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FRONTIER DEFENSE

TED J. WARNER

THE ESTABLISHMENT of Spanish dominion in the vast expanse of northern Mexico, including the present southwestern borderlands of the United States, was an epic phase of the history of the viceroyalty of New Spain. The economic and missionary aspects of this northern movement, which lasted more than two hundred and fifty years, have been described in considerable detail by many historians, colonial and modern. Scholars have given less attention to the problems and methods of military defense which increased in importance during the last century and a half of the colonial regime.

Military defense on the northern frontiers of New Spain served a triple purpose: protection of Hispanic settlements and missionary establishments against the possibility of revolt by "pacified" Indians; defense against marauding attacks by nomadic or semi-nomadic Indians who had not submitted to Spanish rule; and defense of the borderlands against possible encroachment by foreign powers. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the first two aims were paramount. During the eighteenth century mounting pressure by marauding tribes, especially the Apaches, became the major problem while the advances of France, England, and Russia in North America also gave cause for concern.

Between 1530 and the end of the sixteenth century Spanish expansion into the northern reaches of Mexico was spectacular.¹ Nuño de Guzmán occupied Jalisco and the southern part of

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Sinaloa during the 1530's. By 1580 a much larger area, comprising the modern Mexican states of Querétaro, Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas, Durango, and part of Chihuahua, had been occupied. Before the close of the century Spanish settlements were founded as far north as Monterrey in Nuevo León and in New Mexico. This rapid advance of the frontier had been prompted by the discovery of rich silver mines, followed by missionary activity, and the establishment of extensive landed estates devoted to agriculture and the raising of livestock.

From Querétaro westward and northwestward to Durango and Santa Bárbara, and northward to San Luis Potosí, Saltillo, and Monterrey, the Spaniards were harassed by persistent attacks from nomadic and semi-nomadic Indian groups, generally classified as Chichimecas. Chichimec hostility, aggravated by the slaving activities of Spanish colonists and soldiers, was a serious threat to the security of the mining and ranch frontiers and to the Camino Real on which the silver-laden caravans traveled from northwestern Mexico to the viceregal capital. To keep the raiders in check the authorities sent out roving patrols of ten to thirty soldiers, provided escort troops for the wagon trains, enlisted the aid of Indian auxiliaries, organized punitive expeditions into native strongholds, and even used portable and stationary blockhouses. The most important innovation, however, was the development of a system of forts and defensive towns placed at strategic points in the *tierra de guerra* of the silver frontier of New Spain. This line of fortified places resembled those used by the Romans for the protection of the empire, and the lines of castles (hence the name Castile) established in Spain during the invasions by the Moors. These forts were called presidios, from the Latin term *presidium*, meaning a garrisoned town or fortress. The line was not static, but was constantly adjusted to meet new situations as the frontier advanced.²

The first presidios and garrisoned towns were founded during the administration of Viceroy Luis de Velasco I (1550-1564). The most important of these was the presidio at San Miguel in Guanajuato, designed to protect the Zacatecas-Mexico City highway. Al-

though Velasco's efforts did not provide an adequate solution to the problem, his realization of the need for presidios on the frontier led the way for later administrators.

During the four years following Velasco's term as Viceroy serious political problems plagued the government of New Spain. Consequently little or nothing was accomplished and the situation on the frontiers continued to deteriorate. In 1568 raids by the hostile tribes were particularly devastating, and as a result mining was nearly at a standstill. The damage at the new mining camps near Durango and Santa Bárbara, recently opened by Francisco de Ibarra, was tremendous.³

When the new Viceroy, Martín Enríquez de Almanza (1568-1580), arrived, political conditions were again stabilized, and it was once more possible to give attention to subduing the enemy Indians. Enríquez inaugurated a systematic policy of establishing presidios along the northern frontier. He founded no less than sixteen, and perhaps as many as twenty-two, military outposts at strategic points near the main lines of communication northwestward to Zacatecas, Sombrerete, and beyond, and northward to the area of San Luis Potosí. Several new defensive towns were also founded as bases for troops serving on convoy duty on the highways. The most important of these towns were Jerez de la Frontera founded in 1570, Charcas and Tepexala in 1573, León and Aguascalientes in 1575, and Saltillo in 1578. From these presidios and defensive settlements the Spaniards waged campaigns of "fire and blood" against the marauding Indian tribes.

