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## CONDITIONS ALONG THE BORDER—1915

## THE PLAN DE SAN DIEGO

ALLEN GERLACH

FROM 1910 to 1916 the Mexican Republic suffered from acute political instability as one "*Plan*" after another was issued against claimants to the presidency. The turbulence of the Mexican Revolution began in 1910 with the overthrow of Porfirio Díaz by the movement of Francisco I. Madero. In 1913 the tenuous regime of Madero was violently replaced by that of Victoriano Huerta, and the turmoil continued unabated. Faced with major revolutions led by Venustiano Carranza, Francisco Villa, and Emiliano Zapata, Huerta fled Mexico in mid-1914 as the opposition armies converged on Mexico City. Despite the efforts of the new victors to achieve a unified government at the Convention of Aguascalientes in 1914, Carranza's Constitutionalists soon fell into quarreling among themselves and the Revolution entered its most violent phase. Representing the Constitutionalist government of Mexico, Venustiano Carranza and Álvaro Obregón arrayed themselves against Francisco Villa and Emiliano Zapata, who purported to represent the cause of the Convention. As was so often Mexico's tragic experience, force replaced arguments and compromise in determining who would rule the nation.<sup>1</sup> Such chaotic conditions in Mexico offered an excellent opportunity for Victoriano Huerta to reenter the Republic and again assume the presidency.

Soon after Huerta's flight, in July 1914, Pascual Orozco, Jr., a former Huertista general, entered the United States and began plotting a revolution against the Constitutionalists. Orozco initiated his movement by instructing two Huertista generals, José Inés Salazar and Emilio Campa, to launch a revolt in northern Chihua-

hua to harass and divide the Constitutionalists. The movement's central thrust from the United States would follow later, as soon as Orozco could attain better coordination and financial backing.<sup>2</sup> Salazar and Campa moved about northern Chihuahua pouncing quickly with a force of from fifty to eighty men.<sup>3</sup> Orozco furnished them with American arms while he was establishing contact with important Mexican exiles in the United States.

Meanwhile, Victoriano Huerta was planning a similar, but separate, movement in Barcelona, Spain. In February the German government made overtures to Huerta and offered him substantial financial assistance. Huerta had already established himself as a bitter enemy of Woodrow Wilson, and the German government now sought to exploit this antipathy by helping to re-establish Huerta in power.<sup>4</sup> It appears that the basic German motivation was to establish their influence in Mexico and keep the American government occupied with a hostile neighbor and thus less likely to intervene in the European conflict.<sup>5</sup>

By late March 1915 the Orozco and Huerta movements had merged and were receiving financial backing from the German government. In late April or early May more definite arrangements were made. The German authorities sealed an agreement with Huerta and Orozco giving the revolutionists \$895,000 in cash and a promise of 10,000 rifles. In all, the German commitment approached \$12,000,000, and it was agreed that if and when Huerta became president again, Germany would support him in war and peace. The date for Huerta's projected revolution, to be launched across the border from the United States, was set for 28 June 1915.<sup>6</sup>

As the date neared, arms shipments to Huertistas operating in Mexico increased, and intelligence officials on the border became more and more concerned about a new revolutionary movement in Mexico.<sup>7</sup> Despite their reports, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan doubted the foundation of the rumors, although he did comment that "Huerta's coming indicates some kind of scheme, but do not think he will receive any encouragement in United States."<sup>8</sup> Although Bryan was not fully aware of the sig-

nificance of Huerta's activities,<sup>9</sup> Zachary Cobb, the United States Customs Collector at El Paso, continued to write that a Huertista attack upon Ciudad Juárez was imminent.<sup>10</sup> Finally, on 24 June, Huerta arrived in El Paso from New York, just four days before the revolution was to be launched.<sup>11</sup>

Bryan may have underestimated the intrigue, but Department agents had been following it closely. On 27 June, Orozco and Huerta were arrested in Newman, New Mexico, and charged with conspiring to violate United States neutrality laws. Nine months of revolutionary planning was ended in a moment. Both men were placed under house arrest and kept under surveillance in El Paso after paying bond. In spite of these precautions, Orozco escaped on 3 July. Immediately, Huerta's bond was cancelled and he was placed under arrest.<sup>12</sup>

