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NEW MEXICO'S GOVERNOR David Meriwether departed in late February 1854, on a private visit to his former Kentucky home.[1] He was little more than on his way when a Jicarilla Apache raid east of Fort Union foreshadowed a series of difficulties with that tribe. This paper examines those troubles, their background, and the reactions to them.

As hunters and food gatherers the Jicarilla Apache had traversed much of northeastern New Mexico from the Arkansas River on the north to the general vicinity of present Mora, New Mexico, on the south; the area adjacent to the Arkansas River is in present-day Colorado. The Canadian River was the eastern limit, while a north-south line through present Chama, New Mexico, would be an approximate western boundary.[2] In the decade prior to 1854, however, it does not appear that the Jicarilla ranged regularly into what is now the state of Colorado,[3] and Meriwether's gubernatorial predecessor, William Carr Lane (1852-1853), attempted to confine them to lands west of the Rio Grande.[4] Contemporary military opinion regarded the Jicarilla as the most troublesome of the six Apache groups,[5] but Governor Meriwether, as ex officio superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Territory, also realized that the Indians often were desperate for food, a condition which he was unable to alleviate because of lack of money. He was no molly-coddler of the Indians, which he believed Lane to have been.[6] Probably with the best of intentions Governor Lane had furnished some provisions without official authorization in the expectation that the Senate would ratify his agreements with the Indians.

When approval was not received, the Indians experienced considerable disillusionment, and Governor Meriwether spent some of his personal funds for aid in an effort to prevent deterioration of relations.[7]

Officials in New Mexico were concerned about the Jicarilla Apache not only because of depredations on settlers but also because of their proximity to both the Cimarron Cutoff and the Mountain Branch of the Santa Fe Trail. In July of 1850, Colonel George A. McCall, Inspector General of the United States Army, reported that their "trail crosses the Independence and Santa Fe Road between the 'Point of Rocks' and the 'Wagon Mound' or Santa Clara Spring,"[8] and in November the locale was described by Indian Agent James S. Calhoun as "that part of the Santa Fe road which crosses the Rio Colorado [Canadian or Red River]."[9] The Jicarilla presence there was always a threat.

A few Jicarilla joined a party of Navajo and Ute in the late summer of 1852 for an attack on Kiowa and Arapaho, and on their way they raided around the little Greenhorn settlement east of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains, where there had been some white inhabitants since about 1846.[10] That was unusually far north for Jicarilla to appear. More on the home range, so to speak, signs of their restlessness increased during Governor Meriwether's administration when help failed to materialize and food supply dwindled. A Jicarilla-Ute force led by Colorow, a Ute, ambushed a small detachment of United States troops in what is now known as Ute Park, near Old Baldy Mountain on the upper reaches of the Cimarron tributary of the Canadian River. The soldiers probably belonged to the company of First Dragoons stationed at Rayado on the Cimarroncito, and their attackers were said to include the later famous Ute, Ouray (whose mother was a Jicarilla), and Chacon, a leading Jicarilla chief.[11] The Greenhorn raid and the Ute Park incident underscore the fact that the Jicarilla Apache and some of the Ute bands had long been associated.[12]

Such disturbances in the military Department of New Mexico naturally were carefully watched, especially by successive commandants at Fort Union (est. 1851), near the eastern edge of

Jicarilla country. Those officers, because of the post's location near the junction of the Cimarron Cutoff with the Mountain Branch of the Santa Fe Trail, were concerned with the safety of traffic and communication; that preoccupation, of course, involved them with some of the Plains tribes (mainly Kiowa and Comanche) as well as with the Jicarilla Apache and their Ute allies.

Lieutenant Colonel Philip St. George Cooke was in command at Fort Union when a report came in of an Indian raid on cattle belonging to Samuel B. Watrous, purveyor of beef to the troops. It is clear from Cooke's instructions to Second Lieutenant David Bell that no one was quite sure whether the raid should be charged to Jicarilla or Ute. Bell took thirty-five men — a platoon — from Company H, Second Dragoons, with fifteen days rations and orders to scout beyond and down the Canadian River as far as the Cinto Mountain.[13] Brevet Captain George Sykes, Second Dragoons, and Second Lieutenant Joseph E. Maxwell, Third Infantry, accompanied the little force as volunteers. They left the post on the morning of March 2; three days later their guide (unidentified) found a fresh trail of what he said was an Apache hunting party. Soon they saw several Indians riding hard on the other side of a rocky ravine. Crossing to the other side the troopers apprehended a lone Apache and took him prisoner. While he was professing friendship, they saw the main band hastening away at a distance of about three-quarters of a mile. Leaving the prisoner under guard, Bell and his men galloped in pursuit. They crested a hill and found Apache warriors riding towards them full tilt, bowstrings and shields advanced and ready for battle. They halted about 150 paces away and the leader of the warriors performed elaborate movements in irregular curves, beating his shield, assuming fantastic attitudes, and yelling wildly.

Lieutenant Bell called to the Indian in Spanish that the white men wanted to talk; the Apache stopped his defiant posturing and dismounted, came forward and shook hands. Although he did not reveal how he knew it, Bell was certain that he was confronting the Jicarilla band led by Chief Lobo Blanco (White Wolf), who probably had made the raid on the cattle. The Apache with

whom he was talking tried to deny this and to blame Chico Velasquez and his Mohuache Ute band for the thievery. Bell was not taken in and threatened to seize Lobo and take some Indian ponies as indemnification. Oddly enough, Bell reported that the Apache agreed to part with Lobo but not the ponies.