Nevertheless, in the 1580's the Spaniards found that, because of the nomadic habits of the Indians, neither the erection of defensive towns and presidios on the frontiers nor punitive campaigns by presidial troops were sufficient to insure peace along the Chichimec frontier. Despite Spanish efforts, the Indian attacks continued and imposed a serious barrier to further expansion northward. Therefore, the presidio system as an organized policy under viceregal direction was given up in part, and frontier warfare was left in the hands of individual captains to seek solutions to their own immediate problems in their own particular regions.

Now viceregal policy was to negotiate peace treaties, offering bribes of food and clothing to the Indians in the hope of inducing them to settle near the Spanish defensive towns. Once the natives had accepted a peace settlement, they were to be Hispanicized by another frontier institution, the mission.

To facilitate the work of the missionaries the semi-nomadic Indians were assembled at a "reduction"—a village or mission community—where they could be instructed in the Catholic religion and taught European customs. They were expected to emerge from this training within ten years as useful, Christian, and loyal Spanish subjects. Thus the missions also served a secular purpose and as agencies of the state were to aid the advancement of the frontier. A significant commentary on the Crown's association of the missions with frontier defense is the fact that the expenses of both the missions and the presidios were entered under the account of the War Fund (*Ramo de Guerra*) in the records of the royal treasury.⁴ By the end of the sixteenth century the combined efforts of mission and presidio had brought relative peace to important areas on the frontiers, with corresponding benefits to Spanish exploitation of the northern silver mining regions.

The seventeenth century witnessed new advances. In the west, the Jesuits penetrated into northern Sinaloa and thence into the central valleys of Sonora, from which Father Kino and his associates moved into Pimería Alta toward the end of the century. East of the Sierra Madre Occidental, economic motives and the missionary labors of Franciscans and Jesuits opened up new areas of Spanish control. The northern limits of these were an irregular and fluctuating line of outpost settlements extending from Casas Grandes southeast into Coahuila and Nuevo León. At intervals the northward movement was retarded by full-scale native uprisings, such as the Tepehuan Revolt of 1616-1617, and the expanding frontier was harried by intermittent attacks by unpacified Indians from beyond or outside the limits of settlement. The viceregal and provincial authorities now found it necessary to establish new garrison outposts in the north, to replace many of those founded farther south during the preceding century.⁵


The last twenty years of the seventeenth century saw the security of the northern frontiers seriously endangered by Indian uprisings, beginning with the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 in New Mexico, followed by widespread unrest from Sonora eastward to the Conchos Valley and La Junta, and culminating in the Tarahumara rebellion of 1697. As a result, the presidial system on the northern frontier was reorganized, and a permanent garrison was established in the El Paso area in 1683.⁶ The second New Mexico garrison was founded at Santa Fe in 1693 after the reoccupation of the province by Vargas.⁷

Also during the 1680's and 1690's, the threat of French encroachment on the Gulf coast introduced a new factor in the problem of frontier defense, and prompted the temporary occupation of Texas by Spain (1689-1693).⁸ The fear of foreign encroachment continued to influence governmental policy throughout the eighteenth century. It led to the permanent Spanish occupation of Texas in 1713-1719, and was one motive for the founding of the province of upper California in the 1770's. Expansion of French activity into the southwestern plains inspired concern for the security of New Mexico. Nevertheless, the major problems of frontier defense were those created by the wide-ranging raids of Apache tribes driven southward by the Comanche and other Plains Indians. The Apache menace, more than any other single factor, influenced presidio organization and defensive policies in northern New Spain in the eighteenth century.

By 1725 a line of frontier presidios extended in an irregular arc across two thousand miles from Sonora to Eastern Texas. These frontier outposts numbered sixteen, with a total force of only 806 officers and men. Standing like a lonely sentinel on the very edge of the Spanish empire in America, some six hundred leagues north of Mexico City, was the garrison of Santa Fe.

