isidro, Chihuahua, Pascual Orozco pronounced himself in rebellion against the government of Porfirio Díaz.<sup>1</sup> This was part of a chain of events that resulted in the crushing of federal forces in the state of Chihuahua and finally in the collapse of the long Díaz dictatorship. It was also the beginning of a short but brilliant career for Pascual Orozco, whose subsequent actions had a direct bearing on the success and fall of Francisco Madero and Victoriano Huerta. The story of Orozco is also, in part, the story of Chihuahua during the chaotic period from 1910 to 1915.

A brief background will help set the stage for Orozco's activities. Northern Mexico was the natural theater for staging the revolt against Díaz, and Chihuahua was especially well suited as the battleground. The proximity of the United

\* Assistant Professor of Humanities, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, Socorro, New Mexico.

1. Juan Gualberto Amaya, *Madero y los auténticos revolucionarios de 1910* (Mexico, 1943), p. 103; Gustavo Casasola, ed., *Historia gráfica de la revolución, 1900-1940* (Mexico, n.d.), I, 210, says Orozco pronounced on November 20; Joaquín Márquez Montiel, S.J., *Hombres célebres de Chihuahua* (Mexico, 1953), pp. 220-222.

States border, the presence of a frontier society, the remoteness of the northern states from Mexico City, regional economic interests, and the importance of the main line railroads which traversed the north, all played a role in centering revolutionary activity in this area. Added to these general considerations was the agitation of the Mexican Liberal Party which had resisted Díaz for many years.<sup>2</sup>

By 1908, political and economic conditions across northern Mexico had reached a critical stage. To further complicate the situation a financial crisis and recession in the United States reached Chihuahua in June, 1908, causing serious unemployment. There followed a number of incidents which were to leave the northern border, particularly Chihuahua, in an extremely nervous and tense state. On June 19, twenty Mexicans were arrested at Casas Grandes for a proposed plan to seize the Union Mercantile store at Dublán and the Ketelsen and Degonau's store at Casas Grandes. Both establishments had substantial quantities of arms and ammunition in stock.<sup>3</sup> The same day arrests were made at Nueva Casas Grandes. Among those arrested was Santa Ana Pérez, who had led several attacks on the Palomas, Mexico, customs house in 1893.<sup>4</sup> Nineteen of those arrested were indicted for revolutionary activity June 21. The rest, including Pérez, were released.<sup>5</sup>

Three other serious raids took place toward the end of June, 1908. One at Villa Viesca in Coahuila, where raiders robbed the post office, bank, and express office and fled toward

2. For general conditions and events leading to the 1910 rebellion see U. S. National Archives, Marion Letcher, consul, to W. J. Bryan, Sec. of State, Chihuahua, Mexico, October 17, 1913, file No. 812.00/9484, in Bancroft Library Microfilm Collection, Cumberland Film. Hereafter microfilmed Ms. from this collection will be cited as *National Archives* with appropriate Ms. information. For a discussion of the whole problem of the free zone, free ports, economic conditions, and northern sectionalism see Ulises Irigoyen, *El problema económico de las fronteras Mexicanas* (Mexico, 1935), 2 vols., passim. For a detailed account of the activities and political ideas of the Flores Magón brothers see Myra Ellen Jenkins, "Ricardo Flores Magón and the Mexican Liberal Party, 1900-1922," unpublished Ms., The University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, 1953. Some of the violence in Chihuahua is described in Charles Kindrick, consul, to William Day, Asst. Sec. of State, Cuidad Juárez, Feb. 17, 1898, in U. S. National Archives, Microfilm Publications, Consular Dispatches, Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. Hereafter cited as *Microfilm Publications* with appropriate information.

3. *The Mexican Herald*, Mexico City, 1898-1914, daily, June 20, 1908. Hereafter cited as *Herald*.

4. *Ibid.*, June 20, 1908; Thomas Cattam Romney, *The Mormon Colonies in Mexico* (Salt Lake City, 1938), pp. 310-314.

5. *Herald*, June 21, 1908.

Torreón. Torreón was placed in a state of emergency and 1,000 federal troops were placed in the field to pursue the raiders.<sup>6</sup> At Las Vacas, across the border from Del Rio, Texas, a group of Mexican rebels, organized and armed in the United States, attacked the federal garrison. They immediately returned to the United States, closely pursued by Mexican police.<sup>7</sup> On June 19, a small band of twenty to forty men made an attack at Casas Grandes. This same group attacked Pálomas June 30. There was some evidence that this group was organized in the United States since a band of Mexicans was reported seen near Columbus, New Mexico, prior to the attack.<sup>8</sup> For the most part these disturbances were not rebellions but rather protests of hungry and jobless men easily persuaded to violence.

The uprisings or raids of 1908, minor though they were, succeeded in stirring up and increasing the general unrest, and coupled with the growth of the anti-reelection movement, they set the stage for open rebellion in Chihuahua. A cause was needed, and a leader. Madero became the symbol and inspiration, but real leadership in Chihuahua was to rise from among the many men who led local rebellions in November, 1910.

The pronouncement of rebellion by Pascual Orozco at San Isidro was only one among many such declarations issued in Chihuahua on November 19 and 20, 1910, in answer to the call of Madero and in the name of the Plan of San Luis Potosí. Near San Andrés, Chihuahua, Cerferno Pérez, Francisco Villa, and Cástulo Herrera declared their rebellion and moved to attack San Andrés, a main point on the Mexican North-western Railroad. In Parral, Guillermo Baca, Pedro T. Gomez, and Miguel Baca Ronquillos, supported by three hundred men, temporarily drove federal troops from the city. In Temosáchic, Chihuahua, José la Luz Blanco "pronounced" and moved to join Orozco near Ciudad Guerrero, Chihuahua.<sup>9</sup> There were also uprisings near Casas Grandes and Ojinaga.

---

6. *Ibid.*, June 26 and 27, 1908.

7. *Ibid.*, June 28, 1908.

8. *Ibid.*, July 1, 1908.

9. Amaya, pp. 105-108; Casasola, I, 213-215; Alfonso Taracena, *Mi vida en el vertigo de la revolución Mexicana: anales sinticos* (Mexico, 1936), p. 102.

