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CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE JICARILLA APACHE, 1855

MORRIS F. TAYLOR

THE DESTRUCTIVE attack on the Pueblo fort beside the Arkansas River on Christmas Day, 1854, showed beyond a doubt that the relations of the Jicarilla Apache, and their Mohuache Ute allies, with settlers and authorities in northern New Mexico continued to be very poor indeed. Even without the holiday massacre, there were unmistakable signs that hostilities of a more formal and organized nature were about as inevitable as the coming of the spring season, when war again might be expected.

Slight chances for peace were dependent mainly on three men: Chacon, the principal chief of the Jicarilla, Governor David Meriwether, and Colonel Thomas T. Fauntleroy, the new commandant at Fort Union. If the record is straight, it appears that no one of them was really sanguine about settling differences by negotiation. It should be borne in mind, however, that Chacon's attitudes and responses are known only through the reports of his white adversaries. Nor should it be forgotten that the privations of the Jicarilla had not been alleviated in any significant way. The old causes for war were still around.

In early September 1854 Chacon went into Santa Fe to talk with Governor Meriwether. The chief evidently argued the destitution of his people as extenuation of their actions, in reply to which the Governor pointed out that robberies of white men by Indians were the main cause of friction. Shifting his ground, Chacon said that most depredations were the work of a small band led by "a very bad man named José Largo." The inference was that only a small minority (nine lodges) followed José Largo as com-

pared with the sixty-two lodges in Chacon's camp. Chacon asked for time to capture and deliver José Largo, and Meriwether promised him a month's forbearance from any retaliation on his camp near Abiquiu, plus forty fanegas of corn, which could be purchased and given to his people.¹

Meriwether instructed Lafayette Head, a prominent settler on the Conejos River, to secure and deliver the corn. At Chacon's camp, Head reported, he was insolently treated and threatened, and soon after the corn was in their hands the Indians stole some mules, stripped and severely whipped a white man, and then moved their camp into the mountains. During his visit to the Jicarilla camp Head counted more than a hundred lodges, which led him to suspect that all the Jicarilla bands had assembled there, including José Largo's. The Governor concluded that peace was hopeless until the Indians had been given "one or two good thrashings."²

About two months later there was a serious incident in the Raton Mountains, followed by disagreement between Governor Meriwether and Indian Agent Kit Carson over whom to blame. A party of about twenty-five hunters from Taos Pueblo had gone to the Ratons and vicinity seeking deer and antelope as was their custom at that time of the year, and they were attacked by other Indians. Twelve Taos men were slain; among them were warriors who had distinguished themselves in the previous summer's campaigns by Lieutenant Colonel Philip St. George Cooke and others against the Jicarilla.³

Carson believed that the Taos hunters were assaulted by Cheyenne and Arapaho from the Arkansas River country.⁴ A large band of those Plains Indians was seen near the Raton Mountains by the United States mail party on its way from Independence, Missouri, to Santa Fe.⁵ That was known to the Governor, and he allowed that Carson might be correct. Meriwether, however, was inclined to think that the Taos hunters met their death at the hands of Jicarilla warriors, who were seeking revenge for the Taos support of the expeditions against them in 1854.⁶ It is impossible to tell how much this version affected the attitudes of Meriwether and

others on what to do about the Jicarilla problem, but it appears likely that Meriwether had already made up his mind that federal and volunteer troops would have to be employed against them in the following spring.

What to expect of the Ute was less certain for a while. One of the leaders of the Mohuache, Chico Velásquez, died from smallpox which swept their ranks, and he was succeeded by Ka-ni-ache,⁷ who was considered "to be a mild, well disposed Indian," but Meriwether wondered whether he would have as strong an influence as his predecessor.⁸ Participation by Mohuache Ute under Chief Blanco in the Christmas Day episode on the Arkansas (perhaps in part because they believed that trade blankets had been deliberately infected with smallpox by white men)⁹ clarified the intentions of part of the Mohuache Ute at least, just as the presence of Jicarilla Apache in the same raid confirmed belief in their hostility.