During the fruitless parley two old men harangued the Jicarilla warriors, who had dismounted. The leader was getting more and more contemptuous in manner, and Bell suddenly ordered two of his men to dismount and force the Apache onto a horse. The maneuver failed, and about twenty of the warriors (the rest had withdrawn to the rocky ravine and their horses) uttered a great yell and formed a semicircle about thirty yards from the Dragoons, outflanking the platoon on both sides. Lieutenant Bell ordered "draw pistol" and "forward," at the same moment that Captain Sykes failed in an attempt to dissuade the Apache from forcing matters to an extreme. Then came Bell's order to charge. The Indians nimbly side-stepped the charge and attacked from the rear. The Dragoons turned and charged again. The Apache showed incredible alacrity and dexterity in avoiding being trampled, while they discharged their arrows with great rapidity virtually from under the galloping cavalry horses' necks. Then they broke and fled down into the ravines and arroyos which led to the main Canadian. The Dragoons chased them to the edge of the difficult terrain, but fear of ambush prevented further pursuit.

Among the five Apache fatalities was Chief Lobo, characterized by Lieutenant Bell as a "cruel, daring and treacherous chief." The Dragoons officer took no personal credit for the Indian leader's death.[14] Two troopers were lost in the fight. Private James Bell was killed by an arrow, and Private W. A. Arnold died from a spear thrust. Both were buried on the field of battle. Four other troopers were severely wounded by gunfire. Of the cavalry horses, two were killed and two wounded; only six poor-quality ponies were taken from the Indians.

After sending an express to Fort Union,[15] Lieutenant Bell started his force towards that post. They travelled until 3 A.M. March 6, when their guide lost his bearings. In the morning, at

the crossing of the Canadian, they received an express from the fort with the news that an ambulance would arrive within the hour with Surgeon John Byrne. Still on the return march, on the morning of March 7, a man approached Bell and told him that Jicarilla had run off around two hundred head of government cattle on the Canadian about twenty-four hours earlier. His life had been saved by the fortunate intervention of a band of (Mohuache) Ute under Chico Velasquez. Then the man pointed to a hill several miles away, saying that the Ute chief was behind it and wanted to talk. Bell went alone to meet the Indian, who appeared with fifteen men. They told the cavalryman that five warriors had been left with the rest of the government herd to help drive it upriver,[16] and the chief offered to assist in recovering the stolen cattle.[17] Although Bell made no comment about this unusual Ute action, Lieutenant Colonel Cooke later described it as "extraordinary."[18]

Some people thought that Chico Velasquez and his warriors really had been in on the raid and had abandoned the Jicarilla when it seemed to their best interest. When he heard of it, Governor Meriwether said he did not believe that Chico Velasquez would bring back any of the cattle; rather, he anticipated that the Jicarilla would subsist on them in some remote place during the summer. This at least would bring temporary surcease from their depredations.[19]

Lobo's death was a source of elation to many people who believed that he was the leader of the Apache who had killed Santa Fe merchant J. M. White and several others in 1849, abducting Mrs. White, their daughter, and a female Negro servant. The destruction in 1850 of a United States mail party at Santa Clara Springs was also attributed to him. Governor Meriwether expressed optimism to Indian Affairs Commissioner George W. Manypenny, in Washington, about the long-range effect of Lieutenant Bell's victory,[20] but his opinion was offset by an evaluation of the past given by William S. Messervy, Acting Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs during Meriwether's leave of absence. Messervy reminded the Commissioner that until Lieutenant Bell's

recent victory the Jicarilla had been successful, almost without exception, in their challenges to United States troops, American travelers on the Santa Fe Trail, and the general population of northern New Mexico. That was enough, he asserted, to refute the late Governor Charles Bent's opinion, given to the War Department on November 10, 1846, that the Jicarilla were a "cowardly people."[21]

Christopher (Kit) Carson, whose Taos Indian Agency was for Jicarilla, Ute, and others, visited the nearby military post of Cantonment Burgwin on March 25. There he had a council with eight Jicarilla, including two chiefs. He was told that about one hundred warriors and their families were camped near the Pueblo of Picuris, where they were engaged in making earthen vessels, and that they had not been involved in the raids east of the mountains. Carson recognized the urgent need to procure provisions for those people, and he recommended that a special agent be appointed to live among the Jicarilla.[22]

Carson's conciliatory attitude towards the Jicarilla was in contrast with his feelings about the Ute. Just a few days before his meeting at Cantonment Burgwin, he told Messervy that the Ute "should be severely chastised and punished, and to be made to know and feel the power of the government."[23] His statement was a reflection of the belief that the Ute were manipulating the Jicarilla and were the brains behind the recent harassments.

The circumstances of the Jicarilla perplexed the Acting Governor. He knew that game was scarce in their country and that they were afraid to go hunting there because the troops in the area could not "distinguish the good from the bad." Buffalo hunting on the plains was difficult in view of the hostility of the Plains tribes. The barter possibilities of their earthenware were very limited. He estimated that about one-third of the Jicarilla was alienated. To prevent those near Picuris from joining them they must be fed. The government's tight-fisted policy made this virtually impossible. One can sympathize with Messervy's near wish that all of the Jicarilla were at war, which would place full responsibility on the military.[24]