For the most part these small isolated groups were unable to hold their initial gains, and there was little or no conscious co-operation between them.

To successfully follow the rise of a revolutionary leader in Chihuahua it is necessary to return to San Isidro and the activities of Pascual Orozco. He did not hold leadership alone at the beginning of action in the District of Guerrero, Chihuahua. Don Albino Frías, Sr., claimed equal or predominant leadership, which was respected by Orozco. Their first action came on November 19, 1910, and was aimed at Miñaca, Chihuahua, which they captured with ease. Frías was in command at Miñaca and Orozco second in command. Victor Amaya, an eye witness historian to many of the events of the 1910 revolution, called Frías "the first chief of the revolution in Chihuahua." From Miñaca, the small column counter-marched to San Isidro which fell to them on November 20. With two minor objectives taken, and their forces growing, Frías and Orozco ordered an attack on Ciudad Guerrero. The initial assault against this stronger federal garrison was repulsed but the rebels surrounded the town and prepared for further assaults.<sup>10</sup>

The forces of Cástulo Herrera and Francisco Villa unconsciously aided this campaign. Colonel Yépes, moving from Chihuahua City with reinforcements for Ciudad Guerrero, was ambushed on November 23 at San Andrés by the forces of Herrera and Villa.<sup>11</sup> While the federal column was not destroyed, it was forced to halt its advance on Ciudad Guerrero, stopping at Pedernales.<sup>12</sup> Villa and Herrera continued toward Chihuahua City after their partial success at San Andrés. They penetrated as far as Santa Isabel before they were turned back and dispersed by General Juan Navarro who was moving west with a large force to put an end to revolutionary activity in western Chihuahua.<sup>13</sup> Villa and a few of his men hurried across country toward Ciudad Guerrero to join a junta of revolutionary leaders suggested by Orozco.<sup>14</sup> The

10. Amaya, p. 104, 110; Casasola, I, 210.

11. Casasola, I, 214-215; Taracena, p. 102.

12. Casasola, I, 214-215.

13. Amaya, p. 108.

14. Casasola, I, 213-214.

timely independent action of Villa and Herrera at San Andrés allowed Frías and Orozco to consolidate their forces for a final assault on Ciudad Guerrero.

Learning of the movements of Navarro, Frías dispatched Orozco to Pedernales with a small force to stop or delay the federals while pressure was continued on Ciudad Guerrero. Orozco set a successful ambush on November 26, and completely routed the advance guard of Navarro's column along with the remnants of the federal forces that had been waiting at Pedernales for aid.<sup>15</sup> Another victory secured, Orozco returned to Ciudad Guerrero bringing additional supplies captured at Pedernales. With the aid of these supplies the rebels launched a successful attack against Ciudad Guerrero on December 4, 1910.<sup>16</sup>

Following the fall of Ciudad Guerrero, Albino Frías relinquished his leadership in favor of Orozco. Upon taking full command of rebel forces in the District of Guerrero, Chihuahua, on December 6, Orozco issued a manifesto to the nation in which he dedicated himself and his men to the Madero cause and called for the complete overthrow of the Díaz government.<sup>17</sup> Orozco's manifesto was the first formal document issued by the revolutionary forces actively fighting against the federal army and Mexican police.

The success of the rebel forces under Frías and Orozco had an importance way out of proportion to the amount of men and equipment employed. They were not military engagements between armies, but rather skirmishes between small rebel bands and isolated federal detachments. They were, however, of major importance for the future of the revolution. That they succeeded while other revolutionary activity generally failed magnified the importance of Miñaca, San Isidro, Pedernales, and Ciudad Guerrero. Initial success had been attained at Parral, San Andrés, Ojinaga, and other spots of rebellion in Chihuahua, but in no case were the rebel groups able to consolidate their victories. Shortages of arms, ammu-

15. Amaya, p. 108.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 108; Casasola, I, 211, says that the first armed triumph for the Madero revolution was accomplished by Orozco at Ciudad Guerrero.

17. Francisco Ramírez Plancarte, *La revolución Mexicana* (Mexico, 1948), pp. 232-233 n; Amaya, p. 110.

dition, and food supplies quickly caused their collapse. Orozco was also faced with serious supply problems after taking Ciudad Guerrero, and it is a credit to his ability as a leader that he was able to hold his forces together when they had little to sustain them in any kind of military action.

Orozco's succession to leadership in the District of Guerrero, coupled with his success against federal troops, drew the harassed remnants of other revolutionary bands into his camp. Men like Francisco Villa, Cástulo Herrera, and José la Luz Blanco, along with their followers, came together under the command of Orozco to form a loose military unit.<sup>18</sup> The first action of elements of this enlarged command was at Cerro Prieto where forces under Orozco and Francisco Salido attacked federal troops commanded by General Navarro. The fight at Cerro Prieto was the first in which rebel forces could be called an army with a chain of command and a predetermined battle plan, informal though it was. The fight also set a precedent: prisoners were not taken alive by either side. The battle was lost, but the "army" of Chihuahua retained its character and its discipline. The rebels were forced to retire to their strongholds around Ciudad Guerrero.<sup>19</sup>

During January, 1911, Orozco, still centering his activities around Ciudad Guerrero, met federal troops in several engagements. They successfully ambushed a federal column at Mal Paso January 2, la Luz Blanco co-operating with Orozco in this attack.<sup>20</sup> On January 7, Orozco attacked a military supply train at Miñaca which was to supply General Navarro, who was marching on Ciudad Guerrero. Although this deprived Navarro of needed supplies, Orozco realized that he would be unable to maintain his position at Ciudad Guerrero and he ordered a retreat into the mountains of western Chi-

---

18. *Bakersfield Californian*, Dec. 13, 1910; A letter from Orozco to Francisco Salido indicates this loose association and their method of operation, Orozco to Salido, Pederuales, Mexico, Dec. 11, 1910, trans., in U. S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, 1863-194-), 1911, 412-413. Hereafter cited as *Foreign Relations* with appropriate date.