Many people still believed that Orozco would attempt revolution, even though Huerta was under custody. Reports of arms shipments from Havana, Cuba, to Huertistas in Corpus Christi, Texas, and of Huertista recruitment activities in Oklahoma were made to the Secretary of State.<sup>13</sup> Robert Lansing, who had replaced Bryan on 18 June, grew so alarmed that he revoked an order of the Secretary of War releasing three prominent Huertistas from Fort Bliss Prison in Texas. Lansing feared that their release might appear as encouragement to the "new revolutionary movement in Mexico."<sup>14</sup> Whatever threat the scheme posed diminished in July and August when the leaders were either captured or killed. On 20 July, José Inés Salazar was apprehended in Columbus, New Mexico.<sup>15</sup> On 3 August, twenty-four Huertistas were arrested near Fort Hancock, Texas, for filibustering.<sup>16</sup> The most important figure was eliminated on 30 August when Pascual Orozco, Jr., and four companions were shot to death in Culberson County, Texas, by an American posse consisting of federal marshals, deputy sheriffs, Texas Rangers, and Cavalry troops. Had it not been for United States intervention,<sup>17</sup> the course of the Mexican Revolution might well have been different.

The projected revolution of Huerta and Orozco had other ramifications in addition to the planned invasion of Mexico which was

to be launched on 28 June. The prime extension of the movement was the so-called *Plan de San Diego*, an operation which began in early 1915, was composed of Huertistas, and had significant German involvement. These characteristics parallel the Huerta-Orozco movement so closely that it appears safe to conclude that the Plan was merely another phase of the larger Huerta-Orozco scheme.<sup>18</sup>

The Plan, ostensibly written in San Diego, Texas, by an unidentified friend of Basilio Ramos (alias B. R. García), was smuggled into a Monterrey jail, where it was signed on 6 January 1915 by Ramos and seven other Huertistas.<sup>19</sup> The document called for an armed uprising on 20 February 1915 of Mexican nationals and American citizens of Mexican extraction. Its aim was to capture "Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and Upper California, of which states the Republic of Mexico was robbed in a most perfidious manner by North American imperialism." Every North American male over sixteen was to be put to death, with the exception of aged men. Eventually, the captured territory would be annexed to Mexico.<sup>20</sup> These farfetched objectives are exceedingly difficult to take seriously, and it is most probable that the Plan de San Diego was merely a diversionary element in the larger Huerta-Orozco revolution. If the major purpose of the Plan was to create confusion along the border and in the minds of many United States officials, it enjoyed considerable success.

In late January 1915 one of the leaders of the Plan, Basilio Ramos, was arrested in McAllen, Texas, by a deputy sheriff of Cameron County. Although local authorities probably uncovered the plot first, Judge John Sutherland of San Diego had sent a full report to the Attorney General in Washington before the arrest was made. Ramos, in possession of a copy of the Plan when arrested, was sent to jail and indicted on 13 May 1915.<sup>21</sup> The Plan was subsequently reported in a Harlingen, Texas, newspaper and caused considerable alarm among the population, although no disorders or violations of neutrality laws occurred.<sup>22</sup> With Basilio Ramos in jail, his father Jesús and three brothers were assembling arms and furnishing them to Mexicans in Lajitas, Texas. On 6 March one of the Ramos brothers, Vicente, was arrested by a United States

Army officer near Alpine, Texas. He was accused of doing this for the purpose of raising a sufficient force of Huertistas to enter Mexico.<sup>23</sup> Although the fate of Vicente Ramos is unknown, the connection between his activities and the Orozco-Huerta movement appears obvious. He was probably an important part of the effort to prepare for the 28 June invasion by creating confusion along the border. After Basilio Ramos was indicted on 13 May, his case was soon dismissed when the judge informed him: "You ought to be tried for lunacy—not conspiracy against the United States."<sup>24</sup> Local officials did not see the broader significance of Ramos' activities and did not connect his case with the arrest of his brother the previous March. When the case was dismissed as a meaningless scheme of a lunatic, Basilio Ramos dropped from sight, and his subsequent activities are difficult to trace.