In anticipation of further trouble with the Jicarilla, Brevet Brigadier General John Garland, the departmental commander, issued orders from Albuquerque for readying and deploying the limited number of troops at his disposal. Additional men of the First Dragoons were sent to Fort Union with First Lieutenant Samuel D. Sturgis and Second Lieutenant Isaiah N. Moore. First Dragoons Major George A. H. Blake, commanding at Cantonment Burgwin, was instructed to cooperate with Lieutenant Colonel Cooke in any expedition "against the Apache or other Indians." And the ordnance officer at Fort Union was directed to supply Cooke with the arms and ammunition he might need "under the present exigencies of the service."[25] These arrangements were made to help check new Jicarilla aggressions and to keep the mail routes open. From Independence, Missouri, to Fort Union and Santa Fe a rather tenuous, monthly mail service was maintained by the men, mules, and wagons of Waldo, Hall and Company.[26] This and other routes were given military escorts for the United States mail when danger warranted.[27]

Messervy's words about the prowess of the Jicarilla were prophetic. Three days later, on March 30, a disastrous blow was struck against federal troops at Embudo Mountain near Cieneguilla, south of Taos. The day before the fight Messervy had instructed Kit Carson to return to Picuris and promise the Jicarilla there, if he were satisfied that they had taken part in no hostile action, a weekly supply of wheat or corn.[28] But it was too late. That same day the Jicarilla left Picuris, and Major Blake ordered that they be followed by Company I and a detachment from Company F, First Dragoons, sixty men from Cantonment Burgwin commanded by First Lieutenant John W. Davidson. At 7 A.M. on March 30, Davidson encountered a large force of Indians who sounded the war whoop and opened fire.[29] It was later alleged that the Indians left with the intention of preparing an ambush for the troops, who were certain to follow them; it was also said that some of the Jicarilla who had fought Lieutenant Bell on the Canadian were among them.[30] At the time, however, there was no agreement as to whether the Indians actually am-

bushed the troopers or the latter found the strong Indian position and stormed it.[31] Certainly Lieutenant Davidson's reputation fares better if he was ambushed by overwhelming numbers.

For three hours the Dragoons fought against an estimated two to three hundred warriors,[32] a goodly number of whom were said to be Ute.[33] Unless the number of Indians was greatly exaggerated, it supports the contention that the Jicarilla would have been lucky to raise one hundred warriors for such an encounter. Governor Meriwether reported that they had about one hundred fifty all told, but they were divided—Chief Chacon's band (presumably with about fifty warriors) was for an unexplained reason holding aloof from the others.[34] An official report said that Davidson's force was "unexpectedly attacked,"[35] yet it was the opinion of Kit Carson that Davidson was compelled to attack the Indians by having his men dismount and charge up the mountain side.[36] Most divergent in the accounts of this fight, however, are the contemporary statements of casualties among the troops, ranging from Brigadier General Garland's high of about forty killed to Kit Carson's estimate of twenty-two. Both men had high praise for Lieutenant Davidson,[37] but their words attest more to his gallantry and bravery than to his judgment. Curiously enough, a modern biographical sketch of Davidson asserts that he was the victor in the fight, his command being nearly annihilated later by a surprise attack when they were plundering the Jicarilla camp.[38] Neither Garland nor Carson made even the faintest suggestion of that. Also, it is interesting to note that Kit Carson believed the Apache had been driven to war because of the attitudes and actions of the military in the vicinity of Taos.[39]

Military expresses carried the alarm and the alert. Acting Governor Messervy learned of the engagement in that way and so did General Garland, who was on his way to El Paso.[40] "To prevent *further disaster,*" Garland sent orders to Lieutenant Colonel Cooke to take the field with two hundred Dragoons and an artillery company armed with rifles.[41] But Cooke already knew of the fight; Major Blake had sent an express from Cantonment Burgwin to Fort Union, which arrived about 9 A.M. the following day. By

noon Cooke was on the road with Second Dragoons Company H and a detachment of the First Dragoons, units commanded by Second Lieutenant David Bell and First Lieutenant Samuel Sturgis respectively. That force was followed later by Company D, Second Artillery (serving as riflemen) under the command of Brevet Captain George Sykes.[42]

Reaching Taos on April 3, Lieutenant Colonel Cooke remained there until the next day to incorporate thirty to forty Mexicans and Indians from Taos Pueblo into his command as spies, guides, and trailers, with James H. Quinn as captain and John Mostin as second in command. Another recruit was Kit Carson to serve as principal guide.[43] Then the total number of men was augmented by more First Dragoons under Major Blake from Cantonment Burgwin. In all, the force numbered about two hundred men.[44]

Although it is not certain that the Jicarilla chief, Chacon, was present at the Embudo Mountain fight, he was leader when the Jicarilla moved into the mountains south and west of Taos after that encounter.[45] Whatever the internal rifts among the Jicarilla suggested by Governor Meriwether, they seem to have been smoothed over, perhaps because of Acting Governor Messervy's pronouncement of a state of war with all the Jicarilla.[46] And whatever Ute participation there was near Cieneguilla seems largely to have disappeared in the face of strong reaction, particularly Lieutenant Colonel Cooke's swift forced march from Fort Union and resolute pursuit of the Jicarilla through severely cold weather, winds, and snow in extremely rugged country west of the Rio Grande. On April 8, Chacon and his warriors turned and tried another ambush amid a confusion of rocks beside the Rio Caliente, a tributary of the Rio Chama. A frontal assault and a flanking movement, combined with capture of the Indians' horses, brought quick victory to Cooke and his men, whose casualties amounted to one killed and one wounded. Fleeing into the snowy hills, the Jicarilla lost ponies, camp equipment, and, in the long run, additional lives from exposure and starvation. Chief Chacon later admitted to five killed and six wounded in the fighting.[47]