19. *Bakersfield Californian*, Dec. 14, 1910; Casasola, I, 224; Pascual Ortiz Rubio, *La revolución de 1910, apuntes históricas* (Mexico, 1929), p. 177.

20. "Survey of the World," *Independent*, LXX, 7 (Jan. 5, 1911). Hereafter cited only as *Independent* with proper issue; Taracena, p. 104; Ortiz Rubio, p. 177; Márquez Montiel, p. 222.

huahua.<sup>21</sup> There Orozco managed to maintain his forces in relative safety from attack, and he accumulated a store of arms and ammunition which filtered down from Madero's agents in the United States.<sup>22</sup>

The success of the revolution was seriously in doubt during the waning weeks of 1910 and January 1911. Most of the initial victories by the rebels had been dissipated, and federal authorities were confident that the pocket of resistance in Chihuahua would soon collapse. The small rebel successes which had been accomplished were of Orozco's doing. His greatest achievement was that he maintained an "army" at all. Madero, in whose name he fought, was still in the United States and could see little cause for entering Mexico as provisional president and symbol of a revolution that barely existed. The future success of the revolt was in the hands of the ex-storekeeper and freighter, Pascual Orozco, who was optimistic and preparing for new assaults on the Díaz dictatorship.

By early January, 1911, Orozco was recognized by most observers as the military commander of the revolutionary forces in the state of Chihuahua, and the revolution was being given a chance in some quarters.<sup>23</sup> In mid-January, Orozco had sufficient supplies and circulated rumors that he was ready to attack Chihuahua City. This was a feint, and rebel forces moved toward Ciudad Juárez.<sup>24</sup>

The first rebel attempt to take a major border point, always a key part of their strategy, was under way. After several skirmishes with federal troops in the mountains of northwestern Chihuahua, Orozco decided to split his forces, sending one column along the Mexican Northwestern Railroad, the other, under his command, along the Mexican Central Railroad.<sup>25</sup> By February 3, Orozco felt that he had sufficient control of the approaches to Ciudad Juárez and informed

21. *Herald*, Jan. 8, 1911; *El Correo de la Tarde*, Mazatlán, Sinaloa, Mexico, Jan. 10, 1911; Taracena, p. 109.

22. Abraham Gonzales, leader of the anti-reelection party in Chihuahua and staunch *Maderista*, was perhaps the most active of the agents that supplied arms and supplies to the rebels in Chihuahua.

23. *Herald*, Jan. 5, 1911.

24. *Ibid.*, Jan. 25, 1911; *Independent*, LXX, 222 (Feb. 2, 1911).

25. Casasola, I, 226; *Independent*, LXX, 222 (Feb. 2, 1911).

the mayor and the foreign consuls that he would begin a bombardment that afternoon.<sup>26</sup> Failure of expected reinforcements caused him to hold off, and on February 5, Colonel Rábago and some three hundred men fought their way through rebel lines and reinforced the federal garrison. This addition to federal strength discouraged Orozco, the more so when he heard that additional federal troops were being rushed from Chihuahua City. He gave up the attack and retreated south, down the Mexican Central Railroad.<sup>27</sup> On February 14, General Navarro with 1,500 troops entered Ciudad Juárez.<sup>28</sup> The first substantial effort of rebel forces to take a port of entry had failed, but there was no doubt that a disciplined rebel army was operating in Chihuahua.

The withdrawal of Orozco from Ciudad Juárez placed Madero in an awkward position. It was evident that Orozco had assembled an army capable of concerted military action. There were those among Madero's advisers who felt he should be with the troops in Mexico so he could assume true leadership in fact as well as in name. There were others who thought it would be dangerous to the revolution for Madero to enter Mexico until there was more positive evidence of success. The former position won out and on receipt of the news of Orozco's withdrawal from Ciudad Juárez, Madero apologized to Orozco and his men for his absence.<sup>29</sup> On February 13, Madero entered Mexico at Zaragoza, fifteen miles southeast of Ciudad Juárez.<sup>30</sup> Orozco and his forces returned to their mountain strongholds west of Chihuahua City where they were joined by Madero in the latter part of February.<sup>31</sup>

The meeting of Madero and Orozco brought together for the first time the symbolic leader of the revolution and the active military commander. It was hardly a case of mutual admiration. Madero had no knowledge of or appreciation for the capabilities of Orozco, and he brought with him a com-

---

26. *London Times*, Feb. 4, 1911; *El Correo*, Feb. 6, 1911.

27. *El Correo*, Feb. 7 and Feb. 14, 1911; *Herald*, Feb. 9, 1911; Casasola, I, 229.

28. *Independent*, LXX, 281, 330, 330 (Feb. 9, 16, 23, 1911); *London Times*, Feb. 16, 1911.

29. Charles Cumberland, *The Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero* (Austin, Texas, 1954), p. 129.

30. Casasola, I, 230.

31. *El Correo*, Feb. 14, 1911; *Independent*, LXX, 431 (March 2, 1911).

plete military staff. It must have been difficult for the two men to understand one another due to their different backgrounds. Orozco was low born, almost illiterate, crude, and capable of extreme brutality, while Madero was a wealthy aristocrat, well educated, a mystic, and basically gentle. The problem at hand, the defeat of federal forces, became their only common ground.

Madero's failure to recognize Orozco's abilities as a leader resulted in a temporary split between the two men. Orozco, resentful of outside competition for command of rebel forces in Chihuahua, had no place for and no desire to use the men who Madero offered.

In late February, Madero, acting on advice of his advisers rather than on Orozco's, determined to attack Casas Grandes, a federal strongpoint on the Mexican Northwestern Railroad. Orozco was left out of this action and remained in the District of Guerrero, though some of his men saw action at Casas Grandes. There were notable critics of the decision to attack Casas Grandes. Abraham Gonzales, leader of the anti-reelection party in Chihuahua, and active in securing arms in the United States, and Francisco Villa, felt that more would be accomplished by capturing a border point, preferably Ciudad Juárez or Ojinaga. Casas Grandes, even if taken, could serve no useful purpose.<sup>32</sup> Madero was firm, however, and the attack on Casas Grandes began March 5. What followed was the most decisive defeat and slaughter suffered by the rebels during the revolution.<sup>33</sup>

Madero, realizing after the disaster at Casas Grandes that his best chance for success was with Orozco and his men, returned to the south and joined Orozco at Bustillos.<sup>34</sup> For a time the two cooperated, and put into operation a plan to take a border point. Slowly rebel forces moved north toward Ciudad Juárez and Ojinaga. By early April they succeeded in gaining control of the Mexican Central and the Northwest-

32. The Mexican Ambassador to the Department of Justice, Mexican Embassy, Washington, Mar. 17, 1911, with an enclosure of a letter by Abraham Gonzales, in *Foreign Relations*, 1911, 427-428; the Villa position was stated in Edgcomb Pinchon, *Viva Villa* (New York, 1933), p. 148.