Fresh leadership was added to the movement in May when Aniceto Pizano and Luis de la Rosa, both American citizens who had done well economically in Texas, organized raiding bands of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans which attacked the Lower Rio Grande Valley. These parties were composed of from twenty-five to a hundred men, organized into quasi-military companies.<sup>25</sup> Even though such forays increased early in 1915, they posed no real problem for the United States authorities. At least until August, the federal government continued to believe, as did the military, that the situation concerned Texas alone. Although Governor James E. Ferguson had insisted that the center of the disturbances was south of the Rio Grande, an army investigation made by F. W. Sibley in March concluded that the problems originated in Texas and could be quelled by local and state authorities.<sup>26</sup> In July well-armed bands of disciplined Mexicans stole horses, arms, and ammunition in attacks along the Lower Rio Grande.<sup>27</sup> When the citizens of San Benito petitioned the Governor, complaining that bands from Mexico were stealing American property,<sup>28</sup> the Secretary of War, evidently acting upon Sibley's report, refused the Governor's request for federal aid.<sup>29</sup>

During the month of August events of a more spectacular nature occurred. It now appeared that the raids which had been disturb-

ing Texas were related to the Plan de San Diego and that the Plan itself had German connections.

On 7 August a circular, printed in Matamoros, Mexico, appeared in Brownsville, Texas, urging all Mexicans to join the "revolution in Texas," which would be a "vindication of right and justice lost to us for so long a time."<sup>30</sup> The undisputed link between the Plan and the raids was revealed on 10 August when a detachment of cavalry captured incriminating documents from a band of raiders.<sup>31</sup> Supposedly the Plan had three thousand adherents. As a result General Funston, commander of the Southern Department of the United States Army, ordered additional troops to Brownsville and Kingsville.<sup>32</sup> During the last week of August American intelligence channels were flooded with reports about support of the Plan by Mexican newspapers, recruitment for the Plan, and its strength in certain locales.<sup>33</sup> Secretary Lansing protested, ordering that the appropriate officials in Mexico be told to take the steps necessary to quiet the matter.<sup>34</sup> Venustiano Carranza, head of the Constitutionalist forces, complied and ordered his subordinates in the field to abstain absolutely from taking any part in the Plan.<sup>35</sup> Carranza did not have full control over his soldiers in northern Mexico, particularly those under General Emiliano Nafarrete. Some of Nafarrete's soldiers in the Matamoros area were engaged in raids against the United States independently of the Plan de San Diego. When General Funston ordered American artillery and airplanes to Brownsville in mid-August, Nafarrete increased his forces by two thousand men.<sup>36</sup> To prevent a useless clash with the Mexicans, United States troops did not expose themselves near the river,<sup>37</sup> and on 29 August Nafarrete and his Constitutionalist forces retired to a point some distance from the river front to avoid conflict.<sup>38</sup> The American protest to Carranza illustrates how totally unaware the United States was of the Huertista nature of the Plan de San Diego. In any case, Lansing's strong message and Funston's display of force along the border did ameliorate some of the problems resulting from the raids, both those emanating from the Plan and those originating with Mexican soldiers who took advantage of the chaotic situation produced by the Revolution.

In August the German connection to the Huertista Plan was also partially revealed. On the twelfth the American Consulate in Monterrey expressed the conviction that most conservative Mexicans there believed the Germans were instigating the movement in south Texas.<sup>39</sup> On 21 August Colonel Crane of the United States Army reported a conversation in Mexico City in which he had been informed of a connection between Germany and the "uprising" in Texas.<sup>40</sup> Crane, however, was exceedingly vague and included no details. One of the clearest indications of German influence came on 2 September when a band of from twenty-five to thirty Mexicans under Aniceto Pizano murdered two Americans seven miles east of San Benito, near Brownsville, Texas. Pizano's men were equipped with German Mausers and American Winchesters. Before the two Americans were killed by the band, they were asked if they were *alemanes*. When they replied that they were not, they were instantly killed. Another man was spared because he was a German.<sup>41</sup> That raiders were not to molest Germans is illustrated by the case of a farmhouse near Santa Maria, Texas. The owner had a German flag waving above his house, and stated that certain Mexicans told him it would save his property and his life.<sup>42</sup>

The frequency and virulence of the border raids increased during the month of September. They became such an acute problem that at least half of the Mexican-American families, and numerous Anglo-Americans left the rural areas in the Lower Rio Grande Valley—a flight which threatened to disrupt the economy of the area.<sup>43</sup> Mexican newspapers in Veracruz, Monterrey, and Matamoros made much of the "revolution in Texas," as they termed it. Their reports were always favorable to the Mexicans, and the United States was said to be having a difficult time in defeating them.<sup>44</sup> The Constitutionalist papers in Matamoros and Monterrey contained articles by Luis de la Rosa calling for implementation of the Plan.<sup>45</sup> The appearance of such articles does not in any way implicate either the Constitutionalist or their chief, Carranza, even though they permitted the publication of de la Rosa's pleas.