Further attempt to overtake the Jicarilla was made by a mixed

force of Dragoons, Infantry, and Volunteers commanded by Major William T. H. Brooks, who hastened with them northward to the Conejos River. There they learned from some Ute that Chacon, the Jicarilla chief, with seven lodges, all on foot, and another chief named Wherro, with seven lodges and eight horses, had passed down the Conejos. These Jicarilla were not found, although search for them was pushed east of the Rio Grande on the Rio Culebra. Major Brooks and his force returned to Taos.[48]

While regular troops and volunteers were chasing Jicarilla in the country of the Rio Grande, a report from east of the mountains caused considerable concern because Fort Union had been stripped of much of its garrison. The story was that Indians (unidentified) had attacked the little settlement of Rayado, north of Fort Union, and murdered everyone there, including Lucien B. Maxwell and his family.[49] It proved to be untrue, but it was symptomatic of the widespread fear of an Indian war. Acting Governor Messervy, for example, in addition to his concern about Jicarilla Apache and Mohuache Ute, was apprehensive of an alliance of Comanche, Kiowa, Arapaho, and Mescalero Apache.[50]

Occasional word drifted into the settlements about the scattered Jicarilla. A report current in Taos stated that about sixty lodges, including the remnants of Lobo Blanco's band, were in the Raton Mountains,[51] a complex of Sangre de Cristo foothills and high mesas, the latter thrusting eastward onto the plains along the present Colorado-New Mexico line. The Mountain Branch of the Santa Fe Trail traversed them by way of Raton Pass, and they were the habitat of Jicarilla Apache and Mohuache Ute.

Official opinion in Santa Fe came around to the view that general war existed with the Jicarilla—and to the striking admission that the New Mexico Superintendency was unable to cope with it. General Garland gave reassurances that the Jicarilla would be fully chastised.[52] It was believed that some Jicarilla had crossed the Rio Grande del Norte about fifteen miles below Fort Massachusetts on their way east into the Sangre de Cristo Mountains and perhaps beyond. Lieutenant Colonel Cooke ordered Brevet Major James H. Carleton north from Taos to intercept that trail.

He was to take Companies G and K, First Dragoons (Second Lieutenants Robert Johnston and Isaiah Moore) and a platoon from Company I, First Lieutenant Davidson; the force was to have three weeks rations, including enough beef on the hoof for about twelve days.[53] The following account of that phase of the campaigns is based mainly on Captain James H. Quinn's diary,[54] supplemented by Major Carleton's reports to Lieutenant Colonel Cooke.[55]

Major Carleton's regular force comprised about one hundred men to which had been added Captain Quinn's spy company of fifteen mounted men and twenty-five infantry. Indian Agent Kit Carson accompanied the command. They marched north out of Taos on May 23 (Carleton said May 25). Both Quinn and Carleton are agreed that May 27 was the date when the force reached Utah Creek at a point three miles below Fort Massachusetts (est. 1852). Major Carleton, in response to a suggestion from Kit Carson, split his force in order to search along both sides of the White Mountain (Sierra Blanca) for Apache.

Quinn and thirty-six of his spy company were issued three days rations for the march around the western side of the White Mountain complex and over Mosca Pass in the Sangre de Cristos to the Huerfano River. That night they camped at the west entry to Mosca Pass after a thirty-mile march. There they found vestiges of a thirty-three lodge Apache encampment, but the signs were about two weeks old. Quinn was satisfied that these Apache were some of the ones he had pursued with Major Brooks' force in early May. He described the pass, which they crossed the next day, as not more than twelve miles in length, with easy grades suitable for wagons or a railroad. An early camp was made beyond the east entry on the middle branch of the Huerfano River, where they waited for the main force.

The bulk of the column with Major Carleton and Kit Carson moved from the east side of Sierra Blanca to Sangre de Cristo Creek, following up it to the well-protected Vallecito of the Sangre de Cristo Pass and then over the pass, used the previous year by Captain Gunnison.[56] On the eastern side Carson found a cold

trail, nearly obliterated by recent heavy rains. Nevertheless he said it had been made by Jicarilla, probably only three in number. It was decided to prepare an ambush on the Huerfano River, which they reached on May 29, to trap any Apache who might be driven through Mosca Pass by Quinn and his men. But they discovered the morning after that there were no Indians immediately ahead of the spy company. Quinn and his men met Carson, with sixteen Dragoons under Lieutenant Moore, at Gunnison's upper crossing of the Huerfano. They joined forces and later met Carleton with the main column. Quinn described the meeting place as being "at the foot of the mountain on the Greenhorn road," while Carleton spoke of it as on "the road that leads through the Sangre de Christo Pass to the Arkansas River."

That night they made camp at the head of Indian Creek near Maxwell's Pass, and on the following day the column moved through it southward towards the Cucharas, a tributary of the Huerfano River. They discovered another campsite was in that high mountain valley with evidence of the Indians who had fought Lieutenant Davidson's force near Cieneguilla. This vindicated Carson's judgment that they were following hostile Jicarilla, and the morale of the men noticeably heightened. The pace increased as they crossed the valley of the Cucharas. Quinn's company was in the lead, and they halted at a point on the west Spanish Peak[57] near the head of the Cucharas and not very far below timberline. In a grove of quaking aspen they found traces of another Jicarilla camp; it appeared that the Indians had stayed there for three days.