33. Alvin R. Kenner, "The Mexican Revolution," *Mining and Scientific Press*, CII, 621-624 (May 6, 1911); Casasola, I, 231; *Independent*, LXX, 539 (March 6, 1911).

34. Casasola, I, 255.

ern railroads, thereby cutting off Ciudad Juárez.<sup>35</sup> On April 19, Madero demanded the surrender of the city.<sup>36</sup>

From April 19 to May 7 a truce prevailed while peace talks were carried on. The talks failed, for rebel leaders refused to lay down their arms until Díaz resigned from the presidency. The work of the peace commission broke down and the talks ended May 7.

During the course of the truce, the military situation grew tense. Orozco and Villa, restless at the delays, wanted to attack while they still held a military advantage. Friction had also developed between rebel and federal soldiers who, under the strain of the long period of inaction, were constantly harassing one another with insults.<sup>37</sup> The two chieftains and their men were only held in check by the persuasive abilities of Madero.

Even with the collapse of negotiations on May 7, Madero was fearful of pushing the attack on Ciudad Juárez. International complications were almost certain to arise out of a military action so close to the American border. In a statement issued May 7, Madero indicated that rebel forces would be withdrawn from Ciudad Juárez and moved south in a march on Mexico City.<sup>38</sup>

Orozco and his men were not so fearful of the nearness of the American border. On May 8, scattered elements of the rebel army began to advance on Ciudad Juárez, triggering a general assault. Evidence does not indicate whether the attack was ordered by Orozco or Villa, or was spontaneous. Once under way there was little Madero could do but give his approval. By the afternoon of May 10, rebel forces had occupied all of the city and General Navarro surrendered the federal garrison.<sup>39</sup>

Friction developed between Madero and his military leaders over the disposition of the federal commander, Juan

35. Ortiz Rubio, p. 178.

36. *Herald*, April 20, 1911.

37. *Ibid.*, May 10, 1911.

38. Edwards, consul, to Bryan, Sec. of State, Ciudad Juárez, May 7, 1911, in *Foreign Relations*, 1911, 477. For the complete text of the Madero statement, see Ramírez Plancarte, pp. 233-234 n.

39. Casasola, I, 269-270; *Herald*, May 11, 1911; *Independent*, LXX, 1033 (May 18, 1911).

Navarro. Orozco and Villa wanted him executed immediately. They remembered the fate of rebel prisoners at Cerro Prieto and wanted revenge. Madero, not wishing unnecessary bloodshed or unfavorable publicity, personally escorted Navarro to safety across the international boundary.

On May 11, Madero named his provisional cabinet which brought on a serious mutiny. The fact that he named Venustiano Carranza Minister of War enraged Orozco who felt he had earned the appointment. This, coupled with the escape of Navarro and the resentment which had been present since Madero's entry into Mexico, prompted Orozco to deal harshly with Madero. Orozco, Villa, and a hundred men went to Madero's quarters. During the argument that followed, Orozco was only restrained with difficulty from shooting men who came to the defense of Madero, and for a time the Provisional President himself was in great danger.<sup>40</sup> He talked Orozco out of the worst of his anger and the matter was patched up. However, the deep resentment and distrust that had developed between the two men was firmly established.

The capture of Ciudad Juárez proved to be the key victory in the revolt against Díaz and his government. It placed the federal troops at Ojinaga and Agua Prieta in an impossible position, forcing them to give up these border points to rebel forces.<sup>41</sup> Federal power in northern Chihuahua was broken, and the highly touted armies of Díaz began to collapse throughout Mexico. The army Díaz had depended upon was honeycombed with graft, its generals were senile, its rank and file had been drawn from the prisons and slums, and it proved of little value in most of its operations.

The first phase of the Mexican revolution was nearing its end. On May 15, a meeting of the peace commission began and on May 17, an armistice was agreed upon. That same day Díaz agreed to resign by the end of the month; he signed his resignation on May 25, and went into exile in Europe. The revolution had succeeded.

Orozco's contribution to the downfall of Díaz cannot be

---

40. *Independent*, LXX, 1033 (May 18, 1911); *New York Times*, Feb. 10, 1913. Hereafter cited as *NYT* with proper date.

41. *Independent*, LXX, 1033 (May 18, 1911).

underestimated. It was his leadership and refusal to give up in the face of what looked like certain failure that finally gave unity and purpose to the rebels of Chihuahua. The combination of an idealistic and outspoken Madero, and the leadership and fighting abilities of Orozco spelled success for the revolution. To give all of the credit to Madero is to completely overlook a large segment of Mexican history of that period. A number of men in many parts of Mexico brought down the Díaz regime and Orozco in Chihuahua ranks among the most important. Joaquin Márquez Montiel, S.J., Chihuahua historian, said about Orozco,

"This revolutionary military *jefe* was the first to raise in arms against the Porfirian dictatorship and one of the principal factors in the triumph of the *Maderista* revolution."<sup>42</sup>

The period from the fall of Ciudad Juárez to March, 1912, was a time of resentment and dissatisfaction for Pascual Orozco. The wealth and power he had anticipated as his reward for service in the revolution never materialized to a degree acceptable to him. His unrest was fed by anti-Madero elements within the state of Chihuahua. The wealthy groups who earlier would not have associated with such a peon upstart saw in Orozco a possible tool against Madero. This element included the Church, which hated Madero, the *científicos* who had been the brains of the later Díaz period, all the wealth and power of the Terrazas family, and the political connivings of Enrique Creel.<sup>43</sup> To succeed against Madero this group needed a "stalking horse," someone who had demonstrated leadership ability and could count on the support of a broad base of the population. Orozco, as a result of his connection with the revolution of 1910 was, in popular fancy, a great hero, and the victorious ending of the revolution in the interest of his party left him as the man of the hour in the state. Nor was he unambitious. He passed every test and became the man of the reactionary elements in Chihuahua.