Again, during the first half of September, United States intelli-



gence channels were flooded with reports connecting the raids to the Plan de San Diego. American Consul Garrett at Nuevo Laredo felt that the situation warranted martial law,<sup>46</sup> as did General Funston.<sup>47</sup> Consul Blocker, stationed at Piedras Negras, declared that much of the frontier was "infected" with the Plan.<sup>48</sup> During this month, however, it is exceptionally difficult to distinguish between bandit raids, those led by Carranzista or Villista soldiers acting with or without the support of their superiors, and those of adherents to the Plan. Although Carranza denied any involvement in the border raids and insisted that General Nafarrete was attempting to suppress the raiders,<sup>49</sup> Lansing relied on General Funston's judgment that Carranza's soldiers were responsible for many of the disturbances along the Texas border.<sup>50</sup> Although it is quite certain that a few Carranzista<sup>51</sup> and Villista<sup>52</sup> soldiers did participate in forays across the border, thus adding to the confusion, a Carranza Consul at San Antonio, Texas, Sr. Beltrán, pointed out the far more important fact that "an apparently organized movement existed with ends on the American side as well as the Mexican side which it has been impossible thus far to ferret out."<sup>53</sup>

In late September Venustiano Carranza replaced General Nafarrete with General Eugenio López.<sup>54</sup> The Constitutionalist representative in Washington, Eliseo Arredondo, indicated that Nafarrete was removed because of his failure to put an end to the border troubles inspired by his subordinate officers.<sup>55</sup> Carranza's apparent desire to end disorder along the boundary assuredly proves his lack of connection with the Plan de San Diego.

Raids under the Plan continued during October. On the second, de la Rosa, who had been recruiting men up and down the river, was seen in Matamoros. An agent of de la Rosa and Pizano, Domingo Ochoa, was said to be in Laredo with \$40,000 in American money. Supposedly, he was recruiting for the Plan de San Diego, particularly in San Antonio, Texas.<sup>56</sup> In late September and early October there was more marauding and firing across the border by Mexicans at Progreso and Brownsville, Texas.<sup>57</sup> On 18 October de la Rosa and Pizano crossed the river and led a raid which wrecked a train north of Brownsville. Passengers on the train were robbed,

but two merchants saved themselves by claiming they were Germans. One soldier and two American civilians were killed.<sup>58</sup> A few days later a band of Mexicans raided near Rio Bravo, Texas, shouting "*Viva la independencia de Texas.*"<sup>59</sup>

General Funston<sup>60</sup> and the leading public officials of Brownsville<sup>61</sup> unsuccessfully petitioned the Secretary of State for permission to pursue raiders across the international line. Again on 21 October Pizano and about sixty of his raiders attacked a detachment of United States soldiers at Ojo de Agua and burned a ranch.<sup>62</sup> With the tempo of the raids increasing, and in view of American reluctance to cross the border, Secretary Lansing was annoyed to hear that de la Rosa had been seen in Reynosa, Mexico, and that the local Carranza officials had made no attempt to arrest him.<sup>63</sup> Lansing promptly dispatched a complaint to Carranza, urging him to arrest de la Rosa and to break up the bandits operating on the Mexican side of the river.<sup>64</sup> Carranza agreed to do so.<sup>65</sup> Public reaction to the raids grew increasingly vehement,<sup>66</sup> and Texas Senator Sheppard, after a personal investigation, reported that a "race" war was a definite possibility and recommended the construction of permanent forts along the river, plus a treaty with Carranza that would allow American troops to pursue bandits into Mexico.<sup>67</sup> A committee of citizens of San Antonio, Texas, felt compelled to urge President Wilson to declare martial law if necessary and to offer rewards for the outlaws. The Plan de San Diego, they argued, was at the root of the problem.<sup>68</sup> Lansing's response was that the difficulty could be solved by Texas officials if they made an effort. He also pointed out that an official protest had already been sent to Carranza.<sup>69</sup> Despite much excitement in late October, the Ojo de Agua raid of 21 October was the last serious foray until the following year, when a different set of circumstances provoked Francisco Villa into raiding the United States.