Events of the winter supported the wisdom of Governor Meriwether's proclamation for enlistment of mounted volunteer companies that would substantially increase the number of fighting men to protect the settlements and carry the war directly to the Indians. Brevet Brigadier General John Garland, commanding the military Department of New Mexico, sensed "great uneasiness and insecurity" among the settlers, and with his regular army companies down in strength by about 557 men,¹⁰ the importance of a successful volunteer recruitment was obvious. In fact, General Garland was counting on the volunteers to round out a mixed force of about four hundred men to take the field in the spring. In anticipation of that and of adequate funds from Congress, he began to set up supply depots at points that were logistically feasible.¹¹ His expectations were fortified by a memorial from New Mexico to Congress asking for increased support against the Indians, which was presented to the Senate on February 5 by Mississippi's Senator Albert Gallatin Brown.¹²

Response to Governor Meriwether's proclamation was very gratifying. On the basis of a six-month enlistment period six companies of New Mexico Mounted Volunteers were raised, and com-

mand of the battalion, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, was given to that prominent and respected citizen, Ceran St. Vrain,¹³ a man well known all along the Santa Fe Trail back to the States since long before the Mexican War. Meriwether later recalled that there were numerous aspirants and that he chose St. Vrain, who was not among them, in part because selection of one of the others was fraught with ticklish political and ethnic considerations.¹⁴ The choice received Kit Carson's fullest approbation, and in dictating his *Memoirs* the next year, Carson let the animosity between himself and the governor show through when he said, "Many people were surprised at his sound judgment in making such a noble choice."¹⁵

As a condition for his acceptance of command of the Volunteers, Ceran St. Vrain required that a regular army officer be detached to serve as his adjutant, and, more than that, he requested that Brevet Second Lieutenant William Craig, Third Infantry, then stationed at Cantonment Burgwin, be designated for that position. In compliance, General Garland ordered that Lieutenant Craig report to St. Vrain at Taos. How the St. Vrain-Craig friendship started is not known, but Craig later stated that his own hesitancy to accept was overcome by St. Vrain's promise of land on the Vigil and St. Vrain Grant in the extreme northern part of the Territory, over which part of the campaign would undoubtedly take place.¹⁶

Fort Union was the post where the Volunteers would receive their arms and other equipment for service in the field, and responsibility for that fell on the fort's commandant, Colonel Thomas T. Fauntleroy, First Dragoons, who was given command of the expedition being organized against the Mohuache Ute and Jicarilla Apache.¹⁷ Horses were furnished by the recruits themselves or by their company commanders.¹⁸

The three military installations in the northern part of the Territory—Fort Union, Fort Massachusetts, and Cantonment Burgwin—were placed under Colonel Fauntleroy's command for the duration of the campaign. Fort Union (established in 1851) was near the juncture of the Mountain Branch and the Cimarron Cut-off of the Santa Fe Trail, east of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains.

West of that range, and just south of Sierra Blanca in the San Luis Valley, was Fort Massachusetts, which was located in Ute country in 1852. It was the northernmost military post in New Mexico Territory, but its site is presently in Colorado. The third post, Cantonment Burgwin, also established in 1852, was about ten miles south of the town of [Don Fernando de] Taos. All three owed their existence, in part, to the problems of control of Jicarilla and Ute,¹⁹ so they naturally figured in the campaign plans for the summer of 1855. Additionally, the eighteenth-century settlement of Taos was chosen to be a depot for supplies of stores and subsistence in the coming military operations.²⁰

While the elaborate preparations for chastisement of the Indians were going on, more stimuli were given to the feeling of urgency. On Ocate Creek, not far from Fort Union, about eight Indians had killed a man and driven off a few animals. Approximately fifty lodges of Jicarilla were reported to be on Red River only fifty miles from the post, and sizable raids hit herds in the vicinity of Las Vegas.²¹ Heavy depredations were committed at Costilla in the San Luis Valley by a party of about 150 Ute and Apache. In what seemed almost to be an act of defiance, the Indians relieved one Julián Romero of 625 head of sheep and 35 goats. From Juan Benito Váldez, Juan Vigil, and Jesús María Sánchez, they took 3,800 head of sheep and goats and 12 head of cattle.²² Those Indians may have been the ones against whom Captain Charles Deus and his company of New Mexico Mounted Volunteers were ordered to be on the alert because a band of Ute and Jicarilla were moving towards Navajo country. Deus and his men were at Rito, northeast of Abiquiu; in order to cope with the special situation, Deus ordered First Lieutenant Albert H. Pfeiffer to enlist more men for limited service. Pfeiffer and his troopers caught up with the Ute and Jicarilla band at Las Nutrias on March 14, defeating and forcing them back.²³

Raids and killings by Ute and Apache were commonplace in the northern part of the Territory during the month of February, according to Kit Carson.²⁴ It was in response to one of the incidents—a theft of mares in Mora County—that Captain Francisco