From that alpine location the trail led higher through the cleft between the Spanish Peaks, an extremely difficult twenty-five mile trip past two more Jicarilla campsites. The date was June 1, and it may be opined that it was considerable relief for horses and men when they descended into more hospitable country with grass and timber, where they camped near the head of the Apishapa River, another southern tributary of the Arkansas. The course of the next day's march took them over a watershed to Sarcillo Creek, which flowed south to the Purgatoire River, itself the longest of

the southern drainages to the Arkansas. In a grassy valley with pine groves, hemmed in by sandstone bluffs, they came to Earring Spring;[58] the valley, which Carleton dubbed Dragoon Park, was a favorite place of the Jicarilla.

Following the length of the Sarcillo, Major Carleton's force made camp that night, June 2, beside the Purgatoire River. His report indicates that the Jicarilla trail led from the Sarcillo's mouth directly across the Purgatoire and into the Raton Mountains, which at that locale are foothills of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains. He figured that they were about twenty-five miles west of the Bent's Fort road (the Mountain Branch of the Santa Fe Trail). It may be inferred that the Indians, by not following the Purgatoire, were trying to make pursuit as difficult as possible. Quinn's diary says that the camp that night was on a branch of the Purgatoire at the conclusion of a thirty-mile march. The trail had been getting warmer, and for that reason a very early start was made the next morning, June 4. They reached the Bent's Fort road through the Raton Pass about 9 A.M. The time span from "very early" to nine o'clock suggests that the previous night's camp had been in Long's Canyon or a side canyon of it, a few miles west of the road through the pass. The point where they crossed the road was "about six miles north of the summit of the mountains," meaning north of the crest of the Raton Pass.

Near where the column crossed, fresh Indian signs showed that the Jicarilla had sent scouts back along their trail. When Kit Carson discovered the footprints, he told Major Carleton that the Apache would be overtaken at two o'clock that afternoon. The result of his prediction was, of course, the famous wager by Major Carleton that, if his guide were correct, the finest hat that the Major could obtain in New York would be his.[59] From the road the trail led directly up the slope of Fischer's Peak. It is easy to assume that this was the Raton Peak, popularly though erroneously known as Fisher's Peak, which looms over the valley of the Purgatoire at the northern end of the Raton Pass. A careful examination of source materials has convinced the writer that Captain Waldemar Fischer, Missouri Volunteers, Kearny's Army of the West, climbed the vast

mesa south of the Raton Peak at a point that was commemorated by his name in the summer of 1846. From the data left by Quinn and Carleton it appears that they went up present-day Clear Creek.

A heavily timbered canyon screened the column's approach to the rimrock. The troops kept themselves concealed among the trees while Carson and Quinn's spy company, all afoot, cautiously led them through the jumbled hills at the mesa's base. They passed a Jicarilla campsite but a few hours old. The last five hundred feet of the climb was through and over ragged blocks of slaggy lava, where the ascent had to be in single file and ten men could have stopped the whole command. Some of the horses gave out on this arduous stretch. Just before the top was reached, Quinn and three men were sent ahead, closely followed by Carson and Carleton.

Both Quinn and Carleton said that the mesa was only about one hundred yards wide where they crossed it, but apparently that is a too conservative recollection. From their description it is obvious that they reached the top at a place on the big mesa south of the Raton Peak where it was notably narrower than elsewhere. Carson took the lead on the flat, grassy summit, and at the opposite edge he looked into a vast, natural amphitheater, from which there was a magnificent view across the plains to the north. Out of it a stream (Frijoles Creek) flowed northward; to the right were thickly wooded slopes. The Apache's horses were grazing several hundred yards below, and on the edge of the timber Carson could see twenty-two Jicarilla lodges. It was just about 2 P.M., the time of discovery that Carson had predicted. He signaled a warning to the troopers and sent one of Quinn's men to inform Carleton that so far the surprise was complete; the camp showed no sign of alarm. Carleton carefully joined Carson to reconnoiter. Right in front of them was the only place where a descent could be made. It was rocky and precipitous, but the horses could go down two abreast.

The Taos Pueblo Indians among Quinn's men[60] stripped for battle while the Dragoons were coming over the rimrock behind

them. The noise of the approaching Dragoons, together with a shout from Carson to Quinn to charge on the camp, alerted the Jicarilla at the last moment, but it was too late for them to defend their position. With his Pueblo and mounted men, Quinn rushed over the edge and down toward the camp. They fired one volley and reloaded; by then the Jicarilla had deserted their lodges, and Quinn's men turned their attention to the Indians' horses, which three Jicarilla were frantically trying to drive to safety. By that time the main column was over the rimrock and rapidly advancing on the camp and the horse herd. Lieutenant Davidson and Company I went down the creek to try to cut off escape from that direction, and Company G, with Lieutenant Johnston, dismounted to make an advance on the camp. Lieutenant Moore with Company K was ordered back to the top of the mesa; he moved right along the edge in the hope of encountering any of the Jicarilla who might escape on foot from the woods to the mesa top. Coordinating with that move, Lieutenant Davidson and his men beat through the woods some four hundred feet below. At the top, Moore's company dismounted and left four men with the horses. They descended the cliff with great difficulty, using a tree to get to the first ledge and then lowering themselves to the bottom by means of two lariats tied together. The pincers movement failed. No Jicarilla were driven from the thickets, although by then Lieutenant Johnston and some men had been placed at the top to intercept any Indians who might be flushed out.