A few weeks after receiving *de facto* recognition from the United States on 19 October, Carranza pledged to replace trouble-making troops on the border with more reliable forces.<sup>70</sup> The First Chief promised to punish all border offenders and ordered the arrest of de la Rosa and other bandits who had taken part in the

raids.<sup>71</sup> Carranza also suggested an international agreement to allow American troops to pursue outlaws into Mexican territory, and Mexican troops to enter the United States for the same purpose.<sup>72</sup> Unwilling to permit foreign troops to enter the United States, Lansing hastened to refuse the proposal.<sup>73</sup>

Pressures were soon brought to bear upon de la Rosa and other bandits. Carranza patrols<sup>74</sup> kept de la Rosa and Pizano on the run and a force of *Rurales* from Reynosa succeeded in capturing fourteen bandits in three days.<sup>75</sup> Carranza ordered that de la Rosa and Pizano be shot if captured.<sup>76</sup> Nevertheless, word came that the former was recruiting in Monterrey, offering men one-half of the loot to be captured in Texas. It was also reported that a German was issuing commissions with him.<sup>77</sup> But the border remained calm for the rest of the year.<sup>78</sup> On 6 January 1916 the Secretary of War was confident enough to advise the withdrawal of all troops on the border to their permanent peacetime stations.<sup>79</sup> Secretary Lansing, however, thought that the removal of troops would be ill-advised in view of "the circumstances in certain portions of Mexico."<sup>80</sup> With the Villa raid on Columbus, New Mexico, only a few months off, Lansing's decision proved wise.

IT APPEARS almost certain that the Plan de San Diego was a part of the larger Huerta-Orozco movement. The Huertista allegiance of the Plan's adherents, the large degree of German involvement, and the Plan's promulgation four months before the projected invasion of Mexico by Huerta and Orozco, all lead to the conclusion that the scheme was designed to divert the attention of both United States and Mexican authorities from the more important movement. The diversionary effort, in all probability, was successful in attracting many Mexicans and Mexican-Americans, if only by playing upon the bitterness which existed along the border, stemming from racial discrimination and the long legacy of resentment against the United States. One of the prime roots of that animosity was the Mexican War of 1846 and the exceedingly harsh Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which followed. The Huertista designers of the Plan de San Diego did not fail to take advantage of

the pent-up resentment against the United States. Nor did the German government fail to exploit the great animosity between Victoriano Huerta and Woodrow Wilson. Had the United States government appreciated the full implications and dimensions of the Plan de San Diego of 1915, it assuredly would not have been so astounded on 17 January 1917 when the State Department was informed of the Zimmermann Telegram.<sup>81</sup>

## APPENDIX I

### PROVISIONAL DIRECTORATE OF THE PLAN (PLOT) OF SAN DIEGO, TEX., JANUARY 6, 1915<sup>82</sup>

WE, WHO in turn sign our names, assembled in the revolutionary plot of San Diego, Tex., solemnly promise each other, on our word of honor, that we will fulfill, and cause to be fulfilled and complied with, all the clauses and provisions stipulated in this document, and execute the orders and the wishes emanating from the provisional directorate of this movement and recognize as military chief of the same Mr. Agustin S. Garza, guaranteeing with our lives the faithful accomplishment of what is here agreed upon.

1. On the 20th day of February, 1915, at 2 o'clock in the morning, we will rise in arms against the Government and the country of the United States of North America, one as all and all as one, proclaiming the liberty of the individuals of the black race and its independence of Yankee tyranny which has held us in iniquitous slavery since the remote times; and at the same time and in the same manner we will proclaim the independence and segregation of the States bordering on the Mexican Nation, which are: Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and Upper California, of which States the Republic of Mexico was robbed in a most perfidious manner by North American imperialism.

2. In order to render the foregoing clause effective, the necessary army corps will be formed under the immediate command of military leaders named by the Supreme Revolutionary Congress of San Diego, Tex., which shall have full power to designate a supreme chief, who shall be at the head of said army. The banner which shall guide us in this enterprise shall be

red, with a white diagonal fringe, and bearing the following inscription: "Equality and independence," and none of the subordinate leaders or subalterns shall use any other flag (except only the white flag for signals). The aforesaid army shall be known by the name of "liberating army for races and peoples."

3. Each one of the chiefs will do his utmost, by whatever means possible, to get possession of the arms and funds of the cities which he has beforehand been designated to capture, in order that our cause may be provided with resources to continue the fight with better success, the said leaders each being required to render an account of everything to his superiors, in order that the latter may dispose of it in the proper manner.