The size of each garrison varied from twenty-five to one hundred—the average was about fifty—with the governors of New Mexico, Sinaloa, Coahuila, and Texas serving as captains of those

at their provincial capitals. The governors received no additional salary for performing this duty. The other presidios were commanded by captains who exercised almost absolute authority over their men and the areas in which their posts were located. The usual salaries were six hundred pesos a year for captains, and four hundred fifty pesos for subordinate officers and enlisted men. In some posts, however, the salary was as low as three hundred pesos. The total amount paid by the government in salaries for these troops was 366,833 pesos annually.⁹



In relation to the vast expanse of the northern borderlands, there were never enough troops available to provide adequate defense for all the towns, missions, and friendly Indian pueblos. With only sixteen presidios in 1725 to guard two thousand miles of frontier, it is no wonder that there were frequent requests by missionaries, settlers, merchants, presidial troops, and Christian Indians to the viceregal authorities for additional garrisons.

Missionaries, especially in New Mexico, frequently petitioned for more soldiers to protect the missions, to help punish intractable Indians, and to provide escort service between the various missions.¹⁰ Settlers begged for presidios and soldiers to protect their homes, families, ranches, and farms from the depredations of marauding Indians. Very often, able-bodied settlers were drafted for campaign service when there were not enough presidial soldiers, a chronic cause for complaint. So the civilian population repeatedly asked for additional troops in order to lessen the demands for their services on extended campaigns, during which they were forced to leave their farms, ranches, and families untended and unprotected. Sometimes, when they returned from military service, they found their homes destroyed and their wives and children murdered. Merchants needed presidial soldiers to act as escorts for their caravans when they travelled through hostile territory, a situation which invited attack. On occasion presidial captains exploited this danger to extort large sums of money in exchange for the necessary military protection.¹¹ The soldiers stationed at frontier presidios also hoped for reinforcements and the founding of additional garrisons to lessen their burdens and responsibilities.

Even the non-Christian Indians learned to appreciate certain advantages of having a presidio in their vicinity. It offered them an opportunity to secure horses by raiding the presidial herd, to say nothing of procuring such military supplies as guns and ammunition, as well as knives and other hardware, by illegal trade with individual soldiers. The traffic flourished in spite of strict prohibitions and severe penalties.¹² That the soldiers would trade their weapons and other equipment to the very people who might use these against them in battle is a sad commentary on military discipline; and the barter of arms for food and clothing reveals the shortcomings of the methods of presidial supply which compelled the soldiers to resort to such exchanges. The common soldiers, unmercifully squeezed by the governors and their officers, were almost forced to resort to such illegal exchanges to feed and clothe their families.

Certain Indians also sought the aid of the presidio when attacked by other tribes. They had learned that the Spaniards would protect them from their enemies if they asked for baptism. Their ardor for conversion generally disappeared as soon as the danger which had compelled them to seek protection was eliminated.¹³

Indeed, it appears that virtually everyone on the frontier considered the erection of presidios a panacea. In 1726, one astute observer stated that if "every proposal for the foundation of presidios were acceded to, the treasury of Midas would not suffice." He suggested that "for colonial purposes the faith was sufficiently spread out," and that provincial authorities, instead of proposing the erection of new presidios, should devote more attention to converting and consolidating Indian settlements within the areas already protected by such garrison outposts.¹⁴

The problems of administering the frontier presidios were many and varied. The lack of sufficient trained and experienced officers was a constant weakness in the entire system. A few officers and presidio commanders, such as Urdaide in Sinaloa, Urdiñola in Nueva Vizcaya, Cruzate who served in both New Mexico and Sonora, and the two Anzas, father and son, in Pimería, did achieve considerable distinction. But men of this calibre were rare.

The most difficult and persistent problems related to methods of presidio supply. In the beginning, the normal rate of salary for enlisted personnel was three hundred pesos annually. With this modest stipend the soldiers had to keep themselves and their families, as well as the arms and three horses required by the regulations. They were at liberty, however, to purchase needed supplies and equipment wherever they could find the most favorable prices. This method of supply was advocated by promoters of a new district or town where a presidio was located because of the benefit to local trade and economy.¹⁵ In the first quarter of the seventeenth century new methods of supply were developed. Paymasters collected the salaries of presidio soldiers in Mexico City, purchased goods there, and conducted supply caravans to frontier garrisons, where they paid the troops half in cash and half in pro-

visions.¹⁶ Unscrupulous officials took the opportunity to defraud the soldiers of their meager pay by charging excessive prices.