Gonzales' company of Mounted Volunteers was dispatched from Fort Union. They chased some Apache northward for many miles past the Wagon Mound to the vicinity of the present town of Raton, thence through the Raton Mountains into what is now known as Long's Canyon, an important side canyon of the Purgatoire River on its south side in present-day Colorado. Somewhere in that much used passage through the mountains, Gonzales and his men came upon the Apache band. The Indians were eating and nearly taken by surprise. They were alerted just in time to mount up and escape, leaving their partially consumed meal of horseflesh to the hungry cavalrymen.²⁵

Such actions, however, were minor and preliminary to the coordinated campaign under Colonel Fauntleroy's direction. The various units of the combined command converged on Fort Massachusetts in early March. First to arrive, on March 3, were the thirty guides and spies under Captain Lucien Stewart, who reported that Fauntleroy's main force of two Dragoon companies and four companies of Mounted Volunteers, the latter led by Lieutenant Colonel St. Vrain, were on their way from Taos.²⁶ Stewart was a well-known person in Taos, whom St. Vrain had employed as an Indian trader.²⁷ An Artillery Company joined a few days later.²⁸

The concentration of troops at Fort Massachusetts had just been completed when word came in from the south of a large-scale Ute and Apache raid, which seemed nothing less than a challenge. An estimated 800 to 1,000 Indians drove off 1,000 head of sheep, 25 head of horses, mules, and jackasses, and 40 head of cattle from the little settlement of Conejos. Allowing for possible exaggeration of the number of raiders, the incident was bad enough. Carson understood that the 60 or 70 families at Conejos herded their stock in common; he thought that probably every family suffered losses.²⁹

Colonel Fauntleroy left Fort Massachusetts with over five hundred men on March 14, setting out into the snowy landscape of the great intermontane San Luis Valley to settle scores with Mo-huache Ute and Jicarilla Apache.³⁰ With the regulars, volunteers, and spies was the most experienced guide of them all, Kit Carson,

the Indian Agent at Taos, who deemed it his duty to accompany Fauntleroy.³¹ Since this article is intended to be an examination of that part of the 1855 campaign directed particularly at the Jicarilla Apache, suffice it to say here that Colonel Fauntleroy's efforts against the Mohuache Ute and associated Jicarilla Apache in March, April, and May were militarily successful, and that he administered a couple of stinging defeats to the Indians in the San Luis Valley and on the headwaters of the Arkansas.³²

After that Mohuache and Jicarilla separated, the Apache heading down the rugged canyon of the Arkansas in their flight. From seventy-five to eighty lodges of them, after ten or twelve miles, turned up Beaver Creek and camped. Their trail led north between the Arkansas and what Carson called Valles Salados, undoubtedly meaning the Bayou Salade or South Park. Apparently realizing that Fauntleroy's force was following them, the Indians divided into three parties. His guides showed Fauntleroy the trail of the largest band which led back to the Arkansas, and pursuing troops captured an Apache woman and child and eight horses. She told them they were following Jicarilla under the lead of the principal chief, Chacon. Crossing to the south side of the river, the troops came upon the Jicarilla. Fauntleroy ordered a charge; the Indians were routed, and nearly all their livestock was captured. The large amount of mule meat in the camp booty indicated that the Jicarilla were in a nearly destitute condition. But the troops' provisions were running low also. The Dragoons' horses were not standing the strain of the winter campaign as well as those of the Mounted Volunteers. Fauntleroy decided to halt the pursuit and head for Fort Massachusetts. The return route was southward through the Wet Mountain Valley, where they had a brush with a few Ute, and then westward through the Sangre de Cristos via Mosca Pass to the log fort at the foot of Sierra Blanca.³³

After resting and refitting, Colonel Fauntleroy planned to take the field again in the hope of delivering decisive blows against the Mohuache and Jicarilla. Because the main group of the Jicarilla were believed then to be east of the mountains, resumption of hostilities on April 20 saw a separate command under Lieutenant

Colonel Ceran St. Vrain head in that direction, while Colonel Fauntleroy took the remainder of the force in a search for Ute in the San Luis Valley. With St. Vrain were Company F, First Dragoons, and Mounted Volunteer Companies A and B, Captains Charles Williams and Francisco Gonzales respectively. Both Volunteer companies had been recruited in Taos County, and the muster rolls show that, with the exception of Captain Williams, officers and men all had Spanish surnames. Company A listed eighty-three men, including non-commissioned officers, and Company B had eighty-two, among whom was an alert young sergeant by the name of Rafael Chacón, who set down an account of the expedition. Also with St. Vrain's command was Dr. F. E. Kavanaugh, another familiar Taos figure.³⁴