4. The leader who may take a city must immediately name and appoint municipal authorities, in order that they may preserve order and assist in every way possible the revolutionary movement. In case the capital of any State we are endeavoring to liberate be captured, there will be named in the same manner superior municipal authorities for the same purpose.

5. It is strictly forbidden to hold prisoners, either special prisoners (civilians) or soldiers; and the only time that should be spent in dealing with them is that which is absolutely necessary to demand funds (loans) of them; and whether these demands are successful or not, they shall be shot immediately without any pretext.

6. Every stranger who shall be found armed and who can not prove his right to carry arms shall be summarily executed, regardless of his race or nationality.

7. Every North American over 16 years of age shall be put to death, and only the aged men, the women, and children shall be respected; and on no account shall the traitors to our race be spared or respected.

8. The Apaches of Arizona, as well as the Indians (redskins) of the Territory shall be given every guaranty; and their lands which have been taken from them shall be returned to them, to the end that they may assist us in the cause which we defend.

9. All appointments and grades in our army which are exercised by subordinate officers (subalterns) shall be examined (recognized) by the superior officers. There shall likewise be recognized the grades of leaders of other complots which may be connected with this, and who may wish to cooperate with us; also those who may affiliate with us later.

10. The movement having gathered force, and once having possessed ourselves of the States above alluded to, we shall proclaim them an independent republic, later requesting (if it be thought expedient) annexation to Mexico, without concerning ourselves at the time about the form of government which may control the destinies of the common mother country.

11. When we shall have obtained independence for the Negroes, we shall grant them a banner, which they themselves shall be permitted to select, and we shall aid them in obtaining six States of the American Union, which States border upon those already mentioned, and they may form from these six States a republic, and they may therefore be independent.

12. None of the leaders shall have power to make terms with the enemy, without first communicating with the superior officers of the army, bearing in mind that this is a war without quarter; nor shall any leader enroll in his ranks any stranger, unless said stranger belong to the Latin, the Negro, or the Japenese race.

13. It is understood that none of the members of this complot (or any one who may come in later) shall, upon the definite triumph of the cause which we defend, fail to recognize their superiors, nor shall they aid others who, with bastard designs, may endeavor to destroy what has been accomplished by such great work.

14. As soon as possible each local society (junta) shall nominate delegates who shall meet at a time and place beforehand designated, for the purpose of nominating a permanent directorate of the revolutionary movement. At this meeting shall be determined and worked out in detail the power and duties of the permanent directorate and this revolutionary plan may be revised or amended.

15. It is understood among those who may follow this movement that we shall carry in a singing voice the independence of the negroes, placing obligations upon both races and that on no account will we accept aid, either moral or pecuniary, from the Government of Mexico; and it need not consider itself under any obligation in this, our movement.

Equality and independence.

SAN DIEGO, TEX., *January 6, 1919.* [1915]

(Signed)

L. PERRIGO, *President.*  
 A. GONZALES, *Secretary.*  
 A. A. SAENZ.  
 E. CISNEROS.  
 PORFIRIO SANTOS.  
 A. S. GARZA.  
 MANUEL FLORES.  
 B. RAMOS, JR.  
 A. G. ALMARAZ.

## APPENDIX II

## THE ZIMMERMANN TELEGRAM

WE INTEND to begin unrestricted submarine warfare on the first of February. We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support, and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you.

You will inform the President [of Mexico] of the above most secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States is certain and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves.

Please call the President's attention to the fact that the unrestricted employment of our submarines now offers the prospect of compelling England to make peace within a few months. Acknowledge receipt.

ZIMMERMANN

## NOTES

1. The best treatment of this stage of the Revolution is Robert E. Quirk, *The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915* (New York, 1960).
2. Michael C. Meyer, *Mexican Rebel: Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1915* (Lincoln, Neb., 1967), pp. 118-20.
3. *Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929*, National Archives Microfilm Publication, "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 23 Jan. 1915, 812.00/14319. Unless otherwise indicated all correspondence of the Department of State will be from the 812.00 files and will be identified as RDS with only the slash number.
4. The American occupation of Veracruz on 21 April 1914 was largely motivated by Wilson's desire to prevent a German shipment of 200 machine guns and 15 million rounds of cartridges from reaching Huerta. Howard Cline, *The United States and Mexico* (New York, 1963), pp. 158-60.
5. Meyer, pp. 124-27.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
7. RDS, "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 15 April 1915, /14899; Cobb to Bryan, 15 April 1915, /15108; "Report of Conditions

Along the Border," 25 April 1915, /14971; Llorente to Bryan, 23 April 1915, /14955; and Cobb to Bryan, 26 April 1915, /14928.