During the closing months of 1911, plots against the

42. Márquez Montiel, p. 220.

43. *National Archives*, Letcher to Bryan, Chihuahua, Oct. 17, 1913 (812.00/9484); *NYT*, Feb. 10, 1913.

Madero government were in evidence all over Mexico. In November, 1911, Bernardo Reyes, Emilio Vásquez Gómez, and Emiliano Zapata plotted a revolt. The Plan of Ayala, which supported the revolt, recognized Orozco as chief of the revolution if he would accept. Article three of the Plan said: "General Pascual Orozco, second in command to Francisco Madero, is recognized chief of the *Revolución Libertadora*, and in case that he does not accept this office, General Don Emiliano Zapata is recognized as chief of the revolution."<sup>44</sup> Federal authorities used this article plus personal correspondence they claimed to have intercepted to implicate Orozco in the revolt.<sup>45</sup> Orozco, planning his own rebellion, with *hacendado* backing, publicly disassociated himself with the November revolt.<sup>46</sup> The Zapata-Reyes-Vásquez Gómez movement failed from lack of support. Reyes was arrested, Vásquez Gómez fled to the United States and plotted further revolutionary action, and Zapata continued his guerrilla activity in the south.

In the final months of 1911, and in January, 1912, Orozco nominally remained loyal to the Madero government. In December, as commander of the state militia, he took the field against rebel forces supporting Vásquez Gómez.<sup>47</sup> On January 20, 1912, Orozco was in Mexico City and conferred with Madero. Rumors circulated at this time that Orozco was to be sent to Morelos to put down the Zapata revolt, but these were quickly dispelled by Madero.<sup>48</sup> When he returned to Chihuahua, Orozco resigned the commission as commander of the state militia and indicated he was retiring to private life to work for an American mining company guarding ore shipments.<sup>49</sup> Later events showed this to be a neat bit of propaganda.

44. Francisco Naranjo, *Diccionario biográfico revolucionario* (Mexico, 1935), pp. 272-274. On June 19, 1914, a document was issued called the *Ratificación al plan de Ayala* in which article three of the Plan of Ayala was revised to exclude Orozco from leadership as a result of his reactionary tendencies in 1912 and 1913. For the complete text see Manuel González Ramírez, *Planes políticos y otros documentos* (Mexico, 1954), pp. 86-89.

45. *Herald*, Dec. 5, 1911.

46. *Ibid.*, Dec. 8, 1911.

47. He was in pursuit of Antonio Rojas who was later to be one of his aids. *Ibid.*, Dec. 22, 1911.

48. *Ibid.*, Jan. 20, 1912.

49. *Ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1912.

Revolutionary sentiments were again strong in February, 1912. On February 1, the federal garrison at Ciudad Juárez mutinied and declared for Emilio Vásquez Gómez.<sup>50</sup> The agitation of Vásquez Gómez from the United States and the inability of Madero to pacify the country gave considerable support to the revolt. Orozco and his backers were unprepared for their move and were dismayed when the Vásquez Gómez affair gained momentum. The *hacendado* group had not yet collected the necessary arms, ammunition, or money needed for a successful revolutionary enterprise. Orozco was sent immediately to Ciudad Juárez and was able to quiet the mutiny. On February 4, the mutineers were sent to Chihuahua City.<sup>51</sup> Orozco temporized by making terms with the leaders of the mutiny, and troops which were moved from Ciudad Juárez to Chihuahua City were to be an important factor a month later when the Orozco-*hacendado* coalition was ready to move.

All through February, Orozco hesitated while minor uprisings occurred at numerous points in Chihuahua in favor of Vásquez Gómez. On February 18, leaders of the Vásquez Gómez movement tried to force Orozco into committing himself and his backers by proclaiming him General-in-Chief of the rebel forces in Chihuahua.<sup>52</sup> Orozco still hesitated, and as late as February 24, Abraham Gonzales, Governor of Chihuahua, declared Orozco loyal to the government.<sup>53</sup> By March, however, the Vásquez Gómez rebellion had gained such headway that there was danger that Orozco and his supporters would not be able to control it.

On March 3, 1912, Orozco took the final step and declared himself against the Madero government, accepting the previously offered position as General-in-Chief of the Chihuahua rebels. Supporters of Vásquez Gómez and Orozco, within the state government, took over the state legislature and many of the state offices. Francisco Villa, remaining loyal to Madero, led federal troops against Chihuahua City in hopes of restoring the state government to Madero men. Orozco, supported

---

50. *Ibid.*, Feb. 2, 1912; Casasola, I, 422.

51. *Herald*, Feb. 5, 1912.

52. *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1912.

53. *Ibid.*, Feb. 25, 1912.

by the mutineers from Ciudad Juárez, successfully defended the state capital, driving Villa into the western part of the state.

Orozco's defection brought on the customary revolutionary plan. The plan was issued on March 25 as the *Pacto de la Empacadora (Plan Orozquista)*.<sup>54</sup> It was more a personal condemnation of Madero than a plan of revolution. It made few specific charges against the Madero government and offered little in the way of a reform program.

Orozco and his backers hoped their call for revolution would quickly gain support in other northern states. Soon after issuance of the *Plan Orozquista*, Chihuahua was declared seceded from the Mexican republic and an invitation was issued to other Mexican states to unite with Chihuahua to overthrow Madero. None responded however, and Chihuahua carried on the fight alone.

The Madero government found itself defenseless. In office only a short time, it had indifferently organized the affairs of state and was hampered by inexperienced personnel. Its army was entirely disorganized, the old Díaz organization had not been rehabilitated and no new levies had been made. The most powerful military elements that remained of the rebel forces that had overthrown Díaz were mostly in the hands of Orozco in Chihuahua.