Several Jicarilla were killed in the main assault and thirty-eight horses captured. The camp had been abandoned so fast that food was found still cooking on the fires. Dressed skins, dried meat, horse equipment, and ammunition were there for the taking, but the soldiers destroyed it all. When Carson and Quinn could find no trail of the fleeing Jicarilla, most of the troopers were ordered to recross the narrow part of the mesa to some good grass and water. Lieutenants Johnston and Moore and about forty men, along with Captain Quinn and six from his spy company (Carleton said three), were left concealed among the trees and rocks to kill any returning Apache. Quinn and three of his men separated from the

others by about a half mile. One of the Pueblo Indians who could imitate the whistle of the Apache lured two warriors and two squaws back to the deserted village. Their approach sounded like deer cracking dry sticks. Two of Quinn's men fired simultaneously at close range (fifteen steps), and the other one fired a second or so later. One of the Jicarilla was killed. Quinn and another man rushed into the underbrush, following a trail of blood, but they were unable to overtake the three Apache. The Pueblo stripped the dead one, whom Quinn described in irritating generality as "a man in the prime of life well dressed Indian fashion and adorned with ornaments." The Apache, probably the son of a principal chief, was, according to Carleton, scalped by the Pueblo Indians so that they might dance over the trophy that night. The small detachment of troopers and spies reached Major Carleton's camp on the other side of the mesa about nine o'clock in the evening.

Because the Jicarilla were scattered, without horses to make an easy trail to follow, Major Carleton decided to head south through the Raton Pass. He was enticed in that direction by reports that an Apache chief named Flecha Rayada was camped on the headwaters of Red River (the Canadian). The Jicarilla band was not found; the only Indian sign was some three-week old tracks high on Vermejo Creek. There was deep snow and severe cold. The animals were thin and weak, and the men were showing signs of dysentery and scurvy. Companies G and K had been in the field for almost three months. Carleton's command was back in Taos on June 12.[61]

Although hostilities subsided as the Jicarilla scattered to distant places, there was another clash on June 30, 1854. A patrol out of Fort Union picked up an Indian trail and followed it into the mountain country along the Mora River. About sixty men from Companies D and H, Second Dragoons, were led by Brevet Captain George Sykes, and with them was Second Lieutenant Joseph E. Maxwell, Third Infantry. Both officers were veterans of the Canadian and Caliente fights. The troop encountered ten to fifteen Jicarilla, who scrambled up the side of the canyon to escape. In the pursuit Maxwell and four men reached the top first. There

they were met by a volley of arrows, two of which killed the lieutenant instantly just as he was about to saber an Indian. The Jicarilla disappeared among the rocks and trees, and the Dragoons returned to the fort with the body of the fallen officer.[62]

Governor Meriwether had come back to Santa Fe a short time before that skirmish. He conferred at once with General Garland, who expressed concern that he did not have enough troops to deal with widespread Indian harassments. Meriwether asked him to sit down then and there and write an official request for a regiment of volunteers. That Garland did, and the Governor issued a proclamation in English and Spanish calling for such troops.[63]

In a report to the Assistant Adjutant General in New York, coincidentally written on the date of Maxwell's death (June 30), Garland said, "The Jicarilla Apaches have been most thoroughly humbled, and beg for peace."[64] That was putting a rather better light on the matter than the circumstances warranted. Perhaps some of the Jicarilla were desirous of making peace, but there was no formal, inclusive effort to secure it. One peace delegation went into Santa Fe but was turned away.[65] And with the advent of autumn, it was quite clear that bands of Jicarilla still were ranging widely, the old problem of food supply being a main cause of renewed depredations.[66]

Special Orders No. 63 went out from Santa Fe on October 2, 1854, giving instructions for dealing with the recalcitrant Jicarilla. Brevet Major James H. Carleton, First Dragoons, was ordered to take not less than fifty men south to Bosque Redondo (where Fort Sumner was later established in 1862) and then move northward up the Pecos River to the settlement of Anton Chico, examining all possible sites for a military post. If he had the chance, Carleton also was to deal with a small band of Jicarilla said to be raiding settlers in San Miguel County. It had been reported that they were headed for the Mescalero Apache country, an objective which they should be prevented from reaching. Above Anton Chico the Pecos was to be searched by Company I, under Lieutenant John W. Davidson, loser of the Cieneguilla fight and recent campaigner with Carleton in the Raton Mountains. From

Cantonment Burgwin, Brevet Major Philip R. Thompson, First Dragoons, was directed to move east onto the plains as far as Point of Rocks, north of Red River on the Cimarron Cutoff of the Santa Fe Trail. Any roving bands of Jicarilla he might find were to be attacked unless they were too strong. Major Thompson was to keep in touch with Lieutenant Davidson via Fort Union.[67] General Garland's orders hardly leave the impression that the Jicarilla were entirely quiescent.

Fort Union received a new commandant in the person of Colonel Thomas T. Fauntleroy, First Dragoons, who replaced Lieutenant Colonel Philip St. George Cooke on September 17, 1854.[68] It fell to the new man to prepare for a spring campaign against Jicarilla Apache and Ute. General Garland for some months had been thinking in terms of a strong mounted force. Fresh horses for the Dragoons had been brought into Fort Union from the States, and the post's garrison had been strengthened.[69] Then the lethargy imposed by winter settled over troopers and Indians alike, a condition that generally prevailed until the green of spring grass relieved the landscape's drabness.