Although salaries paid to presidio soldiers in the eighteenth century were substantially increased, the troops derived little, if any, benefit. In this later period it was customary for a provincial governor to provision the soldiers of the presidio at the town where he had his official residence. The governors and captains maintained merchant-suppliers (*aviadores*) in Mexico who held power of attorney to collect the annual salaries of the soldiers and purchased goods and equipment needed for the people at the frontier outposts, where the governors or garrison captains distributed them to the troops.¹⁷ The annual salary for each soldier was entered in the presidio accounts once a year. When a shipment arrived, the individual soldier presented himself before the governor or captain and requested the items he needed to maintain himself and his family. The charges were entered in the presidio account book and deducted from the soldier's salary credit.

This method of presidio supply resulted in flagrant abuse and fraud. The soldiers no longer received any cash stipends but were paid only in goods, for which the governors or garrison captains, in collusion with the *aviadores* in Mexico, were able to charge excessive prices. Because of the inflated costs, the individual soldier very soon overspent his annual salary credit and incurred debts which were entered in the presidio accounts as the first charge against his salary for the succeeding year. Thus he became hopelessly encumbered with financial obligations to his governor or presidio captain, and found himself completely at their mercy.

Another evil was the practice of deducting from the soldiers' annual salaries charges called *quites*, *premios*, and sometimes *gastos* (expenses). These special expenses, incurred in Mexico City by the *aviadores* and their agents, included perquisites or tips (*regalías*) paid to treasury officials to facilitate the release of funds, and fees incidental to legal transactions relating to the presidial supply service. In 1724 Viceroy Casafuerte cited the case of a presidio of fifty soldiers for which *quites* amounted to 16.8

per cent of the total annual salaries of the garrison.¹⁸ Such charges, added to the high prices for supplies distributed to the troops, further aggravated the unhappy position of the presidials.

In the early decades of the eighteenth century there were also chronic shortages of essential equipment, especially guns and ammunition. Horses and clothing were also difficult to procure. Such conditions lowered the morale of the troops and made it difficult to maintain discipline. Inadequately equipped, fed, and housed, the presidio soldier developed an attitude of insubordination, or, at best, of sullen obedience. He was compelled, almost for self-preservation, to engage in illegal trade with Indians, giving them hard-to-procure military equipment in exchange for food and clothing. The reliability of such troops was highly questionable, although the exigencies of frontier defense called for trustworthy and loyal troops.

Throughout the eighteenth century the Crown and the governmental authorities of New Spain gave increasing attention to finding ways to insure more effective use of the presidio garrisons and to eliminate abuses in the administration of the military outposts on the northern frontier. With this in mind, inspections of the presidio line were made from time to time by experienced officers of high rank. Their findings became the basis of new *reglamentos* for the relocation of garrisons and for the improvement of presidio supply and discipline. The Rivera visitation of 1724-1728 is one example of this continuing preoccupation with problems of frontier defense. Finally in 1776, a major innovation was introduced with the creation of the Commandancy General of the Interior Provinces, a new governmental and military agency with a large measure of autonomy in relation to viceregal authority and jurisdiction. But this new agency failed to achieve its objectives. Many problems of frontier defense, especially those related to the marauding attacks of the Apache and other seminomadic tribes, remained unsolved at the end of the Spanish regime.

NO FORMALLY ORGANIZED presidio garrison had been established within the territory of the Spanish province of New Mexico before the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. This is rather surprising in view of the isolation of the area, with a long stretch of unpacified country between it and the other frontier settlements of northern Mexico. The relatively easy pacification of the Pueblo area by Juan de Oñate, except for the Ácoma affair of 1598-1599, and the success of the Franciscan missionary effort during the years 1610-1630 doubtless served to convince both viceregal and provincial authorities that Spanish supremacy could be maintained without the aid of the usual frontier garrison. Moreover, the cost would have increased the drain on the royal treasury, for the Crown and viceregal officials had found it necessary to guarantee payment of the salary of provincial governors and to subsidize the mission supply service in order to maintain the province.