The search for Chief Chacon's Jicarilla was pressed with vigor as soon as St. Vrain and his men crossed eastward over the Sangre de Cristo Pass to the headwaters of the Huerfano River. In a short time they discovered a camp of about sixty Jicarilla near that stream in the vicinity of its tributary, the Rio del Oso, or Bear Creek. The resulting fight was a difficult two-day engagement, April 25 and 26, but finally the Indians were driven off with the loss of thirteen killed and wounded and all the camp gear.³⁵ Perhaps it was after this fight that St. Vrain, according to later testimony, pointed out the land on the Vigil and St. Vrain (Las Animas) Grant which he would give to Lieutenant Craig, his adjutant, as soon as the latter resigned his commission after the campaign.³⁶

The Jicarilla fled south along much the same trail that some of them had followed the previous year when they were being pursued by Major James Carleton's force. On Trujillo Creek, a tributary of the upper Apishapa in the foothills, St. Vrain's men had a skirmish with Jicarilla; at one time during that stage of the chase, twenty head of buffalo were seen in a meadow, but the men were not permitted to shoot at them for fear of warning the Indians.³⁷ The fresh Jicarilla trail continued to the Purgatoire River, where a camp was found at the mouth of Long's Canyon about six miles above the site of present Trinidad, Colorado. The Indians had seen St. Vrain's force approaching and were getting away into the

Raton Mountains. The troopers charged the camp remnant, nonetheless, and one Jicarilla warrior was killed and scalped. A few men on foot, led by First Lieutenant Marcelino Vigil and Second Lieutenant Matías Ortega from Captain Williams' Company,³⁸ were sent in immediate search, and Captain Gonzales was ordered to go with a detachment south to a stream known as the Uña de Gato, on the other side of the great mesas that made up part of the Raton, in the expectation of intercepting the Indians somewhere in that vicinity. But he returned next day to report that he and his men had overtaken the Jicarilla in the Raton Pass (near the later site of "Uncle Dick" Wootton's house), killing three warriors. Also he brought in six prisoners (women and children), who said that they belonged to Chief Chacon's band; they added that he was headed for Red River where the Mora emptied into it.³⁹ St. Vrain took his command and prisoners into Fort Union, arriving there on the last day of April. Among other facts about the campaign, he was able to report that none of the men had been killed.⁴⁰ The Volunteer companies and spies kept up the search for Chacon and his band, leaving Fort Union on May 2 with rations for about eight days, but St. Vrain and his adjutant did not accompany them.⁴¹ In the canyons of Red River and its tributaries east of Fort Union, the Jicarilla chief and his people disappeared.

Taos was the rendezvous for regular and volunteer troops after the spring campaign. St. Vrain crossed over the mountains to that town, and Colonel Fauntleroy went down from Fort Massachusetts after his generally satisfactory military operations in the San Luis Valley. The Colonel's intent was to regroup his command and start out once more, especially after Ute,⁴² but it turned out that he and the regular troops did not take major action again that season. A few weeks remained in the enlistment period of the New Mexico Mounted Volunteers, and it fell to Lieutenant Colonel St. Vrain to keep some of them busy in the closing phase of cavalry action. Reports came in from east of the mountains that a mixed band of Ute and Apache had been seen along the Huerfano River. St. Vrain at once left Fort Massachusetts with a three-company force composed exclusively of Mounted Volunteers and ten guides.

The Volunteer units were those of Captains Manuel Chávez, Charles Deus, and Charles Williams; the guides again were led by Captain Charles Stewart; and Dr. F. E. Kavanaugh was attached to the force once more.⁴³

Leaving the fort on June 3 with twenty days rations, St. Vrain and his command passed through Indian Creek Pass to the Cu-charas River, a tributary of the Huerfano. About noon on the second day they found a large Indian trail, but it was at least twenty days old. They followed it from the mountains southeast across the plains about sixty miles to a point on the Pisha-pa [Apishapa] near Hole in the Rock.⁴⁴ There the trail turned an acute angle and headed northwest back towards the mountains, which St. Vrain reached on June 5. The Indians evidently had divided into several parties when they entered the mountains, but nearly two days and nights of hard rain had made the trail all but indiscernible. Here Captain Stewart and his guides proved their worth, telling St. Vrain that the only followable trail was that of a relatively small party of Indians, who had gone south. Eventually they crossed the Picketware (Purgatoire), and on June 8 about two o'clock in the afternoon, St. Vrain and his force unexpectedly came upon an abandoned camp of about sixty lodges, without having seen a fresh track a hundred yards from it.