Orozco moved quickly to carry out his plan. He brought together nearly five thousand men and jeeringly called upon Madero to resign and save his country more bloodshed.<sup>55</sup> The government sent against the rebels most of its available strength, some 1,600 men. They were commanded by General José Gonzales Salas who had resigned as the Minister of War in Madero's cabinet to lead the federal army in the north.<sup>56</sup>

A critical battle for control of Chihuahua developed early in March around Torreón, an important rail center, where Salas had concentrated his troops.<sup>57</sup> Rebel forces, moving south from Chihuahua City along the main line of the Mexican Central Railroad, made contact with federal outposts on

54. González Ramírez, pp. 95-106.

55. *National Archives*, Letcher to Bryan, Chihuahua, Oct. 17, 1913 (812.00/9484).

56. *Ibid.*

57. *Herald*, Mar. 9, 1912.

March 23, 1912, at Rellano, about one hundred miles northwest of Torreón.<sup>58</sup> On subsequent days the rebels advanced south to Escalon and Corralitos. By March 27, the rebels were completely victorious.<sup>59</sup> This series of victories plus successful operations in the northern part of the state gave Orozco control of Chihuahua.<sup>60</sup>

Although the revolution looked as though it would certainly succeed, the rebels were not to have it so easy. The federal army had been defeated and scattered, and the road to Mexico City was open and undefended. Panic gripped the capital at the prospect of a rebel advance. A decision made in Washington, D. C., however, was to spell disaster for the rebel cause. On March 13, 1912, the United States government placed an embargo on all arms shipments to Mexico.<sup>61</sup> This cut off the rebel source of arms and ammunition and made it difficult, if not impossible, for Orozco to quickly re-supply his army. Orozco defended his failure to follow up his victory on the basis of an arms shortage. The United States' arms embargo brought on bitter denunciation by the rebels. Indeed, the Orozco rebellion was characterized throughout by great hostility towards the United States and towards its citizens who resided within territory held by the rebels.<sup>62</sup>

In early April, Madero prepared a second army to send against Orozco. The command of operations in the north was given to Victoriano Huerta who was given a free hand in organizing the force and assembled an army of about 8,000 men. These began to move north to Torreón on April 10.<sup>63</sup> A month later Huerta was ready to begin operations against Orozco's forces.

Early in May a major split appeared among the leaders of the rebellion. Emilio Vásquez Gómez entered Mexico at Ciudad Juárez on May 3, and on the following day declared himself Provisional President and leader of the revolution.<sup>64</sup> Orozco refused to recognize the provisional government es-

58. *Ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1912.

59. *Ibid.*, Mar. 28, 1912.

60. In the north, Ciudad Juárez fell to the rebels on Feb. 24. *Ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1912.

61. *Ibid.*, Mar. 14, 1912.

62. *National Archives*, Letcher to Bryan, Chihuahua, Oct. 17, 1913 (812.00/9484).

63. *Ibid.*; *Herald*, April 11, 1912; Casasola, I, 443.

64. *Herald*, May 5, 1912.

tablished and went so far as to have Vázquez Gómez arrested and later expelled from Mexico.<sup>65</sup> Orozco and his backers were now in complete control, but they were to find that the treatment of Vázquez Gómez and the very apparent reactionary course of the revolution would soon alienate all but the staunchest of Orozco's followers.

In the meantime, Huerta launched a series of attacks that gradually forced the rebels north and would eventually destroy them as an effective army. Orozco was still short of supplies and his forces faced a numerically superior foe. Also, his break with Vázquez Gómez had lowered the morale of many of his followers who had earlier supported the deposed presidential aspirant. On May 10, 1912, fighting broke out at Conejos, about forty miles northwest of Torreón on the Mexican Central Railroad, which resulted in a victory for Huerta.<sup>66</sup> Federal troops continued to advance along the railroad and on May 22 and 23 fought a pitched battle at Rellano and again defeated the rebels.<sup>67</sup> From Rellano, Orozco retreated north to Bachimba, destroying the railroad as he went. It took Huerta's work crews and army until July 3 to repair the rails and to move into position for an assault on Orozco's defenses. The battle of Bachimba was fought on July 3; and on July 4, Orozco's forces were in full retreat toward Chihuahua City. The revolutionary forces were disbanded as an organized army on July 7, when Huerta reached Chihuahua City.

When he disbanded his army Orozco gave orders for guerrilla warfare.<sup>68</sup> He admitted defeat but was determined to continue fighting. On July 12, he delivered a final diatribe against Madero through the newspapers. It was a weak effort to gain sympathy and support, and it failed.<sup>69</sup>

Huerta established his headquarters at Chihuahua City but made little effort to stop the guerrilla bands that ravaged the country. Orozco made his headquarters at Ciudad Juárez. There is some evidence that the federal armies in the north

---

65. *Ibid.*, May 8, 1912.

66. *Ibid.*, May 11, 1912.

67. *Ibid.*, May 24, 1912.

68. *National Archives*, Letcher to Bryan, Chihuahua, Oct. 17, 1913 (812.00/9484).

69. *Herald*, July 13, 1912.

were not wholly unsympathetic to the rebel cause, and that Orozco and Huerta were in touch and knew of each other's plans. It is not surprising that Huerta, allied by almost life long association and community of interest with Díaz, should be a foe of the new regime in Mexico City. There was much talk in Chihuahua among the army people that General Huerta was planning to turn against Madero. Whether or not it was true that he was plotting such a revolt at this time, it was true that he was inactive in suppressing completely the Orozco rebellion, though all means possible had been placed at his command. His facilities even included two airplanes along with trained pilots and mechanics. The planes were never taken from their hangars.<sup>70</sup>

Orozco retained control of Ciudad Juárez without serious interference from Huerta and continued his fight against Madero. The biggest threat he was able to bring against the Madero government was the persecution of foreigners and their property. He issued orders that all foreigners must give up their arms or join his revolution, and he withdrew all guarantees for the protection of foreign interests.<sup>71</sup> These moves had little effect, for Orozco's power had waned and he controlled only a small territory. On August 16, 1912, Orozco abandoned Ciudad Juárez.<sup>72</sup>

The series of military defeats between May 10, 1912, and the abandonment of Ciudad Juárez caused major dissension in the ranks of Orozco's followers and dissatisfaction on the part of his backers. On July 10, there was a movement to depose Orozco as revolutionary leader in favor of Vásquez Gómez and David de la Fuente.<sup>73</sup> De la Fuente was to take over as military commander and Vásquez Gómez as political leader.<sup>74</sup> On July 17, Antonio Rojas demanded that Orozco give up the funds he had accumulated during the revolution and also relinquish leadership of the movement.<sup>75</sup> The

70. *National Archives*, Letcher to Bryan, Chihuahua, Oct. 17, 1913 (812.00/9484); for a short history of early aviation in Mexico see Dorote Negrete, *Cronología aeronáutica de México* (n.p., 192-), passim.