8. RDS, Bryan to Cobb, 26 April 1915, /14928.

9. For a different interpretation of Bryan's knowledge of the scheme, see Meyer, p. 128. He feels the intrigue was well known by the United States government, including Bryan. The Secretary's correspondence indicates otherwise.

10. RDS, Cobb to Bryan, 7 June 1915, /15155. See also "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 29 May 1915, /15158, and 16 June 1915, /15278.

11. RDS, Cobb to Bryan, 25 June 1915, /15308.

12. Meyer, pp. 129-30.

13. RDS, Arredondo to Lansing, 2 July 1915, /15358; and Arredondo to Lansing, 3 July 1915, /15363.

14. RDS, Lansing to Cobb, 8 July 1915, /15360.

15. RDS, "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 20 July 1915, /15632.

16. *Ibid.*, 4 Aug. 1915, /15812; Hay to Agwar, 3 Aug. 1915, /15636.

17. Meyer, pp. 130-35.

18. The major article on the Plan de San Diego is by William M. Hager, "The Plan of San Diego: Unrest on the Texas Border in 1915," *Arizona and the West*, vol. 5 (1963), pp. 327-36. Hager does not use the vital 812.00 series and views the Plan as an isolated eccentric scheme. He misses its true significance as a part of the Huerta-Orozco movement that entailed considerable German involvement. The same omissions are made, more understandably, by Barbara W. Tuchman, *The Zimmermann Telegram* (New York, 1958), pp. 91-92, and Walter Prescott Webb, *The Texas Rangers: A Century of Frontier Defense* (New York, 1935), pp. 484-86. Meyer (p. 121) suggests, but does not prove, that the Plan was part of the Huerta-Orozco scheme. His brief but penetrating suggestions stimulated this writer to further examination.

19. Webb, pp. 484-86; Hager, p. 330.

20. A translated copy of the Plan de San Diego is in *Investigation of Mexican Affairs, Report and Hearing before a Subcommittee on Foreign Relations*, Sen. Doc. 285, 66 Cong., 2nd Sess., Serial No. 7665, 2 vols. (Washington, 1919-1920), vol. 1, pp. 1205-07.

21. Hager, pp. 329-31.

22. RDS, "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 18 Feb. 1915, /14470.

23. RDS, "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 11 March 1915, /14603.

24. Hager, pp. 329-31.



25. *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*, vol. 1, pp. 1231-41. See also Charles C. Cumberland, "Border Raids in the Lower Rio Grande Valley, 1915," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, vol. 57 (1954), pp. 287-89.
26. Cumberland, pp. 287-89.
27. RDS, "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 6 July and 8 July 1915, /15517.
28. *Ibid.*, 24 June 1915, /15448.
29. Cumberland, p. 290.
30. RDS, "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 7 Aug. 1915, /15812.
31. Hager, pp. 335-36.
32. Cumberland, p. 294.
33. RDS, Consul Garrett (Nuevo Laredo) to Lansing, 13 Aug. 1915, /15813; Garrett to Lansing, 26 Aug. 1915, /15929; Blocker to Lansing, 26 Aug. 1915, /15941; Garrett to Lansing, 27 Aug. 1915, /15987; "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 28 Aug. 1915, /16054; Blocker to Lansing, 28 Aug. 1915, /16011; Garrett to Lansing, 28 Aug. 1915, /15946; Blocker to Lansing, 28 Aug. 1915, /15947.
34. RDS, Lansing to American Consul in Monterrey, 28 Aug. 1915, /15929.
35. RDS, General Pablo González to General Ricaut, 31 Aug. 1915, /16149.
36. Cumberland, pp. 294-95.
37. RDS, "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 28 Aug. 1915, /16054.
38. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915* (Washington, 1924), p. 806. Puig to Lansing, 29 Aug. 1915.
39. RDS, American Consulate in Monterrey to Lansing, 12 Aug. 1915, /15829.
40. RDS, "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 21 Aug. 1915, /15985.
41. RDS, Funston to Adjutant General, 2 Sept. 1915, /16013; *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*, vol. 1, p. 1250.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 1263-64.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 1307. See also Cumberland, pp. 298-302.
44. RDS, article from *El Dictamen*, 1 Sept. 1915, issue from Vera Cruz, dispatch of 6 Sept. 1915, /16275; American Consulate in Monterrey to Lansing, 3 Sept. 1915, /16130.
45. RDS, Asst. Sec. of Treasury to 3rd Asst. Sec. of State, 9 Sept. 1915, /16194; "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 8 Sept. 1915, /16175.
46. RDS, Garrett to Lansing, 8 Sept. 1915, /16149; Garrett to Lansing,