Now that the Jicarilla had eluded him again, St. Vrain ordered his command to separate into four parts. One, with all the baggage and an adequate guard, was sent ahead to an agreed spot on the headwaters of Red River. Each of the other three groups sought the Jicarilla in separate escape routes. The detachment commanded by Captain Deus returned in the late afternoon, and Captain Gonzales' party came in soon after dark; neither had much to show for its efforts—a Mexican recaptured and one horse taken. The Volunteers and guides with Captain Williams, however, told a different story, with supporting evidence. While searching for the Indians recently encountered on the Purgatoire, Williams' force surprised another Jicarilla camp and themselves. They charged at once, and the camp was taken. Six Indians were killed, five of

them in defense of their camp, and the troopers seized twenty-nine horses, six guns, and an indeterminate amount of bows, arrows, robes, skins, and camp items. The site of the Jicarilla camp is not known, except that it was in the Raton Mountains.

When his force reassembled, St. Vrain moved westward onto the headwaters of the Purgatoire, doubtless because signs of their trail indicated that the Indians had headed in that direction. Camp was made in remote and mountainous country on the night of June 10, and once again St. Vrain, using his camp as a base, subdivided his command; this time he broke it into parties of twenty-five, which were sent in all directions. The results were not gratifying. After three days of searching for fifty miles around, the detachments came in with only two horses for all the trouble. This frustration caused St. Vrain to complain to Lieutenant Craig, in a letter sent to Fort Union, that his camp was in a "central position in this vast region unfit for the habitation of man or beast, but suitable only for the connecting link between the two, and a fit hiding place for his ill-gotten gain."⁴⁵

St. Vrain's oblique characterization of the Jicarilla leaves little doubt that he was not among those who were inclined to be sympathetic to and understanding of their plight. And whatever the circumstances of his mountain camp, it was necessary for him to proceed southward to Red River (the Canadian), where the bulk of his gear had been sent. Grouping his command again into its component companies, he sent Captain Williams and his men down Red River to the crossing of the Santa Fe Trail. Chávez' company was ordered to search down Vermejo Creek, while Captain Deus was given a similar assignment some distance to the south, probably along the Poñil or the Cimarroncito and onto the Cimarron. It appears that St. Vrain went directly to Lucien Maxwell's place at Rayado, where the three companies met on June 16.⁴⁶

Instead of going into Fort Union, St. Vrain led his force back to Fort Massachusetts over the same general route that had brought him to Rayado. His guides found a large Indian trail in the vicin-

ity of the Spanish Peaks (Huajatollas). The Indians were aware of the Volunteer force and retreated into the canyon of the Huerfano, finally splitting into small groups and disappearing in the rugged terrain of the Greenhorn or Wet Mountains.

The search was futile. The Fourth of July, 1855, found the troopers in camp on the east face of the Greenhorns near the crest, from which vantage point St. Vrain indicated the outboundaries of his huge land grant, that lay before them in the great panorama of plains and mountains. Next day, while moving north, St. Vrain was warned of the approach of a large number of unidentified Indian warriors. Quickly concealing his men in a pine forest near its edge, St. Vrain and his officers planned an ambush. The Indians, presumably on horseback, came into clear view, but the ambush was suddenly ruined when someone in Captain Chávez' company accidentally discharged his gun. Once again the Indians faded into the difficult country.

That incident marked the northernmost reach of the expedition. Moving southward through the Wet Mountain Valley to the upper Huerfano River, St. Vrain and his command then crossed westward over Mosca Pass to Fort Massachusetts.⁴⁷ It was then mid-July, and the expiration date of the Volunteers' enlistment was only a couple of weeks away. The departmental commander, Brevet Brigadier General Garland, already had issued orders for the disbandment of the New Mexico Mounted Volunteers. Those companies commanded by Captains Williams and Gonzales were to be mustered out at Taos by Major George A. H. Blake, the others under the direction of Brevet Major W. T. H. Brooks in Santa Fe. Arms, equipment, and ammunition were to be returned to the Ordnance Depot at Fort Union.⁴⁸