71. *Herald*, July 30, 1912.

72. *Ibid.*, Aug. 17, 1912; Casasola, I, 466.

73. *National Archives*, Memorandum, unaddressed, unsigned, July 8, 1912 (812.00/7956).

74. *Herald*, July 11 and 12, 1912.

75. *Ibid.*, July 18, 1912.

Church, the *científicos*, and many of the *hacendados* of Chihuahua had abandoned Orozco in July when it was obvious that Huerta was going to defeat him. By late July much of his army had deserted and leadership of the main revolutionary forces in Chihuahua passed into other hands.<sup>76</sup>

Orozco's activities during the last half of 1912 were confined to small guerrilla raids and spiteful reprisals against foreigners, particularly United States nationals. On September 13, 1912, he captured Ojinaga which remained his headquarters until January, 1913.<sup>77</sup> Here again the position of the federal armies in Chihuahua was shown. Orozco, during these last months of 1912, had only about 800 poorly armed, untrained men, and these were fast dwindling, yet he was able to hold Ojinaga and to pillage northern Chihuahua with little interference from federal troops.<sup>78</sup> In January, 1913, his army all but gone, Orozco gave up his fight and entered the United States. He was apparently aware, however, that a bigger revolution was near at hand.

On January 25, 1913, Orozco, in exile in the United States, published a formal statement again calling for the resignation of Madero. The statement also suggested a provisional government: President, Jerónimo Treviño; Foreign Minister, Francisco de la Barra; Treasury, Toribio Esquivel Obregón; Communications, Felix Díaz; Public Instruction, Francisco Vásquez Gómez. The statement closed "Pascual Orozco declines any benefit."<sup>79</sup> This was the final gesture of Orozco's revolution against Madero. In February the Reyes-Felix Díaz revolt took precedence, and on February 15, Orozco declared himself for that group.<sup>80</sup>

Orozco's rebellion in Chihuahua, though unsuccessful, did much to bring down the Madero government. To accomplish stability and consolidate his government, Madero needed peace and money. In July, 1911, the Mexican Treasury had a surplus of 63,000,000 pesos.<sup>81</sup> A large portion of this disappeared to support federal forces in Chihuahua. Disturbances

76. *Ibid.*, July 25, 1912.

77. *Ibid.*, Sept. 4, 1912.

78. *National Archives*, Letcher to Bryan, Chihuahua, Oct. 17, 1913 (812.00/9484).

79. *Herald*, Jan. 28, 1913; *NYT*, Feb. 10, 1913.

80. *Herald*, Feb. 16, 1913.

81. *Ibid.*, July 8, 1911.

in all parts of Mexico told heavily on the central government, but Chihuahua became the focus of effort. Lack of funds made it impossible for Madero to put into effect the demands for reform, and dissatisfaction with his inability to deal with rebellion cost him support and made him vulnerable to the machinations of Huerta, Reyes and Felix Díaz. Although Orozco had no personal part in the coup d'état which brought Huerta to power, it can be said that Huerta inherited Orozco's revolution and did in another way what Orozco could not accomplish on his own. The same elements that had supported Orozco in 1912 backed Huerta.

The ascendancy of Huerta brought Orozco scurrying back to Mexico. He was met by Huerta and, after the customary *abrazos*, Huerta appointed Orozco as a brigadier-general in the Mexican army for his service to his country in trying to overthrow Madero.<sup>82</sup> Huerta, following his "election," issued an invitation to all the state leaders to support his government. In the north the invitation was rejected by most men when it became known that Carranza intended to oppose Huerta. Orozco was among the few who accepted. The Carranza forces revolted.

Orozco became the workhorse among Huerta's generals in northern Mexico. From July, 1913, until the fall of Huerta a year later, Orozco was the most persistent in fighting the rebel advance. Though a federal commander, his troops were usually irregulars, made up of his personal followers who had remained loyal to him since 1910. Federal strongholds were at Chihuahua City, Ciudad Juárez, Ojinaga and Torreón. The rebel army was concentrated in southern Chihuahua and was commanded by Orozco's one time aide, Francisco Villa. Until October, 1913, neither force was able to gain any real advantage.

Late in 1913, Villa began operations to clear Chihuahua of federal troops. In October he broke federal power at Torreón which severed the last connection between the Mexican capital and the federal forces in Chihuahua. Villa's next objective became Chihuahua City, but Orozco and his irregu-

---

<sup>82</sup>. *National Archives*, Letcher to Bryan, Chihuahua, Oct. 17, 1913 (812.00/9484); Casasola, II, 527.

lars proved the balance of power and Villa was repulsed by the federal troops. Rather than return south, Villa by-passed Chihuahua City and on November 15 succeeded in taking Ciudad Juárez. Villa began an advance south November 24, capturing Tierra Blanca. Orozco moved out of Chihuahua City to halt the rebel advance, but was driven back.<sup>83</sup> With the rebels controlling the railroads both north and south, federal forces abandoned Chihuahua City on December 3.<sup>84</sup> Orozco's forces and those from Chihuahua City retreated to Ojinaga.<sup>85</sup> Villa closely pursued the federals to Ojinaga, and on January 10, 1914, drove them into the United States. Most of the officers and men were interned, but Orozco escaped and soon organized another command to fight the rebels in northern Mexico.<sup>86</sup>