The defense of New Mexico depended upon a small corps of soldier-encomenderos, normally thirty-five, who received tribute from their *encomienda* Indians in lieu of salary for military service. As encomenderos these colonists were under obligation to maintain arms and horses, to perform escort duty at outlying missions, and to serve in campaigns against Apache and Navajo raiders on the mission pueblos. The only military official, other than the governor and captain-general of the province, who received a salary from the royal treasury was an armorer responsible for the repair and maintenance of essential weapons. The treasury also made a small periodic outlay for the purchase of lead and gunpowder.¹⁹

In times of urgency, when it became necessary to conduct punitive expeditions against Apaches and Navajos, the encomendero corps was supplemented by the enlistment, on a temporary basis and without pay, of other colonists and a force of Pueblo Indian auxiliaries. During the 1660's and 1670's recurrent attacks by Apaches and Navajos threatened the security of the Hispanic settlements and the mission villages. By the mid-1670's this menace had become so serious that the viceregal government, in response to representations made by the New Mexico community,


authorized the dispatch of fifty soldiers, most of them conscripted convicts, with weapons, horses, and supplies, to bolster the defenses of the province. In 1680 the Crown instructed the viceroy to take whatever action he might deem necessary to insure the safety of New Mexico, but the decision was too late in coming. In August 1680 the Pueblo Indians rose in revolt and forced the colonists and missionary friars to withdraw to the El Paso area.²⁰

In 1681 a temporary presidio was established in the El Paso area, pending the outcome of the expedition of 1681-1682 for the recovery of New Mexico. In 1683 this garrison, located on the right bank of the Rio Grande a few leagues below modern Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, was reorganized and placed on a permanent footing by Governor Cruzate. The El Paso presidio was designed to serve a dual purpose: to defend a strategically important frontier area of New Spain, and to serve as a base of operations for the eventual reconquest of New Mexico. Ten years later, in 1693, Don Diego de Vargas, the Reconqueror, founded a second New Mexico presidio at Santa Fe, officially christened "El Real Presidio de Nuestra Señora de los Remedios y la Exaltación de la Santa Cruz de Santa Fe." The El Paso presidio had fifty soldiers with a captain in command, the Santa Fe garrison a hundred Spanish troops including officers and non-commissioned officers. By virtue of his military title of captain-general, the provincial governor of New Mexico served as the supreme military commander of both garrisons.²¹

The salaries of the soldiers changed rather frequently during the decades after the first enlistments in 1681. In that year the recruits for the El Paso presidio received annual stipends of 350 pesos.²² Documents for the years 1687-1690 show a reduction to 315 pesos.²³ In 1693, when Vargas established the Santa Fe presidio, the annual salary of enlisted personnel was set at 450 pesos, but sometime between 1697 and 1704 it was reduced to 400 pesos.²⁴ In 1707 the stipend was raised to 431 pesos and between 1715 and 1726 it again went up to 450 pesos.²⁵ In 1726 Visitador Pedro de Rivera ordered a reduction to 400 pesos an-

nally.²⁶ These ups and downs could not have been conducive to an effective *esprit de corps*.

The New Mexico presidios were important links in the chain of frontier military outposts in northern New Spain, and played their part in the planning of defense on the northern frontier as a whole. In the military history of New Mexico, however, they represented a notable departure from older norms and precedents. Reliance upon a small corps of soldier-encomenderos had, to be sure, proved unsatisfactory during the years immediately preceding the Pueblo Revolt. In any case, since the encomienda system was not restored in New Mexico after the reconquest and was brought to an end by general legislation of the decade 1710-1720, another solution had to be found. The older soldier-encomendero group, some of whom did not return to New Mexico, were replaced by garrisons paid for by the royal treasury, and more immediately subject to the provincial governors and garrison commanders responsible for administering the presidio supply. As a result, the soldiers were more dependent upon the local authorities than the soldier-encomendero of the seventeenth century had been. Although discipline and efficiency could have improved under the new system, much depended upon the experience, qualities of leadership, and personal ambitions of the governors and commanding officers who now exerted a preponderant influence in local affairs.



NOTES

1. See Philip Wayne Powell, *Soldiers, Indians, and Silver* (Berkeley, 1952); "Presidios and Towns on the Silver Frontier of New Spain," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 24 (1944), pp. 179-200; "Spanish Warfare Against the Chichimecas in the 1570's," *ibid.*, pp. 580-604, for excellent treatments of the northward advance of New Spain from 1530 to 1600, upon which the following discussion is based.

2. Frank W. Blackmar, *Spanish Institutions of the Southwest* (Baltimore, 1891), p. 192.

3. For the story of the opening of mining in this region, see John Lloyd Mechem, *Francisco de Ibarra and Nueva Vizcaya* (Durham, 1927).