10 Sept. 1915, /16105; Garrett to Lansing, 14 Sept. 1915, /16216; Garrett to Lansing, 8 Sept. 1915, /16149.

47. RDS, Funston to Adj. Gen., 6 Sept. 1915, /16198.

48. RDS, Blocker to Lansing, 15 Sept. 1915, /16229.

49. *Foreign Relations, 1915*, pp. 807-08. Silliman to Lansing, 1 Sept. 1915; and Arredondo to Lansing, 6 Sept. 1915.

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 809-12. Lansing to Arredondo, 10 Sept. 1915; Funston to Sec. of War, 17 Sept. 1915; and RDS, Funston to Adj. Gen., 29 Sept. 1915, /16329.

51. Cumberland, p. 299; RDS, Funston to Adj. Gen., 24 Sept. 1915, /16302; Funston to Adj. Gen., 24 Sept. 1915, /16306.

52. Clarence C. Clendenen, *The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1961), pp. 219-20.

53. RDS, David Lawrence to Lansing, 29 Sept. 1915, /16346½.

54. Cumberland, pp. 302-03.

55. RDS, David Lawrence to Lansing, 1 Oct. 1915, /16348½; Consul General in Monterrey to Lansing, 6 Oct. 1915, /16469.

56. RDS, "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 28 Oct. 1915, /16667.

57. RDS, "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 4 Oct. 1915, /16457; *Foreign Relations, 1915*, p. 815. Lansing to Arredondo, 6 Oct. 1915.

58. *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*, vol. 1, p. 1269; RDS, Sheriff of Brownsville, Tex., *et al.*, to Lansing, 19 Oct. 1915, /16523.

59. RDS, Funston to Adj. Gen., 22 Oct. 1915, /16567.

60. Cumberland, pp. 306-07.

61. RDS, Sheriff of Brownsville, *et al.*, to Lansing, 19 Oct. 1915, /16523.

62. RDS, "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 25 Oct. 1915, /16667.

63. *Foreign Relations, 1915*, p. 816. Sec. of War Garrison to Lansing, 22 Oct. 1915.

64. *Ibid.*, pp. 816-17. Gov. Ferguson to Wilson, 27 Oct. 1915.

65. *Foreign Relations, 1915*, p. 819. Lansing to Texas Gov. Ferguson, 3 Nov. 1915.

66. RDS, Texas Sen. Morris Sheppard to Lansing, 23 Oct. 1915, /16563; Cumberland, p. 305.

67. Cumberland, p. 305.

68. RDS, Petition from San Antonio, Tex., to President Wilson, 29 Oct. 1915, /16654.

69. *Foreign Relations, 1915*, p. 817. Lansing to Ferguson, 30 Oct. 1915.

70. RDS, John W. Belt to Lansing, 1 Nov. 1915, /16665.
71. *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 819. Lansing to Ferguson, 3 Nov. 1915.
72. RDS, Silliman to Lansing, 3 Nov. 1915, /16686.
73. RDS, Lansing to Sen. Ashurst, 9 Nov. 1915, /16823.
74. RDS, "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 10 Nov. 1915, /16803.
75. *Ibid.*, 14 Nov. 1915, /16842.
76. RDS, Commanding Officer, Mission, Tex., to Funston, 16 Nov. 1915, /16872.
77. RDS, "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 17 Nov. 1915, /16842.
78. *Ibid.*, 16 Dec. 1915, /16999, and 6 Jan. 1916, /17078.
79. RDS, Sec. of War to Lansing, 6 Jan. 1916, /17070.
80. RDS, Lansing to Sec. of War, 12 Jan. 1916, /17070.
81. See Appendix II, p. 208. The text of the telegram is from Tuchman, p. 136.
82. *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*, vol. 1, pp. 1205-07.