Contemporary evaluations of the 1855 campaign ranged from flowery praise to critical disgust. General Garland issued a statement that was complimentary to the New Mexico Mounted Volunteers, or perhaps simply perfunctory, saying "that the whole period of their service was spent in active campaign and that whether in the mountains covered with eternal snows, or in the arid plains,

they vied successfully with the old troops of the line in following up the enemy never failing in a single instance to inflict upon them the punishment which their many acts of atrocity had rendered so necessary."⁴⁹ About a year later, Kit Carson expressed his belief that had the Volunteers had three more months of service, and had St. Vrain been in sole command, the Indians would have been taken care of, and there would have been no further need of troops in that country. It did not work out that way, in his opinion, because the authorities thought the Indians had been harried enough; when the Indians sought peace, they received it.⁵⁰ Doubtless sincere in his confidence in St. Vrain, Carson used it in implied criticism of regular army officers and civilian officials.

Both Garland and Carson were somewhat subjective in their assessments. The record of the New Mexico Mounted Volunteers was good, but they never inflicted a defeat on the Jicarilla of sufficient certitude to end their depredations. Small bands continued to raid settlements.⁵¹ Colonel Fauntleroy and his mixed force, however, dealt the Mohuache Ute heavy enough blows so that they rather quickly became quite peaceful, and Governor Meriwether hoped that the Mohuache example would bring the Jicarilla around.⁵² Prolonged harrassment had made some of the Jicarilla amenable to peace talks.

A delegation of Mohuache and Jicarilla came to the Governor in early August to open negotiations; as a result, September 10 was set as the date for a general parley on the Chama River above Abiquiu. Negotiations were marked by success, and treaties were made with the Mohuache Ute and Jicarilla Apache on September 11 and 12, 1866, respectively. Intent and good faith were underscored by exchanges of prisoners.⁵³ The central proposition was land cultivation by those tribes on tracts that were specified therein. To the Mohuache Ute were given lands immediately below the northern boundary of New Mexico Territory (then the 38th parallel across the San Luis Valley in present-day Colorado), west of the Rio Grande, and east of the drainage of the San Juan River. If that tract was less than a thousand square miles, they could extend

their boundaries westward until that total was reached. The area to be reserved to the Jicarilla, south of that allotted to the Mohuache, was generally the upper drainage of the Chama River.⁵⁴

Evidently the terms of Meriwether's treaties were not made public immediately, although nearly everyone probably soon knew by word of mouth of the altercation between Governor Meriwether and Kit Carson, when the Jicarilla and Mohuache camps were in great confusion because of reports of an impending Kiowa attack. Carson advised the Governor to take cover with him below the river bank because the Indians, in their present mood, might kill them. Meriwether refused and subsequently preferred charges against Carson for disobedience, insubordination, disrespect, and cowardice; the latter charge, in the opinion of Professor Harvey L. Carter, Carson's most recent biographer, was quite unjustifiable.⁵⁵

When the locations of the treaty reservations were known, a strong protest was sent from Taos in the form of a memorial to President Franklin Pierce, dated April 21, 1856. The Chief Executive was asked to reject Meriwether's treaties because the reservations were dangerously close to the settlements and there was plenty of tillable land farther to the west.⁵⁶ The memorialists were trying to by-pass the Governor, who apparently had not consulted them, and they were moved to such action in part by genuine fear of continued depredations, which was not mollified by the quiescence of the Indians during the month of March.

Indian Agent Lorenzo Labadi reported to the Commissioner of Indian affairs in Washington that heavy snow and severe cold had scattered the deer so that his charges had had poor hunting. Labadi again described the desperate situation of the Apache and Ute, who "are at this time very destitute of food and clothing, and are without means of support," but he, too, put some reliance on the well-meant but wrongheaded policy of bending those hunters and gatherers to a life of farming when he said that "they are anxiously awaiting the arrival of H. E. Governor Meriwether, in hopes of his being able to assist them in commencing the cultivation of the soil for their future maintenance."⁵⁷

The Senate of the United States did not ratify the treaties, but

it was unlikely that approval would have pacified the Jicarilla Apache. It was Kit Carson's opinion, however, that they and the Mohuache would stay friendly for a long time.⁵⁸ When resumption of Jicarilla raids on livestock and other property set in not long thereafter, Carson warned against worse to come and said that no treaty should have been made with them in the first place.⁵⁹ Even Carson seemed to be insensitive to the frustrating and seemingly hopeless circumstances of the Jicarilla.