During the first six months of 1914 Orozco's activities were difficult to trace, for he was constantly on the move. Being thoroughly familiar with the border, he slipped in and out of Mexico at will. He is known to have lived for months within a short distance of El Paso, Texas. In May he showed up briefly in Los Angeles where he tried to recruit men and supplies for the Huerta cause. He fled Los Angeles when a warrant was issued for his arrest on a charge of violating United States neutrality laws.<sup>87</sup> In June Orozco was back in Mexico in command of 4,000 irregulars; his orders were to support the federal garrison at Zacatecas. The Carranza rebels soundly defeated the federal garrison. Orozco, not wanting to risk his small force in the fight, retreated to Soledad where the rebel cavalry caught up with and surrounded him.<sup>88</sup> He escaped their trap and in late June joined other Huerta leaders at San Luis Potosí where they declared themselves separated from the control of the regular army but at the same time pledged that they would continue to fight the Constitutional Army led by Carranza.<sup>89</sup>

83. *NYT*, Nov. 30, 1913.

84. Casasola, II, 654; Juan Barragan Rodriguez, *Historia del ejército y de la revolución constitucionalista* (Mexico, 1946), 2 vols., II, 654.

85. *NYT*, Dec. 10, 1913.

86. *Ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1915; Barragan, p. 232.

87. *NYT*, May 13, 1914.

88. *Ibid.*, June 27, 1914.

89. *Ibid.*, June 29, 1914.

By July it was evident the Huerta regime was fast coming to an end. Rebel forces under Carranza were closing on Mexico City, Villa had all but complete control in the north. On July 15, 1914, Huerta gave up and left the country, going to Spain.

Orozco, without waiting for a Carranza government to come into full control, started a counter-revolution. His chief aide was Francisco Cardenas, the officer who had commanded the guard that had custody of Madero when he was murdered.<sup>90</sup> The counter-revolution was never to be a serious threat to either Villa or Carranza, who themselves split in 1914 and were fighting each other. Orozco's activities were confined to minor clashes with Villa forces in northern Mexico. He moved freely across the border and was wanted by Villa in Mexico and authorities in the United States. In December, Orozco appeared for a short time in New York City, seeking arms and financial aid for his fight against Carranza and Villa.<sup>91</sup>

While Orozco was carrying on his lone fight, Huerta had returned from exile in Spain and was in the United States plotting his return to power. He and Orozco joined forces and on June 27, 1915, met at Newman, New Mexico, near El Paso. They were immediately arrested by American immigration officers for violation of United States neutrality laws. Apparently Orozco and Huerta planned to cross the border where loyal forces were waiting to revolt. It was also reported that a substantial quantity of arms was waiting for the rebels in a warehouse in El Paso.<sup>92</sup>

This was not to be the end of Orozco's activities, but it was the finish of Huerta. On July 2, Orozco jumped his bail of \$7,500 and entered Mexico. Huerta was arrested before he could do likewise and was held in an El Paso jail.<sup>93</sup> A short time later Huerta was killed by another prisoner while still in jail.

During the remainder of July and in August, 1915, Orozco and a few loyal followers operated along the border trying to

---

90. *Ibid.*, July 19, 1914.

91. *Ibid.*, Dec. 15, 1914.

92. *Ibid.*, June 28, 1915.

93. *Ibid.*, July 3 and 13, 1915.

gather an army, but with little success. To support themselves they raided ranches on both sides of the border. On August 31, Orozco raided the Dick Love Ranch in the Big Bend district of Texas. A posse of civilians, United States customs officials, and members of the 13th United States Cavalry were close at hand and took his trail. In the Green River Canyon of the High Lonesome Mountains near Hillsburg, Texas, Pascual Orozco and four of his companions were killed in a running fight.<sup>94</sup> Orozco had fallen a long way since his triumphant entry into Chihuahua City as general of the revolutionary army that had beaten Díaz in 1911.

Orozco was an opportunist; the satisfaction of his ambitions for wealth and prestige determined his loyalties. He thrived on the brutality, lawlessness, and coarseness of guerrilla fighting. For all his shortcomings his appeal to the people of Chihuahua was remarkable. Even in defeat, disgraced in the eyes of most Mexicans, and declared a bandit by two nations, Orozco was still able to raise an army in Chihuahua with relative ease. In the annals of Chihuahua history he remains a hero to this day, particularly for his part in the overthrow of Díaz.

His services to the revolution in 1910-1911, when the Díaz forces were defeated, were second only to those of Madero, and perhaps in some respects he takes precedence over the "Apostle of the Revolution." The remaining years of his life are not so deserving of praise. After the fall of Díaz, Orozco's name and abilities became permanently associated with all the elements in Mexico that stood for the old tyranny and the old ways of doing things. Until the day he died he kept the northern states, and particularly Chihuahua, in a state of turmoil. Forces that were eventually welded to crush him and others like him were also strong enough to bring a degree of stability and sanity to the Mexican nation. The leaders of this new force emerged the victors over the more reactionary and anti-revolution elements.

In all parts of Mexico in 1910 men like Pascual Orozco burst suddenly upon the Mexican scene. The chance for lead-

<sup>94</sup>. *National Archives*, Weekly Report, Headquarters, Southern Department, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, Dept. 3, 1915; *NYT*, Sept. 1, 1915.

ership, recognition, and even wealth was there for the strong to take. It was a period of particular brutality and inhumanity. To survive the rigors of leadership a man had to be cast in the pattern of an Orozco or a Villa or a Zapata. It was not until the Mexican nation was exhausted and prostrate that any semblance of order or of law developed.

Until the many state and local leaders who participated in the great rebellion, from 1910 to 1917, are sorted out and analyzed, our knowledge of the Mexican movement will be inadequate and faulty. The Mexican Constitution of 1917, which has had such an important impact upon the constitutional development of all of the Latin American countries, was a direct outgrowth of the Díaz dictatorship and the chaotic six years that followed his fall. The developing revolution with all of its ramifications also grew out of the anarchy and bloodshed that swept Mexico from 1910 to 1917. It is essential that the basic elements that went into the making of Mexican history during these six or seven years be understood. The activities of Pascual Orozco, Jr., and his Chihuahua rebels were but one link in that chain of events.