The dormant state was rudely shattered, however, on Christmas Day, 1854, when a mixed band of Mohuache Ute and Jicarilla Apache massacred the inhabitants of a small fur traders' post, Fort Pueblo, on the north bank of the Arkansas River above the mouth of the Huerfano. That clinched General Garland's determination to take strong action as soon as possible. His regular army companies were below strength, but the lack of numbers was made up by the volunteers being enrolled under Governor Meriwether's recent proclamation.[70]

NOTES

1. David Meriwether, *My Life in the Mountains and on the Plains,* Robert A. Griffen, ed. (Norman, 1965), pp. 174-77; Calvin Horn, *New Mexico's Troubled Years: The Story of the Early Territorial Governors* (Albuquerque, 1963), pp. 60-61.

2. Morris E. Opler, *Childhood and Youth in Jicarilla Apache Society* (Los Angeles, 1946), p. 1.

3. Albert H. Schroeder, "A Study of the Apache Indians: Part II, The Jicarilla Apaches," (unpublished manuscript, 1958), p. 91.

4. *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1854* (Washington, 1855), p. 170.

5. U.S. Congress, Senate, *Report of Colonel George A. McCall, Inspector General,* Senate Ex. Doc. 26, 31st Cong., 2nd Sess., Serial 589, vol. 3, pp. 26-27; House, *Memorial of the Legislative Council of New Mexico,* House Misc. Doc. 45, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess., Serial 741.

6. Marshal D. Moody, "Kit Carson, Agent to the Indians in New Mexico, 1853-1861," NMHR, vol. 28 (1953), p. 2.

7. Messervy to Manypenny, March 31, 1854, and Meriwether's Report, September 1, 1854, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, New Mexico Superintendency, 1854-1855, Microcopy 234, Roll 547, National Archives Microfilm Publications, hereafter referred to as New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

8. *Report of Colonel McCall,* p. 13.

9. Annie Heloise Abel, *The Official Correspondence of James S. Calhoun While Indian Agent at Santa Fe and Superintendent of Indian Affairs in New Mexico* (Washington, 1915), p. 269.

10. LeRoy R. Hafen, ed., *Colorado and Its People: A Narrative and Topical History of the Centennial State* (New York, 1948), vol. 1, p. 104.

11. Schroeder, p. 109.

12. *Ibid.,* pp. 76-77, 81-82.

13. Cooke to Bell, March 1, 1854, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Selected Letters Received, 1853-55, Record Group 94, National Archives, referred to hereafter as Selected Letters Received. The account of this phase of the campaign is based on the official report, Bell to Cooke, March 7, 1854, Selected Letters Received. Bell had been out on a similar mission from February 13 to 17. Bell to Maxwell, February 19, 1854, Records of United States Army Commands, 1821-1920, Department of New Mexico Letters Received, Record Group 393, National Archives, referred to hereafter as Department Letters Received.

14. Twenty years later Cooke contributed a chapter of reminiscences to Theo. R. Rodenbaugh, *From Everglade to Cañon With The Second Dragoons (Second United States Cavalry): An Authentic Account of Service in Florida, Mexico, Virginia, and the Indian Country, Including Personal Recollections of Prominent Officers* (New York, 1875), pp. 175-94. His account of Bell's fight is on pp. 176-78. It is open to question in details. For example, Cooke said that Bell shot White Wolf several times, but one of the soldiers gave the *coup de grace* by crushing the chief's skull with a rock. Another source states that Lobo, pierced by seven bullets, shot a young trooper named Arnold with a bow and arrow. They grappled and died in each other's arms. See Clinton E. Brooks and Frank D. Reeve, eds., "James A. Bennett: A Dragoon in New Mexico, 1850-1856," NMHR, vol. 22 (1947), p. 141. Private W. A. Arnold was one of the two troopers killed, but the official report says he died from a spear wound. Bennett's account must be seriously doubted; he also said that Lobo was killed on November 22, 1853. His unreliability in another matter was noted by his editors, a discrepancy which is noted here in footnote 20.

15. Bell's message to Cooke was written by an expressman already in the saddle; it was dated "On the Plains, 2:30 P.M. March 5th, '54." Selected Letters Received. Cooke later identified the man as Sergeant Lawless, who arrived at Fort Union at 10 P.M. after a ride of seventy miles. See Rodenbaugh, pp. 177-78.

16. This may have meant up the Mora River, closer to Fort Union.

17. Meriwether to Manypenny, March 17, 1854, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

18. Cooke to Nichols, March 8, 1854, Selected Letters Received.

19. Meriwether to Manypenny, March 17, 1854, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

20. *Ibid.* Bell's Report, March 7, 1854, and Cooke to Nichols, March 8, 1854, Selected Letters Received, blame Lobo for the White and mail party killings. James A. Bennett's editors point to his error in stating that the attack on the White party occurred in 1851 instead of 1849. Brooks and Reeve, p. 73 and n. 31.

21. Messervy to Manypenny, March 31, 1854, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

22. Carson's Report, March 27, 1854, *ibid.*

23. Carson's Report, March 21, 1854, *ibid.*

24. Messervy to Manypenny, March 31, 1854, *ibid.*

25. Special Orders No. 15, March 12, 1854, Special Orders of the Department of New Mexico, July 19, 1851-September 19, 1857, vol. 27, p. 45, Records of the War Department, United States Army Commands, Record

Group 98, National Archives, referred to hereafter as Special Orders, with number and date.

26. Waldo, Hall and Company had the first four-year mail contract from Independence to Santa Fe in 1850. Ralph Emerson Twitchell, *Old Santa Fe: The Story of New Mexico's Ancient Capital* (Chicago, 1963), p. 242.