NOTES

1. Meriwether to Manypenny, Sept. 29, 1854, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, New Mexico Superintendency, 1854-1855, Microcopy 234, Roll 547, National Archives Microfilm Publications, hereafter referred to as New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Carson's Report, Nov. 25, 1854, *ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*

5. At this time the Independence-Santa Fe mail contract was held by Jacob Hall, partner in the firm of Hockaday and Hall. U.S. Congress, House, *Letter from the Postmaster General*, Ex. Doc. No. 86, 33rd Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 318-19.

6. Meriwether to Manypenny, Nov. 30, 1854, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

7. For a study of this Ute chief see Morris F. Taylor, "Ka-ni-ache," *Colorado Magazine*, vol. 43 (1966), pp. 275-302, vol. 44 (1967), pp. 139-61.

8. Meriwether to Manypenny, Nov. 30, 1854, New Mexico Superintendency Letters. Full reliance cannot be placed on David Meriwether's autobiography, which he dictated many years later (1886). Therein he identifies Chico Velasquez as a Jicarilla chief. David Meriwether, *My Life in the Mountains and on the Plains*, ed. and with an introduction by Robert A. Griffen (Norman, 1965), p. 195.

9. Blanche C. Grant, ed., *Kit Carson's Own Story of His Life as Dictated to Col. and Mrs. D. C. Peters about 1856-57 and Never Before Published* (Taos, 1926), p. 216.

10. U.S. Congress, House, *Report of the Secretary of War*, Ex. Doc. No. 1, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 57, hereafter referred to as *Report of the Secretary of War, 1855*.

11. *Ibid.*

12. A. B. Bender, "Frontier Defense in the Territory of New Mexico," NMHR, vol. 9 (1934), p. 350; U.S., *Congressional Globe*, 33rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1855, vol. 30, p. 603.

13. Special Orders No. 12, Feb. 5, 1855, Special Orders of the Department of New Mexico, July 19, 1851-Sept. 19, 1857, Records of the War Department, United States Army Commands, Record Group No. 98, National Archives. Hereafter reference will be made only to orders and date. Meriwether, p. 194, says he appointed St. Vrain to the rank of colonel, an apparent error in recollection.

14. Meriwether, p. 194.

15. Harvey Lewis Carter, 'Dear Old Kit': *The Historical Christopher Carson* (Norman, 1968), pp. 144-45.

16. William Craig, *Claimant, versus Las Animas Grant: Argument of William Craig* (Denver, 1873), p. 12, hereafter referred to as *Argument of William Craig*; Special Orders No. 19, Feb. 18, 1855. The land grant (later surveyed for over 4,000,000 acres) was bestowed upon Cornelio Vigil and Ceran St. Vrain in 1843 by Governor Manuel Armijo. Vigil was killed in the Taos uprising in January 1847. See Morris F. Taylor, "Captain William Craig and the Vigil and St. Vrain Grant, 1855-1870," *Colorado Magazine*, vol. 45 (1968), pp. 301-21.

17. Special Orders No. 12, Feb. 5, 1855.

18. Harold A. Wolfinbarger, Jr., "Captain Charles Deus," *Denver Westerners Monthly Roundup*, vol. 24 (1968), pp. 11-12.

19. Robert W. Frazer, *Forts of the West: Military Forts and Presidios and Posts Commonly Called Forts West of the Mississippi River to 1898* (Norman, 1965), pp. 40, 96, 105.

20. Special Orders No. 12, Feb. 5, 1855.

21. Fauntleroy to Fields, Feb. 9, 1855, Records of the Adjutant General's Office (Fort Union, New Mexico, Letters Received), Record Group No. 94, National Archives, hereafter referred to as Fort Union, Letters Received.

22. Carson's Report, Feb. 28, 1855, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

23. Wolfinbarger, p. 12.

24. Carson's Report, March 1, 1855, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

25. Rafael Chacón, "Campaign Against Utes and Apaches in Southern Colorado, 1855," *Colorado Magazine*, vol. 11 (1934), pp. 108-09.

26. Special Orders No. 12, Feb. 5, 1855; Morris F. Taylor, "Action at Fort Massachusetts: The Indian Campaign of 1855," *Colorado Magazine*, vol. 42 (1965), p. 295. This article discusses Colonel Fauntleroy's main

operations against the Ute and Apache, but gives only a cursory look at Lt. Col. St. Vrain's actions against the Jicarilla.