4. Herbert E. Bolton, "The Mission as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish American Colonies," *American Historical Review*, vol. 23 (1917-18), p. 51.

5. For discussions concerning the Indian uprisings which retarded the northward advance of the frontiers of New Spain see: Hubert Howe Bancroft, *History of the North Mexican States and Texas, 1531-1889*, 2 vols. (San Francisco, 1884-89); Peter M. Dunne, *Pioneer Jesuits in Northern Mexico* (Berkeley, 1944), *Early Jesuit Missions in Tarahumara* (Berkeley, 1948); Charles Wilson Hackett, ed., *Historical Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya and Approaches Thereto, to 1773*, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1923-37), vol. 2, pp. 101-15.

6. Frank D. Reeve, *History of New Mexico*, 3 vols. (New York, 1961), vol. 1, pp. 249-75; Ann E. Hughes, *The Beginnings of Spanish Settlement in the El Paso District* (Berkeley, 1914); Vina Walz, *History of the El Paso Area, 1630-1692* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1951); Charles Wilson Hackett and Charmion Clair Shelby, eds., *Revolt of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and Otermín's Attempted Reconquest, 1680-1692*, 2 vols. (Albuquerque, 1942); Hackett, vol. 3.

7. The best study of the reconquest of New Mexico is J. Manuel Espinosa, *Crusaders of the Rio Grande* (Chicago, 1942). See also Reeve, vol. 1, pp. 216-310.

8. Fray Juan Agustín Morfi, *History of Texas, 1693-1779*, trans. and ed. by Carlos Eduardo Castañeda, 2 vols. (Albuquerque, 1935).

9. Informe de Pedro de Rivera, México, December 7, 1728, Archivo General de la Nación, México (cited hereinafter as AGN), Provincias Internas, vol. 29.

10. Fray Francisco de Vargas to Governor Diego de Vargas, Santa Fe, March 1696, Archivo General de Indias, Seville (cited hereinafter as AGI), Audiencia de Guadalajara, leg. 141.

11. Informe de Pedro de Rivera, AGN, Provincias Internas, vol. 29.
12. Numerous *bandos* in Spanish Archives of New Mexico, Santa Fe, expressly forbid such trade and prescribe the penalties for violations (e.g., nos. 57, 117, 118, 185, 320). Banishment to serve in one of the more remote frontier settlements was the usual punishment.
13. Pedro de Rivera to Viceroy Casafuerte, El Paso, September 26, 1726, AGN, Historia, vol. 394.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Petition of Fray Andrés Pérez, México, September 12, 1638, AGI, Audiencia de Guadalajara, leg. 138; translation in Hackett, vol. 3, p. 103.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Instrucciones que los vireyes de Nueva España dejaron a sus sucesores*, 2 vols. (México, 1867-73), vol. 1, pp. 269-71.
18. Instructions of Viceroy Casafuerte to Pedro de Rivera, México, September 15, 1724, AGI, Audiencia de Guadalajara, leg. 144.
19. France V. Scholes, "Civil Government and Society in New Mexico in the Seventeenth Century," NMHR, vol. 10 (1935), pp. 78-79; Lansing B. Bloom, "The Vargas Encomienda," NMHR, vol. 14 (1939), pp. 366-72; Reeve, vol. 1, pp. 173-77.
20. Hackett, vol. 3, pp. 327-48; Reeve, vol. 1, pp. 249-75; Hackett and Shelby.
21. Espinosa, pp. 112-35; Reeve, vol. 1, pp. 216-310. See also J. Manuel Espinosa, ed., *First Expedition of Vargas into New Mexico, 1692* (Albuquerque, 1940), pp. 160-64, 297-303, for Vargas' letter recommending the establishment of a presidio at Santa Fe and for the approval of the plan by a *junta general* in Mexico City on February 25, 1693.
22. Reeve, vol. 1, p. 265.
23. Walz, pp. 238-45.
24. Vargas to the viceroy, Zacatecas, May 1, 1693, Biblioteca Nacional, México, leg. 4, no. 5; Fray Silvestre Vélez de Escalante, "Extracto de Noticias," *ibid.*, leg. 3, no. 1.
25. Informe de Pedro de Rivera, AGN, Provincias Internas, vol. 29.
26. *Ibid.*