27. Leo E. Oliva, *Soldiers on the Santa Fe Trail* (Norman, 1967), p. 108.

28. Messervy to Carson, March 29, 1854, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

29. Blake to Nichols, March 30, 1854, Selected Letters.

30. Messervy to Manypenny, April 29, 1854, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

31. Kit Carson, for example, simply said that the Indians had chosen an advantageous position, but gave no indication that a trap had been set. Harvey Lewis Carter, *'Dear Old Kit': The Historical Christopher Carson* (Norman, 1968), p. 134.

32. Blake to Nichols, March 30, 1854, and Quinn to Smith, March 30, 1854, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

33. De Leon to Messervy, March 31, 1854, *ibid.*; U.S. Congress, Senate, *Report of the Secretary of War,* Senate Ex. Doc. No. 1, 33rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Serial 747, Part II, p. 33, referred to hereafter as *Report of the Secretary of War, 1854.*

34. Meriwether to Manypenny, March 17, 1854, New Mexico Superintendency Letters; *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1854,* p. 170.

35. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1854,* p. 33.

36. Carter, p. 134.

37. *Ibid.,* pp. 134-35; *Report of the Secretary of War, 1854,* p. 33.

38. Charles F. Carey, "John W. Davidson," *Dictionary of American Biography,* Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds., (New York, 1930), vol. 5, pp. 93-94.

39. Moody, p. 348.

40. Messervy to Manypenny, March 31, 1854, and April 29, 1854, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

41. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1854,* p. 34. Author's italics.

42. Cooke was very gratified that he had anticipated Garland's orders. Cooke to Nichols, May 24, 1854, Department Letters Received; *Report of the Secretary of War, 1854,* p. 34; Rodenbaugh, p. 178.

43. Carter, pp. 134-35; *Report of the Secretary of War, 1854,* p. 34; Rodenbaugh, p. 178.

44. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1854,* p. 34. Since this phase of the campaigns appears to be better known, it is treated in less detail than the other phases. Cooke's Report is in Cooke to Nichols, May 24, 1854, Department Letters Received.

45. Cooke to Nichols, May 24, 1854, Department Letters Received; Rodenbaugh, p. 177.

46. Messervy to Manypenny, March 31, 1854, and Meriwether's Report, September 1, 1854, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

47. Rodenbaugh, p. 178. Another contemporary account is James H. Quinn's diary, "Journal of the spy company in the expeditions against the Indians with Col. Cooke, Major Brooks, and Major Carleton," HM RI 136, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California. This material is used here through the kind permission of Dr. Robert O. Dougan, Librarian, Huntington Library, and it will be referred to hereafter as Quinn Diary. For Kit Carson's account see Carter, pp. 135-39.

48. Quinn Diary, pp. 8-10.

49. Davis to Meriwether, April 7, 1854, and Meriwether to Messervy, May 28, 1854, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

50. Messervy to Meriwether, May 30, 1854, *ibid.*

51. Dunn to Messervy, April 14, 1854, Stanford Research Institute, *Historical and Documentary Evidence Concerning Claim of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe of the Jicarilla Indian Reservation, New Mexico, Before the Indian Claims Commission: No. 22, The Apache Nation ex. rel. Fred Pellman, et al, Petitioners v. The United States of America, Respondent* (Menlo Park, 1957), Book 6, pp. 492-93.

52. Messervy to Carson, April 13, 1854, Christopher Carson Correspondence and Papers, P-E 64, Box 1, Bancroft Library, University of California. Copy by the University of California Library Photographic Service 5634 in the State Historical Society of Colorado Library; *Report of the Secretary of War, 1854,* p. 35.

53. Orders No. 10 (no date), Department Letters Received.

54. James H. Quinn was a merchant, lawyer, and territorial politician of some consequence. Carter, p. 136, n. 293; Ralph Emerson Twitchell, *Leading Facts of New Mexico History* (Albuquerque, 1963), vol. 2, pp. 208, 269, 272.

55. Carleton to Cooke, June 5, 1854, and June 10, 1854, Department Letters Received.

56. Captain John Gunnison, Topographical Engineers, headed a railroad survey in 1853. He and his party had moved westward over the Sangre de Cristo Pass from the valley of the Huerfano to Fort Massachusetts.

57. The Spanish Peaks are known also as the Huajatollas (variously spelled, and translated as Breasts of the World) and as Los Dos Hermanos.

58. This spring probably took its name from Sarcillo Creek. *Zarcillo* means earring.

59. Carter, p. 142. Carson's *Memoirs*, edited by Professor Carter, gives a brief account of this phase of the campaign.

60. Men from Taos Pueblo were chosen to go on the expedition, doubtless because they knew the Raton Mountains thoroughly. Hunters from Taos Pueblo went to the Ratons and the adjoining plains every autumn in quest of deer and antelope. Carson to Meriwether, November 25, 1854, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

61. Carleton to Cooke, June 10, 1854, Department Letters Received; Quinn Diary, p. 14.

62. Orders No. 13, July 1, 1854, and Sykes to Cooke, July 2, 1854, Department Letters Received.

63. Meriwether, pp. 188-94.

64. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1854*, p. 36.

65. Robert M. Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue, 1848-1865* (New York, 1967), p. 146.

66. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1854*, p. 37; Horn, p. 61.

67. Special Orders No. 63, October 2, 1854.

68. Special Orders No. 56, September 6, 1854.

69. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1854*, p. 34; Special Orders No. 51, August 28, 1854, and No. 55, September 5, 1854.

70. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1854*, p. 57; U.S. Congress, House, *Report of the Secretary of War*, Ex. Doc. 1, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 57.