27. Carter, p. 144, n. 309, and p. 145.
28. Taylor, "Action at Fort Massachusetts," p. 295.
29. Carson's Report, March 31, 1855, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.
30. Taylor, "Action at Fort Massachusetts," p. 295.
31. Carson's Report, April 5, 1855, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.
32. Carter, pp. 145-46; Taylor, "Action at Fort Massachusetts," pp. 297-309.
33. Carson's Report, April 5, 1855, New Mexico Superintendency Letters; *Report of the Secretary of War, 1855*, p. 63.
34. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1855*, p. 64; Whittlesey to Sturgis, May 1, 1855, Records of the Adjutant General's Office (Fort Union, New Mexico, Letters Sent), Record Group No. 94, National Archives, hereafter referred to as Fort Union, Letters Sent; Militia Election Returns and Abstracts of Muster Rolls, Adjutant General's Files, New Mexico State Records Center and Archives, referred to hereafter as Muster Rolls, Adjutant General's Files; Howard Louis Conard, "Uncle Dick" Wootton, *the Pioneer Frontiersman of the Rocky Mountain Region: An Account of the Adventures and Thrilling Experiences of the Most Noted American Hunter, Trapper, Guide, Scout, and Indian Fighter Now Living* (Chicago, 1890), pp. 364-65.
35. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1855*, p. 64; Chacón, p. 111.
36. *Argument of William Craig*, p. 15.
37. Chacón, p. 111.
38. Muster Rolls, Adjutant General's Files; Kavanaugh to Carson, May 1, 1855, Records of the New Mexico Superintendency of Indian Affairs, Roll 1, Microcopy No. T-21, National Archives Microfilm Publications. Copy in Tutt Library, Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colorado, referred to hereafter as Records of the New Mexico Superintendency.
39. Kavanaugh to Carson, May 1, 1855, Records of the New Mexico Superintendency; Whittlesey to Sturgis, May 1, 1855, Fort Union, Letters Sent.
40. Whittlesey to Sturgis, May 1, 1855, Fort Union, Letters Sent.
41. Kavanaugh to Carson, May 1, 1855, Records of the New Mexico Superintendency.
42. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1855*, p. 69.
43. St. Vrain to Craig, June 17, 1855, Fort Union, Letters Received. Captain Deus had replaced John Henry Mink in command on Jan. 29,

1855. Albert H. Pfeiffer was his first lieutenant, and the second lieutenantcy was held by Matías Martínez. Martínez resigned, and while the company was at Trinchera, en route to Fort Massachusetts, Lafayette Head was elected in his place on May 15, 1855. Deus's company of ninety-two men had only two men with Anglo names in its ranks. Muster Rolls, Adjutant General's Files. Deus and Pfeiffer were German immigrants; Deus and Head were veterans of the War with Mexico, both having first come to New Mexico in that connection.

44. If St. Vrain referred to the well-known Hole in the Rock on the Mountain Branch of the Santa Fe Trail, which seems likely, he was a bit imprecise in his description. Hole in the Rock is at the head of Timpas Creek, south of the Apishapa. Perhaps he was speaking only generally in reference to familiar places.

45. St. Vrain to Craig, June 17, 1855, Fort Union, Letters Received.

46. *Ibid.*

47. Wolfinbarger, p. 13; Daniel B. Castello, "Life of Captain Deus on the Frontier," MSS XII-5, State Historical Society of Colorado Library. The latter data, written from the Captain's dictation many years later, have some serious errors in chronology.

48. Special Orders No. 64, July 6, 1855.

49. Orders No. 19, Aug. 6, 1855, General Orders of the Department of New Mexico, July 19, 1851-Aug. 8, 1861, Records of the War Department, United States Army Commands, Record Group No. 98, National Archives.

50. Carter, p. 146.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 147; Meriwether to Manypenny, July 31, 1855, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

52. Meriwether to Manypenny, July 31, 1855, New Mexico Superintendency Letters.

53. Meriwether to Manypenny, Sept. 1855, *ibid.* Similar agreements were concluded that summer with the Mimbres Apache, Navajo, and Capote Ute.

54. "Notes and Documents," NMHR, vol. 21 (1946), pp. 261-62, gives excerpts from the treaties.

55. Meriwether, pp. 229-32; Carter, p. 148, n. 320.

56. Memorial to the President, "Notes and Documents," NMHR, vol. 21 (1946), pp. 262-64.

57. Letter from Lorenzo Labadi to Commissioner Manypenny, March 30, 1856, *ibid.*, pp. 264-65.

58. *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1855* (Washington, 1856), p. 192.

59. Carter, p. 147.